CHAPTER - 9
THE JUBBULPORE
MUTINY – 1946
The mutiny at Jubbulpore took place between 27 February
and 3 March 1946, about two weeks after the Naval mutiny at Bombay Jabalpur Bombay Bombay
and Karachi , the Jubbulpore
revolt was put down with an iron hand, by using British troops. There was no
firing, but a bayonet charge that left about 70 men injured, and three dead.
Though the mutiny at Jubbulpore
was at that time not considered as ‘serious’ as the Naval mutiny, its
repercussions were immense. The earlier revolts in the RIAF and RIN, though
more widespread and larger in scale, did not really worry the British
authorities, because the Indian Army, on which they depended for meeting
external and internal threats was still considered reliable, having proved its
fidelity during World War II. The mutiny at Jubbulpore
was the first major uprising in the Indian Army during or after the war. This
set alarm bells ringing from Delhi to London Britain to reach a settlement with the political
parties and quit India
After
the end of World War II there was feeling of uncertainty among soldiers, with
the threat of demobilisation and loss of livelihood being matters of serious
concern. The return of a large number of troops from British colonies in
South-East Asia aggravated the situation, with military stations in India
In February 1946, there
were two major establishments of the Indian Signal Corps at Jubbulpore .
The first was the Signal Training Centre (STC) comprising No. 1 Signal Training
Battalion (Military) and 2 & 3 Signal Battalions (Technical). The second
was the Indian Signal Depot & Records, which comprised the Indian Signals
Depot; the Indian Signals Demobilisation Centre and the Indian Signals Records.
The Commandant of the STC was Colonel L.C. Boyd, while Colonel R.T.H. Gelston,
commanded the Depot & Records. Both these establishments came under the
Jubbulpore Area, commanded by Brigadier H.U. Richards, who also commanded 17
Indian Infantry Brigade. The Area came under the General Officer Commanding
Nagpur District, Major General F.H. Skinner, with his headquarters at Nagpur Agra
Conditions
at Jubbulpore were no different from those at
other military stations, except that the men, being mostly from technical
trades, were more educated. Many of the men undergoing long training courses
were not sure whether they would be retained or sent home in the next few
months. The delay in announcement of a clear policy on demobilisation had
created an air of uncertainty and restlessness, which could not remain
unnoticed. On 27 November 1945, Colonel Boyd had written to the Organisation
Directorate in General Headquarters (India
It is for consideration whether the present policy of continuing to put
men under lengthy courses of training, irrespective of the time they are likely
to remain in the Army, is not extremely wasteful both of instructors’ time and
Government..… Among these men unsettlement and lack of interest in their work
are already noticeable, since they think they will be released form the Army
before their course finishes. It should also be noted that it is the highly
educated men such as are enrolled for Group ‘A’ trades that are keenest to
leave the Army at the earliest possible moment in order to obtain highly
remunerative employment.….To carry on with Workshops and Operator training in
these circumstances seems to be a waste of time. The unsettlement in squads
already referred to is having an adverse effect on training …
It was almost three
months before General Headquarters (India), replied to Colonel Boyd’s letter,
ordering the immediate release of one thousand recruits then under training at
the Indian Signal Training Centre at Jubbulpore and Bangalore.3 By the
time the orders reached the STC the mutiny had started. Referring to the letter
in his report to the Area Headquarters after the mutiny, Colonel Boyd lamented:
‘It is unfortunate that the decision contained therein could not have been come
to earlier’.3
Even
if the decision to release the thousand men had been taken earlier, it would
have been difficult for the Signal Training Centres to cope with such large
numbers. The Signals Depot was then not authorised a demob centre; it was
making do with an ad hoc demob centre that had a capacity to release only 70
persons in a day. The staff of the depot was already overworked and the
additional load would have stretched them to the limit. The severe overcrowding
and unsatisfactory living conditions only added to the unrest. The shortage of
staff affected management of security in the area, and the men had free access
to civilian areas. The Signal Training Centre, Depot and Records employed large
numbers of civilians, through whom political developments found their way into
the military camp and the idle minds of the men, easily converting them into
‘devils’ workshops’.
