CHAPTER - 11
THE SOLDIER’S
CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN INDEPENDENCE
India
was pitched into World War II on 3 September 1939 by a proclamation by the
Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, who consulted neither the Central Legislature nor the
major political parties. Mahatma Gandhi openly expressed his sympathy for
Britain, but the Congress made its support conditional to a promise that India
would be granted dominion status, if not complete independence, after the war
ended. Finding such an assurance not forthcoming, the Congress decided to
resign from the ministries in all provinces. The Muslims were divided on the
issue; while the Muslim League warned the British Government that they would
support them only if they were given justice and fair play, the Muslim Premiers
of Bengal, Punjab and Sind pledged the unconditional support of their
provinces. Soon afterwards, Jinnah made the demand for a separate state for the
Muslims – Pakistan. This was opposed not only by the Congress but by several
prominent Muslims, such as Fazl-ul-Huq and Sir Sikander Hyat Khan.
Unfortunately, the Viceroy did not give Jinnah’s demand serious thought,
choosing to ignore the demand and leave it for some one else to deal with,
after the war. In a letter to Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India,
he wrote, ‘I am not too keen to start talking about a period after which
British rule will have ceased in India. I suspect that the day is very remote
and I feel the least we say about it in all probability the better’. Later, the
well known historian S. Gopal commented on this passage: ‘There could be no
more revealing gloss on all the statements made by British authorities over the
years on their determination to leave India.’ 1
Linlithgow
was not the only British statesman who regarded grant of independence to India
as premature; if anything, Churchill was an even greater imperialist. After the
fall of France in 1940 and of Singapore and Burma in 1941, British fortunes
were at a low ebb. With the Japanese invasion of India becoming a real possibility,
it became important for Britain to garner support from the Indian public. In
January 1942 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a prominent liberal leader, telegraphed the
British Prime Minister, advising him to treat India on par with other units of
the Commonwealth.. General Chiang Kai-Shek, worried that China would be cut off
from western aid if India fell, visited India in February to rally Indian
opinion against the Japanese, at the end of which he reported to Roosevelt and
Churchill that unless the Indian political problem was immediately solved,
Japanese attack on India would be ‘virtually unopposed.’ A few weeks before the
‘Lend Lease’ Bill was signed, Roosevelt sent Averell Harriman to London with
the message: ‘Get out of India, or you may not get what you need now’. Shortly
afterwards, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill that American public opinion just
could not understand why India could not be granted independence immediately. 2
Churchill
decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India with a draft declaration of policy
that was designed to convince the Indian people of Britain’s sincere resolve to
grant them independence as soon as the war was over. During the war, the
present set up would continue, with Britain retaining control for the direction
of the war. The declaration was more than what had been offered earlier, and
both the Congress and the Muslim league were inclined to accept it. However,
Mahatma Gandhi opposed it, since it provided for the provinces and the rulers
of princely states, as distinct from the people of these states, the authority
to refuse accession, which could result in vivisection of the country. During
discussions, it emerged that the proposed Executive Council that was to consist
entirely of Indians, except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, would
have very little say in defence matters. As a result, the declaration was
rejected by both the Congress and the Muslim League. Commenting on the episode,
Penderel Moon writes:
The mission had failed, as Linlithgow, Churchill and
Amery had expected and may well have hoped. Churchill indeed did not attempt to
conceal his pleasure at the outcome. In a consoling telegram to Cripps he said
that the effect throughout Britain and the United States had been ‘wholly
beneficial’. As a public relations exercise designed to appease American and
left-wing British opinion, it was certainly a success. A serious attempt to
meet Indian political aspirations had been made, and this was really no less
important than that it should succeed – indeed its success should be fraught
with positive disadvantages. Congress leaders as members of the executive
Council were likely to be more of an embarrassment than a help in the
prosecution of the war, and endless wranglings between them and the League
members were more probable than a gradual drawing together in the execution of
a common task.3
After
the failure of the Cripps Mission, the British made no serious attempt to end
the deadlock until the war ended. The intervening years saw many political
changes, one of the notable ones being the ‘Quit India’ resolution of 1942,
after which almost all Congress leaders were imprisoned and Jinnah gradually
emerged as the undisputed leader of the Muslims. There was no apparent change
in the British attitude to Indian independence, Linlithgow continuing to hold
the view that British rule in India would continue for a long time. ‘For many
years to come’, he told L.C.M.S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, ‘our
