tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-80103207107068065362024-03-06T19:34:11.646-08:00veekay's history bookveekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.comBlogger61125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-13385859954359559512022-07-27T09:05:00.000-07:002022-07-27T09:05:07.979-07:00THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE TRUTH – AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP<p> </p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE TRUTH – AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">By<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Maj Gen VK Singh<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Twice during the last one week, the Chief Justice of
India has spoken about the trustworthiness of our newspapers and news channels.
There was a time before the advent of TV and smart phones, when newspapers and
radio were the only source of news for the citizenry. Right up to the middle of
the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, before transistors began to used, radios were
expensive and could be afforded only by the upper classes. For the common man,
the only source of news was the newspaper. It had the advantage of being
inexpensive, light in weight and unbreakable. It was also dependable and
trustworthy, when compared to news one heard from friends, relatives and shop
keepers, often referred to as <i>bazaar gossip</i>. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In recent years, there have
been several instances of fake news being circulated by the electronic as well
as print media. This has severely dented their dependability and
trustworthiness. Surprising as it may seem, the relationship between newspapers
and the truth has always been an uneasy one. In fact, the genesis of the secrecy
laws in India, culminating in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, which is still in
force, was the news report in the</span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Amrita Bazar Patrika </span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">in 1889, which led to the enactment of the Indian
Official Secrets Act, 1889.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
September 1889 the Official Secrets Act was passed in Britain. It was
applicable to India, but since it was considered unsuitable to the Indian legal
system, it was decided to enact a separate law for India. The Army wanted
certain changes to be introduced in the Indian version and a bill to ‘<span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Prevent the Disclosure of Official Documents
and Information’ was intended to be enacted separately in India. </span>The
Viceroy’s Council met at the Viceregal Lodge, Simla, on Thursday, the 17<sup>th</sup>
October, 1889. After the bill had been introduced by Mr Scoble, the President
of the Council, Lord Lansdowne made some interesting comments which are
reproduced below:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Extract from the
Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor General of India,
assembled for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations under the provisions
of the Act of Parliament 24 & 25 Vict., Cap. 67.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">His Excellency THE
PRESIDENT said-<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -2.3pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“Our
hon’ble colleague, Mr. Scoble, on moving for leave to introduce this Bill,
expressed his opinion that a measure of the sort has long been required in
India.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That opinion I entirely share: I
have seen enough during the comparatively short time which I have spent in this
country to satisfy me that, unless legislation of this kind is resorted to, the
interests of the public are likely to suffer materially.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is scarcely necessary to enlarge on the
consequences which must ensure if the kind of treachery which is involved in
the disclosure of official documents and information, and in the procuring of
such information by persons interested in publishing it, is allowed to remain
unpunished; and I believe that it is absolutely necessary for the Government of
India to hold in its hand a weapon which can, if necessary, be used with
exemplary effect against those who are guilty of such practices. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -2.3pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -2.3pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I trust, however, that I shall not
be understood as suggesting that, in my opinion, it is upon punitive measures
such as this that the Government of India should rely for the maintenance of
the degree of secrecy which is indispensable for the proper conduct of certain
classes of public business. I rejoice to think that those whose opportunist—I
mean than members of the public service—deserve, as a general rule, the high reputation
which they have earned for trustworthiness and discretion. The opportunities
enjoyed by such persons for obtaining access to public documents, and for
making known their contents, are almost unlimited. Such information has, as all
know, an appreciable, and sometimes a very high, commercial value. We are well
aware that persons are at all times to be found ready to encourage breaches of
official confidence, and to throw serious temptation in the way of those who
are in a position to commit then. It is, moreover, a matter of notoriety that
is sometimes spoken of as the enterprise of the public Press has of recent
years, and not in India only, led to the encouragement of such misconduct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Under such circumstances it would be strange
indeed if occasional breaches of good faith on the part of those whose daily
duties afford them the means of acquiring official knowledge did not
occur.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This Bill will give us the power
of punishing both the parties to such transaction, - the thief and the receiver
of stolen goods, - and there is every reason to expect that the passage of the
measure will have a salutary and deterrent effect.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -2.3pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I may perhaps be permitted to
enforce what I have said by referring to a recent case in which a particularly
scandalous disclosure of official information has taken place.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A Calcutta journal, the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Amrita Bazar Patrika, </i>in a recent issue published what professed to
be the text of a document described as one ‘the original of which His
Excellency will find in the Foreign Office,’ and as containing ‘the real reason
why the Maharaja of Kashmir has been deposed.’<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -2.3pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The document purports to be a
memorandum submitted to the then Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, by Sir H. M. Durand,
the Foreign Secretary, in May, 1888, and runs as follows :-<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">‘To HIS EXCELLENCY, - I do not
agree with Mr Plowden, the Resident in Cashmere, in this matter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He is too much inclined to set Cashmere aside
in all ways and to assume that if we want a thing done we must do it ourselves.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>‘The more I think of this scheme the more
clear it seems to me that we should limit our overt interference as far as
possible to the organization of responsible military force in Gilgit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So far we can hope to carry the Durbar
thoroughly with us.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we annex Gilgit,
or put an end to the suzerainty of Cashmere over the petty principalities of
the neighbourhood, and, above all, if we put British troops into Cashmere just
now, we shall run a risk of turning the Durbar against us and thereby increase
the difficulty of the position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I do not
think this is necessary.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No doubt we
must have practically the control of Cashmere relations with those
principalities, but this we already have.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Indeed, the Durbar has now, since the dismissal of Lachmun Das, asked
Mr. Plowden to advise the Gilgit authorities direct without reference to
them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we have a quiet and judicious
officer at Gilgit, who will get the Cashmere force into thorough order and
abstain from unnecessary exercise of his influence, we shall, I hope, in a
short time, have the whole thing in our hand without hurting any one’s
feelings.’<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“Up to this, the document is a
substantially accurate reproduction of a minute actually written upon the above
date by Sir Mortimer Durand, so much so that there can be no doubt whatever
that it must have been communicated to the Press by a person who had had an
opportunity of copying or committing to memory a part at all events of Sir
Mortimer Durand’s minute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A few words
only have been misquoted, but they are not of material importance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I think the Council will agree with me in
considering that there is nothing in the passage which I have read which could
be legitimately construed as revealing iniquitous designs upon the State of
Kashmir on the part of the Government of India.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It will no doubt be within the recollection of hon’ble members that, at
the time when the minute was written, there had been considerable disturbances
on the Gilgit frontier, that the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar were in revolt
against Kashmir, that Chaprot had been captured, and other places within the
territories of the Maharaja threatened by the insurgents, who had defied the
Kashmir authorities. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“These events had shown in so
striking a manner the insufficiency and weakness of the frontier administration
of the Kashmir Durbar, that proposals were submitted by the then Resident for
the purpose of coming to its assistance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>With this object Mr. Plowden advised the appointment of an English
Political Agent at Gilgit, and he was further of opinion that it might be
desirable to send British troops into Kashmir.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>These were the proposals to which the Foreign Secretary, in the document
of which I have just read a part, took exception, and in the passages which
follow in the original minute, which I have lately examined, I find that his objections
to the Resident’s proposals were throughout based upon the reason which he
assigned at the outset, namely, that Mr. Plowden was disposed to rely too much
upon British intervention, and not enough upon the efforts of the Durbar.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sir Mortimer expresses his belief that we
should ‘be able to improve and strengthen the position of the Kashmir
authorities’; that any officer whom we send up ‘should act with the consent and
assistance of the Durbar’; that ‘he should not take command of the Kashmir troops
or get up any military expeditions’; and he was to ‘give advice to the Governor
in his present military difficulties’ only ‘if the Durbar wishes it’.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“Will it be believed that the whole
of the portion of the minute from which I have taken these extracts has been
omitted or suppressed, and that in lieu of it has been inserted the passage
which I shall now proceed to read :-<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">‘Altogether
I think our first step should be to send up temporarily and quietly a selected
military officer (Captain A. Durand of the Intelligence Department) and a
junior medical officer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Both of them
will have the support of the Durbar when and where it will be necessary, and
they will not display any indiscretion, so that the Durbar may not have any
hint of the work they are about to undertake, and they will have to obtain the
consent of the Durbar in matters concerning military difficulties.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once we can establish a belief that our
undertaking is nothing but the welfare of the Durbar, we are surely to attain
our object.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Time will show that my view
is not a wrong one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In it lies, I
venture to hope, the safe realization of that object which was once contemplated
in Lord Canning’s time and afterwards it was abandoned after deliberation’. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“This extract, with the exception of
the first line and a half, in which it is recommended that an officer should be
sent up temporarily to Gilgit, is a sheer and impudent fabrication.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not only is it not to be found in Sir
Mortimer Durand’s minute, but is misrepresents him in all the most essential
particulars.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It has thus come to pass
that, on the one hand, important passages of Sir Mortimer Durand’s minute have
been altogether suppressed, and, on the other, words have been ascribed to him
which he not only never used, but which convey a meaning absolutely
inconsistent with those which he actually wrote. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“I have already called attention to
the suppression of those parts of the minute which most strikingly illustrate
the moderation of the policy which found favour with the Foreign Secretary and
which was approved by the Viceroy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When
we come to the passages for which the writer has drawn upon his own
imagination, we find a series of unfounded statements expressed in language
which those who are familiar with Sir Mortimer Durand’s style would not for a
moment mistake for his, and abounding in suggestions to the effect that our
policy in regard to Kashmir was governed by motives of the most sinister
kind.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of such a description are the
passages in which it is said that the officers sent to Gilgit are to conduct
themselves ‘so that the Durbar may not have any hint of the work that they are
about to undertake’, and the statement that, ‘once we can establish a belief
that our undertaking is nothing but the welfare of the Durbar, we are surely to
attain our object’, - an object which is subsequently described as that ‘which
was contemplated in Lord Canning’s time, and afterwards it was abandoned after
deliberation’.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“The newspaper version of the minute
ends with the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">‘Eventually
Major Mellis should go to Cashmere on the part of the Durbar and submit a
mature scheme for the better administration of the State, which is at present
very badly managed indeed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This scheme
should include the outline of our arrangements for strengthening the Government
policy. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>‘After the expiry of six months we will be in
a position to decide whether the permanent location of a Political Agency at
Gilgit, also a contingent of troops for the defence of the frontier for which
the Durbar have already agreed to put their resources and troops at the
disposal of the British Government. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 8;"> </span>(Sd.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>H. M. DURAND, <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 10;"> </span>6<sup>th</sup>
May.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">‘Very
well,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 3;"> </span>‘(Sd.) DUFFERIN,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 5;"> </span>10<sup>th</sup>
May.’<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“Upon these passages I have only to
observe that the earlier portion is rendered with complete inaccuracy, Sir M.
Durand never having recommended that Major Mellis should submit a scheme for
the administration of the State, but merely that that officer should at a later
date go to Kashmir in order to confer with the Durbar in regard to its offer of
aid for the defence of the frontier.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
concluding sentence is a pure fabrication, none of the words after ‘policy’
appearing in the original minute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
latter, I may add, received the Viceroy’s approval, although not in the terms
mentioned in the fabricated version. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“I have shown already what were the
objects with which the Government of India proposed, in 1888 to intervene in
the affairs of Kashmir, and within what narrow limits Sir Mortimer Durand, with
the Viceroy’s approval, was prepared to restrict that intervention; and it is
unnecessary for me to point out how full of mischievous and misleading suggestion
are the passages which I have quoted from the spurious portions of his supposed
minute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“The responsibility which rests upon
those who are ready not only to give to the public documents which they are
well aware could not have been obtained except by a distinct and criminal
breach of trust, but who are not even at the pains to satisfy themselves that
these documents are genuine, is a very serious one.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“In the present instance the
spurious information can have been published with no other object than that of
persuading the people of this country that the recent action of the Government
of India in Kashmir has been prompted by motives which have been repudiated in
official documents of the first importance as well as by the public statements
of the Secretary of State in the British Parliament.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not content with persistently misrepresenting
the Government of India, the publishers of the article have not scrupled to
present to the public a garbled version of a confidential note, written more
than a year ago, in order to give an entirely distorted account of the then
view and actions of the Government.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Neither then nor at the present time has it been the desire of the
Government of India to promote its own interests at the expense of those of the
Kashmir State; then, as now, it was our desire to see that State well and
wisely governed, with a minimum of intervention on our part, and without any
ulterior designs upon its independence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I am not without hopes that the sincerity of our motives will in process
of time come to be understood even by those who have been misled by the
persistent misrepresentation which has taken place in connection with these
matters, and I believe that an exposure of the practices to which our critics
have not scrupled to resort in the present instance may have the effect of, in
some degree, opening the eyes of the public as to the methods which have been
adopted for the purpose of prejudicing its judgment in regard to this important
case. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.0cm;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“I have thought it my duty to bring this
matter to the attention of the Council, both for the purpose of affording an
illustration of the kind of malpractice against which the Bill on the table is
directed, and also because I think it should be generally known that the new
law is intended to be put in force in such cases, and that those who publish
official documents without authority will come within its scope, whether the
persons by whom those documents have been divulged are discovered or not, and
whether the documents themselves are published in their entirety or, as in the
present instance, reproduced in a garbled and truncated form.”<sup>1</sup><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">1.
<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Legislative Department Proceedings, <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">– October 1889, No. 237, APPENDIX A35.</span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">National Archives of India (NAI).</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-64827275353681229402022-06-08T09:31:00.001-07:002022-06-08T09:31:20.304-07:00RANK, APPOINTMENT & DESIGNATION<p> </p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; mso-line-height-alt: 11.75pt; text-align: center;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">RANK, APPOINTMENT & DESIGNATION</span></b><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; mso-line-height-alt: 11.75pt; text-align: center;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">By</span></b><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; mso-line-height-alt: 11.75pt; text-align: center;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Maj Gen VK Singh</span></b><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; mso-line-height-alt: 11.75pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> </span></b><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">In recent years, there has
been a lot of debate on the correct manner of addressing officers of the Armed
Forces who have retired from service. Some recommend that the word ‘Retired’ or
abbreviation ‘Retd’ should be used after the rank e.g. Colonel (Retd) AB Singh.
Others feel that the correct method is to write ‘Retd’ after the name e.g.
Colonel AB Singh (Retd). Army HQ tried to remove the confusion and issued
a circular on 21 July 2021 clarifying that the latter option is correct, and
the name should be written as Colonel AB Singh (Retd). Unfortunately, this has
only confounded the confusion.</span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Army
officers are granted commissions that are signed personally by the President of
India. Under British rule, officers commissioned in the Indian Army before 1935
were known as Kings Commissioned Indian Officers (KCIOs). Their commissions
were signed by the King or Queen of England. Most of these officers were
granted commissions after undergoing training at Sandhurst or Woolwich in the
UK, except for a few like KM Cariappa who was trained at the Daly Cadet
College, Indore. After being commissioned, Army officers were earlier granted
the rank of Second Lieutenant. This rank has now been abolished in India and
officers are being commissioned in the rank of Lieutenant, which was earlier
granted after two years’ service as a Second Lieutenant. Thereafter
officers continue to get promotions until they retire or are released. The
highest rank in the Army is that of General, which is held by the Chief of Army
Staff. A few who are exceptionally deserving are promoted from General to Field
Marshal, who never retires. In India only two officers have reached the rank of
Field Marshal – KM Cariappa and SHFJ Manekshaw.</span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">In
India, Army</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #212121; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> officers are entitled to retain their rank
even after retirement, as per privileges given under the Constitution which was
adopted in 1950, when India became a Republic. However, the practice of
military ranks being retained after retirement was in vogue earlier also under
British rule. This tradition is followed by most countries, including the UK
and the USA. The confusion about the manner of writing ranks after retirement
was not there in the initial years after Independence. Old timers will recall
that KCIOs such as Cariappa, Nathu Singh, Maharaj Rajendra Sinhji, Thimayya,
Thorat etc. did not use the word ‘retired’ after hanging their uniforms. I am
not sure when and why this practice started. Lately the word retired has been
replaced by veteran, following the custom in most countries. In fact, the Retired
Officers Identity Card issued to officers after retirement has now been
replaced by the Indian Army Veteran Card, which has the officer’s photograph in
uniform as well as civil dress. Since this card is also issued by Army HQ, I
wonder if there was a need for the circular issued on 21 July 2021.</span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #212121; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">According to article 18 of the
Constitution ‘</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">No title, not being a military or academic
distinction, shall be conferred by the State’. Titles are used before names, in
formal correspondence as well as on invitation cards and during normal
conversation. Many professions carry titles, either by usage or as a
result of a professional or academic qualification. Medical practitioners
including dentists are universally referred to as doctors, as are those with
post graduate degrees such as Ph.D. Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court
also carry their titles, even after they retire, though this is from usage and
custom rather than any written rule. Similarly, many people who have held the
post of ambassador are now using this as a prefix, which is technically
incorrect. A person holds the appointment of ambassador in a foreign country
for a few years. It is not a title that should be used for life. In smaller
countries, the position if often held by a relatively junior member of the
Indian Foreign Service. Sometimes the appointment of ambassador is held
by a person who is not from the Indian Foreign Service. S Radhakrishnan, VK
Krishna Menon, MC Chagla, Karan Singh, Nani Palkiwala and General KM Cariappa
have held the appointments of Ambassador or High Commissioner. None of them was
from the Indian Foreign Service. And none of them used the prefix Ambassador
with their names.</span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">
As regards the All India Services such as the IAS and IPS, very few of them use
these abbreviations as a suffix after their names. Some use the designation or
last appointment held. So you may find names such as AB Singh, IAS; AB Singh,
DIG, or AB Singh, DG BSF and so on. These are all incorrect. The day an
IAS or IPS officer retires, he ceases to be a member of the service. Of course,
there is nothing wrong in mentioning his last appointment, e.g. former Cabinet
secretary; ex-DGP Haryana and so on. Again, it is a matter of individual choice
and if someone wants to add IAS or IPS after his name, it is for the particular
service or their association to take a call.</span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 16.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #222222; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Coming back to the question of
Army ranks, m</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: #212121; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">y view is that it is a matter of personal choice.
Once an officer has retired, it is entirely up to him how he writes his name.
He can write only his name or his rank and name. Considering the ethos of the
Army and the pride most of us feel, no one would like to hide his rank. If he
prefers to write Retd or Veteran after his name, so be it. A name is a precious
possession and an heirloom given to us by our parents. The rank is sacrosanct
symbolising the nation’s trust. Nothing else is important.</span><span style="color: #222222; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-7053138864907675592022-06-05T07:35:00.000-07:002022-06-05T07:35:12.386-07:00ADAPTING TO CHANGE - WHY DOES THE ARMY ALWAYS LAG BEHIND?<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">ADAPTING
TO CHANGE - WHY DOES THE ARMY ALWAYS LAG BEHIND?<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">By<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Maj
Gen VK Singh<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Change
is part of life. With time rules and trends change in every walk of life. In
almost all cases, these changes are for the better, and make our lives easier
and more comfortable. Fifty years ago, the only way to communicate with family
members and friends was the letter sent by post or telegram, unless one had a
telephone. Today, even those living in remote areas have mobile phones. Very
few people had cameras and one had to rely on professional photographers during
important occasions such as weddings and family gatherings. The only medium to
get news of what is happening in the World was the radio and newspaper, which
only the privileged few could afford. Most of the rural population did not have
access to banks and had to keep their savings in cash or gold ornaments. Even
in cities and towns, depositing and withdrawing money was a tedious process.
ATMs and online banking changed all this. Earlier, when a migrant worker wanted
to send money to his family in the village, he had to send a money order, which
took days if not weeks to reach it destinations. Today the migrant labourer
transfers money to his wife online and it reaches her instantly.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Another change concerns the identity
of the citizens. The only people who had identity cards were members of the
Armed Forces, Police and Government departments. A person without a job had
virtually no identity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One could vote,
provided his name was in the electoral rolls. With the passage of time the use
of identity cards has grown exponentially. Fifty years ago, the only card an
Armed Forces veteran had was the identity card issued by the Service HQ or
Records Office. These granted him access to almost every place including
military establishments, offices, hospitals, canteens and so on. These were valid
for life and did not have to be renewed. Of course, if one owned a weapon or a
car, one had to get a licence for its use, which needed to be renewed from time
to time. The same applied to passports for foreign travel.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When I retired twenty years ago, my identity card
was withdrawn and I was issued a Retired Officers identity card. A few years
back this card was withdrawn and I was issued a Veterans Card. With time the
number of cards kept increasing. Today a veteran officer has literally dozens
of cards. There is the veteran card, the ECHS card, the canteen card, the DSOI
membership card, the golf course membership card, the PAN card, the Aadhaar
card, the voter card, the driving licence, and so on. In addition, you have
debit cards for withdrawing cask from your bank account and credit cards for
purchasing items in shops or online. In recent years some more have been added
such as the ESM identity card from the Zila Sainik Board. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The plethora of cards have created a
number of problems, with regard to their safe custody and renewal. As one grows
older, keeping track of where each card is kept and when it is due for renewal
becomes a hassle. The issue that troubles elderly veterans the most is the process
of renewal. Almost all other agencies, government and private, have switched
over to online renewal. This applies even to the life certificate one had to
submit for his pension from the bank or annuity. Earlier, one had to submit
these certificates in writing after getting them countersigned by a gazetted
officer or the bank manager. Since the last couple of years, ICICI Prulife which
earlier insisted on a physical life certificate now does it on line. After you log
in the camera of your phone or laptop takes the photograph and the process is
complete. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For some reason, the Armed Forces have still not switched
on to the online mode. The ECHS card has undergone two changes. Each time, one
had to collect it in person. The Veteran card also had to be collected
personally from Station HQ. The Zila Sainik Board also insists that you must
visit their office to collect the ESM card identity. One might ask, once you
have a veteran card, why should you need an ESM card to prove your identity as
an ex-serviceman?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Credit and debit cards
for banks are also renewable. But the new ones are sent by post. If the banks
can do it what prevents our military establishments such as Station HQ, ECHS
and Zila Sainik Boards from doing the same? Consider the plight of elderly and disabled
veterans who find it difficult to make personal visits. Some living in remote
villages have to spend a lot of time and money to travel to these establishments
just to collect a card. Can we not make their lives somewhat easier by adapting
to change and adopting new practices being followed by others? <o:p></o:p></span></p>veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-36996915058951931612022-01-26T06:45:00.000-08:002022-01-26T06:45:30.847-08:00THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY – A BRIEF HISTORY<p> </p><p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY – A BRIEF HISTORY <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Birth
of the INA<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
INA was formally created in December 1941 by Captain Mohan Singh of 1/14 Punjab
Regiment and Major Fujiwara Iwaichi of the Japanese Army. Mohan Singh claims
that after his capture by the Japanese in Malaya on 11 December 1941 he was
inspired by a sudden burst of patriotic feeling that had lain dormant until
that time.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>According to him, he was
encouraged by Japanese propaganda that exhorted all Asian races to ‘kick out
the white devils from the East’, and thought that if he approached the Japanese
to help him in starting a movement for India’s independence, he would be able
to attract a large number of soldiers. At that time, Mohan Singh felt that his
force <i>‘would provide India with a new weapon, an organized and patriotic
army to back up the non-violent struggle being carried from within by the
Indian National Congress’</i>.<b><sup>1</sup><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Maj. Gen. Mohan Singh, <i>Soldiers’
Contribution to Indian Independence</i>, Army Educational Stores, New Delhi,
1974, p.67<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<h4 style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In fact, the creation of
the INA was part of a well-planned strategy evolved by Japan even before the
commencement of the war in the Pacific. Indian nationalist movements had taken root
in Thailand, Malaya, Burma and Sumatra, under the leadership of Baba Amar Singh
and Sardar Pritam Singh. In Japan, Rash Behari Bose, Raja Mahendra Pratap and
AM Sahay formed the nucleus of the Indian nationalist movement. Even before
Japan entered the war, the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo sent Major
Fujiwara Iwaichi to Bangkok to enlist the support of the Indian nationalist
elements in South East Asia and induce the defection of Indian soldiers of the
British Army, should war break out. An agreement was signed between Amar Singh
and Colonel Tamura of the Japanese Army, according to which the Indian
Independence League (IIL) agreed to collaborate with the Japanese by inciting
and undermining the loyalty of the soldiers of the Indian Army. Leaflets in
English, Gurmukhi and Hindustani were kept ready to be thrown among them
exhorting them to disobey the orders of their English commanders if asked to
fight against the Japanese.<b><sup>2</sup> <o:p></o:p></b></span></h4>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>T.R. Sareen, <i>Japan and the Indian
National Army</i>, pp. 51-52<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<h4 style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></h4>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On 8 December 1941 the Japanese
invaded Malaya. Captain Mohan Singh’s battalion, 1/14 Punjab, was part of 15
Indian Infantry Brigade, then deployed near Jitra. After a preparatory
bombardment with mortars, Japanese tanks attacked the position on 11 December 1941.
The battalion literally disintegrated, with most of the personnel being
captured immediately or during the course of the next few days, while trying to
escape southwards towards Singapore. Mohan Singh was part of a group that
included his CO, Lieutenant Colonel LV Fitzpatrick, who was wounded.<b><sup>3</sup>
</b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Joyce C. Lebra, <i>Jungle Alliance – Japan
and the Indian National Army,</i> pp.16-18. (Lebra erroneously writes that
Mohan Singh was the second-in-command of the battalion. In fact, there were
several officers senior to him, including Major VDW Anderson, the 2ic).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 15 December 1941
Mohan Singh’s group met Major Fujiwara and Giani Pritam Singh, who had been
following the Japanese as they advanced through Malaya. Pritam Singh and
Fujiwara explained to Mohan Singh their plans for raising an army to fight for
Indian independence. Mohan Singh was highly impressed with Fujiwara, who was a
genuine idealist and a great believer in the concept of the Greater Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere. With arguments backed by phrases such as ‘Asia for
Asiatics’ and India’s ‘shackles of slavery’, Fujiwara convinced Mohan Singh
that India was not going to be free by non-violent methods being advocated by
Mahatma Gandhi. If Indians wanted freedom, they would have to fight for it. He
told Mohan Singh, ‘<i>If you really want freedom for your country you must
aspire to do something active. You must raise an Indian National Army’.</i> <b><sup>4<o:p></o:p></sup></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Hugh Toye, <i>The Springing Tiger</i>,
p.3.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>After detailed discussions with
Fujiwara, Mohan Singh agreed to raise the INA according to the model suggested
by the Japanese. It soon became apparent that the role that the Japanese
government was ready to allot to the INA was marginal. Instead of a fighting
force, the Japanese intended to use the INA for propaganda purposes,
particularly to foster anti-British feeling among Indian soldiers and the
Indians in the region, for controlling prisoners of war and for maintaining law
and order among the Indian population. Though Mohan Singh found Fujiwara to be
a well-informed person, he felt that his knowledge of the strength and position
of the Congress in India was poor. Whereas he had great regard for Mahatma
Gandhi as a saint, he had not the slightest faith in his glorified weapon of
non- violence. Mohan Singh tried to convince Fujiwara that under the prevailing
conditions in India, the Congress method of fighting the British was the only
practical one.<b><sup>5</sup><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Mohan Singh, p.78<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It took less than 15
days for Mohan Singh to change his opinion about Mahatma Gandhi and the
Congress, and fall in line with the stance of the Japanese. After discussions
in Taiping on 30-31 December 1941, during which the Japanese handed over a
memorandum on the role of the INA, Mohan Singh wrote to Fujiwara on 1 January
1942, agreeing to accept the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose and modifying
his views with regard to the Congress: “<i>The day Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose’s
name comes before us, we promise that if it suits our purpose we will openly
condemn the Indian National Congress</i>”. <b><sup>6</sup><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Mohan Singh, p.86<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>After the battle of the
Shin River on 7 January 1942, three Indian infantry brigades were dispersed.
Many Indian prisoners of war, after being subjected to intensive propaganda by
Mohan Singh and his men, agreed to transfer their allegiance to the Japanese.
Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, and a large number of Allied soldiers
surrendered. Different figures have been given by historians about the total
number of Allied prisoners, the number of Indian soldiers and the number that
agreed to join the INA. According to Mohan Singh, 45,000 Indian soldiers were
handed over by Lieutenant Colonel Hunt to Fujiwara at Farrer Park on 17
February 1942, who handed them over to Mohan Singh. However, Menezes gives the
figure of Indian soldiers as 60,000, which is also the number mentioned by
Cohen, relying on Winston Churchill’s History of the Second World War. After
Mohan Singh spoke to the assembled Indian prisoners at Farrer Park, most of
them cheered enthusiastically. They were then sent to the Bidadari Camp, but
the officers were separated from the men and not allowed to talk to the latter.
During the next few days, the prisoners were asked to volunteer for the INA,
with implied threats by the Japanese that the non-volunteers would be ill-treated,
and the leaders in any non-cooperation would be shot.<b><sup>7</sup> </b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, <i>Fidelity and
Honour – The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, </i>p.382<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Estimates vary as to the actual numbers that
joined the INA when it was formed. Mohan Singh writes that 42,000 men
volunteered, while 13,000 remained non-volunteers. <b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b>According to him, approximately one third
of the officers and one fifth of the VCOs did not join. Gerard Corr writes that
out of the 55,000-60,000 Indian prisoners, probably about 20,000 enlisted
immediately.<b><sup>8</sup></b> Approximately the same figure is given by Joyce
Lebra, who writes that close to 25,000 of the 45,000 Indians taken prisoner at
Singapore did not volunteer.<b><sup>9 </sup></b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Gerard
H. Corr, <i>The War of the Springing Tigers</i>, p. 116<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Lebra, p.83. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Mohan Singh promoted himself from captain to
general, and became the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the INA.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He set about organizing the newly formed
Army, using novel techniques. All subedars and subedar majors were given the
rank of captain, while jemadars were made lieutenants. To gain the confidence
of these newly promoted officers, who were much older than the Indian
Commissioned Officers (ICOs), Mohan Singh decided to give them command of
battalions and brigades, using the ICOs to fill staff appointments such as
brigade major, staff captain, adjutant etc. The command of the brigade was
given to Subedar Onkar Singh of 5/4 Punjab Regiment.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The first INA division
was raised on 1 September 1942. Mohan Singh wanted to raise two divisions, but
the Japanese agreed to only one. The division had three brigades, which were
commanded by Lieutenant Colonels IJ Kiani (Gandhi Brigade), Aziz Ahmed Khan
(Nehru Brigade) and Prakash Chand (Azad Brigade). Lieutenant Colonel JKT
Bhonsle was given command of No. 1 Field Force Group, which had three infantry
battalions and a heavy gun battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Burhan-ud-din
commanded the Bahadur Group. The other functionaries were Major Jaswant Singh
(Intelligence Group); Colonel MS Brar (Propaganda and Welfare Group),
Lieutenant Colonel Kulwant Rai (Medical Group), Major SA Malik (Reinforcement
Group), Lieutenant Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan (Officers Training School) and Major
AB Mirza (HQ POWs). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Gradually,
Mohan Singh began to realize that the Japanese had no intention of building up
the INA into a strong military force. They wanted to use the INA more as a
political pawn than a military weapon. In fact, the role that they had
envisaged for the INA was propaganda, fifth column duties and minor military
operations. They hoped that when they marched into India with the INA ‘<i>they
would be acclaimed as liberators of India and Indians would automatically join
them and the plum of victory will fall into their lap, ripened by the heat of
their own activity. Thus they intended to use us as spies, euphemistically
calling us patriots and freedom fighters’</i>. <b><sup>10 </sup></b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<h4 style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">10.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Mohan
Singh, p.201<o:p></o:p></span></h4>
<h4 style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></h4>
<h4 style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Disillusioned by the<b> </b>Japanese attitude<b> </b>and
his differences with Rash Behari Bose<b>, </b>the President of the IIL, Mohan
Singh decided to dissolve the INA. On 21 December 1942 he signed a Special
Order of the Day formally dissolving the INA. The Japanese promptly arrested
Mohan Singh, and placed the INA under the IIL, headed by Rash Behari Bose, an
Indian revolutionary who had married a Japanese and lived in Tokyo. He was
under the influence of the Japanese and Mohan Singh had earlier refused to
accept his authority over the INA, leading to differences between them. Though
Mohan Singh had taken a pledge from his officers that the INA would not be
raised again, this was soon forgotten. JKT Bhonsle became the new Commander of
the INA, with the title of Director, Military Bureau. <o:p></o:p></span></h4>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Arrival of Subhas
Chandra Bose <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p>
<h4 style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Subhas Chandra Bose was then in Germany, having reached there after his
dramatic escape in January 1941 from Calcutta, where he had been placed under
house arrest by the British authorities. With the support of the Germans, he
had tried to raise the Indian Legion from the Indian prisoners of war in North
Africa. However, he met with limited success, and only about three thousand
prisoners agreed to join him. It was only after a year that Bose was able to
have an audience with Hitler, and request him to recognize his movement or at
least announce that India would be granted independence after the war. Hitler
felt that such a declaration was premature, and asked Bose to wait until German
forces had advanced far enough. After German losses at Alamein and Stalingrad,
it became clear that this would not happen. Bose then requested the Germans to
arrange his move to South East Asia, where he had already been invited to take
over the IIL and the INA. On 8 February 1943 Bose left Kiel in a German submarine,
accompanied by Abid Hasan. On 28 April 1943 he was transferred to a Japanese
submarine near Madagascar, reaching Sabang in Northern Sumatra on 6 May and
Tokyo on 16 May 1943. This was not the first, or indeed the last time that Bose
left his followers to their fate, moving to greener pastures. In the words of
Fay: “<i>Bose left behind three thousand Indian men in Wehrmacht uniforms whose
future would be half-hearted participation in the manning of the Atlantic Wall
and then a British prisoner of war cage – three thousand men and a wife and
child”</i>. <b><sup>11 </sup><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></b></span></h4>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Peter Ward Fay, <i>The Forgotten Army</i>,
p.200<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On
his arrival in Tokyo, Bose found the Japanese more accommodating than the
Germans. Prime Minister Tojo received him soon after his arrival, and was quite
receptive to his project of forming a provisional government in exile. On 16
June 1943 Tojo made a declaration in the Diet that Japan was firmly resolved to
extend all help to India to achieve full independence. This was music to the
ears of Bose, who had tried for almost two years to get a similar commitment
from Hitler, without success. He made a series of radio broadcasts, publicizing
his presence in South Asia, calling Japan India’s greatest friend.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He received a tumultuous welcome when he
reached Singapore on 2 July 1943, followed by week-long celebrations that were
later commemorated annually as ‘<i>Netaji</i> Week.’ On 4 July he accepted the
Presidency of the IIL and the allegiance of the INA, which he reviewed on the
next day, giving it the battle cry ‘<i>Chalo Dilli’</i> (To Delhi).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Two days later, another parade was held, at
which Tojo himself took the salute. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On 8 August 1943 Subhas Chandra Bose
assumed personal command of the INA. Unlike Mohan Singh, who had taken the rank
of general, Bose held no military rank – he was just the Supreme Commander.
However, he wore a uniform that was neither Indian nor British, but was similar
to what he had seen in Italy and Germany – breeches, tunic and jack boots. (The
only other member of the INA to wear breeches was Captain Lakshmi Swaminathan,
who commanded the Rani of Jhansi Regiment). The uniform was not the only thing
Bose took from the Germans and Italians.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Hitler and Mussolini had titles – Fuehrer and Il Duce – and deciding
that he too must have one, he settled on ‘<i>Netaji</i>’ (The Leader). On 21
October 1943 Bose announced the formation of the <i>Arzi Hukumat-e-Hind</i>, or
the Provisional Government of Free India, which was recognized by Japan,
Germany, Italy and some other countries that were under Axis domination. A few
days later, the Provisional Government declared war on Great Britain and the
United States. Bose made the declaration of war at a rally of fifty thousand
Indians, who were asked to ratify it, by standing up and raising their hands if
they were prepared to lay down their lives. The audience rose instantly,
cheering, raising their rifles in the air, and shouting, “<i>Netaji Ki Jai!
Inqilab Zindabad! Chalo Delhi!” </i>The declaration proved to be a windfall for
the new government – during the next few days over thirteen million dollars
were collected from Indians in Singapore and Malaya. The money was spent as
soon as it poured in.<b><sup>12 </sup></b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Lebra, p.130;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>M. Sivaram, <i>The Road to Delhi</i>, p.158 <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
November 1943 Bose was invited to Tokyo for the Greater East Asia Conference,
which he attended as an observer. During his visit, he met Prime Minister Tojo
and requested that Japan formally hand over to the Provisional Government of
Free India the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal, which the
Japanese had occupied in early 1942. This would give his government a measure
of legitimacy, he reasoned. Tojo demurred, since the islands were strategically
important, and the Japanese Navy was bound to object strongly. Finally, a
compromise was reached. Tojo announced that Japan was ready to hand over the
islands shortly, as the initial evidence of her readiness to help in India’s
struggle for independence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This was a
declaration of intent, not a de facto transfer. The distinction was
significant, for the next step – the actual transfer of administration – was
never taken by the Japanese Government.<b><sup>13 <o:p></o:p></sup></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Lebra, <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>p.133<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Military Operations
Conducted by the INA</span></u></b><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">From the day of
its inception, Mohan Singh had been pressing for the INA to be sent to the
front to take part in actual operations and wanted to raise two divisions.
However, the Japanese agreed to only one. Mohan Singh soon realised that the
Japanese were not serious about making the INA a strong force that could
conduct regular military operations. After the ‘dissolution’ of the first INA
in December 1942, its strength had dropped to 12,000. After the arrival of
Subhas Chandra Bose, about 10,000 prisoners agreed to join and it was decided
to raise two more divisions. The first operational exposure of the INA was in a
minor role in the Arakan, where it was employed in small detachments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This was followed by two operations in Imphal
and on the Irrawaddy, for which Bose was able to convince the Japanese to allot
specific sectors to the INA, instead of using it in penny packets. Bose
repeatedly stressed that advance into India must be led by the INA, and <i>‘the
first drop of blood to be shed on Indian soil should be that of a member of the
INA.</i><b>’ <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">In the Arakan
offensive in February 1944, INA special groups comprising espionage and
propaganda elements totalling about 250 men were part of the Japanese offensive
against the 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Indian Divisions. These men were
organised in small parties that had mainly nuisance value, shouting propaganda
or confusing orders in encounters with British-Indian troops, leading them
sometimes into Japanese ambushes and spying out their defensive positions. One
of these parties led by Major LS Misra managed to subvert an Indian outpost
held by a platoon of Gwalior Lancers. This was touted as major success by the
INA, Bose calling it an ‘active and important’ part in a great Japanese
victory, which alas never materialized, the Arakan battle ending in a
shattering defeat for the Japanese.<b><sup>14</sup> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p. 105.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><b><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The next operation
in which the INA took part was the Japanese offensive against Imphal in March
1944. A group of about 150 irregulars of the INA Special Forces was attached to
each of the three divisions that the Japanese employed in Imphal. The only
regular INA division available was the 1<sup>st</sup> INA Division, under
Colonel MZ Kiani – the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division was in Malaya - which comprised
the 1<sup>st</sup> (Subhas) Regiment with a strength of 3,000 men, and the 2<sup>nd</sup>
and 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiments, each two thousand strong. (The regiments were
akin to brigades, and were sometimes referred to as such). The first to be
mobilized was the Subhas Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan,
which was sent to the front with great fanfare, after a farewell speech by Bose
himself on 3 February 1944. No. 1 Battalion, under Major PS Raturi was
despatched to the Kaladan Valley, while No. 2 and 3 Battalions (Majors Ran
Singh and Padam Singh) were to proceed to Haka and Falam area in the Chin Hills.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">No. 1 Battalion
reached the Kaladan Valley on 24 March, as the 81<sup>st</sup> West African
Division was withdrawing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It had several
skirmishes with the rear guards, suffering a few casualties. It remained there
intact, without further encounter, until September, posting a company at Mowdok
in the Sangu Valley, on Indian soil, during the monsoon. The crossing of the
border was accompanied by great jubilation. According to the Japanese plan,
Imphal was to be captured by 10<sup>th</sup> April 1944. The 2<sup>nd</sup> and
3<sup>rd</sup> Guerilla Regiments reached Rangoon only in March, when the
offensive was well underway and there was little chance of them playing a role
in the battle. However, Bose had persuaded General Kawabe to let them at least
enter Imphal on the heels of the Japanese.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In any case, nobody expected<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>that these men would have to fight. They were to line the route at
Bose’s entry into Imphal and assist in the formation of the new divisions
there.<b><sup>15</sup></b><sup> </sup><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p. 106<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The 2<sup>nd</sup>
Guerilla Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel IJ Kiani) together with the headquarters
of the 1<sup>st</sup> INA Division commenced their move from Rangoon on 25
March. On his arrival at Maymyo on 28 March the Divisional Commander, Colonel
MZ Kiani, was told that if he wished to be present at the fall of Imphal, he
should immediately rush his force to Tamu and join the Yamamoto Force, which
was part of the Japanese 33<sup>rd</sup> Division. 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment
moved post-haste, leaving behind all its heavy baggage, mortars and machine
guns at Kalewa, with the men carrying only a blanket, a rifle and fifty rounds
of ammunition. The Regiment reached the village of Khanjol towards the end of
April, and was informed that it would take part in the attack on Palel
airfield, in conjunction with the Japanese thrust, which was planned for 1 May.
With great difficulty the Regiment was able to muster 300 ex-Indian Army
soldiers, who were grouped in a task force under the command of Major Pritam
Singh, a staff officer at divisional headquarters who volunteered to lead the
assault. The force left Khanjol on the night of 30 April, but took almost two
days to travel the twelve miles to the assembly area, reaching there on 2 May.
The Japanese attack had gone in a day earlier from the East, but Pritam Singh
decided to attack from the South on his own. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The attack was
launched on the night of 2 May. At about 2230 hours the leading company, moving
in extended order, ran into a platoon of 4/10 Gurkha Rifles, about five miles
short of the objective. The INA soldiers had been assured that neither British
nor Indian troops would fire on them, and were talking and smoking as they
walked, with no semblance of discipline.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The Gurkhas, forewarned of their approach, waited for them to reach a
suitable position and then opened fire. The INA soldiers panicked and
scattered, but Pritam Singh rallied some of them and approached again, this
time more cautiously. He tried to parley with the Gurkhas, asking them not to
fire. When this failed, the INA column attacked the platoon, but was beaten
back. Pritam Singh launched seven attacks, before deciding to call it off. He
ordered a withdrawal, sending a patrol to carry out reconnaissance for a new
attack and calling his regimental commander for help. Two INA officers and many
soldiers were killed; about thirty-five more surrendered or were captured. The
Gurkhas lost two killed. Shortly afterwards the regimental headquarters was
attacked by a company of the Frontier Force Rifles, followed by an air strike,
in which fifty INA soldiers were killed and about the same number wounded. An
artillery concentration severely shook the morale of the rest, and Kiani
ordered the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment to withdraw to Khanjol. The reconnaissance
patrol sent by Pritam Singh had also surrendered.<sup>16 <o:p></o:p></sup></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">16.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p. 226.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The failure at
Palel and the casualties were a severe jolt to the morale of the INA, which had
come to believe the assurance given by Bose that propaganda and not firepower
would decide the result when they would face Indian troops. Even for the
Japanese, the battle was not going according to plan. By the first week of May
the offensive of the Yamamoto Force had lost steam. The INA continued to hold
Khanjol and Mittong Khunue in spite of frequent attacks and temporary
withdrawals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rains throughout May and
June restricted activity on both sides to patrolling and the 2<sup>nd</sup>
Guerilla Regiment did not fight any more battles. But the effects of climate,
hunger and malaria took a heavy toll and by the beginning of July, the strength
of the Regiment was down to 750 men. On 3 July an Indian battalion, the 4<sup>th</sup>
Mahratta Light Infantry, attacked and cleared Khanjol, which was held by just
50 men, and occupied Mittong Khunue. The Indian battalion did not advance
further, and continued to hold the end of the Mombi track until it finally
withdrew in the third week of July. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The 3<sup>rd</sup>
Guerilla Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Gulzara Singh, did not play any
significant part in the Imphal battle. The Regiment reached Tamu on 26 May
after the monsoon had broken and was ordered to occupy a defensive position
around Narum. One battalion was used for transport duties with the other two
occupying the villages of Lamyang, Keipham and Khosat. The Regiment was already
depleted by sickness when it arrived in the battle area. The rains and irregular
supplies added to their woes, reducing the strength of the battalions to almost
half. Both the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Guerilla Regiments and the
remnants of the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment began to withdraw on 18 July 1944. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Though the
campaign ended in July, by the end of April 1944 it had become clear that the
offensive against Imphal was not going well. However, INA headquarters in
Maymyo, without any means of communications with the forward troops, was
unaware of this development, and in mid-May, Bose sent three senior ministers
of his cabinet - Chatterji, Alagappan and AM Sahay – to Tamu, partly in order
that they might be at hand when Imphal was entered, and to buy up supplies,
relieve the INA difficulties and bring back an accurate report. Their report
reached Bose towards the end of June, but he was still unaware of the actual
state of affairs. Even on 10 July, when the Japanese officially informed Bose
that the Imphal campaign was being abandoned, he appeared to have no inkling of
the magnitude of the disaster. (No one has been able to explain the reason for
lack of communications between Bose and his field commanders. There must have
been hundreds of wireless sets in the equipment captured from the British at
Singapore. Bose also had a secret radio link to Germany, on which he sometimes
spoke to Nambiar, and also his wife). Netaji Week was celebrated in Rangoon
with customary gusto, including parades, speeches and cultural events. Bose
issued a statement on the year’s progress, and finalised the government
organisation that would be needed once Imphal was captured. He broadcast
messages to the people of India, including those who worked for the government,
and to soldiers of the Indian Army, assuring them that they would be taken into
the INA after victory, and their service would count towards their INA
pensions! <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The decision to
suspend the Imphal campaign was made public on 26 July, the day the Japanese
Prime Minister Tojo resigned. It was only in August when survivors from the
front began arriving in Rangoon with tales of horrible deaths due to disease
and starvation that Bose was enlightened of the magnitude of the tragedy that
had befallen his soldiers. On 19 August there was a desperate appeal from
Colonel Kiani to intervene with the Japanese to save hundreds of sick men
stranded by floods on the withdrawal route. Bose was helpless, for the Japanese
were themselves in dire straits and could do little to help the INA. Bose
blamed the Japanese for the debacle, by denying essential supplies to the INA,
and recommended the dissolution of the Hikari Kikan that had been responsible
for this task. In future, the INA would look after all their administration
themselves, he declared. He was enraged when he came to know of the large
number of desertions in the INA and publicly berated the officers for their
lack of leadership, which resulted in low morale of the troops. Of 6000 men
that had been sent the front, at least 1500 had deserted or been captured. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">In October 1943,
Bose received an invitation to visit Tokyo from the new Japanese Prime
Minister, General Koiso. Bose found the Japanese still receptive to his
demands, which included the appointment of an ambassador to his government,
increase in the size of the INA by at least 50,000, a loan agreement, better
weapons including tanks, planes and guns to supplement captured British stores,
distribution of propaganda literature written by himself and transfer of all
Indian POWs to the INA. At this time, American bombers were already paying
frequent visits to the Japanese capital, and many of these demands appeared to
be meaningless, which is probably the reason for the Japanese conceding them.
However, in return for sending a diplomat to his government, the Japanese asked
for a <i>quid pro quo – </i>Bose agreed to put the INA under Japanese command
during the defence of Malaya and Burma.<b><sup>17</sup></b> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">17.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Lebra, p.143,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sivaram, p.230<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Though the writing
was on the wall, Bose continued to exhibit his confidence that the Japanese
would win the war. In an article in the <i>Azad Hind</i> on 6 November 1944,
after the retreat from Imphal, he reiterated his firm conviction that the final
victory would belong to Japan and Germany. <i>‘A new phase of war was
approaching’</i>, he wrote, ‘<i>in which the initiative would again lie in the
hands of the Japanese’</i>. Not surprisingly, Professor Joyce Lebra was
constrained to write: “<i>Bose’s constant repetition of this faith throughout
and even after the Imphal campaign raises the question of the soundness of his
military judgement”.</i> <b><sup>18</sup></b><sup><o:p></o:p></sup></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">18.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Lebra, p.191<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">After spending a
month in Japan, Bose returned to Singapore in December 1944. He spent over a
month in Malaya, reviewing the functioning of the training camps at Seletar and
Kuala Lumpur, and going over the finances. On both counts he found the outlook
dismal. The number of new recruits barely matched those who were shedding their
uniforms and slipping away. The income of the Indian Independence League was
drying up, and when persuasion failed, draconian measures were adopted to
increase collections. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">At a press
conference in Rangoon the day after his arrival, Bose asserted that the war had
now entered the third phase, which would be decisive, and Indians must play
their rightful part. “<i>Had the rains not intervened</i>,” he said, “<i>we
should by now have occupied the Manipur basin</i>”. During a rally in October,
he had given a new war cry – <i>khun</i> (blood). In the days that followed, he
repeated it at every opportunity. He no longer talked of the march to Delhi,
but blood. It was Indian blood that he wanted, and he asked for it because the
old slogan did not sound convincing now. The war was not over, but Bose knew
that his men were not going anywhere near Delhi. Yet, the fight must go on.