At
that time, units were given cash to purchase condiments, which were not being
supplied with rations. There had been a delay in purchase of condiments with
the resultant deterioration in the quality of food being prepared in the langars
(Other Ranks messes in the Indian Army are generally called thus. The term
is taken from the free kitchen in a gurudwara, the place of worship for
Sikhs). The personnel responsible for purchasing condiments were often corrupt,
and the quantity and quality of condiments was much below the prescribed
standards. This applied also to the rations supplied to the men through the
supply depot manned by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. Other then rations,
even other stores and amenities authorised to the men were frequently pilfered.
The general standard of the men’s cookhouses, living quarters, bathrooms and
urinals was poor. Unlike in operational units, there was very little contact
between the officers and the men, whose grievances often went unnoticed or
unredressed. The quality of Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) and
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) posted in instructional appointments in the
STC was usually good, but the same could not be said of the supervisory staff
responsible for administration, some of whom had been in Jubbulpore for several
years, developing a callous attitude towards the men and their problems.
A
feature unique to technical arms such as the Indian Signal Corps was the
presence of a large number of British soldiers in every unit and establishment.
Before the war, most of the technical trades in the Indian Signal Corps were
open only to British Other Ranks (BOR), with Indian Other Ranks being eligible
for the ‘lower’ trades such as operator visual, despatch rider, lineman, MT
driver etc. Before the war, the Indian Signal Corps comprised about two
thousand BOR, with the number of IOR being almost twice that number. When the
war ended, the number of BOR had gone up ten times to almost twenty thousand,
while the number of IOR had grown thirty times to sixty thousand. The rapid
expansion of the Corps necessitated several new trades being opened to Indians,
who began to be recruited as mechanics, operators and electricians. By the end
of the war Indians were employed in all jobs that were being done earlier by
Europeans, the exception being ciphers, which was not opened to Indians until Independence
A seemingly
inconsequential cause for discontent was the bad quality of gur
(jaggery) being supplied to the troops by resorting to local purchase. This had
been officially reported to the Centre Headquarters on 25 February 1946.
However, the decision on the complaint or the progress was not communicated to
the men. On 26 February a number of notices were seen pasted on the company
notice boards in the lines of the Demob Centre and No. 4 Depot Company. Some
notices had ‘Jai Hind’ written on them, while others called upon all Indian
Other Ranks to cease work and, if necessary, shed blood. The notices were seen in the morning by
Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Anderson, Officer Commanding Indian Signals Depot, who
reported this to the Commandant, Colonel R.T.H. Geltson. Viewing the situation
as serious, Colonel Gelston immediately sought an interview with the Area
Commander, to report on an ‘Intelligence’ matter. At 3 pm, Colonel Gelston and
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson met the Area Commander and apprised him of the
notices. In the evening, all officers were called for a conference and
explained the developments. At about 6 pm all IOR of Records were paraded and
the Company Commander, Captain DS Garewal, addressed them, in the presence of
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson and the Officer in Charge Records, Lieutenant
Colonel C.M. Macdonald. The men were calm during the address, and there was no
untoward incident.
The mutiny started at
about 9.20 am on 27 February 1946 in ‘G’ Company of No. 2 Signal Training
Battalion. The first works parade was held at 7 am as usual, and the men were
drilled. All officers attended the parade which ended at about 8.30 am, when
everyone broke off for breakfast. Soon after breakfast, about 200 men, mainly
workshop trainees, formed up in the lines of the unit, just before the second
works parade was due to fall in. Most of them were in uniform, carrying flags
of the Congress and Muslim League. They formed a procession and marched out of the
unit, shouting slogans of ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’. The Senior
Viceroy Commissioned Officer of the unit, Subedar Major and Honorary Captain
Ahmed Khan, asked them to halt, but they did not listen to him. Khan
immediately telephoned the Adjutant, who was having breakfast in the Officers
Mess. The Adjutant told the Subedar Major that Major C.C. Tucker, the
officiating Commanding Officer, had left the mess about five minutes earlier
and he should await his arrival in the office. He also informed Major D.C.
Dashfield and Captain J. Knowles, Company Commander and Training Officer
respectively of ‘G’ Company, who were in the mess with him. Collecting another
officer, Captain M.B. Myers, they left for the unit area on bicycles.