position in India will be the dominating position’. In the same vein he told
William Phillips, an emissary of President Roosevelt, ‘there could be no
question of our handing over here for very many years’. 4
In
October 1943 Linlithgow was replaced as Viceroy by Field Marshal Wavell, the
post of Commander-in-Chief in India being taken by General Sir Claude
Auchinleck, who returned to his old job from the Middle East. Unlike his
predecessor, Wavell did not wish to wait for the war to end before finding a
solution to the Indian problem. Even before he took up his new appointment, he
submitted to London a memorandum recommending the formation of a coalition
government in India drawn from all political parties. His proposal was shot
down by the archtype imperialist, Prime Minister Winston Churchill. After
attending a meeting in which his proposal was discussed, Wavell was convinced
that the Cabinet was ‘not honest in its expressed desire to make progress in
India’. Not surprisingly, Wavell waited for a year before making any fresh
political move in India. During this period, his proposals for appointment of
Indians in important positions or upgrading their status were vetoed by London.
In September 1944 he sent to The Secretary of State a proposal for a
transitional government working within the existing constitution but
representative of all political parties. Wavell offered to come to London
personally to explain his proposals.
After
procrastinating for six months, the Government asked Wavell to come to London,
only after a veiled threat to resign if there was any further delay. The next two months were spent in futile
discussions with various members of the Cabinet. Churchill’s obduracy prevented
any worthwhile result until the end of the war in Europe, after which the
Coalition was dissolved and a caretaker Conservative Government took office.
Churchill suddenly dropped his objections; he subsequently revealed that he had
been assured that the move was bound to fail. After he returned to India Wavell
invited Gandhi, Jinnah and 20 other political leaders for a conference at
Simla, where he placed his proposals before them. Churchill had been right; the
conference failed, thanks to Jinnah’s intransigence. However, Gandhi, Azad and
several others were impressed by Wavell’s sincerity. They felt that he had
opened new possibilities of Indo British friendship. 5
The
Second World War came to an end with the capitulation of Japan after the
dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. This coincided with the victory of the Labour
party in the general elections in Britain. With Churchill’s removal from the
scene, the Indian problem began to receive serious attention. Wavell’s
suggestions to hold elections for the central and provincial assemblies, lift
the ban on Congress organisations and release political prisoners were approved
and he was asked to come to London for consultations. Sir Penderel Moon gives
an interesting hypothesis as to the reasons for the change in Britain’s outlook
after the war, which explains the central role of the Indian army in bringing
about the end of British rule in India. He writes:
Even before the war British rule over India had become
an anachronism, and two of the reasons that had then deterred the British from
relaxing their grip had now, as result of the war, lost all validity. One of
these was the fear that an independent Indian Government might repudiate all India’s
foreign debt, most of which was held in England; but by the end of the
war this had all been liquidated and
Great Britain had become the debtor, owing India over 1,000 million pounds. The
second and less selfish reason was that in the pre-war years there were not
nearly enough trained Indian military officers to take over the Indian army and
provide for India’s defence; but now there were over 15,000 trained Indian
officers, and though only two or three had reached the rank of brigadier there
was a sufficient number of them capable of filling the higher posts except in
the technical arms, and plenty of regimental officers. 6
Towards
the end of 1945 Wavell was confronted with a new problem - the trials of three
officers of the Indian National Army in the Red Fort at Delhi. During the war
people in India and the political parties had virtually ignored the Indian
National Army, which had been raised from captured Indian prisoners of war with
the help of Japanese. After the surrender fall of Rangoon, Subhas Chandra Bose
fled to Bangkok – he died in an air crash shortly afterwards – leaving behind
the bulk of the officers and men of the Indian National Army who became
prisoners. It was decided to segregate them into three groups – white, grey and
black – depending on the extent of their involvement. The majority, who fell in
the first two categories, were either reinstated or discharged, but those who were
accused of serious atrocities were to be tried by court martial. The initial
trials were held in Simla and did not attract much notice. About 20 such men
were found guilty and executed at Attock before it was decided to shift the
trials to Delhi. 7
The
decision to carry out the trials in the Red Fort at Delhi was unwise, as
Auchinleck was to lament on several occasions. It gave the Congress a
heaven-sent opportunity to arouse popular feeling against the British. The
Muslim League also expressed their support for the prisoners, and the Viceroy
and Commander-in-Chief were in a dilemma. The three officers were found guilty
of waging war against the King, and sentenced to be cashiered and transported
for life. The sentences caused great resentment and Auchinleck was forced
commute the sentences of transportation.
