CHAPTER - 7
THE AIR FORCE MUTINY - 1946
The mutiny in the
RIAF (Royal Indian Air Force) occurred at almost the same time as the more
serious uprisings in the RIN (Royal Indian Navy) and Army units at Jubbulpore
in February 1946. Many historians prefer to call it a strike rather than a
mutiny, since there was no violence and neither was any one punished. However,
the term ‘strike’ is seldom used in the armed forces, collective
disobedience always being called a mutiny,
irrespective of the number of persons involved and the gravity of the
insubordination. Though they occurred at
almost the same time, the trouble in the RIAF was quite different from the
insurrection that occurred in the other two services. While the disturbances in
the Army and the RIN were confined to Indian soldiers and sailors, the unrest
in the RIAF was induced by ‘strikes’ by British airmen of the RAF (Royal Air
Force). Since no disciplinary action was taken against the British airmen, the
authorities had to take a lenient view of the indiscipline by Indian airmen
also. Unlike the uprisings in the Navy and the Army that had some nationalistic
element, the demands of the RIAF personnel related mostly to pay, rations and
travel concessions.
Though the RIAF
mutiny was controlled without the use of force, it had far reaching
implications. The Indian Air Force - the
prefix Royal was added only in 1943 - was just six years old when World War II
began, undergoing a ten fold increase in size by the time it ended. Though
still minuscule compared to the Indian Army, it was a potent force that could
no longer be ignored. Coupled with the more serious incidents in the other two
armed forces, it reinforced the perception of the British authorities that the
Indian troops could no longer be relied upon to maintain Britain’s hold over
India. This necessitated a serious review of British policy, leading ultimately
to the decision to pull out of India.
Three Indians
pilots held commissions in the RAF during World War I, fighting with great
gallantry. They were Lieutenant H.S Malik, 2nd Lieutenant E.S.C. Sen
and Lieutenant Indra Lal Roy. Sen was shot down over Germany and became a
prisoner of war, while Roy was killed in air combat in July 1918. It was only
in 1930 that a decision was taken to establish an air force in India. Officers
selected as pilots were sent to Cranwell in UK for training, while the ground
staff, recruited as hawai sepoys (air
soldiers) were trained in India. The
first batch of five Indians commissioned as pilot officers comprised Sircar,
Subroto Mukerjee, Bhupinder Singh, A. Singh and A.D. Dewan. The IAF (Indian Air
Force) formally came into being on 1 April 1933, when the first Indianised
squadron – No. 1 Squadron - was formed at Karachi, exactly 15 years after the
creation of the RAF.1
Shortly after the outbreak of
World War II, it was decided to form the IAFVR (Indian Air Force Volunteer
Reserve) to take over the task of coastal defence from the RAF. Following the
commencement of the Japanese offensive in South East Asia in December 1941, a
flight of the IAFVR was flown to Moulmein to carry out anti-submarine and
convoy protection operations. After the capture of Moulmein by Japanese forces,
No. 3 IAFVR Squadron was sent to Rangoon for reconnaissance and convoy
protection duties. As British forces withdrew in the face of the relentless
Japanese offensive, No. 1 Squadron arrived at Toungoo, where they were
subjected to raids by the Japanese Air Force on the first day itself. During
the next two days, Squadron Leader K.K. ‘Jumbo’ Majumdar led the whole squadron
on raids against the Japanese base at Mehingson inflicting severe damage and
earning a great moral victory. The exploit not only made Majumdar a hero
overnight but also enhanced the reputation of the fledgling IAF in its first
major operation during the war. In view of its splendid performance during the
war, the IAF was given the prefix ‘Royal’ on its tenth anniversary, becoming
the RIAF (Royal Indian Air Force) on 1 April 1943.