Information about the crowd
collecting and shouting slogans in front of the guard room of No 2 Signal
Training Battalion had also reached Colonel Gelston, whose office was located
just a hundred yards away. Gelston saw
the crowd leave the unit area and move along Peter’s Path, which led towards
No. 3 Signal Training Battalion and the Signals Depot. He telephoned the Area
Headquarters and also the Depot, warning them that that the crowd might come
that way. The Depot Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, was then in his
bungalow. When Gelston rang him up, he told him that he had called for a 15-cwt.
vehicle and was planning to come to his office, to report that notices had
again been seen during the morning parade. Gelston informed Anderson
Meanwhile, the
procession was proceeding on Peter’s Path, along Napier Road
Colonel Gelston and
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson reached the crowd as they were coming out of No. 3
Signal Training Battalion. They were soon joined by Major Dashfield and Captain
Knowles. The four officers got out of their vehicles and tried to stop the men,
who just rushed past them and marched through the Depot. They were very excited
and seemed completely out of hand, shouting slogans and waving party flags.
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson kept moving with the head of the column while
Colonel Gelston got in the truck and asked the driver to start. The truck was
soon surrounded by the mutineers and some even tried to get in. Gelston ordered
the driver to keep moving forward slowly. At one stage the driver’s foot slipped
off the pedal and the truck bounded forward, knocking over two men. Due to the
heavy rush, even Anderson Anderson
Realising that they would not be able to stop
the procession on their own, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson collected about15 men
and issued them with rifles. He also armed Dashfield and Knowles with pistols
and the party moved in a lorry towards the procession, which had already passed
through the Depot. Overtaking the crowd on the Outram Road Anderson Nerbudda Road Gorakhpur
Two Viceroy’s
Commissioned Officers of ‘G’ Company followed the crowd and attempted to fid
out their complaints. The main grievances of the men were: 4
·
Differences
in pay between IORs & BORS.
·
Poor
quality of rations.
·
Why
was fire opened on RIN ratings?
·
Why
were two INA officers sentenced to seven years RI when others were merely cashiered?
Undeterred by the attempts to stop
them the crowd proceeded towards the city. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Tillaya,
they stopped and held a meeting, where speeches were made by some of the men
highlighting their grievances. There was a lot of slogan shouting and waving of
flags of Congress and Muslim League. Some of them went to the local office of
the Congress Party and sought the help of the local political leaders. An
officer from the Intelligence Branch of Area Headquarters and some officers
from the Signal Training Centre also went to the venue in civil dress and noted
down the names of the prominent persons taking an active part in the meeting
and discussions.
The news of the incident spread
quickly. There was considerable tension in the city and shopkeepers closed
their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there was no violence or
unruly behaviour by the men. At about 4.15 pm they started back for the unit.
By this time the military authorities had mobilised two companies of 27 Jat and
two ID (Internal Disturbance) companies of the Signal Training Centre in case
force was required to carry out arrests. But the crowd entered the lines
peacefully and sat down in the battalion area. The troops earmarked for
effecting arrests were therefore asked to stand down. The ID companies, which
had taken over the main guard, kot (armoury) and magazine guard were
later relieved by the Jat troops. The ‘ring-leaders’, whose names had been
noted down by the Area Intelligence Officer and by other officers from Signal
Training Centre, were asked to fall out when their names were called, which
they did without any protest. Major C.C.
Tucker, the officiating Commanding Officer of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion,
ordered a Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer to march the ringleaders to the main
quarter guard. Sensing what was going to happen next, the others pulled them
back into the crowd.
Soon afterwards, the Commandant,
Colonel L.C. Boyd arrived, followed by the Area Commander, who addressed the
men. He told them that they were all under arrest, but assured them that he
would forward their grievances to higher authorities. They fell in and were
marched to the Signal Training Centre Cage where the Commandant noted down
their demands, which were as under:- 5
·
Increase of basic pay
·
Increase of rations
·
Better accommodation
·
Equal treatment with British Other Ranks
·
Speedier demobilisation
·
Protest against speeches of the Commander-in-Chief and
Admiral Godfrey - the passage that if Indian Army soldiers are indisciplined
every force would be used against them
·
Release of all INA prisoners including Captain Rashid and
Burhanuddin.
