CHAPTER – 6
MUTINIES AND REVOLTS DURING WORLD WAR
II
Mutinies
occur in all armies, and the Indian Army during the British Raj was no
exception. However, it has been noticed that during war, cases of mutiny
actually reduce, while those of desertion by individual soldiers increase. There were several mutinies during the two
World Wars, but none so serious as to affect the conduct or performance of the
Army as a whole. During World War I the Ghadr Party planned to create large
scale disturbances in India, inciting Indian troops to revolt against British
rule. Between 7000 and 8000 Ghadrites were sent to India for this purpose.
However, the Ghadrites paid scant heed to secrecy and surprise, resulting in
most of them being caught by British intelligence. The only two mutinies that
occurred during World War I were a minor revolt in the 130th Baluch
Regiment at Rangoon, and a more serious one in the 5th Light
Infantry at Singapore, which has been described in Chapter 5.
The
mutinies during World War II are covered in this chapter. The unique feature
about these mutinies is the fact that all of them involved Sikh troops. During
World War I also, the Sikhs formed the largest complement of the Ghadrites.
However, the Sikhs in the Army remained loyal, and it was the Muslims who
revolted, due to their reluctance to fight the Turks. During World War II, the
Muslims remained loyal, while it was the Sikhs who revolted, mostly due to
political influences and from fear of being sidelined by the Muslims, who were
bent upon getting a separate homeland in the Punjab. The mutinies covered in
this chapter are the RIASC (Royal Indian Service Corps) Mutiny of 1940; the CIH
(Central India Horse) Mutiny of 1940; the Hong Kong
Mutiny of 1941 and the Christmas Island
Mutiny of 1942. Though the Hong Kong mutiny occurred in a Royal Artillery unit,
it has been mentioned briefly because it involved Sikh troops.
Soon after the commencement of World War II the 4th
Indian Division was moved to Egypt. The divisional headquarters was located at
Mena near the Pyramids, with administrative elements including the divisional
RIASC at El Rebiqi, a short distance away. The Commander RIASC was Lieutenant
Colonel J.J. O’ Brien, with the Ammunition, Supply and MT Companies being
commanded by Majors T.N. Shelton, F. Oliffe and E.C.T Mitchley respectively.
Towards the end of January 1940 it was discovered that a
large number of RIASC personnel were disaffected and were resorting to ‘go
slow’ tactics while performing their duties. Out of over 300 such men who were
classified as ‘passive resisters’, 92 were tried summarily by Major Mitchley on
1 February 1940 and awarded rigorous imprisonment ranging from 14 to 28 days.
The same day 64 Sikhs refused to go on parade, which included almost all the
Sikhs in the Ammunition Company (37 out of 39). The men refused to load stores,
saying that they were not ‘coolies’. The matter was reported to the Commander
RIASC who conveyed to the company commanders information received from the CID
that certain subversive influences had been reported in the unit. He ordered
that no action was to be taken immediately but the men should be watched
carefully. At a parade held next morning the number of Sikhs who refused to
fall in fell from 64 to 51.
Colonel O’ Brien reported the matter to the divisional
headquarters, recommending that the men who had refused to load stores should
be tried by court martial, with rest being dealt with summarily in the unit. On
3 February some additional information regarding subversive influences was
received from the CID. During the next two days the remaining ‘passive
resisters’ were summarily tried and a few of those who were politically
motivated sent away to other locations. A Summary General Court Martial held
from 16 to 22 February tried 36 men for refusing to load stores. All of them
were found guilty and sentenced to seven years transportation. Subsequently,
the sentences of two were commuted to five years rigorous imprisonment.
In order to weed out the Sikhs who were still
disaffected, tests were carried out over the next few days, by ordering the men
to load, in batches. In addition to the 36 who had been court martialled
earlier, 19 men who continued to refuse were tried and sentenced to one year
rigorous imprisonment. Another 29 who had earlier refused to go on parade were
released from service, along with 15 who were considered undesirable. Based on
the recommendation of the Commander RIASC, divisional headquarters issued
orders that the term ‘loader’ would not be used henceforth, the men in question
being called spare drivers.1
The Central India
Horse had moved from Jhansi to Bolarum, near Secunderabad in November 1939,
shortly after World War II started. Before moving, the regiment had been
‘mechanised’, handing over its horses to the relieving unit, Hodson’s Horse.
