CHAPTER – 4
THE SINGAPORE MUTINY – 1915
The
mutiny in the 5th Light Infantry at Singapore that took place in
1915 is important for several reasons. It occurred at a time when World War I
was in full swing, and a large number of Indian troops were fighting on various
fronts. Though the nationalist movement in India had take root and was fairly
well developed, its leaders had extended unequivocal support to Britain as soon
as the war broke out. Many factors contributed to the outbreak of the mutiny.
However, none of them appeared serious enough to warrant such a drastic step by
seasoned troops belonging to a regiment that had earned the sobriquet ‘The
Loyal Fifth’ for its past services. In addition to several Europeans, the
mutineers killed their own officers, dealing a serious blow to the almost
sacred theory that Indian troops fought not for the King or their country but
for their regiments and the British officers who led them. This was perhaps the
first mutiny in a regular unit of the Indian Army that was inspired, at least
in part, by a nationalist movement that was not home-grown but had been born in
another country – the Ghadar movement.
The
mutiny caught the British authorities in Singapore by surprise and would have
succeeded, had the mutineers been properly organised and led. Acting on the
spur of the moment, they rose against their superiors without having made a
plan of action. Also, they made no attempt to obtain any help from the civil
population, which included a large number of people of Indian origin. There were almost no forces available in the
island to suppress the mutiny, and it was only with the help of troops of other
nationalities that the authorities were able to regain control. Retribution was
swift and severe. Within a month, two Indian officers and 200 men of the 5th
Light Infantry were tried by court martial. All, except one sepoy, were
convicted. Both the officers and 45
sepoys were sentenced to death, 64 to transportation for life, and the
remainder to terms of imprisonment varying from one to twenty years. Eleven men of the Malay States Guides who had
joined the mutiny were also tried and sentenced to simple imprisonment from 11
months to two years. The executions were
carried out publicly, the guilty men being shot in front of thousands of
Chinese, Malays and Indians outside the Outram Road Prison in Singapore.1
The
Ghadr (Revolution) party came into being in 1913 in San Francisco, taking its
name from the newspaper called Ghadr,
which began to be brought out in November of that year by Lala Hardayal. It
found support among the large number of Indian emigrants then living in Canada
and the USA, who had left their homelands due to famine and unemployment,
especially in the Punjab. The avowed aim of the Ghadr party was to end British
rule in India by fomenting an armed revolution. Just before the outbreak of
World War II, the Komagata Maru incident took place. In April 1914,
Gurdit Singh, an Indian businessman living in Singapore chartered a Japanese
ship, the Komagata Maru, to carry Indian emigrants from Hong Kong to
Canada. When the ship reached Vancouver the Canadian authorities, under British
pressure, did not allow the 376 passengers (24 Muslims, 12 Hindus and 340
Sikhs) to land. After spending two months moored in the harbour, without
supplies and water, the ship began its return journey. Touching Yokohama, Kobe
and Singapore, the Komagata Maru finally arrived at Budge Budge near
Calcutta where the authorities had arranged a special train to carry them to
Punjab. However, the passengers refused to board the train and tried to enter
the city. The Police tried to stop them but was unsuccessful. Finally, troops
had to be called in to subdue the mob and round up the passengers, many of
which had escaped. There was a riot and firing from both sides, resulting in
several casualties. Several members of the Calcutta and Punjab Police were
killed, in addition to some civilians and railway officials. Of the Sikh
rioters, 18 died in the firing by British troops, giving rise to considerable
resentment.2 Though the passengers had not been allowed to land
at Singapore, their plight was known to the Indian residents of the city.