·
Unnecessary to spend one crore on Victory celebrations when
there is food crisis in India
·
Ready to work if the demands are put forward. We did no
indiscipline while out. Pray no action against us.
After taking down their grievances
the Commandant spoke to the men and left. When the afternoon parade was
dismissed a number of men of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion approached the
cage and started milling around shouting words of encouragement. Those who
wished to join their friends inside the cage were allowed to do so and the rest
were ordered to return, which they did. After dark the same thing occurred. The
men inside the cage refused food and bedding. When the Commandant came to know
of this he entered the cage and spoke to the men, after which they agreed to
eat food and accepted bedding. Apart from sporadic slogans, the night passed without
incident.
By
early next morning, a British battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had
arrived in Jubbulpore . A party of about 80 men
from No. 2 Signal Training Battalion assembled in the unit at 7 am and began
moving along the same route that had been taken by their colleagues on the
previous day, but before they could cover any substantial distance, they were
intercepted by a platoon of the British battalion. When addressed by various
officers, a few of them agreed to return to work but the remainder were left on
the roadside under the guard of British troops.
At
9 am No. 2 Signal Training Battalion was paraded. Major Tucker and Colonel Boyd addressed the
men and asked to return to work. Though the men remained orderly they refused,
saying that they could not do so because their comrades were in custody. If
they were let out, they would all go back to work. They were asked to return to
their lines and remain quiet, which they readily agreed to do. At about 10 am
personnel of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion became restive, and about 100 men
joined the clerks of the Records and sat down with them, demanding the release
of the men inside the cage. Some officers and Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
tried to talk them out of this demand, but very few responded. A few men from
the ID companies who had been asked to stand down took off their equipment and
joined the crowd.
The District Commander, Major General Skinner
arrived to get a first hand account of the events. In consultation with the
Area Commander and the Commandant Signal Training Centre, a plan was made to
arrest the ringleaders. The officiating Commanding Officer and the Subedar
Major would enter the cage to reason with the men and try to effect the arrests
placidly. If this were to fail, then the ringleaders would be pointed out to
the Company Commander of the Somerset Light Infantry, who would make the
arrests forcibly. Major Tucker, Lieutenant Waugh and Subedar Major Khan entered
the cage and reasoned with the men for over an hour without success. The
Second-in-Command of 27 Jat and Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose, an Indian officer
who had been called from Katni, then entered the cage and spent another hour,
but failed to induce the ringleaders to give themselves up. There was no
recourse left except the use of force.
About
80 soldiers of the Somerset Light Infantry entered the Cage, with bayonets
fixed on their rifles. A few of the men were physically removed, amidst a lot
of shouting. Faced with the bayonets of the British troops, the crowd retreated
to one corner of the cage, which gave way under the weight of sheer numbers. A
large number managed to escape through the gap, while the remainder were
involved a scuffle with the British troops. Many sustained injuries from
bayonets and some were trampled in the stampede. The injured were immediately
removed to the hospital. Some of the men who escaped rushed towards the city
but others who were very frightened hid in huts in the lines or in the local
countryside. Information about the escapees was conveyed to the police and the
civil authorities, with a request to arrest them and bring them back at the
earliest.
The
news of the bayonet charge spread like wild fire in the Signal Training Centre
and at many places the men came out and demonstrated against this, resulting in
some more arrests. At 6 pm 14 men returned voluntarily, followed by some more
in smaller groups of two or three. They were all placed under arrest and put in
the guardroom. At about 7.30 pm information was received from the local police
that about 200 men who had been rounded up by them were being returned in
police lorries. The District Commander and Commandant Signal Training Centre
met these men when they arrived. The injured were sent to the hospital while
the rest were sent to the Jat lines. Meanwhile, about 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion continued to sit
in the Records lines.
While events had taken a
serious turn in the Signal Training Centre on 28 February 1946, things were far
from normal in the Depot and Records. In the morning about 200 clerks of the
Records collected near 4 Company lines and marched towards the Depot Battalion.