This had a serious impact, since it divided the Indian Army, where there
were many who agreed with the decision while others felt that it amounted to
condoning treason, considered the most heinous of military crimes. For the first time in its long history,
there were fissures in the Indian Army, which were to have serious consequences
in the coming months.
The
year 1946 opened with serious cases of disaffection in all three armed
services, which have been described in earlier chapters. In the last week of
March the Cabinet Mission, comprising Sir Stafford Cripps, the President of the
Board of Trade; Mr. A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty; and Lord
Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State, arrived in Delhi, with the task of
reaching an agreement with the principal political parties on two issues: one,
the method of framing a constitution for a self-governing, independent India
and two, the setting up of a new Executive Council of Interim Government that
would hold office while the constitution was being drafted. The Viceroy was
fully involved in the deliberation of the Cabinet Mission, but the problem of
the disaffection in the armed services caused him not a little anxiety. In a
dispatch addressed to King George VI on 22 March 1946, he wrote:
The last three months have been
anxious and depressing. They have been marked by continuous and unbridled abuse
of the Government, of the British, of officials and police, in political
speeches, in practically the whole of the Press, and in the Assembly; by
serious rioting in Bombay; by a mutiny in the RIN, much indiscipline in the
RIAF; some unrest in the Army; by an unprecedented drought and famine
conditions over many parts of India; by threatened strikes on the Railways, and
in the Posts and Telegraphs; by a general sense of insecurity and lawlessness.
…….
The
most disturbing feature of all is that unrest is beginning to appear in some
units of the Indian Army; so far almost entirely in the technical arms.
Auchinleck thinks that the great mass of the Indian Army is still sound, and I
believe that this is so. It may not take long, however, to shake their
steadiness if the Congress and Muslim League determine to use the whole power
of propaganda at their command to do so. 8
On
27 March 1946 Sir J.A. Thorne, the Home Member of the Viceroy’s Council, was
asked to prepare a brief appreciation of
what would happen if the Cabinet Mission does not achieve a settlement. One of
the important points covered was the staunchness
of the Indian Services if called upon to quell civil disturbances. According to
Thorne’s appreciation, which he submitted on 5 April, the loyalty of the
Services could no longer be taken for granted. In the 1942 disturbances
the Services were nearly 100 percent staunch, but this would not be so on a
future occasion. If faced with the prospect of firing on mobs, not all units
could be relied upon. As regards the behaviour that could be expected of troops
generally under these circumstances, there would be a lot of disaffection, and
downright mutiny, especially in the RIAF, RIN and Signals units. Thorne suggested that an appreciation on
these aspects be prepared by the War Department. 9
The Commander-in-Chief directed the
Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier B.P.T. O’Brien, to assess the
present state morale and degree of reliability of the three Indian fighting
services, with special reference to the Indian Commissioned Officers, from the
point of view of their capacity to under three conditions – in aid of civil
power in widespread communal or ant-present-Government disturbances; in
operations on the Frontier; and as garrisons over seas. The Director of Military Intelligence
submitted the Note to the Commander-in-Chief on 25 April, who expressed his
general agreement with its contents. Extracts from the Note are given below: 10
........We
consider that the Indian Services could not remain in being in the face of
communal trouble started by, or turned into, a Jehad; neither can we suggest
any action which might increase the likelihood of them starting firm under
these circumstances.