Freedom, he observed, carries a price – blood. And since blood was all that his
young recruits had to offer, it became his constant refrain in the months that
followed. “<i>Tum mujhe khun do, main tumhen azadi dunga </i>(give me blood,
and I will give you freedom)”, he said. As 1945 opened, this was all Bose had
to offer. <b><sup>19<o:p></o:p></sup></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Fay, p.315. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">After their defeat
at Imphal, Japanese forces had withdrawn to the Irrawaddy River, where the next
major battle was to take place. Two INA divisions, the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup>,
were to take part in the battle. In the event, only one regiment of the 2<sup>nd</sup>
Division, the 4<sup>th</sup> Guerilla Regiment under Major GS Dhillon could
take part, the rest still waiting in Rangoon for their stores and equipment to
arrive from Malaya. Mutiny and desertion had become a serious problem in the
INA, and troops were screened before being sent to the front. About 150 men
from Dhillon’s regiment were sent back as suspect, leaving him with 1,200 men
to defend twelve miles of the river. Bose ordered several measures to raise the
morale of the troops. They were protected from contact with Imphal survivors
and encouraged by glowing accounts of INA heroism in battle. Gallantry awards
were presented and there were accelerated promotions, including four major
generals, one of them being Shah Nawaz Khan, the newly appointed commander of
the 2<sup>nd</sup> INA Division.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The 7<sup>th</sup>
Indian Division began to cross the Irrawaddy on 14 February 1945 at Nyangu and
Pagan, where the 4<sup>th</sup> INA Regiment was deployed. The attacking troops
suffered some casualties from medium machine guns in the INA defences, but
managed to cross the river. About a hundred men of the 7<sup>th</sup> INA
Battalion under Lieutenant Hari Ram surrendered at Nyangu and one hundred and
forty of the 9<sup>th</sup> INA Battalion under Lieutenant Chandra Bhan showed
a white flag and laid down their arms at Pagan. Shah Nawaz has chosen to gloss
over these surrenders, mentioning only the gallantry of the INA troops and the
casualties they inflicted on the enemy. ‘<i>Our men having used up all their
ammunition resorted to bayonet charges, but eventually most of the men of the 7<sup>th</sup>
Battalion were overpowered and had to surrender’</i>.<b><sup>20</sup><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">20.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, <i>My Memories
of INA and its Netaji,</i> p. 190<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><b><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, Bose was deeply pained when he heard
of the surrenders, and wrote to Dhillon: ‘<i>I have heard with grief, pain and
shame of the treachery shown by Lieutenant Hari Ram and others. I hope that the
men of the 4<sup>th</sup></i> <i>Regiment will wash away the blot on the INA
with their blood</i>.’<b> </b>Worried by the desertions, Bose wrote another
letter to an officer of the INA Police at Mandalay<b>, ‘</b><i>According to my
information the men who recently deserted from Mandalay … are still in the
Mandalay area. These men must be arrested and sent down to Rangoon under
escort. If you cannot arrest them, they must be shot at sight</i><b>.’ <sup>21</sup></b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">21.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p. 139<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">On 17 March 1945
there was another action at Taungzin where Dhillon’s troops are said to have
redeemed their reputation, according to INA accounts. A British motorized
column attacked an INA company under the command of Second Lieutenant Gian
Singh Bisht, in which the company lost about forty men, including the company
commander.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Shah Nawaz has described the
action thus: <i>‘In the name of India and Indian independence they charged the
enemy trucks. The enemy immediately debussed and hand to hand fighting ensued
which lasted for full two hours, but our heroes would not give in. Forty of
them sacrificed their lives after inflicting heavier losses on the enemy. The
enemy was so impressed by their determination that they beat a hurried retreat</i>’.<b><sup>22</sup>
</b>A more down-to-earth version of the action has been given by Fay, who
writes: ‘<i>Near Taungzin one day a company of his let itself be trapped in the
open by light tanks, armoured cars and infantry in trucks, tried vainly to
break out with the bayonet and lost several score men dead or captured. ……But
Dhillon was also prone to heroics. When the publicity people at Rangoon heard
about the Taungzin disaster, they transformed it into a sort of latter-day
Charge of the Light Brigade, and Dhillon was pleased’</i>. <b><sup>23</sup><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">22.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Shah Nawaz, p. 195<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">23.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Fay, pp. 342-343. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The next action
occurred at Mount Popa on whose western slopes the 2<sup>nd</sup> INA Regiment
under PK Sahgal was occupying defences.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Headquarters 2<sup>nd</sup> INA Division was also at Popa, under its
newly appointed commander, Major General Shah Nawaz Khan. In February Bose decided
to visit Mount Popa himself, to get a first-hand account of the conditions
there. His first visit to the front line had to be cut short because the enemy
got there first. He was in Meiktila on 25 February when news came that British
tanks had reached Mahling, just twenty miles away. When Shah Nawaz advised that
they should turn back, Bose refused, saying “<i>England has not produced the
bomb that can kill Subhas Chandra Bose</i>.” However, reason finally prevailed
over bravado, and he fled from Meiktila, accompanied by a very anxious Shah
Nawaz in the only staff car that they had. Everyone was armed to the teeth and
ready for the worst, Bose sitting with a loaded tommy gun across his lap with
Shah Nawaz beside him, his personal physician next to the driver and the
liaison officer on the running board. The scene is now a key element of the
Bose legend.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Soon after his
return to Rangoon Bose received the shocking news that five staff officers of 2<sup>nd</sup>
INA Division – four majors and one lieutenant - had walked across to the
British lines. Soon afterwards, British aircraft dropped leaflets signed by one
of them, advising others in the INA to surrender. The shameful desertions soon
became a topic of conversation in every Rangoon household and the subject of
laughter in every Japanese mess.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Bose
was rattled by the treachery, and said that he would take his own life if such
a thing happened again. He announced the observance of a ‘Traitors’ Day’ in
each INA unit, when deserters would be publicly dishonoured. He issued two
special orders, outlining a number of measures to deal with the problem. One of
these specified that ‘<i>every member of the INA - officer, NCO or sepoy - will
in future be entitled to arrest any other member of the INA, no matter what his
rank may be, if he behaves in cowardly manner, or to shoot him if he acts in a
treacherous manner.</i>’ <b><sup>24.</sup></b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">24.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p. 142<i>. Special Order of the
Day,</i> 13th March 1945<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Unfortunately, the
desertions did not stop. Late in March, one of Dhillon’s battalion commanders
deserted. On the night of 2 April, just before a full-scale attack on the 2<sup>nd</sup>
INA Regiment at Legyi, three staff officers and some NCOs deserted. The attack
came at mid-day and the INA defences soon collapsed, even the administrative
area being overrun. Sahgal ordered a counter attack but the two platoons
concerned deserted. A second counter attack after nightfall succeeded, but
Sahgal then came to know that the whole of his 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion – the
CO, company commander and about three hundred men - had deserted. The remainder
could not face another attack and Sahgal withdrew them on his own initiative
during the night. What followed was a rout. Except for an odd occasion when
they decided to stand and fight, the 2<sup>nd</sup> INA Division disintegrated
and virtually ceased to exist. By the end of April, only fugitives remained at
large. On 13 May 1945, Shah Nawaz, Dhillon and about fifty men surrendered at
Pegu. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><u><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">The End of the INA<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Rangoon fell to
British forces on 4 May 1945. A day earlier, the senior British officer who was
a prisoner in the Rangoon jail had ordered the disarming and concentration of
the INA, which was now under the command of Major General Loganadhan, the
Supreme Commander having left about ten days earlier along with a few senior
officers, about fifty League workers and the last contingent of women of the
Rani of Jhansi regiment. In his last message before leaving Bose declared ‘<i>I
do not leave Burma of my own free will. I would have preferred to stay on here
with you and share with you the sorrow of temporary defeat</i>.’ But his
advisers had overruled him, he had other responsibilities in Siam and Malaya
that nobody else could fulfil, and for Indians this defeat was only an incident
in their struggle. ‘<i>Go down as heroes’</i>, he said, ‘<i>go down upholding
the highest code of honour and discipline’.</i><b><sup>25<o:p></o:p></sup></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">25.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p. 146<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><b><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Bose’s last words
to his men were to ‘uphold the highest code of honour’, which he was even then
violating, perhaps unknowingly.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not
being a professional soldier, he can be forgiven for not being aware of the
time honoured code that a captain always goes down with his ship and a
commander with his troops, be it death or captivity. (Percival surrendered with
85,000 of his men when Singapore fell in 1942 and Niazi with 93,000 troops in
1971 in East Pakistan. Captain Mulla went down with the INS <i>Khukri</i> in
1971). However, most of the senior INA officers had spent long years in
uniform, and it appears strange that they advised him to escape, leaving more
than ten thousand of his men to their fate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">It has been
suggested that Bose wanted to go to Russia and carry on the struggle from
there, but there appears no concrete proof of this. Another reason put forward
is that the British authorities would have executed him if he had been
captured, but this appears unlikely. Bose was never a member of the Indian Army
and could not have been tried for treason under the Indian Army Act, like Shah
Nawaz, Sahgal and Dhillon. His stature and prestige in India would have
deterred the British from even contemplating such a step. In fact, the wave of
sympathy that swept the country after the INA trials would have multiplied
manifold and united the Indian people against the British. Who knows, with Bose
being present at the final parleys, India may not been partitioned. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The INA ceased to exist after its
remnants surrendered to British forces on 4 May 1945.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Supreme Leader of the INA, Netaji Subhas
Chandra Bose died in a plane crash shortly after this. But the legend of Bose
refuses to die. Anton Pelinka has a very interesting and plausible reason for
this ‘mythos’ as he calls it. He writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 7.65pt;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Whatever Bose had in mind when his plane
crashed on August 18, 1945, he could no longer realize it. But in the
imaginations of millions of people in in India (and likely also in Pakistan and
Bangla Desh), Bose lived on. Above all, there remained the fact that
independence did not come to mean a high standard of living for the many but
rather expulsion and death for millions and the still unsolved problem of mass
poverty. In the face of all these disappointments, Bose embodied the hope that remained
unfulfilled. <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">And for that reason, he was not allowed
to die. The Bose mythos begins with the doubt that Subhas Chandra Bose actually
perished in the plane crash of August 18, 1945 in Taipei. Many people were
willing to believe in a cover-up of mass proportions, regardless of who might
have carried it out. Bose was alive, it was said, or had been seen somewhere,
he was alive in a Soviet camp, he was a high ranking member of Mao’s People’s
Liberation Army and would soon, very soon, in fact, return to India. He would
come, like a messiah, to eradicate all evil and thus, to fulfill the
unfulfilled promises of independent India. (Bose, M, 1982, p.251).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Numerous commissions of the Indian
government have examined the circumstances surrounding his death. They all
arrive at the same conclusion: Bose died on August 18, 1945 in Taipei from
severe burns sustained in the plane crash. Bose’s family also subscribes to
this interpretation (Bose, Sisir, interview 1999: Bose, Sugata, interview,
2001). But the legend refuses to die. The hundredth anniversary of his birth
was celebrated intensively in India, particularly in Calcutta. The city administration
in Calcutta, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, published a detailed report on
Bose’s life works. In this special edition of the Calcutta Municipal Gazette,
Bose’s death is reported in lapidary fashion: “The mysteries concerning his
death remain unsolved till date” (Calcutta Municipal Gazette 1997:344).<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The fact that Calcutta was and continues
to be the place where Bose’s mythos is cultivated points to a further function
of this mythos. Bose stands for Bengal’s disappointments. Around 1900, Bengal
was the most important part of British India, and Calcutta was the capital of
the empire’s crown jewel. But then Bengal lost more and more of its importance.
The British moved the capital to Delhi, and Bengal seldom played an important
role in the Indian national congress. Bose was the exception to this rule. And
then came the partition. After Punjab, Bengal was the second of India’s
traditional regions to be divided, with all of the terrible consequences for
both sides. <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bose is the protest against the loss of
significance, especially for the Bengali sense of self, against the dominance
of Delhi, and that of Uttar Pradesh, against the predominance of Hindi. For
Bengal, Bose could not be allowed to die. In the ongoing memory of him, Bengal
celebrated self-pity and nostalgia (Chaudhuri 1987:799). Bose’s mythos is also
Bengal’s attempt to demand recognition of its importance within India.</span></i><b><sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">26</span></sup></b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">26.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Anton Pelinka, <i>Democracy Indian
Style –Subhas Chandra Bose and the Creation of India’s Political Culture</i>,
Routeledge, 2003, pp.8-9.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.0cm;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-26954748217488810902022-01-22T05:23:00.002-08:002022-01-22T05:23:46.192-08:00SUBHAS BOSE & THE INA – SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS<p> </p><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b>CHAPTER 7<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center;"><b>SUBHAS BOSE & THE INA – SOME UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">The Indian National Army remains an enigma, even today. Throughout
its life span of three years, and even later, the INA has generated several
controversies and given rise to conundrums some of which remain unsolved.
Ironically, during its existence the activities of the INA remained shrouded in
mystery and it was only after it ceased to exist that most of these
controversies surfaced. Though there is a wealth of literature available about
the INA and its leader, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, many questions still remain
unanswered. These are often discussed at debates and seminars and provide the
topic for articles and books. Some of these questions will be discussed in this
chapter. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Q.1 Why did
some Indian soldiers join the INA while others did not?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In the Foreword to
Toye’s book, Philip Mason, who was the Joint Secretary in the War Department in
1945-46, gives four motives for joining the INA. A few did so with the
intention of re-joining British forces when they saw a chance; some were
puzzled, misinformed, misled, and on the whole believed the course they took
was the most honourable open to them; others were frankly opportunist and some
really were fervent nationalists. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Stephen Cohen has given
a similar analysis. ‘<i>At least three factors influenced the decision to join
the INA: personal comfort, nationalist political beliefs, and the charismatic
appeal of Subhas Bose.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A few of the
defecting officers anticipated personal rewards for themselves when they
transferred allegiance to the Japanese, and to this extent the British label of
“treasonous rabble’ was accurate. No INA officer has ever admitted such a
motive, but interviews with former INA leaders and British officers indicate that
money and security were important considerations for a few Indians.’</i> <b><sup>1
</sup><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">1.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Stephen Cohen, <i>The
Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation</i>, p.152<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Major (later Major General) Shahid Hamid was the
Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the
Commander-in-Chief in India in 1946-47. According to him, <i>‘Most of the men
who joined the INA were cowards and were not prepared to face the hardships of
the prisoner of war camps. It was an escape from ill treatment and starvation.
Very few joined for patriotic reasons.</i><b>’ <sup>2<o:p></o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">2.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Major
General Shahid Hamid, <i>Disastrous Twilight</i>, p.17<b><sup><o:p></o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Some of the reasons given by ex INA officers for
joining the INA are interesting, even amusing. A number of officers such as
Shah Nawaz, JKT Bhonsle, Gian Chand etc. did not join the INA initially, but
later changed their minds. Shah Nawaz writes: ‘<i>We decided that the best
course was (a) for the senior officers to join the INA, gain control of it and
prevent the ill treatment of prisoners of war, and also their exploitation by
the Japanese. If we were unable to do this, then we would try and wreck the INA
from within, if and when we had an opportunity to do so. (b) For the rank and
file to remain out of the INA and if need be to undergo hardships and ill
treatment, but the senior officers in the INA would do their best to help them.
This at that time concerned mainly the Muslims’</i>. <b><sup>3<o:p></o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">3.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Shah Nawaz, p. 47<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><b><sup><o:p> </o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">The concern of Shah Nawaz for Muslims was one of the reasons that
prompted his decision to join the INA. This has been confirmed by Harbaksh
Singh, who writes that Shah Nawaz joined the INA ‘because of some dispute over
accommodation for a Muslim JQ.’ As for Bhonsle, Harbaksh does not mince words.
“<i>Bhonsle, I knew, had done it to save his skin. He had admitted as much to
me.”</i><b><sup>4<o:p></o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 0cm;">4.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>, p.134<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><b><sup><o:p> </o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Prominent among those who did not join were Captain (later Lieutenant General)
Harbaksh Singh, 5/11 Sikhs; Captain (later Major General) HC Badhwar; Captain
(later Lieutenant General) KP Dhargalkar, both of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Cavalry
and Captain (later Lieutenant General) AC Iyappa, Signals. The reasons for
these officers deciding against joining the INA were mainly two – distrust of
the Japanese and lack of faith in the INA leadership. According to Harbaksh, <i>‘unless
Mahatma Gandhi or Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru made an appeal over the air for
every young man outside India to join the INA to liberate India with the help
of the Japanese, we would not join, as we had no faith in its leadership’</i>.<b><sup>5<o:p></o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">5.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Harbaksh Singh, pp.111-112<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Cohen cites another reason for the
professional soldier being less than sympathetic to the INA – his oath of
loyalty. Many did not regard lightly the breaking of their oath, and preferred
to spend the war in a prison camp undergoing privations at the hands of the
Japanese or the INA. In India, the concept of loyalty is closely linked to
‘salt’. An employee is expected to be loyal to his employer, whose salt he has
eaten. For many Indian soldiers joining the INA meant being untrue to their
salt, and facing the stigma of faithlessness and disloyalty in their regiments
and villages when they returned home. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">There is no doubt that those who refused to join face hardships, hard
labour, and even torture, sometimes by their own men. Some of the officers who
refused to join were subjected to third degree methods to bring them in line.
Badhwar and Dhargalkar were locked in underground cages, which were about five
feet long by five feet wide and seven feet high, and sometimes held five or six
prisoners. They were kept inside these cages for 88 days, during which time
they saw nothing of the outside world. <b><sup>6</sup><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">6.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Cohen, p.149<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">The fate of
those who refused to join the INA was uncertain. The fortunate ones remained in
POW camps or were sent as working parties to depots and airfields. Many were
sent to labour camps in Borneo, the Celebes and Thailand, where thousands died
of disease and starvation. Those who joined the INA not only had a more
comfortable life but also a better survival rate.<i> </i>According to Menezes,
of the 40,000 prisoners of war who did not join the INA, 11,000 died in
captivity, of disease, starvation or were murdered, some even cannibalized by
the Japanese. Strangely enough, the Provisional Government of <i>Azad Hind</i>,
which claimed the allegiance of all Indians and guaranteed equal rights and
equal opportunities to all its citizens, did nothing to alleviate the
sufferings of these unfortunate soldiers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Corr writes<i>:‘As for Gill, suffering in solitary confinement, he
(Bose) did nothing. Neither did he do anything for the thousands of Indians in
Thailand who were being worked to death on the Infamous Death Railway. He left
them to their appalling fate’.</i> </span><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">7 <o:p></o:p></span></sup></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">7.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Corr, p.149<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>What is the truth? Did the majority
of prisoners join the INA for patriotic reasons, or for pecuniary gains, better
living conditions and to escape torture and harsh treatment at the hands of
their Japanese captors?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><u>Q.2 Were the aims of the INA practical and
achievable?<o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">In mid-January 1942 Mohan Singh said that the eventual object of the INA
was to drive the British out of India. During the Bangkok Conference held in
June 1942, the Indian Independence League resolved that the INA would be used
for operations against British forces; to secure and safeguard Indian National
Independence and for any other purpose that may assist the Independence of
India. Soon after his arrival in South East Asia, Bose declared: ‘<i>Indians
outside India, particularly Indians in East Asia, are going to organise a
fighting force which will be powerful enough to attack the British Army in
India. When we do so, a revolution will break out, not only among the civil
population at home, but also among the Indian Army, which is now standing under
the British flag.’</i> <b><sup>8</sup><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">8.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan<i>, My Memories of INA and its
Netaji,</i> p. 89<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">The aim of the INA, as envisaged by Mohan Singh, the IIL and also by Bose
was twofold – to militarily defeat the British and to subvert the loyalty of
the Indian Army. Were these aims achievable? Bose was confident that as soon as
he entered India, Indian soldiers would lay down their arms. However, it was
the height of military naiveté to believe that the ill-trained and ill-equipped
INA would be able to defeat the British Army. Mohan Singh, Shah Nawaz as well
as several others have written that the Japanese did not support them with
weapons, ammunition and supplies. If this was true, why did they agree to send
their men into battle, where they were bound to suffer heavy casualties? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Though Bose was not a professional soldier, even he must have known that the
military objectives of the INA were not achievable. According to Corr, Bose
made two fatal errors of judgement during his career. The first was his
decision to challenge Gandhi, which set him on the road out of India. The
second error was to believe that he could return through military means. ‘<i>Bose
was aware that the tide of war had turned against Japan and the Imphal
offensive was a gigantic gamble. Yet he spoke to his men in a way that
suggested the road to Delhi lay open. …. Becoming a victim of his own
propaganda, Bose</i> <i>urged on his regiments to destruction. In the end he
lost touch with reality</i>.<b>’<sup>9</sup><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">9.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Gerard H. Corr, <i>The War of the Springing Tigers</i>,
p.165<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">After the defeat at Imphal, when General Kawabe told him that the order
to retreat had been given, Bose declared that the INA would continue the
operations. <i>“Increase in casualties, cessation of supplies, and famine are
not reason enough to stop marching. Even if the whole army becomes only spirit
we will not stop advancing towards our homeland. This is the spirit of our
revolutionary army</i>,” he said. Though Corr writes that Kawabe was much
moved, he must also have been amused at Bose’s innocence. ‘<i>Prodigal with
emotional language, Bose did not seem to feel he had been sufficiently prodigal
with the lives of his soldiers. He talked – to the amazement of even the
Japanese – of sending the Rani of Jhansi Regiment up to the battle front</i>.’<b><sup>10</sup></b><sup>
</sup><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">10.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Corr, p.166<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Having known that the INA did not have the military strength to defeat
the British Army, why did its leaders send it into battle, to face death and
destruction?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><b><u>Q3.
How did the INA perform in battle?<o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Almost all ex-INA officers eulogize
the gallantry of its members during operations. Some even suggest that the INA
planned and executed the attack on Imphal, with the Japanese playing a
subsidiary role. Shah Nawaz writes: <i>“While the INA was on the offensive
there was not a single occasion on which our forces were defeated on the
battle-field, and there was never an occasion when the enemy despite their overwhelming
superiority in men and material were able to capture a post held by the INA. On
the other hand there were very few cases where INA attacked British posts and
failed to capture them”.</i><b><sup>11</sup></b><i><o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">11.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Shah Nawaz, p. 159<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>According
to Dr. RM Kasliwal, who was the personal physician to Bose in 1945, <i>“In the
fighting in the Imphal sector our troops played a very prominent part. They
pushed the enemy back everywhere ….. Our armies, along with those of our allies
chased the British forces deep into Manipur sector. Some of our troops reached
Kohima and occupied that town, and some penetrated up to Dimapur</i>.”<b><sup>12</sup>
</b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -42.9pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">12.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>RM Kasliwal, <i>The Impact of Netaji and
INA on India’s Independence</i>, p.20 <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The war
diaries of the Indian Army formations and units that fought in Imphal not only
contradict the INA claims but also contain unflattering accounts of their
performance, which are endorsed by<b> </b>the Japanese who were fighting
alongside. The low casualty figures and the large numbers of INA personnel who
surrendered and deserted are also indicative of the pedestrian performance of
the INA. Several foreign writers have commented on the performance of the INA
in battle. Cohen writes:“…<i>the INA was starved of equipment, logistic support
and information, and although it did occupy Indian soil briefly, it’s battle
history was dismal</i>.” <b><sup>13</sup></b>. John Connell writes<i>: “In
every recorded clash between British and Indian forces and the INA in Burma,
the INA was worsted. Their leadership was far from inspiring: three officers in
all were killed in battle, one was killed by a Japanese sentry and one died in
an air crash</i>.”<b><sup>14</sup></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt;">13.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Stephen Cohen, <i>The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the
Development of a Nation</i>, p.152<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">14.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>John Connell, <i>Auchinleck- A Critical Biography</i>, p.97, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>One of
the reasons for the INA’s poor performance was the quality of its leaders.
Commenting on this aspect, Toye writes: <i>“…few of the platoon and company
commanders in the 1<sup>st</sup> INA Division had been trained as officers at
all: most of them had been promoted direct from the ranks by Mohan Singh… What
quality of leadership could be expected of officers such as these in the war of
1944?</i>”<b><sup>15<o:p></o:p></sup></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">15.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.120<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">In military terms, are the claims of INA victories
genuine? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt;"><b><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt;"><b><u>Q.4
How many INA soldiers were killed in battle?</u><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Apart
from their performance in battle, INA veterans make tall claims about the
number of soldiers who died in battle. Captain SS Yadav, an ex-INA officer has
complied a book (<i>Forgotten Warriors), </i>listing the names of all members
of the INA.<i> </i>This is also claimed to be the official history of the INA. The
list contains about 13,000 names, with several appearing more than once and
many addresses missing or incomplete. It has a list of 131 persons who died in
action and a Roll of Honour listing the names of 1602 persons who died from all
causes, including wounds, sickness, accidents etc. Yet, he writes: <i>“The
valiant troops of the INA had to withdraw to Burma from the battlefronts of
Kohima and Imphal. About twenty six thousand heroes of the Indian National Army
laid down their lives</i>”.<b><sup>16</sup> </b>Shah Nawaz is more
conservative, stating that 4,000 INA soldiers were killed in the fighting in
April and May 1944. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72.0pt; text-indent: -36.0pt;">16. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Captain SS Yadav, <i>Forgotten Warriors<b>
</b>of Indian War of Independence 1941-1946</i>, p.50<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText3"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText3"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The INA figures appear to be grossly
inflated. Quoting official figures given by GHQ India, Toye writes: “<i>The INA
Division had started out for Imphal six thousand strong: only two thousand six
hundred returned, and of these about two thousand had to be sent at once to
hospital. During the campaign 715 men deserted, about four hundred were killed
in battle, about eight hundred surrendered, and about fifteen hundred died of
disease and starvation.</i><b><sup>17</sup> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">17.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, pp.125-126<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText3"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In subsequent operations, the number of desertions
increased, while fewer were killed in action. Menezes writes: “<i>Of some
15,500 INA personnel in Burma in 1945, 150 were killed in action; 1,500 died of
starvation or disease; 5,000 surrendered or deserted; 7,000 were captured;
2,000 escaped towards Bangkok</i></span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">. <sup>18<o:p></o:p></sup></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt;">18.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, <i>Fidelity and Honour – The Indian
Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century</i>, p. 397<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">It is obvious that the number of INA
soldiers killed in action was much less than what is claimed in the official
history. Unfortunately, there is no Roll of Honour or a war memorial on which
the names of these fallen soldiers can be inscribed. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><u>Q5. Were Indian soldiers in the pre-Independence
Indian Army patriots or mercenaries? <o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">The soldiers of the INA fought
against their compatriots in the British Indian Army. The professed aim of the
INA was to free India from British rule. Hence they considered themselves as
patriots and the Indians serving in the British Indian Army as mercenaries.
This question had baffled most Indians of that time and does so even today. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Almost all
officers who joined the INA claim that they did so for patriotic reasons. Of
course, none of them has been able to explain why his sense of patriotism
surfaced only after being captured. If they felt so strongly about serving
under the British, they should have resigned. In the Preface to Toye’s book,
Philip Mason wrote, <i>“One must respect such a man as Subhas Chandra Bose, who
resigned from the Indian Civil Service because he sincerely believed it his
duty to India; that respect can hardly be extended to all who changed sides in
adversity and who a second time chose the more comfortable path</i>”</span><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">19</span></sup><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">.</span></sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">19.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Hugh Toye, <i>The Springing Tiger,</i> p. VIII<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Mohan Singh feels differently,
writing: <i>In whatever dignified colours we may paint the pre-Independence
Indian Army, we cannot hide one hard fact that, besides its responsibility for
the defence and security of our country, it had to play its purely mercenary
role.</i><b><sup>20</sup> <o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">20.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Mohan Singh, p. 65<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Of course, there is an inherent<b> </b>contradiction
in Mohan Singh’s statement – responsibility for defence of one’s country does
not blend with a mercenary role. The primary task of the Indian Army, even
under British rule, was defence and internal security of the country. In 1933
the War Office had spelt out the role of the Indian Army in the following
words: “<i>The duties of the army in India include the preservation of internal
security in India, the covering of the lines of internal communication, and the
protection of India against external attack</i>. <i>Though the scale of forces
is not calculated to meet external attack by a great Power, their duties might
well comprise the initial resistance to such an attack pending the arrival of
imperial reinforcements</i>.<b><sup>21 </sup></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">21.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Bisheshwar Prasad, ed. <i>Official History of the Indian Armed
Forces in the Second World War 1939-45 – India and the War,</i> p.35<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">The supplementary role implied the
provision of an Imperial Reserve, for which the British Government agreed to
grant an annual subsidy of 1.5 million pounds to the Government of India. This
role was modified by the ‘1938 Plan’ (Document No. B-43746), which stipulated
six tasks for the Indian defence forces, viz. defence of the Western Frontier
against external aggression; defence of land frontiers other than the Western
Frontier; maintenance of law and order and the suppression of disorder and
rebellion; safeguarding strategic lines of communication within India;
provision of a general reserve with mobile components; and provision of forces
for possible employment overseas at the request of the Government of UK. In
view of the enhancement in the responsibilities assigned to India, the
Chatfield Committee was constituted in 1938 to recommend measures to modernize
and increase the size of the Indian armed forces. The Committee recommended
that a new contract be negotiated with the Government of India, to enable it to
fulfill its task. The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the
British Cabinet on 28 June 1939, but before they could be implemented, World
War II broke out.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">As will be obvious, the primary
responsibility of the Indian Army – defence of India – never changed. The
employment of Indian troops overseas was covered by a formal contract between
the governments of UK and India.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By
definition, a mercenary soldier fights for money or reward for a country other
than his own. Strictly speaking, the term would be more appropriate for the INA
soldiers who fought for a foreign power – Japan. It is pertinent that the
salaries of all ex-Indian Army soldiers in the INA were paid by Japan, the
Provisional Government of <i>Azad Hind</i> paying only for the civilian
recruits. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Who were the mercenaries – Indian
soldiers in the Indian Army or the Indian National Army?<u><o:p></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoHeader" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><u>Q.6 What is the truth about atrocities committed by the INA?<o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">There were several reported instances of the INA soldiers committing
atrocities on Indian soldiers who were captured and held in their custody, as
well as on those who refused to join the INA. After the end of the war, some of
them were tried by court martial and convicted, not only for waging war against
the Crown but also murder, and causing grievous hurt. Of the three officers
(Shah Nawaz Khan, P.K. Sahgal and G.S. Dhillon), who were tried in the Red Fort
in 1945, Dhillon was charged with the murder of Duli Chand, Hari Singh, Daryao
Singh and Dharam Singh, whereas the other two were charged with abetment to
murder, in addition to waging war against the King. Later, Captain Burhanuddin
was also tried for murder but found guilty only of causing grievous hurt.
Apparently, <b>“</b><i>Teja Singh was stood on a table, his wrists tied to a
rope eight feet from the ground, the table removed, and Teja Singh beaten by
120 men in succession under Burhanuddin’s orders until he lost consciousness,
with the result that he subsequently died.”</i><b><sup>22</sup><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>2</b>2.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Connell, p.817<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commenting on the atrocities omitted
by the INA, Shahid Hamid writes: ‘<i>Most officers later realized that the INA
was a trap, but once in they could not get out. They had no love for the
Japanese and maintained that they were let down by them. The atrocities
committed by the Kempatai (Japanese Special Military Police) did not help
towards better relations. Taking their clue (sic) from the Kempatai the INA
committed atrocious crimes in the name of patriotism against their own
comrades. These are considered among the most degrading crimes in the history
of soldiering’</i><b><sup>23</sup><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">23.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Hamid, p.17<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">However, there is a contrary view,
which holds that stories of INA atrocities were sometimes concocted or
deliberately exaggerated by British Intelligence, in order to protect Indian
soldiers from falling prey to INA propaganda. According to Peter Ward Fay, in
1943 the British authorities adopted a programme that was intended to blacken
the name of the INA, which was christened the JIFC (Japanese Indian or Inspired
Fifth Column), which came to be known as Jiffs. Each unit was asked to form a<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>‘josh group’, in which officers were detailed
to educate and train in countering INA propaganda and possible seduction by
contact parties of the INA as had occurred in the Arakan. Interrogation files
were combed for instances of barbarous behaviour by the Japanese towards
prisoners, and these were circulated among troops deployed on the Burma Front.
“<i>There is a purpose here. It is to instil hatred of the Japanese, contempt
for traitors, and in general a desire to be ‘up and at them’ into the men”.</i>
<b><sup>24</sup></b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">24.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Fay, p.424<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoHeading8" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The INA executed some of its own
members, who were accused of desertion. This was done after trials conducted by
the INA under its own Act, whose legality was suspect. However, Bose had
himself decreed that traitors would be executed, even though he had earlier
announced that anyone who wished to leave the INA could do so at any stage.
There was the well-known case of Captain Durrani, who not only instructed
several intelligence agents sent to India to surrender, but gave them
intelligence to pass on to authorities in India. At a secret midnight
arraignment in the Bidadri Concentration Camp, Bose personally interrogated
Durrani, who was weak and dazed after ten days of Japanese third degree. Bose
would take no denial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i>“You should be
grateful to me”</i>, he said, “<i>that I have saved you from the Japanese
firing squad, and that you will be shot by Indians”</i>. <b><sup>25.</sup> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">25.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.112. (Durrani survived and was
later decorated with the George Cross for his fortitude.)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><u>Q7. Did the INA resort to coercion to collect funds?<o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%;"><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Maintaining
a large military force like the INA needed considerable amount of funds. The
Japanese agreed to pay the salaries of the prisoners of war, and to supply the
weapons, equipment and rations. Most of the weapons and equipment were captured
from the British Army after the fall of Singapore, and as it retreated from
Burma. However, the civilian recruits had to be paid by the IIL, which had to
rely on contributions from the Indian community in South East Asia. In the
initial period these contributions were voluntary, and sufficed to meet the
needs of the INA. However, after the arrival of Bose, the IIL was expanded,
with a secretariat and eight departments to handle its multifarious activities.
By October 1943 the monthly expenses amounted to about a million local dollars
or 116,700 pounds sterling</span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">The arrival of
Bose infused new life into the movement, and Indians made generous
contributions. A merchant named Habeeb donated his entire estate to the IIL.
Even poor Indians did not lag behind and gave whatever they could afford.
However, the contribution soon dried up and persuasion was replaced by
threats.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On 25 October 1943 Bose
addressed the merchants of Malaya with severity: <i>Legally speaking there is
no private property when a country is in a state of war. If you think that your
wealth and possessions are your own, you are living in delusion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Your lives and property do not belong to you;
they now belong to India and India alone</i></span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">. <sup>26</sup></span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">26.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.94<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">When Bose heard
that some of the rich Indians of Malaya were murmuring that he was harassing
them, and wanted to change their nationalities or avoid payment by some other
means, he told them; ‘<i>I stand here today representing the Provisional
Government of Azad Hind which has absolute rights over your lives and
properties…If you do not choose to come forward voluntarily, then we are not
going to remain slaves on that account… Everyone who refuses to help our cause
is…..<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>our enemy</i>. </span><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">27</span></sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">27.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.95<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Bose soon
recognized that cash donations would not be enough to meet his needs and
decided that he must make a systematic levy on Indian property. From the
beginning of 1944 Indians had to declare their assets. Levies of from ten to
twenty five percent were imposed and collected with progressive vigour. After a
state reception in Manila, Bose visited Saigon on 24 November 1943, where the
Indian community was assembled to greet him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He assessed its contribution to his funds at twelve million <i>piastres</i>
and, when the leaders demurred, exclaimed, much as he had done in Malaya<i>:
‘All your wealth would not buy back one life lost in battle. I have full
jurisdiction over you and can order you to the front</i>.</span><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">28 <o:p></o:p></span></sup></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">28.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.98<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">The shortage of
funds was aggravated once it became clear that Japan was losing the war. In
November 1944 the collection in Malaya fell from $ 2,000,000 to $ 617,000, in
six months. It became difficult to enforce assessments - now that people knew
that time was on their side, they delayed payments and concealed assets. In
December 1944 Bose toured the region, to collect funds. In Penang he ordered
the arrest of a defaulter, which had a salutary effect on the others. On his
return to Singapore, he threatened ten people with arrest. Letters were sent
out to each defaulter, with a warning that if they did not pay up within three
days, they would face arrest and imprisonment. On his way back to Rangoon in
January 1945 Bose addressed a public meeting.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>His speech was direct and bitter: those who opposed him should say so
openly, they could then be put into concentration camps with the British and
their property could be confiscated: if they wished to remain free they must
pay their assessments. Bose left with the Japanese Security Police a list of
ten persons for immediate arrest, and eighty others for varying degrees of
surveillance and pressure: in the following two weeks the ten were arrested. </span><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">29 <o:p></o:p></span></sup></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">29.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.133 <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">In July 1945
‘Netaji Week’ was celebrated in Singapore. The rich Indians were called for a
meeting to hear new demands for money. On the orders of Bose, five of the
defaulters warned in January were arrested by the Japanese Security Police.
Several demand notes went out from the IIL.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>A man who had promised ten thousand dollars but sent only half received
a terse note: ‘<i>I regret that our instructions are not to accept part
payments. Netaji made it very clear that promises must be fulfilled in a day or
two. It is incumbent on you to pay your promised amount at once.</i>’ Kuala
Lumpur was similarly visited, where five defaulters were arrested. </span><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">30 <o:p></o:p></span></sup></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">30.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.162<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Were these coercive methods to extort funds from
Indians living in foreign countries lawful? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><b><u>Q8 What is
the truth about Bose’s marriage to Emilie Schenkel and the reasons behind
keeping it hidden? <o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">One subject that remains somewhat of a mystery is Bose’s secret marriage
to Emilie Schenkl, an Austrian girl he first met during his visit to Europe in
the thirties. She worked as his secretary and helped him produce <i>The Indian
Struggle</i> in 1934. During a subsequent visit in 1937, she accompanied Bose
to the health resort of Bad Gastein, where he wrote his autobiography, <i>The
Indian Pilgrim</i>, which was published ten years later.<b><sup>31</sup></b> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">31.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Fay, p.195. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Emilie was his secretary again in 1941, when he went
to Germany after his dramatic escape from Calcutta and established the Free
India Centre. Toye writes: ‘<i>In July 1942 it became necessary for Fraulein
Schenkl, who had been Bose’ private secretary for more than a year, to leave
the Free India Centre. The dismissal was not what it seemed. Bose had known
Emilie Schenkl ever since 1934; she was now secretly his wife, and in September
1942 was to bear him a daughter’</i>. <b><sup>32</sup></b><sup> <o:p></o:p></sup></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">32.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.75. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -22.35pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 20.4pt;">Though it is fairly certain Bose married Emilie <span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Schenkl secretly in
1937 and they had a daughter named </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anita_Bose_Pfaff" title="Anita Bose Pfaff"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Anita Bose Pfaff</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>in 1942, some questions about the marriage
remain. It has not been clearly established if there was an actual marriage
ceremony. </span>Bose<span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> chose to keep his marriage a secret and did not reveal it except to a
chosen few. What could be reason for this? Several historians have written
about it including members of his own family, such as Sugata Bose.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-left: 20.4pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">On 4 November 1937,
Subhas sent a letter to Emilie in German, saying that he would probably travel
to Europe in the middle of November. "Please write to Kurhaus Hochland,
Badgastein," he instructed her, "and enquire if I (and you also) can
stay there". He asked her to mention this message only to her parents, not
to reply, and wait for his next airmail letter or telegram. On 16 November, he
sent a cable: "Starting aeroplane arriving Badgastein twenty second
arrange lodging and meet me. ...”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
spent a month and a half—from 22 November 1937, to 8 January 1938—with Emilie
at his favourite resort of Badgastein.<b><sup>33</sup></b><u><sup> <o:p></o:p></sup></u></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-left: 20.4pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-indent: 15.6pt;">33. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sugata_Bose" title="Sugata Bose"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Bose, Sugata</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> <i>(2011), </i></span><a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=g-pfHRAD03AC"><i><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">His Majesty's Opponent: Subhas
Chandra Bose and India's Struggle against Empire</span></i></a><i><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">, Harvard University
Press. </span></i><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">p. 127<i> </i> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-right: -22.35pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 20.4pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">He goes on to write: <i>On 26 December 1937, Subhas Chandra Bose secretly
married Emilie Schenkl. Despite the obvious anguish, they chose to keep their
relationship and marriage a closely guarded secret.<b><sup>34</sup></b></i><b><u><sup>
</sup></u></b><u><sup><o:p></o:p></sup></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-indent: 20.4pt;">34. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subhas_Chandra_Bose#CITEREFBose2011"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Bose (2011</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">), pp. 129–130.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -22.35pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 20.4pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Leonard A Gordon, who has written a biography of Netaji and his brother
Sarat Chandra Bose, writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0cm; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Although
we must take Emilie Schenkl at her word (about her secret marriage to Bose in
1937), there are a few nagging doubts about an actual marriage ceremony because
there is no document that I have seen and no testimony by any other
person. ... Other biographers have written that Bose and Miss Schenkl were
married in 1942, while Krishna Bose, implying 1941, leaves the date ambiguous.
The strangest and most confusing testimony comes from A. C. N. Nambiar, who was
with the couple in Badgastein briefly in 1937, and was with them in Berlin
during the war as second-in-command to Bose. In an answer to my question about
the marriage, he wrote to me in 1978: 'I cannot state anything definite about
the marriage of Bose referred to by you, since I came to know of it only a good
while after the end of the last world war ... I can imagine the marriage
having been a very informal one ...'... So what are we left
with? ... We know they had a close passionate relationship and that they
had a child, Anita, born 29 November 1942, in Vienna. ... And we have
Emilie Schenkl's testimony that they were married secretly in 1937. Whatever
the precise dates, the most important thing is the relationship."<b><sup>35</sup></b>
<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-left: 64.35pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">35.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonard_A._Gordon" title="Leonard A. Gordon"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Gordon, Leonard A.</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> (1990),<i> </i></span><a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=J8s-AQAAIAAJ"><i><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Brothers against the Raj: a biography
of Indian nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose</span></i></a><i><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">, Columbia University
Press, </span></i><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">pp. 344–345.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;"><span style="background: yellow; mso-highlight: yellow;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -22.35pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.0cm;">According to Fay, Emilie had begun living with Bose
almost from the moment he reached Europe. Since Bose had taken a vow that he
would not marry until India was free, he was naturally reluctant to formalize
their relationship. However, Emilie wanted to get married, and he could not
refuse her. But he agonized over the repercussions when the secret became
known, as it was bound to someday. Many years later, soon after the debacle at
Imphal, during a rare moment when he was alone with Laksmi Swaminathan, he
asked her, “<i>Do you think people in India will understand</i>?” <b><sup>36</sup></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1.0cm;">36.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Fay, p.312. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><b><u>Q. 9 Was
Azad Hind Government a sovereign state? <o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 8.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="background: white;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="background: white;">On 21 October
1943, Bose announced the formation of the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arzi_Hukumat-e-Azad_Hind" title="Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind"><i><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Arzi
Hukumat-e-Azad Hind</span></i></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">, or the Provisional Government of Free India, </span><span style="background: white;">with himself as the Head of State, Prime Minister and
Minister of War. (This was the second </span><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Provisional Government of Free India, the first
having been established in in Kabul o</span><span style="color: #202122;">n 01
December 1915 by Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh, with the support of Germany,
Turkey and Afghanistan. </span><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI;">The
Provisional Government ceased to function in 1920 when King Amanullah of
Afghanistan made peace with England after his famous war of independence). </span><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">The INA was declared to
be the army of <i>Azad Hind</i>. </span><span style="background: white;">Immediately
after its formation, the Provisional Government of Free India declared war
against the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allies_of_World_War_II" title="Allies of World War II"><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Allied forces</span></a><span style="background: white;"> on the Indo-Burma Front.<sup> </sup></span><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">The Azad Hind
Government also produced its own currency, postage stamps, court and civil
code, and was recognised by some Axis powers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>To qualify as a sovereign state, the Azad Hind Government needed some
territory of its own. In 1942, the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_the_Andaman_Islands" title="Japanese occupation of the Andaman Islands"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Japanese took possession of Andaman and Nicobar Islands</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A year later, the Provisional Government of
Azad Hind and the INA were established in the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andaman_and_Nicobar_Islands" title="Andaman and Nicobar Islands"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">I</span><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">slands</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> with Lt
Col. </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A.D._Loganathan" title="A.D. Loganathan"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">A.D.
Loganathan</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> as Governor General. The islands were renamed <i>Shaheed</i> (Martyr)
and <i>Swaraj</i> (Independence). However, the Provisional
Government’s civil authority was never enacted in areas occupied by the INA;
instead, Japanese military authority prevailed and responsibility for administration
of occupied areas of India was shared between the Japanese and the Indian
forces. <sup><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></sup></span><span style="background: white;">During his interrogation after the war, Loganathan
admitted that he had only had control over the islands' education department,
as the Japanese had retained full control over the police force, and in
protest, he had refused to accept responsibility for any other areas of
Government. He could not prevent the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homfreyganj_massacre" title="Homfreyganj massacre"><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Homfreyganj massacre</span></a><span style="background: white;"> of 30 January 1944, where forty-four Indian
civilians were shot by the Japanese on suspicion of spying. Many of them were
members of the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Independence_League" title="Indian Independence League"><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Indian Independence League</span></a><span style="background: white;">, whose leader in </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Blair" title="Port Blair"><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Port Blair</span></a><span style="background: white;">, Dr. Diwan Singh,
had already been tortured to death in the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellular_Jail" title="Cellular Jail"><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Cellular Jail</span></a><span style="background: white;"> after doing
his best to protect the islanders from Japanese atrocities during the first two
years of the occupation.<b><sup>37, 38</sup></b></span><b><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">37. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Dasgupta,
Jayant (2002) <i>Japanese in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Red Sun over
Black Water</i>. Delhi: Manas Publications. Pp. 67, 87, 91–95. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">38. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Mathur,
L.P. (1985) <i>Kala Pani. History of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands
with a study of India's Freedom Struggle</i>. Delhi: Eastern Book Corporation.
pp. 249–251.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Significantly, when the Japanese
surrendered at the end of World War II, there was a formal surrender ceremony
which Lt Col Nathu Singh, who was commanding 1/7 Rajput battalion of the Indian
Army, accepted the formal surrender of Japanese troops in the Andaman and
Nicobar islands from Vice Admiral Teejo Hara, on behalf of the Supreme Allied
Commander, South East Asia.<b><sup>39</sup></b> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 70.9pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: -42.55pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">39.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Singh, Major General V.K. (2005), <i>Leadership
in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers:</i> New Delhi, Sage
Publications, p.65 <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">Can the Azad Hind Government still claim that it was a sovereign state? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><b><u>Q10. Was
Netaji a military or a political leader? <o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;">Subhas
Chandra Bose was only 24 years old when he returned to India from England in
1921, after having resigned from the ICS. He met Mahatma Gandhi who in turn
advised him to meet CR Das, who was leading the freedom movement in Bengal.