From one squadron
in 1939 the IAF had grown to three by the beginning of 1942, the year which saw
the greatest expansion in its size. By the end of 1942, it had seven squadrons;
during the next year another two were added, bringing its strength to nine
squadrons by the beginning of 1944. The number of personnel had increased
correspondingly, from 16 officers and 269 airmen at the beginning of the war to
1,200 officers and over 20,000 trained airmen, with another 6,000 undergoing
training, besides about 2,000 followers. In the early years of the war, 20
Indian pilots had been sent to the UK to help the RAF, which had run perilously
short of pilots during the Battle of Britain. These Indian pilots served in RAF
squadrons and did sterling work during the critical months, carrying out
fighter sweeps over France and escorting bombers. Seven Indian pilots were killed in
operations, the remainder returning to India in mid 1942. One of the pilots who
returned from the German front with a DFC was K.K. Majumdar, who later died in
an air crash at Lahore in February 1945. 2
While World War I
lasted four years, World War II continued for six years. When it ended in 1945,
everyone was weary and drained out. Many of the participants had been away from
their homes for several years and were eagerly looking forward to a reunion
with their families. Demobilisation began soon after the end of the war, but
the sheer numbers of servicemen, especially from the USA and UK, made the
process slow and time consuming. Hundreds of thousands of troops were literally
doing nothing, waiting for ships to take them home from remote and inhospitable
corners of the globe. The wait seemed interminable, and most men were unable to
comprehend the reasons for the delay in sending them home. Coupled with the
delay in repatriation, another major problem was the uncertain future that most
of the men faced. Resettlement and rehabilitation measures obviously could not
cater for all the servicemen, who knew that they would have to fend for
themselves. Wartime industries that employed millions of workers were closing
down, and most of the men shedding uniforms had neither the training nor the
experience for the new enterprises that were coming up.
The first sign of
unrest came from American troops based in Germany who held mass parades to demand
speedier demobilisation and repatriation. These parades were given wide
publicity on the American forces programmes that were very popular and eagerly
heard by servicemen all over the world. Similar demonstrations by American
soldiers in Calcutta could not leave British troops serving in South East Asia
unaffected and it was only a matter of time before the virus spread to other
stations. Apart from the logistics, another reason for the slow rate of
demobilisation of British servicemen was the uncertainty about the future of
British rule in India. As late as June 1946, the Chiefs of Staff in London were
still considering various options, one of which was to continue British rule in
India, for which seven additional divisions would be needed. This would naturally
result in suspending the process of demobilisation, with serious implications,
especially the effect on morale.3
Taking a cue from
the Americans, British airmen at the RAF base at Mauripur refused to join duty
on 22 January 1946. The Inspector General of the RAF, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Arthur Barratt, who was on tour in South East Asia, and was passing through
Mauripur at the time, held a meeting with the men to ascertain their
grievances. The men had many complaints, most of which were related to aspects
of demobilisation that could only be dealt with at a higher level by the
Cabinet or the Air Ministry. One such grievance was, ‘why is RAF demobilisation
so slow compared with that in the Army and the Navy?’ Air Chief Marshal Barratt
explained that practically all the points raised by the men had been explained
in the demobilisation forms which were a part of the release scheme and kept
the personnel fully in the picture, explaining the reasons for the various actions taken,
especially with regard to the release under classes ‘B’ and ‘C’.
The men were not
satisfied and demanded that a Parliamentary representative should visit them so
that they could impress upon him, and he on Parliament, their feelings about
the slow speed of demobilisation. A Parliamentary delegation was then in India
and they asked that it should visit Mauripur. Air Chief Marshal Barratt assured
the men that he would forward their demands to Air Ministry, and asked the men
to return to work but they refused. He warned the airmen that nothing would be
obtained under threat and urged them to return to duty. The meeting ended with
no promises made. The Air Officer Commanding 229 Group stated that he would be
able to get the men back to work that afternoon. After making his report to the
Air Ministry, the Inspector General proceeded on his pre-arranged tour
programme. The situation remained unchanged in the evening. Many of the men
showed an inclination to join duty but appeared to be fearful of rough
treatment at the hands of others.
In his report to the Air Ministry, Air Chief Marshal
Barratt had mentioned all their grievances, asking for a reply to be sent to
the Air Officer Commanding India. As regards the demand for the Parliamentary
delegation already in India to visit Mauripur, he felt that the delegation was
visiting parts of the Commonwealth for an entirely different purpose and it
would not be wise to permit the members to address the men, as they were not well versed in the intricacies of
the demobilisation policy of the government and did not understand the feelings
of the personnel in South East Asia. However, it was possible for Mr Harold
Davies, the MP for Leek, who was visiting South East Asia, to meet the airmen.