Several Ghadrites, as the members of the Ghadr Party came to be known,
transited through Singapore on their way to India from Canada and the USA,
spreading subversive propaganda among the Indians. These Ghadrites also made
contact with Indian troops, especially the Sikhs of the Malay States Guides and
with the Muslims of the 5th Light Infantry.3
When World War II
began, the British garrison in Singapore comprised two infantry battalions, the
1st Battalion, The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and the 5th
Light Infantry. There was also a mule battery of the Malay States Guides and
some gunners of the Royal Garrison Artillery. The senior British officer in the
station was Brigadier General D.H. Ridout, General Officer Commanding the
Troops in the Straits Settlements. After the sinking of the German raider Emden
in November 1914, the major threat to Singapore from the sea diminished, and it
was decided to send the British battalion to the Western Front, leaving the
Indian battalion as only regular infantry unit in Singapore. The composition of
the 5th Light Infantry was somewhat unusual in that it was composed
entirely of Muslims. It was organised in two wings (four companies in each),
one having Hindustani Mussalmans (Pathans and Baluchis) and the other
comprising ‘Ranghars’ (Muslim Rajputs from East Punjab and Delhi). The strength
of the battalion was about 800. The mule battery of the Malay States Guides was
a predominantly Sikh unit of about 100 men, which was plagued by internal
troubles in the form of a religious divide known as the ‘Majah-Malwa’ conflict,
which necessitated men from the two regions being grouped into separate
companies. The unit had come under a cloud after it refused to serve overseas
in 1914.
The 5th
Light Infantry was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E.V. Martin, with
Major William L. Cotton as the Second-in-Command. The Right Wing (Ranghars)
comprised No. 1 and 2 Double Companies, commanded by Captains Lionel R. Ball
and P. Boyce respectively. The Left Wing (Hindustani Mussalmans), which did not
mutiny, comprised No. 3 and 4 Double Companies, commanded by Lieutenant H.S.
Eliot and Captain William. D. Hall respectively. The senior Indian officer in
the battalion was Subedar Major Khan Mohammad Khan. Lieutenant Colonel
Martin had previously served in the unit
as the Second-in-Command. The then Commanding Officer did not think very highly
of his abilities and had him posted to another unit for three months to earn a
‘special report’, after which he returned as the Commanding Officer, to the
surprise and chagrin of many officers and men. Matters worsened when he
initiated adverse reports on two officers who he felt had been working against
him during the tenure of the previous Commanding Officer. Soon, the unit was
split in two groups, with some of the men seeing the Commanding Officer over
the heads of their wing commanders and officers. Another matter that had split
the battalion into two camps was the squabble over the promotion of a Ranghar
non commissioned officer, Colour Havildar Imtiaz Ali, who was passed over
twice, under the influence of officers from the other wing. The Ranghars were
very bitter about the perceived injustice. 4
Apart from the
political influence of the Ghadr Party, the unit was also affected by
propaganda of German and Turkish agents who preached that it was wrong for
Muslims to fight against Turkey, the seat of the Khalifa (Caliph) of
Islam. A maulvi (Muslim priest) at a mosque near Alexandra Barracks
regularly preached this line to the sepoys of the 5th Light
Infantry. Similar propaganda was disseminated by an Indian merchant, Kasim
Ismail Mansur, who ran a coffee shop that was much frequented by the soldiers.
The battalion often provided guards at the prisoner of war camp where several
sailors from the Emden were interned. The German prisoners convinced the
Indian soldiers that the Kaiser himself was a Muslim and a descendant of the
Prophet. The soldiers began to believe that the Germans were Muslims and
Britain had embarked on a war against Islam.5
The 5th
Light Infantry was under orders to move on 16 February 1915. It was to go to
Hong Kong but this was not conveyed to the men for security reasons. Rumours
that the battalion was going to Mesopotamia to fight against the Turks began to
circulate among the men. At 7 a.m. on 15 February, Brigadier General Ridout
inspected the battalion at Alexandra Barracks. In his farewell address, he
complimented the battalion and referred to their impending departure. His speech in English was translated into
Hindustani by the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Martin. The translation
was not very clear and tended to create some confusion among the men. Their
destination, Hong Kong, was not mentioned in the speech. After the address by
the General Officer Commanding, two sepoys of A Company (Right Half) fell out
to make complaints regarding their applications for discharge, which were
disposed off under his directions. The Right Half was then dismissed and
marched off to their lines. While moving off, some Ranghars shouted in protest
against the Left Wing being detained for the purpose of examination of
havildars for promotion to commissioned grade, which they felt should have gone
to one of their own, Colour Havildar Imtiaz Ali.
After lunching with the officers of the 5th,
General Ridout drove back to his bungalow in Tanglin. By this time the unit’s
heavy baggage and equipment, including machine guns, had already been sent down
to the Nore, the troopship that was to take them to Hong Kong. Small
arms and ammunition was to be moved the next morning. But after the parade,
Lieutenant Colonel Martin changed his mind and ordered the removal of the
ammunition that afternoon. Shortly after 2 p.m., the ammunition was loaded in a
lorry at the regimental magazine under the supervision of Lieutenant Elliot.