Bose found <span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Das to
be more flexible than Gandhi and sympathetic to the extremism that attracted
idealistic young men such as Bose in Bengal. It was Das who launched Bose into
nationalist politics. For the next 20 years, Bose worked within the ambit
of the Indian National Congress politics even as he tried to change its course.<sup>
<b>40</b></sup><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-left: 90.0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: -47.45pt;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">40.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subhas_Chandra_Bose#CITEREFGordon1990"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Gordon
1990</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">, p. 69.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.0cm;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Bose's writings prior to 1939 shows
that he disapproved of the racist practices and annulment of democratic
institutions in Nazi Germany. However, he expressed admiration for the
authoritarian methods which he saw in Italy and Germany during the 1930s, and
thought they could be used in building an independent India. During the
two years he spent in Germany from 1941 to 1943, he was able to open the Free
India Centre in </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin" title="Berlin"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Berlin</span></a><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, and to set up a Free India
Radio on which he broadcast every night. He also created the 3,000 strong Free
India Legion from Indian prisoners of war captured by Germany’s Afrika
Korps.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This restored his reputation as a
politician, which had been adversely affected in the previous two years. </span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">After his arrival in
Singapore in 1943, Bose realized that the Japanese were more responsive to his
aspirations than the Germans. He was able to obtain more support from Japan
than he had from Germany. The Indian National Army that had been disbanded was
revived and took part in some operations in Burma alongside Japanese forces. He
also created the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azad_Hind" title="Azad Hind"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Provisional
Government of Free India</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"> in Japanese occupied Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These
efforts did not bear fruit and after the recapture of Singapore by British
forces and the surrender of the remnants of the INA at Rangoon, Bose escaped to
Manchuria, hoping to continue his campaign for liberating India with the help
of the Soviet Union. His life ended in the plane before could complete his journey.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">There is little doubt that Bose had all the qualities needed by a
successful political leader.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He was
confident of his abilities and just a week after his arrival in Singapore said
so himself. </span>On 9 July, 60,000 people stood in pouring rain to hear Bose
proclaim: ‘<i>There is no nationalist leader in India who can claim to possess
the many sided experience that I have been able to acquire</i>.’ <b><sup>41</sup><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">41. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p. 82<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">But
can the same be said about his military experience? He had not undergone any
military training at all, yet when he raised the INA he chose to be its
Commander-in-Chief. He emulated Adolf Hitler, not only in his actions but also
in matters of dress, salutation and title. Hitler had some military experience
having served in the German Army during World War I, but had risen to rank of
corporal. He often overruled his marshals with disastrous results, which
ultimately led to his downfall. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; margin-right: -36.55pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 20.4pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">During Imphal campaign, though the Japanese appreciated the firmness with
which Bose's forces continued to fight, they were endlessly exasperated with
him. A number of Japanese officers, even those like </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iwaichi_Fujiwara" title="Iwaichi Fujiwara"><span style="color: windowtext; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Fujiwara</span></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">, who were devoted to
the Indian cause, saw Bose as a military incompetent as well as an unrealistic
and stubborn man who saw only his own needs and problems and could not see the
larger picture of the war as the Japanese had to.<b><sup>42 </sup></b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 1.2pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-indent: 20.4pt;">42. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subhas_Chandra_Bose#CITEREFGordon1990"></a><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Gordon
(1990) p. 517.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Fujiwara, who knew
the INA and its leaders more than any other Japanese officer, writes: <i>“As
leader of the Army, Bose became the foundation of spiritual strength and was
the pivot of the INA organisation. However, the standard of his operational
tactics was, it must be said with great regret, low. He was inclined to be
idealistic and not realistic. </i>To this Toye adds: <i>“The fact that he was
neither a good soldier, nor the infallible political genius his disciples
believed, makes only the more remarkable his power of fascination.”</i></span><i><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">43<o:p></o:p></span></sup></i></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">43.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Toye, p.178</span><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p></o:p></span></sup></p>
<p class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><sup><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span></sup><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">Though Bose had worn
the mantle of a military leader, in Germany as well as in Singapore, some of
his actions show that he was not aware of the responsibilities that such a role
entails. One of these was the safety and well-being of the men under his command,
which is part of the motto of every Indian officer who passes out from the
portals of the Indian Military Academy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;">After having created
the Indian Foreign Legion in Germany, when he found that the Germans were not
willing to give him the role that he wanted, he left for Singapore, to seek the
help of Japan. He left 3,000 soldiers of the Indian Foreign Legion to their
fate. He did something similar when he found that the INA had not failed to
achieve its objectives. Ten days before the INA surrendered to British forces
at Rangoon, Bose left for Manchuria, along with the women of the Rani Jhansi
Regiment and a few others. He left 10,000 soldiers of the INA to their fate.
This was contrary to the time honoured custom of a commander always
surrendering with his troops, instead of leaving them to their fate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="background: white;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="background: white;">America declared its independence in 1776, but it took
another five years to win freedom from the British. On October 19, 1781,
the British General Charles Cornwallis surrendered in Yorktown, Virginia along
with 8,000 British troops. During World War I, in the siege of Kut-al Amara,
Major General Charles Townshend surrendered to the Turkish forces on 29
April 1916. He spent the rest of the war confined at Constantinople, while
around 4,000 of the 10,000 troops which surrendered at Kut died either on the
march to Turkish prison camps, or were worked to death in the camps. During </span>World
War II, L<span style="background: white;">ieutenant General Arthur Percival
surrendered at Singapore to the Japanese along with 136,000 men in February
1942. Churchill called it “the worst disaster in British history”. A more
recent example is the surrender of </span>L<span style="background: white;">ieutenant
General Niazi along with 93,000 Pakistani soldiers at Dacca in 1971, after the
liberation of East Pakistan by the Indian Army. Bose may not be aware of this
military custom, but surely his military advisers must have been. It is
surprising than none of them advised him about this tradition.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><span style="background: white;">Shahnawaz mentions an interesting incident that
occurred on 29 April 1945 during the journey after Bose left Rangoon. He
writes: “</span><i>General Isoda of the Liasion Department asked Netaji to go
in the car and the Rani Jhansi girls in the lorries. He said “Do you think I am
Ba Maw of Burma that I will leave my men and run for safety?”<b><sup>44<o:p></o:p></sup></b></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 39.0pt; text-align: justify;">44.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Shahnawaz, p. 243.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">In fact, this is
exactly what Bose was doing – leaving his men and running for safety.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><b><u>Q.11 Did
the INA play a part in India’s independence?</u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Most INA veterans assert that they played a stellar
role in India’s independence from British rule. In support of this view, they
cite various documents that show that one of the reasons that prompted the
British decision to grant independence to India was the realisation that they
could no longer rely on the Indian Army.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In note written in early 1946 Lord Wavell wrote: <i>“It would not be
wise to try the Indian Army too highly in suppression of it’s own people</i>.”<b><sup>45</sup></b>
In the Foreword to KC Praval's book on the Indian Army, Lieutenant General SK
Sinha wrote, ‘<i>There had also been the Naval mutiny at Bombay and the Army
(Signals) mutiny at Jubbulpore. It was now clear as daylight to the British
that they could no longer use the Indian Army to perpetuate their imperial rule
over India</i>…”<sup>46<b><o:p></o:p></b></sup></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">45.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Wavell, <i>The Viceroy’s Journal, </i>p. 197<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">46.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Major KC Praval, <i>Indian Army After Independence</i>, p. IX.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">Menezes writes: ‘<i>Now in early 1946, serious cases
of mutiny suddenly occurred in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN), less serious in the
Royal Air Force (RAF) (wanting early repatriation) and in the Royal Indian Air
Force, and a lesser protest in the Indian Army, at Jubbulpore in the Signal
Training Centre</i>.<b><sup>47</sup></b> Though Menezes calls the Jubbulpore
mutiny ‘a lesser protest’, in fact it was taken most seriously by the British
authorities. The RIN and RIAF at that time were miniscule forces, with hardly
any role in governance. The major instrument of British power was the Indian
Army, and disaffection in its ranks was a cause for concern, however small. On
28 March 1946, less than a month after the suppression of the mutiny at
Jubbulpore, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India,
broadcast his famous appeal to all officers of the Indian Army. On 30 March
1946, the Hindustan Times<i> </i>commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal. “<i>There
is no doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought
about, the foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian
Army</i>…”<b><sup>48.</sup></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">47.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Menezes, p. 404<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">48.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Hamid, p.47 <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While there is no doubt that
nationalist feelings had taken root in the Indian Army, there is no proof that
the INA was the catalyst. There were three prominent mutinies in 1946 – the RIN
mutiny at Bombay, Karachi and other places; the Army mutiny at Jabalpur and the
RIAF mutiny at several places. The root causes of all three were deficiencies
in pay, food, accommodation etc; delay in demobilization and discrimination
against Indian servicemen. While it is true that after the INA trials - not
before - there was a feeling of sympathy for the INA prisoners in certain
quarters in the Armed Forces, there is nothing on record to show any direct
correlation between these movements and the INA. In fact, after the fall of
Rangoon so strong was the feeling against the INA prisoners amongst Indian
soldiers that Auchinleck had to issue instructions for their safety. The
assertion that these mutinies were inspired by the INA appears to be
fallacious. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="margin-right: -36.0pt;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span><span style="background: white;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="background: white;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="background: white;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="background: white;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.55pt; text-align: center;"><b><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></b></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.55pt; text-align: center;"><b><u><o:p><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.55pt; text-align: justify;"><o:p> </o:p></p>veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-24671637270136530512020-06-27T08:08:00.000-07:002020-07-02T09:07:14.536-07:00Comments by Maj Gen VK Singh on book Watershed 1967 -India’s Forgotten Victory Over China, By Probal DasGupta<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Comments
by Maj Gen VK Singh<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Watershed 1967 -India’s Forgotten Victory Over China, <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">By Probal DasGupta<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; line-height: 115%;">JUGGERNAUT BOOKS, 2020<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: center; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Extracts from the Book are given in normal
font, with the comments given below in italics)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
book starts with a section titled <span style="color: black;">Praise for the
Book. This is the first time I have seen something like this in a book dealing
with military history. I will not comment on the contents of the section. After
reading the comments given in the succeeding paragraphs, readers can form their
own opinions. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Introduction (Page
9-12)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
twin victories at Cho La and Nathu La have only been covered in fragments
through articles and papers. This book, based on extensive interviews with the
army men who were present at the scene, captures the events truthfully and aims
to fix this blind spot in history. This was personally important to me, being a
former army officer myself.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The author’s claim that the twin victories a ChoLa and Nathu La
have only been covered in fragments through articles and papers is not
correct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This subject has been covered
in detail in Chapter 8 of Volume III of the History of the Corps of Signals
that was written by Maj Gen VK Singh. It is also available on his blog. This
includes extracts from the diary of 2/Lt (later Col) NC Gupta, who was then the
signal officer in HQ 112 Brigade. This is the most authentic account of the
Nathula skirmish, as it was written as and when the events occurred. It has
been quoted by Maj Gen Randhir Sinh in his book. After reading the book, it is
obvious that the author has copied large portions from the blog. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">An account of the skirmish at Nathula <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>is also covered in the biography of Gen Sagat
Singh that forms part of the book <b>Leadership</b> <b>in the Indian Army
–Biographies of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Twelve Soldiers, </b>written
by <span style="color: black;">Maj Gen VK Singh in 2005.This is the earliest
published account of the action. This too has been used by the Author, without
giving any credit. <o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">An interesting side light is
that in 2019 </span></i><i><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">I was invited to attend
the commemoration ceremony of the centenary of Gen Sagat Singh in Jodhpur. That
is where I met the Author. There was a seminar and he spoke about the
Nathula and Chola incidents. His book had still not been published till then. I
asked him if he had read the biography of Gen Sagat that I had written. He told
me that he had read the biography written by Maj Gen Randhir Sinh and was in
touch with Gen Sagat’s son and daughter. I told him about NC Gupta's diary and
offered to send him copies, along with extracts from the Corps History. Next morning
I went to the office of the CSO Brig DK Tiwari. I got photo copies made of the
relevant pages from the Corps History. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the Author did not contact me to
collect them. I now understand why. He had already copied them from my
blog.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: center; text-autospace: none;">
<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Part
1: The Road to 1967<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">1. Secret Games:
Spies, Soldiers and the Opening Gambit<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2. In the Shadow
of the Dragon: The War Moves East<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">3. Protests,
Disagreements and a Temporary Truce: Advantage China<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Part 1 comprising the first three
chapters covers 49 pages. Most of it is irrelevant and has been included just
to fill up space.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter
1 -<span style="color: #0000ef;"> </span>Secret Games: Spies, Soldiers and the
Opening Gambit <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Page 14-31)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The author has written about several matters, such as a CIA plot
to encourage China and Pakistan to attack India; meetings between Sheikh
Abdulla and CIA operatives; Pakistani attacks in the Rann of Kutch in July
1965; Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August 1965 followed by the full scale
war on the whole of the Western Front in September; details of major battles
such as Haji Pir, Asal Uttar, Dograi etc. There are 48 notes, mostly referring
newspaper articles in Indian and foreign journals. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter
2-<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the Shadow of the Dragon: The War
Moves East (Page 32-40)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The chapter covers the Goa
operation in December 1961; Pakistan’s failed attempts to obtain help from USA
and China; and the cease fire between India and Pakistan on 22 September. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In
the 1962 war, Harbaksh was the commander of 33 Corps, based in Siliguri in West
Bengal, under whose command lay 17 Mountain Division in Sikkim. In the summer
of 1965, Sagat arrived to take over the same division.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In the 1962 war, Lt Gen <span style="color: black;">Harbaksh Singh was appointed GOC IV Corps for a short
period, when Lt Gen BM Kaul fell sick and was evacuated to Delhi. At that time,
17 Mountain Division was not in Sikkim. It moved to Sikkim only in 1964.<o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Sometime
in the early 1960s, an American couple visiting the Taj Mahal in Agra on a
holiday happened to meet Sagat at the city’s Clarks Shiraz hotel. They had been
to Lisbon earlier and recalled seeing Sagat’s face on a poster in the city. The
poster promised a reward of $10,000 to anyone who would bring the head of the
Indian army officer Sagat Singh.</span><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">8<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The incident did not take
place in the early 1960s, as mentioned by the Author. It happened later, in
1962, after the capture of Goa in Dec 1961. It has been mentioned on Page 307
of the biography of Gen Sagat Singh written by Maj Gen VK Singh.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><a href="http://veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot.com/2012/10/biography-lieut-general-sagat-singh-pvsm_4.html">http://veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot.com/2012/10/biography-lieut-general-sagat-singh-pvsm_4.html</a><i><span style="color: black;"> <o:p></o:p></span></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter
3-Protests, Disagreements and a Temporary Truce:Advantage China (Page 41-59)</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This
chapter covers the diplomatic exchanges between India and China after some
sheep crossed over into India; the agitation outside the Chinese embassy led by
Atal Behari Vajpayee, the ultimatum by China to India to vacate Nathula and
Jelepla; Sagat’s refusal to vacate Nathula; minor skirmishes in 1965; the
marriage of Hope Cooke with the Palden Thondup, the Chogyal of Sikkim; her
friendship with Gen Sagat; the Tashkent agreement;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">As
the Chinese began to amass additional forces opposite the passes and heightened
the pressure on India at the border, </span><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">17 </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">orders from 33 Corps came in for 17 and 27 Divisions to vacate
Nathu La and Jelep La,</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Note 17. <span style="color: #0000ef;"><a href="http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/2042471866_VKSingh.pdf">http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/2042471866_VKSingh.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<i><span style="background: white; color: #4d5156; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This note refers to the article The Skirmish at
Nathula (1967) – published in the Scholar Warrior in Autumn 2014. </span></i><i><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">As
soon as India decided to withdraw from Jelep La, China promptly seized the
vacated pass. </span><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">23</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Note 23. <a href="http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/2042471866_VKSingh.pdf">http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/2042471866_VKSingh.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
link is the same as in Note 17, referring to the article <span style="background: white; color: #4d5156;">The Skirmish ant Nathula (1967)</span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Meanwhile,
opposite the Nathu La pass on the Tibetan side, the Chinese had assembled
loudspeakers – twenty-one of them! They blared all day, rebuking the Indians
for their actions, screaming that destiny had a rerun of 1962 in store for them.
They reminded the Indians about the might of the Chinese army. The slogans,
which oscillated between homilies about the virtues of communism that benefited
the poor soldier and rubbishing the Indian soldiers, were in Hindi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">However,
they had been translated into ‘shudh’ Hindi. Meant to be menacing and threatening,
they ended up being incomprehensible to the Indian troops who were used to more
colloquial language.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The installation of loudspeakers has been taken from the History
of the Corps of Signals that was written by Maj Gen VK Singh. In the Army, Signals
is responsible for PA equipment and the loudspeakers at Nathula were installed
and maintained by 17 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment, where he was then
serving. This has been<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>quoted on Page 77
of Gen Randhir’s book.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter 4-China’s Psychological
Tactics:Softening Up the Enemy Before the Storm (Page 61-68) <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This chapter covers in insurgency in Mizo Hills, the bombing of
Aizwal by IAF, the beginning of the Naxalite movement; machinations of Hope
Cooke in an effort to gain independence from India; and the stand-off at Dokla</span></i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">m. <i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 5 -1966–67: Warriors Arrive at the
Watershed (Page 69 -76)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This chapter covers the organisation of the Indian Army into
commands, corps, divisions, brigades and battalions; brief biographical
sketches of some officers (KB Joshi,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Parulekar,
Ram Singh Rathore) and men (Tinjong Lama, Debi Prasad)</span></i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <i>of 7/11 GR and some officers of 2 Grenadiers (Rai Singh,
Bishan Singh and PS Dagar). <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter
6 -The Tipping Point: A Tale of Spies and a Breach at the Watershed (Page 77-96)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This
chapter starts with the arrest and deportation of two Indian diplomats in
Peking in <span style="color: black;">June 1967; India’s retaliation by<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>expelling a Chinese diplomats followed by mob
attacks on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi; similar attacks on the Indian
embassy in Peking; arrival of 2 Grenadiers at Nathula in</span></span></i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <i>August 1967;commencement of laying the wire at Nathula by 2
Grenadie</i>rs <i>on 20 August; objection by the Chinese; visit by Corps
Commander and Gen Sagat Singh to the border on 1 Sep 1967; patrol led by Maj Bishan
Singh surrounded by Chinese leading to scuffle; fencing using concertina coils
started on 5 Sep; brawl between Indian and Chinese soldiers at the fence on 7
Sep resulting in injury to the political commissar; meeting held HQ 112 Brigade
by Gen Sagat Singh during which Maj Bishan Singh given task of completion
of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>fence; allotment of additional troops
from Engineers to assist him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter
7 - Hellfire at Nathu La (Page 97-105)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The opening paragraph of chapter 7 gives details of signal
communications, including the new line laid overnight from the brigade
headquarters in Chhanggu to Sherathang where the mortars were located. All
posts were connected on telephone and radio. This network was patched to the
Divisional HQ. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This information has
obviously been obtained from the diary of NC Gupta that is mentioned in my
articles as well as Chapter 3 of the History of the Corps of Signal, Volume III,
which is on my blog. However, no credit has been given for this information. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
suddenness of the Chinese actions had forced a bunch of soldiers, over thirty
according to accounts, to instinctively make a run for their lives: some even
escaping from the scene. This unpleasant chapter of the battle is often dropped
from narrations, but to exclude this would undermine the heroism of the
soldiers who stood and fought gallantly. Months later, court martials would be
held to prosecute deserters, on charges of cowardice.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This clearly brings out the fact that
troops ran away from their post. Several were later court martial led for
desertion and cowardice. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Bishan,
who had tried to prevent the two young officers from embarking on the suicidal
mission, </span><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">5 </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">provided
covering fire to the young soldiers and even downed the Chinese soldier who
shot Dagar. Bishan was also wounded in the process and fell unconscious, though
he survived the battle, unlike Dagar and Harbhajan. </span><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">6<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Note
5 </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">. Conversations with Bishan Singh in Jaipur.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Note
6 </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">. Bishan Singh would later be transported to the Siliguri hospital
as one of the survivors of Nathu La.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The author only mentions that Bishan Singh was injured. He has
totally ignored the role of NC Gupta in saving his life. It is difficult to
believe that Bishan Singh<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>did not reveal
the true facts during the author’s meeting with him in Jaipur. One can only
conclude that this was done deliberately, since that would have brought out the
fact of 2/Lt Attar Singh quitting his post at South Shoulder and being taken back
to the post by NC Gupta, under orders of the brigade commander. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Sheru
Thapliyal was sitting atop Sebu La, watching the action below. He saw Harbhajan
and Dagar drop before his eyes. ‘They couldn’t have reached the Chinese bunkers
anyway,’ remembers Sheru with sadness. ‘It was like a cruel movie playing
before the eyes,’ he recalls. Then the ‘clouds rolled in and I couldn’t see any
more’, Sheru reminisces fifty years later. </span><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">7<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Note
7</span><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">. Conversations with Sheru Thapliyal in Delhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
assertion that Sheru <span style="color: black;">Thapliyal saw Harbhajan and
Dagar drop before his eyes does not appear to be plausible. Thapliyal was
located at Sebula, about 1 Km away from Nathula. From that distance it is not
possible to recognize anyone, from the large number of soldiers involved in the
assault. </span><span style="color: #222222;">After the incident a couple of
officers were asked to write their views of the battle. Apart from the officers
of 2 Grenadiers, this included the OC of the Engineer Company. Copies of all
these comments are available in Capt Dagar Museum. Interestingly there is also
a report of Camel Back OP but none of Thapliyal.</span><span style="color: #0000ef;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Signal
Officer Naveen Gupta and Second Lieutenant Attar Singh, who was among the
younger officers in the unit, joined in and ran from trench to trench as he
yelled at the men to keep the flock together and respond with fire. The morale
had to be kept up.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The above is not true. Naveen did not join Attar Singh and run
with him from trench to trench. In fact, Attar Singh was at South Shoulder
while Naveen was with the brigade commander.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">By
then, signal communication with the platoon on South Shoulder had also been lost.
On Bakshi’s instructions, Naveen and a signal line repair party proceeded
towards South Shoulder with a radio set for the platoon there. On arriving at
the post, Naveen found the bodies of a few dead soldiers ahead of the defences.
The post wore a desolate look as most men had either been killed or had left
the post, barring an abandoned light machine gun (LMG). Naveen grabbed the LMG
and fired a few salvos to show the post was still occupied. Bakshi radioed him
that reinforcements were on their way and would take a while. To his relief,
Naveen soon spotted Second Lieutenant Attar Singh and a group of soldiers
coming down the slope, trying to rally the troops. The indefatigable Attar had
continued to revive the men’s spirits and managed to get<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">some
of them back on their feet and stay in the fight. In an unusual and unique episode,
Attar would later be promoted by Sagat to the rank of captain on the spot,
after he was told how the young officer restored the shocked spirits. The Grenadiers
had suffered large numbers of casualties at the start, but the officers and men
refused to back down and responded with machine guns and rifles. The melee
continued amidst a gritty fightback from the Grenadiers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
author has twisted the facts mentioned by Naveen in his diary. Naveen in fact
found the post abandoned. The diary runs into 25 pages of hand written notes.
Part of the diary describing the events of 11 September are given below:- <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">By
about 0930 hrs, Chinese fire had intensified and gradually we started getting
out of touch with the troops at North Shoulder and South Shoulder.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By 0945 hrs we had no contact with anyone on
the position on the shoulders even on the Artillery network.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It was a panic station for me.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All the lines were down and so was the B1 to
the pass.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I tried to enter the battalion
net and the company net but failed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>There was no response on any of the almost dozen frequencies of the
battalion in use that day for various nets.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I asked the operator at Brigade HQ to press in additional radio sets and
keep trying for a response directly on ANGRC-9 working to the Artillery OP and
CO of the Field Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Around this time from the vantage
position at Central Bump the Commander saw over a dozen troops running down the
slopes of South Shoulder towards Sherabthang.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He also observed that some of them had shed their helmets, packs and
even rifles as they ran down.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This
created a panic for us.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Commander
asked me to call South Shoulder but there was no response.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We tried to observe the area of South
Shoulder but could see no movement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
shelling on the South Shoulder had also increased.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Under the circumstances perhaps
there was no other option for the Commander but to ask me to send someone to
South Shoulder to restore the communication. While I had a line party and spare
radio sets with me it was decided that a radio be sent to South Shoulder a
distance of around 500 mtrs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The route
was open at places and involved going down around 300 mtrs and then up around
200 mtrs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The linemen with me were new
to Nathula and had never gone to South Shoulder.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Havildar Bhakuni of the Rover had gone there
many times.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The choice was therefore
between him and me.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Seeing the gravity
of the situation and the shelling the Commander said, “OK, Commando (my pet
name in Brigade HQ), off you go”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">I
reached South Shoulder at around 1000 hours.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>To my astonishment I found the post totally abandoned.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I informed the same to the Commander. He
asked me to look around for wounded if any and remain at the post and keep him
in picture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>From the bunkers on South
Shoulder I could see the Chinese in their bunker across.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By this time intermittent fog had started
setting in.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I informed the Commander
that I can see a few dead soldiers in the area ahead of our </span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">defences</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> close to the fence. Barring this
there is no one on the post that was designed for a platoon of Infantry.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I resorted to intermittent firing from my
carbine to indicate that the post is still occupied.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Soon I found an LMG in its bunker.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I then used it very carefully to try and
depict our presence on the post.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>At around 1100 hrs the Commander
informed me that re-enforcements are on their way but would take at least three
hours to reach and that I must hold on till then.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A little later he asked me to go around 100
mtrs down South Shoulder where he had spotted around six soldiers sitting
behind a huge rock.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After firing a few
salvos of LMG I went down.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I found six
Jawans of 2 Grenadiers including 2/Lt Attar Singh (fresh from IMA), one
Havildar and four Jawans.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I made Attar
Singh speak to the Commander. Thereafter we all went back to the post and
organized ourselves.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">By
1200 hrs the fog had intensified. As I was watching from one of the bunkers I
saw one of the dead moving. He was just next to the fence barely 10 mtrs from
the Chinese bunker. Taking advantage of the fog I went ahead to try and recover
him. To my surprise it was Major Bishan Singh, Tiger of Nathula who had been
injured in the initial firing. He was a 6 foot tall Jat. He was badly injured.
With great difficulty I managed to lift him and partly drag him into our
defences. Once inside I made him speak to the Commander.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After the Commander had been briefed by him
the Commander asked me to evacuate him using the four Jawans and asked me,
Attar Singh and the Havildar to remain at the post. Ten minutes later the
Commander asked me to return to the area of Bumps leaving the radio set with
2/Lt Attar Singh.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">As
would be obvious from the words in the diary, Attar Singh was not trying to
rally the troops but had abandoned the post along with his men. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">As
regards the fact that Attar Singh was promoted to the rank of Capt by the GOC,
this happened due a misunderstanding. These orders were given by the GOC when he
was informed on radio that the post had been reoccupied by Attar Singh. In
fact, he even ordered that Attar Singh should be recommended for a VrC. The
real story was narrated by Naveen only after he returned to the Brigade HQ.
When Gen Sagat came to know this he was enraged and ordered the officer to be
stripped of his rank and cancelled the orders recommending him for a gallantry
award. At this stage, Brig Bakshi felt that removing the rank would hurt the
feelings of the men, whose morale was already quite low. On his advice, Gen
Sagat permitted him to continue wearing the rank.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This has been mentioned in the Notes at the
end of the article “The Skirmish at Nathula (1967)” that has been given in the
Notes s by the Author at several places.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/2042471866_VKSingh.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">To
the few that had had enough of the tough battle and who decided to retreat to a
safer shelter, a rude surprise awaited. Sagat had decided to move closer to the
scene of the battle. Like a no-nonsense army drill sergeant out to catch cadets
who had loitered outside the precincts without permission, the general had<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>started to marshal the troops that had
abandoned the battle, shouting at them, herding them back into action. Sagat
stood on the road coming down from Nathu La trying to stem the rout. He even
threatened to shoot anyone he found moving to the rear. Sagat hated to see his
troops run away from the Chinese. When he saw a few men struggling to keep up,
he screamed at them, scolding, lambasting those who had gone astray, finally
collecting them like a schoolteacher at picnic and steering them back into class
– up towards the forward posts, into their harnesses and back into the battle.
Most of the soldiers stayed and fought valiantly, some attaining martyrdom.
There were still a few who had deserted the battle that day. Over<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">thirty
soldiers faced court martial later for cowardice. </span><span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">9<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Note
9. https://theprint.in/defence/remembering-the-war-we-forgot-51-years-agohow-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="color: #0000ef; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">india-gave-china-a-bloody-nose/127356/<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This
note gives reference of my article <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">WHEN
THE CHINESE GOT A BLOODY NOSE. However, this article makes no mention of Gen
Sagat collecting the deserters like </span><span style="color: black;">a
schoolteacher at a picnic and steering them back. But the information about
Sagat threatening to shoot deserters is true. This had been told to me by Gen
Sagat himself when I met him at his home in Jaipur in 1997-98. I had several
meetings with him in connection with his biography, before he approved the
draft. I had shared this with Gen Randhir Sinh when he was writing his
biography of Gen Sagat.<o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In fact, 2 Grenadiers was not the only battalion that showed traces of
cowardice under fire. Similar instances occurred in other units, including NC
Gupta’s own company as entries in his diary reveal. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter
8 - The Battle of Cho La (page 106 -120)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This chapter describes the actions of 7/11 GR in the battle of
Chola. It is entirely based on the regimental history of the regiment “</span></i><i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Path of Glory: Exploits of the 11 Gorkha Rifles” written by
Gautam Sharma and the Author’s conversation with Lt Col KB Joshi. The Author
has totally ignored the role of 10 JAK Rif, which was<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>awarded one MVC and three VrCs. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i><i><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i><i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The name of
the brigade commander, Brig Kundan Singh has also not been mentioned. The
regimental history of written by Col Gautam Sharma, mentions the name of the
brigade commander and his conversation with Lt Col KB Joshi. It is not
understood why the author has chosen to ignore his name. It now appears that
the whole aim of writing the book is to eulogize the 7/11 GR. The Author has
devoted 15 pages to the chapter, while the chapter which describes the battle
of Nathula has been given only 7.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Part
3 -Epilogue - After the Watershed Battles<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
Epilogue covers subjects such as the war in 1971, the creation of Bangla Desh
and the merger of Sikkim with India with the assistance of RAW. All these are
irrelevant to the subject of the book, which is professed to cover the battles
of Nathula and Chola.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
author has written 23 pages (121 -144) on the Epilogue, with 78 Notes. In
comparison only 9 pages have been devoted to the battle at Nathula (97-105) and
15 pages (106-120) to Chola.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><i><u><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">General
Comments<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">At
first glance, the book appears to be dealing with an important event in India’s
military history. This view is supported by some of the comments listed under
Praise for the Book. Shekhar Gupta opines “<span style="color: black;">This is a
valuable addition to the still thin genre of military historiography in India.”
Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam (retd), feels that it is<b> </b>“Meticulously
researched<b>”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b>Shiv Aroor calls it
“A book that should forever emblazon 1967’s victory against China in India’s
public consciousness as much as 1962’s defeat.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">After reading the detailed comments given above, chapter wise, I
am not sure how many will agree with these words of praise. The author can be called
a storyteller, but certainly not a military historian. He seems to have done
hardly any research, except for taking snippets from articles. Except for the regimental
history of his own Regiment, the 11<sup>th</sup> Gorkha Rifles, he has not
consulted the regimental histories of The Grenadiers, The Rajput Regiment and
The Jammu & Kashmir Rifles. Of course, he has made to attempt to go through
the war diaries of the units or the formation HQ. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">This being his first book he can perhaps be excused for gaffes
such as using incorrect ranks, names and decorations. In the introduction, he
mentions that under the leadership of Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, young
officers and soldiers of the Indian army defeated the Chinese at Nathu La. At
that time, Sagat Singh was major general, not a lieutenant general. Ranjit
Singh Dayal, the captor of Haji Pir is called Rajinder Singh Dayal; Gen Shiv
Charan Singh, GOC 27 Division is called Ramcharan Singh. Brig MMS Bakshi’s is
said to have been awarded a VrC in 1965, whereas he actually got an MVC. According
to the book, Mhow stands for Military Headquarters of War whereas it is the
name of a village called Mahu in the vicinity</span></i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">. <i>He
also has a disconcerting habit of giving names without mentioning the rank. For
instance, he mentions Kul Bhushan, Parulekar, Tinjong Lama, Debi Prasad etc. without
their ranks. Kulbhushan is sometimes referred to as KB. His full name with rank
Lt Col KB Joshi or Kul Bhushan Joshi is rarely mentioned. Since the battalion
has another KB (Krishna Bahadur), this sometimes leaves the reader confused.
Using names without ranks may be the norm in articles and stories; it is almost
never done in a book on military history.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">As already mentioned in </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Chapter 8 - The Battle
of Cho La, the Author has totally ignored the role of 10 JAK RIF and its CO, Lt
Col Mahatam Singh, MVC. In addition to the MVC for the CO, the battalion was
awarded three VrCs. This is an unacceptable lapse and amount to an insult to
the unit. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The
most glaring lacuna in the book is the distortion of facts relating to 2
Grenadiers. The only authentic version of the battle is the diary of 2/Lt
(later Col) NC Gupta, which gives a day by day account of the occurrences from
11-14 September 1967.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Its authenticity
cannot be questioned because it was written on a daily basis as the events occurred
and not in hind sight after 40-50 years like this book and some articles
written by a few others. The diary clearly brings out the instances of
cowardice, especially the vacation of South Shoulder at a critical juncture.
The war diaries and regimental histories either ignore this altogether or gloss
over it. Often, units resort to this due to a false sense of ‘Izzat’. Achievements
are often glorified while failures are either totally omitted or watered down.
This makes them unreliable for penning an authentic historical account.
Sometimes, one gets a true picture only after comparing the unit records with
those in the brigade or divisional HQ. This falsification of records is a dangerous
trend that bodes ill for India’s military history.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 115%;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The regimental history of The Grenadiers, titled </span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="X-NONE" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Grenadiers – A Tradition of Valour, </span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">was written by </span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span lang="X-NONE" style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Col. R.D. Palsokar</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> in 1980. Writing about the South Shoulder, he writes:
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">At
one stage it appeared that the force fighting from the South shoulder was wiped
out as it was the main target of the Chinese. The troops could not hold it and
had to fall back. When the Chinese fire died down, they once again occupied the
feature. The South Shoulder would have remained unoccupied had 2nd Lieutenant
Attar Singh not been there. His personal example inspired the men to stay fast.
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Col RD Palsokar (Guards) is a well known
military historian, who has penned a large number of regimental histories and
biographies. It appears that what he has written is based on the inputs given
to him by The Grenadiers, which is not his parent Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Another example of this falsification
syndrome is the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>article titled “<span style="mso-font-kerning: 18.0pt;">The Nathu La skirmish: when Chinese were given
a bloody nose” by </span>Sheru Thapliyal in the Force journal. He writes:-<span style="mso-font-kerning: 18.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoNormalTable" style="mso-cellspacing: 0in; mso-padding-alt: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; mso-yfti-tbllook: 1184; width: 100%px;">
<tbody>
<tr style="mso-yfti-firstrow: yes; mso-yfti-irow: 0; mso-yfti-lastrow: yes;">
<td style="padding: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; width: 10.0%;" width="10%"></td>
<td style="padding: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; width: 8.0%;" width="8%"></td>
<td style="padding: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; width: 5.0%;" width="5%"></td>
<td style="padding: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; width: 8.0%;" width="8%"></td>
<td nowrap="" style="padding: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; width: 17.0%;" width="17%"></td>
<td style="padding: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; width: 8.0%;" width="8%"></td>
<td nowrap="" style="padding: 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt 1.5pt; width: 44.0%;" width="44%"></td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2
Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to
their CO but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went
round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as
Captain on the spot. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">I
have noticed that some officers, especially from the Infantry, take offence
when they come across critical comments about their own or even other Regiments.
On page 82 of his book<span style="color: black;"> A<b> Talent for War: The
Military Biography of Lt Gen Sagat Singh</b>, Maj Gen Randhir Sinh has described
the evacuation of South Shoulder in these words: <o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2/Lt NC Gupta, who was the
Brigade Signal Officer and received a Sena Medal for his actions, was ordered
by Bakshi to go to South Shoulder as the position seems to have been vacated.
Gupta held on to the place until relieved by Atttar Singh and then evacuated
the badly injured Bishen Singh in the face of the enemy. 21. </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Note 21.
Personal account of </span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Brig
NC Gupta in History of the Corps of Signa</span></i></b><i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">ls.ibid. He is less than charitable towards people
and units in his first person account. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">One can understand the author’s unhappiness at the
mention of the evacuation of South Shoulder, which he has not quoted in full,
glossing over the role of Attar Singh. But is he justified in his observation
that NC Gupta has been less than charitable towards people and units? In fact
Gupta has mentioned several other cases of cowardice in other units, including
his own company. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">THE
MISSNG PAGES FROM NC GUPTA’S DIARY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The story of 2 Grenadiers would not be complete without relating the
episode of the missing pages of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Gupta’s
diary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After the incident a few officers were asked
to write their views of the battle. This included the OC of the field company.
Gupta told the Commander that he has written it down daily on whatever paper he
could find at Sherathang. This was mainly the reverse of radio logs on the
sheets that have a blue line margin on the left. After about a month or two
when Gupta was handing over to Capt Amar Singh to go on annual leave, the
Brigade HQ gave him back the file. Like any other young officer, he kept it in
his luggage and left for home. He never saw it after that. After his marriage
he did give it to his wife to read but he is sure she understood nothing. This
file remained at his family home in Faridabad, unread by anyone including Gupta
himself.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After I finished writing Volume II of the
Corps History in 2006, I started work on Volume III, which covers the period
1947 – 72. By this time Gupta had moved to Australia but came to India every
year for a couple of months.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sometime in
2009, I asked him for some inputs about the Nathula skirmish. Gupta told me
that he had a diary of the events at Nathula and would hand it over to me.
After locating the diary Gupta thought that he should he should read it, to
revive his memory. When he opened it, he was horrified when he found nine pages
missing. These were the pages which covered the actions of that fateful
morning. When Gupta told me this I asked him to<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>recollect the incidents as best as he could. Accordingly he made an
endorsement on the handwritten pages that nine pages are missing (this
endorsement still exists on the original, which is now in HQ 17 Mountain
Division). After adding the details of these nine pages from memory, Gupta<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>came to the Corps History Cell office in
Signals Enclave and handed it over to me. (Surprisingly his re-collection was
good, as he discovered later). We kept the diary for some time and returned
them to Gupta after making copies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In June 2016 Mr Vijay Dagar, the nephew
of Late Captain PS Dagar, VrC of 2 Grenadiers obtained Gupta’s address from the
Signals Directorate. He then visited his house at Faridabad Since Gupta was in
Australia he met his younger brother Gp Capt S Chandra who stays next door
and learnt from him that Gupta would be coming to India on 10 June for his knee
surgery. He left his card and took Gupta’s number.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">When
Gupta reached India, he called VijayDagar and told him that since he was
getting admitted in Army Hospital R&R after five days, they could meet
after his operation was over. However, Vijay came to the hospital to meet him
and told him about the museum he had made in memory of his uncle, Captain PS
Dagar, at Rotala, near Najafgarh. He invited Gupta to visit the museum when he
had fully recovered. Gupta promised to do so and told him that he would present
him a copy of his diary.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In
August 2016 when Gupta went to visit the Capt Dagar museum to present them the
diary, he found that it had a lot of memorabilia that Vijay had collected from
various sources. But the best was yet to come. He was stunned to see the
missing nine pages of his diary in the museum! Vijay told him that he had
got it from a clerk of 2<sup>nd</sup> Grenadiers. Perhaps the clerk kept a
colour photo copy for himself and gave him the original. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Then,
putting two and two together things all fell in place. Obviously, someone had
removed the nine pages from the file when Gupta had submitted it to the Brigade
HQ. The other officers had also given their comments. Copies of all these also
comments were also there in the Museum. Interestingly there is also a report of
Camel Back OP but none of Thapliyal. On his return from the museum, Gupta added
the original nine pages to the diary held with him. He also shared copies with
the Corps History Cell, where they are still available.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In September 2019 Gupta was invited by
HQ 17 Mountain Division to attend a commemoration ceremony to be held at
Nathula, on the anniversary of the operation. I was also invited but could not
go due to other commitments. Gupta went for the ceremony along with some other
members of his family. He presented the original copy of the diary to the GOC. <o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The first page has an annotation on the
top in red ink by the brigade commander, Brig MMS Bakshi, MVC, “Notes of 2/Lt
Gupta.”</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Mr Vijay Dagar is a very dedicated
person, who has located almost all the surviving prime witnesses of the fate
day when Capt PS Dagar lost his life at Nathula. These include:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0in;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Maj
Cheema, OC 70 Fd Company living in Noida<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Maj
Bishen Singh living in his home town.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Maj
Chadrashekhar living in Chennai.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Capt
Attar Singh living in Noida.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">A
JCO of Grenadiers living in Najafgarh. Then a young sepoy.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> Mr
Vijay Dagar has visited and met all of them personally. He knows many more
individuals who were present that day and are still alive though they did not
play a major role in the battle. He visits the unit almost every year with his
son and a few relatives on 11 Sept. He deserves the real credit for keeping the
legacy of Nathu La alive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The missing pages from Gupta’s diary
point to the disturbing trend already mentioned – the falsification of military
records by units. That the unit could resort to even removing documents from
higher HQ, which they perceived cast aspersions on their performance in battle,
speaks for itself.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Significantly,
the ERE in the Brigade HQ at that time was from the Grenadiers.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> This is indeed a serious matter and needs urgent attention
from those concerned with our military heritage and history.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<br /></div>
<br /></div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-42441687438552663922016-09-12T09:25:00.001-07:002016-09-12T09:25:29.005-07:00THE AIR FORCE MUTINY - 1946 <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -9.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u>CHAPTER - 7<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<h1 style="margin-right: -9.0pt;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></h1>
<h1 style="margin-right: -9.0pt;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE
AIR FORCE MUTINY - 1946<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The mutiny in the RIAF (Royal Indian
Air Force) occurred at almost the same time as the more serious uprisings in
the RIN (Royal Indian Navy) and Army units at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
in February 1946. Many historians prefer to call it a strike rather than a
mutiny, since there was no violence and neither was any one punished. However,
the term ‘strike’ is seldom used in the armed forces, collective
disobedience always being called a
mutiny, irrespective of the number of persons involved and the gravity of the insubordination. Though they occurred at almost the same time,
the trouble in the RIAF was quite different from the insurrection that occurred
in the other two services. While the disturbances in the Army and the RIN were
confined to Indian soldiers and sailors, the unrest in the RIAF was induced by
‘strikes’ by British airmen of the RAF (Royal Air Force). Since no disciplinary
action was taken against the British airmen, the authorities had to take a
lenient view of the indiscipline by Indian airmen also. Unlike the uprisings in
the Navy and the Army that had some nationalistic element, the demands of the
RIAF personnel related mostly to pay, rations and travel concessions. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
Though the RIAF mutiny was
controlled without the use of force, it had far reaching implications. The
Indian Air Force - the prefix Royal was
added only in 1943 - was just six years old when World War II began, undergoing
a ten fold increase in size by the time it ended. Though still minuscule compared
to the Indian Army, it was a potent force that could no longer be ignored. Coupled
with the more serious incidents in the other two armed forces, it reinforced
the perception of the British authorities that the Indian troops could no
longer be relied upon to maintain <st1:country-region w:st="on">Britain</st1:country-region>’s
hold over <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>.
This necessitated a serious review of British policy, leading ultimately to the
decision to pull out of <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>.
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
Three Indians pilots held
commissions in the RAF during World War I, fighting with great gallantry. They
were Lieutenant H.S Malik, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant E.S.C. Sen and Lieutenant
Indra Lal Roy. Sen was shot down over <st1:country-region w:st="on">Germany</st1:country-region>
and became a prisoner of war, while <st1:city w:st="on">Roy</st1:city>
was killed in air combat in July 1918. It was only in 1930 that a decision was
taken to establish an air force in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>. Officers selected as pilots
were sent to Cranwell in <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region>
for training, while the ground staff, recruited as <i>hawai sepoys </i>(air soldiers)<i> </i>were
trained in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>.
The first batch of five Indians commissioned as pilot officers comprised
Sircar, Subroto Mukerjee, Bhupinder Singh, A. Singh and A.D. Dewan. The IAF
(Indian Air Force) formally came into being on 1 April 1933, when the first
Indianised squadron – No. 1 Squadron - was formed at Karachi, exactly 15 years
after the creation of the RAF.<b>1<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b> </b>Shortly
after the outbreak of World War II, it was decided to form the IAFVR (Indian
Air Force Volunteer Reserve) to take over the task of coastal defence from the
RAF. Following the commencement of the Japanese offensive in South East Asia in
December 1941, a flight of the IAFVR was flown to <st1:city w:st="on">Moulmein</st1:city> to carry out anti-submarine and
convoy protection operations. After the capture of <st1:city w:st="on">Moulmein</st1:city>
by Japanese forces, No. 3 IAFVR Squadron was sent to <st1:city w:st="on">Rangoon</st1:city> for reconnaissance and convoy protection
duties. As British forces withdrew in the face of the relentless Japanese
offensive, No. 1 Squadron arrived at Toungoo, where they were subjected to
raids by the Japanese Air Force on the first day itself. During the next two
days, Squadron Leader K.K. ‘Jumbo’ Majumdar led the whole squadron on raids
against the Japanese base at Mehingson inflicting severe damage and earning a
great moral victory. The exploit not only made Majumdar a hero overnight but
also enhanced the reputation of the fledgling IAF in its first major operation
during the war. In view of its splendid performance during the war, the IAF was
given the prefix ‘Royal’ on its tenth anniversary, becoming the RIAF (Royal
Indian Air Force) on 1 April 1943. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
From one squadron in 1939 the IAF
had grown to three by the beginning of 1942, the year which saw the greatest
expansion in its size. By the end of 1942, it had seven squadrons; during the next
year another two were added, bringing its strength to nine squadrons by the
beginning of 1944. The number of personnel had increased correspondingly, from
16 officers and 269 airmen at the beginning of the war to 1,200 officers and
over 20,000 trained airmen, with another 6,000 undergoing training, besides
about 2,000 followers. In the early years of the war, 20 Indian pilots had been
sent to the <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region>
to help the RAF, which had run perilously short of pilots during the Battle of
Britain. These Indian pilots served in RAF squadrons and did sterling work
during the critical months, carrying out fighter sweeps over France and
escorting bombers. Seven Indian pilots
were killed in operations, the remainder returning to <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> in mid
1942. One of the pilots who returned from the German front with a DFC was K.K.
Majumdar, who later died in an air crash at <st1:city w:st="on">Lahore</st1:city> in February 1945. <b>2<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
While World War I lasted four years,
World War II continued for six years. When it ended in 1945, everyone was weary
and drained out. Many of the participants had been away from their homes for
several years and were eagerly looking forward to a reunion with their
families. Demobilisation began soon after the end of the war, but the sheer
numbers of servicemen, especially from the <st1:country-region w:st="on">USA</st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region>,
made the process slow and time consuming. Hundreds of thousands of troops were
literally doing nothing, waiting for ships to take them home from remote and
inhospitable corners of the globe. The wait seemed interminable, and most men
were unable to comprehend the reasons for the delay in sending them home.
Coupled with the delay in repatriation, another major problem was the uncertain
future that most of the men faced. Resettlement and rehabilitation measures
obviously could not cater for all the servicemen, who knew that they would have
to fend for themselves. Wartime industries that employed millions of workers
were closing down, and most of the men shedding uniforms had neither the
training nor the experience for the new enterprises that were coming up. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The first sign of unrest came from
American troops based in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Germany</st1:country-region>
who held mass parades to demand speedier demobilisation and repatriation. These
parades were given wide publicity on the American forces programmes that were very
popular and eagerly heard by servicemen all over the world. Similar
demonstrations by American soldiers in <st1:city w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:city>
could not leave British troops serving in <st1:place w:st="on">South East Asia</st1:place>
unaffected and it was only a matter of time before the virus spread to other
stations. Apart from the logistics, another reason for the slow rate of
demobilisation of British servicemen was the uncertainty about the future of
British rule in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>.
As late as June 1946, the Chiefs of Staff in <st1:city w:st="on">London</st1:city>
were still considering various options, one of which was to continue British
rule in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>,
for which seven additional divisions would be needed. This would naturally
result in suspending the process of demobilisation, with serious implications,
especially the effect on morale.3 </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
Taking a cue from the Americans,
British airmen at the RAF base at Mauripur refused to join duty on 22 January
1946. The Inspector General of the RAF, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt,
who was on tour in <st1:place w:st="on">South East Asia</st1:place>, and was
passing through Mauripur at the time, held a meeting with the men to ascertain
their grievances. The men had many complaints, most of which were related to
aspects of demobilisation that could only be dealt with at a higher level by
the Cabinet or the Air Ministry. One such grievance was, ‘why is RAF demobilisation
so slow compared with that in the Army and the Navy?’ Air Chief Marshal Barratt
explained that practically all the points raised by the men had been explained
in the demobilisation forms which were a part of the release scheme and kept
the personnel fully in the picture, explaining the reasons for the various actions taken, especially
with regard to the release under classes ‘B’ and ‘C’. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The men were not satisfied and
demanded that a Parliamentary representative should visit them so that they
could impress upon him, and he on Parliament, their feelings about the slow
speed of demobilisation. A Parliamentary delegation was then in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> and they
asked that it should visit Mauripur. Air Chief Marshal Barratt assured the men
that he would forward their demands to Air Ministry, and asked the men to
return to work but they refused. He warned the airmen that nothing would be
obtained under threat and urged them to return to duty. The meeting ended with
no promises made. The Air Officer Commanding 229 Group stated that he would be
able to get the men back to work that afternoon. After making his report to the
Air Ministry, the Inspector General proceeded on his pre-arranged tour
programme. The situation remained unchanged in the evening. Many of the men showed
an inclination to join duty but appeared to be fearful of rough treatment at
the hands of others. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
In
his report to the Air Ministry, Air Chief Marshal Barratt had mentioned all
their grievances, asking for a reply to be sent to the Air Officer Commanding
India. As regards the demand for the Parliamentary delegation already in India
to visit Mauripur, he felt that the delegation was visiting parts of the
Commonwealth for an entirely different purpose and it would not be wise to
permit the members to address the men, as they
were not well versed in the intricacies of the demobilisation policy of
the government and did not understand the feelings of the personnel in South East
Asia. However, it was possible for Mr Harold Davies, the MP for Leek, who was
visiting <st1:place w:st="on">South East Asia</st1:place>, to meet the airmen.