The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, turned out his Internal
Defence Company and followed them, accompanied by his Second-in-Command and
Captain D.S. Garewal of Signals Records. They met the crowd of mutineers on the
bridge near the Indian
Military Hospital Outram Road
A company of the
Somerset Light Infantry had been placed around the lines of No. 4 Company. With
the help of some British soldiers, the Brigade Major of 17 Indian Infantry
Brigade, Major K.B. Langdon, arrested four Indian Other Ranks who were then
marched away. After these arrests and the departure of the Area Commander,
about 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion rushed into the 4 Company
lines and joined the mutineers, accompanied by a lot of shouting. Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Macdonald, the
Officer-in-Charge Records and Captain Macfarlane, Adjutant No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion tried to quieten the men. After about ten minutes the newly
arrived recruits sat down behind the mutineers already seated there. Some more
officers from No. 3 Signal Training Battalion arrived and tried to persuade
their men to return to their lines but failed. The total number of mutineers
present in No.4 Company had now swelled to almost 350. The Commandant Indian
Signals Depot and Records, Colonel Gelston spoke to them about their grievances
and promised to do all that could be done to remove them. The men also demanded
the release of the four men arrested earlier and the removal of British troops.
At 4 pm the British troops were withdrawn without any visible reaction from the
mutineers. The night of 28 February passed off without any further incident.
In the early hours of 1
March 1946, about 150 Other Ranks from 3 Signal Training Battalion left their
lines and marched in a procession towards Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans and
waving flags. This information was conveyed to Area Headquarters, which ordered
a company from Somerset Light Infantry to proceed to the garrison ground, where
the crowd was reported to have be headed for. At 7.30 am the Commanding
Officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.B.S. Eraut, the Adjutant, Captain Facfarlane and
Jemadar Natesan, a Madrassi Mussalman interpreter, proceeded to the Garrison
Ground but found no trace of the procession. Colonel Eraut went to the Area
Headquarters, while Captain Facfarlane and Jemadar Natesan searched for the
crowd in the city and the cantonment, without success. On their return to the
unit they discovered that 24 men from the Internal Disturbance Company had
joined the procession. The Commanding Officer ordered the Internal Disturbance
Company to stand down, and the British guard to take over.
At about 9 am
information was received that the procession was coming back in an endeavour to
mobilise the remainder of the unit. The Commanding Officer positioned a few
officers and Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers to meet the procession when it
reached the lines and divert them to the football ground. The Commandant
reached the unit shortly before the arrival of the procession at 9.45 am.
Efforts to guide them to the football ground failed and they moved towards the
staging camp. They were stopped en route and the Commanding Officer began to
address them. At first he was shouted down but eventually succeeded in making
them sit down and listen. The Commandant then addressed the men and listened to
their points. Since it was the morning break the rest of No. 3 Signal Training
Battalion also gathered round to listen. After the Commandant left for the Area
Headquarters, the Commanding Officer ordered the unit to parade for normal
work. This order was not immediately obeyed but after about twenty minutes all
the men less the demonstrators returned to work. At about 11.30 am Lieutenant
Colonel Poonoose arrived and addressed the men for over an hour, after which a
few of them returned to work. It appeared that many more were willing but were
being prevented by the leaders.
At about 13.15 pm the
Subedar Major reported to the Commanding Officer that the demonstrators were
requesting permission to go to the cook house and have their food, and promised
to return to normal duties after that. The Commanding Officer agreed making it
clear that the normal course of military law would be followed. Shortly after
this the Subedar Major accompanied by 11 men left for the Records lines in
order to persuade the party of mutineers from No. 3 Signal Training Battalion
who were sitting there to return. He came back after 30 minutes and reported
that he had not only failed in convincing the mutineers but had lost two men of
this party, who had been persuaded to join them. After lunch, all the men
except for those still in Records attended the afternoon works parade.
The situation in No. 4
Company of Records on 1 March continued to be tense. Captain Garewal, the
Company Commander attended the first works parade at 8 am and found only two
men present. The mutineers were still sitting between the first and second
barracks, where they had been the previous day. Most of them were seated in orderly
ranks, with a few standing around and talking. At about 10.30 pm they became
noisy and began to form a procession, taking down several Congress and Muslim League
flags from the open ground between the barracks and the road where they had
been erected the previous day. However, there were many among them who shouted
to the men to stay in the lines, and the procession broke up into small
groups. At about midday the flags were
re-erected. Shortly afterwards a deputation led by the Subedar Major of No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion arrived to persuade their men to return. There was a heated
discussion followed by a lot of pulling and pushing, and some men were
physically prevented from going back.