We consider that the very great bulk of Indian Armoured Corps,
Gunners, Sappers and Infantry, could be relied on to act in communal trouble
not amounting to a Jehad but would advise against bringing other services in
the Army, the R.I.N. or the R.I.A.F. into direct contact with rioters.
….Our
views on the reliability of the Indian Services in widespread Congress inspired
trouble are
(a) The Indian Armoured Corps, Gunners, Sappers and Infantry
can in the main be depended on provided that
their I.C.Os, particularly the senior ones, remain loyal and any waverers among
them are dealt with firmly and immediately…
(b) The Indian Signal Corps cannot at present
be considered reliable….
(c) The Ancillary Services of the Army as a
whole should not be relied on to act
against rioters…
(d) The Royal Indian Navy cannot at present
be regarded as reliable….
(e) The Royal Indian Air Force must be
regarded as doubtful…
….the key to the reliability of the
Services, particularly the Army, is the attitude of the I.C.O. …the morale of
the I.C.O. can be greatly improved by the example and attitude of British
officers…
Auchinleck forwarded Brigadier O’Brien’s
Note to the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, giving copies to Army Commanders
as well as the Chiefs of the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air
Force. As can be imagined, it
caused considerable dismay and alarm in all quarters. Meanwhile, the Cabinet
Mission requested the Viceroy for an appreciation of the situation that was
likely to arise if their proposals fail and for a general policy on India in
that event. In a Top Secret Memorandum dated 30 May 1946, Wavell made some
interesting observations. The Congress, he felt, was determined to grasp all
the power they can as quickly as possible. ‘It is as if a starving prisoner was
suddenly offered unlimited quantities of food…his instinct is to seize it all
at once … also to eat as much and as
quickly as possible, an action which is bound to have ill effects on his
health’. As for Mahatma Gandhi, he was ‘a pure political opportunist, and an
extremely skilful one, whose guiding principle is to get rid of the hated
British influence out of India as soon as possible’. Wavell warned that if the
Congress and Muslim League failed to come to terms, serious communal riots may
break out, with very little warning, especially in the Punjab and the ‘Mutiny
Provinces’ of UP and Bihar. Prompt action would be required to deal with the
trouble, with very little time for consultations with London. He suggested that their actions should be
based on certain definite principles, the first being to give India self-government
as quickly as possible without disorder and chaos breaking out. It was
important that Britain should avoid a situation in which she had to withdraw
from India under circumstance of ignominy after wide spread riots and attacks
on Europeans, or adopt a course that could be treated as a policy of ‘scuttle’
or gave the appearance of weakness.
While deciding the short term policy, the long-term strategic interests
of Britain should be safeguarded. In the
event of serious trouble, there was a military plan, which provided for holding
on to the principal ports – Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi – and to Delhi.
Subsequently, British troops would be transferred from Southern India to the
North. Stressing the need to avoid at all cost being embroiled with both Hindus
and Muslims, he suggested a ‘worst case’ solution – to hand over the Hindu
Provinces to the Congress and withdraw to the Muslim Provinces the North-West
and North-East. 11
Three
days later, the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy sent a ‘Most Immediate’
telegram to the Prime Minister, stressing the urgent need for the British
Government to announce a clear policy in the event of the negotiations between
the Cabinet Mission and the political parties breaking down. They expected the
crisis to be reached any time between 5 and 15 June, and the necessity for
urgent decision on the line of action that the Viceroy was to adopt. The first
point to be decided was whether they should attempt to repress a mass movement
sponsored by the Congress and maintain the existing form of government. This was
possible only if the Indian Army remained loyal, which was doubtful. It would
also cause much bloodshed and achieve nothing, unless it was intended to stay
on in India for another 10 to 20 years. At the other extreme was the decision
to withdraw from the whole of India as soon as the Congress gave a call for a
mass uprising. This would have an adverse impact on British prestige throughout
Commonwealth. After considering several options, the Cabinet Mission opined
that if negotiations did in fact break down and they were faced with serious
internal disorders, the situation would have to be met by adopting one of five
courses. These were (1) complete withdrawal from India as soon as possible; (2)
withdrawal by a certain date; (3) an appeal to the United Nations
Organisation; (4) maintaining overall
control throughout India; and (5) giving independence to Southern and Central
India, and maintaining the existing position in North-West and North-East
India. 12
The
appreciations of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission reached London while the
latter were still carrying out their negotiations in Delhi and Simla. They were
considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which asked the Chiefs of
Staff to examine the military implications of the five courses of action listed
by the Cabinet Mission, keeping in mind the short-term policy and the long-term
strategic interests listed by the Viceroy. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff,
which was prepared without consulting General Headquarters India due to the
short time available, figure in the Defence Committee Paper D.O. (46) 68 dated
12 June 1946, entitled ‘India – Military Implications of Proposed Courses of
Action’. It is a remarkable document,
which reveals the difference in the mind sets of ‘imperialists’ in London and
the ‘liberals’ in Delhi. It also casts doubts on the intentions of the British
Government, regarding granting independence to India.