Mr Davies had already visited units in India, Burma and Malaya in order to keep
the men in touch with the new Government’s policy and, during his tour, had
spoken to hundreds of servicemen.4
News of the strike at Mauripur soon spread to Ceylon,
the first unit being affected being at Negombo, where the personnel of No. 32
Staging Post refused to carryout servicing of aircraft. The morning York service from Mauripur on 23
January 1946 was serviced by the aircrew themselves, giving an indication that
something was amiss. As at Mauripur, the major complaint was that of slow
demobilisation, the other grievances being bad administration and lack of
sports facilities and entertainment. The men felt that personnel of the Fleet
Air Arm should be drafted into the RAF to assist with key trades, and expedite
the RAF release. Another cause for complaint was that RAF airmen were being
asked to work on BOAC and Qantas aircraft. The men felt that this had two
effects: firstly, that the air passage of civilians was delaying release of
servicemen and secondly, that the employment of airmen was incorrectly
providing aviation companies with cheap labour.
The Air Officer Commanding, Air Commodore Chilton was on
his way to the Cocos Islands when he received news of the strike. He returned
to Negombo and talked to the men, promising to remedy the local problems
straightaway. As regards the drafting of personnel of the Fleet Air Arm,
speeding up demobilisation and servicing of civilian aircraft, he assured them
that these would be forwarded to the Air Ministry. With the resolution of
grievances concerning administration, sports facilities and entertainment, it
was hoped that the men would resume duty on the following day. Air Commodore
Chilton decided to continue his flight since the news of the Negombo incident
had reached 129 Staging Post in the Cocos Islands where it was understood that
the airmen intended taking similar action.
However, on his arrival at the Cocos Islands, he found
the station running smoothly, with no sign of trouble. While he was visiting
the station he received a signal asking him to return to Negombo where the
situation had deteriorated. The stoppage of work by the airmen had spread from
the Staging Post to the rest of the station including the Communication and
Meteorological Flights. The men were well behaved but adamant. The Air Officer
Commanding tried to convince the men that no good would come of their strike
irrespective of what was happening in India. The men continued to complain of
the delays regarding repatriation and mails. It was pointed out that by
refusing to work they would delay their release and mails even more. Releases were governed by the Manpower
Committee in London and the local RAF authorities could do little more than
forward the complaints to the Air Ministry.
By this time the disaffection had spread and by 26
January airmen at Koggala, Ratmalana and Colombo were also involved. It was
apparent from reports received from various units that broadcasts made by the
BBC on 24 and 25 January were largely responsible for the information reaching
them, bringing out feelings that were dormant and encouraging them to emulate
their colleagues who had joined the strike. Except at Negombo where the
relations between the Station and Staging Post were not easy, at other stations
the unit commanders and officers were in close touch with the men, addressing
them at the first sign of trouble. However, the problems concerning
repatriation and release could not be solved by them on their own, though every
effort was made to take the men into confidence and explain the policy in this
regard. Many of the grievances, such as disparity in releases compared to RAF
personnel in UK and faster repatriation of personnel of the Navy and Army were
unfounded.
Meanwhile, the strikes in RAF stations in India continued
to spread. On 26 January 1946 Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr, Air Officer
Commanding, British Air Forces in South East Asia, sent a signal to the Air
Ministry giving details of the stoppage of work that had occurred at Palam, Dum
Dum, Poona, Cawnpore and Vizagapatnam, in addition to Mauripur. Except at
Mauripur, all stoppages were of short duration but it was considered that other
units were likely to be affected. The majority of units were ‘striking’ in an
orderly and respectful manner in order to register a protest against the
Government’s policy, and then returning to work. Air Marshal Carr considered
that unless the Government shouldered the responsibility of making a
comprehensive statement, even if that statement did not meet the airmen’s
requirements, he anticipated that the men would strike again. Units that had
returned to work had done so on the assumption that their dissatisfaction with
the demobilisation policy had been presented to the Government from which they
were expecting a comprehensive statement. No promises were made, but the men
had been informed that the questions raised in the Inspector General’s report
had been forwarded to the Secretary of State. In conclusion, Air Marshal Carr
stressed that he saw no alternative to a Government statement. While he agreed
that the Government should not be called upon to issue a general statement as a
concession to indiscipline, he felt that in this instance, failure to do so it
may have serious consequences.