At the second works
parade, not a single man fell in on the parade ground. The Officer-in-Charge
Records was informed that some men would go to work individually but were
afraid to come to the parade ground. At about 4.15 pm, Colonel Gelston and
Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose arrived and met the men. Poonoose spoke to men with
all officers present, and later alone. At 5.45 pm, Colonel Gelston and
Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose left to meet the Area Commander. At the Roll Call
parade at 6 pm, 41 men were present. The rest of the men were still sitting
between the two barracks, but were quiet.
The previous day’s
incidents had been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable
resentment at the bayonet charge on the Indian soldiers. According to the
newspapers, three men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet
charge. The District Magistrate, Mr. E.S. Hyde declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a
restricted area, and the entry of civilians was banned. Notices to this effect
were pasted at prominent places and also announced by the beat of drum.
Headquarters Jubbulpore Area had also issued instructions confining all troops
to lines. Another infantry battalion, the First Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR) had
also arrived.
On 2 March 1946,
Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose again spoke to the mutineers in Records and No.3
Signal Training Battalion. He reported that he had failed to make any headway
and found that some men who had appeared to be amenable the previous day were
now obdurate. During the day, a message from Major General F.H. Skinner,
General Officer Commanding Nagpur District was read out to all ranks, in
English and Urdu. Making it clear that the action of the men who had
collectively absented themselves from their lines without permission amounted
to mutiny, it went on to assure that there would be no mass punishment and
‘justice would be tempered with mercy’. The message also appreciated the
conduct of those who had remained staunch to their duty in the ‘face of
provocation and bad example’.6
During the day,
conditions improved. In No. 2 Signal Training Battalion, all men reported for
the first works parade except for nine, who also reported after half an hour.
In No. 3 Signal Training Battalion all
men resumed duties except for the 100 men in Records and those detained in the
Jat lines. Major Dashfield visited the Jat lines with some Viceroy’s
Commissioned Officers and tried to bring back some of the men, but they refused
to come unless the ringleaders were released as well. Colonel Gelston and
Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose visited the mutineers in Records in the morning at
7.30 am. Poonoose spoke to them for about half an hour but found them in the
same frame of mind. He noticed that some men whom he had spoken to the previous
day were missing, and suspected that they had been forcibly prevented from
attending his talk.
At 12.30 pm, Captain
Garewal read out the District Commander’s message, twice in Urdu and once in
English, using a pubic address system. Everyone heard this in silence. During
the afternoon, all was quiet and there was no shouting of slogans. At the
evening roll call, 268 men were present.
At 9 pm, the mutineers announced that they were willing to end the
mutiny. They burned their flags and started reporting at the office, where
their names were noted down. The 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training battalion
returned to their lines. By 11 pm, it appeared that all mutineers had
surrendered, except the ones in the Jat lines.
On 3 March 1946 a roll
call parade was held in all units at 9 am. Immediately afterwards some
ringleaders were arrested and sent to the Jat lines. Troops of 17 Indian
Infantry Brigade had placed a cordon around the lines. The Area Commander and
Commandant Signal Training Centre visited the mutineers in the Jat lines. They
said that they were willing to come back if all of them were released. The
ringleaders among them had been segregated and without them the others refused
to return to their units. During the next two days, the situation improved, but
was still far from normal. The men in the Jat lines refused to come out until their
leaders were released. There were no incidents on 4 and 5 March and normal
parades were held in the units. On 7 March all the men in the Jat lines
returned. On reaching their units they staged a protest for the release of the
ringleaders, threatening to go on strike again if this was not done. However,
the threat did not materialise and there were no untoward incidents after 7
March 1946. The mutiny was over.