Right at the beginning, the Chiefs
of Staff – Alanbrooke, Cunningham and Tedder – spelt out the strategic requirements
of Britain in India in any future war. It was emphasised that Britain should
have recourse to India’s industrial and manpower potential, and should be able
to use her territory for operational and administrative bases, and air staging
posts. It was therefore important that India should be secure from external
aggression and internal disorder. For defence purposes, it was essential that
she should remain a single unit. These were surprising assertions, considering
that even at that moment, the Cabinet Mission was in Delhi, discussing with
Indian leaders the form of self governance that was to be introduced. It was
also inconsistent with the Viceroy’s stated views about giving India self-government as
quickly as possible.
Before
proceeding to examine the military implications of the courses proposed by the
Cabinet Mission, the Chiefs of Staff eliminated the first three. The first and second courses that envisaged a
complete withdrawal, with or without a time limit, were ruled out since they
did not safeguard Britain’s strategic interests. The third course of appealing
to the United Nations had the disadvantage of freezing military action while
the case was being debated, and was therefore unacceptable. That left only two
courses viz. maintaining control throughout India and a withdrawal in phases,
which they proceeded to examine. The
most important factor in retaining hold over the whole country was the ability
to maintain law and order, which depended largely on the loyalty of the Indian
armed forces. The conclusions on this crucial aspect were in line with those of
General Headquarters India. ‘ ….we consider that the reliability of the Indian
Army as a whole, including those in garrisons outside India is open to serious
doubt. This applies even to Gurkha units….The Royal Indian Navy and the Royal
Indian Air Force cannot be regarded as reliable’.
An
important part of the Report deals with the reinforcements required to deal
with internal disorders, based on estimates given by the Commander-in-Chief,
India. In case the Indian Armed Forces remained loyal, it was estimated that in
addition to the existing British forces then in India, reinforcements of three
brigade groups and five air transport squadrons would be required. In the event
of Indian troops becoming disaffected, the existing British forces and
reinforcements mentioned earlier would be employed to hold key areas. To
restore the situation in case of widespread disorder, additional reinforcements
`required would be between four and five British divisions, for which
considerable administrative backing would also be needed. The Indian formations
serving overseas would also have to be replaced by British formations. The
requirement of reinforcements outside India was visualized as six brigades in
Burma and Malaya; two brigades in Hong Kong and Japan; two battalions in the
Dodecanese and three battalions in Iraq. The total British reinforcements thus
came to five divisions for India; six brigades for Burma and Malaya and three
battalions for Iraq.
The
Report examined the availability of reinforcements and implications of
providing them. There was at that time one British division in the Middle East;
two in Greece; one in Italy and one division and seven brigades in Germany.
Apart from the fact that pulling them out from these theatres would have
serious security implications, it would need at least four months to move all
the troops, equipment and vehicles to India, and that too at the expense of
merchant shipping and vessels then engaged in carrying personnel home under
demobilisation and repatriation programmes. The implications of maintaining the
existing units in India up to their present strength would make it necessary to
stop release in the formations concerned. In the interest of equality of
treatment, it may become necessary to suspend release throughout the army and
the other services. These would have a serious effect on morale as well as
political repercussions. .