The stoppage of
work on RAF stations in India influenced the personnel of the RIAF also.
Reports of men staying away from work were received from Trichinopoly and No.
228 Group. The main cause of discontent - demobilisation – was augmented by
complaints regarding leave, food and family allowances. In addition to speeding
up their in release, the Indian airmen requested that family and ration
allowances should be paid to them while on leave. They maintained that granting
only one free rail warrant per annum meant hardship to airmen who had to split
their leave in two or three parts. They requested that that either additional
railway warrants should be given or permission granted to avail their entire
leave at one time during the year.
The strikes in the
RIAF alarmed the authorities, since they could have an adverse effect on the
political situation in the country. The Air Marshal Commanding, British Air
Forces in South East Asia sent a signal to all RAF units informing them of
this. The signal, which was not sent to RIAF units, read:
The Government plan for demobilization must be a
balanced one: our industries at home require manpower, but this cannot be
provided at the risk of endangering the safety of the World. There are still
defence problems in India. The public press has recently made it clear that a
political crisis is approaching, a crisis which may only be solved by little
short of civil war. If you wish, you may quote me as authority for this. The
Government at Home are now fully aware that conscripts in the RAF have little or
no pride in their service. I do not believe that these misguided airmen who
took part in the recent so-called strikes appreciate that their action may be
endangering the safety of India. Already their example has been followed by the
RIAF. Such actions can only encourage civil disturbances and may lead to grave
consequences for everyone in India including those airmen who are not due for
repatriation in the near future.5
The Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Keith Park was also concerned by the RIAF strikes. He signalled all commanders
in South East Asia, stressing that it was essential that pay and allowances and
other conditions of service in the post-war Indian Air Force should be made
known to all concerned, with the least possible delay. The Government of India
had set up a committee to examine and make recommendations on the terms and
conditions of service to be applied to the post war Indian forces, including
the Air Force. The work of the committee would be hastened with due regard to
the necessity of arriving at a well considered conclusion. The message
continued:
I have collected from various sources a full list of the
grievances of the Royal Indian Air Force airmen and will do everything in my
power to have them investigated. To do this thoroughly will take time. I must
make it clear to all concerned that I cannot condone the serious breaches of
discipline that have taken place during the last twelve days, and any
improvement in conditions that I may be able to make will not, repeat, not be a concession to discipline. I will
always accept honest complaints if passed to me through the correct channels. I
would like to assure both officers and other ranks personnel who desire to continue
in the service that the Royal Indian Air Force offers a fine career to the
right man.
Meanwhile, the strikes in RAF stations continued to
spread, with the most serious incident occurring at Seletar in Singapore on 26
January 1946, followed by a similar incident at Kallang on the very next day.
The Allied Air Commander-in-Chief visited Seletar and had detailed discussions
with the men, which he reported to the Air Ministry. Realising the seriousness
of the matter, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Clement Atlee, made a statement
in the House of Commons on 29 January, outlining the measures being taken to
expedite repatriation and release, which seemed to be the root cause of the
trouble. On the same day the men of 194 (Transport) Squadron in Rangoon stopped
work. However, they returned to work the next day. The unit was scheduled for
disbandment in the near future but in view of this incident, it was disbanded
on 15 February 1946.