Mr Davies had already visited units in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Burma</st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st="on">Malaya</st1:place>
in order to keep the men in touch with the new Government’s policy and, during
his tour, had spoken to hundreds of servicemen.<b>4 <o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
News
of the strike at Mauripur soon spread to Ceylon, the first unit being affected
being at Negombo, where the personnel of No. 32 Staging Post refused to
carryout servicing of aircraft. The
morning <st1:city w:st="on">York</st1:city>
service from Mauripur on 23 January 1946 was serviced by the aircrew themselves,
giving an indication that something was amiss. As at Mauripur, the major
complaint was that of slow demobilisation, the other grievances being bad
administration and lack of sports facilities and entertainment. The men felt
that personnel of the Fleet Air Arm should be drafted into the RAF to assist
with key trades, and expedite the RAF release. Another cause for complaint was
that RAF airmen were being asked to work on BOAC and Qantas aircraft. The men
felt that this had two effects: firstly, that the air passage of civilians was
delaying release of servicemen and secondly, that the employment of airmen was
incorrectly providing aviation companies with cheap labour.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
The
Air Officer Commanding, Air Commodore Chilton was on his way to the <st1:place w:st="on">Cocos Islands</st1:place> when he received news of the strike. He
returned to Negombo and talked to the men, promising to remedy the local
problems straightaway. As regards the drafting of personnel of the Fleet Air
Arm, speeding up demobilisation and servicing of civilian aircraft, he assured
them that these would be forwarded to the Air Ministry. With the resolution of
grievances concerning administration, sports facilities and entertainment, it
was hoped that the men would resume duty on the following day. Air Commodore
Chilton decided to continue his flight since the news of the Negombo incident
had reached 129 Staging Post in the <st1:place w:st="on">Cocos Islands</st1:place>
where it was understood that the airmen intended taking similar action. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
However,
on his arrival at the <st1:place w:st="on">Cocos Islands</st1:place>, he found
the station running smoothly, with no sign of trouble. While he was visiting
the station he received a signal asking him to return to Negombo where the situation
had deteriorated. The stoppage of work by the airmen had spread from the
Staging Post to the rest of the station including the Communication and
Meteorological Flights. The men were well behaved but adamant. The Air Officer
Commanding tried to convince the men that no good would come of their strike irrespective
of what was happening in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>.
The men continued to complain of the delays regarding repatriation and mails.
It was pointed out that by refusing to work they would delay their release and
mails even more. Releases were governed
by the Manpower Committee in <st1:city w:st="on">London</st1:city>
and the local RAF authorities could do little more than forward the complaints
to the Air Ministry. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
By
this time the disaffection had spread and by 26 January airmen at Koggala,
Ratmalana and <st1:city w:st="on">Colombo</st1:city>
were also involved. It was apparent from reports received from various units
that broadcasts made by the BBC on 24 and 25 January were largely responsible
for the information reaching them, bringing out feelings that were dormant and
encouraging them to emulate their colleagues who had joined the strike. Except
at Negombo where the relations between the Station and Staging Post were not
easy, at other stations the unit commanders and officers were in close touch
with the men, addressing them at the first sign of trouble. However, the
problems concerning repatriation and release could not be solved by them on
their own, though every effort was made to take the men into confidence and
explain the policy in this regard. Many of the grievances, such as disparity in
releases compared to RAF personnel in <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region> and faster repatriation of
personnel of the Navy and Army were unfounded. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
Meanwhile,
the strikes in RAF stations in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>
continued to spread. On 26 January 1946 Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr, Air
Officer Commanding, British Air Forces in South East Asia, sent a signal to the
Air Ministry giving details of the stoppage of work that had occurred at Palam,
Dum Dum, Poona, Cawnpore and Vizagapatnam, in addition to Mauripur. Except at Mauripur,
all stoppages were of short duration but it was considered that other units
were likely to be affected. The majority of units were ‘striking’ in an orderly
and respectful manner in order to register a protest against the Government’s
policy, and then returning to work. Air Marshal Carr considered that unless the
Government shouldered the responsibility of making a comprehensive statement,
even if that statement did not meet the airmen’s requirements, he anticipated
that the men would strike again. Units that had returned to work had done so on
the assumption that their dissatisfaction with the demobilisation policy had
been presented to the Government from which they were expecting a comprehensive
statement. No promises were made, but the men had been informed that the
questions raised in the Inspector General’s report had been forwarded to the Secretary
of State. In conclusion, Air Marshal Carr stressed that he saw no alternative
to a Government statement. While he agreed that the Government should not be
called upon to issue a general statement as a concession to indiscipline, he
felt that in this instance, failure to do so it may have serious consequences. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The stoppage of work on RAF stations
in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>
influenced the personnel of the RIAF also. Reports of men staying away from
work were received from Trichinopoly and No. 228 Group. The main cause of discontent
- demobilisation – was augmented by complaints regarding leave, food and family
allowances. In addition to speeding up their in release, the Indian airmen
requested that family and ration allowances should be paid to them while on
leave. They maintained that granting only one free rail warrant per annum meant
hardship to airmen who had to split their leave in two or three parts. They
requested that that either additional railway warrants should be given or
permission granted to avail their entire leave at one time during the year. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The strikes in the RIAF alarmed the
authorities, since they could have an adverse effect on the political situation
in the country. The Air Marshal Commanding, British Air Forces in <st1:place w:st="on">South East Asia</st1:place> sent a signal to all RAF units informing
them of this. The signal, which was not sent to RIAF units, read:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 27.0pt; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
The
Government plan for demobilization must be a balanced one: our industries at
home require manpower, but this cannot be provided at the risk of endangering
the safety of the World. There are still defence problems in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>. The public
press has recently made it clear that a political crisis is approaching, a
crisis which may only be solved by little short of civil war. If you wish, you
may quote me as authority for this. The Government at Home are now fully aware
that conscripts in the RAF have little or no pride in their service. I do not
believe that these misguided airmen who took part in the recent so-called
strikes appreciate that their action may be endangering the safety of <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>. Already their
example has been followed by the RIAF. Such actions can only encourage civil
disturbances and may lead to grave consequences for everyone in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> including
those airmen who are not due for repatriation in the near future.<b>5 </b> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 27.0pt; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The
Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park was also
concerned by the RIAF strikes. He signalled all commanders in South East Asia,
stressing that it was essential that pay and allowances and other conditions of
service in the post-war Indian Air Force should be made known to all concerned,
with the least possible delay. The Government of India had set up a committee
to examine and make recommendations on the terms and conditions of service to
be applied to the post war Indian forces, including the Air Force. The work of
the committee would be hastened with due regard to the necessity of arriving at
a well considered conclusion. The message continued:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
I
have collected from various sources a full list of the grievances of the Royal
Indian Air Force airmen and will do everything in my power to have them investigated.
To do this thoroughly will take time. I must make it clear to all concerned
that I cannot condone the serious breaches of discipline that have taken place
during the last twelve days, and any improvement in conditions that I may be
able to make will not, repeat, not be a
concession to discipline. I will always accept honest complaints if passed to
me through the correct channels. I would like to assure both officers and other
ranks personnel who desire to continue in the service that the Royal Indian Air
Force offers a fine career to the right man.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
Meanwhile,
the strikes in RAF stations continued to spread, with the most serious incident
occurring at Seletar in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Singapore</st1:country-region>
on 26 January 1946, followed by a similar incident at Kallang on the very next
day. The Allied Air Commander-in-Chief visited Seletar and had detailed
discussions with the men, which he reported to the Air Ministry. Realising the
seriousness of the matter, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Clement Atlee, made
a statement in the House of Commons on 29 January, outlining the measures being
taken to expedite repatriation and release, which seemed to be the root cause
of the trouble. On the same day the men of 194 (Transport) Squadron in <st1:city w:st="on">Rangoon</st1:city> stopped work.
However, they returned to work the next day. The unit was scheduled for
disbandment in the near future but in view of this incident, it was disbanded
on 15 February 1946. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The mutiny by ratings of the Royal
Indian Navy in February 1946 added a new dimension to the problem, especially
at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>,
where the RIAF airmen went on a sympathetic strike. To subdue the mutineers who
had taken control of ships and were threatening to bombard <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>, one of the measures being seriously
considered was air attacks using rocket projectiles. However, in view of the
strike by RIAF personnel, the authorities felt that Indian squadrons could not
be used for this purpose. Responding to an appeal from Sir Roderick Carr, Air
Officer Commanding British Air Forces in <st1:place w:st="on">South East Asia</st1:place>,
the Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, Sir Keith Park agreed to divert some
aircraft from his resources. However, in view of the recent experience in Java,
he advised Carr to obtain the approval of the C-in-C India before using RAF and
RIAF aircraft in an offensive role against the local population<b>. 6</b> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
RIAF personnel refused to report for
duty at many stations for varying periods. The Naval strike came to an end on
23 February 1946, leading to improvement in the situation at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>, though the airmen had still not
resumed duty. Other than <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>, the stations
that continued to be affected were Cawnpore, <st1:city w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:city>,
though conditions seemed to be improving and were expected to become normal
soon. However a serious incident occurred in <st1:city w:st="on">Rangoon</st1:city>, where 140 RIAF personnel failed to
report for duty on 23 February. When asked for their grievances, the airmen
listed the following demands:-</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Equal rights with BORs in the Unit canteen</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Equal distribution of Unit dues between the RAF
and RIAF.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Separate Mess for RIAF with half BOR and half
Indian type rations.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Weekly show of Indian films.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Separate recreation room with Indian
periodicals.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Full entitlement of leave for all RIAF
personnel.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Better living conditions. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Higher scale of pay and allowances.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->Second class railways warrants</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .75in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--> Speed up
demobilisation.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
On
the night of 24 February the Commanding Officer interviewed two of the of the
men’s representatives and informed them that their grievances had been
forwarded to the Air Marshal Commanding Air Headquarters Burma. Grievances that
could be resolved locally would be dealt by the Air Marshal personally while
the remaining questions concerning pay, allowances and demobilisation would be
forwarded to higher authorities. The Commanding Officer emphasized that the men
must return to duty before their demands could be considered. The
representatives agreed and gave an assurance that they would do so, but the men
did not join duty until 28 February 1946. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
In
February there was strike at Kohat, the only Air Force station in India manned
by the RIAF, where the Station Commander was Group Captain (later Air Chief
Marshal) A.M ‘Aspy’ Engineer. An account of the strike and how it was handled
has been described by Squadron Leader (later Air Vice Marshal) Harjinder Singh,
who was then posted at Air Force Station Peshawar. On 26 February Harjinder received a telephone
call from Flight Lieutenant Shahzada, Adjutant of the Air Force Station Kohat informing
him that the airmen had gone on strike that morning. The men had collected at
the aerodrome from where they intended to take out a protest march through the
city. Group Captain Engineer had asked the Adjutant to inform Harjinder that he
had already requisitioned some Gurkha troops from the Army to erect a road
block at the aerodrome gate, and if necessary, open fire on the strikers if
they tried to force their way out. Harjinder asked his Station Commander, Group
Captain Vallaine, to permit him to fly to Kohat, without giving him any reason.
Fortunately, Vallaine agreed, and detailed Flying Officer Glandstein to take
Harjinder to Kohat in a Harvard aircraft.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
After
reaching Kohat, Harjinder reported to the Station Commander who gave him some
more details of the strike. Apparently the men were in no mood to listen to any
officer and he advised Harjinder not to go near them. Harjinder felt that
unless the situation was brought under control immediately, it would be the end
of the only Indian Air Force station in the country. He asked for permission to
approach the strikers and talk to them. Engineer refused, but when Harjinder
insisted, he relented, telling the latter that that he would not be responsible
for his life. When Harjinder approached the strikers, who had collected on the
airstrip, one of them shouted: ‘Don’t let this officer come near, because he
will call off the strike.’ But there were others who differed, and wanted him
to come. Harjinder proposed that they
take a vote by show of hands, and was pleasantly surprised when the majority elected
to hear him. After talking to the men, Harjinder found that they had heard that
it was planned to bomb and machine gun the Naval ratings that had gone on
strike in <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>.
When asked for their demands, they said that the Station Commander should send
a message to the Commander-in-Chief in <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city>
telling him that the Indian Air Force Station Kohat refuses to cooperate in
bombing their colleagues in the Navy. Also in the signal it should be clearly mentioned
that the Air Force Station Kohat sympathizes with the relatives of the people
who have been killed in the firing at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>.
The rest of the story is best described by Harjinder in his own words:</div>
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<br /></div>
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To
my mind, it was a reasonable demand and I asked them: “Is that all?” and they
all said “Yes”. So I told them:” I will guarantee that the Station Commander
will do what you have asked, and what is more, there was never an intention of sending
Indian Air Force Squadrons to bomb and machine-gun our naval colleagues and
there must have been some misunderstanding. </div>
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After addressing the men further and quietening them down I
told them that they had disgraced themselves by striking, and before it was too
late they should report back to work; and as a first consequence, they should
immediately fall in. The men readily agreed. I got them fallen-in in three ranks
and marched them to the Cinema hall. I told them to accept any punishment that
the Station Commander gave without hesitation and if the station Commander asked
them: “Did you go on strike?” they should say “No, we never had any such intention.”
It took me exactly ten minutes to settle the issue in this way.</div>
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<br /></div>
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After marching the airmen into the Cinema hall, I reported to
the Station Commander and briefed him on what to say. In fairness to Aspy I must
say he sent the signal to General Auchinleck on the lines that I had promised
the airmen. When he went into the Cinema hall and asked the men whether they
had intended to go on strike, the men with one voice shouted: “No.” As
preplanned, he said: “All right, but as a punishment for your indiscipline this
morning, I am ordering extra parades in the afternoon for the whole Station for
one month.” They filed out of the hall quietly enough.</div>
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<br /></div>
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After the ‘strike’ was over, I took off for <st1:city w:st="on">Peshawar</st1:city>. Some days alter I heard that the Station
Commander had been called up by Delhi and given a sound dressing down because
of the signal which he ah sent concerning the Indian Naval mutiny at Bombay.<b>7<o:p></o:p></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
Another
strike that was defused by an Indian officer was the one at the Factory Road
Camp in <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city>.
The strike lasted four days and was eventually broken by sympathetic handling
by Group Captain (later Air Chief Marshal) Subroto Mukerjee, who was ably
assisted by Warrant Officer Verghese. After the strike ended, RAF Intelligence
was asked to identify the ring leaders. Based on their report, Air Headquarters
decided to discharge the personnel involved in the strike. Surprisingly, the
first name on the list was that of Warrant Officer Verghese, who had been
instrumental in subduing the strike. It was only after Subroto Mukerjee
intervened with Air Marshal Sir Rodrick Carr that the orders for Verghese’s
discharge were withdrawn.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
Though officially classified as a
mutiny, the incidents in the RIAF were nothing more than ‘strikes’. In almost all
cases, the airmen resorted to stoppage of work or a sit down strike. They was
no slogan shouting, waving of flags or processions, as happened in the mutinies
in the other two services that occurred at almost the same time. No violence
was used, by the strikers or the authorities, and in most cases the strikes ended
after the intervention of officers who assured the men that their grievances
would be looked into sympathetically. None of the participants were punished,
though a few of the ring leaders were discharged from service. Though the
strikes were not serious, they brought to light the feeling of discontent among
the Indian personnel serving in the Air Force, forcing the British authorities to
review the dependability of the armed forces in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>. This played a part in the
decision of the British to quit <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>
in 1947.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<div class="MsoTitle">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">END NOTES <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoTitle">
<br /></div>
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This chapter is largely based on N.
Mansergh and Penderel Moon’s <i>The Transfer
of Power</i>, (London, 1982); Lt. Gen S.L. Menezes’ <i>Fidelity & Honour</i>,
(New Delhi, 1993); Air Commodore A.L. Saigal’s <i>Birth of An Air Force – The Memoirs of Air Vice Marshal Harjinder Singh</i>,
(New Delhi, 1977); and documents in the Ministry of Defence, History Division,
New Delhi. Specific references are
given below:-<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoTitle">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">1. Air
Commodore A.L. Saigal (ed.), <i>Birth of An
Air Force – The Memoirs of Air Vice Marshal Harjinder Singh</i>, (New Delhi,
1977), p. 34.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;">
2. Saigal, p. 216. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>3. </b>Nicholas Mansergh
and Penderel Moon, (ed.)<i> The
Transfer of Power 1942- 47 </i>(12
vols, <st1:city w:st="on">London</st1:city>,
1982), vii, pp. 894-5</div>
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<br /></div>
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</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;">
4. A Brief History of Events Associated
with The Disaffection and ‘Strikes’ Among Personnel in the RAF units of Air
Command, South East Asia, Ministry of Defence, History Division, (MODHD), New
Delhi, 601/9768/H, pp. 1-2 </div>
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<br /></div>
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5. ibid., p. 10.</div>
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<br /></div>
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6. ibid.,
p. 24.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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7. Saigal, pp. 218-21</div>
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<br /></div>
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</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com21tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-22376927999972453442016-09-12T09:24:00.001-07:002016-09-12T09:24:22.385-07:00THE NAVAL MUTINY – 1946 <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoTitle">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CHAPTER - 8<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h1 style="margin-right: -.5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">THE NAVAL</span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal;"> </span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">MUTINY – 1946<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The mutiny in the RIN (Royal Indian
Navy) in February 1946 was unique in many ways. Mutinies are usually confined
to a particular station, establishment or ship. However, this was the first
instance when the entire service joined the revolt. The closest parallel was
the Great Mutiny of 1857, when almost the whole of the Bengal Army was involved;
the <st1:city w:st="on">Madras</st1:city> and
Bombay Armies remained virtually unaffected. This was also probably the first
time after 1857 when the general public was caught up in a mutiny in an armed
service, leading to mass protests and ‘<i>hartals</i>’, especially in Bombay.
This was in spite of the fact that few Indians were aware of the existence of
the Indian Navy, whose role during World War was relatively insignificant and
therefore unpublicized. Another feature of the mutiny was that it was directed
against the British government and not against superior officers – not a single
officer, British or Indian, was harmed. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The Naval mutiny was easily
suppressed by the use of force and there were some casualties. Though almost
the all ships and shore establishments were drawn in, the most important events
took place in <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city>, two of the largest and most
populated cities in the sub-continent.
The involvement of the political parties, especially the National
Congress, and its leaders – Gandhi, Nehru, Patel and Aruna Asaf Ali – ensured
that the mutiny received wide publicity. Though the Naval mutiny failed to
achieve its immediate objectives, its fall-outs were considerable. Along with
the mutinies in the Air Force and the Army that occurred almost simultaneously,
it led to the realisation that <st1:country-region w:st="on">Britain</st1:country-region>
could no longer depend on Indian soldiers, sailors and airmen to uphold her
authority over her colonies in the East. This contributed not only to the
British decision to grant independence to <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> but to advance the date from
June 1948 to August 1947. </div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The mutiny of 1946 was by no means
the first that occurred in the Royal Indian Navy. Sailors in merchant vessels
as well as men of war have mutinied since the time humans began to cross the
seas, and their stories are an important part of the history and folklore of
seafaring nations. Mutinies on ships have had a tremendous impact on several
issues, some totally unrelated with sailing. It has spawned its own genre in
literature, and forms the central theme of some of the most well known writing
in all languages, the most famous being <i>Mutiny on the Bounty</i>. Mutinies
have also caused demographic and social changes, and the creation of new
civilizations. To escape the gallows, mutineers often took refuge on remote
islands, including some that were at one time bereft of human habitation. Many
others escaped and settled down in then virtually unexplored regions, assimilating
with the local population. Not surprisingly, residents of some islands in the
Pacific claim their ancestry in countries half way round the globe. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
When World War II started in
September 1939 the Royal Indian Navy was a miniscule force, consisting of about
1,500 sailors and 150 officers. By the time the War ended, its strength had
multiplied almost fifteen times. In December 1945, it had 2,438 officers, 214
warrant officers and 21,193 ratings.<b> </b>During this period, there were
several mutinies in the service. In March 1942, ratings at the Mechanics
Training Establishment at <st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place>
mutinied demanding higher pay, resulting in seven being sentenced to three
months imprisonment. In June 1942 the ratings of HMIS <i>Konkan</i>, which was
then in the <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region>,
went on hunger strike, due to problems connected with food, accommodation and
the scale of rations. Seventeen sailors were awarded three months rigorous
imprisonment. Three months later, there
was a major case of indiscipline on board the HMIS <i>Orissa,</i> again in the <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region>. This time, not only the men but also the
officers were punished. The Commanding Officer was tried by a general court
martial and sentenced to lose a year’s seniority. The 2<sup>nd</sup> officer and the gunnery
officer also lost three months seniority. Thirteen ratings were disrated, and
awarded imprisonment terms ranging from three to seven years. Almost at the
same time, there was a less serious case of indiscipline on the HMIS <i>Khyber</i>
in the <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region>,
after which three men were discharged.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
After the four cases in 1942, there
were no revolts for almost two years, when there were several incidents with
religious overtones. In June 1944, Muslim sailors of the HMIS <i>Akbar </i>in <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> revolted,
demanding a mosque, resulting in the discharge of 100 Pathans. A month later,
Muslim sailors on board the HMIS <i>Hamlawar</i> at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> assaulted a sub-lieutenant, alleging
that he had insulted the Koran. The officer was found guilty and lost three
months seniority. Thirteen men were discharged and ten sentenced to varying
terms of imprisonment. In July 1944 the men on board HMIS <i>Shivaji</i> at
Lonavla refused to eat meat that they suspected was contaminated with pork and
four had to be discharged. In March 1945
three men on board HMIS <i>Himalaya</i> in <st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city> went to a mosque after being refused
permission. They were declared absent without leave and sentenced to a year’s
rigorous imprisonment. A month later, there was another revolt on the HMIS <i>Shivaji</i>
when 51 ratings refused to clean the ship. Thirty-eight were awarded three
months rigorous imprisonment.<b>1<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<h4>
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></h4>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
After
the end of World War II, the bulk of the Royal Indian Navy was located at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>, with smaller complements at <st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on">Madras</st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:city>,
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Vizagapatnam</st1:city>, <st1:state w:st="on">Cochin</st1:state></st1:place> and several other stations. The
establishment at Bombay comprised the Royal Indian Navy Depot, which included
the Castle Barracks that housed about 900 ratings awaiting appointment to ships
or shore establishments; the Fort Barracks that housed the HO (Hostilities
Only) ratings; the CCO (Central Communications Office) that handled all signal
traffic at Bombay; the Colaba Receiving Station; the Mahul Wireless Station in
Trombay Island and the RIN Hospital at Sewri. The other shore establishments at
Bombay were HMIS <i>Talwar</i>, the training school for communication ratings;
HMIS <i>Machlimar</i> at Versova, the anti-submarine training school; HMIS <i>Hamla</i>
at Marve that held the landing craft; HMIS <i>Kakauri,</i> the demobilisation
centre that held about 1400 ratings; HMIS <i>Cheetah</i>, the second
demobilisation centre and training school for Special Service ratings; and HMIS
<i>Feroze</i> on Malabar Hill that functioned as a training school and
demobilisation centre for officers. There was a large number of ships: HMIS <i>Narbada</i>
and <i>Jumna</i> (sloops); <i>Dhanush</i> and <i>Shamsher</i> (frigates); <i>Gondwana,
Assam, Mahratta</i> and <i>Sind</i> (corvettes); <i>Kumaon, Kathiawar, Khyber,
Punjab, Bombay, Madras, Orissa </i>and<i> Oudh</i> (minesweepers); <i>Clive</i>
and <i>Lawrence </i>(old sloops); <i>Agra, Cuttack, Karachi, Lahore, Madura,
Nautilus, Nasik, Patna, Poona, Rampur, Berar, Amritsar, </i>and<i> Cochin </i>(trawlers);
<i>Nilam, Moti, Lal </i>and<i> Heera</i> (Persian gun boats); <i>Kalawati,
Ramdas, Dipawati </i>and<i> Bhadrawati</i> (auxiliary vessels) and a few motor
minesweepers. All the ships and establishments were involved in the mutiny, the
lone exception being the Frigate HMIS <i>Shamsher</i>. <b>2<o:p></o:p></b></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
One
of the important establishments at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> was
the HMIS <i>Talwar</i>, the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Communication</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Ratings</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Training
School</st1:placetype></st1:place>. When World War II ended, the <i>Talwar</i>
was under the command of Lieutenant Commander E.M. Shaw. In September 1945,
Shaw was transferred as Staff Communication Officer, being relieved by
Lieutenant Commander A.T.J. Cole. Both Shaw and Cole were experienced officers
and popular with the men. At that time, apart from the 200 communication
ratings there were about 700 men under training and about 300 ratings of the
draft reserve awaiting demobilization, housed in the <i>Talwar</i>. As a
result, there was an accommodation crunch. Though the number of ratings was
fairly large, there were very few officers. The overcrowding in the barracks,
with a large number of men having nothing to do, and an almost complete lack of
supervision, all contributed to the dissatisfaction and unrest. On 30 November
1945, on the eve of Navy Day, slogans such as ‘Quit India’, ‘Revolt Now’, ‘Kill
the White Dogs’ and ‘Down with the Imperialists’ were found written on walls.
An inquiry was held but the perpetrators could not be traced. However, a rating
named Deb was suspected and discharged on grounds of ‘services no longer
required’. 3</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
On 21 January 1946, HMIS <i>Talwar</i>
got a new commanding officer, Commander F.W. King. Like many British officers
in the Royal Indian Navy at that time, King had never served in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> earlier
and was unfamiliar with the customs, castes and religious prejudices that are
so important in this country. The appointment of King was resented by the
ship’s company, especially since he was not a Communication Officer, and known
for his rough treatment of ratings. It was generally believed that King was
sent to the <i>Talwar</i> to set things in order since his predecessor, Cole,
was lenient and regarded as pro-Indian. On 1 February 1946, slogans similar to
those that had been seen two months earlier reappeared on a platform on the <i>Talwar
</i>from which the Commander-in-Chief was to take the salute on the next day.
The originator, Leading Telegraphist B.C. Dutt was caught and placed under
close arrest. However, the slogans continued and one day the tyres of the
Commanding Officer’s car were deflated. A few anonymous letters addressed to
Commander King also reached his office. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The incident that triggered the
mutiny occurred on 8 Feb 1946 when King entered the barrack where several
off-duty ratings from the Central Communications Office were resting after
having finished their breakfast. Reportedly, King heard some catcalls from the
barrack at some WRINs (Women’s Royal Indian Navy) who were passing by and was
annoyed by the uncivilized behaviour of the ratings, who he thought were
abstaining from duty. The men did not notice his presence and continued
talking, instead of coming to their feet and paying compliments to the
Commanding Officer. King lost his temper and lashed out at the men, using
abusive terms such as ‘sons of bitches’, ‘junglees’ and ‘coolies’, before
stomping out of the barrack. The men were agitated, and the next day, fourteen
ratings put in a complaint against Commander King for using foul language. On 9
February 1946, a Saturday, they were seen by Lieutenant Commander Shaw, who
told them that he would forward their complaint to the Commanding Officer. On
Monday, Shaw informed King, who agreed to see the men next Saturday, the day on
which personal interviews were granted by the Commanding Officer. Shaw tried to
impress upon King that in view of the seriousness and urgency of the matter, it
would be better to see them earlier and not wait until Saturday, but the latter
did not agree. When King saw the men, he warned them that it was a serious
offence to make a false complaint against a senior officer. In accordance with
regulations, he would give them 24 hours to think over the matter, after which
they could, if they wished, put their request in writing. On the same day, Dutt
was summarily tried, and a report sent to Naval Headquarters. The ratings did
exactly what they were told to do, presenting their written complaints on the
morning of 18 February. By this time, the mutiny had already broken out.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
The
situation on HMIS <i>Talwar</i> had deteriorated considerably during the week,
and all that was needed was a spark to ignite the mutiny. As on several earlier
occasions, it was provided by the galley. On 17 February 1946, a Sunday, cooks
in two vegetarian messes mixed <i>dal</i> (lentils) and vegetables for the
evening meal, which the men refused to eat, complaining that it was
inedible. The duty officer came to know
of the incident, but did not report it. The ratings went to bed hungry, but did
not create any trouble. Next morning, a
large number of men refused to eat breakfast and shouted slogans. King was
informed when he reached his office at about 9 a.m., but he left soon
afterwards to have his breakfast, without leaving any instructions. He returned
to his office after about half an hour. When divisions were piped, Indian
ratings did not come to the parade ground and began shouting and jeering. The
Flag Officer Bombay was informed on telephone that the men were not listening
to the officers and were completely out of control. King held a conference that
was attended by all officers and warrant officers. However, no plans were made
or instructions given for dealing with the situation. Lieutenants S.N. Kohli
and S.M. Nanda - both were destined to become Chiefs of Naval Staff –
volunteered to act as trouble shooters and made another attempt to speak to the
men. However, they were hooted down<b>.4</b> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
At
midday, the Flag Officer Bombay, Rear Admiral A.R. Rattray arrived and spoke to
the men, asking them to return to duty and then left. However, the men did not
obey his orders, and the situation worsened. By this time all other
establishments that were manned by communication ratings had been affected.
This included the Central Communication Office that was manned by ratings from
the <i>Talwar,</i> as well as the Receiving Station at Colaba and the Dockyard
Signal Station. B.C. Dutt, who was under detention, was sent by King to try and
pacify the deserters, but they were in no mood to listen. In the evening at
about 5 pm Admiral Rattray again visited HMIS <i>Talwar</i> and spoke to the
men. He asked them to appoint representatives who should meet him next morning
with the list of grievances. He also informed them that Commander King was
being replaced by Captain Inigo-Jones. This only added fuel to the fire, since
Inigo-Jones was known for his anti-Indian bias and repressive measures, an
example of which he had exhibited when dealing with a similar outbreak at the Mechanical
Training Establishment, resulting in him being given the pseudonym ‘butcher of
the RIN’.5 </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
On 19 February Rear Admiral Rattray
arrived at about 0930 a.m. and met the representatives of the ratings. However,
by this time some ratings from other establishments had also arrived and a few of
them tried to disrupt the meeting. The ratings handed over to Rattray a list of
14 demands, as given below:-</div>
<ol start="1" style="margin-top: 0in;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">No victimization </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Release of RK Singh, who had been detained earlier</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Speeding up demobilization</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Action against Commander King</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Improvement in the standard of food</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Indian ratings to be given the same scale of pay and
allowances as personnel of the Royal Navy, along with access to NAAFI
canteens. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Kit not to be taken back at the time of release.</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Grant of higher terminal benefits on release.</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;">Good behaviour by officers towards ratings.</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"> Regular
promotion of lower deck personnel as officers</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"> Appointment of
a new Commanding Officer. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"> Immediate
release of INA prisoners and Captain Rashid, who had been sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment.</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"> Enquiry into
incidents of firing on public all over <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>.</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify;"> Withdrawal of
Indian troops from <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place>. <b>6</b></li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">While the first eleven demands pertained to the Navy,
the last three were of a political nature, which were probably added as an
afterthought. All that Admiral Rattray could do was to assure the men that he
would forward their request to the FOCRIN (Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian
Navy) at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. Some ratings had hauled down the Naval Ensign
while the meeting was going on, but it was quickly hoisted again. Admiral
Rattray left the<i> Talwar</i> at about 11.40 a.m., returning at 3.45 p.m. for
a second brief visit. By this time the
unrest had spread to other establishments in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. About 2000 ratings came to the breakwater
and asked the sailors manning the ships to join a ‘sit down’ strike. Some
ratings joined a procession in the streets, taken out by ratings from other
establishments. This did not go
unnoticed and soon everyone in the city came to know of the strike. The news
was also broadcast by All India Radio and reached other stations around the
country. Accompanied by the Area Commander and the Commissioner, Admiral
Rattray visited the <i>Talwar</i> again at 10.20 p.m.. After spending a few minutes they left for the
Castle Barracks, where the situation appeared to be more serious. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain Inigo-Jones was in command of the Castle
Barracks up to 19 February 1946 when he was transferred to HMIS <i>Talwar</i>,
handing over to Commander E.C. Streatfield-James. When the latter arrived at
Castle Barracks in the morning at about 8.30 a.m., he found his way barred by
several jostling ratings. He forced his way in and held a conference with the
men. He had almost succeeded in convincing them to give up the strike when a
rating from another establishment arrived and asked the men to follow him. More
than 200 ratings agreed to go with him and left in a procession to the <i>Talwar</i>.
This was immediately conveyed to the Flag Officer Bombay. Soon after this when
some officers arrived and were entering the gates the ratings crowded round
them and made them remove their caps, shouting ‘<i>topi utaro’</i>. Most of
them complied, but Lieutenant Commander B.S. Soman, who was later to head the
Indian Navy, apparently refused, telling them that since he had not put on his
cap with the permission of the ratings he saw no reason to take it off on their
orders. 7<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Around midday a rating hauled down the Ensign, but it
was re-hoisted by Lieutenant Sassoon. Commander Streatfield-James tried to open
a dialogue with the men but they were in no mood to listen to the Indian
officers, including Soman, who were sent to talk to them. Nothing noteworthy
happened after this and the men had their lunch as usual. In the evening
Streatfield-James went to Vithal House and pleaded with the Flag Officer Bombay
for military aid. Later that night, two chief petty officers from <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Fort</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Barracks</st1:placename></st1:place>
entered Castle Barracks and demanded the release of about 150 ratings who had
been arrested in the <i>bazaar</i> by the military and police during the day.
When this was refused, they left, threatening that they would secure the
release of the prisoners by force. At 11 p.m. the Flag Officer Bombay arrived,
accompanied by the Area Commander, Major General Beard and Brigadier Southgate.
Commander Streatfield-James asked for the Army to be called in, but the Flag
Officer Bombay did not agree. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apart from the <i>Talwar</i> and Castle Barracks where
the major events occurred on 19 February 1946, there were some incidents on
other ships and establishments also. About 250 to 300 ratings from HMIS <i>Kakaur
</i>broke into HMIS <i>Machlimar</i> shouting slogans. They asked the ratings
of the <i>Machlimar </i>to join them. Some agreed while a couple of reluctant
ratings were forcibly dragged out. Some ratings of HMIS <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><i>Assam</i></st1:place></st1:country-region>
hoisted a Congress flag and refused work in sympathy with the ratings of the <i>Talwar.
</i>They also took out some weapons and indulged in looting. One such incident
has been described by described by Trilochan Singh Trewn, whose ship was
alongside the outer breakwater: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One fine early morning, I noticed
about 20 junior ratings surrounding the main duty-free canteen located close to
the smithy shop inside the naval dockyard in Mumbai. This large canteen was a
part of an international chain of canteens run by the Royal Navy and was
well-stocked with choicest brands of foreign liquor, cheeses, caviar,
cigarettes etc mostly imported. About four ratings forced themselves into the
store and came out with cartons of cigarettes, cameras and electric irons etc.
It was followed by another rush of ratings who now were holding boxes of scotch
whisky in both hands and sported imported umbrellas slinging (sic) on their
shoulders. Soon the canteen staff also arrived but was helpless and terrified
as some of the ratings carried arms.8<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Seeing the Congress flag flying on the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><i>Assam</i></st1:country-region><i> </i>the ratings of HMIS <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Sind</i></st1:place> and HMIS <i>Mahratta </i>also refused work.
On HMIS <i>Shivaji</i> flags of both the Congress and the Muslim League were
hoisted and the ratings shouted slogans such as ‘Quit India’ and ‘Quit
Indonesia’. On HMIS <i>Clive</i> the communication branch ratings went on
strike, with six leading telegraphists and forty-six ordinary telegraphists
refusing to turn out. The HMIS <i>Punjab</i> and HMIS <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Berar</i></st1:place>
were in the dockyard. A crowd of about 2000 ratings appeared on the breakwater
and boarded both ships, pulling down the Ensigns and the Union Jacks. The
ratings of the ships did not join them but refused work. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 20 February 1946 at about 2 a.m. a party of 150
ratings from HMIS <i>Hamla</i> forced their way into the Castle Barracks, led
by Lieutenant Sobhani, who had joined the striking ratings. Sobhani asked the
ratings in Castle Barracks to join him and left after twenty minutes.
Streatfield-James immediately called for military aid. The Area Commander, in
consultation with the Flag Officer Bombay, decided to place a platoon each at
the Central Communication Office, Colaba Receiving Station and Mahaul Wireless
Station. At 6 a.m. a platoon of the
Mahratta Light Infantry (MLI) arrived. Two hours later a lorry full of ratings
drove inside the Castle Barracks. All hands were called to the quarterdeck
where a spokesman addressed them. They were informed that a Central Strike
Committee had been formed with Leading Seaman M.S. Khan as the President and
Petty Officer (Telegraphist) Madan Singh as the Vice President. The ratings of
Castle Barracks were asked to elect two representatives for the Central Strike
Committee, who were later taken to the <i>Talwar</i> in the lorry. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The FOCRIN (Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy),
Vice Admiral J.H. Godfrey flew down to <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>
from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> in
the morning. After consulting the Flag Officer Bombay and General Rob Lockhart,
the GOC-in-C Southern Command, he agreed that help from the military was
essential to quell the unrest. Before returning to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> the FOCRIN met some members of the
Strike Committee, led by Leading Seaman Khan. According to B.C. Dutt, who was
then in custody, ‘…I do not recall if
Godfrey wanted to meet the members or whether the Central Committee turned to
Godfrey, There was little choice considering that the Committee could not get
to first base with the National leadership. In any case, Godfrey made no
attempt to come inside the <i>Talwar</i> to meet us: our men went to meet him.’<b>9
</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At about 2.30 p.m. two additional platoons of the MLI
arrived at Castle Barracks, bringing up their strength to a company. Some of
the ratings threw stones at the troops, who soon established machine gun posts
to cover the entry and exit gates. About 150 ratings were arrested outside
Castle Barracks. In the afternoon at 4 p.m.
M.S. Khan, the president of the Strike Committee arrived and addressed the men.
Soon afterwards the men watched a cinema show that had been organised by for
the ratings. Things were relatively quiet until 6.30 p.m. when the ratings who
were outside returned and demanded that the troops be withdrawn. The situation
appeared to be worsening but the troops maintained their cool and did not fire.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The situation on <i>Talwar</i> seemed to be calm until
about 2.45 p.m. when troops from the MLI arrived and were posted at the gates.
A sailor who wanted to go out was prevented from doing so, leading to some
violence that subsided after the guard fired one shot. A crowd of about 300 ratings broke into the <i>Machlimar,</i>
hauled down the White Ensign, tore it up and hoisted a ‘Jai Hind’ flag. They damaged vehicles and broke window-panes.
When they left, all ratings joined them. On <i>Clive</i> the seamen and stokers
also joined the telegraphists, who had mutinied the previous day. They took
over a motor-boat that was used to ferry them ashore. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The mutiny
reached its peak on 21 February 1946, a day that was characterised by violence
and high drama. In the morning some of the mutineers in Castle Barracks asked
for permission to go to the <i>Talwar</i>, to contact their leaders and get
instructions. They were given transport and left at about 7.30 am They returned
after some time and told the others that it has been decided that the strike
will continue. At about 9 am the ratings tried to force their way out of the
main gate. A crowd of civilians and ratings had gathered near the gate. The
commander of the guard, a British major, warned them but when this did not have
any effect, he ordered the guard to open fire. The MLI troops were reluctant to
fire on the ratings and this resulted in some delay before fire was opened. The
troops fired one round each, and a total of 18 rounds in all were fired, most
of them directed not at the ratings but at the ground in front of them. The
ratings immediately closed the gate, placed motor vehicles across it, rushed
back towards the barracks, broke open the armory and took out weapons and
ammunition. Soon they were firing back at the troops from the ramparts.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The military
cordoned off the area around the Castle Barracks and cleared the roads passing
along the Mint and Town Hall. All offices and establishment were closed and the
workers who arrived for work were turned back. The MLI platoons were replaced
by troops of the Leicestershire Regiment. British troops and Royal Marines were
deployed to guard all approaches to Castle Barracks and the waterfront at the Gateway
of India. The firing from Castle
Barracks intensified and one RAF airman in the CCO was injured. In addition to
rifles, the ratings began using light machine guns and grenades. The firing
continued for almost six hours and ceased only when a ‘cease fire’ came into effect later in the day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The sound of
firing was heard by the men aboard the ships, who were all on the decks,
looking anxiously towards the Castle Barracks from where messages were being
transmitted informing them of the firing. At about 10.30 am Khan, the President
of the Strike Committee came to the bridge of the <i>Kumaon</i> and addressed
the men. Speaking in both Urdu and English he exhorted the men to raise steam,
load guns and stand by for action. He warned the men that they might have to
take up battle positions to defend themselves and the dockyard. He also asked
them to order all British officers to leave their ships, asserting that the
ratings could do without them. Indian officers could also leave, in case they
wished to. His inflammatory speech had the desired effect, and the men promptly
armed themselves with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on. The
officers were ordered to hand over the keys to magazines and leave the ships.
In the flagship of the RIN, the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Narbada</i></st1:place>,
the ratings did not bother to ask for the keys – they simply broke open the
magazine and loaded the guns. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Around midday the CCO was evacuated and control of
Castle Barracks was handed over to the Army. However, five naval officers,
including two medical officers in the Depot Sick Quarters, were trapped inside.
After some rough treatment at the hands of the ratings, they were permitted to
leave in the evening. Surgeon Lieutenant Commander Martin, the Senior Medical
Officer, offered to talk to the Flag Officer Bombay and arrange for a truce.
The ratings were initially suspicious but later agreed. Martin spoke to
Commander Payne at Vithal House, who informed him that they had already
contacted the Central Strike Committee, which was planning to send a truce
party to Castle Barracks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
situation in <i>Talwar </i>became tense after the firing in Castle Barracks. At
about 10 am Captain Inigo-Jones, accompanied by Leading Seaman Khan and two
other members of the Strike committee, left for Castle Barracks to persuade the
ratings to stop firing. Jones returned alone after an hour, leading to
excitement and rumours that persisted until Khan came back in the evening. At
2.20 pm the FOCRIN broadcast a message on All India Radio, which was relayed to
all ships at 5.45 pm. He ended his
broadcast with the chilling message: ‘...I want again to make it quite plain
that the Government of India will never give in to violence. To continue the
struggle is the height of folly when you take into account the overwhelming
forces at the disposal of the Government at this time and which will be used to
their utmost even if it means the destruction of the Navy of which we have been
so proud’. 10<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the
firing at Castle Barracks, the situation was critical because there was a grave
danger of the ships under control of the mutineers opening fire on the city and
causing casualties to civilians. Some ships did open fire with machine guns and
Oerlikons in the direction of Castle Barracks but fortunately there was little
effect. In some cases the weapons were being manned by untrained personnel such
as ships clerks, cooks and wireless operators who had never handled them
before. Due to lack of coordination and communication there was considerable
confusion and a spate of rumours. This sometimes resulted in comic situations,
such as the one concerning HMIS <i>Kumaon</i>, which was moored adjacent to the
breakwater and being used by the Central Strike Committee for its
deliberations. After Khan came on board and addressed the men, the officers
left the ship. The Oerlikon was loaded and the ship put out to sea. However,
after sailing about 100 feet it returned and was secured. Trewn describes the
incident thus: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The morning news on the radio indicated
that fully-armed destroyers of British Navy had already steamed out of
Trincomalee harbour and were heading towards Mumbai to quell the Mutiny. The
naval ratings’ strike committee decided, in a confused manner, the HMIS <i>Kumaon</i>
had to leave Mumbai harbour while HMIS <i>Kathiawar</i> was already in the <st1:place w:st="on">Arabian Sea</st1:place> under the command of a striking rating. At
about 10.30 HMIS <i>Kumaon</i> suddenly let go the shore ropes, without even
removing the ships’ gangway while officers were discussing the law and order
situation on the outer breakwater jetty. So the wooden gangway, six-metre-long
was protruding out of the ship’s starboard waist when the ship moved away from
the jetty under command of a revolver bearing senior rating. However, within
two hours fresh instructions were received from the strikers’ control room and
the ship returned to the same berth.11<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the call for the officers to leave their ships
most of them were allowed to go after handing over their weapons. Some of the
Indian officers remained on board, but stayed below decks. In most cases, the
officers left without any difficulty, the ratings themselves assisting them.
Meanwhile, the FOCRIN asked the Commander-in-Chief East Indies to send a naval
force to assist in putting down the mutiny.
In <st1:city w:st="on">London</st1:city>, Prime Minister Atlee informed
the House of Commons that several warships including a cruiser of the Royal
Navy were speeding towards <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> in response to
an urgent request from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Overall command of the situation was now in the hands of Lieutenant General Rob
Lockhart, GOC-in-C Southern Command, who had received instructions from the
Commander-in-Chief, General Claude Auchinleck. By the evening a regiment of
artillery equipped with 12-pounder guns, two British infantry battalions and
several armoured cars had reached the city. RAF bombers had already arrived at <st1:city w:st="on">Santa Cruz</st1:city> and the cruiser <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><i>Glasgow</i></st1:place></st1:city> was expected soon from
Trincomalee. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, a member of the Congress
Working Committee was in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
at that time. The mutineers contacted him and requested his help. But Sardar
Patel refused to interfere, making it clear that it was wrong on their part to
take up arms against their superiors. He termed it as an act of indiscipline,
which could not be condoned in an armed service like the Navy. This was a set
back to the mutineers, who had been counting on support of the political
leaders. The ultimatum in the FOCRIN’s broadcast also dampened their spirits,
and many started having second thoughts about the strike. At 4.30 pm Khan sent
a message to all ships to cease fire and await further instructions, which
would be communicated after his meeting with the FOCRIN and Flag Officer
Bombay. In the evening a truce party of
officers visited the Castle Barracks and told them to give up their arms since
talks were now going on between the government and the national leaders, and
the matter would be resolved soon. The ratings were reluctant to surrender
their arms but agreed when they were informed that this would result in loss of
support from the political parties. Eventually they decided to hand over the
weapons and ammunition and release the detained officers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By dusk the firing had stopped but the troops were not
withdrawn. The supply of food and water had also not been restored. It was made clear to the mutineers that
troops would be withdrawn only after they surrendered unconditionally. The
Strike Committee met in the <i>Talwar</i> to review the situation and decide
its next move. It drew up an appeal to the people and all political parties to
come to their aid. Drawing attention to their demands and the brutal methods
being adopted by the authorities to crush their ‘peaceful strike’, they called
for a <i>hartal</i> (general strike). Pointing to the threat of the FOCRIN to
destroy the Indian Navy, the Committee said:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">You do not want your Indian brothers
to be destroyed by British bullets. You know our demands are just, you must
support us. We appeal to you all, particularly to the leaders of the Congress,
League and Communist parties: Use all you might to prevent a blood bath in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>! Force the naval
authorities to stop shooting and threats and to negotiate with us! Rally our
people to support us, through a peaceful <i>hartal </i>and peaceful strikes! We
appeal to you, brothers ands sisters, to respond. <b>12</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 22 February 1946 the situation remained critical,
and incidents of looting and hooliganism continued. At about 10 am the FOCRIN
arrived at HMIS <i>Talwar</i> and was received outside the gate by Captain
Inigo-Jones. Shortly afterwards command of <i>Talwar</i> was handed over to
Commander S.G. Karmakar. The Wireless Telegraphy station at Mahul was handed
over to the Army. At about 11 am a message from the FOCRIN was delivered to the
mutineers over a loud hailer, informing them that the C-in-C Southern Command
has assumed control in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>.
To show them that ample forces were available in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>, the C-in-C had ordered a formation of
RAF aircraft to fly over the harbour in the afternoon. The aircraft would not
take any offensive action, provided no action was taken against them. If the
mutineers decided to surrender, they were to hoist a black or blue flag and
muster all hands on deck on the side facing <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> and await further orders. At about 2.30 pm a formation of bombers flew
over the harbour. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The citizens of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
had shown their sympathy with the ratings from the day the strike began. On 19
February the people were amazed to see the ratings parading through the
streets, shouting slogans. Many of them cheered the ratings and some even
joined the processions. The spectacle was repeated next morning, with larger
crowds watching and cheering the ratings. The same afternoon troops were
positioned at the gates of the naval barracks. A large crowd collected outside
and many of them passed on food packets to the ratings confined inside. On 21
February when the situation escalated and the ratings attacked the guards, the
civilian crowd joined them. The firing by the guards caused considerable
excitement in the city and a large crowd collected around the Gateway of India
and several other places. In many places there were scenes of hooliganism and
looting, and the Police had to open fire to control the mobs. By the evening,
the people came to know of the Strike Committee’s call for a <i>hartal</i> next
day. In spite of Sardar Patel’s appeal not to observe the <i>hartal</i>, many
people responded. Among them were 30,000 mill hands who downed tools, as well
as workers in other establishments such as offices, workshops and tramway
depots. The city transport system collapsed and unruly crowds attacked
Europeans at several places, setting fire to their shops, offices and cars. The
situation was beyond the control of the Police and British troops were brought
in to restore order. The crowds paced barricades on roads to impede the
movement of military vehicles and resorted to violence, leading to fire being
opened at several places. Finally, curfew had to be imposed in the dockyard and
the adjoining areas<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sardar Patel, who the mutineers had met a day earlier,
sent the following message to the mutineers: ‘The strikers should lay down all
arms and should go through the formality of a surrender and the Congress would
do its level best to see that there is no victimization and the legitimate
demands of Naval ratings are met as soon as possible’.13<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Because of the curfew imposed during the previous
night, the city appeared calm in the morning on 23 February 1946. But as the
day advanced, crowds began to collect on the streets. The newspapers carried
the news that the strike had been called off at the instance of Sardar Patel
and Jinnah, but most people refused to believe this and took to the streets.