The lorry then proceeded to the Quartermaster’s stores where some oil drums
were being loaded. At about 3 p.m. a shot was fired at the ammunition lorry
from the direction of the quarter guard. This was the signal for the
commencement of the mutiny. The fatigue parties vanished, except for a sepoy of
C Company who was later shot in two places and crawled to his barrack room. A
and B Companies turned out en masse, led by Colour Havildar Imtiaz Ali and
Havildar Ibrahim respectively. While A Company attacked and looted the
ammunition lorry, B Company ransacked the magazine that contained 26,600 rounds
of ammunition. They were soon joined by the remainder of the Right Wing i.e. C
and D Companies.
Within a few minutes of the first
shot being fired, Subedar Major Khan
Mohammad Khan rushed to the residence of the Commanding Officer and informed
him that the Right Wing had mutinied and the Left Wing had apparently
dispersed. Colonel Martin immediately warned headquarters at Fort Canning and
telephoned General Ridout. Meanwhile, Major Cotton (Second-in-Command), Captain
Ball (Commander No. 1 Double Company) and Captain Boyce (Commander No. 2 Double
Company) rushed to the Indian Officers’ Quarters, where they met Subedars
Mohammed Yunus and Dunde Khan and Jemadars Chisti Khan, Abdul Ali and Hoshiar
Ali. The British officers wanted to go to their respective double companies but
were restrained by the Indian officers, who told them that their lives would be
endangered, since they could no longer control the men. (It later transpired
that they were in fact the ringleaders who had planned and organized the
uprising). The British officers decided to go to the camp of the Malaya State
Volunteer Rifles at Normanton Barracks to procure assistance. On the way,
Captain Boyce lost his way. (He was subsequently found murdered). Major Cotton
and Captain Ball managed to reach Normanton Barracks and warn the Malaya
State Volunteer Rifles.
Though the Left Wing did not take
active part in the mutiny, they became virtually ineffective as soon as the
alarm was given. Both No. 3 and No. 4 Double Companies fell in without
ammunition under the command of their commanders, Lieutenant Elliot and Captain
Hall. Both tried to gain control of their men and encouraged them to stand
firm. A burst of firing caused Elliot’s men to break and disperse into the
jungle. Accompanied by Jemadar Fattu, Elliot tried to follow them but was
apparently overtaken by a body of mutineers and killed. Hall moved his double
company towards the Commanding Officer’s bungalow. Being without ammunition, he
ordered his men to fix bayonets and was preparing to charge the mutineers when
a heavy burst of fire from the direction of the Indian Officers’ Quarters
caused the men to panic and disperse into the jungle. A few men remained with
Hall and he soon picked up another small body under Subedar Suleman. Eventually, Captain Hall and his party of
about 50 men reached the Normanton Barracks and joined Major Cotton and
Captain Ball. The Malay States Volunteer Rifles turned out a body of some 80
rifles under Captain Sydney Smith. Accompanied by Captain Hall’s men of No 4
Double Company, they moved to the Commanding Officer’s bungalow’s towards which
the mutineers were reported to have gone. 6
The mutineers of the Right Wing made
their way towards the Commanding Officer’s bungalow, where they were joined by
some Sikhs of the battery of the Malay States Guides that was located near the
5th Light Infantry. However, the involvement of the Guides was brief
– after killing Captain Mackean, an officer of the Royal Garrison Artillery who
was on attachment with them, they disappeared, taking no further part in the
proceedings. Later, many of them were found in Malaya, marching north. They
claimed they were on their way to their depot at Taiping near Perak. A few
returned to their barracks or reported to police stations in Singapore. The
Sikhs’ sudden change of heart in distancing themselves from the mutiny was
probably because they did not wish to get involved with Ranghars whom they
regarded as inferior.
Meanwhile, the mutineers had split
into three groups. The largest group of 100-150 men under Subedar Dunde Khan
proceeded to the lines of the Malay States Guides, who were given arms and
intimidated to join them. This group then prepared to attack the Commanding
Officer’s bungalow, where the Subedar Major, the Second-in-Command and his wife
and two other officers had taken shelter. The second small group, an off-shoot
of the first group, proceeded to the Sepoy Lines where they murdered some
officers before moving towards Singapore by the circuitous Pasir Panjang Road.