The
last course proposed by the Cabinet Mission was granting independence to
Hindustan and withdrawing to Pakistan, comprising North-Western and
North-Eastern India. This had several
political and military implications, the most important being the division of
India, which would preclude the establishment of a central authority to deal
with defence, and in turn prejudice the future security of India against
external attack. The armed forces would have to be reorganized and while India
would have a strong army immediately, it would take many years for Pakistan to
form an effective army of her own, making her susceptible to raids from the
tribes on the North West Frontier. There
would be communal riots in the Punjab due to the large Hindu population in the
area under British control in Pakistan. In Hindustan, the Muslims may be
ill-treated. In the worst case, there may even be civil war, leading to British
troops being involved in fighting with Hindustan and controlling communal
strife in parts of Pakistan which have Hindu minorities. The Report concluded
that withdrawal into Pakistan would not safeguard British strategic interests,
could lead to civil wars and in the event that Congress opposed it, even lead
to war. Hence, this option was completely unacceptable on military grounds.
The
Report ended with the conclusions, which stated:
….A policy of remaining in India and firmly
accepting responsibility for law and order would result, if the Indian Army
remained loyal, in an acceptable
military commitment and would safeguard our long term strategic interests….If
however, the Indian Armed Forces did not remain loyal… we would be faced with
the necessity of providing five British divisions for India, with the
consequent abandonment of commitments in other areas hitherto regarded as
inescapable, serious effects on our import and export programmes and world-wide
repercussions on the release scheme. The only alternative to this would be
ignominious withdrawal from the hole of India. 13
The
Report by the Chiefs of Staff is an important document that brings to light
several important points connected with India’s independence. It clearly brings
out the fact that the British Government was seriously considering the option
of creating Pakistan in June 1946, not because of the lack of agreement with
the political parties – this was still being negotiated by the Cabinet Mission
– but due to the threat of disaffection in the Indian armed forces. This option
was ruled out only because it did not serve British strategic interests. The
disparity in the outlook of British officials in London and Delhi is also
clearly visible; for the former, Britain’s long term strategic interest
dictated continuation of British rule, while those closer to the scene of
action, such as Wavell and Auchinleck, realized that it was time to go. Had the
Indian armed forces remained loyal or there had been enough British divisions
to keep them in check, the British would never had left India.
Early
in September 1946 the Viceroy forwarded to London a plan for phased withdrawal
from India, which was a revised version of the Breakdown Plan of the Cabinet
Mission. This had and rejected by the British Government as it did not help
British strategic interests. Wavell could see that the situation was steadily
deteriorating, and unless a clear policy was announced, India could slide into
anarchy. After consulting the Governors and the Commander-in-Chief, he
estimated that the British could hold on for not more than 18 months. The
Secretary of State, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, did not agree with Wavell’s
appreciation. He felt that it was still possible to hold on to India, and
proposed further European recruitment to augment British troops in India. By
this time, serious communal riots had broken out in East Bengal and in the
Punjab, resulting in sizeable casualties among Hindus as well as Muslims. A new
Interim Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru had been installed at Delhi, with
Sardar Baldev Singh as the defence member. In a letter dated 12 September to
Auchineleck, who had recently been appointed a Field Marshal, Nehru discussed
the withdrawal of British forces from India; pulling out Indian troops from the
Netherlands East Indies and Iraq; and
the future of the Indian Army. In a broadcast to the Armed Forces on 9 October
Baldev Singh announced the setting up of a committee to accelerate the pace of
nationalization. In view of these
developments, Pethick-Lawrence’s proposal to raise additional European troops
for India appeared surreal.