During the day, violence occurred at several places in the heavily populated
working class areas. Rioters looted shops selling foodgrains and textiles, and
set fire to factories, including the Kohinoor and Usha Woollen Mills. The
entire city seemed to be in flames, with hundreds of motor-cars, buses, trams
and train coaches being set on fire. A three thousand strong crowd attacked the
Police Station at Mahim, and almost lynched the Inspector in charge. The living
quarters of policemen were ransacked at Two Tanks and Null Bazaar and their
belongings thrown on the streets. Clashes between the rioters and the Police
and Military left about 150 people dead and over 1,500 injured. Citizens
recalled that this was the worst rioting that the city had witnessed in living
memory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As the day wore on the pressure on the leaders of the
mutiny increased to resolve the impasse. The shortage of food and water had
begun to tell on their endurance. The stern warning from the authorities, the
military presence and the snub from the political leaders left them with little
choice. The Central Strike Committee met
on <i>Talwar </i>and deliberated on the message received from Sardar Patel.
Without the support of the Congress, they realised that they could not achieve
anything and it was decided to call of the strike. There were many who did not
agree, and wanted to carry on the struggle. Shortly afterwards, a message
arrived from Jinnah that echoed the advice given by Patel, asking them to
surrender, and promising to see that justice was done. At 4.30 pm
representatives of all ships were brought to the <i>Talwar</i> and met the
Strike Committee, which apprised them of this decision. At 6.15 pm, the representatives
informed Commodore Karmakar that they were ready to surrender unconditionally.
The information was conveyed to all other stations and ships outside <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. The mutiny was
over. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Other than <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>, the
station most affected by the mutiny was <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Though the number of ships and establishments was smaller, in terms of violence
and casualties <st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city> surpassed <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. The mutiny
affected the two ships that were anchored in the harbour at Keamari - HMIS <i>Hindustan</i>
and HMIS <i>Travancore</i> - and the three shore establishments at Manora -
HMIS <i>Bahadur,</i> the Boys’ Training Establishment; HMIS <i>Chamak</i>, the <st1:placename w:st="on">Radar</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
and HMIS <i>Himalaya</i>, the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gunnery</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>. All the ships and
establishments were affected with the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place>
witnessing the heaviest exchange of fire between the mutineers and troops of
the Indian Army. When the mutiny ended at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>
on 23 February 1946, eight lives had been lost and 33 persons lay wounded,
including some British soldiers. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The mutiny in
<st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> started on 19 February but it was only on
the next day that the effect was felt in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Since the mutiny had been initiated by ratings from the communication branch in
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>, it was
easy for them to convey the information to their colleagues manning
communications in other ships and establishments. However, the signal that
triggered the mutiny at <st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city> came not from <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> but from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
At about 10 am a message was received from Naval Headquarters ordering HMIS <i>Travancore</i>
and HMIS <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place> to proceed to sea at
5 pm. The former proceeded to the buoy, and waited for the latter to sail, as
ordered. However, the ratings manning the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place>
had other ideas. At 2.15 pm 11 ratings walked ashore without permission,
shouting and gesticulating, followed by another five about two hours later.
They were joined by 28 ratings from the <i>Travancore </i>and several others
from the <i>Himalaya</i>, the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gunnery</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The ratings
proceeded to the market at Keamari and urged the shop owners to down shutters.
Shouting slogans such as ‘Jai Hind<i>’</i> and ‘Inquilab Zindabad<i>’</i> they
marched in a procession to the Jackson Bazaar and the railway station,
declaring that they were proceeding to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
By 6 pm, most of them returned to their ships but refused to go on board.
Shortly afterwards, when the Captain of the <i>Hindustan</i> returned after
meeting the Naval Officer-in-Charge, the ratings demanded the removal of the
First Lieutenant for his insulting behaviour. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 7
am on 21 February 1946, the ratings of the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place>
were mustered. Four of them gave complaints to the Captain. At about 9 am, two
of the men who had complaints accompanied the Captain to meet the Naval
Officer-in-Charge, returning to the ship shortly afterwards. Meanwhile, about
forty ratings of HMIS <i>Bahadur</i> proceeded to the quarter deck, pulled down
and tore the Ensign, hoisting in its pace a ‘Jai Hind’ flag. They made their
way to HMIS <i>Chamak</i>, the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Radar</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Training School</st1:placetype></st1:place>. However,
when they tried to enter, the boys from <i>Chamak</i> resisted, but gave in
after a while. The crowd then proceeded to HMIS <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Himalaya</i></st1:place>,
which was similarly invaded. The Ensign was hauled down, window-panes broken,
vehicles damaged and cells opened. The
mob, which now had men from three ships – <i>Bahadur, Chamak</i> and <i>Himalaya
– </i>then seized two landing craft and started moving towards Keamari from
where they intended to go to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city></st1:place>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When the two
landing craft packed with ratings from Manora were about two hundred yards from
the shore they were intercepted by two motor-boats carrying British
parachutists. The Army captain in command ordered the landing craft to proceed
towards China Creek but the ratings continued moving towards Keamari. At about
10 am the landing craft with about 50 ratings, armed with hockey sticks and
canes, came alongside the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place><i>.
</i> As the ratings were trying to board
the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place> the parachutists from one
of the boats opened fire. This was followed by firing from the quayside, which
had been occupied by the military. The ratings of <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place>
loaded the Oerlikons and fired at the motor-boats, which moved towards China
Creek. Some shots were also directed at a BOAC aircraft that was parked nearby.
Two British soldiers were wounded, while two ratings from the <i>Bahadur</i>
and three ratings from the <i>Himalaya </i>who were in the crowd on board the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place> died in the firing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To prevent
the ratings from marching intro the city as they had done on the previous day,
the Army and Police had cordoned off the bridge connecting Keamari with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>. The ratings on
board the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place> tried to break the
cordon and enter the city but did not succeed. The enraged ratings gave an
ultimatum that if the British troops were not withdrawn from the harbour they
would be open fire with the Oerlikons and other armament on board the ships.
However, this did not have any effect and the Army pickets remained. During the
night additional troops were moved in to the harbour. Troops were deployed on
the terrace of the buildings near the wharf and mounted artillery was
positioned nearby. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 9
am on 22 February 1946, Commodore Curtis went on board the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place>
and asked the men to surrender, warning them that the Army action would begin
at 9.30 if they did not surrender. At 10 am another warning was issued giving a
deadline of 10.30 am for surrender. The ratings the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place>
responded by manning the ship’s guns. They had decided not to give up without a
fight. At 10.30 am the British troops
opened fire with 75 mm howitzers and mortars.
The ratings retaliated with all armaments on board the ship, including
the 4-inch guns. It was an unequal battle but the firing continued for about
twenty minutes before the ratings gave up. At 1050 a white flag was hoisted on
the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place><i>, </i>whose upper deck
was on fire. Firing was stopped and the ratings surrendered to the Army. One rating each of <i>Hindustan</i>, <i>Travancore,</i>
and <i>Chamak</i>, two of <i>Bahadur </i>and three of <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Himalaya</i></st1:place>
were killed and several others wounded. 14 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though the
major events concerning the mutiny occurred at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>,
ships and establishments at other locations were also affected. HMIS <i>Kathiawar</i>,
a minesweeper, was on a good will cruise along the <st1:placename w:st="on">Western</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Coast</st1:placetype> when the mutiny broke out at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. The ship was at
Porbander on 20 and 21 February, when the ratings learned of the incidents at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>
on the wireless, with the officers remaining unaware of the mutiny. On 22
February the ship sailed for Veraval, its next port of call. However, without
warning, the ratings seized control of the ship, confining all officers to the
wardroom. The ship was turned around and set course for <st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city>
when information was received that the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hindustan</i></st1:place>
had surrendered. The commanding officer
resumed command but the ratings insisted that the goodwill cruise be called of
and the ship should sail to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>,
so that they could learn for themselves the true state of affairs. By the time
the ship reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
on 23 February the strike had been called off.<b>15</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The 37<sup>th</sup>
Minesweeping Flotilla comprising the <i>Rohilkhnad, Hongkong, Deccan, Bengal,
Bihar, Baluchistan </i>and<i> Kistna, </i>was in the Andamans when the mutiny
started in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>.
The ships were anchored in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Semaris</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bay</st1:placetype></st1:place> at Port Blair<i> </i>carrying
out ‘boiler cleaning’, and were to resume minesweeping operations as soon as
this was over. The ratings heard the news of the mutiny on BBC and All India
Radio. They also received wireless messages asking them to join the strike.
After the broadcast of Admiral Godfrey’s message on 21 February tempers ran
high and there was considerable unrest on all the ships. Next morning the
ratings of the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Kistna</i></st1:place><i> </i>stopped
work, and a motor-boat went around the harbour asking others to join the
strike. In the evening a concert was arranged on the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Deccan</i></st1:place>,
which was attended by ratings from other ships also. The performance was
interrupted by one of the ratings who announced that it was shameful that they
were enjoying themselves while their brothers in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> were being killed. The concert was
stopped and there was a lot of slogan shouting, which continued when the men
returned to their ships. On 23 February the ratings of all the ships refused to
fall in. They refused the orders of their officers and daily routine was not
carried out. Though the mutiny was over the same evening, the men refused to
resume work and insisted that the flotilla sail for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. Commander Bailey, the senior officer
present, visited all the ships and talked to the men but they were adamant. He
had no choice and ordered the flotilla to sail for Bombay<b>.16</b> Commodore
RP Khanna, who was then serving on the <i>Rohilkhand</i>, recalls that the men
did not harm the officers, and when they reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>, the Chief Bosun’s Mate escorted them
to the Taj Mahal Hotel. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> HMIS <i>Valsura</i>,
the Electrical and <st1:placename w:st="on">Torpedo</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Training School</st1:placetype> at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jamnagar</st1:place></st1:city>, had about three hundred ratings.
The ratings did not join the mutiny, but held a meeting on 21 February and
passed some resolutions, which included a demand for the release of all sailors
arrested at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>.
On 23 February, papers were found containing slogans such as ‘Join the Talwar
Strike’, and ‘Death to White Skins’. The same day some ratings from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> arrived with
copies of the <i>Free Press Journal</i>, which had given wide coverage to the
mutiny. After the mutiny ended at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>,
a news broadcast on 24 February mentioned that the personnel of HMIS <i>Valsura</i>
had not joined the strike. This agitated the ratings, who felt that it showed
that they had no sympathy with their colleagues in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. They decided to make amends and
struck work on 25 February, refusing to fall in. They surrendered on 26
February after a platoon of 26<sup>th</sup> Sikhs arrived to restore order. <b>17</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At <st1:city w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:city>, the ratings of the HMIS <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hooghly</i></st1:place>,
a shore establishment, refused duty on 19 February in sympathy with the men of
the <i>Talwar.</i> The Commodore, <st1:place w:st="on">Bay of Bengal</st1:place>
spoke to the men who said that it was a peaceful strike. Next morning the sentries
refused duty. The WRINs were sent away in view of the deteriorating situation.
On 21 February the stewards, cooks and topasses at Lord Sinha road went on
strike, instigated by the <st1:place w:st="on"><i>Hooghly</i></st1:place><i> </i>men.
The next two days passed off peacefully, but the strike continued. Finally, a
military guard was posted on 24 February, after which the strike ended.18<b> </b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In HMIS <st1:country-region w:st="on"><i>India</i></st1:country-region> at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, some ratings in the Naval Barracks
refused work on 20 February. The men were assembled but refused commands when
called to attention on the arrival of the commanding officer. They were asked
to nominate a representative who could put up their grievances. Finally, 56 men
agreed to join duty while the rest refused. Next morning a platoon of Gurkhas
arrived and placed 38 men under arrest.<b>19 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
Vizakhapatnam, the naval units comprised the HMIS <i>Circars</i>, a shore
establishment; three ships – HMISs <i>Sonavati</i>, <i>Ahmedabad</i> and <i>Shillong
</i>– and certain flotillas. Effects of
the mutiny in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
were felt only on 21 February. Ratings of the <i>Circars</i> hauled down the
Ensign and shouted slogans in front of the Navy Office. They went to the golf
course and shouted at the officers. The harbour signal centre hoisted a ‘Jai
Hind’ flag. This was seen by the ratings of the <i>Sonawati</i> and <i>Shillong</i>
who followed suit. Ratings from other ships boarded the <i>Ahmedabad</i> and
asking the men to join them, pulled down the Ensign, which was promptly
re-hoisted by the Quartermaster. Seventeen ratings left the ship to join the
others. About half the ratings of the <i>Sonavati </i>also left. On 22 February a conference was held in the
Sub Area Headquarters and the Army took over all naval establishments in
Vizakhapatnam. The mutineers were rounded up and taken in military custody. By
25 February all the ratings who had left their ships returned. The ring-leaders
were detained, with the rest being permitted to join their ships.20<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Similar
incidents occurred at several other stations. At <st1:state w:st="on">Cochin</st1:state>
the ratings of the HMIS <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on"><i>Baroda</i></st1:city></st1:place><i>
</i>struck work for 24 hours, with those of the
HMIS <i>Venduruthy, a </i>shore establishment, remained unaffected. At <st1:city w:st="on">Madras</st1:city> the ratings of the shore establishment HMIS <i>Adyar
</i>decided to show their sympathy to the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
mutineers. Donning No. 10 dress they took out a procession and shouted slogans.
An officer who asked them to go back was struck with a belt by a rating.
However, they went back and joined duty.
At the Wireless Telegraphy Station at <st1:city w:st="on">Aden</st1:city>
the ratings went on a hunger strike on 20 February when they heard about the
strike at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>.
Next day the three watches refused to carry out their duties, resulting in
disruption in communications. 21<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
accordance with the rules, a Board of Inquiry was held by the naval authorities
to enquire into the incidents on board every ship and shore establishment. In
addition, the government constituted a Commission of Inquiry, which was chaired
by Sir S. Fazl Ali, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. The two judicial
members were Justice K.S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, Chief Justice of Cochin State,
and Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, of the Lahore High Court. The two service
members were Vice Admiral W.R. Patterson, Flag Officer Commanding the Cruiser
Squadron in East Indies Fleet, and Major General T.W. Rees, General Officer
Commanding 4<sup>th</sup> Indian Division. The Commission began its deliberations
in April and submitted its report in July 1946. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In its
report, the Commission identified four main causes of the mutiny. These were
discontent due to long standing grievances; low state of morale, bad management
and unsuitability of a large number of ratings; politics and the incidents that
occurred on the <i>Talwar</i>. In its
concluding remarks, the Commission commented: ‘The basic cause of the mutiny in
our opinion was widespread discontent among the Naval men arising mainly from a
number of service grievances which had remained unredressed for some time and
were aggravated by the political situation. Without this discontent, the mutiny
would not have taken place.’<b>22</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
politics was listed as one of the causes of the mutiny, it was not among the major
ones. It is true that the mutineers did approach several politicians, but their
response was lukewarm. The first person they contacted was Aruna Asaf Ali, who
was requested by the ratings of the <i>Talwar</i> to be their spokesman and
take up their cause with national leaders. Not wishing to get involved in the
strike, she advised them to remain calm and contact the ‘highest Congress
authority in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>,
Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel’. When contacted by Aruna, Patel replied that since
the ratings did not take his advice before resorting to the strike, he saw no
reason why he or she should interfere. Patel’s views were supported by the
Bombay Provincial Congress Committee whose President, S.K. Patil, advised the
ratings ‘to observe perfect discipline in their conduct and maintain an
atmosphere of non-violence in all circumstances’.23 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Alarmed by the events that occurred on 21 and 22
February, Aruna Asaf Ali wired Nehru, requesting him to come down to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> immediately to
‘control and avoid tragedy’. Sardar Patel was equally perturbed by the violent
turn of events, and wrote to the Governor of Bombay assuring him that the
Congress Party would do its bit to control the violence and end the strike. The
leaders of the Muslim League, M.A. Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, also felt it
necessary to advise the mutineers to call off the strike. The issue was
discussed in the Central Legislative Assembly on 22 and 23 February 1946. On 26
February 1946 Nehru and Patel addressed a gathering at Chowpatty in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>, decrying the violence,
while commending the ratings for their patriotic spirit. The only leader who
came out unequivocally against the mutiny was Mahatma Gandhi. Unlike most other
political leaders who preferred to call it a strike, Gandhi was very clear that
it was a mutiny. In a scathing comment on the action of the ratings, he said: ‘If
they mutinied for the freedom of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, they were doubly wrong. They
could not do so without a call from a prepared revolutionary party. They were
thoughtless and ignorant, if they believed that by their might they would
deliver <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
from foreign domination’. <b>24</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">However, according to B.C. Dutt, who was in custody at
that time, the aim of the mutiny was to end British rule, and the refusal to
eat food was chosen as a convenient excuse. ‘We decided to incite the ratings
on the bad food issue. They must refuse to eat. That would constitute a
corporate offence – Mutiny’.<b>25 </b>Dutt’s claim is not supported by others,
including some of his closest associates. While there is no doubt that Dutt was
the first one to raise the banner of revolt by writing slogans before the
FOCRIN’s inspection on 2 February 1946, there is no evidence of this act being
in any way connected with the mutiny. After his arrest a search of his papers
revealed that he was in possession of revolutionary literature. He called
himself an ‘Azad Hindi’ and tried to persuade others to join him, but
apparently found few supporters. Throughout the mutiny he was in detention and
had no contact with leaders of the Strike Committee. In fact, when Commander
King tried to take his help and sent him to talk to the mutineers, they sent
him back, making it clear that they had no faith in him. One of his close
friends called him a sycophant and a devoted follower of Mir Jafar (i.e. a
traitor).26<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The reasons for the mutiny have been spelt out by one
of the leaders, Petty Officer (Telegraphist) Madan Singh, who was Vice
President of the Strike Committee. During an interview he said: <b>27</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There had been a current of
deep-rooted discontent simmering underneath the surface calm which erupted on
February 18, almost like a volcano. The beginning was made by HMIS <i>Talwar</i>,
a sea shore establishment for training wireless operators. The ship’s ratings
were better educated as compared to the other Naval ratings of RIN. The
egotistical attitude of the officers, particularly British who were
predominant, was further fuelled by the off-the-cuff remarks of the newly
arrived Commander King on a routine visit to the Ship. He had commented that
Indian Ratings were sons of Indian bitches. When we protested through the
official channel we were threatened. The service conditions were pathetic,
particularly in contrast to the English Ratings. The last straw on the camel
was the breakfast unfit for consumption served to us on February 18. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though not inspired by political reasons, the RIN
mutiny did have political consequences. It was preceded by the RIAF mutiny and
followed by several mutinies in the Army, including one at the Signal Training
Centre at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>. Together, these caused
consternation and alarm in <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">London</st1:place></st1:city>. The realisation
that <st1:country-region w:st="on">Britain</st1:country-region> could no longer
depend on the Indian Armed Forces was partly responsible for her decision to
quit <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1947. Recognising this contribution, the Government of India subsequently
agreed to accord the ratings who participated in the mutiny the status of
freedom fighters. In June 1973 the Government approved the grant of freedom
fighters’ pension to 476 personnel who had lost their jobs, being dismissed or
discharged from service because of their role in the mutiny. 28<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="MsoTitle">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">END NOTES<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0in; text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This chapter is largely based on
Dilip Kumar Das’ <i> Revisiting Talwar – A
Study in the Royal Indian Navy Uprising of February 1946</i>, (New Delhi,
1993); Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh’s <i>Under Two Ensigns – The Indian Navy
1945-1950</i>, (New Delhi,
1986);<b> </b>BC Dutt’s <i>Mutiny of the
Innocents</i>, (Bombay, 1971); and ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry – RIN
Mutiny 1946’, (Ministry of Defence, History Division, New Delhi). Specific
references are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="MsoBlockText">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">1. Report of the Commission of Inquiry – RIN Mutiny 1946,
Ministry of Defence, History Division, (MODHD), New Delhi, Document 601/7968/1,
pp. 20-27.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">2. Rear
Admiral Satyindra Singh,<i> Under Two Ensigns – The Indian Navy 1945-1950</i>, (New Delhi, 1986), p. 55<i>. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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3. Dilip Kumar Das, <i> Revisiting Talwar – A Study in the Royal
Indian Navy Uprising of February 1946</i>, (New Delhi, 1993), p.63</div>
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4. Das, p.74</div>
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5. Das, pp.77-78</div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">6. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p.53.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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7. Das, p. 164</div>
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8. Trilochan Singh Trewn, ‘The
lesser-known Mutiny’, <i>The Tribune,</i> <st1:place w:st="on">Chandigarh</st1:place>,
24 February 2002. </div>
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9. BC Dutt, <i>Mutiny of the Innocents</i>,
(<st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>, 1971),
p.137</div>
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10. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p.
56 </div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">11. Trewn, ‘The lesser-known Mutiny’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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12. Das, pp. 217-18, quoting <i>The Free
Press Journal</i>, <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>,
22 February 1946.</div>
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13. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p.
59 </div>
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14. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p.
100</div>
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15. Das, pp. 180-3.</div>
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16. Das, pp. 187-8</div>
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17. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, pp.
102-04 </div>
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18. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p.
105</div>
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19. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, pp.
106-07</div>
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20. Report of the Commission of Inquiry,
pp.109-112</div>
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21. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p.
113</div>
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22. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p.
498</div>
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23. Das, p. 211, quoting <i>The Free Press
Journal</i>, <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>,
22 February 1946.</div>
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24. Das, p.263, quoting Mahatma Gandhi, <i>Collected
Works</i>, Vol. 83, p. 184</div>
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25. BC Dutt, <i>Mutiny of the Innocents</i>, <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>, 1971, p.109.</div>
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26. Das, p.235</div>
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27. HJS Waraich, ‘Total Recall – Witness to
History’, <i>The Sunday Tribune</i>, <st1:place w:st="on">Chandigarh</st1:place>, 21 March 2004. </div>
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28 Satyindra Singh, p. 90</div>
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veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com74tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-91631028083168118372016-09-12T09:21:00.001-07:002016-09-12T09:21:46.179-07:00THE JUBBULPORE MUTINY – 1946<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CHAPTER - 9<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h1>
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">THE <st1:place w:st="on">JUBBULPORE</st1:place>
MUTINY – 1946<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
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The
mutiny at Jubbulpore took place between 27 February and 3 March 1946, about two
weeks after the Naval mutiny at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>.
The men who participated in the mutiny were all Indian Signal Corps personnel
posted at the Signal Training Centre at Jubbulpore (now called <st1:city w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:city>). According to official sources,
1716 men were involved in the mutiny. The immediate provocation for the revolt
was the firing on the naval ratings at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>
and the harsh punishments awarded to the INA prisoners after the trials at the
Red Fort. The men also had certain grievances concerning pay, food and
accommodation that they placed before their superior officers and were agitated
when these were not heard. The uprising was peaceful and the participants did
not resort to violence of any kind. Like the naval mutiny at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on">Karachi</st1:city>, the <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
revolt was put down with an iron hand, by using British troops. There was no
firing, but a bayonet charge that left about 70 men injured, and three dead. </div>
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Though
the mutiny at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place> was at that time not
considered as ‘serious’ as the Naval mutiny, its repercussions were immense.
The earlier revolts in the RIAF and RIN, though more widespread and larger in
scale, did not really worry the British authorities, because the Indian Army,
on which they depended for meeting external and internal threats was still
considered reliable, having proved its fidelity during World War II. The mutiny
at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place> was the first major uprising in
the Indian Army during or after the war. This set alarm bells ringing from <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on">London</st1:city>,
and doubts began to be expressed on the steadfastness of the Indian Army.
Ultimately, it forced <st1:country-region w:st="on">Britain</st1:country-region>
to reach a settlement with the political parties and quit <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>. </div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> After
the end of World War II there was feeling of uncertainty among soldiers, with
the threat of demobilisation and loss of livelihood being matters of serious
concern. The return of a large number of troops from British colonies in
South-East Asia aggravated the situation, with military stations in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
overwhelmed with troops for whom there was little work and no accommodation.
This led to severe overcrowding and a fall in standards of hygiene, food and
discipline, the latter due to lack of employment. During the war, most of the
men had been serving in operational areas, remaining ignorant or unaware of the
political situation in the country. The demands for independence from British
rule escalated after the 1942 Quit India agitation, and the end of the war raised
expectations in the minds of the public that freedom was imminent. Most of the
men went home on leave for the first time after the war, and learned of the
momentous political events that had taken place during the last three or four
years. The INA trials also played a part in kindling among soldiers ‘political
consciousness’, of which they had no earlier experience. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">In February 1946, there were two
major establishments of the Indian Signal Corps at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>.
The first was the Signal Training Centre (STC) comprising No. 1 Signal Training
Battalion (Military) and 2 & 3 Signal Battalions (Technical). The second
was the Indian Signal Depot & Records, which comprised the Indian Signals
Depot; the Indian Signals Demobilisation Centre and the Indian Signals Records.
The Commandant of the STC was Colonel L.C. Boyd, while Colonel R.T.H. Gelston,
commanded the Depot & Records. Both these establishments came under the
Jubbulpore Area, commanded by Brigadier H.U. Richards, who also commanded 17
Indian Infantry Brigade. The Area came under the General Officer Commanding
Nagpur District, Major General F.H. Skinner, with his headquarters at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nagpur</st1:place></st1:city>. Headquarters
Central Command was then located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> Conditions
at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place> were no different from those at
other military stations, except that the men, being mostly from technical
trades, were more educated. Many of the men undergoing long training courses
were not sure whether they would be retained or sent home in the next few
months. The delay in announcement of a clear policy on demobilisation had
created an air of uncertainty and restlessness, which could not remain
unnoticed. On 27 November 1945, Colonel Boyd had written to the Organisation
Directorate in General Headquarters (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>), bringing this to their
notice. He wrote: 1<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It is for consideration whether the present policy of continuing to put
men under lengthy courses of training, irrespective of the time they are likely
to remain in the Army, is not extremely wasteful both of instructors’ time and
Government..… Among these men unsettlement and lack of interest in their work
are already noticeable, since they think they will be released form the Army
before their course finishes. It should also be noted that it is the highly
educated men such as are enrolled for Group ‘A’ trades that are keenest to
leave the Army at the earliest possible moment in order to obtain highly
remunerative employment.….To carry on with Workshops and Operator training in
these circumstances seems to be a waste of time. The unsettlement in squads
already referred to is having an adverse effect on training …<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">It was almost three months before
General Headquarters (India), replied to Colonel Boyd’s letter, ordering the
immediate release of one thousand recruits then under training at the Indian
Signal Training Centre at Jubbulpore and Bangalore.<b>3</b> By the time the
orders reached the STC the mutiny had started. Referring to the letter in his
report to the Area Headquarters after the mutiny, Colonel Boyd lamented: ‘It is
unfortunate that the decision contained therein could not have been come to
earlier’.3 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> Even
if the decision to release the thousand men had been taken earlier, it would
have been difficult for the Signal Training Centres to cope with such large
numbers. The Signals Depot was then not authorised a demob centre; it was
making do with an ad hoc demob centre that had a capacity to release only 70
persons in a day. The staff of the depot was already overworked and the
additional load would have stretched them to the limit. The severe overcrowding
and unsatisfactory living conditions only added to the unrest. The shortage of
staff affected management of security in the area, and the men had free access
to civilian areas. The Signal Training Centre, Depot and Records employed large
numbers of civilians, through whom political developments found their way into
the military camp and the idle minds of the men, easily converting them into
‘devils’ workshops’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> At
that time, units were given cash to purchase condiments, which were not being
supplied with rations. There had been a delay in purchase of condiments with
the resultant deterioration in the quality of food being prepared in the <i>langars
</i>(Other Ranks messes in the Indian Army are generally called thus. The term
is taken from the free kitchen in a <i>gurudwara</i>, the place of worship for
Sikhs). The personnel responsible for purchasing condiments were often corrupt,
and the quantity and quality of condiments was much below the prescribed
standards. This applied also to the rations supplied to the men through the
supply depot manned by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. Other then rations,
even other stores and amenities authorised to the men were frequently pilfered.
The general standard of the men’s cookhouses, living quarters, bathrooms and
urinals was poor. Unlike in operational units, there was very little contact
between the officers and the men, whose grievances often went unnoticed or
unredressed. The quality of Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) and
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) posted in instructional appointments in the
STC was usually good, but the same could not be said of the supervisory staff
responsible for administration, some of whom had been in Jubbulpore for several
years, developing a callous attitude towards the men and their problems. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> A
feature unique to technical arms such as the Indian Signal Corps was the
presence of a large number of British soldiers in every unit and establishment.
Before the war, most of the technical trades in the Indian Signal Corps were
open only to British Other Ranks (BOR), with Indian Other Ranks being eligible
for the ‘lower’ trades such as operator visual, despatch rider, lineman, MT
driver etc. Before the war, the Indian Signal Corps comprised about two
thousand BOR, with the number of IOR being almost twice that number. When the
war ended, the number of BOR had gone up ten times to almost twenty thousand,
while the number of IOR had grown thirty times to sixty thousand. The rapid
expansion of the Corps necessitated several new trades being opened to Indians,
who began to be recruited as mechanics, operators and electricians. By the end
of the war Indians were employed in all jobs that were being done earlier by
Europeans, the exception being ciphers, which was not opened to Indians until <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>. Though IOR were now doing the same job as
BOR, there was considerable disparity in their status – BOR did not salute
Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) - salaries, rations and living
conditions. This naturally irked the Indians, who saw no reason for this
discrimination. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">A seemingly inconsequential cause
for discontent was the bad quality of <i>gur</i> (jaggery) being supplied to
the troops by resorting to local purchase. This had been officially reported to
the Centre Headquarters on 25 February 1946. However, the decision on the
complaint or the progress was not communicated to the men. On 26 February a
number of notices were seen pasted on the company notice boards in the lines of
the Demob Centre and No. 4 Depot Company. Some notices had ‘Jai Hind’ written
on them, while others called upon all Indian Other Ranks to cease work and, if
necessary, shed blood. The notices were
seen in the morning by Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Anderson, Officer Commanding
Indian Signals Depot, who reported this to the Commandant, Colonel R.T.H.
Geltson. Viewing the situation as serious, Colonel Gelston immediately sought
an interview with the Area Commander, to report on an ‘Intelligence’ matter. At
3 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel Anderson met the Area Commander
and apprised him of the notices. In the evening, all officers were called for a
conference and explained the developments. At about 6 pm all IOR of Records
were paraded and the Company Commander, Captain DS Garewal, addressed them, in
the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson and the Officer in Charge Records,
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Macdonald. The men were calm during the address, and
there was no untoward incident. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">The mutiny started at about 9.20 am
on 27 February 1946 in ‘G’ Company of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion. The
first works parade was held at 7 am as usual, and the men were drilled. All
officers attended the parade which ended at about 8.30 am, when everyone broke
off for breakfast. Soon after breakfast, about 200 men, mainly workshop
trainees, formed up in the lines of the unit, just before the second works
parade was due to fall in. Most of them were in uniform, carrying flags of the
Congress and Muslim League. They formed a procession and marched out of the
unit, shouting slogans of ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’. The Senior
Viceroy Commissioned Officer of the unit, Subedar Major and Honorary Captain
Ahmed Khan, asked them to halt, but they did not listen to him. Khan
immediately telephoned the Adjutant, who was having breakfast in the Officers
Mess. The Adjutant told the Subedar Major that Major C.C. Tucker, the
officiating Commanding Officer, had left the mess about five minutes earlier
and he should await his arrival in the office. He also informed Major D.C.
Dashfield and Captain J. Knowles, Company Commander and Training Officer
respectively of ‘G’ Company, who were in the mess with him. Collecting another
officer, Captain M.B. Myers, they left for the unit area on bicycles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">Information about the crowd
collecting and shouting slogans in front of the guard room of No 2 Signal
Training Battalion had also reached Colonel Gelston, whose office was located
just a hundred yards away. Gelston saw
the crowd leave the unit area and move along Peter’s Path, which led towards
No. 3 Signal Training Battalion and the Signals Depot. He telephoned the Area
Headquarters and also the Depot, warning them that that the crowd might come
that way. The Depot Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, was then in his
bungalow. When Gelston rang him up, he told him that he had called for a 15-cwt.
vehicle and was planning to come to his office, to report that notices had
again been seen during the morning parade. Gelston informed <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Anderson</st1:place></st1:city> of the developments, and asked him
to pick him up from his office, so that they could both go and see what was
happening.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">Meanwhile, the procession was
proceeding on Peter’s Path, along <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Napier
Road</st1:address></st1:street> to the lines of No. 3 Signal Training
Battalion. Major Tucker was cycling to his office when he met the crowd. Having
failed in his attempt to stop them, he cycled ahead and warned No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion of their approach. The four officers of No. 2 Signal
Training Battalion had also reached the unit, and the Adjutant telephoned No. 3
Signal Training Battalion. Major Dashfield and Captain Knowles got into a 3-ton
lorry and drove towards the crowd al full speed. Having been warned of the
approach of the procession, No. 3 Signal Training Battalion had turned out its
guard. But the crowd brushed it aside, and entered the unit area, sweeping
Major Tucker off his bicycle. When Major Dashfield and Captain Knowles caught
up with him, he ordered them to go after the crowd and halt them. Noticing that
the crowd was about to leave 3 Signal Training Battalion near the Boys’
Company, they halted the truck and went towards the mob. When Major Dashfield
asked them to stop, one of them said, ‘we have demands’. Captain Knowles, who
had his back towards the crowd, was hit three times by stones. Enveloping the officers,
the crowd continued on its way. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant
Colonel Anderson reached the crowd as they were coming out of No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion. They were soon joined by Major Dashfield and Captain
Knowles. The four officers got out of their vehicles and tried to stop the men,
who just rushed past them and marched through the Depot. They were very excited
and seemed completely out of hand, shouting slogans and waving party flags.
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson kept moving with the head of the column while
Colonel Gelston got in the truck and asked the driver to start. The truck was
soon surrounded by the mutineers and some even tried to get in. Gelston ordered
the driver to keep moving forward slowly. At one stage the driver’s foot slipped
off the pedal and the truck bounded forward, knocking over two men. Due to the
heavy rush, even <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Anderson</st1:place></st1:city>
was almost run over. After this, the truck was stopped and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Anderson</st1:place></st1:city> got in. Both officers then made
their way to the Depot.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU"> Realising that they would not be able to stop
the procession on their own, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson collected about15 men
and issued them with rifles. He also armed Dashfield and Knowles with pistols
and the party moved in a lorry towards the procession, which had already passed
through the Depot. Overtaking the crowd on the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Outram Road</st1:address></st1:street> about 200 yards from the
Nerbudda Junction, they halted the lorry with the men keeping their rifles at
the aim. The officers dismounted and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Anderson</st1:place></st1:city>
threatened to shoot if the men did not stop. Hearing this, the men in the crowd
bared their chests and dared him to open fire. The three officers were
literally thrust out of the way and the crowd turned off the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Nerbudda Road</st1:address></st1:street> towards <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gorakhpur</st1:place></st1:city> and headed for the city. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">Two Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
of ‘G’ Company followed the crowd and attempted to fid out their complaints.
The main grievances of the men were: 4<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU">Differences
in pay between IORs & BORS.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU">Poor
quality of rations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU">Why
was fire opened on RIN ratings?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .5in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU">Why
were two INA officers sentenced to seven years RI when others were merely cashiered? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .25in; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-AU"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Undeterred by the attempts to stop
them the crowd proceeded towards the city. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Tillaya,
they stopped and held a meeting, where speeches were made by some of the men
highlighting their grievances. There was a lot of slogan shouting and waving of
flags of Congress and Muslim League. Some of them went to the local office of
the Congress Party and sought the help of the local political leaders. An
officer from the Intelligence Branch of Area Headquarters and some officers
from the Signal Training Centre also went to the venue in civil dress and noted
down the names of the prominent persons taking an active part in the meeting
and discussions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The news of the incident spread
quickly. There was considerable tension in the city and shopkeepers closed
their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there was no violence or
unruly behaviour by the men. At about 4.15 pm they started back for the unit.
By this time the military authorities had mobilised two companies of 27 Jat and
two ID (Internal Disturbance) companies of the Signal Training Centre in case
force was required to carry out arrests. But the crowd entered the lines
peacefully and sat down in the battalion area. The troops earmarked for
effecting arrests were therefore asked to stand down. The ID companies, which
had taken over the main guard, <i>kot</i> (armoury) and magazine guard were
later relieved by the Jat troops. The ‘ring-leaders’, whose names had been
noted down by the Area Intelligence Officer and by other officers from Signal
Training Centre, were asked to fall out when their names were called, which
they did without any protest. Major C.C.
Tucker, the officiating Commanding Officer of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion,
ordered a Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer to march the ringleaders to the main
quarter guard. Sensing what was going to happen next, the others pulled them
back into the crowd. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon afterwards, the Commandant,
Colonel L.C. Boyd arrived, followed by the Area Commander, who addressed the
men. He told them that they were all under arrest, but assured them that he
would forward their grievances to higher authorities. They fell in and were
marched to the Signal Training Centre Cage where the Commandant noted down
their demands, which were as under:-<b> 5</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Increase of basic pay<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Increase of rations<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Better accommodation<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Equal treatment with British Other Ranks<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Speedier demobilisation<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Protest against speeches of the Commander-in-Chief and
Admiral Godfrey - the passage that if Indian Army soldiers are indisciplined
every force would be used against them<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Release of all INA prisoners including Captain Rashid and
Burhanuddin. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Unnecessary to spend one crore on Victory celebrations when
there is food crisis in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Ready to work if the demands are put forward. We did no
indiscipline while out. Pray no action against us.<b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-left: .25in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After taking down their grievances
the Commandant spoke to the men and left. When the afternoon parade was
dismissed a number of men of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion approached the
cage and started milling around shouting words of encouragement. Those who
wished to join their friends inside the cage were allowed to do so and the rest
were ordered to return, which they did. After dark the same thing occurred. The
men inside the cage refused food and bedding. When the Commandant came to know
of this he entered the cage and spoke to the men, after which they agreed to
eat food and accepted bedding. Apart from sporadic slogans, the night passed without
incident. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-AU"> By
early next morning, a British battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had
arrived in <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>. A party of about 80 men
from No. 2 Signal Training Battalion assembled in the unit at 7 am and began
moving along the same route that had been taken by their colleagues on the
previous day, but before they could cover any substantial distance, they were
intercepted by a platoon of the British battalion. When addressed by various
officers, a few of them agreed to return to work but the remainder were left on
the roadside under the guard of British troops.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-AU"> At
9 am No. 2 Signal Training Battalion was paraded. Major Tucker and Colonel Boyd addressed the
men and asked to return to work. Though the men remained orderly they refused,
saying that they could not do so because their comrades were in custody. If
they were let out, they would all go back to work. They were asked to return to
their lines and remain quiet, which they readily agreed to do. At about 10 am
personnel of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion became restive, and about 100 men
joined the clerks of the Records and sat down with them, demanding the release
of the men inside the cage. Some officers and Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
tried to talk them out of this demand, but very few responded. A few men from
the ID companies who had been asked to stand down took off their equipment and
joined the crowd.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU"> The District Commander, Major General Skinner
arrived to get a first hand account of the events. In consultation with the
Area Commander and the Commandant Signal Training Centre, a plan was made to
arrest the ringleaders. The officiating Commanding Officer and the Subedar
Major would enter the cage to reason with the men and try to effect the arrests
placidly. If this were to fail, then the ringleaders would be pointed out to
the Company Commander of the Somerset Light Infantry, who would make the
arrests forcibly. Major Tucker, Lieutenant Waugh and Subedar Major Khan entered
the cage and reasoned with the men for over an hour without success. The
Second-in-Command of 27 Jat and Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose, an Indian officer
who had been called from Katni, then entered the cage and spent another hour,
but failed to induce the ringleaders to give themselves up. There was no
recourse left except the use of force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-AU"> About
80 soldiers of the Somerset Light Infantry entered the Cage, with bayonets
fixed on their rifles. A few of the men were physically removed, amidst a lot
of shouting. Faced with the bayonets of the British troops, the crowd retreated
to one corner of the cage, which gave way under the weight of sheer numbers. A
large number managed to escape through the gap, while the remainder were
involved a scuffle with the British troops. Many sustained injuries from
bayonets and some were trampled in the stampede. The injured were immediately
removed to the hospital. Some of the men who escaped rushed towards the city
but others who were very frightened hid in huts in the lines or in the local
countryside. Information about the escapees was conveyed to the police and the
civil authorities, with a request to arrest them and bring them back at the
earliest. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-AU"> The
news of the bayonet charge spread like wild fire in the Signal Training Centre
and at many places the men came out and demonstrated against this, resulting in
some more arrests. At 6 pm 14 men returned voluntarily, followed by some more
in smaller groups of two or three. They were all placed under arrest and put in
the guardroom. At about 7.30 pm information was received from the local police
that about 200 men who had been rounded up by them were being returned in
police lorries. The District Commander and Commandant Signal Training Centre
met these men when they arrived. The injured were sent to the hospital while
the rest were sent to the Jat lines. Meanwhile, about 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion continued to sit
in the Records lines. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">While events had taken a serious
turn in the Signal Training Centre on 28 February 1946, things were far from
normal in the Depot and Records. In the morning about 200 clerks of the Records
collected near 4 Company lines and marched towards the Depot Battalion. The
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, turned out his Internal
Defence Company and followed them, accompanied by his Second-in-Command and
Captain D.S. Garewal of Signals Records. They met the crowd of mutineers on the
bridge near the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Hospital</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
A column of the Somerset Light Infantry had also arrived and was lined up on
the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Outram Road</st1:address></st1:street>
opposite the hospital. Lieutenant Colonel Anderson spoke to the men and asked
them what they wanted. On being told that they had several grievances he asked
them to return to their lines and hand over their grievances, which he promised
to take up with the authorities. After some hesitation they agreed and followed
him to the lines, where they sat down and narrated their grievances, which were
noted down and handed over to the Area Commander when he arrived soon
afterwards to address the men.
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson again spoke to the men and asked them to
return to work but they refused. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">A company of the Somerset Light
Infantry had been placed around the lines of No. 4 Company. With the help of
some British soldiers, the Brigade Major of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade, Major K.B.
Langdon, arrested four Indian Other Ranks who were then marched away. After
these arrests and the departure of the Area Commander, about 100 men of No. 3
Signal Training Battalion rushed into the 4 Company lines and joined the
mutineers, accompanied by a lot of shouting.
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Macdonald, the Officer-in-Charge Records and
Captain Macfarlane, Adjutant No. 3 Signal Training Battalion tried to quieten
the men. After about ten minutes the newly arrived recruits sat down behind the
mutineers already seated there. Some more officers from No. 3 Signal Training
Battalion arrived and tried to persuade their men to return to their lines but
failed. The total number of mutineers present in No.4 Company had now swelled
to almost 350. The Commandant Indian Signals Depot and Records, Colonel Gelston
spoke to them about their grievances and promised to do all that could be done
to remove them. The men also demanded the release of the four men arrested
earlier and the removal of British troops. At 4 pm the British troops were
withdrawn without any visible reaction from the mutineers. The night of 28
February passed off without any further incident. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">In the early hours of 1 March 1946,
about 150 Other Ranks from 3 Signal Training Battalion left their lines and
marched in a procession towards Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans and waving flags.
This information was conveyed to Area Headquarters, which ordered a company
from Somerset Light Infantry to proceed to the garrison ground, where the crowd
was reported to have be headed for. At 7.30 am the Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel R.B.S. Eraut, the Adjutant, Captain Facfarlane and Jemadar
Natesan, a Madrassi Mussalman interpreter, proceeded to the Garrison Ground but
found no trace of the procession. Colonel Eraut went to the Area Headquarters,
while Captain Facfarlane and Jemadar Natesan searched for the crowd in the city
and the cantonment, without success. On their return to the unit they
discovered that 24 men from the Internal Disturbance Company had joined the
procession. The Commanding Officer ordered the Internal Disturbance Company to
stand down, and the British guard to take over. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">At about 9 am information was
received that the procession was coming back in an endeavour to mobilise the remainder
of the unit. The Commanding Officer positioned a few officers and Viceroy’s
Commissioned Officers to meet the procession when it reached the lines and
divert them to the football ground. The Commandant reached the unit shortly
before the arrival of the procession at 9.45 am. Efforts to guide them to the
football ground failed and they moved towards the staging camp. They were
stopped en route and the Commanding Officer began to address them. At first he
was shouted down but eventually succeeded in making them sit down and listen.
The Commandant then addressed the men and listened to their points. Since it
was the morning break the rest of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion also gathered
round to listen. After the Commandant left for the Area Headquarters, the
Commanding Officer ordered the unit to parade for normal work. This order was
not immediately obeyed but after about twenty minutes all the men less the
demonstrators returned to work. At about 11.30 am Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose
arrived and addressed the men for over an hour, after which a few of them
returned to work. It appeared that many more were willing but were being
prevented by the leaders. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">At about 13.15 pm the Subedar Major
reported to the Commanding Officer that the demonstrators were requesting
permission to go to the cook house and have their food, and promised to return
to normal duties after that. The Commanding Officer agreed making it clear that
the normal course of military law would be followed. Shortly after this the
Subedar Major accompanied by 11 men left for the Records lines in order to
persuade the party of mutineers from No. 3 Signal Training Battalion who were
sitting there to return. He came back after 30 minutes and reported that he had
not only failed in convincing the mutineers but had lost two men of this party,
who had been persuaded to join them. After lunch, all the men except for those
still in Records attended the afternoon works parade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">The situation in No. 4 Company of
Records on 1 March continued to be tense. Captain Garewal, the Company
Commander attended the first works parade at 8 am and found only two men
present. The mutineers were still sitting between the first and second
barracks, where they had been the previous day. Most of them were seated in orderly
ranks, with a few standing around and talking. At about 10.30 pm they became
noisy and began to form a procession, taking down several Congress and Muslim League
flags from the open ground between the barracks and the road where they had
been erected the previous day. However, there were many among them who shouted
to the men to stay in the lines, and the procession broke up into small
groups. At about midday the flags were
re-erected. Shortly afterwards a deputation led by the Subedar Major of No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion arrived to persuade their men to return. There was a heated
discussion followed by a lot of pulling and pushing, and some men were
physically prevented from going back. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">At the second works parade, not a
single man fell in on the parade ground. The Officer-in-Charge Records was
informed that some men would go to work individually but were afraid to come to
the parade ground. At about 4.15 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose arrived and met the men. Poonoose spoke to men with all officers
present, and later alone. At 5.45 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose left to meet the Area Commander. At the Roll Call parade at 6 pm, 41
men were present. The rest of the men were still sitting between the two barracks,
but were quiet. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<span lang="EN-AU">The previous day’s incidents had
been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable resentment at
the bayonet charge on the Indian soldiers. According to the newspapers, three
men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet charge. The District
Magistrate, Mr. E.S. Hyde declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a restricted area, and
the entry of civilians was banned. Notices to this effect were pasted at
prominent places and also announced by the beat of drum. Headquarters
Jubbulpore Area had also issued instructions confining all troops to lines.
Another infantry battalion, the First Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR) had also
arrived. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">On 2 March 1946, Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose again spoke to the mutineers in Records and No.3 Signal Training
Battalion. He reported that he had failed to make any headway and found that
some men who had appeared to be amenable the previous day were now obdurate.
During the day, a message from Major General F.H. Skinner, General Officer
Commanding Nagpur District was read out to all ranks, in English and Urdu.
Making it clear that the action of the men who had collectively absented
themselves from their lines without permission amounted to mutiny, it went on
to assure that there would be no mass punishment and ‘justice would be tempered
with mercy’. The message also appreciated the conduct of those who had remained
staunch to their duty in the ‘face of provocation and bad example’.6<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">During the day, conditions improved.
In No. 2 Signal Training Battalion, all men reported for the first works parade
except for nine, who also reported after half an hour. In No. 3 Signal Training Battalion all men resumed
duties except for the 100 men in Records and those detained in the Jat lines.
Major Dashfield visited the Jat lines with some Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
and tried to bring back some of the men, but they refused to come unless the
ringleaders were released as well. Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose visited the mutineers in Records in the morning at 7.30 am. Poonoose
spoke to them for about half an hour but found them in the same frame of mind.
He noticed that some men whom he had spoken to the previous day were missing,
and suspected that they had been forcibly prevented from attending his talk. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">At 12.30 pm, Captain Garewal read
out the District Commander’s message, twice in Urdu and once in English, using
a pubic address system. Everyone heard this in silence. During the afternoon,
all was quiet and there was no shouting of slogans. At the evening roll call,
268 men were present. At 9 pm, the
mutineers announced that they were willing to end the mutiny. They burned their
flags and started reporting at the office, where their names were noted down.