The third group of about 80 men under Havildar Ibrahim moved across country
towards Tanglin, where the camp for German prisoners was located.
The group moving towards Singapore
met and killed a Singapore District Judge, Mr C.V. Dyson, and then shot dead Mr
Marshall of the China Mutual Insurance Company, and Mr B.M. Woolcombe of the
Eastern Extension Telegraph Company and his wife. Some sepoys, instead of
taking the turning to the city, carried on towards Pasir Panjang. On their way,
they passed a seaside bungalow where three Europeans –McGilvray, Dunn and
Butterworth –were enjoying a lounge and a smoke in the verandah. They shot all three. The mutineers who had
turned towards the city killed five Europeans, including one of their own
officers, Lieutenant Elliot. A couple of civilians who were fired upon managed
to escape, racing back to the city to spread the alarm.
The group that had proceeded to
Tanglin reached the internment camp at about 4 p.m., catching the guards
totally unprepared, thanks to a delay in passage of the information about the
mutiny. Guard duties at the camp were being carried out by men of the Singapore
Volunteer Rifles with the assistance of some men from the Johore State Forces,
the private army of the Sultan of Johore, who was on friendly terms with the
British. General Ridout, soon after the call from Colonel Martin at about 3
p.m, had left for his headquarters in Fort Canning, leaving instructions with
his wife to telephone and warn the Tanglin camp. For some inexplicable reason, Mrs Ridout was
able to get through to the guard commander, Lieutenant Love Montgomerie just as
the mutineers reached the camp. She had just begun talking to him when she
heard shots and the line went dead. After killing Montgomerie the mutineers ran
into the camp, where they killed the Commandant, two captains, two corporals
and four privates of the Singapore Volunteer Rifles. They also killed two
British sergeants, a Malay officer, two Malay soldiers and a German prisoner of
war. The mutineers threw open the gates of the camp, telling the German and
Austrian prisoners that they were free. Very few of them took up the offer,
most preferring to stay in the camp and tend to the wounds of the guards.
Finally, only 17 Germans left the camp, of whom four were later recaptured, the
remainder getting away to the neutral Dutch East Indies. It was later
discovered that the prisoners had been working on a tunnel that was almost
complete, and would have escaped after a few days had the mutiny not taken
place. In view of this, their reluctance to leave the camp appeared strange.
Apparently, most of them seemed to think that taking advantage of the mutiny
was not an honourable way to achieve freedom, and declined the opportunity.
One of the German prisoners who escaped
was Lieutenant Jules Lauterbach, the former navigating officer of the Emden,
who was reported to have had a hand in encouraging the men of the 5th
Light Infantry to mutiny. The mutineers were counting on him to lead them, and
were surprised when they realised that he was only interested in getting out of
Singapore with some of his crew. Lauterbach was later to command the German
raider Mowe which, like the Emden, took a heavy toll of British
shipping. The mutineers were also astonished by the behaviour of the German
prisoners, who seemed more interested in helping their wounded British captors
than escaping. They soon realised that they had been misled about the Germans –
some believed them to be Turks, of their own faith. Bewildered and puzzled, the
mutineers did not know what to do next, and broke up. Some went into Singapore
in search of the Turkish warship that Mansur, the coffee shop owner, had told
them would take them off the island. Others crossed the Straits into the Johore
jungles, hoping to escape from British reprisal that they knew would follow
soon.
As soon as he reached his office at
Fort Canning, General Ridout sent a message to HMS Cadmus that was in
the harbour. Fortunately the ratings had not been given shore leave and could
be mustered. Apart from the police that had been alerted by Captain Ball and
the Singapore Volunteer Rifles, Ridout also had at his disposal a detachment of
36th Sikhs who were in transit to their regiment at Weihaiwei in
China. He also spoke to the Japanese Consul who hastily enrolled 190 of his
nationals as special constables, who were issued with rifles by the police.
With the help of the available forces, Ridout placed armed guards on all public
buildings and docks. He concentrated the volunteers at the drill hall and the
police at the Orchard Road Police Station.