Refusing
to take no for an answer, Wavell sent a strongly worded note to the Secretary
of State on 23 October, in which he reiterated his demand for a firm
declaration of the policy of the British Government. His plan, he wrote, was
based on two main assumptions: (1) the object was to transfer power to India
without undue delay and with the minimum of disorder and bloodshed; to secure
the interests of the Minorities and to provide for the safety of the 90,000
Europeans in India; (2) the power of the British Government in India was
weakening daily, and could not be sustained beyond 18 months. Using exceptionally strong language, Wavell
made it clear that as the man on the spot, it was his responsibility to advise
the Government of the action to be taken to achieve these objects. ‘If the
H.M.G. consider that my advice shows lack of balance and judgment, or that I
have lost my nerve, it is of course their duty to inform me of this and to
replace me’, he wrote. ‘But they take a very grave responsibility upon
themselves if they simply neglect my advice’. Wavell ended by emphasizing that
they ‘must have an emergency plan in readiness; and if it is agreed that we
cannot hope to control events for longer than 18 months from now, we shall have
to make up our minds and make a definite pronouncement at least in the first half of 1947. While I agree that we should
not leave India till we have exhausted every possible means of securing a
constitutional settlement, we can make no contribution to a settlement once we
have lost all power of control’. 14
In December 1946 the British
Government invited Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan to London
for discussions, along with the Viceroy. During his visit, Wavell again pressed
for adoption of the Breakdown Plan, urging the Government to announce that they
would withdraw all control from India by March 1948. Some Cabinet Ministers
such as Bevin and Alexander, who were imperialists at heart, balked at the
prospect of a stark announcement of the ending of the British Raj. Prime
Minister Attlee also felt strongly that the British should not relinquish
control until at least a constitutional settlement had been reached. Since the
chances of reaching an amicable settlement appeared dismal, Attlee’s views
seemed illusory. After a series of meetings the India and Burma Committee
decided to recommend that 31 March 1948 should be announced as the date by
which the British would hand over power in India. Wavell pressed for a firm
announcement in this regard by the British Government. Attlee replied to Wavell
on 21 December 1946, giving the impression that his proposal had been by and
large accepted. Three days earlier, Attlee had offered Mountbatten the post of
Viceroy in replacement of Wavell. 15
Moutnbatten reached India on 22
March 1947. Before he left London, he had been told that India would be granted
independence by June 1948, i.e. after 15
months; this was exactly what Wavell had been demanding for the last two years.
On 23 May 1947 the British Cabinet approved, in principle, a draft Partition
Plan, which was to be implemented in case of a failure to secure a final
compromise. After consulting Indian political leaders, Mountbatten announced on
3 June 1947 that India would become independent on 15 August 1947. A few days
later Mountbatten received the draft Indian Independence Bill, and was surprised
to find that the British Government intended to retain the Andaman Islands,
which were not be regarded as a part of British India. It transpired that
Britain was planning to make the Andamans a British Settlement. The
recommendation to retain the islands had come from the British Chiefs of Staff,
due to their strategic location in the Bay of Bengal, covering the sea routes
to the East. Mountbatten strongly opposed the plan, informing London that any
attempt ‘to claim the Andaman Islands as colonies, to be treated in the same
way as Aden, will cause an absolute flare-up throughout the length and breadth
of India.’ In view of Mountbatten’s strong opposition, the British Government
decided to drop the proposal. 16
The
crucial role of the Indian Armed Forces, especially the Indian Army, in the
British decision to quit India has been commented on by several writers and
historians. Captain Shahid Hamid, who
was the Private Secretary to General Auchinleck, made the following entry in
his diary on 30 March 1946: ‘Today the Hindustan Times commented
editorially on the Auk’s appeal to the Indian Army. “There is no doubt whatever
that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought about, the foreign rulers
of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian Army…”17
The
well known historian, Dr. Tara Chand, has written: ‘The most controversial
measure of the Viceroy was the decision to advance the date of transfer of
power from June 1948 to August 15, 1947. On this issue Mountbatten recorded his
reasons in his conclusions appended to the Report on the Last Viceroyalty
submitted to His Majesty’s Government in September 1948. His defence for
expediting the transference of power to the Indians was on these lines… “Secondly, the ultimate sanction of law and