The 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training battalion returned to their lines. By 11
pm, it appeared that all mutineers had surrendered, except the ones in the Jat
lines.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">On 3 March 1946 a roll call parade
was held in all units at 9 am. Immediately afterwards some ringleaders were
arrested and sent to the Jat lines. Troops of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade had
placed a cordon around the lines. The Area Commander and Commandant Signal
Training Centre visited the mutineers in the Jat lines. They said that they
were willing to come back if all of them were released. The ringleaders among
them had been segregated and without them the others refused to return to their
units. During the next two days, the situation improved, but was still far from
normal. The men in the Jat lines refused to come out until their leaders were
released. There were no incidents on 4 and 5 March and normal parades were held
in the units. On 7 March all the men in the Jat lines returned. On reaching
their units they staged a protest for the release of the ringleaders,
threatening to go on strike again if this was not done. However, the threat did
not materialise and there were no untoward incidents after 7<sup> </sup>March
1946. The mutiny was over. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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The
mutiny had shocked the military establishment, especially the British officers
who had always believed that the Indian soldier would never rebel. The reasons
for the disaffection were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken. The
District Commander issued instructions to all concerned to improve the standard
of food and accommodation. Lieutenant Colonel Cassani from the Welfare
General’s Branch visited the lines of the Indian Signals Depot on 6 March 1946
and submitted a detailed report at General Headquarters (<st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>). The
report brought to light the pathetic conditions under which the Indian troops
lived. After it was found that some officers, Viceroy’s commissioned officers
and non commissioned officers had spent almost eight to ten years at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>, those who had been there for over two years
were immediately posted out. The number of Indian officers was increased, so
that they could understand the problems of Indian troops. </div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Disciplinary action taken against those who
participated in the mutiny was severe and swift. Those against whom there was
even the slightest inkling were punished. Most of them were charged under
Indian Army Act Section 27 (a) – ‘joining, exciting, causing or conspiring in a
mutiny’ – and Army Act Section 27 (b) – ‘being present at a mutiny and not
using his utmost endeavours to suppress the same’. A total of 85 men were found to have been
actively involved in the mutiny. Eighteen men were tried by Summary General
Court Martial, of which 15 were sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment ranging
from one to three years, with three being acquitted. Seven men were dismissed
without trial and 19 discharged without terminal benefits. In addition, 41 were
discharged from service on
administrative grounds – services no longer required - without any enquiry or investigation. Many
more were sent home merely on suspicion and the statements of Viceroy’s and non
commissioned officers that were considered loyal by British officers. Most of
these men had put in long years of service and fought in World War II. They did
not get any pension or gratuity and many lived and died in penury. Their pleas
for redress fell on deaf years as instructions were also issued not to
entertain any petition or appeal unless Army Headquarters recommended it. Old
records contain several letters that bring out the pathetic state of these
unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt and helped the British
win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the British sense of fair
play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at the treatment they
received at the hands of the Government of the day.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
bad food and living conditions were the major reasons behind the mutiny at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>, it had a political tinge right from the
beginning. The firing on the naval ratings at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> and the punishments awarded to the
officers of the Indian National Army were included in the list of grievances
given by the mutineers on the first day itself. Throughout the revolt, the
participants carried flags of the Congress and the Muslim League and shouted
slogans such as ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’. On 27 and 28 February they
contacted local political leaders and sought their help. The local Congress
leaders visited the mutineers under detention in the Jat lines and persuaded
them to give up their resistance. They were shown a letter from Maulana Azad,
the Congress President, asking them to resume work.7 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During a press conference on 3 March 1946, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru referred o the Jubbulpore mutiny, and said, ‘…the men ... have
remained completely peaceful…The demands were for better treatment in regard to
rations, amenities etc, and equality of treatment between Indian and British
soldiers. There were also some political demands… Such demands should not
normally be made on the basis of a strike… We have seen recently strikes by
American and British servicemen’.8<b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party raised the
matter in the Central Assembly in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
on 15 March 1946. In his reply, the War Secretary, Mr. Philip Mason gave the
official version of the case. According to him, 1,716 persons were involved in
the mutiny. He accepted that thirty-five persons had been wounded of whom eight
had bayonet wounds with remainder having minor injuries from barbed wire or
contusions. Only two persons were seriously injured and there were no deaths.
However, he denied that there was any firing or bayonet charge. According to
him, some persons had sustained bayonet wounds when they attempted to overpower
the troops that had been called in to arrest the ringleaders. Mr. Ahmad Jaffar
of the Muslim League suggested that a couple of members of the Defence
Consultative Committee should be associated with the Inquiry, but this was
rejected by the War Secretary, who contended that this was a service inquiry
under the Indian Army Act, and it would be quite illegal to associate
non-officials. 9<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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The
Army mutiny at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place> followed the
mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy. It is
pertinent to remember that one of the compelling reasons for the departure of
the British from <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>
was the apprehension that the loyalty of Indian Armed Forces was doubtful. Due
to obvious reason, the staunchness of the Army was more worrisome than that of
the other two services. On 5 September 1946, in a note by the
Commander-in-Chief on the military aspects of the plan to withdraw from <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>, General
Auchinleck was to record, ‘The importance of keeping the Indian Army steady is
emphasised. It is the one disciplined force in which communal interests are
subordinated to duty, and on it depends the stability of the country. The steadiness of the R.I.N. and the R.I.A.F.
is of lesser import but any general disaffection in them is likely seriously to
affect the reliability of the Army.<b>’10<o:p></o:p></b></div>
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The
mutiny in the Signal Training Centre and the Indian Signal Corps Depot and Records
at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place> was only major uprising in the
Indian Army after the end of World War II. It was also the last uprising by
soldiers under the British Raj. In a sense, it was the proverbial ‘last straw’
that broke the camel’s back. Fearful of the effect it might have on the rest of
the Army, news about the mutiny was deliberately suppressed. Having occurred in
a small town, it was almost ignored by the national newspapers based in <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>.
The Corps of Signals also chose to ignore the mutiny, even after <st1:city w:st="on">Independence</st1:city>, and old
timers talked about it only in hushed voices. Many officers were worried about
the stigma associated with a mutiny, which has always been regarded as the most
heinous of military offences. The fact that the Corps of Signals continued to
be headed by a British officer up to 1954 may have played a part in this.
Strangely enough, no record of the <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
mutiny exists in the National Archives or the Historical Section of the
Ministry of Defence. As a result, it has been ignored by military historians as
well those who have written about the freedom struggle. The men involved in the
mutiny have also suffered – unlike the participants in the naval mutiny, they
have not been classified as freedom fighters. <span lang="EN-AU"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ENDNOTES
<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This chapter is largely
based on N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon’s <i>The Transfer of Power</i> (<st1:city w:st="on">London</st1:city>, 1982); Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes’ <i>Fidelity and
Honour</i> (New Delhi, 1993); and various files and documents in the Corps of
Signals Museum, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>. Specific references are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<b><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1. </span></b><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">STC to GHQ (I), 27 Nov. 1945<b>, </b><st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype> (SM), <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:city></st1:place>, 242-C, fol. 94 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2. GHQ (I) to Comdt. ISC Depot & Records, 21 Feb 1946,
(SM), 242-C, fol.92 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3. STC to Jubbulpore Area, 9 Mar. 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.93<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4. STC to Jubbulpore Area, 27 Feb. 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.134<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5. Appx. ‘B’ to STC to
Jubbulpore Area, 8 Mar 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol.95 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6. Richards to Boyd, Gelston and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Anderson</st1:place></st1:city>, 1 Mar 1946, (SM), 242-C, fol. 58 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
7. Dipak Kumar Das, <i>Revisiting Talwar</i>,
(<st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city>, 1993),
p. 294</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
8 Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes, <i>Fidelity and
Honour</i> (New Delhi, 1993), p. 404</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9. Statement of Mr. Philip Mason, ICS, War Secretary, in the
Central Legislative Assembly on 15 March 1946. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
10. N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon (ed.), <i>The
Transfer of Power </i>(12 vols, <st1:city w:st="on">London</st1:city>,
1982), viii, p.462</div>
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</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-71307115014260237242016-01-16T07:36:00.003-08:002016-01-16T07:36:54.669-08:00APPENDIX 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt;">APPENDIX 6 </span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt;">BIBLIOGRAPHY <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -3.6pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Books and Articles<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -3.6pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Ahmad</span><span lang="EN-AU">, </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Lieutenant Colonel </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Mustasad</span><span lang="EN-AU">,<i> </i></span><i><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Living Upto Heritage - The Rajputs</span></i><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">, </span><st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-AU">New Delhi</span></st1:place></st1:city><span lang="EN-AU">: </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Lancer</span><span lang="EN-AU">, </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">1997</span><span lang="EN-AU">.</span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -3.6pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Antia<i>,</i><b> </b>Lieutenant Colonel<i> </i>S.N. <i>“</i>United Nations
Emergency Force: Its Creation and Problems”, <i>The Signalman,</i> January 1958<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 115%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Bajwa,
</span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Major
General </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">K.S., <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><i>Jammu</i></st1:place></st1:city><i> and <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>
War (1947-48) – Political and Military Perspective,</i> <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>: Har-Anand Publications.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Barreto, Brigadier T.<i>, History of the Corps of Signals, Volume 1 – Early Times to Outbreak of
<st1:place w:st="on">Second World</st1:place> War (1939)</i> <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>: The Corps of Signals Association,
Second Edition, 2006. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Cardozo, Major General<b> </b>Ian, Ed. <i>The Indian Army - A Brief History</i>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>: 2005. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Dalvi, Brigadier
John, <i>Himalayan Blunder,</i> <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>: Thacker &
Co., 1969.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">‘Eighth W.I.A.A Reliability
Trials-<st1:metricconverter productid="1961’" w:st="on">1961’</st1:metricconverter>,
<i>The Signalman, </i>April, 1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Ferris, Major
W.V, ‘Motor Cycle Trials’, <i>The Signalman,</i>
July 1961.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
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<span lang="EN-AU">‘Ninth Triangular Sports Meet’, <i>The Signalman,</i> January 1971.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">Prasad, S.N.
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<span lang="EN-AU">Prasad, S.N., <i>Operation
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<span lang="EN-AU">Regimental History – Indian Contingent Signal
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<span lang="EN-AU">Singh, Major General Lachhman, <i>Indian Sword Strikes In <st1:place w:st="on">East
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<i><span lang="EN-AU">----, Victory In Bangla Desh</span></i><span lang="EN-AU">, Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1981.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-AU">Singh, Lieutenant
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<span lang="EN-AU">Singh, Major
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">------<i>History of the Corps of Signals, Volume II</i></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>: Corps of Signals Association,
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<span lang="EN-US">-------</span><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">
In the Line of Duty – A Soldier Remembers</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>: Lancer, 2000. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Singh, Brigadier
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">‘Sixth W.I.A.A Reliability
Trial-<st1:metricconverter productid="1959’" w:st="on">1959’</st1:metricconverter>,
<i>The Signalman,</i> October 1959<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Subramanyam, Colonel
V.A., <i>A History of the Corps of Signals</i>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>:
Macmillan, 1986<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Tewari, Major General K.K., A<i> Soldier’s Voyage of Self Discovery,</i> Auroville:
1995.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">‘Third Triangular Sports Meet: <st1:metricconverter productid="1962’" w:st="on">1962’</st1:metricconverter>, <i>The Signalman,</i> April 1962.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Verma, Major
General Ashok Kalyan, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on"><i>Rivers</i></st1:placetype><i> Of <st1:placename w:st="on">Silence</st1:placename></i></st1:place>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>:
Lancer, 1998. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU"> ‘W.I.A.A Reliability Trials-<st1:metricconverter productid="1968’" w:st="on">1968’</st1:metricconverter>, <i>The Signalman,</i> October 1968<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-AU">Other Sources<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Corps of Signals Planning/Liaison Notes No. 1
(January 1948) to No. 40 (January 57); and No. 61 (January 1963) to No. 99
(January 73).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Historical Report JA Divisional Signal Regiment, 04 May to <st1:date day="30" month="11" w:st="on" year="1948">30 Nov 1948</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Historical Report, 50
Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; tab-stops: 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Historical Records, ‘Operation Vijay’, HQ 17
Infantry Division, </span><span lang="EN-AU">(HD-MOD),<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Minutes of the 1<sup>st</sup>
Indian Signal Corps Committee Meeting, <st1:date day="10" month="9" w:st="on" year="1946">10 September 1946</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Minutes of the 2<sup>nd</sup>
Indian Signal Corps Committee Meeting, 15 May 1947<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Minutes of Corps of Signals
Committee Meetings (post- <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>),
from serial 1 (April 1948) to serial 26 (June 1975)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Pamphlet ‘Post Commission
Training of Permanent Commission Officers <st1:metricconverter productid="1968’" w:st="on">1968’</st1:metricconverter>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Report on Aguada <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Fort</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Incident</st1:placename></st1:place>,
(HD-MOD), New <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; tab-stops: 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Report on
Operation ‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern
Command dated <st1:date day="4" month="5" w:st="on" year="1962">04 May 1962</st1:date>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Report on Performance of
Force Signal Unit in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
by Captain M.S. Sodhi, 1954<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;">
<span lang="EN-AU">Review of Activities of the
Corps of Signals, <st1:date day="7" month="10" w:st="on" year="1965">7 October
1965</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-AU">‘White Paper on <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>’</span></i><span lang="EN-AU">, Government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:date day="26" month="2" w:st="on" year="1948">26 February 1948</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<br /></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-34986065393949701442016-01-16T07:35:00.002-08:002016-01-16T07:35:48.065-08:00APPENDIX 5 LIST OF MAPS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">APPENDIX 5 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">LIST OF MAPS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">CHAPTER 2<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">1. J&K Operations (1947-49), Southern
Front, <i>page</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">2. J&K Operations (1947-49), Northern
Front, <i>page</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">CHAPTER 3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">3. Goa Operations (1961), <i>page</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">CHAPTER 4<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> Deleted<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">CHAPTER 5<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">4. Indo Pak War (1965), XI Corps Sector, <i>page<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">5. Indo Pak War (1965), XV Corps Sector, <i>page<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">CHAPTER 6 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6. Indo Pak War (1971), Eastern Theatre, <i>page</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">CHAPTER 7<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">7. Indo Pak War (1971), XI Corps Sector, <i>page<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">8. Indo Pak War (1971), J&K Sector, <i>page</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">CHAPTER 8<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">9. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> (1950-54), <i>page</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">10. Indo China (1954), <i>page<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">11. UN Emergency Force Gaza (1956-67), <i>page<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">12. UN operations in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> (1960-1964),
<i>page</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-53996161311981964202016-01-16T07:34:00.003-08:002016-01-16T07:34:50.465-08:00APPENDIX 4 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB">APPENDIX 4 </span></u></b></div>
<h1 align="center" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">AA - Anti Aircraft<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">AA & QMG - Assistant Adjutant & Quarter Master General<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">ADC - Aide-de-Camp<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">ADLS - Air Despatch Letter Service<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">AFHQ - Armed Forces Headquarters<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">AG - Adjutant General<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">AQMG - Assistant Quarter Master General<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">ASSU - Air Support Signal Unit<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">AT - Animal Transport<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -30.45pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">BEM - <st1:place w:st="on">British Empire</st1:place>
Medal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -30.45pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">BM - Brigade Major<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">BOR - British Other Rank(s)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">CAFSO - Chief Air Formation Signal Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">CGS - Chief of General Staff<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">CHM - Company Havildar Major<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="margin-right: 54.0pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US">C-in-C - Commander-in-Chief <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">CQMH - Company Quarter Master Havildar<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">CRA - Commander Royal Artillery<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h1 style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-weight: normal;">CSO - Chief Signal Officer <o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">CW - Continuous Wave <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">cwt - hundredweight (112 lbs.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">DAA & QMG - Deputy
Assistant Adjutant & Quarter Master General<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">DAQMG - Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">DCGS - Deputy Chief of General Staff<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">DCSO - Deputy Chief Signal Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">DDSD - Deputy Director of Staff Duties<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">DF - Direction Finding<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h2 style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DR - Despatch Rider<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
<h2 style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DRLS - Despatch Rider Letter Service<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">D Sigs - Director of Signals<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h2 style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DSO -
Distinguished Service Order,
Duty Signal Officer<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">ELS - Express Letter Service <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">FFR - Frontier Force Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">FFW - Fitted For Wireless<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">GCB - Knight Grand Cross of the Order of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bath</st1:place></st1:city><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; text-indent: -108.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">GCSI - Knight Grand Commander of the Most
Exalted Order <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; text-indent: -108.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> of
Star of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h1 style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-weight: normal;">GHQ - General Headquarters <o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">GOC - General Officer Commanding<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">GOC-in-C - General Officer Commanding-in-Chief<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">GSO 1 - General Staff Officer, Grade
1(Lieutenant Colonel)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">GSO 2 - General Staff Officer, Grade 2
(Major)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">GSO 3 - General Staff Officer, Grade 3
(Captain)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">HF - High Frequency<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">HLI - Highland Light Infantry<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h1 style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-weight: normal;">HQ - Headquarters<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">IAF - Indian Air Force<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">ICO - Indian Commissioned Officer <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">IDSM - Indian Distinguished Service Medal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">IEF - Indian Expeditionary Force <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">IMA - <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">INA - Indian National Army<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">IOM - Indian Order of Merit<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">IOR - Indian Other Rank(s)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">ISC - Indian Signal Corps<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">JCO - Junior Commissioned Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Km - Kilometer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">KW - Kilowatt<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">KCIO - King’s Commissioned Indian Officer <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; text-indent: -108.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">KCMG - Knight Commander of the Order of St.
Michael and <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; text-indent: -108.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> St.
George<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">L of C - Line of Communication <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">LMG - Light Machine Gun<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">MBE - Member of (the order of) the <st1:place w:st="on">British Empire</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">MC - Military Cross, Motor Cycle<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Mc/s - Megacycles per second<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">MEO - Military Evacuation Organisation<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">MGO - Master General of Ordinance<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">MM - Military Medal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">MMG - Medium Machine Gun<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h1 style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-weight: normal;">MT - Mechanical Transport <o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">No - Number<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">NCO - Non Commissioned Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">NC (E) - Non Combatant (Enrolled) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">NWFP - <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">North West</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Frontier</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Province</st1:placetype></st1:place> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OBE - Officer of (the order of) the <st1:place w:st="on">British Empire</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OBI - Order of <st1:place w:st="on">British
India</st1:place> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OC - Officer Commanding<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OCTU - Officer Cadet Training Unit<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OR - Other Rank(s)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OT (W) - Operator Telegraph (Wireless)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OT (L) - Operator Telegraph (Line)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OTS - Officers’ Training School<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">OV - Operator Visual <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Pt - Point<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">lb - Pound (Weight)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">PBF - <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
Boundary Force<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 350.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">PL - Permanent Line <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">POW - Prisoners Of War<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">PRC - Permanent Regular Commission<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">P & T - Posts and Telegraphs<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">PWRIMC - Prince of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Wales</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Royal</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">QM - Quarter Master<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">QMG - Quarter Master General<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RA - Royal Artillery <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RAF - Royal Air Force<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RAP - Regimental Aid Post<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RHM - Regimental Havildar Major<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RIAF - Royal Indian Air Force<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RIN - Royal Indian Navy<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RQMH - Regimental Quarter Master Havildar<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RQMS - Regimental Quarter Master Sergeant <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RT - Radio Telephony<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">RTT - Radio Teleprinter Transmission<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">SAAT - Signal Assistant Animal Transport<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">SDS - Signal Despatch Service<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">SO 1 - Staff Officer, Grade 1 (Lieutenant
Colonel)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">SO 2 - Staff Officer, Grade 2 (Major)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">SO 3 - Staff Officer, Grade 3 (Captain)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">STRAN - Static Radio Army Network <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">STC - Signal Training Centre<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">STC (I) - Signal Training Centre (Indian)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">SWAN - Static Wireless Army Network <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">TA - Territorial Army<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">TEV - Terminal Equipment Vehicle<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">TMO - Technical Maintenance Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">TRC - Tape Relay Centre<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">TSIC - <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Temporary</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
for Indian Cadets<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">UG - Under Ground <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB">UK</span></st1:place></st1:country-region> <span lang="EN-GB">- <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United Kingdom</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB">USA</span></st1:place></st1:country-region> <span lang="EN-GB">- <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States of America</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">VC - Victoria Cross<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">VCOs - Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">VHF - Very High Frequency<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">WAC (I) - Womens Auxiliary Corps (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">WS - Wireless Set<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB">WT - Wireless Telegraphy<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-85749520553687128022016-01-16T07:33:00.003-08:002016-01-16T07:33:45.834-08:00APPENDIX -3 HONOURS & AWARDS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">APPENDIX -3 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">HONOURS & AWARDS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 25.2pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">This Appendix lists the honours and
awards earned by personnel of the Corps of Signals between <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1947">15 August 1947</st1:date> and <st1:date day="31" month="12" w:st="on" year="1972">31 December 1972</st1:date>. It includes
personnel who were serving with non-signal units, on staff and on attachment or
deputation. The list has been divided in two parts. Part I contains gallantry
awards while Part II covers awards for distinguished service. Some awards for
the 1971 war were given in 1972. These have been included in the list.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 25.2pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 25.2pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">The lists have been prepared based on
inputs from the Military’s Secretary’s Branch and Directorate General of
Signals in Army HQ; Signals Records; the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></st1:place>;
and lists published in the Signalman. There are several discrepancies in the
lists, with regard to the rank, spelling of the name and date of award,
especially in the case of awards for distinguished service. An attempt has been
made to correct these by referring to the unit war dairies and interaction with
the concerned personnel. However, some inconsistencies could not be resolved,
which the reader is requested to overlook.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 25.2pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">PART I – GALLANTRY AWARDS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Mahavir Chakra<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-3999 Brig K.S.
Gowrishankar 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-993 Brig H.S. Kler 1971<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Vir Chakra <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-583 Maj H.S.
Bains 1948<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6280652 Sigmn D.C.
Dhilan 1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6263784 L/Hav K.G.
George 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-15842 Capt P.K.
Ghosh 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Ashoka Chakra Class III<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-7833 2/Lt J.K.
Grover 1957<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US">2<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Sena Medal<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6265267 Sigmn G.R.
Das 1960<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6273136 Sigmn Tejwant
Singh 1961<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-12066 Lt Lal
Singh 1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6261901 L/Nk Gulbadan
Singh 1963<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6237987 Hav Lekh
Raj 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-7346 Maj B.K.
Mathur 1966<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-31047 Nb Sub Karnail
Singh 1966<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6262894 Nk T.K.
Sen 1966<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-16951 2/Lt N.C.
Gupta 1968<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6251686 L/Nk M.G.
Ezhuthachan 1968<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-5999 Maj <st1:place w:st="on">N. Kovoor</st1:place> 1969<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6269040 Hav M.D
Bhardwaj 1969<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-1583 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> E.N. Ramadoss 1969<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-10144 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> Vinay Khanna 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-21768 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> G.P. Singh 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-26510 2/Lt M.S.A Rasheed 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-23167 Lt Bibhishan
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-23002 Lt Suresh
Rajan 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-42031 Nb Sub Mehtab
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-20128 Sub P.J.D.
Sundara Raju 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-32525 Sub Gian
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-60205 Nb Sub Bhagat
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6265282 Hav K.N.
Sharma 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6271672 Hav Bakhshish
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US">3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6275350 L/Hav K.P.
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6265946 Nk Vithal
Dass 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6875708 Nk Vasant
Pawar 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6278578 Nk Gopal
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6289730 Nk P.V.
Ramanaiah 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6300166 L/Nk Deepa
Ram 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6318807 L/Nk B.S.
Sigee 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6319787 L/Nk Mahanga
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6320496 L/Nk K.
Vasavan 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6357950 L/Nk Venu
Naidu 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6321546 Sigmn R.N.S.
Patel 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6355227 L/Nk Dharmiyan
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6371287 L/Nk Virendra
Kumar 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6479248 Sigmn K.P.
Pandey 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">PART II –
DISTINGUISHED SERVICE AWARDS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Padma Bhushan <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-307 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> P.N. Luthra 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Param Vishisht Seva Medal <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-2130 Maj Gen S.N. Antia 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-446 Lt Gen R.N. Batra, OBE 1966<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-89 Lt Gen A.C. Iyappa, MBE 1968<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-414 Lt Gen I.D. Verma 1970<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-795 Lt Gen E.G. Pettengell, MBE 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US">4<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Vishisht Seva Medal Class-II/Ati Vishisht Seva
Medal <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-993 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> H.S. Kler 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-796 Maj Gen R.Z. Kabraji 1967<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-845 Brig G.S. Sidhu 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-520 Brig K.K. Tewari 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-2925 Brig J.S.
Nanda 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-1888 Brig S.L.
Juneja 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Vishisht Seva Medal <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6257952 Nk Chhankar
Singh 1963<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-29367 Sub N.B.
Nair 1969<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-2603 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> P.D. Sawhney 1970<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">SL-212 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> Achhar Singh 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">SL-11 Maj Sardar Singh 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">SL-28 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> V.M. Anantharaman 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-3205 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> P.R. Gangadharan 1972
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-10868 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> S.P. Malik 1972
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-5327 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> A. Kumar 1972
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-7017 Maj S.G.
Mookerjee 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-10483 Maj J.R.
Sethi 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-20636 Capt S.B.
Mathur 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-22476 Capt P.J.
Anthony 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-60254 Nb Sub P.C.
Awasthi 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6309693 L/Nk Hari
Chand 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-5394 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> P.C. Bhalla 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US">5<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-5905 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> P.S. Talwar 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-4851 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> R. Mohan 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-5845 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> B.K. Bhandari 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-2301 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> R.M. Rajan 1972
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-6127 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> B.P. Murgai 1972
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-12435 Maj M.L.
Dutta 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-7600 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> A. Verma 1972
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">SL-145 Maj Kartar
Singh 1972<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-58254377798813866712016-01-16T07:32:00.002-08:002016-01-16T07:32:48.597-08:00APPENDIX 2 ROLL OF HONOUR<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">APPENDIX 2 </span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">ROLL OF HONOUR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> The names of
personnel of the Corps of Signals killed in action during the period 1947-72 are
listed in this appendix. It includes the names of personnel killed in various
wars fought with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
during United Nations peace keeping operations in foreign countries, and in
counter insurgency operations against Naga and Mizo hostiles. The list is based
on names obtained from the Adjutant’s General’s Branch in Army HQ and Signals
Records. The names of personnel who died from wounds or disease, or were
missing believed killed, have not been included. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Army No</span></u><span lang="EN-US"> <u>Rank</u> <u>Name</u> <u>Date of casualty</u> <u>Theatre/Place of <o:p></o:p></u></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 324.0pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">casualty <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">IEC-13364 2/Lt P.P. Deviya <st1:date day="16" month="2" w:st="on" year="1948">16 Feb 48</st1:date> J&K
Ops 1947-48<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -12.6pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6274623 Sigmn Mohammad Sadique <st1:date day="19" month="4" w:st="on" year="1960">19 Apr 60</st1:date> Naga
Hostilities (Nagaland) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6271745 Sigmn K.
Kasi 19 Apr 60 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6259803 L/Nk Chanchal Singh <st1:date day="16" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">16 Nov 61</st1:date> UN
Peace <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mission</st1:place></st1:city> <span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red;"> </span><span lang="EN-US">(<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-6366 Maj Ram Singh <st1:date day="20" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">20 Oct 62</st1:date> Indo
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
War 1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6273649 Sigmn A. Rahim Khan 20 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6275568 Sigmn Ram Dhan 20 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6256568 L/Nk C.A. Chandy 20 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6272031 Sigmn R. Dayananda 20 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Prakash<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6278044 Sigmn M.D. Salamuddin K. 20 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6269150 Sigmn Atiwal Singh 20 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6240845 LNK N. Siva Dass 21 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6268368 Sigmn Ram Singh 21 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6279151 Washerman C. Kannan 21
Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6276060 Sigmn Rathnam V. <st1:date day="21" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">21
Oct 62</st1:date> -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6274938 Nk K. Nallaiah 23 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6274701 Sigmn Mohan Reddy 27 Oct 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6265706 Sigmn Chandra
Sekhar Rai <st1:date day="31" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">31 Oct 62</st1:date> Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> War 1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6275696 Sigmn Bihan Kumar Saha 16 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6270981 Sigmn Balwant Singh 16 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6275184 Sigmn Daya Sindhoo 16 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Prasad<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6253914 L/Nk Sawinder
Singh 16 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6273177 Sigmn Chaman Lal Sharma 16 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6260741 Sigmn R.K. Sarkar 18 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6276589 Sigmn M. Venu <st1:date day="18" month="11" w:st="on" year="1962">18 Nov 62</st1:date> -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6228622 Hav Balwant Singh 18 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6263758 Sigmn Ram Raj Pandey 18 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6267614 Sigmn P.K. Sengupta 18 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6273429 Sigmn Rajpal Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6281937 Sigmn Kulwant Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6244759 Hav Bhagwan Dass 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-12546 2/Lt D.K. Chopra <st1:date day="19" month="11" w:st="on" year="1962">19 Nov 62</st1:date> -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6267767 Sigmn Sheik Mauhlla 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6269336 Sigmn K.C. Patnaik 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6271899 Sigmn Awtar Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6273402 Sigmn Jeetmal Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6272772 Sigmn S. Aseer Vadam 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6242381 L/Nk T.K. Mohanan 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6631727 Sigmn S. Narayanan 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6241973 L/Nk Abdul Gafoor 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6235595 Nk Lalman Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6247935 L/Nk Chathunni 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6269475 Sigmn E.N. Karunakaran 19 Nov 62 Indo
China War 1962 Nair<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6276146 Sigmn Anna Saheb Dhange 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6250376 Nk Gurbaksh Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6262422 L/Nk Sher Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6271588 Sigmn Hausala Prasad 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Tiwari<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6279880 Sigmn Sham Rao Naik 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6280790 Sigmn P.N.R. Nair 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6268029 Sigmn Swarn Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6278904 Sigmn Munishwar Chand 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6262106 Sigmn Bichitra Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6277283 Sigmn Mohan Singh 19 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6277285 Sigmn V.V. Nagarajan 21 Nov 62 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-8468 Capt K.S. Mann 21 Nov 62 -do- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">EC-55324 2/Lt M.S. Bakshi <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">15 Aug 65</st1:date> Indo
Pak War 1965 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6294982 Sigmn Baba Saheb Bhosle 15 Aug 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6299522 Sigmn Basro Ram 21 Aug 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6284779 Sigmn Babu Ram 25 Aug 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6278549 Sigmn Raja Ram Gupta 07 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6275328 L/Nk
T.V. Pandurangan 07 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"><br />
6256944 Nk Budhi Ballabh 08
Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Gahrola<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6617367 Sigmn Kiran Singh 09 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">8283966 Sigmn Inder Singh Manhas 09 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6298642 Sigmn Josudan Khosla 09 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6291366 Sigmn Anand 09 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6242850 L/Nk Raja Gopal 09 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6284450 Sigmn Ramanandan Singh <st1:date day="11" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">11 Sep 65</st1:date> Indo
Pak War 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6247478 Sigmn Faqir Chand 11 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6257121 Sigmn Surat Ram 11 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6255465 Nk Namadarapu 12 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Venkanna<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6268183 Nk Sarvdeo Upadhyay 13 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6290136 Sigmn Santiagu Ambrose <st1:date day="13" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">13 Sep 65</st1:date> -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6298528 Sigmn Rup Ram Gogoi 14 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-8685 Maj Yashwant Govind 15 Sep 65 -do- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Gore<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6263479 Nk Somnath 15 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6237987 Sigmn Lekh Raj 15 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6250393 Hav Shiv Singh 15 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6266777 L/Hav Shri Ram Tiwari 18 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6250932 L/Hav Narinder Singh 18 Sep 65 -do- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6279985 Sigmn Udaibhan Singh 20 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Yadav<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6257956 L/Hav Ram Mehar 20 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6275245 Sigmn Prem Prakash Dubey 21 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">JC-12785 Sub Hari Singh 21 Sep 65 -do- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6268075 Nk Edward Lakra 21 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6320155 Sigmn Surjit Singh Paul <st1:date day="21" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">21 Sep 65</st1:date> -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6255942 Sigmn R. Kanda Swamy 21 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6289855 Sigmn Ram Chandra Shedge 22 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6288076 Sigmn Hukam Singh 22 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6322958 Sigmn Pratap Chand 30 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6281784 Sigmn Mahendra
Singh 30 Sep 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Tyagi<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6284886 Sigmn Chaman Lal 02 Oct 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6270122 Sigmn C. Rajamanickam <st1:date day="10" month="10" w:st="on" year="1965">10 Oct 65</st1:date> Indo
Pak War 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6279809 Sigmn Girdhari Singh 15 Oct 65 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6320625 Sigmn Gurubachan Singh 15 Nov 65 -do- Jandu<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -30.6pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6279747 Nk Rai Singh Bisht <st1:date day="1" month="5" w:st="on" year="1966">01 May 66</st1:date> Mizo
Hostilities (Mizo Hills)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">6310939 Rect Tual
Khankapsim 12 May 66 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6285960 L/Nk Dattatray
Patil <st1:date day="12" month="7" w:st="on" year="1967">12 Jul 67</st1:date> UNAVEM (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">6290604 Sigmn Bhim
Bahadur Rana 12 Jul 67 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6289337 Sigmn Bharat Hagawane 12 Jul 67 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6297158 Hav Mangal Chand 17 Nov 67 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">14202942 Sigmn Thui Ram Sharma <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">04 Dec 71</st1:date> Indo
Pak War 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6277000 Messwaiter Soma Nath Behera 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6280574 Nk Ram Nath 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6286126 L/Nk
Bhagrath Singh 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6287937 Barber Sita
Ram 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6289097 L/Nk
Bhagwan Singh 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6323456 Sigmn R.K.R. Kurup 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6293975 Sweeper<span style="color: red;"> </span>Sarwan <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">04 Dec 71</st1:date> -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6309885 Sigmn Dhanpat Singh 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6296458 Nk Vishwanath Singh 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6304862 Sigmn K.P. Ramachandran 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Pillai<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6302503 Sigmn Raj Kanwar 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6641981 Nk Surat Singh 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6325491 Sigmn Dumdappakala 04 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US"> Sannava<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6290332 Nk Shadevan Kotayi 05 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6316589 Sigmn Ram Janam Singh 05 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6274056 Nk K. Subbian <st1:date day="5" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">05 Dec 71</st1:date> Indo
Pak War 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6305034 Sigmn Dharam Singh 05 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6284587 L/Nk Perumal Varadan 05 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6300432 Sigmn Balakrishna Mahadik 06 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6315955 Sigmn Surya Narain Shukla 06 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6300166 L/Nk Deepa Ram 07 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">14208422 Sigmn Aram Singh Gurjar 11 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">14279410 Sigmn Jit
Singh 11
Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">14208286 Sigmn Nachimuthu
Annavi 11 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6325158 Sigmn Kalia 11 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">14200403 Sigmn Murat Singh 13 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6279329 Nk Inder Singh 17 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6273786 Hav Roshan Lal 17 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6287023 L/Nk
B.D. Rao 17 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6306307 Sigmn Bhup Singh 17 Dec 71 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">6326353 Sigmn Munnu Lal 05 Feb 72 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">IC-12731 Maj M.S.G. Rao 19 Aug 72 -do-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Summary<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span lang="EN-US">1962
Ops 51<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span lang="EN-US">1965
Ops 41<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span lang="EN-US">1971
Ops 31<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span lang="EN-US">Other 12<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span lang="EN-US">_______________<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Total 135<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-70413728090957657052016-01-16T07:31:00.001-08:002016-01-16T07:31:33.999-08:00APPENDIX 1 UNIT HISTORIES<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>APPENDIX 1 <o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>UNIT HISTORIES<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Brief histories of signal units that existed at any time between <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1947">15 August 1947</st1:date> and <st1:date day="31" month="12" w:st="on" year="1972">31 December 1972</st1:date> are
recorded in this Appendix. The title shown in bold type was the designation of
the unit on <st1:date day="31" month="12" w:st="on" year="1972">31 December 1972</st1:date>,
or the last title, if disbanded earlier. The sub-titles below show the changes
in title, starting from the earliest. Changes in designation effected due to
change in style e.g. replacement of ‘signals’ by ‘signal regiment’ or dropping
of the word ‘Indian’ after Independence have been mentioned in the text but not
in the sub titles. However, changes in designation that involved alterations in
the establishment or role such as ‘infantry’ to ‘mountain’ or vice versa have
been indicated. Due to constraints of space, only major units are included in
the appendix, though an attempt has been made to indicate as many independent
companies as possible, about which information was available. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
The names of commanding officers have been mentioned in chronological order,
indicating the year of assumption of command. However, where units were formed
from smaller entities such as sections or companies, the names of their
officers commanding have been omitted. Due to constraints of space, changes in
designation of units mentioned in the sub titles and text have not been
repeated in the record of names of commanding officers. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
As mentioned in the Preface, there are gaps in the histories of some
units, especially those that had short life spans or were amalgamated with other
units. In such cases, details such as location and names of commanding officers
have been taken from war diaries of other units or formation headquarters.
However, the gaps remain, especially in the names of the commanding
officers. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b><u>Divisional
Signals</u> <u>Page</u><o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
1 Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
2 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
3 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
4 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
5 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
6 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
7 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
8 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
9 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
10 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
11 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
12 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
14 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
15 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
16 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
17 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
19 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
20 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
23 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
25 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
26 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
27 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
36 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
39 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
54 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
57 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b><u>Corps Signals<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
I Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
II Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
IV Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
XI Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
XV Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
XVI Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
XXXIII Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b><u>Command
and Army HQ Signals<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Western Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Eastern Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Southern Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Northern Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Central Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Southern Command <st1:place w:st="on">Mobile</st1:place>
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Special Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
1 Army HQ Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
2 Army HQ Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b><u>Communication
Zone Signals<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘H’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘J’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘L’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘M’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘N’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘O’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘P’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘Q’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘S’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘T’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘V’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘Y’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
‘Z’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b><u>Air
Formation/Air Support Signals</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
1 Air Formation Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
2 Air Formation Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
3 Air Formation Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
4 Air Formation Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
1 Air Support Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
2 Air Support Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
3 Air Support Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
4 Indep Air Support Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
5 Indep Air Support Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
6 Indep Air Support Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b><u>Area/Para
Signal Companies <o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Madhya Pradesh, <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place>
and Orissa Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Delhi Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Bihar & Orissa Indep Sub Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Bengal Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Tamil Nadu, Mysore & Kerala Area Indep
Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Maharastra and Gujarat Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
31 Communication Zone Sub Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
Andhra (independent) Sub Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
UP Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b>Parachute
Brigade Signal Companies<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
50 Independent Parachute Brigade Signal
Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
51 Independent Parachute Brigade Signal
Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b><u>Radio
Monitoring Companies<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
1 Radio Monitoring Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
2 Radio Monitoring Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
3 Radio Monitoring Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
4 Radio Monitoring Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
5 Radio Monitoring Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>1 ARMOURED DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
At the time of Partition, 1 Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment was located
at Secunderabad. In November 1947, elements from the unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jammu</st1:city>, where it provided
communications to the JAK Force. Towards the end of 1947, the regiment moved
with its parent formation to <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city>.
In early 1948, it moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Poona</st1:city>,
from where it moved to take part in Operation ‘Polo’ in <st1:city w:st="on">Hyderabad</st1:city> in September 1948. It remained at
Secunderabad for a little over a year before moving to <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city> and then to <st1:city w:st="on">Meerut</st1:city>. From July 1951 to October 1954 it was
deployed in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>, from where it moved again
to <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city>. It participated in Operation ‘Ablaze’ in April
1965 and Operation ‘Riddle’ in October 1965 in the Punjab Sector. In March
1966, the regiment moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:city>
and then to Ambala in February 1967. It returned to <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city> in February 1970. The unit took pat in
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ and was deployed in the Ganganagar sector, from October
to December 1971. After the war, it returned to Ambala. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 60.0pt; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: list 60.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -24.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1947<!--[endif]--> Lieutenant
Colonel Apar Singh, M.B.E. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo6; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1947<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel Jaswant Singh<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo6; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1948<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Gairola<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo7; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1951<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel R.Z. Kabraji<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo7; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1952<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel K.D. Bhasin<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo8; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1955<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel V. Mehta<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l18 level1 lfo9; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1959<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel Ajit Singh, M.B.E.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 60.0pt; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo10; tab-stops: list 60.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -24.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1961<!--[endif]--> Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Batra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1964<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]--> Lieutenant Colonel K. Balaram<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo11; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1965<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel K.F.D. Lima<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 121.5pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo12; tab-stops: list 103.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -85.5pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1968<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]--> Lieutenant Colonel E.N. Ramadoss, S.M.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 121.5pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo12; tab-stops: list 103.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -85.5pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1969<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]--> Lieutenant Colonel B.L. Kapoor<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel S.C. Khurana<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>2 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
2 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
2 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised on <st1:date day="20" month="11" w:st="on" year="1962">20 November 1962</st1:date> and was located at
Kharjan. Thereafter, on <st1:date day="4" month="5" w:st="on" year="1964">4 May
1964</st1:date> it was reorganized as 2 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. The
unit moved to its permanent location at Dinjan on <st1:date day="6" month="1" w:st="on" year="1966">6 January 1966</st1:date>. During the 1971 war, elements of
the regiment moved to assist 101 Communication Zone Area for operations in the
Kamalpur-Mymensingh sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Deol<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel R. Narasimhan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel P.D. Sawhney<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel N. Ray<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Mathur<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1971 Major J.S. Dhillon<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel B.N. Sharma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>3 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
3 Himalayan Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
3 Himalayan Divisional Signal Regiment was raised on <st1:date day="26" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">26 October 1962</st1:date> at Udhampur.
Immediately thereafter, it moved to Leh. It participated in the 1962 war
against <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>
in the Ladakh sector. It was redesignated as 3 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment on <st1:date day="15" month="1" w:st="on" year="1963">15 January 1963</st1:date>.
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel Harjit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel Mahindar
Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Bhola<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel R.R. Chatterji<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel P.R.
Vishwanathan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel B.K. Bhatia<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>4 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b>7 Indian Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b>4 Indian Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b> 4
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
At the time of Partition, 7 Indian Divisional Signal Regiment was at <st1:city w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:city>. The unit
changed places and designations with 4 Indian Divisional Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:city> soon after <st1:city w:st="on">Independence</st1:city>. It was
subsequently renamed as 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. The unit moved
to the NEFA region in November 1959. It participated in the 1962 operations
against the Chinese. It was reorganized as 4 Mountain Divisional Signal
Regiment on <st1:date day="7" month="2" w:st="on" year="1963">7 February 1963</st1:date>.
On <st1:date day="12" month="2" w:st="on" year="1963">12 February 1963</st1:date>,
the regiment moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:city>.
It participated in the 1965 Indo- Pak war in the Khem Karan sector. In February
1970, the regiment moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:city>
and then to Panagarh in September 1971 for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. After the operations, it moved to Bhadreshwar
in <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place> in February 1972. In April
1972, the unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 54.0pt; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1947<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]--> Lieutenant Colonel R.N. Batra,
O.B.E.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 60.0pt; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 60.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -24.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1947<!--[endif]--> Lieutenant Colonel M.N. Batra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 60.0pt; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 60.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -24.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1948<!--[endif]--> Lieutenant Colonel R.K. Vats<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1950 Lieutenant Colonel M.B.K. Nair<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1952 Lieutenant Colonel S.R. Khurana<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1954 Lieutenant Colonel D.C. Barnett<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1956 Lieutenant Colonel K.D. Verma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1957 Lieutenant Colonel N.S. Mathur<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1960 Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Tewari<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel G.S. Sodhi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b> </b>1965 Lieutenant
Colonel R.C. Rawat<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel R.P. Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Sethi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel S. Sable<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel Hardayal
Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>5 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
5 Indian Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
5 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
At the time of Partition, 5 Indian Divisional Signal Regiment was at <st1:city w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:city>. In December 1948
the unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jammu</st1:city>
to provide communications to the newly raised HQ J&K Corps. After a few
months the unit returned to <st1:city w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:city>
but later moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:city>
in December 1949. In March 1950 the unit moved to Hissar. It was renamed 5 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment in 1951. <span style="color: red;">During 1952-54 the unit was located at
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city></span>
from where it moved to Ferozepore in early 1955. During the Sino Indian
conflict in 1962 the unit moved to Misamari. In 1963, it was reorganised as 5 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment. The regiment moved to Bomdila in February 1964 and then
to Tenga in June 1964. This regiment has the honour of being the oldest Signals
unit in the Indian Army. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1947 Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Iyappa,
M.B.E.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1948 Lieutenant Colonel D.C. Saker<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1950 Lieutenant Colonel A. Brockmyatt<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1951 Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Kakar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1954 Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Antia<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1957 Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Panwar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1959 Lieutenant Colonel R.S. Tiwana<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Kler<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel K.F. Thomas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1965
Lieutenant Colonel K.D.
Bhargava<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel R.K. Gupte<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant Colonel H.B.S. Grewal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel D.B. Dutta<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel S.P.
Choudhary<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>6 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Indian Contingent Signal
Regiment ONUC <st1:country-region w:st="on">Congo</st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
The regimental headquarters and
third company of the Indian Contingent
Signal Regiment ONUC Congo was raised in April 1961 at <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> before moving to <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>
in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Congo</st1:country-region>.
On its return to <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> in April
1963 most of the unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Bareilly</st1:city>
to provide communications to the newly raised 6 Mountain Division. On <st1:date day="20" month="4" w:st="on" year="1963">20 April 1963</st1:date>, the unit was
re-designated as 6 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. During the 1965
Indo-Pak war, the regiment was deployed in the Sialkot Sector and took part in
the battle of Chawinda. During Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ in 1971 the unit was
located at Binaguri in the Eastern Theatre under HQ XXXIII Corps. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b> <o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1961 <b> </b>Lieutenant Colonel K.D. Bhasin<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel M.S.K. Moorthy<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Unni<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1967
Lieutenant Colonel D.K. Banerjee<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel P.L. Kohli<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel Yatindra
Pratap<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>7 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
7 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
7 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was
raised on <st1:date day="1" month="7" w:st="on" year="1963">1 July 1963</st1:date>
at Ferozepore. It was reorganised as 7 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="4" month="5" w:st="on" year="1964">4 May 1964</st1:date>. It participated
in the Indo-Pak War of 1965 in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place> sector. During the Indo-Pak
War of 1971 it was deployed in the Hussainiwala sector in the Western Theatre. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b> <o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Barooah<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Brar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel L.
Mascarenhas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel R.S. Trehan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>8 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
8 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was
raised on <st1:date day="1" month="9" w:st="on" year="1963">1 September 1963</st1:date>
at <st1:city w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:city>. It moved
to Kohima in May 1964 and then to Zakhama in May 1967. It participated in
Indo-Pak War in 1971 in the Eastern Theatre and was deployed in the Dharmanagar
- Maulvi Bazar - Sylhet sector. After
the surrender of the Pakistani Army, the regiment returned to Zakhama on <st1:date day="29" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">29 December 1971</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b> </b>1963 Lieutenant
Colonel P.G. Naidu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel K.J. Shahaney<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Bhatia<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968
Lieutenant Colonel B.P.
Upasani<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel Kalyan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel N.B.
Phansalkar<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>9 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
9 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
9 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was
raised on <st1:date day="1" month="12" w:st="on" year="1963">1 December 1963</st1:date>
at <st1:city w:st="on">Agra</st1:city> and
then moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:city>.
During the Indo-Pak War of 1965 the unit was deployed in <st1:place w:st="on">West
Bengal</st1:place> on the <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>
border. It was reorganized as 9 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="19" month="12" w:st="on" year="1969">19 December 1969</st1:date>. During
the Indo-Pak War of 1971 the unit took part in the battles of Jessore and <st1:city w:st="on">Khulna</st1:city> in the Eastern
Theatre. The regiment moved back to <st1:city w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:city>
on <st1:date day="23" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">23 December 1971</st1:date>.
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1964 Lieutenant Colonel G.S. Sidhu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel K.
Gowrishankar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel J.B. Bartake<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1968 Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Sibal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b> </b>1970<b> </b>Lieutenant Colonel K. Dhawan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>10 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
11 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
11 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was
raised at Yol in February 1965. It was deployed in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
in May 1965 during Operation ‘Ablaze’ after which it joined its parent
formation (10 Infantry Division) in <st1:city w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:city>
in July 1965. During Operation ‘Riddle’ in 1965 the unit was deployed in Akhnur
from September 1965 onwards. After the war the unit moved to Pathankot. It was
subsequently reorganised from 11
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment to 10 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
on <st1:date day="28" month="2" w:st="on" year="1967">28 February 1967</st1:date>. During the Indo-Pak war of 1971 the unit was
again deployed in Akhnur. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel Y.S. Awasthi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel D.C. Smith<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel Harcharan
Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel V.