The mutiny had shocked the military establishment,
especially the British officers who had always believed that the Indian soldier
would never rebel. The reasons for the disaffection were quickly analysed and
remedial measures taken. The District Commander issued instructions to all
concerned to improve the standard of food and accommodation. Lieutenant Colonel
Cassani from the Welfare General’s Branch visited the lines of the Indian
Signals Depot on 6 March 1946 and submitted a detailed report at General
Headquarters (India Jubbulpore , those who had been there for over two years
were immediately posted out. The number of Indian officers was increased, so
that they could understand the problems of Indian troops.
Disciplinary action taken against
those who participated in the mutiny was severe and swift. Those against whom
there was even the slightest inkling were punished. Most of them were charged
under Indian Army Act Section 27 (a) – ‘joining, exciting, causing or
conspiring in a mutiny’ – and Army Act Section 27 (b) – ‘being present at a
mutiny and not using his utmost endeavours to suppress the same’. A total of 85 men were found to have been
actively involved in the mutiny. Eighteen men were tried by Summary General
Court Martial, of which 15 were sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment ranging
from one to three years, with three being acquitted. Seven men were dismissed
without trial and 19 discharged without terminal benefits. In addition, 41 were
discharged from service on
administrative grounds – services no longer required - without any enquiry or investigation. Many
more were sent home merely on suspicion and the statements of Viceroy’s and non
commissioned officers that were considered loyal by British officers. Most of
these men had put in long years of service and fought in World War II. They did
not get any pension or gratuity and many lived and died in penury. Their pleas
for redress fell on deaf years as instructions were also issued not to
entertain any petition or appeal unless Army Headquarters recommended it. Old
records contain several letters that bring out the pathetic state of these
unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt and helped the British
win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the British sense of fair
play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at the treatment they
received at the hands of the Government of the day.
Though bad food and living conditions were the major
reasons behind the mutiny at Jubbulpore , it
had a political tinge right from the beginning. The firing on the naval ratings
at Bombay
During a press conference on 3 March
1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru referred o the Jubbulpore mutiny, and said, ‘…the
men ... have remained completely peaceful…The demands were for better treatment
in regard to rations, amenities etc, and equality of treatment between Indian
and British soldiers. There were also some political demands… Such demands
should not normally be made on the basis of a strike… We have seen recently
strikes by American and British servicemen’.8
Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party
raised the matter in the Central Assembly in Delhi
The Army mutiny at Jubbulpore
followed the mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy.
It is pertinent to remember that one of the compelling reasons for the
departure of the British from India India
The mutiny in the Signal Training Centre and the Indian
Signal Corps Depot and Records at Jubbulpore
was only major uprising in the Indian Army after the end of World War II. It
was also the last uprising by soldiers under the British Raj. In a sense, it
was the proverbial ‘last straw’ that broke the camel’s back. Fearful of the
effect it might have on the rest of the Army, news about the mutiny was
deliberately suppressed. Having occurred in a small town, it was almost ignored
by the national newspapers based in Delhi and Bombay Independence Jubbulpore mutiny exists in the
National Archives or the Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence. As a
result, it has been ignored by military historians as well those who have
written about the freedom struggle. The men involved in the mutiny have also
suffered – unlike the participants in the naval mutiny, they have not been
classified as freedom fighters.
ENDNOTES
This chapter is largely
based on N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon’s The Transfer of Power (London , 1982); Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes’ Fidelity and
Honour (New Delhi, 1993); and various files and documents in the Corps of
Signals Museum, Jabalpur
1. STC to GHQ (I), 27 Nov. 1945, Signals
Museum (SM), Jabalpur
2. GHQ (I) to Comdt. ISC Depot & Records, 21 Feb 1946,
(SM), 242-C, fol.92
3. STC to Jubbulpore Area, 9 Mar. 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.93
4. STC to Jubbulpore Area, 27 Feb. 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.134
5. Appx. ‘B’ to STC to
Jubbulpore Area, 8 Mar 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.95
6. Richards to Boyd, Gelston and Anderson
7. Dipak Kumar Das, Revisiting
Talwar, (Delhi
8 Lt Gen. S.L.
Menezes, Fidelity and Honour (New Delhi, 1993), p. 404
9. Statement of Mr. Philip Mason, ICS, War Secretary, in the
Central Legislative Assembly on 15 March 1946.
10. N. Mansergh and
Penderel Moon (ed.), The Transfer of Power (12 vols, London
No comments:
Post a Comment