order, namely, the Army, presented difficulties for use as an instrument of
government for maintenance of peace…’18
Mangat
Rai, a colleague of Penderel Moon in the Indian Civil Service before Independence, wrote an appreciation of
the latter’s book The British Conquest
and Dominion of India. Commenting on the role of the Indian Army he writes:
How far were the competence and size
of the Indian army factors in persuading the British to contemplate withdrawal
from India, and in the final decision? In general Moon has consistent praise
both for the sepoy regiments of the Company and for the Indian army’s
contribution in two world wars. He notes that at the end of the Second World
War the army comprised two and a half million, in place of the 190,000 at the
start. The army’s record was brilliant marred only by the defection of
comparatively small numbers to the Japanese –promoted INA. With an army of
Indians of this calibre and size, would it have been practical to continue to
govern India under British control? 19
Charles
Raikes, a British Civil servant of the Mutiny days, had bluntly asserted that
the British ‘should legislate and govern India as the superior race’, adding
with some prescience, ‘whenever that superiority ceases, our right to remain in
India terminates also’. This was in line with the view held by most Britons,
who felt that British rule was a blessing for India. By the time World War II
ended, the USA had assumed the mantle of the leader of the developed World, and
her democratic principles of equality began to be embraced by other nations in
the West. From the mutiny onwards, Indians had steadily acquired knowledge and
skills that they had previously lacked, closing the gap between them and the
British. According to Sir Penderel Moon, ‘One noteworthy, but not often
mentioned, example of change was the ending of the superiority of British to
Indian troops, which had been a factor in the Company’s original conquest of
India. By 1943 Indian Divisions, in the opinion of Field Marshal Sir William
Slim, were among the best in the world and divisional commanders on the Burma
front called for Indian rather than British battalions. Thus Charles Raikes, if
he had still been alive, would probably have felt obliged to admit that on his
own premises the time had come for British withdrawal’. 20
It
is interesting to reflect on the course of history if the Indian soldier had
not been affected by nationalistic feelings and continued to serve loyally as
he had during and before World War II. Though the freedom movement had
developed considerable momentum by the time the war ended, the assumption that
it would have achieved independence on its own would be erroneous. With the
vast resources at their disposal, it would not have been difficult for the
British authorities in India to muzzle the movement, as they had done in 1930
and 1942. The only reason for them not being able to resort to such measures
after 1945 was the uncertain dependability of the Army. Had the Indian soldier
remained staunch, or adequate British forces been available, it is most
unlikely that freedom would have come in 1947. If nothing else, it would have
been delayed by 10-15 years. If this had happened, perhaps India would not have
been partitioned, the Kashmir problem would not have existed, and the Indo-Pak
wars of 1948, 1965 and 1972 would not have been fought. Who knows, with its
large size, population and a long spell of peace unfettered by the threat of
war, India would have been a World power, equalling or even surpassing China by
the turn of the century.
END
NOTES
This chapter is largely based on Sir Penderel Moon’s The British Conquest and Dominion of India,
(London, Duckworth, 1989); and Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon’s The
Transfer of Power 1942-47 (London,
1982). Specific references are given below:-
1. Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, (London, Duckworth, 1989). P. 1092, quoting S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru (1975-79), vol. 1, p.
263
2. Lt. Gen
S.L. Menezes, Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993), p. 345,
3. Moon, p.
1109
4. Moon, p.
1122
5. Moon, p.
1136-8
6. Moon, p.
1140
7. Maj Gen D.K. Palit, Major General A.A Rudra – His Service in
Three Armies and Two World wars, (New Delhi, 1997), p.
277
8. Nicholas
Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.)
The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London)
vi, pp. 1233-37.
9. Mansergh and Moon, The
Transfer of Power, vii, p.150.
10. Mansergh and Moon, The
Transfer of Power, vii, pp. 406-7.
11 Mansergh
and Moon, The Transfer of Power,
vii, pp. 731-7.
12 Mansergh
and Moon, The Transfer of Power,
vii, pp. 787-95.
13. Mansergh
and Moon , The Transfer of Power,
vii, pp. 889-900.
14. Mansergh
and Moon, The Transfer of Power,
viii, pp.794-9
15. Moon, pp. 1164-5
16. Mansergh and Moon, The
Transfer of Power, xi, 306
17. Major
General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight,
(London, 1986), p.47
18. Dr Tara
Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India,
19. Moon, pp. 1195
20. Moon, pp. 1187