A number of cars were requisitioned, hastily armoured with sheets of
metal, and used to bring European women and children from the suburbs. They
were given temporary refuge at Government House and later taken aboard some of
the ships in Keppel Harbour. A landing party of 80 ratings from the Cadmus
was positioned to block the entry of mutineers into the city from the Pasi
Panjang area. Martial law was proclaimed at 6.30 p.m. By sunset the island was
in a reasonable state of defence. 7
Meanwhile, the Commanding Officer’s
bungalow was still under siege. During the night, the mutineers kept up sniping
fire but were deterred form an outright attack by a searchlight at nearby
Blakang Mati that lighted up the bungalow.
The mutineers also fired occasional shots at police stations in the
city. At Alexandra Road Police Station, Dr A.F. Legge of the Singapore
Volunteer Medical Company was killed as he moved to attend to a mortally
wounded soldier. At Bukit Timah Police station 138 men of the 5th
Light Infantry surrendered, while two mutineers were killed in an exchange of
fire at Orchard Road Police Station. Surprisingly, life in the city went on as
usual. The Chinese remained blissfully unaware of the mutiny, mistaking the
sounds of firing for crackers being burst as part of New Year celebrations. At
the railway station the mail train from Penang came in on time and the night
mail departed on schedule. On board the Penang train were 150 men of the Johore
State Forces under the personal command of the Sultan who had responded to a
call from the Governor, Sir Arthur Young.
During the night, a force had been
assembled to relieve the party in the Commanding Officer’s house. At dawn on 16
February, Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Brownlow led a combined the force of 80 men
from HMS Cadmus, 50 men of the Singapore Volunteer Corps, 21 men of the
Royal Garrison Artillery and 25 armed civilians. Advancing from Keppel harbour,
the force occupied the barracks that were not held in strength. Further advance
was held up by heavy fire from a higher ridge, which had to be cleared by an
attack from the left by the men from the Cadmus and the Singapore
Volunteer Corps. The mutineers were pushed back and the force reached Colonel
Martin’s bungalow. Since the force was outnumbered by the mutineers, it was
decided to retire to Keppel Harbour with the relieved personnel. The relieving
force lost two men in the action, with four being wounded. Of the mutineers, 11
were killed. 8
On the way back to the city Colonel
Brownlow’s force swept the golf course at Tanglin and other stretches of open
country, picking up between 30 and 40 sepoys. During the day many others
surrendered all over Singapore. Some had taken refuge in mosques until they
judged it safe to reappear. During the same morning, the Veteran Company of the
Singapore Volunteer Corps occupied Tanglin Barracks without opposition and took
charge of the prisoners of war. The Volunteers were also deployed to guard
Government House, General Hospital and Fort Canning. The Japanese special
constables raised by the Japanese Consul were sent to various police stations,
where they provided armed patrols. As a precautionary measure, all ladies and
children were removed from hotels to the ships in the harbour during the day.
Apart from the Japanese, the British
authorities received assistance from several other nations. Wireless messages
had been sent to ships at sea and in the harbour, asking for help to quell the
mutiny. The French cruiser Montcalm that had sailed from Singapore on
the day the mutiny broke out turned back as soon as it got the message, docking
in the morning on 17 February. The Japanese cruiser Otowa arrived the
same afternoon. A party of 190 men with two machine guns from the Montcalm
proceeded by motor transport to the Seletar District where a group of mutineers
had been reported. Before their arrival, however, the mutineers crossed over to
Johore where 61 of them surrendered to the Sultan’s forces. On the morning of
18 February Colonel Brownlow’s force, reinforced with 76 men from the Otowa
marched out from Keppel Harbour and occupied Alexandra Barracks, capturing six
men. A party of the Japanese then proceeded to Normanton Barracks where it
captured 12 mutineers. The same afternoon the Russian cruiser Orel
arrived and sent 40 men ashore. By this time situation was under control and
Government House issued an announcement that the position was completely in
hand. On 19 February, another Japanese cruiser, the Tsuchima arrived
with 75 men. She was followed on 20 February by the SS Edvana from
Rangoon, carrying six companies of the 4th Battalion of the
Shropshire Light Infantry (Territorials). By the evening of 22 February, one
week after the outbreak, 614 men of the 5th Light Infantry had
surrendered. It was estimated that 56 mutineers had been killed or drowned.9
Even as the hunt continued for the
remaining fugitives, proceedings against the captives had begun, with the first
of the executions being carried out on 23 February 1915. Of the 202 persons tried by courts martial, 47
were sentenced to death and the remainder to varying terms of imprisonment.