The mutiny by
ratings of the Royal Indian Navy in February 1946 added a new dimension to the
problem, especially at Bombay, where the RIAF airmen went on a sympathetic
strike. To subdue the mutineers who had taken control of ships and were
threatening to bombard Bombay, one of the measures being seriously considered
was air attacks using rocket projectiles. However, in view of the strike by
RIAF personnel, the authorities felt that Indian squadrons could not be used
for this purpose. Responding to an appeal from Sir Roderick Carr, Air Officer
Commanding British Air Forces in South East Asia, the Allied Air Commander-in-Chief,
Sir Keith Park agreed to divert some aircraft from his resources. However, in
view of the recent experience in Java, he advised Carr to obtain the approval
of the C-in-C India before using RAF and RIAF aircraft in an offensive role
against the local population. 6
RIAF personnel
refused to report for duty at many stations for varying periods. The Naval
strike came to an end on 23 February 1946, leading to improvement in the
situation at Bombay, though the airmen had still not resumed duty. Other than
Bombay, the stations that continued to be affected were Cawnpore, Allahabad and
Jodhpur, though conditions seemed to be improving and were expected to become
normal soon. However a serious incident occurred in Rangoon, where 140 RIAF
personnel failed to report for duty on 23 February. When asked for their
grievances, the airmen listed the following demands:-
·
Equal rights with BORs in the
Unit canteen
·
Equal distribution of Unit dues
between the RAF and RIAF.
·
Separate Mess for RIAF with
half BOR and half Indian type rations.
·
Weekly show of Indian films.
·
Separate recreation room with
Indian periodicals.
·
Full entitlement of leave for
all RIAF personnel.
·
Better living conditions.
·
Higher scale of pay and
allowances.
·
Second class railways warrants
·
Speed up demobilisation.
On the night of 24 February the Commanding Officer
interviewed two of the of the men’s representatives and informed them that
their grievances had been forwarded to the Air Marshal Commanding Air
Headquarters Burma. Grievances that could be resolved locally would be dealt by
the Air Marshal personally while the remaining questions concerning pay,
allowances and demobilisation would be forwarded to higher authorities. The
Commanding Officer emphasized that the men must return to duty before their
demands could be considered. The representatives agreed and gave an assurance
that they would do so, but the men did not join duty until 28 February 1946.
In February there was strike at Kohat, the only Air
Force station in India manned by the RIAF, where the Station Commander was
Group Captain (later Air Chief Marshal) A.M ‘Aspy’ Engineer. An account of the
strike and how it was handled has been described by Squadron Leader (later Air
Vice Marshal) Harjinder Singh, who was then posted at Air Force Station
Peshawar. On 26 February Harjinder
received a telephone call from Flight Lieutenant Shahzada, Adjutant of the Air
Force Station Kohat informing him that the airmen had gone on strike that
morning. The men had collected at the aerodrome from where they intended to
take out a protest march through the city. Group Captain Engineer had asked the
Adjutant to inform Harjinder that he had already requisitioned some Gurkha
troops from the Army to erect a road block at the aerodrome gate, and if necessary,
open fire on the strikers if they tried to force their way out. Harjinder asked
his Station Commander, Group Captain Vallaine, to permit him to fly to Kohat,
without giving him any reason. Fortunately, Vallaine agreed, and detailed
Flying Officer Glandstein to take Harjinder to Kohat in a Harvard aircraft.
After reaching Kohat, Harjinder reported to the Station
Commander who gave him some more details of the strike. Apparently the men were
in no mood to listen to any officer and he advised Harjinder not to go near
them. Harjinder felt that unless the situation was brought under control
immediately, it would be the end of the only Indian Air Force station in the
country. He asked for permission to approach the strikers and talk to them.
Engineer refused, but when Harjinder insisted, he relented, telling the latter
that that he would not be responsible for his life. When Harjinder approached
the strikers, who had collected on the airstrip, one of them shouted: ‘Don’t
let this officer come near, because he will call off the strike.’ But there
were others who differed, and wanted him to come. Harjinder proposed that they take a vote by
show of hands, and was pleasantly surprised when the majority elected to hear
him. After talking to the men, Harjinder found that they had heard that it was
planned to bomb and machine gun the Naval ratings that had gone on strike in
Bombay. When asked for their demands, they said that the Station Commander
should send a message to the Commander-in-Chief in Delhi telling him that the
Indian Air Force Station Kohat refuses to cooperate in bombing their colleagues
in the Navy. Also in the signal it should be clearly mentioned that the Air
Force Station Kohat sympathizes with the relatives of the people who have been
killed in the firing at Bombay. The rest of the story is best described by
Harjinder in his own words:
To my mind, it was a reasonable demand and I asked them:
“Is that all?” and they all said “Yes”. So I told them:” I will guarantee that
the Station Commander will do what you have asked, and what is more, there was
never an intention of sending Indian Air Force Squadrons to bomb and
machine-gun our naval colleagues and there must have been some
misunderstanding.
