THE STC MUTINY - 1946
In February 1946, there was a
mutiny at the STC, Jubbulpore. It was by no means the first such incident in
the Indian Army. Starting with the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857, Indian troops
had often rebelled against British authority. Even during World War II, there
were several revolts and mutinies, the most well-known being the Suez Canal
Army Revolt (1943); the Ambala Cantt. Army Revolt (1943); the Jhansi Regiment
Case (1940) and the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny (1946), the last one having
occurred less than two weeks prior to the Jubbulpore mutiny. Then there were
the troops who joined the Indian National Army (INA) after being captured by
the Japanese or deserting their units. These were classified as Japanese
Inspired Forces (JIF) by the British authorities.
At that time, there were
two major establishments of the ISC at Jubbulpore. The first was the Signal
Training Centre (STC) comprising No. 1 Signal Training Battalion (Military) and
2 & 3 Signal Battalions (Technical). The second was the Indian Signal Depot
& Records, which comprised the Indian Signals Depot; the Indian Signals
Demobilisation Centre; and the Indian Signals Records. The Commandant of the
STC was Colonel L.C. Boyd, while Colonel R.T.H. Gelston, commanded the Depot
& Records. Both these establishments came under the Jubbulpore Area,
commanded by Brigadier Hutchins, which in turn came under the GOC Nagpur
District, Major General Skinner, with his headquarters at Nagpur. HQ Central
Command was then located at Agra.
The
mutiny started at 0920 hours on 27 February 1946. (The personnel involved
referred to their action as a strike). About 200 men, mainly workshop trainees
from G Company of 2 Signal Training Battalion formed up in the lines of the
unit, just before the second works parade was due to fall in. Shouting slogans,
they marched through the unit to the lines of 3 Signal Training Battalion,
brushing past the Company Commander and Subedar Major who tried to stop them
near the Quarter Guard. Marching through the Depot, they proceeded towards the
city shouting ‘Jai Hind’(glory to India) and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’(long
live freedom), and waving flags of the Congress party and the Muslim
League. The CO of the Depot Battalion, Lieutetant Colonel Anderson and a party of 15 armed NCOs tried
to stop them near the Nerbudda Club and even threatened to shoot, but this did
not deter them from continuing their march. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Tillaya
in the city, they stopped and held a meeting, where speeches were made by some
of the men, accompanied by slogans and waving of flags.
The
news of the incident spread quickly. There was considerable tension in the city
and shopkeepers closed their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there
was no violence or unruly behaviour by the men. At about 1615 hours they
started back for the unit. By this time the military authorities had mobilised
two companies of 27/9 Jats to assist the STC in containing the uprising. Having
reached the unit, the protesters sat down in the Battalion Arena. The
Commandant, Colonel L.C. Boyd arrived, and the names of all the men were taken
down. Soon afterwards, the Area Commander arrived and addressed the men. He
told them that they were all under arrest, but assured them that he would
forward their grievances to higher authorities. They fell in and were marched
to the STC Cage where the Commandant noted down their grievances. These were
discrimination in pay between Indian and British other ranks; poor quality of
rations; slow speed of demobilisation; protest against the firing in Bombay,
Karachi and Calcutta; protest against the expenditure on Victory celebrations
in view of the food crisis; and the release of all INA prisoners including
Captains Burhanuddin and Abdul Rashid.
They indicated that they were ready to go back to work if their demands
were met. After taking down their grievances the Commandant spoke to the men
and left. The men remained in the Cage during the night, and were given food
and bedding.
By
early next morning, a British battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had
arrived in Jubbulpore. A party of about 80 men from 2 Signal Training Battalion
assembled in the unit at 0700 hours and began moving along the same route that
had been taken by their colleagues on the previous day. They were intercepted
by a platoon of the British battalion and brought back to the unit. About 200
clerks of the Records also collected at one place. They were joined by about a
hundred men from 3 Signal Training Battalion, who sat down and refused to go to
work, demanding the release of their colleagues who were still inside the Cage.
The District Commander, Major General
Skinner arrived on the scene, and it was decided to arrest the ring
leaders only. The Second-in-Command of the 27/9 Jats and Lieutenant
Colonel Poonose entered the Cage and
tried to induce the ring leaders to give themselves up. However, the rest of
the men did not allow this and became restless. Finally it was decided to carry
out the arrests by force.
About
80 soldiers of the Somerset Light Infantry entered the Cage, with bayonets
fixed on their rifles. A few of the men were physically removed, amidst a lot
of shouting. Faced with the bayonets of the British troops, the crowd retreated
to one corner of the cage, which gave way under the weight of sheer numbers. A
large number managed to escape through the gap, while the remainder were
involved a scuffle with the British troops. Many were injured by bayonets and
some were trampled in the stampede. Most of those who escaped were caught and
brought back, to be kept in custody in the Jat lines.
The
news of the bayonet charge spread like wild fire in the STC and at many places
the men came out and demonstrated against this, resulting in some more arrests.
In the early hours of 1 March, about 150 ORs from 3 Signal Training Battalion
left their lines and marched through Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans and waving
flags, but returned to the unit within an hour. The previous day’s incidents had
been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable resentment at
the bayonet charge on the Indian soldiers. According to the newspapers, three
men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet charge. The District
Magistrate declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a restricted area, and the entry of
civilians was banned. During the next two days, the situation improved, but was
still far from normal. The men in the Cage refused to come out until their
leaders were released. On 3 March, troops of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade placed
a cordon around the STC lines. The Area Commander and Commandant spoke to the
men and asked them to return to work. Most of them agreed, and normal parades
were held in the units. During the next two days several men returned and
joined duty. By 7 March 1946 the situation had become normal and
there were no untoward incidents.
Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party raised the matter
in the Central Assembly in Delhi. In his reply on 15 March 1946, the War
Secretary, Mr. P. Mason gave the official version of the case. According to
him, 1,716 persons were involved in the mutiny. He accepted that thirty-five
persons had been wounded of whom eight had bayonet wounds. However, he denied
that there was any firing or bayonet charge. According to him, some persons had
sustained bayonet wounds when they attempted to overpower the troops that had
been called in to arrest the ringleaders. Only two persons were seriously
injured and there were no deaths. Mr. Ahmad Jaffar of the Muslim League
suggested that a couple of members of the Defence Consultative Committee should
be associated with the Inquiry, but this was rejected by the War Secretary, who
contended that this was a service matter and it would be quite illegal to
associate non-officials.
The
mutiny shocked the military establishment, especially the British officers who
had always believed that the Indian soldiers would never rebel. The reasons for
the disaffection were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken. The
District Commander issued instructions to all concerned to improve the standard
of food and accommodation. Lieutenant Colonel Santos Cassani of the Welfare
General Branch at GHQ visited the Centre. His report brought to light the
pathetic conditions under which the Indian troops lived. Officers, VCOs and
NCOs who had been posted at the STC for more than two years were immediately
posted out, after it was found that some of them had been there for 8-10 years.
The SO-in-C, Major General C.H.M. Vulliamy directed that more Indian officers
should be posted to the Centre, so that they could understand the problems of
Indian troops. In April 1946 Lieutenant
Colonel T.K. Mukerjee and Major Bhat
were posted in as CO and Second-in-Command of 2 Signal Training Battalion. Soon
afterwards, Captain K.K. Tewari was posted to the STC as the Adjutant and Major
Tery Barreto as OC ‘G’ Company, which had led the mutiny.
Disciplinary action taken against those who participated in
the mutiny was severe and swift. 41 persons were tried Summary General Court
Martial, of which 18 were sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment ranging from
one to three years, and 20 were dismissed. The three who were acquitted were
later discharged. In addition 41 men were discharged without any enquiry or
investigation, on the grounds ‘services no longer required’. Many more were
sent home merely on suspicion and the statements of JCOs and NCOs who were
considered loyal by British officers. Most of these men had put in long years
of service and fought in World War II. They did not get any pension or gratuity
and many lived and died in penury and their pleas for redress fell on deaf
years. The letters in old files bring out the pathetic state of these
unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt and helped the British
win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the British sense of fair
play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at the treatment they
received at the hands of the Government of the day.
The Naval mutiny at Bombay had resulted in bad publicity
for the Government, since it had to be suppressed by the use of force. The STC
mutiny at Jubbulpore started a few days later, and once again force had to be
used to quell it. The Indian Navy then was a miniscule force, and the Army could
easily handle disaffection in its ranks. But what if the Army itself was
alienated? The prospect was too fearsome to even imagine and caused
consternation and panic in Delhi and London. The STC mutiny played a part not
only in the British decision to grant Independence but also the pronouncement
advancing the date from June 1948 to August 1947, a fact that has been
documented and commented by several authors and historians.
Major General Shahid Hamid, who was then private
secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the C-in-C in India made an
entry in his diary dated on 30 March 1946. He wrote:-
‘Today the Hindustan Times commented editorially
on the Auk’s appeal to the Indian Army. “There is no doubt whatever that if the
transfer of power is not quickly brought about, the foreign rulers of India
cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian Army…”6
There
were similarities between the RIN Mutiny and the STC Mutiny. The grounds for
both were similar - bad food, unhygienic living conditions, discrimination
between British and Indian troops, ill treatment by British officers, delay in
demobilisation and resentment against the INA trials. Both mutinies were started by signallers, the
one at Jubbulpore by personnel of the Signal Corps and the one at Bombay by
personnel of H.M.I.S. ‘Talwar’, a shore establishment that trained
wireless operators. Though they started on different dates, both mutinies
finished on the same date i.e. 3 March 1946. However, where the two mutinies
differed was in scale and the use of violence. The Jubbulpore mutiny was
localized in a few units of the STC, and did not spread to other Army units
located nearby. In Bombay, the mutiny embraced almost the entire naval fleet
and spread to Karachi, Calcutta and several other naval stations. The mutineers
in Bombay used the ships’ wireless system to spread the word to 70 ships and 20
seashore establishments. They also secured the telephone exchange, the cable
network and the transmitter at Kirkee, which was used for communication between
India and UK. The Jubbulpore mutiny was characterized by non-violence. It was a
passive demonstration by soldiers who only wanted their grievances to be heard.
The ratings at Bombay resorted to widespread looting and damaged government
property, the first target being the duty free canteen, which was ransacked of
all imported goods, especially vast quantities of scotch whisky. They also
removed weapons from the armoury and opened fire, which had to be silenced by
use of howitzers and mortars, resulting in several deaths. Several cars in the
city were set on fire, and police officers were burnt alive. 7
1 comment:
My father G.B.Mirza (Ghouse Baig Mirza) led the mutiny of RIAF at Ambala on Feb 22nd 1946 and was hailed as 'Hero of Ambala'
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