Though public execution had been terminated in 1890’s, the practice was revived
for the Singapore mutiny. The executions took place outside Outram Road Prison,
watched by thousands of people. The firing parties were drawn from units that
had suffered casualties at the hands of the mutineers in the proportion of five
soldiers firing at one man being executed. The largest execution of 21
mutineers was carried out on 25 March by a firing party of 105 drawn from the
Singapore Volunteer Corps and the Singapore Volunteer Artillery Maxim Company.
The two Indian officers who had instigated the mutiny, Subedar Dunde Khan and
Jemadar Chisti Khan were executed on 21 April by a firing squad of ten men from
the Royal Garrison Artillery. The last executions took place on 17 May 1915.
The first volley usually failed to kill the condemned men, necessitating a
second volley from a shorter distance. Even then warders had to walk along the
line with pistols to finish the proceedings. There was considerable debate on
the manner in which the executions were carried out, with some persons
recommending the use of automatic weapons such as machine guns instead of
rifles to hasten the death of the condemned men. 10
A first hand account of one of the
executions by Nishimura, a Japanese doctor, brings out the poignancy of the
proceedings and the feelings among the local population. Witnessing the
execution on 1 April 1915, Nishimura writes:
These days, in the afternoon, a music
band goes out from the post of the Volunteers in Beach Road to play cheerfully
and walk through the city. When I asked what had happened, answer was:
‘Mutineers were shot dead.’ Those who witnessed the scene of public execution
told me: ‘Last moments of the lives of Indian mutineers were really
praiseworthy’. They are brave and firm in their thought. There is none who died
a shameful death.’ I also wanted to see the scene for my information and walked
to the execution ground.
5 o’clock in the evening.
Piles were driven at intervals of ten shaku (3 metres) in the lawn
outside the wall of Outram Road prison. People are crowded along the road or
the incline inside the hospital. More than twenty thousand spectators were
there. The execution ground can be clearly seen by all as they occupied their
places on the layered slope. Crowds are waiting for the moment, holding their
breaths. At five thirty, six mutineers were brought there accompanied by six
stretchers and guarded by thirty soldiers. They obeyed to (sic) the command of
soldiers and stood in front of the stakes. A British Major read the
promulgation of the sentences. One mutineer said something indignantly. It was
spoken in an Indian language, which I could not understand.
Five gunners took aim at
one mutineer and delivered a volley of fire to him with the order of a
commander. Simultaneously with the sound of the gunfire five mutineers fell
down miserably, but the last person remained standing and breathed his last. A
medical officer confirmed their deaths formally, and the dead bodies on the
stretchers covered by white cloths were taken back to the Prison. They were
alive when they came here, and left in death. This is the fourth execution since
it started. Those mutineers who believed in the never-ending cycle of
reincarnation died admirably. The reputation in the city is not false. 11
The mutiny in the 5th Light Infantry in
Singapore in 1915 has been well documented, though opinions differ on its
character. The British authorities treated it is as a military revolt,
instigated by disgruntled elements within the regiment. Others felt that it was
a manifestation of the growing feeling of nationalism among soldiers in the
Indian Army, who had begun to question their role in fighting for an alien
power. The leaders of revolutionary movements outside India, such as the Ghadr
Party, claimed that the mutiny was part of their plan to overthrow British rule
in India. The mutiny failed because of poor leadership, lack of a precise
programme and absence of coordination with revolutionary movements in other
parts of the world. It is well known that the ambitious plans of the Ghadr
Party to incite revolts in India and several places were thwarted by British
intelligence and due to several other reasons, including ill luck. Had their
plans succeeded, the British authorities would have found it difficult to spare
forces to quell the mutiny in Singapore, which was then denuded of regular
troops and warships.