After its arrival at Bolarum the regiment got busy with its new role, and spent
most of its time getting used to its new mounts; the ‘A’ vehicles were 15-cwt.
(cwt. is the abbreviation for hundredweight, which equals 112 pounds) Ford
trucks and ‘B’ vehicles comprised 30-cwt. Chevrolet lorries. In June the
Second-in-Command, Major J.G. Pocock was promoted and assumed command of the
regiment, after the departure of Lieutenant Colonel D. St. V. Gordon, who was
sick. Major R. George now became the Second-in-Command. The three squadrons of the regiment - A, B
and C - comprised Muslims, Sikhs and Jats respectively.
In early July 1940 the
regiment received mobilization orders. Entraining on 14 July, the unit reached
Alexandra Docks in Bombay on the morning of 16 July. The ship on which they
were to sail had still not arrived, and was expected only in the afternoon. The
regiment was asked to stay in the train until embarkation which was scheduled
for 18 July. It rained continuously throughout the day and the men had to stay
in their carriages. On the morning of 17 July Risaldar Kartar Singh of ‘B’
Squadron reported to the Squadron Leader that four men in the squadron were
spreading propaganda amongst the other Sikhs. The Squadron Leader decided to
isolate the men unobtrusively and detailed them for a guard on board the ship.
However, the men refused to fall in for the guard. Soon afterwards, the
majority of the men in ‘B’Squadron came out of the train and announced that
they would not embark. The mutiny in the Sikh squadron of the Central India
Horse had begun.
The matter was
immediately reported to the Commanding Officer, who subsequently informed the
higher authorities. For several hours, the Indian and British officers of the regiment
tried to persuade the men to change their minds. Subsequently the Area
Commander and the District Commander also addressed the men, but they remained
adamant. Finally each man was ordered individually by name to embark.
Altogether 108 Sikhs, or nearly two thirds of all the Sikhs in the regiment,
refused to obey the order and were placed under arrest. By the evening of 17
July the arrested men had been removed and the rest of the regiment, including
over 60 Sikhs, mostly from the Headquarters Squadron which was not affected,
prepared to embark the next day. But on the morning of 18 July orders were
received that none of the Sikhs would embark. The Sikh squadron was replaced by
a Dogra squadron and it was therefore decided to replace the Sikhs in the Headquarters
squadron also by Dogras. The regiment sailed on 18 July, without any Sikhs on
board. The 108 Sikh mutineers were court martialled. Four were executed, 100
transported and four were imprisoned.
The mutiny in the
Central India Horse was sudden and took everyone by surprise. The men who
refused to embark stated that they had no grievance against their officers,
conditions of service or the government – their objection was only to serve
abroad. The Sikh officers of the unit were sure that the mutiny was
unpremeditated and would not have occurred if the men had not had to spend over
24 hours sitting in the train. It was during this period that the ringleaders
were able to convince them that if they embarked they would never see their
wives and children again. It was subsequently ascertained that during the
previous summer the chief ringleader had joined a revolutionary society in
Meerut whose aim was to cause maximum inconvenience to the British. This man
later perverted three others to join him as ringleaders. 2
Khushwant Singh, in his seminal work, History of the Sikhs, has discussed the reasons for the
disaffection among Sikhs in the Army. He writes:
Communists, who had
acquired influence in the central districts (of the Punjab) adhered to the party
line regarding the war in Europe as Imperialist: their agents busied themselves
disseminating anti-war propaganda among Sikh soldiers. The Alkalis, who
mattered more than all the other parties put together, were the most confused.