Balachandran<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>11 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
10 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
10 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:city> on <st1:date day="30" month="5" w:st="on" year="1964">30 May 1964</st1:date>. It moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:city> in December 1964 and then to Khavda
in June 1965. On <st1:date day="1" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">1 August
1965</st1:date> it was reorganised as 11 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
and moved to Ahmedabad. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war the unit took part in
Operation ‘Kabadi’ in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>
and in Operation ‘Riddle’ in the Rajasthan sector. During the Indo-Pak war of
1971 the unit was deployed in the Rajasthan sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1964 Lieutenant Colonel C. Soni<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel Jaswinder
Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel B.N. Satyamurti<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel Satish
Chandra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>12 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OLE_LINK2"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OLE_LINK1">Rajasthan
Sector </a>Signal
Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Rajasthan Sector Signal Regiment was raised at on <st1:date day="26" month="2" w:st="on" year="1966">26 February 1966</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:city>. It was redesignated as 12 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="13" month="11" w:st="on" year="1966">13
November 1966</st1:date>. It
participated in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 in the Rajasthan sector.<b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Kumar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1968 Lieutenant Colonel Umrao Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Jog<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Khanna<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>14 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
14 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at Saugor on <st1:date day="31" month="3" w:st="on" year="1966">31 March 1966</st1:date>. While it was
still under raising, the regiment participated in the Indo-Pak war in 1965 in
the <st1:city w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:city>
sector. On its return from the operations it moved to Dehradun. In 1971, it participated in the Indo-Pak war
in the Fazilka Sector. <b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Mousinho<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Sidhu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Coutts<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel S. Sable<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>15 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
15 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at Dehradun on <st1:date day="27" month="5" w:st="on" year="1964">27 May 1964</st1:date>. It
participated in the Indo Pak war of 1965 in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>
sector. After the war, it moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:city>. During the 1971 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:country-region> the
unit was located in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and took part in
the battle of Dera Baba Nanak. <b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1964 Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Norton<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel Daulat Ram<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1968 Lieutenant Colonel S.C. Puri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel S. Mohan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel Y. Deva <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>16 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Foxtrot Sector
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
Foxtrot Sector Signal Regiment was
raised at Ambala on <st1:date day="15" month="4" w:st="on" year="1971">15 April
1971</st1:date>. It participated in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 and was located
at Abohar. It was re-designated as 16 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="15" month="7" w:st="on" year="1972">15 July 1972</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel B.K. Chopra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>17 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT</u><o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
17 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
17 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised on <st1:date day="1" month="2" w:st="on" year="1960">1 February 1960</st1:date> at Ambala. It
participated in the <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> operations in 1961. During
the Sino-Indian conflict in October 1962 the unit moved to Binaguri. In
December 1963, it changed places with 20 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
and moved to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:country-region>.
On <st1:date day="1" month="5" w:st="on" year="1964">1 May 1964</st1:date>, it
was reorganised as 17 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l18 level1 lfo9; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1960<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel D. Dwarkadas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l18 level1 lfo9; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1961<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Lieutenant
Colonel S.V.S. Juneja<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel V.C. Khanna<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel P.K. Roy Chowdhury<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel L. Sharma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel P.M. Wad<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel A.K. Minocha<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>19 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
6 L
of C Signal Regiment (Modified)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<st1:city w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:city> Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
6 L of C Signal Regiment (Modified) was formed from 2 Company of Eastern
Command Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="1" month="3" w:st="on" year="1948">1
March 1948</st1:date> at Pathankot. The regiment was reorganised as Srinagar Divisional
Signal Regiment in May 1948 and moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:city>.
It was redesignated as 19 Divisional Signal Regiment in December 1948. It
participated in the Jammu & Kashmir operations in 1948-49. In April 1963
the unit moved to Baramulla. The regiment participated in the 1965 and 1971
Indo-Pak wars in Jammu & Kashmir. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1948 Lieutenant
Colonel Hazara Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1948 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Chowdhury<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1950 Lieutenant
Colonel L.F. Butler<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1951 Lieutenant
Colonel T. Barreto<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1951 Lieutenant
Colonel P.S. Gill<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1953 Lieutenant
Colonel M.B.K. Nair<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1955 Lieutenant
Colonel R.N.R. Sawhney<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1958 Lieutenant
Colonel J.V. Pinto<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1962 Lieutenant
Colonel K.D. Bhasin<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Gill <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel S.L. Juneja<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel K.K. Dogra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Oberoi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel D.K. Vaidya<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>20 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
20 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
20 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised on <st1:date day="8" month="5" w:st="on" year="1950">8 May 1950</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:city>. It moved to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:country-region> in
October 1962 at the outbreak of the war with <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>. On <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1963">15 December 1963</st1:date>, it moved to Binaguri.
It was reorganized as 20 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="16" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">16 September 1965</st1:date>. It
participated in the Indo- Pak war in 1971 in the Eastern Theatre and was
deployed in the Bogra sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1950 Lieutenant
Colonel Lachhman Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1952 Lieutenant
Colonel T. Barreto<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1954 Lieutenant
Colonel Pran Nath<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1956 Lieutenant
Colonel A.K. Kapur<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1958 Lieutenant Colonel T. Sarin<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1960 Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Kalra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Sehgal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Andhare<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel K.K.
Poonawala<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1968 Lieutenant Colonel J. Kumar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel S.C. Sharma <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel N.B. Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>23 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
GOC Nagaland
Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
23 Infantry Divisional Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
23
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
GOC Nagaland Signal Company was
raised on <st1:date day="10" month="4" w:st="on" year="1958">10 April 1958</st1:date>
in Kohima. It was reorganized as 23 Infantry Divisional Signal Company in 1959
under the DCSO, 23 Infantry Division. It was redesignated as 23 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment in 1961. The regiment was involved in counter insurgency
operations in Nagaland till December 1962. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, it
moved along with the division to <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> but
could not take part in the operations due to cessation of hostilities. In 1965,
it was reorganised as 23 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. It moved to
Rangiya in April 1966. It participated in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 in the
Comilla sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1958 Major Balbir Singh <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b> </b>1961 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Deol<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel DAJ Beeby<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel S. Ghosh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel S.B. Raghavan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Bhalla<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel P.S. Talwar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>25 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
‘V’ Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
25
Infantry Divisional Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘V’ Signal Company was raised in Naushera on <st1:date day="1" month="6" w:st="on" year="1949">1 June 1949</st1:date>. While still under raising, the company
participated in the J & K Operations of 1948. It was re-designated as 25
Infantry Divisional Signal Company on <st1:date day="23" month="1" w:st="on" year="1950">23 January 1950</st1:date>. It was reorganised as 25 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="1" month="8" w:st="on" year="1950">1
August 1950</st1:date> at Rajauri. It
participated in the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 in the J & K sector.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1949 Major K.K. Tewari<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1950 Lieutenant
Colonel Shiv Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1951 Lieutenant
Colonel B.M. Chakarvarty<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1954 Lieutenant
Colonel Hazara Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1956 Lieutenant
Colonel A. Mehra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1956 Lieutenant
Colonel R.P. Sapra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1959 Lieutenant
Colonel N.J.S. Sethi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1962 Lieutenant
Colonel A. Brock Myatt<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel Surjit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel C.S. Joshi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel Harjit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Grover<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel T.K. Rao<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>26 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
2 Airborne Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
JAK
Force Signals<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<st1:city w:st="on">Jammu</st1:city> Divisional Signal
Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
26
(2 AB) Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
At the time of <st1:city w:st="on">Independence</st1:city>,
2 Airborne Divisional Signal Regiment was located in <st1:city w:st="on">Quetta</st1:city>. In August 1947 it moved to Dehradun and then
to Pathankot. In March 1948 it moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jammu</st1:city>
and was re-designated as JAK Force Signals. In May 1948 it was renamed Jammu
Divisional Signal Regiment. In December
1948, it was re-designated 26 (2 AB) Divisional Signal Regiment. It was
re-designated as 26 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment in July 1951. The
regiment participated in the 1965 and 1971 operations against <st1:country-region w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:country-region> in the
Jammu & Kashmir sector.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1947 Lieutenant Colonel R.N. Sen<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1948 Lieutenant Colonel H.K. Bhagwat<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1949 Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Banerjee<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1950
Lieutenant Colonel V.D.
Deshpande<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1952 Lieutenant Colonel G.H. Simoes<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1953 Lieutenant Colonel T.K. Mukerji<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1954
Lieutenant Colonel J.N.
Shahani<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1956 Lieutenant Colonel G.L.
Bhattacharya<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1958 Lieutenant Colonel A.M. David<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1960 Lieutenant Colonel H.C.
Hefferman<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Nanda<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Mukherji<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel M.C. Rawat<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel K.P.G. Kurup<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel Y.P. Gupta<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>27 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
27 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
27 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:city> on <st1:date day="21" month="4" w:st="on" year="1956">21 April 1956</st1:date>. During the 1962 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region> it was
located in Bagrakot. In 1964 it moved to
Kalimpong. It was reorganised as 27 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="1" month="5" w:st="on" year="1964">1 May 1964</st1:date>. During the Indo
Pak war in 1971 the unit moved to <st1:place w:st="on">North Bengal</st1:place>
to take over static communication commitments of units that were taking part in
the operations. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1957 Lieutenant
Colonel Hazara Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1959 Lieutenant
Colonel Y.R. Puri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1961 Lieutenant
Colonel K.D. Verma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel D. Asirvadam<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel Satish Chandra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel S.K. Bahl<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel I.M. Chhabra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel K.K. Kapur<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>36 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
36 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
36 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at Rangiya on <st1:date day="19" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">19 September 1965</st1:date>. In March 1966, it was reorganized as 36
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. In April 1966, it moved to Saugor. During
the Indo Pak war in 1971 the unit was deployed in the Shakargarh sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel A.S. Apte<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel Chanan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel W. David<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel H. Bahadur<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>39 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
39 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city> on <st1:date day="14" month="1" w:st="on" year="1966">14 January 1966</st1:date>. It moved to Yol in February 1970.
The regiment participated in the Indo Pak war in <st1:metricconverter productid="1971 in" w:st="on">1971 in</st1:metricconverter> the <st1:city w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:city> sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel J.R. Fallerio<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel S.K. Sahni<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel T.S. Anand<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel S.G. Sathe<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>54 INFANTRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
54 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at Secunderabad on <st1:date day="26" month="9" w:st="on" year="1967">26 September 1967</st1:date>. It
participated in the Indo Pak war of 1971 in the <st1:city w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:city> sector. <b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel R.S. Seekond<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel L. Herbert<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel S.P. Malik<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>57 MOUNTAIN DIVISIONAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
57 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at Masimpur on <st1:date day="10" month="12" w:st="on" year="1969">10 December 1969</st1:date>. It
participated in the Indo Pak war in 1971in the Eastern Theatre in the Ashuganj
sector, and the advance to <st1:city w:st="on">Dacca</st1:city>
after the crossing of the River Meghna. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel B.S. Chadha<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel C.S. Joshi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OLE_LINK4"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OLE_LINK3"><b><u>I CORPS SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></a></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
I
Corps Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Varanasi</st1:city>
on <st1:date day="15" month="2" w:st="on" year="1963">15 February 1963</st1:date>.
It moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city>
in May 1965, and again to <st1:city w:st="on">Mathura</st1:city>
in August 1965. It participated in the Indo Pak wars in 1965 and 1971 in the
Western Theatre. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel C.S. Randhawa<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel B.C. Banerjee<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Bhatia<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel R.K. Gupte<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel G.K. Bhagat<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u>II
CORPS SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
II Corps Signal Regiment was raised at Krishnanagar (<st1:place w:st="on">West
Bengal</st1:place>) and <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city>
in October 1971. The regiment participated in the Indo Pak war in 1971 in the Eastern
Theatre in the Jessore sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel S.C. Chaudhuri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u>IV
CORPS SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
The unit was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Agra</st1:city>
on <st1:date day="25" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">25 October 1962</st1:date>.
While still under raising, the regiment
participated in the Sino-Indian war in 1962. It played an important role in the
Indo Pak war in 1971 in the Eastern Theatre, where it was deployed in the
Sylhet – Maulvi Bazar Sector. After the war, it moved to Tezpur in February
1972. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING
OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1962 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Mehta<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel I. Jayakaran<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel V.S. Ramanand<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Dahiya<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel Har Krishan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel S.C. Dhodapkar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u>XI
CORPS SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
5 Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
5 Corps Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Agra</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on">Jammu</st1:city> in September 1949. It was re-designated
as XI Corps Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="15" month="3" w:st="on" year="1950">15
March 1950</st1:date> and moved to Ambala. The unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:city> in July 1951. The regiment
participated in the 1965 and 1971 Indo Pak wars and was located in the Punjab
sector.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1949 Lieutenant
Colonel Lachhman Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1950 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Banerjee<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1953 Lieutenant
Colonel I.D. Verma <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1954 Lieutenant
Colonel E.G. Pettengell<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1957 Lieutenant
Colonel Harchand Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1961 Lieutenant
Colonel Y.S. Desai<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel A.N. Mathur<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel D.B. Lahiri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel M.S. Dhillon<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel R.A. Rajan <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel S.K. Sahni<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel S.K. Bahl<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>XV CORPS SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
XV Corps Signal Regiment was raised at Srinagar on 20 June 1972. The
original XV Corps Signal Regiment which was located at Udhampur was renamed
Northern Command Signal Regiment.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel A.J.S. Gill<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>XVI CORPS SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Bravo Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Bravo Signal Regiment was raised on 10 October 1971 at Tezpur. The
regiment participated in the Indo Pak war in <st1:metricconverter productid="1971 in" w:st="on">1971 in</st1:metricconverter> the Eastern Theatre.
After the war it moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Jammu</st1:city>
to take provide communications to the newly raised XVI Corps. It was re-organized
as XVI Corps Signal Regiment in June 1972. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b> <o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b> </b>1971 Lieutenant Colonel B.G. Chakravarty <b><o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>XXXIII CORPS SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
The unit was raised at Agra on in May 1960 and moved to Shillong in
September 1960. It participated in the Indo China war in October 1962 and moved
to Bagdogra for the operations. The regiment moved to Sukhna in December 1967. It
took part in the 1971 Indo Pak war in the Eastern Theatre and was deployed in
the Bogra sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1960 Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Ohri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel Sri Ram <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel N.S. Chahal <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Sodhi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel N.T.C. Nambiar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel R. Mohan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel Harbhajan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>WESTERN COMMAND SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Bengal
and Assam Signal Regiment,<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Northern India Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Delhi
and East Punjab Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
At the time of Independence, the Bengal and Assam Signal Regiment located
at Calcutta was split in three parts. The regimental headquarters and No. 3
Company moved to Delhi to form Northern India Signal Regiment at Delhi on 22
August 1947. The unit was re-designated as Delhi and East Punjab Signal
Regiment on 15 December 1947. On 1 March 1948, the regiment was re-designated
as Western Command Signal Regiment. In 1955, the unit moved to Simla. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1947 Lieutenant
Colonel H. Chukerbuti<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Lieutenant
Colonel Hazara Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1950 Lieutenant
Colonel A.C. Kakar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1952 Lieutenant
Colonel B.S. Panwar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1953 Lieutenant
Colonel I.D. Verma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1954 Lieutenant
Colonel Phalwant Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1957 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Bedi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1959 Lieutenant
Colonel S. Prasad<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant
Colonel V.D. Deshpande<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel S. Tandon<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel Gopal Das<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel A. Kumar, V.S.M.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel M.K. Kotwal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>EASTERN COMMAND SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Eastern Command Signal Regiment was raised in Calcutta on 1 March 1963,
from the nucleus of 2 company of the erstwhile Eastern Command Signal Regiment,
which had been renamed as Central Command Signal Regiment and moved from Ranchi
to Lucknow in 1955. The unit participated in the 1971 Indo Pak war in the
Eastern Theatre. <b><o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel J. Mayadas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel P.S. Gill<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel K.L. Suri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel K.D. Bhargava<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel K. Gowrishankar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel A. Verma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>SOUTHERN COMMAND SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Southern Command Signal Regiment was located at Poona at the time of
Independence. Elements of the unit participated in Goa operations in 1961 and
the Indo Pak war in 1965. During the 1971 Indo Pak war the unit moved to
Jodhpur for a short period. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1947 Lieutenant
Colonel P.N. Luthra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Gairola<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Lieutenant
Colonel Pran Nath<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1950 Lieutenant
Colonel Phalwant Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1952 Lieutenant
Colonel Ajit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1954 Lieutenant
Colonel Shiv Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1956 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Garewal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1959 Lieutenant
Colonel A.S. Mann<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Sidhu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel E. Fonseca<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel R.M. Rajan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel G.Y. Sowani<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel Umrao Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>NORTHERN COMMAND SIGNAL REGIMENT</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
XV Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
XV Corps Signal Regiment was raised on 1 November 1964 at Udhampur. It
participated in the 1965 and 1971 Indo Pak wars in the J & K sector. On the
raising of HQ Northern Command in 1972, the unit was re-designated as Northern
Command Signal Regiment on 15 June 1972. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Dhaliwal <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel B.S. Paintal <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Sundaram<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel G.A. Newton <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>CENTRAL COMMAND SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Eastern Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
At the time of Independence, Eastern Command Signal Regiment was located
at Ranchi. On the move of HQ Eastern Command to Lucknow in February 1955, the
unit also moved to Lucknow. The regiment was re-designated as Central Command
Signal Regiment on 1 May 1963. At the same time, a new Eastern Command Signal
Regiment was raised at Calcutta. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1947 Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Chowdhary<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Lieutenant
Colonel Prem Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1949 Lieutenant
Colonel Karam Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1954 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Banerjee<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1956 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Chowdhary<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1959 Lieutenant
Colonel Hazara Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1960 Lieutenant
Colonel B. Seshamani<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel S.V.S. Juneja<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel H.B.S. Grewal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel R.K. Date<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel K.G. Gangadharan <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel A. Basu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel S.L. Mehrotra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>SOUTHERN COMMAND MOBILE SIGNAL REGIMENT</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Southern Command Mobile Signal Regiment was raised on
<st1:date day="9" month="6" w:st="on" year="1972">9 June 1972</st1:date> at
Alwar. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant Colonel R.S. Anand<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>SPECIAL SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Signals Trial and
Demonstration Unit<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Signals Trial
and Demonstration Unit was raised in Delhi in 1954. Its role was to
investigate defects in signal equipment and to suggest appropriate
modifications. It was reorganised as Special Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="1" month="12" w:st="on" year="1963">1 December 1963</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
1961 Major
R.C. Singh <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Major E.N. Ramadoss<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel N.T.C. Nambiar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Gill<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lieutenant Colonel</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">S.C.</st1:state></st1:place>
Chaudhuri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel R.S. Lakhanpal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>1 ARMY HQ SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
GHQ Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
GHQ (Indian) Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Army
HQ Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
On 15 August 1947, GHQ Signal Regiment at Delhi was re-designated as GHQ
(Indian) Signal Regiment, to differentiate it from the GHQ (British) Signal
Regiment that was raised to look after the communication needs of the Supreme
Commander’s Headquarters. It was redesignated as Army HQ Signal Regiment on 1
January 1948 and as 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment on 8 September 1965, after the
raising of the second signal regiment for Army HQ.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1947 Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Bhatia <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Lieutenant
Colonel P.N. Luthra <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Lieutenant Colonel Jaswant Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1949 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Antia<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1951 Lieutenant
Colonel Hari Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1951 Lieutenant
Colonel L.F. Butler<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1952 Lieutenant
Colonel R.N. Sen<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1955 Lieutenant
Colonel H.K. Bhagwat<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1956 Lieutenant
Colonel H.S. Bains, VrC<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1956 Lieutenant
Colonel K.N. Talwar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1960 Lieutenant
Colonel C.U.K. Nair<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel Hari Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel V.S. Ramanand<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel S.L. Juneja <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel K.K.K. Seth<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel S.B. Raghavan <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel B.P. Murgai <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>2 ARMY HQ SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
2 Army HQ Signal Regiment was raised on 10 September 1965 in New Delhi.
It was co-located with 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment in Signals Enclave. On 20
November 1972 the unit moved to Meerut, where the transmitter station had moved
a year earlier from Lodhi Road in Delhi. One company of the unit remained in
Delhi, with the receiver station on the Ridge. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel N.A. Patil<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Major
Prem Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel K. Balasubramaniam<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel S. Ambady<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘H’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘H’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:city>. It participated in the Indo Pak war
of 1971 in the Western Theatre. The unit moved to Jaipur on 3 March 1972. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Maini <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘J’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
‘U’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘U’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on 22 November 1962 at Varanasi.
It was re-designated as ‘J’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment on 25 June 1964
and moved to Kargil. In June 1969, it moved to Leh. The regiment participated
in the Indo Pak war in 1971 in the J & K sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel E. Fonseca<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel J.S. Nanda<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel G.B. Bhide<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel M.L. Khanna <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel P.N. Kapoor <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel B.B. Sarin<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel D.B. Dutta<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘L’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘L’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on 15 April 1964 at
Siliguri. The regiment moved to Lebong (Darjeeling) in 1969. It moved to Tezpur
in 1971 and participated in the Indo Pak War in the Eastern Theatre. After the
war, the unit moved to Bagdogra in 1972. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel Didar Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel K.T. Bopaya<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel Shanti Swarup<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel S.C. <st1:city w:st="on">Roy</st1:city><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘M’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘M’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on <st1:date day="8" month="4" w:st="on" year="1965">8 April 1965</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:city>.
The regiment moved to Gwalior in November 1966. During the Indo Pak war
of 1971, the regiment moved to Pathankot in October 1971.<b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel J. Gabriel<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel R.A. Bhola<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel M.S. Gurdial Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel K.M. Upadhyaya<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘N’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Nagaland Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Nagaland Signal Regiment was raised on 12 March 1963 at Agra. In October
1963, it was re-designated as ‘N’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment. The unit
moved to Jorhat in Assam in May 1964. It participated in the Indo Pak war of
1971 in the Eastern Theatre under HQ IV Corps. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Row<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel S.S. Jha<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel Bhagwan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel B.K. Bhandari<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel D.S. Paode<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘O’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘O’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on 10 June 1964 at
Bareilly. On 5 October 1971, the regiment moved to Kausani to provide
communications on the UP- Tibet border. The unit returned to Bareilly in 1972.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1964 Lieutenant Colonel Y.R. Puri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel Dhani Ram<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel B.K. Bose<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel Sarjit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘P’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘P’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on 4 May 1965 at Alwar.
During the 1971 war the regiment was
located at Jodhpur. It was merged with ‘H’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment
in December 1971. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel H.P. Bhardwaj<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel J. Bagchi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘Q’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
The unit was raised on 5 December 1966 at Poona. It moved to Jodhpur and
participated in the Indo Pak war of 1971 in the Rajasthan sector. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel R.G. Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel N.C. Achia<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel Jaswant Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘S’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘S’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on 25 October 1962 at
Agra. It moved to Gauhati on 22 December 1962. The regiment participated in the
Indo Pak war in 1971and was deployed in the eastern Theatre. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Dhillon<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel A.B. Tawadey<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel Y.S. Awasthi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Barooah<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel Shiv Raj Kumar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘T’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘T’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on 26 December 1961 at
Agra. The regiment moved to Srinagar during the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962.
It also took part in the Indo Pak wars in 1965 and 1971 in the Western Theatre.
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1961 Lieutenant Colonel Harjit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant
Colonel Ajit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Viswanath<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel R.S. Wadhwa<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel B.S. Mangat<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel H.B. Swarup<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘V’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘V’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was raised on 22 November 1962 at Varanasi
and then moved to Tezpur in January 1963. During the Indo Pak war of 1971 the regiment
was located to Krishnanagar in the Eastern Theatre. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Dhamija<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel Balbir Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel S.A. Sawhney<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel M.L. Khanna<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel Baldev Arora<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘Y’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
‘Y’ L of C Signal
Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘Y’ L of C Signal Regiment was
raised at Agra on 1 December 1948. It moved to Jammu on 14 April 1949. The
regiment provided communications to HQ XV Corps at Udhampur during 1951. On 3
July 1954, the regiment was re-designated as Y Communication Zone Signal
Regiment. The regiment provided the nucleus for raising XV Corps Signal
Regiment in May 1964, and moved back to Jammu. The unit took part in the 1965 and
1971 Indo Pak wars in the Western Theatre. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1948 Lieutenant Colonel Phalwant
Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1950 Lieutenant Colonel Pran Nath<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1951 Lieutenant Colonel Hari Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1954 Lieutenant Colonel R.K. Vats<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1957 Lieutenant Colonel Karam Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1960 Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Bhide<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Dhaliwal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1964 Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Batra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel T.N.K. Nair<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel G.D. Kapoor<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1971 Lieutenant Colonel R.K. Verma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>‘Z’ COMMUNICATION ZONE SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
‘Z’ Communication Zone Signal
Regiment was raised on 27 November 1962 at Jullundur from ‘Z’ L of C Signal
Company. The regiment was located at Faridkot during the Indo Pak war of 1971. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Lieutenant
Colonel B.D. Bhardwaj<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel C.P. Kataria<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel N.S. Dwarkanath<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel P.K. Joglekar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel Y.R. Ratra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>1 AIR FORMATION SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
1
Air Formation Signal Regiment (Modified)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1 Air Formation Signal Regiment (Modified) was located at Delhi in
1947. The unit was reorganised as 1 Air
Formation Signal Regiment and took part in the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. It also participated in the Indo Pak war of
1971 in the Western Theatre. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1947 Major K.D. Bhasin<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Major
Lachhman Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Major
A.M. David<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1949 Major
S.L. Soni<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1951 Major
R.C. Bhandari<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1954 Major
Boor Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1958 Major
F.J. Mendies<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1961 Major
Dhian Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Major
R.B Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel D. Dwarkadas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant Colonel K.T. Bopaya<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel P.S. Jauhal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel S.K. Bahl<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel K.C. Sud<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>2 AIR FORMATION SIGNAL REGIMENT</u></b><b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
2 Air Formation Signal Regiment was raised on 17 October 1951 at Begumpet. It was deployed to meet the requirements of
communication of the Air Force during the P&T strike in 1957 and again in
1960. During the Indo Pak war of 1971 the unit moved <span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";">to Delhi Cantt in November 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1951 Major K.F.
Thomas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1952 Major D.
Freemantle<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1954 Major Hari Chand<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1955 Major C.R. Belletty<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1957 Major K.S. Row<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1959 Major D. Asirvadam<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1961 Major S.L.
Norton<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Major
V.C. Fernandes<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel A.K. Joshi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Lieutenant
Colonel A.S. Apte<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel Gurdial Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel H.P. Bhardwaj<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel K.F. Thomas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Lieutenant
Colonel A.L. Coutts<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>3 AIR FORMATION SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
3 Air Formation Signal Regiment was raised on 16 November 1962 at Delhi.
It moved to Gauhati on 11 August 1963.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1962 Major
M.L. Sahni<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel A.K. Joshi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant
Colonel Chanan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel Harcharan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant
Colonel S.C. <st1:city w:st="on">Roy</st1:city><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel R.B. Babulkar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>4 AIR FORMATION SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
4 Air Formation Signal Regiment was raised on 1 April 1965 at Delhi. It
was moved to Allahabad in 1967. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant
Colonel Mahindar Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant
Colonel S.P. Malik <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Lieutenant
Colonel Virendra Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>1 AIR SUPPORT SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
1 Air Support Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1 Air Support Signal Company was raised at New Delhi on 15 September
1948. 3 Air Support Signal Company was raised on 2 April 1963 in New Delhi. The
two companies were re-organized as 1 Air Support Signal Regiment on 15 April
1964 at New Delhi. The regiment participated in the Indo Pak war in 1965 and
was located to Ambala. The regiment moved to Jullundur during the Indo Pak war
in October 1971. It returned to Delhi on 19 March 1972. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b> </b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Major Lachhman Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1949 Major Didar Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1953 Major D.S. Bawa <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1955 Major V.C. Khanna<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1960 Major Parshan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1963 Lieutenant Colonel S.P.S. Bedi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant
Colonel C.S. Joshi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Lieutenant Colonel R.N.R. Sawhny<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel G.S. Sekhon<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Lieutenant Colonel A.K. Ghorai<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>2 AIR SUPPORT SIGNAL REGIMENT<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
2 Air Support Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
` 2 Air Support Signal Company was
raised in September 1961 at Calcutta. It
was re-designated as 2 Air Support Signal Regiment on 1 April 1965. The company
participated in the Goa Operations in 1961 and the Indo China war in 1962. It
also participated in the Indo Pak wars in 1965 and 1971 in the Eastern Theatre.
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b> </b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1961 Major Balbir Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Lieutenant Colonel K.S. Suri<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant Colonel S.A. Sawhney<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Dhamija<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u>3
AIR SUPPORT SIGNAL REGIMENT</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
3 Air Support Signal Regiment was raised on 9 June 1972 at
Udhampur. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>4 INDEP AIR SUPPORT SIGNAL COMPANY</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
4 Air Support Signal Company was raised on 22 November 1963 at Varanasi.
It moved to Lucknow on 25 February 1964. It was re-designated as 4 Independent Air
Support Signal Company on <st1:date day="29" month="7" w:st="on" year="1967">29
July 1967</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>5 INDEP AIR SUPPORT SIGNAL COMPANY</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
5 Independent Air Support Signal Company was raised
on <st1:date day="31" month="7" w:st="on" year="1967">31 July 1967</st1:date>
at <st1:city w:st="on">Poona</st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Major
C.M. Sagane<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Major
V. Khanna<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Major
J. Khullar<b><u> <o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>6 INDEP AIR SUPPORT SIGNAL COMPANY</u></b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
6 Independent Air Support Signal Company was raised on <st1:date day="31" month="7" w:st="on" year="1967">31 July 1967</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Mathura</st1:city>. It participated in the Indo Pak war
of 1971. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Major
J.N. Raina<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Lieutenant
Colonel V.P. Abbi <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><u>MADHYA PRADESH, <st1:place w:st="on">BIHAR</st1:place> AND ORISSA AREA SIGNAL COMPANY</u></b><b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Madhya Pradesh
Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Madhya Pradesh Area Signal Company was raised on <st1:date day="29" month="2" w:st="on" year="1964">29 February 1964</st1:date> at. It was re-organized
as Madhya Pradesh, <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> and Orissa Area
Signal Company during 1971. <b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>DELHI AREA SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Delhi
& Rajasthan Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Delhi Area Signal Company was raised in August 1957. In January 1958, it
was re-designated as Delhi & Rajasthan Area Signal Company. In April 1966, on
the separation of Rajasthan from the Area, it was reorganised and again
re-designated as Delhi Area Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1959 Captain G.S. Sukhija<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1960 Major
S.S. Jha<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1962 Captain
V.N. Prashar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1963 Captain
Jagdev Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1964-72 Not
known<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span><u><span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OLE_LINK5"><b><u>BIHAR & ORISSA INDEP SUB
AREA SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></a></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place>
and Orissa Independent Sub Area Signal Company was raised on <st1:date day="1" month="3" w:st="on" year="1964">1 March 1964</st1:date> at Danapur. <b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Major Vinod Kumar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965
Major J.P. Berry<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Major H.L. Diwan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Major V.R.K. Murty<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>BENGAL AREA SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
Bengal Area Signal Company was raised on <st1:date day="10" month="1" w:st="on" year="1965">10 January 1965</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:city>. The company participated in the
Indo Pak war of 1971 in the Eastern Theatre. <b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Second
Lieutenant G.K. Zutshi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Major
R.C. Bhandari<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Lieutenant
A. Dey<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Major
S. Banerjee<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Major
B.K.D. Gupta<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>TAMIL NADU, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">MYSORE</st1:place></st1:city>
& KERALA <o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u>AREA
INDEP SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Madras Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Madras
Area Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Madras
Area (Independent) Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Madras,
Mysore & Kerala Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
The unit existed as Madras Signal Regiment at the time of <st1:city w:st="on">Independence</st1:city>. It was
re-designated as Madras Area Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="15" month="11" w:st="on" year="1947">15 November 1947</st1:date>. On <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1952">1 October 1952</st1:date> it was re-designated as
Madras Area (Independent) Signal Company. On <st1:date day="1" month="1" w:st="on" year="1958">1 January 1958</st1:date>, it was redesignated as Madras,
Mysore & Kerala Area Signal Company. On <st1:date day="15" month="1" w:st="on" year="1969">15 January 1969</st1:date>, it was redesignated <a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OLE_LINK9"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="OLE_LINK8">Tamil
Nadu, </a><st1:city w:st="on">Mysore</st1:city> and Kerala
Area Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1947 Major
D.C. Barnett<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1948 Major
L.F. Butler<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1949 Major
R.M. LePeltier<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1950 Major
Shamboo Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1951 Major
L.S.J. Chalke<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo18; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1952<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Major R.J. Patel<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1955 Major D.C. Smith<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1957 Captain S.
Devidoss<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo19; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1958<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Major S.S. Ramdas<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1960 Major A. Mehra<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1962 Major Param Jit
Singh Basi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1964 Major M.M. Kurup<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
1967 Lieutenant Colonel
<st1:city w:st="on">L.A.</st1:city> <st1:city w:st="on">Walker</st1:city><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo20; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1969<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Major J.L.
Ratan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1971 Major
R.K.R. Naidu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<st1:place w:st="on"><b><u>MAHARASHTRA</u></b></st1:place><b><u>
AND GUJARAT AREA SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify;">
2 Company Southern Command
Signal Regiment located at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>
was re-organised as Maharashtra And Gujarat
Area Signal Company in June 1965. The unit took part in Operation ‘Cactus
Lily’ during 1971 and provided communication in the <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>
sector.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1947 Major E.A. Raynor<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1947 Major A.J. Ball<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1948 Major Pran Nath<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1949 Major Avtar Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1949 Major Ajit Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1950 Major V.G. Sowani<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1951 Major K.D. Verma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1954 Major B. Seshamani<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1958 Major Gian Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1960 Major S.P.S. Bedi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1962 Major Shamboo Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1963 Major M.S. Sodhi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1964 Major M.S. Saharan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1965 Major Sard Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1966 Major D.R. Bhagwat<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1969 Major M.M. Khorana<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1972 Major M.M. Pandey <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>31 COMMUNICATION ZONE SUB AREA SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
V Sector Sig Coy<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify;">
The company was raised on <st1:date day="15" month="11" w:st="on" year="1967">15 November 1967</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:city> as V Sector Signal
Company. It was re-designated as 31 Communication Zone Sub Area Signal Company
on <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1972">1 October 1972</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1967 Major M.K. Ghosh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1969 Captain S.K. Sanan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1970 Major <st1:country-region w:st="on">C.A.</st1:country-region>
Parthasarthy<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>ANDHRA (INDEPPENDENT) SUB AREA SIGNAL COMPANY</u></b><b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
Deccan (Independent) Sub Area Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
Secunderabad
Station Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<st1:place w:st="on">Deccan</st1:place> (Independent) Sub Area Signal
Company was raised on <st1:date day="23" month="11" w:st="on" year="1949">23
November 1949</st1:date>. It was later redesignated as Secunderabad Station
Signal Company on <st1:date day="13" month="11" w:st="on" year="1952">13 November
1952</st1:date>. It was again redesignated as Andhra (Independent) Sub Area Signal
Company on <st1:date day="1" month="7" w:st="on" year="1963">1 Jul 1963</st1:date><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING
OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Major
N.P.B. Nair<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1965 Major P. Rangarajan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1966 Lieutenant
Colonel Y.A. Mirza<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1969 Major P.K.B. Naidu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1971 Captain V.K.
Rajan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1972 Major K.A. Ganapathy <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>UP AREA SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
UP Area Independent Signal Company<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
UP
Area Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
HQ United Provinces Independent Signal Company was raised in <st1:city w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:city> on <st1:date day="15" month="2" w:st="on" year="1947">15 February 1947</st1:date>. At <st1:city w:st="on">Independence</st1:city>, it was
re-designated as UP Area Independent Signal Company. The company moved to <st1:city w:st="on">Bareilly</st1:city> in 1955 with HQ
UP Area. It was re-organized as UP Area Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="4" month="2" w:st="on" year="1963">4 February 1963</st1:date>. On <st1:date day="11" month="11" w:st="on" year="1965">11 November 1965</st1:date>, it was again
re-organized as UP Area Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> </span></b>COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b> </b>1948 Major Rattan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1949 Major S.S. Bedi<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1949 Major S.S. Jones<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1950-55 Not known<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 108.0pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo8; tab-stops: list 108.0pt; text-indent: -72.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1956<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Captain Balkar Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1959 Major
Hazra Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1960 Major Shiv Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt;">
1963-72 Not known<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>50 (INDEPENDENT) PARACHUTE BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
50 (Independent) Parachute
Brigade Signal Company was reorganized from a section on 23 March 1950 at Agra.
The company took part in the <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> operations in
1961. During the <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> operations in April
1965 the company moved from <st1:city w:st="on">Agra</st1:city>
to Khavda. It returned to <st1:city w:st="on">Agra</st1:city>
after the operations were over. In September 1965 the company moved to <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and was deployed in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Icchogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>
sector under XI Corps. In February 1971 the company moved from <st1:city w:st="on">Agra</st1:city> to Barrackpore for Operation ‘Cactus
Lily’. While the operations were on the company was moved to the Western
Theatre on <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">11 December 1971</st1:date>.
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1950 Major
H.S. Kher <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1954 Major
J.C. Dhamija <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1956 Major
M.B. Hart<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1957 Major
Ram Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1961 Major
R.R. Chatterji<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1963 Major Y.S.
Awasthy<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1965 Major Vinod
Kumar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1967 Major S.
Upadhyaya<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1969 Major G.C. Sah<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1971 Major M. Bhatia <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>51 (INDEPENDENT) PARACHUTE BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
51 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company was raised in 1965 at
Gwalior. It subsequently moved to Dharchula but returned to <st1:city w:st="on">Gwalior</st1:city>. In January 1967 it moved to Sugar
sector. Subsequently, it moved to Ambala. The company took part in the 1971
Indo Pak war in the Western Theatre and was deployed in the Ganganagar area as
part of F Sector.<b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
1965 Major L.
Sharma<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 27.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 4.5pt;">
1967 Major
C.A.A. Roderigues <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
1969 Major D.L.
Kapoor<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
1971 Major C.J.
Appachu<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>1 RADIO MONITORING COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
1 Radio Monitoring Company was raised on <st1:date day="31" month="8" w:st="on" year="1964">31 August 1964</st1:date> at Kolkata. Monitoring sections
of the company participated in the Indo Pak war of 1971 in the Eastern Theatre.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Major
B. Nagarajan<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Major R.K. Sehgal<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Major
Agyapal Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>2 RADIO MONITORING COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
2 Radio Monitoring Company was raised on <st1:date day="31" month="3" w:st="on" year="1965">31 March 1965</st1:date> at Simla. Monitoring sections of
the company participated in the Indo Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 in the Western Theatre.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Major
S.K. Walia<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Major P.K. Janmeja<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Major
Parshan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
1971 Major K.S. Caveeshar<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>3 RADIO MONITORING COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
3 Radio Monitoring Company was raised in <st1:city w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:city> on <st1:date day="29" month="12" w:st="on" year="1964">29 Dec 1964</st1:date> with its HQ and two sections. <b><u><span style="font-family: "Bookman Old Style","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1964 Major N.K. Tarapore <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1965 Major V.K.
Ahuja <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Major S.N. Capoor <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Major S. Mohan <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1971 Major S.N. Sood<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Major R.C. Dhyani <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>4 RADIO MONITORING COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u><br /></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
4 Radio Monitoring Company was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Poona</st1:city> on <st1:date day="4" month="6" w:st="on" year="1966">4 June 1966</st1:date>.
The unit did not undergo any subsequent moves or amalgamations. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1967 Major S.S.
Mankekar <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1969 Major
C.M. Sagane <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1970 Major
M.M.G. Sharma <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u>5 RADIO MONITORING COMPANY<o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
5 Radio Monitoring Company was raised on <st1:date day="6" month="9" w:st="on" year="1966">6 September 1966</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
COMMANDING OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 275.35pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1966 Major
Khazan Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1968 Major Balwinder Singh<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
1972 Major
K.P.S. Ahluwalia <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
(Words 7887)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-outline-level: 1; text-align: center;">
<b><u><br /></u></b></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-46302963876466307912016-01-16T07:28:00.002-08:002016-01-16T07:28:46.653-08:00CHAPTER 12 - REGIMENTAL INSTITUTIONS, SPORTS & ADVENTURE<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CHAPTER
12 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">REGIMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS, SPORTS & ADVENTURE<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -2.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Introduction</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
REGIMENTAL INSTITUTIONS : <i>Corps Association – Corps Committee –
Colonels Commandant – Corps Emblem & Motto – Corps Colours – Corps Flag –
Reunion – War Memorial – Corps Museum – Headquarters Mess – Corps Band – DR
Display Team – Dress & Accoutrements – Corps Publications – Corps History
Committee – Corps Traditions Committee – Cariappa Trophy – Iyappa Trophy –
Daulet Singh Trophy- Plaque of Honour.</i> SPORTS & ADVENTURE : <i>Hockey – Football – Basketball – Volleyball –
Triangular Sports Meet – W.I.A.A. Reliability Trials</i>. CONCLUSION.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; tab-stops: 123.75pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Introduction<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Customs and traditions are
inseparable from the military life. With advances in technology, the modern
battle field bears little resemblance to that of yesteryears. The days of hand
to hand combat are virtually over, and one will rarely see an enemy face or
force, except on a computer screen. It would appear that qualities such as
valour, daring and discipline, the hall marks of every soldier, have been
replaced by intelligence, knowledge and technical skills. This is true but only
in part. Even today, the premium on
traditional military values such as courage, discipline and <i>esprit de corps</i> remains high as ever.
Each regiment and corps has its own distinct ethos developed over decades and
centuries of adherence to regimental customs, both on and off the battlefield.
Regimental institutions are the means to nurture these customs and strengthen
the bonds between soldiers. By
itself, each one may appear insignificant or irrelevant. However, taken as a
whole they form the mortar that binds the various parts that together represent
the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army. The institutions that existed in the
Corps from its inception up to 1947 have already been covered in Appendix 2 of
Volume II. The developments in these institutions and new ones that came up
after Independence are covered in this chapter.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">REGIMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
Association<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Indian Signal Corps Association was formed on <st1:date day="1" month="4" w:st="on" year="1947">1 April 1947</st1:date> primarily as a
welfare measure. The objects of the Corps Association were to render financial
assistance to serving and retired signallers and their families who were in
financial distress; to enable old comrades to keep in touch with each other;
and to assist retired and released personnel in finding employment. In a wider
context, it was not only expected to look after the wellbeing of its members
but also promote brotherhood, camaraderie and esprit-de-corps. Major General R.F.H.
Nalder, the SO-in-C, encouraged all serving members of the Corps to support the
Association in the early stages of its existence, so that its future is
assured. He also instructed all CO’s to publicise the aims and objectives of
the Association and to inspire such confidence in it as would ensure its
success.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Initially,
two branches of the Corps Association were formed at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>
in 1947, each branch being based on an ISC Centre and possessing its own
section of the Association Funds. Both branches were controlled by a Central
Committee which met annually at GHQ in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
The Central Committee was headed by the SO-in-C, with one ICO from each command
and ISC Centre as members. In addition, two or three ICOs were nominated by the
SO–in–C, one of whom functioned as the Secretary. The day-to-day administration
of each branch of the Association, including the administration of the funds,
was vested in an executive committee which was formed at each ISC Centre. The
executive committee consisted of the Commandant (Chairman), four senior ICOs,
up to four retired ICOs or VCOs and an ICO who functioned as the Secretary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> There
was little change in the rules of the Association until 1959, when the Corps
Committee decided to do away with annual membership and permit only life
membership. The existing annual members were to be converted to life
members. Units would pay the difference
in the subscriptions to Records which would be recovered from individuals in
instalments. It was decided that flat
rates of subscriptions would apply to JCOs and OR. However, officers would continue to pay the
existing rates on rank basis. The final
striking of names of those existing annual members who were not willing to become life members would be taken up at the next Committee meeting
after knowing the exact number of such members at the time of the conference.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 1</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the next meeting of the Corps
Committee Meeting held at Jullundur on
24-25 March 1960 it was decided that annual members could not be debarred
from the Signals Association as long as they paid their annual subscription and
would be treated the same as life members for purposes of grants of loans from
the Signals Benevolent Fund. If the
arrears of subscription in respect of defaulters were not received by 1
July1960, then such individuals would cease to be members of the Signals
Association. However, in future only
life members would be enrolled into the Corps of Signals Association. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though the Corps Association had
been formed in 1947, it did not have a permanent office. In 1961, Brigadier T.
Barreto, then CSO Western Command, proposed that Signals should have a
regimental headquarters on the lines of other Arms and Services and the Royal
Signals in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The point was considered by the Corps Committee, which was presided over by
Major General A.C. Iyappa, since Lieutenant General Daulet Singh could not
attend. The Colonel Commandant felt that the idea, though desirable, was an all
arms issue and would require special Government sanction. It was decided that further information in
this connection should be obtained from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> and the case examined by the SO-
in-C (Major General R.N. Batra).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It is interesting to note that at
Brigadier Barreto’s insistence, this point continued to be considered at every
subsequent meeting of the Corps Committee, but was always postponed, for one
reason or the other. In 1967, two years
after Brigadier Barrreto had retired; the point was discussed for the last
time. The SO-in- C pointed out that a regimental headquarters had been
sanctioned for the Royal Signals, but in view of the restrictions on raising of
operational units only it had not yet been possible to take up this case with
Army HQ. Though he agreed that there was
a need for the establishment of a regimental headquarters, in view of the heavy
commitments on Signals 4 Section in the Signals Directorate, the proposal would
have to be pended for the time being.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 2</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The point about conversion of
annual membership remained unresolved for several years. In 1964 it was decided
that all references to annual membership will be deleted from the rules and
only life membership will be permitted. As a result of this amendment, all
annual members were given a final option to convert their subscription and
become life members, failing which their names were to be struck off the rolls.
Apparently, there were many who did not comply. In 1966, the Association had
62,690 members out of which 2728 were still to convert to life membership. In 1972, while discussing the point regarding
presentation of mementoes to officers prior to their retirement from service,
the Committee felt that officers who did
not accept the obligations and allegiance the Corps would not be dined out on
retirement and the presentation of memento withheld. Such officers would cease
to be life members of the Corps Association and would no longer be treated as
members of the Corps.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 3</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">One
of the primary aims of the Corps Association was to render financial assistance
to members who were in financial distress, and those who had been boarded out
due to disease and infirmity. The Association
originally maintained two main funds. These were the Indian Signals Benevolent
Fund and the Indian Signals Reunion Fund. The Benevolent Fund was used for
making monetary grants in cases of poverty and distress among members and their
families, including those of deceased members. Assistance to families was
restricted to wives, widows, fathers, mothers, sons and daughters only. In the
case of officers, only those who had been commissioned from the ranks were
eligible for relief for themselves or their families. On its formation,
subscriptions for life and annual membership were Rs. 75 and Rs. 10
respectively for officers, Rs. 30 and Rs. 3 for VCOs, Rs. 15 and Rs.1 for OR and Rs. 7/8 and Rs -/8 (eight annas) for non
combatants (enrolled). The Reunion Fund was to meet the expenses of reunions,
which were planned to be held annually. It was also intended to start an
organisation for helping old comrades of the Corps to find employment. Lest the
present generation of readers find these rates too low, it is well to remember
that the basic pay of a second lieutenant was only Rs. 400, while that of a
signalman was Rs. 60/65, depending on his trade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apart from grants, loans were also given to
personnel for meeting unforeseen expenses. In 1951, Subedar Dharam Singh and
Jemadar Sardara Singh who were going abroad for training were given loans of Rs
1000/- and 500/- respectively, for which ex-post facto sanction was accorded by
the Signals Committee. Since there was
no financial safeguard in respect of loans granted to personnel who became
non-effective, in 1953 it was decided that loans would be given to all ranks on
proper agreement on the security of men in the unit or Corps as defined in RAI
Instruction 743. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The objects and rules of the Corps
funds were formalised during the 9<sup>th</sup> Corps Committee meeting on <st1:date day="11" month="4" w:st="on" year="1956">11 April 1956</st1:date>. It was
decided that the following funds would be maintained by the Corps:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps of Signals
General Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps of Signals Bands
Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps of Signals HQ
Mess Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps of Signals War
Memorial Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals Benevolent Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals <st1:place w:st="on">Reunion</st1:place> Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals Scholarship
Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Signalman Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 10<sup>th</sup> meeting of the
Signals Committee held on <st1:date day="5" month="4" w:st="on" year="1957">5
April 1957</st1:date> decided that newly raised signal units would be given
grants from the General Fund. The rates were Rs. 1,000/- for major units, Rs.
500/- for brigade signal sections and Rs. 100/- for smaller signal sections.
For officers’ messes of newly raised units, loans could be given from the HQ
Mess Fund. The procedure of sanctioning loans was also streamlined. It was
decided that loans to JCOs/OR would be sanctioned by Officer-in-Charge Signal
Records. In an emergency, CSOs Command could sanction normal loans of up to Rs.
250/-. The limits for normal loans from the Benevolent
Fund for officers, JCOs and OR were 2, 4 and 6 months’ basic pay respectively.