It is difficult to single out a specific factor that was
responsible for the mutiny. Though World War I had started, Singapore was far
removed from theatres where Indian troops were fighting. This naturally led to
doubts among the Indian officers and men of the 5th Light Infantry
about their role in the war. The entry of Turkey in the war against Britain
complicated the issue, especially for Muslim soldiers who treated the Khalifa
as their religious head. The influence of Kasim Ismail Mansur, the ‘pro-Turkish’
merchant who had close contacts with the soldiers may have augmented the
reluctance of the latter to go to war.
The refusal of the Malay States Guides to go to war in 1914 added to the
misgivings of the men of the 5th Light Infantry. The effect of their
intimacy with the German prisoners of the Emden interned at Singapore
cannot be discounted. Finally, the Komagata Maru incident and the
passage of Ghadrities through Singapore had sown the seed of nationalism among
the soldiers. All that was needed was a spark, and this was provided by the
issue of promotion and uncertainty about being sent to fight against their
co-religionists.
The British authorities suppressed the revolt with the
help of several foreign powers, including France, Russia and Japan. There was a
heated debate in Japan on the propriety of using Japanese soldiers and civilian
volunteers to quell the mutiny. The Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance that had been
concluded in 1911 provided for Britain and Japan to assist each other in case of
aggression by a third party against their territories in India and East Asia.
However, it did not provide for suppression of mutinies and internal
disturbances. Japan had helped Britain in capturing Tsintao from the Germans in
1914. But its assistance to Britain in suppressing the mutiny in Singapore in
1915 was questioned by many, including officers in the Japanese Navy. At that
time, several Indian revolutionaries had made Japan their home, in the hope of
obtaining her support in gaining independence from British rule. The Indian
nationalist movement was supported by large sections of the Japanese people,
who felt that the actions of their Consul in Singapore dealt a severe blow to
Indian aspirations.
A Japanese scholar who has carried out a deep study of
the Singapore Mutiny is Sho Kuwajima, of the Department of India and Pakistan,
Osaka University of Foreign Studies. According to him, ‘Singapore Mutiny was an
expression of both anti-war feelings which derived from daily feelings of
Indian soldiers and their aspiration for freedom which was encouraged by the
continuous and pervasive propaganda of the Ghadr Party. The lack of
revolutionary leadership and their programme blurred the basic character of the
Mutiny’.12
END NOTES
This chapter is largely based on Sho Kuwajima’s First World War and Asia – Indian Mutiny in
Singapore (1915), (Osaka, 1988), Gerard H. Corr’s The War of the
Springing Tigers, (London, 1975); Khushwant Singh’s The History of the
Sikhs, Vol II, (Delhi, 1991); and
Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes’ Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993). Specific references are given below:-
1. Sho
Kuwajima, First World War and Asia – Indian Mutiny in Singapore (1915)-
(Osaka, 1988), p. 68, quoting R.W.E. Harper and Harry Miller, Singapore
Mutiny, (Singapore, 1984), pp. 203-4
2. Bhai
Nahar Singh and Kirpal Singh (ed.), Struggle for Free Hindustan (Ghadr
Movement), Vol. I, 1905-1916 (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 76-9.
3. Khushwant
Singh, The History of the Sikhs, Vol II, (Delhi, 1991), pp.
182-3
4. Lt.
Gen S.L. Menezes, Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993), p.278.
5. Gerard
H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers, (London, 1975), pp. 7-8
6. Kuwajima,
pp. 43-8
7. Corr,
pp. 9-12
8. Kuwajima,
p. 65, quoting D, Moore, The First 150 Years of Singapore, (Singapore,
1969), p. 550
9. Kuwajima,
pp. 65-7
10. Menezes,
p.280
11. Kuwajima,
pp. 68-9, quoting Takeshiro Nishimura, Singapore Sanjyugonen (Thirty
Five Years in Singapore), (Tokyo, 1941), pp.163-4
12. Kuwajima,
p. 126
2 comments:
Thank you for a very detailed description of the event. The probable location of the searchlight at Blakang Mati can be found here : https://amazingwalks.wordpress.com/2021/07/23/fort-siloso-and-1915-singapore-mutiny/
Very interesting. I chanced upon the Legge family grave on a walk here in Aberdeen, Scotland this afternoon. It mentioned on the gravestone that Lt Legge was killed in Singapore in 1915, and curiosity led me to this site and your splendid explanation of the mutiny concerned and Lt Legge's death. Thank you for a very detailed explanation.
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