Their leaders, most of whom had served long terms of imprisonment during the
gurdwara agitation had little love for the British. They were equally hostile
to the Muslim Leaguers and to the pro-British Unionists. But they wished to
preserve the numerical strength of the Sikhs in the armed services so that when
the day of reckoning came, the Khalsa would have an army of its own. The Akali
Party agreed to help the government and pressed for more Sikh recruitment; at
the same time…the unenthusiastic support of the Alkalis and the antagonism of
the Communists during the ‘imperialist’ phase of the war was reflected in the
reluctance of the Sikh peasants to enlist and disaffection in some regiments.’3
Chevenix-Trench, an Indian Cavalry officer though of a
different regiment, felt that ‘the Sikhs had been “got at’ by persons warning
them of a nefarious British plot to have them exterminated so that the Punjab
would be ruled by Moslems.’ 4
The British authorities had been aware of the activities
of Sikh religious movements since long. In his book Handbooks for the Indian Army – Sikhs published in 1928, Major
(later Brigadier) A.E. Barstow had cautioned:
… the “Kirti” movement recently organized by Sikh
agitators in the Doaba tract should be carefully watched and Jat Sikhs who
supply recruits to for the Army should be warned in time to beware of the
pitfalls. The “Kirti” movement is a part of a conspiracy against the State
which has been conducted since 1923 when the Akali agitation and Jatha
activities were most intense by a number of disaffected Sikhs in India sent in
certain foreign countries. Their proposals included the formation of secret
societies for revolutionary work under cover of religious or communal
organisations…… A sum of Rs. 10,000 was received from the Kabul party with the
object of setting up a press and in February the first issue of the publication
appeared. In its contents it was explicit in the expression of its
revolutionary aims, and has persistently advocated the cause and ideals of the
Indian Ghadrites of 1914 and 1915 and has persistently glorified the Babbar
Akalis as martyrs and heroes. The activities of the members have been
potentially dangerous rather than actually dangerous and they have openly
preached communistic doctrines. The Punjab “Kirti” party has become formally
affiliated to the Communist party, but their capacity for danger is at present
restricted by the limitation of the leaders of the moment. The organisation is
however. undoubtedly a real danger. Given a genuine agrarian grievance, it
could do great harm.5
Unfortunately, the warning contained in Barstow’s book
was not taken seriously by the British authorities. This appears strange, since
Barstow’s assessment was part of an official publication, which was used as a
reference book by officers posted to units having Sikh troops. Barstow had
served with Sikhs for many years, and his views must certainly have been seen
and approved by senior officers before being cleared for publication.
The 12th
Heavy Regiment of Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery was stationed in Hong
Kong. Though it was a British unit, it had a large number of Sikhs, who had
been enrolled in the garrison artillery since the previous century. The
political influences that had caused the mutinies in the RIASC in Egypt and the
Central India Horse at Bombay had also affected the Sikhs at Hong Kong.
However, the trigger for the mutiny that occurred in January 1941 was an order
making it compulsory for all troops to wear helmets. The Sikhs objected to the
order that went against their religious beliefs, which mandated the wearing of
a turban. However, the authorities did not listen, on the plea that the order
was applicable for the entire garrison. A similar order had been issued in
France during World War I, but had been rescinded after the extent of
resentment among Sikh troops became clear. Finding their pleas being ignored,
the Sikhs mutinied. After the mutiny had been subdued, 84 Sikhs were court
martialled and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. 6
The
Christmas Island is located about 400 kilometers south of the western extremity
of Java in the Indian Ocean. In March 1942, a detachment of Sikhs of the 7th
Coast Guard Regiment, Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery was stationed on
the island. The strength of the detachment was one Viceroy’s Commissioned
Officer, four British Non Commissioned Officers and 27 Indian Other Ranks. The
detachment commander was Captain Williams, Royal Artillery. The settlement was
administered by the District Officer, Mr. Cromwell, who had a small complement
of Sikh policemen to assist him. Due to the wartime conditions, Captain
Williams was in overall control.
At
about 6 a.m. on 7 March 1942, the island was shelled by a Japanese Naval Force.
The crew of the 6-inch gun left their posts and went into the jungle. Realising
that resistance was useless, Williams ordered the white flag to be hoisted. He
also ordered the gun to be dismantled and the weapons of the detachment to be
withdrawn, except his own pistol and that of his Subedar. However, the Japanese
did not land. After waiting for three days, Williams ordered the Union Jack to
be re-hoisted, hoping to attract an Allied ship that could rescue them. The gun
was reassembled but the men’s arms remained locked up. This caused some resentment
among the Sikh gunners and the policemen.