After addressing the men further and
quietening them down I told them that they had disgraced themselves by
striking, and before it was too late they should report back to work; and as a
first consequence, they should immediately fall in. The men readily agreed. I
got them fallen-in in three ranks and marched them to the Cinema hall. I told
them to accept any punishment that the Station Commander gave without
hesitation and if the station Commander asked them: “Did you go on strike?”
they should say “No, we never had any such intention.” It took me exactly ten
minutes to settle the issue in this way.
After marching the airmen into the
Cinema hall, I reported to the Station Commander and briefed him on what to
say. In fairness to Aspy I must say he sent the signal to General Auchinleck on
the lines that I had promised the airmen. When he went into the Cinema hall and
asked the men whether they had intended to go on strike, the men with one voice
shouted: “No.” As preplanned, he said: “All right, but as a punishment for your
indiscipline this morning, I am ordering extra parades in the afternoon for the
whole Station for one month.” They filed out of the hall quietly enough.
After the ‘strike’ was over, I took
off for Peshawar. Some days alter I heard that the Station Commander had been
called up by Delhi and given a sound dressing down because of the signal which
he ah sent concerning the Indian Naval mutiny
at Bombay.7
Another strike that was defused by an Indian officer was
the one at the Factory Road Camp in Delhi. The strike lasted four days and was
eventually broken by sympathetic handling by Group Captain (later Air Chief
Marshal) Subroto Mukerjee, who was ably assisted by Warrant Officer Verghese.
After the strike ended, RAF Intelligence was asked to identify the ring
leaders. Based on their report, Air Headquarters decided to discharge the
personnel involved in the strike. Surprisingly, the first name on the list was
that of Warrant Officer Verghese, who had been instrumental in subduing the
strike. It was only after Subroto Mukerjee intervened with Air Marshal Sir
Rodrick Carr that the orders for Verghese’s discharge were withdrawn.
Though officially
classified as a mutiny, the incidents in the RIAF were nothing more than
‘strikes’. In almost all cases, the airmen resorted to stoppage of work or a
sit down strike. They was no slogan shouting, waving of flags or processions,
as happened in the mutinies in the other two services that occurred at almost
the same time. No violence was used, by the strikers or the authorities, and in
most cases the strikes ended after the intervention of officers who assured the
men that their grievances would be looked into sympathetically. None of the
participants were punished, though a few of the ring leaders were discharged
from service. Though the strikes were not serious, they brought to light the
feeling of discontent among the Indian personnel serving in the Air Force,
forcing the British authorities to review the dependability of the armed forces
in India. This played a part in the decision of the British to quit India in
1947.
END NOTES
This chapter is largely based on N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon’s The
Transfer of Power, (London, 1982); Lt. Gen S.L. Menezes’ Fidelity &
Honour, (New Delhi, 1993); Air Commodore A.L. Saigal’s Birth of An Air Force – The Memoirs of Air Vice Marshal Harjinder Singh,
(New Delhi, 1977); and documents in the Ministry of Defence, History Division,
New Delhi. Specific references are
given below:-
1. Air Commodore A.L. Saigal (ed.), Birth of An Air Force – The Memoirs of Air
Vice Marshal Harjinder Singh, (New Delhi, 1977), p. 34.
2. Saigal,
p. 216.
3. Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942- 47
(12 vols, London, 1982), vii, pp. 894-5
4. A
Brief History of Events Associated with The Disaffection and ‘Strikes’ Among
Personnel in the RAF units of Air Command, South East Asia, Ministry of
Defence, History Division, (MODHD), New Delhi, 601/9768/H, pp. 1-2
5. ibid.,
p. 10.
6. ibid., p. 24.
7. Saigal,
pp. 218-21
1 comment:
In 1946 there was a problem at AF Station Tambaram also. Some airmen were dismissed from service. Sorry, I don't know details.
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