On 10 March about ten
men broke open the stores and armed themselves with rifles. The mutineers
placed two Lewis guns facing the quarters of the British Other Ranks. Captain
Williams and the four British Non Commissioned Officers were killed and their
bodies thrown in the sea. Next morning, the District Officer, who had heard the
shots, went to the Fort to investigate. He found that the Sikh policemen had
joined the mutineers, who were all armed with rifles. A few days later, the Japanese landed on the
island and learned of the murder of the British personnel. Asking the
detachment to fall in, the Japanese asked: ‘Who are the brave fellows who have
killed the British?’ Nine men stepped
forward.
After
the surrender of Japan, seven Indian gunners were rounded up in the Netherlands
East Indies. They were tried by a General Court Martial in Singapore in
December 1946. After a trial lasting three months, one was acquitted, one
awarded two years rigorous imprisonment and five sentenced to death. After
Independence, based on representations from the Governments of India and
Pakistan, the King commuted the death sentences to penal servitude for life.7
The British authorities were bewildered by the mutinies
among the Sikhs, who had performed so magnificently during World War I. Not
willing to take further risks, they imposed a temporary ban on the enrolment of
Sikhs. Acting on a suggestion of the
Secretary of the Defence Ministry, Sir Charles O’Gilvy, the government set up
an enquiry commission to go into the causes of the disaffection among the
Sikhs. It consisted of officers well acquainted with the Sikhs; Brigadier
General A.E Barstow (Chairman); Major A.J.M. Kilroy, 36th Sikhs;
Major A.E. Farwell, Ludhiana Sikhs; Major ‘Billy’ Short, 47th Sikhs
and Captain Niranjan Singh Gill, who later joined the Indian National Army.
Members of the commission individually toured Sikh districts and discussed the
difficulties of soldiers with retired officers. They also held meetings with
political leaders.8
The commission found evidence of ‘Kirti’ and Communist
infiltration, and a sense of uneasiness concerning the Unionist Party
Ministry’s alignment with the Muslim League, which had begun to talk of a
Muslim state in the Punjab. The Sikh grievances were redressed – assurances
were given that Sikh interest would not be sacrificed to appease the Muslims,
and Sardar Baldev Singh (the future Defence Minister) was appointed a Minister
in the Unionist Party Ministry. The ban on enrolment of Sikhs was lifted, and a
Khalsa Defence of India League was organized under the chairmanship of the
Maharaja of Patiala, to step up the resumed Sikh recruitment. The Sikh
community quickly realised what a loss it would be if either the British continued
to curtail recruitment, or if Sikh recruits were not forthcoming in response to
the British call. `9
ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 7
This chapter is largely based on Brigadier A. A. Filose’s King
Geroge V’s Own Central India Horse – Volume II of the Regimental History,
(Edinburgh, William Blackwood & Sons, 1950); Khushwant Singh’s History of the
Sikhs (Delhi, OUP, 1991); Major
A.E. Barstow’s Handbooks for the Indian
Army – Sikhs, (Calcutta, Government Press, 1928); Lt. Gen S.L. Menezes’, Fidelity
& Honour, (New Delhi, 1993); and War Diary, HQ 4th Indian
Division RIASC (Ministry of Defence, History Division, New Delhi). Specific references are given below:-
1. War Diary, HQ 4th
Indian Division RIASC, Ministry of
Defence, History Division, (MODHD), New Delhi,
2. Brigadier A. A. Filose, King George V’s Own Central India Horse –
Volume II of the Regimental History, (Edinburgh, William Blackwood &
Sons, 1950), pp.210-3.
3. Khushwant Singh, History of the
Sikhs (Delhi, OUP, 1991) Vol. 2. p. 240.
4. Lt. Gen
S.L. Menezes, Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993), p. 348, quoting C. Chevenix-Trench, The Indian Army and The King’s Enemies -
1900-1947 (London, Hutchinson, 1988), p.137
5. Major
A.E. Barstow, Handbooks for the Indian
Army – Sikhs, (Calcutta, Government Press, 1928), p.55.
6. Menezes,
p.349
7. The
Christmas Island Mutiny, MODHD, New
Delhi.
8. Khushwant Singh, p. 241
9. Menezes,
p.349
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