The loan amount had to be returned in two and a half years. The unit commander
would stand surety for the loan. In case the individual was transferred to
another unit, the surety would also be transferred. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">The limits for grants
and loans were revised from time to time. In 1971, a sum of Rs. 1, 07,000 was
disbursed as grants to TB patients, ex-servicemen, disabled personnel and next
of kin of deceased personnel. In addition, 1082 serving personnel were given
loans totalling Rs. 3, 00,000, which was the limit laid down. In 1972 the
ceiling on loans was raised to Rs. 5, 00,000. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Corps Committee<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The
formation of the ISC Committee in 1946 was an important step towards
‘Indianisation’ of the Corps. It was for the first time that decisions on
‘domestic matters’ of the Corps were entrusted to a majority of Indian
officers, whereas these had in the past been dealt exclusively by British
officers. Only two meetings were held prior to <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1947">15 August 1947</st1:date>. According to the charter
adopted at the first meeting held on <st1:date day="10" month="9" w:st="on" year="1946">10 September 1946</st1:date>, the main functions of the Committee were to sponsor the social and domestic
interests of the ISC and to represent Corps opinion in all matters pertaining
to the welfare and <i>esprit-de-corps</i>. The ex-officio Chairman of
the Committee was the SO-in-C, with members being nominated from each command
and STC. In addition, two or three
members were nominated by the SO-in-C. The Committee comprised Major General
R.F.H. Nalder (Chairman); Lieutenant Colonels B.D. Kapur and T.K. Mukerji;
Majors Bhattacharya, A.C. Iyappa, S.S. Chowdhary, M.B.K. Nair, Mohd. Suleman and M.N. Batra (Secretary); and Captain
Ajit Singh. The Committee decided to invite General Sir Douglas D. Gracey to
serve as Colonel Commandant of the Corps and Chairman of the Committee. It was decided that the SO-in-C would
henceforth assume the duties of Deputy Chairman.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> The Committee took several important
decisions in its first meeting on <st1:date day="10" month="9" w:st="on" year="1946">10 September 1946</st1:date>. These included the replacement of the
Corps Motto ‘Certa-Cito’ by ‘Tez-o-Sahih’; the compilation of the history of
ISC; approval of designs for shoulder badges for the Army Signal School, the
Corps cap and collar badges and the colour of flash backings and unit flags.
The second meeting of the Committee was held on <st1:date day="13" month="5" w:st="on" year="1947">13 May 1947</st1:date> under the chairmanship of the
SO-in-C, Brigadier H.D. Beadon. It was decided that a quarterly journal called
“The Indian Signal Quarterly Journal” would be published by the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Commandant</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
Mhow, in three languages - English, Roman Urdu and one vernacular language. It
was also decided to give an award to the best young officer (YO) of the year.
The award was to consist of a miniature bronze ‘Jimmy’ mounted on a wooden
plinth. </span><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
the Committee was reconstituted. The first meeting of the reconstituted
Committee was held on 1-2 April 1948 at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
under the chairmanship of Brigadier C.H.I. Akehurst. It was decided that the Colonel
Commandant of the Corps would be the ex-officio Chairman, with the SO-in-C
being the Deputy Chairman. Other members of the Committee would include the
Deputy Director Signals; one member from each command to be nominated by the
CSO; one member each from the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> and the STC to be
nominated by the respective commandant; and three members to be nominated by
SO-in-C, one of whom would be a subedar major. The GSO II Signals 4 would be
the secretary. It was also decided that a sub-committee may be deputized from
time to time at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
to go into various matters as may be decided.
The sub-committee would consist of the SO-in-C, Deputy Director Signals,
GSO II Signals 4 and such other officers from local signal units as may be
required. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Committee formally approved the following charter of the Indian Signals
Committee:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The functions of the
Indian Signals Committee are to sponsor the social and domestic interests of
the Indian Signals and to represent Corps opinions in all matters pertaining to
the welfare and esprit-de-Corps generally.
In particular, it will maintain interests in such matter as particulars
of dress; mess customs and etiquette; social and sports activities; regimental
customs; welfare of officers and other ranks both during their period of
service and after return to civil life; Corps manuals and journals; the
establishment of technical status of personnel in relation to civil
institutions; examination and control of such funds as may be decided;
sponsoring any associations or committees formed for the implementation of the
items above.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 4</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The next meeting of the Committee
was held at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
from 24-26 May 1949. It was chaired by General K.M. Cariappa, the Colonel
Commandant. In his opening address the Chairman dwelt on a number of issues
such as customs and traditions, dress, officers’ messes, austerity, membership
of clubs etc. He also talked about loyalty of army officers. He stated that an
officer’s loyalty was first to his country i.e. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>; then to our Army, i.e.
Indian Army; then to the Corps of Indian Signals; then to the unit, then to his
men and lastly to himself. He said that
they (the members of the Committee) belonged to the privileged few, who had
been given the unique task of building up their Corps. They should be proud of this trust placed in
them, and give their best to the Corps regardless of personal comforts. The
foundation of the Corps should be built on dignity and loyalty, and if service
to the Corps is maintained as the first and foremost task, nothing was
impossible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It was decided that the Corps
Committee should meet twice annually.
One meeting would be held in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and the other in Mhow and <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
alternatively each year on 10 October and 15 February respectively. However,
this did not happen, and the Committee was never able to meet more than once a
year, except in 1950, when it met in March and October. After this, the Corps
Committee continued to meet regularly every year, except in 1961 because of the
Golden Jubilee and in 1963, due to the Emergency in the wake of the 1962 war.
The meetings were usually chaired by the Colonel Commandant, if he was
available, or the SO-in-C, who was the Deputy Chairman. From 1948 to 1955 the
Corps had only one Colonel Commandant, General Cariappa. In 1955 Major General
Daulet Singh was appointed the second Colonel Commandant. He attended the
meeting in 1962. General Cariappa chaired the meetings twice, in 1949 and 1958.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1959, Major General A.C. Iyappa
was appointed Colonel Commandant after the relinquishment of the post by
General Cariappa. In 1962 it was decided that the second Colonel Commandant
would be designated as the Co-Chairman of the Corps Committee. It was also
decided that one retried officer would be nominated on the Committee by the
SO-in-C. In 1964 the SO-in-C, Major General R.N. Batra was appointed the second
Colonel Commandant after the demise of Lieutenant General Daulet Singh and
became the Co- Chairman. It was decided that so long as the SO-in-C was also a
Colonel Commandant, a Deputy Chairman would not be appointed. In view of the
growing number of retired officers, it was felt that their representation in
the Corps Committee should be increased. It was agreed that there was a
requirement for appointing a Corps Tradition Sub-Committee under the
chairmanship of a senior member of the Corps to examine Corps customs and
traditions and put up suggestions for approval of the Corps Committee. Brigadier T. Barreto was appointed Chairman
of the Corps Tradition Sub-Committee.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 5</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1967 Lieutenant General I.D.
Verma was appointed the third Colonel Commandant. Consequently the 19<sup>th</sup>
Corps Committee meeting held on <st1:date day="7" month="2" w:st="on" year="1968">7
February 1968</st1:date> was chaired by Lieutenant General A.C. Iyappa, with
two Co-Chairmen - Lieutenant General R.N. Batra and Lieutenant General I.D. Verma.
(The rank of SO-in-C was upgraded the same year.) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The decisions of the Corps of
Signals Committee on important domestic matters were disseminated through
directives. After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>
the following Corps of Signals Committee Directives were issued:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Directive
No.</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Date</u>
<u>Subject <o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 1 <st1:date day="2" month="2" w:st="on" year="1953">2 February 1953</st1:date> Corps
of Signals DR Display Team<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 2 <st1:date day="4" month="2" w:st="on" year="1953">4 February 1953</st1:date> Charter
of Duties of Editorial Staff of THE SIGNALMAN<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 3 <st1:date day="3" month="9" w:st="on" year="1953">3 September 1953</st1:date> Scheme
for Grant of Loan from Signals Benevolent Fund<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 4 <st1:date day="5" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">5 October 1962</st1:date> Corps
Traditions Committee<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 5 <st1:date day="6" month="2" w:st="on" year="1964">6 February 1964</st1:date> Corps
Sports Control Committee<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 6 <st1:date day="5" month="11" w:st="on" year="1963">5 November 1963</st1:date> Lt Gen Daulet Singh Trophy for Personal High Endeavour<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 7 <st1:date day="17" month="2" w:st="on" year="1964">17 February 1964</st1:date> The Iyappa Trophy <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 8 <st1:date day="16" month="9" w:st="on" year="1964">16 September 1964</st1:date> Unit Sign Boards <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9 <st1:date day="15" month="1" w:st="on" year="1965">15 January 1965</st1:date> Record of Mess Property and Silver of
Historical Value<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10. <st1:date day="21" month="9" w:st="on" year="1964">21 September 1964</st1:date> Award of Corps Colours and Blazers<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
the Corps Committee was intended to deal with domestic matters such as dress;
mess customs; sports activities; regimental customs; welfare of serving and
retired personnel and so on, over a period of time it became almost an
extension of the Signals Directorate. One of the staff officers in Signals
Directorate performed the job of the secretary of the Corps Committee, on a
part time basis. The need for a permanent secretary of the Committee and a
permanent address for the Corps Association, as existed in Royal Signals had
been brought up several times by Brigadier T. Barreto, but it was not
implemented. Had a regimental headquarters for the Corps of Signals been
officially designated, with a permanent secretariat, perhaps the Committee
would have been more effectual. It would
have also avoided the autocratic and cavalier manner in which the Committee
sometimes functioned. Nothing illustrates this fact as well as the manner in
which the Committee treated one it’s most active and faithful members,
Brigadier T. Barreto. <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier
Barreto first became a member of the Corps Committee in 1954 and attended every
meeting thereafter until 1965, when he retired. He became Chairman of the Corps
History Committee in 1957 and of the Corps Tradition Sub-Committee in 1964. He
played an important role in suggesting, designing, setting up and nurturing
several important Corps institutions such as the Corps Museum, War Memorial,
Regimental Colours, Corps Flag, Headquarters Mess, Roll of Honour, Honours and
Awards list and many others. Form a perusal of the agenda and minutes of the
Corps Committee and connected correspondence, there is no doubt that he
sponsored the maximum number of points for discussion and was one of the few
who took follow up action on its decisions.
However, as mentioned in a long article on him in the Signalman after
his retirement, <i>‘he was strong willed to
a fault and possessed the highest principles. He loved the Corps as few others
did and he was uncompromising where truth and the interest of the Corps, as
understood by him, were involved. To Tery, the Corps was everything’.</i></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 6</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
June 1963, Brigadier Barreto, who was then Commandant School of Signals, sent
12 points for inclusion in the agenda of the 15<sup>th</sup> Corps Committee
meeting that was scheduled to be held in 1964. These points were as given
below:-</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 7</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Where is the Daulet
Singh Trophy for High Endeavour? What are the rules for competition/presentation
of this trophy?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">What is future of the
Iyappa Trophy for technical proficiency? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discuss future of the
Signalman in view of cut in Publications Team and embargo on use of GSO2
(Publications) on duties other than those laid down by DMT.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discuss stocking of
liquor in HQ Mess.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sanction write-off of
sword of Lt Col Rosenburg which is missing from HQ Mess.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Approve return of skins
presented/loaned to HQ Mess by Lt Col VD Deshpande. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discuss amounts due
from the Corps Funds to School funds.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Review items
manufactured by Saharan & Company for quality and cost.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Revise Corps Committee Directive No 3 in light
of Minute 7 (b) of 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (This dealt with loans from the
Signals Benevolent Fund to officers.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discuss
progress/improvement in sports publicity<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discuss introduction of
President’s Own Despatch Riders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discuss compilation of
Annual Resume of Activities. The last issue contained a large number of
omissions and inaccuracies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In August 1963, the Secretary of
the Corps Committee sent a reply to Commandant School of Signals, informing him
that 10 of the 12 points submitted by him had not been included in the agenda
for the 15<sup>th</sup> Corps Committee meeting. The only two points that had
been included were those pertaining Saharan & Company and sports publicity.
The reasons given for rejection of the other points were interesting: ‘this is
an administrative problem and should be referred to Signals Directorate
(stocking of liquor in HQ Mess); ‘this is already under correspondence (amount
due from Corps Funds to School Funds); ‘the point may be referred to Signals
Directorate for examination (writing off sword of Lt Col Roesnburg); ‘this will
be progressed by Signals Directorate (President’s own DR); ‘necessary action
will be taken by Signals directorate’ (Annual Resume of Activities) and so on. </span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">8</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Some of the points submitted by
Brigadier Barreto had been under correspondence for several months, on which he
had already sent several reminders. Several other points raised by him had been
either ignored or treated in a cavalier fashion. The reply of the Secretary
Corps Committee irked him no end. He wrote an angry letter to the SO-in-C,
Major General R.N. Batra, extracts from which are given below:-</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 9</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">………The Secretary
has thought it fit to reject 10 out of the 12 items submitted by me for
inclusion in the agenda. This unilateral and dictatorial action shows that the
Secretariat does not appreciate the status of the Corps Committee and its
members. Before I deal with the particular items I had submitted, I shall state
my views on the general case.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At last year’s
conference, you had very correctly defined the difference in status between the
CSO's Conference and the Corps Committee meeting. The former is your personal
conference and CSOs/Comdts cannot claim any rights to be heard nor can they
insist on raising issues. The final decision on all matters concerning that
conference rest entirely with you personally. The Corps Committee, however, is
a democratic body consisting of responsible members charged with the duty of regulating
the domestic affairs of the Corps. Generally speaking, decisions are taken by
majority vote, the power of veto resting with the representative Colonel
Commandant in his capacity as chairman of the Committee. If therefore, there
exists a certain freedom of discussion, it presupposes that members have the
privilege of raising such matters as are within the legitimate purview of the
Committee. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">My personal
status on the Corps Committee is unique by virtue of active and continuous
participation in its deliberations over a period of years, and it is not
without a record of achievement. It is therefore to be expected that I should
know what may or may not be discussed at such meetings. I have no objection to
any point of mine being excluded as a result of satisfactory action being taken
subsequent to the receipt of my points; such is the case in four of them, some of which have been
outstanding for years. …….<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">What may or may
not be discussed by the Corps Committee? The Corps Committee being the watch dog
of the Corps, it should not fight shy of examining any matters affecting its
domestic affairs, however embarrassing they may be. Only thus can the Corps
Committee achieve its rightful status and be looked upon with respect by the
rest of the Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I am deeply hurt
by this unwarranted action by the Secretariat, even more than the insulting
treatment extended to me over the past years by their persistent refusal to
reply to my letters and reminders thereto. Perhaps you may not be aware of this
attitude of the Secretariat. Various excuses, such as changes in staff and the
Emergency, have been offered, but something solid is required to ensure a more
efficient and progressive transaction of Corps Committee business. I do not
believe in witch hunting, nor is there anything personal in my complaint, but I
do believe that a regimental headquarters is now more than necessary to
administer its domestic affairs. The correct set up on an unofficial part-time
basis has, in my opinion, failed to keep up with e progress required by growing
Corps. …………<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
15<sup>th</sup> Corp Committee Meeting was held on 14 and <st1:date day="17" month="2" w:st="on" year="1964">17 February 1964</st1:date> at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. It was chaired by General Iyappa with
General Batra as Co-Chairman. Most of the points raised by Brigadier Barreto
were discussed and decisions arrived at. Some contentious issues such as the
Headquarters Mess, Daulet Singh Trophy, Tradition Committee and The Signalman
were hotly debated and the decisions were not always unanimous, as is apparent
from subsequent correspondence on these subjects. Vindicating Brigadier
Barreto’s opinion regarding the functioning of the Secretariat, the Committee
decided that its decisions<i> ‘will not be
made by correspondence alone; but points and views of members will, in future,
be circulated and final decisions made only when these have been considered. If
necessary, these may be held over for discussion at the next Corps Committee
Meeting.’</i> Significantly, Lieutenant Colonel M.B. Hart performed the duties
of Secretary during the meeting, the permanent incumbent Lieutenant Colonel Sri
Ram being in attendance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Apart
from the absence of a permanent secretariat of the Corps Committee, another
factor that affected its functioning was the office of the Colonel Commandant.
From 1946 right up to 1963, the Colonels Commandant and Chairmen of the Corps
Committee – Generals Gracey, Cariappa and Daulet Singh - were not from
Signals. Even if they did not attend all
meetings of the Corps Committee, their exalted position in the Army and status
as Chairman ensured that their views were considered before important decisions
were taken by the Committee or its Secretariat. After 1963, this important
check was removed and the Corps Committee was headed by a retired or serving
SO-in-C. The nomination of a staff officer of Signals Directorate as the part
time secretary aggravated the problem. One can perhaps forgive the secretary
for not being able to distinguish between the office of the Chairman of the
Corps Committee and the SO-in-C, on whose staff he was serving. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Colonels
Commandant<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">As explained in Volume
II, the institution of Colonel of the Regiment or Colonel Commandant is a
British legacy. In Victorian times, commissions were given only to members of
the aristocracy and the landed gentry, the class which could be trusted to remain
loyal to the Sovereign. This not only reduced the chances of mutinies and
revolts, but also provided an honourable occupation to scions of the nobility,
for whom no other profession or calling was considered respectable. Few of
these officers had formal training and some even bought their commissions.
Regiments were commanded by colonels who often paid the salaries of the
soldiers and the cost of their uniforms. Some continued to look after their
estates and commitments in Court, leaving them little time for day to day
administration of the regiment during peace time. This gave birth to the rank
of lieutenant colonel, who deputized for the colonel. As the army became more
professional, the system changed and every officer had to start at the bottom
rung as a second lieutenant. But the institution of Colonel remained, becoming
largely ceremonial. In the Infantry and Cavalry, he was known as the Colonel of
the Regiment, while in other Arms and Services, he was referred to as the
Colonel Commandant. These Colonels could be of any rank and are not to be
confused with the rank of colonel, which a lieutenant colonel attains on
promotion. The Colonel was normally a senior officer of repute, who was
regarded as a father figure in the regiment. In case a regiment did not have an
officer of the requisite rank and seniority, a suitable officer from another
regiment was invited to be the Colonel of the Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Major General S.H.
Powell, who is regarded as the ‘Father’ of the Corps, was appointed the first
Colonel Commandant of the ISC on <st1:date day="15" month="5" w:st="on" year="1934">15 May 1934</st1:date>, when the appointment was sanctioned. General
Powell relinquished the appointment at the age of 70 after attending the Silver
Jubilee celebrations of the Corps at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
in 1936. He was succeeded by General Sir
Robert A. Cassells, the C-in-C of the Indian Army. Almost at the same time, the
Princess Royal was appointed the Colonel-in-Chief of the ISC. Following the retirement of General Cassells,
Lieutenant General Douglas D. Gracey assumed the appointment of Colonel Commandant
on <st1:date day="21" month="2" w:st="on" year="1947">21 February 1947</st1:date>. After Partition, General Gracey was appointed
the C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, and expressed his unwillingness to continue as
the Colonel Commandant of the ISC. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">The point was discussed
during the </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">first meeting of newly reconstituted
Corps Committee on 1- <st1:date day="2" month="4" w:st="on" year="1948">2 April
1948</st1:date>. It was agreed that General Gracey could not continue to be
the Colonel Commandant of the Corps anymore. Since
there was no officer above the rank of brigadier within the Corps, it was
decided to request an officer from outside for this assignment. The Committee authorized
the Chairman, Brigadier C.H.I Akehurst to approach the following officers in
order of priority to accept this appointment:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lieutenant General K.M.
Cariappa, O.B.E.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major General K.S.
Thimayya, D.S.O.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major General S.M.
Shrinagesh<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Committee also agreed to the
appointment of a second Colonel Commandant of the Corps in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and
authorized the Chairman to approach Major General C.H.H. Vulliamy, C.B.,
D.S.O., for this purpose. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_4" o:spid="_x0000_i1027" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:232.5pt;
height:287.25pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image005.jpg"
o:title="01"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="383" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_4" width="310" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
First Indian Colonel Commandant Gen KM Cariappa, OBE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; tab-stops: 40.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the event, General Gracey resigned from the
appointment of Colonel Commandant of the Corps on <st1:date day="16" month="7" w:st="on" year="1948">16 July 1948</st1:date>. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lieutenant
General K.M. Cariappa was then heavily involved with the operations in Jammu
& Kashmir and it was only after he took over as C-in-C
of the Indian Army that he accepted the invitation
and was appointed the first Indian Colonel Commandant of the Corps on <st1:date day="5" month="4" w:st="on" year="1949">5 April 1949</st1:date>. During the next meeting of the Indian Signals
Committee on 24-26 May 1949, which he chaired, General Cariappa thanked
the Corps Committee for inviting him to become Colonel
Commandant of the Corps of Indian Signals. He stated that he accepted the offer extended
to him, because he felt that he could help with advice and guidance in making
the Corps of Indian Signals the ‘Corps elite’ of the Army.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General Cariappa agreed that so long as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> remained
within the Commonwealth, the Princess Royal must inevitably remain the
Colonel-in-Chief of the Corps of Indian Signals. He said that he, as Colonel Commandant, would send a greeting message to
H.R.H. The Princess Royal, the Colonel-in-Chief. He also agreed that it would
be advantageous for the Corps to have a second Colonel
Commandant in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and directed the Director Signals to take this up with the Military Secretary’s
Branch. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_5" o:spid="_x0000_i1028" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:218.25pt;
height:285pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image007.jpg"
o:title="02"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="380" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image008.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_5" width="291" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The
Second Indian Colonel Commandant Lt Gen Daulet Singh, MBE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1955 Major General Daulet Singh
was appointed the second Colonel Commandant of the Corps. General Cariappa, who
had been appointed <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
High Commissioner in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Australia</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1953, continued to take keen interest in the Corps and offered to donate a
trophy for a Corps championship in chess.
Even after his return from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Australia</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1956, he remained the
Colonel Commandant and attended the Re-union in 1958. In 1959, General Cariappa
relinquished the appointment of Colonel Commandant, and Major General A.C.
Iyappa was appointed in his place. In 1963 Lieutenant General Daulet Singh lost
his life in a tragic air accident. Though Major General B.D. Kapur was senior,
he withdrew his name in favour of the SO-in-C, Major General R.N. Batra, who
was appointed the Colonel Commandant in 1964. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though he had ceased to be the
Colonel Commandant and settled down in his ancestral home in Mecara in Coorg,
General Cariappa agreed to attend the Colour presentation ceremony in 1965 and
travelled to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>
with President Radhakrishnan in the same aircraft. In 1967 a third Colonel Commandant was
authorised and the appointment was filled by Major General I.D. Verma, who had
become the SO-in-C a year earlier. The very next year, the rank of SO-in-C was
upgraded and all three Colonel Commandants were lieutenant generals. In 1971
Lieutenant General Iyappa’s tenure ended and he was replaced by Lieutenant
General E.G. Pettengell, the newly appointed SO-in-C. Shortly afterwards the
policy of having retired officers as Colonel Commandants was revised and it was
decreed that only serving officers would hold the appointment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
Emblem & Motto<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">The emblem of the Corps
of Signals is based on Mercury, or Mercurius, the Roman version of Hermes, the
messenger of the Gods in Greek mythology. It is commonly believed that the
figure which is part of the </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">badge of the Signal
Corps of almost every Commonwealth nation, including <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, is based on the bronze
statue of the Hermes made by Giovanni Bologna, which is now in the Muzio
Nazionale in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Florence</st1:place></st1:city>.
Signallers all over the World affectionately call it the ‘Jimmy’, though the
history of the appellation is obscure.
The Jimmy, surmounted by a crown, was first used by the Telegraph
Battalion of the Royal Engineers when it was formed in 1884. Apparently, the suggestion to use the figure
of Hermes came from Captain C.F.C. Beresford of the Royal Engineers, whose
father had bought a replica of the statue at an exhibition in <st1:place w:st="on">Hyde
Park</st1:place> in 1851. With a few
small changes, the emblem was later adopted by Royal Signals in 1929. The Indian Signal Corps began using it in
1934, with the crown being replaced by the five-pointed Star of India. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1946 a new badge was introduced in the Royal Corps of
Signals and the ISC. The new badge,
without the oval band, had the figure of Mercury on a globe, supported by a
scroll bearing the motto <i>Certa Cito</i>
and six laurel leaves arranged on each side of the globe. The badge of Royal
Signals was surmounted by a detached crown, while that of the ISC had a
detached Star of India. The Mercury and the globe were to be in silver, the
remainder being in gold. This badge
continued to be used until <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
when the motto was changed from <i>Certa
Cito</i> to <i>Tez-o-Sahih</i>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The
motto of the Royal Signals from 1929 onwards was <i>Certa Cito</i>, which can be translated as ‘reliable information
quickly’. Since this lacked harmony and consonance, it was later replaced with <i>Swift
and Sure</i>, which was simpler and more easily understood. However, the motto
was not used in the emblem until 1946, when the oval band inscribed with the
words “Royal Corps of Signals” was removed and a scroll added at the base of
the figure inscribed with the words <i>Certa Cito</i>. This motto was used by
the Royal Signals as well as the ISC. In April 1947, the new motto approved for
the ISC was ‘<i>Tez-o-Sahih’</i> meaning ‘Swift and Correct’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The 1<sup>st</sup> meeting of the newly reco</span><span lang="EN-GB">nstituted Signals Committee held on 1-2 April 1948 took several
important decisions with regard to the motto, emblem and title of the Corps. It
was decided to do away with the present Corps motto of <i>Tez-o-Sahih</i> and to ask signal units to submit suggestions for new
Corps motto. It was decided that Rs.
100/- would be paid from the Indian Signals fund for the three best suggestions
received. The present motto would continue until a new and suitable motto had
been decided upon and finally approved.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
examining the different designs of the Corps badges produced before it, the
Committee decided to retain the present layout of the badge and to authorize
the sub-committee at Army HQ to further examine the possibility of obtaining a
die from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and getting the badge made locally at cheaper rates. It was decided that one firm only should
supply Corps badges to all signal units and individuals. Also a decision was
taken not to have any backing to the Corps badge. However, if the Army HQ
sub-committee Committee recommended a backing, it should be oval in shape and
coloured light blue (top) and green (bottom). Metal buttons would have only an
embossed “Jimmy” with no other inscriptions.
Details and sizes were left to the sub-committee at Army HQ.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps Committee recommended the
following redesignations in the title of the Corps and its institutions:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Present Designation</u> <u>Proposed Designation</u> <u>Remarks</u><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">INDIAN
SIGNAL CORPS “CORPS OF INDIAN SIGNALS” Full title<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> “INDIAN
SIGNALS” Short
title normal use<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> “<st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">IND</st1:place></st1:state>
SIGS” Abbreviated
Title <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">1
INDIAN SIGNAL “SIGNALS
TRAINING CENTRE” Full Title<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">CORPS
CENTRE “STC” Abbreviated
Title<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 72pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">INDIAN
SIGNAL CORPS “SCHOOL OF SIGNALS” Full Title<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -16.65pt 0.0001pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">SCHOOL “<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">SCHOOL</st1:placetype> OF <st1:placename w:st="on">SIGS</st1:placename></st1:place>” Abbreviated
Title<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In April 1948 Signals
Directorate sent a letter to all signal units asking for suggestions for a new
Corps motto. However, the response was not very encouraging. In July 1948 it
was decided to ask for further suggestions from all ranks through an Indian
Army Order. Accordingly IAO 512/48 was published, asking for suggestions for a
new motto for the Corps of Indian Signals. It was stipulated that the suggested
motto should have some association in meaning with the work of Signals, be
simple, easy to pronounce and be short i.e. not more than two words.
Suggestions were to be sent to the Secretary Indian Signal Corps Committee by <st1:date day="21" month="8" w:st="on" year="1948">21 August 1948</st1:date>. It was
stated that Rs. 100/- would be distributed in prizes for the three best
suggestions received by due date.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
call for suggestions through IAO 512/48 elicited a large number of responses.
The three mottos considered most suitable were <i>SHIGRA-SHUDDHA</i> (Swift-Correct), <i>TIVRA-SATYA</i>
(Keen-True) and <i>TEZ AUR CHAUKAS</i>
(Swift – accurate, cautious, vigilant, careful, exact). On <st1:date day="21" month="10" w:st="on" year="1948">21 October 1948</st1:date> these were sent to
the Ad Hoc Committee comprising Brigadier B.S Bhagat, CSO Western Command;
Lieutenant Colonel P.N. Luthra, CO Army HQ Signal Regiment; Lieutenant Colonel
Hazara Singh, CO Western Command Signal Regiment; and Major A.M. David, Staff
Officer, Air Formation, Air HQ. The
members of the Ad Hoc Committee, who were all based in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, were asked to state their order of
preference by <st1:date day="31" month="10" w:st="on" year="1948">31 October
1948</st1:date>. If considered necessary, they could get the opinion of others
under their command.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 10</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Ad Hoc Committee finalized its
recommendations on <st1:date day="11" month="11" w:st="on" year="1948">11 November
1948</st1:date>. Instead of selecting one of the mottos sent to them, in toto,
it decided to take one word each from two of the mottos and combine them to
form <i>TEEVRA CHAUKAS</i> (changing the
spelling <i>TIVRA</i> to <i>TEEVRA</i>). The new motto of the Corps of
Indian Signals was disseminated to all units on <st1:date day="17" month="11" w:st="on" year="1948">17 November 1948</st1:date> by the Secretary of the Corps
Committee. It was subsequently approved by the C-in-C and promulgated through
Indian Army Order No. 3/49. The exact
meaning of the motto is ‘Swift and Sure/Secure’. It signifies the determination
of every member of the Corps to do his best in transmitting the commander’s
orders as quickly as possible and in the most accurate manner. Nine persons
shared the monetary award, of which only three (one JCO, one NCO and one civilian)
were from Signals, the remainder being from other arms and services. </span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">11</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
Colours <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since
earliest times, colours, standards and guidons have been used to indicate the
presence of commanders on the battlefield. With advancements in weaponry and
means of communication, battlefields became larger and the commander was rarely
visible to the troops. Though their function now is largely ceremonial, colours
remain an important ingredient of military ritual, and command great reverence
from soldiers. The significance of the colours has been described by Sir Edward
Hamly in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>A moth eaten rag on a worm eaten pole,<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It does not look
likely to stir a man’s soul.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Tis
the deeds that were done ‘neath the moth eaten rag,<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When the pole
was a staff and the rag was a flag. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Before
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
only infantry and cavalry regiments were entitled to possess colours, which
were emblazoned with the crest of the regiment, and the battle honours awarded
to it during war. According to the existing orders, the Indian Signal Corps was
not eligible for award of colours or battle honours. These orders were revised
vide Army HQ letter No. 51991/1AG//PS-8 dated 2 March 1956, according to which
President’s Colours could be awarded to battalions, regiments and corps. The
matter was discussed during the 12<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Corps Committee
held on 19-20 March 1959 and it was decided that a statement of case should be
prepared for presentation of the President’s Colours to the Corps. Based on
this, a case was initiated by Signal Directorate in February 1960 for
authorizing regimental colours for the Corps and award of the President’s
insignia. A proposal by Brigadier T. Barreto to claim battle/theatre honours
which could be inscribed on the regimental colours was considered by the 13<sup>th</sup>
Corps Committee Meeting on 24-25 March 1960. However, it was felt that
battle/theatre honours could not be claimed for signal units or the Corps as a
whole since the Corps had taken part in practically all operations.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps Colours<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The colours were approved in
December 1960 but due to difficulties experienced in getting them manufactured,
the presentation could not be held during the Golden Jubilee celebrations in
1961. According to the approved design,
the size of colours was 3 ft. 9 in. in the fly and 3 ft. in the hoist with a
two-inch wide gold fringe. On a
background of light blue, the Corps badge and motto was embroidered within a
single wreath composed of Ashoka leaves and flowers. The title of the Corps was
embroidered on a scroll below the wreath. The wooden staff surmounted by the
national state emblem in gilt metal was 8 ft. 7½ in. The tassel suspended by
cord from the upper corner of the hoist was of crimson and gold mixed. The
material used was indigenous silk or hand woven silk. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1962, Brigadier T. Barreto again
proposed that a case should be taken up for award of battle honours “Neuve
Chapelle (1915)” and “<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ngakyedauk</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> (1944)” to the
Corps. The point was discussed during the 14<sup>th</sup> Corps Committee
Meeting on 16-17 March 1962. It was explained that this question had not been
taken up earlier because it was felt that that no operation could be successful
without Signals providing the means of exercising command and control. Since we
contributed to the success of every battle it would not be appropriate to claim
battle/theatre honours for any particular battle or operation. However, after
discussion it was agreed that the present orders which made the Corps
ineligible for claiming battle/theatre honours were not justified and action
should be taken to have them amended. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As regards the award of President’s
insignia for the regimental colours, it was explained that the case had already
been prepared and would be submitted soon. It was agreed that proper cord silk
for the flag be procured from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>, if necessary. With regard to
the presentation of the regimental colours, it was felt that once a decision is
obtained for the award of the President’s insignia, a presentation ceremony for
the colours should be arranged during the next reunion or earlier on a Corps
birthday. In the meantime a write up on the award of regimental colours to the
Corps, along with its photograph should be published in the Signalman. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
article on regimental colours was duly published in the April 1963 issue of the
Signalman. The point about battle/theatre honours was not discussed in the next
meeting of the Corps Committee held on 14 & <st1:date day="17" month="2" w:st="on" year="1964">17 February 1964</st1:date>. However, on the insistence
of Brigadier Barreto a case was taken up by Signals Directorate asking for
battle honours and theatre honours In the Report of the Corps of Signals Tradition Committee 1964-65 submitted on <st1:date day="1" month="2" w:st="on" year="1965">1 February 1965</st1:date>. Brigadier
Barreto pointed out that battle honours and theatre honours have been asked for
specific units only and not for the Corps.
He also noted that the Battle of Neuve Chapelle had been omitted. He recommended that battle honours “Neuve
Chapelle (1915)” and “<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ngakyedauk</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> (1944)” should be
claimed for the Corps as a whole so that these titles may be emblazoned on the
regimental colours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
The Corps of Signals was presented regimental colours by the President
of India, Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan at an impressive ceremonial parade on <st1:date day="20" month="2" w:st="on" year="1965">20 February 1965</st1:date> at 1 STC, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>. The parade
comprising 50 officers, 49 JCOs and 1649 OR was commanded by Colonel R.N. Sen,
Commandant 1 STC. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lieutenant Colonel</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">N.S.</st1:state></st1:place> Mathur was the parade
second-in-command. The cased colours sheathed in a leather cover were brought
on parade under escort. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lieutenant
Colonel</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">N.S.</st1:state></st1:place> Mathur
removed the sheath and placed the uncased colours on six side drums and one
tenor drum piled in three tiers. The colours were then consecrated by four
religious teachers – the Pandit (Naib Subedar Ram Dutt Pant), the Granthi (Naib
Subedar Pritam Singh), the Maulvi (Naib Subedar Atta Ullah) and the Padre
(Havildar Gurupadam). The colours were then handed over to the President by
Lieutenant General A.C. Iyappa. The colours were formally handed over by the
President to the Colour Ensign, Second Lieutenant M.S. Ahluwalia. In his
address to the parade, the President lauded the role of the Corps of Signals
since <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
including UN assignments in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The President, Dr S
Radhakrishnan presents the colours at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="20" month="2" w:st="on" year="1965">20 Feb 1965</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The colours are preserved in 1 STC <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>. They are
brought out only during guards of honour and ceremonial parades. When being
moved, the colours are always escorted. The colour party usually comprises an
officer who carries the colours escorted by two havildar majors. Uncased
colours are saluted with the highest honours viz. arms presented, trumpets
sounding the salute and drums beating a ruffle. On occasions when the National
Salute is given, the colours are lowered. For General Salutes, the colours
remain flying. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoHeading7" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="line-height: 150%;">The Corps Flag<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The
official colours of the ISC were blue and white, as specified in Army Order 184
of 1922, which stated: <i>The Signals service has now proved its worth in the
field and should have distinctive dress of its own</i>. <i>Blue and white, the
Signal Service colours should form its distinctive colouring.</i> In 1926, it
was decided that the ISC would use the same colours as the Royal Signals, which
were light blue, dark blue and dark green, representing communications by sky,
sea and land. However, blue and white continued to be used in the signal office
flag, and on the arm bands of DRs and signal office staff, as they are to this
day. The pre-war flag did not have the Corps emblem. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Along
with the approval of the new motto and crest for ISC in 1946, the Indian Signal
Corps Committee approved the new design for the Corps flag. It was specified that the length of the flag should
be twice the breadth for sizes up to 10 feet; the Corps colours would be in the
proportions of 3/7<sup>th</sup> light blue uppermost, 1/7<sup>th</sup> dark
(navy) blue in the middle and 3/7<sup>th</sup> dark green lower most; in the
centre without oval backing would be a gold (deep chrome yellow) “Jimmy” with
star and motto scroll; the overall height of the badge being one half the
breadth of the flag and the badge would face away from the hoist on both sides.
It was decided that a coloured drawing should be sent to M/s Phelps in <st1:address w:st="on"><st1:street w:st="on">Connaught Place</st1:street>, <st1:city w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:city></st1:address> to obtain an estimate of the cost. <b>12</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
the ratio of the length to the width of the flag was changed from 2:1 to 3:2,
vide Army Instruction 128/48. The size
of the badge, however, was not mentioned.
There was some confusion about the orientation of the Jimmy in the
flag. In some cases the Jimmy faced inwards,
in some outwards and in still others, on one side it faced the hoist and on the
other the fly. Though the Corps
Committee of September 1946 had specified that the Jimmy should face the fly,
based on a similar decision of the Royal Signals Committee held in
February/March 1946, many people felt that this looked improper. In the Corps
badge, the Jimmy faces the left, in heraldic terms the ‘Dexter’ side. In heraldry, when any heraldic device is
transferred to a standard or flag, the ‘Dexter’ side is always that nearest the
staff, known as the hoist. Once it was
pointed out that the orientation of the Jimmy was not in consonance with
heraldry, the Royal Signals issued an amendment and decided that the Jimmy
should face the hoist on both sides of the flag. However, the orientation of
the Jimmy in the Indian Signals flag continued to face away from the hoist,
until several years later. </span><b><u><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the Indian
Signals Committee held on 24-26 May 1949 under the Chairmanship of General K.M.
Cariappa, O.B.E, the specimen Corps flag received from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
displayed. The Committee observed that
the background of the crest did not merge with the rest of the flag and the
stitching on the separate piece of cloth in the centre of the flag was not satisfactory. It was decided that the manufacturers be
asked to produce another sample eliminating the above defects, for approval of
the ad hoc committee before bulk orders for the flag were placed. A fresh sample of the Corps flag manufactured
in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was displayed at the next meeting in March 1950 and was approved by the
Committee. It was decided to place bulk
orders for the same on the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
firm.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the 14<sup>th</sup> Meeting
of the Signals Committee on 16-17 March 1962, Brigadier Barreto brought to the
notice of the Committee that technical specifications do not exist to control
the manufacture of the Corps flag, nor is the actual size of the badge, in
relation to the length and width of the flag, clearly laid down. It was decided that a sub-committee will be
appointed to examine the question and also to make recommendations whether we
should follow the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
pattern of having the Jimmy facing the hoist on both sides of the flag as
opposed to our present specification which laid down that the Jimmy will face
away from the hoist. Brigadier T. Barreto was nominated the chairman of the
sub-committee, the other members being Lieutenant Colonel V.D. Deshpande and
Major D.B. Lahiri. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The sub-committee acted with
commendable speed and came up with a comprehensive report on <st1:date day="12" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">12 October 1962</st1:date>. Its
recommendations were approved during the next meeting of the Signals Committee
in February 1964. Details such as the design of the flag, the material used,
the occasions on which it is to be flown, the size of the mast and the plinth
were specified. Along with the Corps flag, the specifications of the signal
centre flag were also laid down. The new flags, conforming to these
specifications, were to be brought into use and the old flags wasted out by
October 1964.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps flag is made up of
material either wool <i>khadi</i> (hand spun
cotton) or bunting cloth. It consists of the Corps emblem mounted centrally on
the background of the Corps colours, light blue, dark blue and dark green in
the proportion 3:1:3. The size of the flag is 6 ft. X 4 ft. The emblem faces
the hoist on both sides. The overall height of the emblem is 2 ft. from the
lower edge of the globe to the upper point of the surmounting star. The flag is
displayed at all unit quarter guards and behind the saluting base at ceremonial
parades. Traditionally, it is also flown outside the office of the commanding
officer. The flag is not carried on
parades and ceremonials. It is not entitled to any honours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
signal centre flag is 3 ft. X 2 ft. in size and is an Ordnance issue item
authorised in the equipment table of every signal unit. The colour of the flag
is white and dark blue horizontally paced in the proportion of 1:1. In peace
time it is flown outside the static signal centre on a 10 ft. high mast. Under
field conditions the size of the mast is reduced and the flag displayed keeping
in mind the requirements of camouflage and concealment. While moving by road
the signal centre vehicle flies the flag to enable despatch riders to know its
location. At night, the signal centre vehicle is permitted to carry a white and
blue light to indicate its location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Reunion</span></u></b></st1:place><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The custom of holding reunions goes
back several centuries. Reunions are held by educational institutions,
religious sects, social organisations etc., but nowhere is it as popular as in
the military. Like other regiments of the Indian Army the Corps of Signals also
follows this tradition. Reunions enable
comrades-in-arms to renew past associations and revive old memories. It is also an occasion to recall the
sacrifices and pay homage to those who laid down their lives to that the
present generation could live in peace.
The ‘Spirit of the <st1:place w:st="on">Reunion</st1:place>’ has been
aptly described by an old signaller in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">But the essence of a
Re-Union of this nature is the spirit of comradeship which inspires the whole
gathering. Two distinct generations, as it were, meet on a common plane. The
old soldiers bring with them a treasure of experience and tradition; the
younger generation who have stepped into their shoes are anxious to maintain a
high standard of discipline and heroism set up by the older generation.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The first reunion of the Indian Signal Corps
was organized by Northern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>
in March 1931. The next reunion was held
in 1932 at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>, which has since then
been the venue of all subsequent reunions.
In 1936, a grand reunion was held to celebrate the silver jubilee of the
Corps, which was attended by the ‘Father of the Corps’, Major General S.H.
Powell, who came from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">England</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The first post-war reunion was held
in 1950. This being the first reunion of the Corps of Signals that came into
being after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
it needs to be covered in some detail. In early 1949 approval of Army HQ was
obtained for holding the first post-war reunion of the Corps in February 1950.
It was also decided that the reunion week would be held in February every
alternate year to include 15 February, as this was the birthday of the Corps.
Though instructions for the reunion were issued by Signals Directorate, detailed
planning for the event was done by the STC. In mid 1949, the Commandant,
Colonel Apar Singh, was promoted brigadier and posted as CSO Southern Command.
The responsibility for organizing the reunion fell to the lot of the Deputy
Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel T. Barreto, who was promoted colonel and
appointed Commandant. The reunion was
originally planned to be held in February but was subsequently postponed to
March 1950. About two weeks before the reunion, Apar Singh returned to his old
appointment as Commandant, in the rank of colonel. In the event, Barreto had to
drop his rank and revert to his appointment of Deputy Commandant, in the rank
of lieutenant colonel. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General K.M. Cariappa, O.B.E, the
C-in-C and Colonel Commandant of the Corps, agreed to attend the reunion and
all preparations were made accordingly. The reunion had many unique features,
which deserve mention. There were no less than four conferences, on different
dates – the Subedar Majors’ Conference, the Unit Commanders’ Conference, the CSOs/Commandants’
Conference and the Signals Committee Meeting. The Inter Command (Signals)
Championships were held in hockey, football, basket ball, volley ball, and
rifle and pistol shooting. Other events that took place during the week, from 6
to 11 March were concerts (Pollard Arena and Herdon Arena); equipment
demonstration (Hugh Rose Barracks); baby show (Child Welfare Centre); pagal
gymkhana (Parade Ground); athletic meet (Copeland Ground); cinema show (Delite
Cinema); dance (Nerbudda Club); bara khana (unit lines); JCOs’ guest night
(JCOs Mess) and the Corps Dinner (Officers Mess). In addition, there were
visits to various institutions, group photographs and informal interactions
between the guests attending the reunion.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Invitations for the reunion were
sent to 105 pensioners and ex-servicemen, after dividing them into three
categories – those who had been discharged before 1931; those discharged
between 1931 and 1939 (with decorations) and those discharged after 1939 (with
decorations). Finally, 80 pensioners and ex-servicemen attended the reunion.
General Cariappa was to arrive on 8 March and return to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> on 10 March. He was to be accompanied
by Brigadier W.W. Loring, the military attaché in the British High Commission
in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, and
other members of his staff. Due to a national emergency, the C-in-C’s programme
was cancelled a day before his arrival. In his absence, the SO-in-C, Brigadier
C.H.I Akehurst presided over the functions. Other senior officers who attended
the reunion were Brigadiers A.C. Iyappa, B.D. Kapur and B.S. Bhagat; Colonels
S.N Bhatia, P.N. Luthra and J.N. Shahani. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Among the prominent JCOs who
attended the reunion were Subedar Majors (Honorary Captains) Chajja Singh
Sardar Bahadur O.B.I., R. Panchanadan Bahadur O.B.I., Mohd. Shahab Khan Sardar
Bahadur O.B.I. and Teja Singh Gurung;
Subedar Majors Narain Singh Bahadur O.B.I., M.B.E., A.D.C., Joginder
Singh Bahadur, O.B.I., M.B.E., R. Seshachalam M.B.E. and Shiv Singh Bahadur,
O.B.I.; Subedars Ahmed Badsha, G.Moses, M.B.E., Asa Ram Bahadur O.B.I.,
I.D.S.M. and D. Narayana Swami Bahadur
O.B.I.; Jemadars Gulaba and A. George
I.D.S.M. <b>14</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
the face of it, the reunion appears to have been organised on a lavish scale.
In fact, it was an example of austerity and meticulousness. Signals Directorate
had decreed that the total expenditure on the Reunion Week was not to exceed to
Rs. 10,000. As a result, the accent was on economy. One way rail fare of all
pensioners was paid by the Government, the return fare being reimbursed from
the Indian Signals Reunion Fund. Pensioners were also provided free messing and
accommodation. Senior officers
(brigadiers and colonels) were accommodated in the Flag Staff House and Circuit
House. Most of the lieutenant colonels stayed in the Rest House with the balance
staying in the Officers Mess with the other officers (majors and below). A
large number of officers stayed with officers posted at the STC. Two pensioners
had the pleasure of staying with their sons. Subedar Major Narain Singh stayed
with his son Captain Hardev Singh and Subedar Major and Honorary Captain Chajja
Singh with his son Captain H.S. Kler. Transport being in short supply, even
senior officers had to share the available staff cars and stations wagons.
Almost all officers and their wives were transported to various functions in 15
cwt. trucks. Many used their own cars.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though
it had been earlier decided that reunions would be held<span style="color: red;">
</span>every alternate year, it was subsequently decided to hold them once
every four years together with the Signals Inter-Command Games. Accordingly,
the second post-war reunion was held at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
from 9-16 February 1954. As already decided, the Inter-Command games were also
held. Five teams – one from each command, the STC and Army HQ – contested in
five events – hockey, football, volleyball, basketball and shooting. The
Akehurst Challenge Cup was awarded to Southern Command which stood first,
winning the Inter-Command Championship. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> There were a few changes in the
programme from the previous reunion of 1950. A Signals Tableaux was organised,
which included a para drop, trick riding by despatch riders, PT display by the
Boys Regiment and floats depicting the evolution of Signals from early times.
Instead of a dance at the Nerbudda Club, a ‘social night’ was held in the
Officers Mess. This was in addition to the Corps Dinner which was held on 15
February as a Regimental Guest Night. Another new event was the carnival,
organised on the lines of a fete or a <i>mela
</i>(fair<i>).</i> This had a number of
stalls selling eatables, artefacts and souvenirs, in addition to games of skill
and chance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This reunion was also a farewell to
Brigadier Akehurst, who was laying down the reins of office of the SO-in-C on
his retirement. Due to exigencies of service, General Cariappa – he had retired
as C-in-C but was still the Colonel Commandant - could not attend the reunion
but sent a message that was read out by the SO-in-C. The number of pensioners
who attended the reunion was 108, including some who had attended the previous
reunion in 1950. One of the prominent veterans was Subedar Major and Honorary
Captain Chajja Singh. Among the senior serving officers who attended were
Brigadiers A.C. Iyappa, B.D. Kapur, R.N. Batra, Apar Singh and M.N. Batra. The
only two retired officers present were Majors P. Bernard and Puran Singh.<b>15 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The third post-war reunion held in
1958 was the sixth reunion since 1931, when the first reunion was held in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>. Many people
in the Corps felt that the appellation ‘post-war’ should be given up, and the
reunions numbered from 1931 onwards. As the Editor of the Signalman wrote in
the issue of April 1958, <i>“Surely we are
not going to let transitory wars and allied events interfere with our history
and tradition.”</i> He also suggested the Hindi translation of the reunion as <i>punarmilan, </i>hoping that this would be
readily accepted and brought into use. As a matter of record, the invitations
in Roman Hindustani to ex-servicemen sent for the 1950 reunion had used the
words <i>mel milap</i>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_8"
o:spid="_x0000_i1031" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:354pt;height:253.5pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image013.jpg"
o:title="7"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="338" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image014.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_8" width="472" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Colonel Commandant conversing with Havildar Magh Singh and other pensioners
during the 1958 <st1:place w:st="on">Reunion</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 1958 reunion was attended by
General Cariappa, who was the senior Colonel Commandant. The second Colonel
Commandant, Lieutenant General Daulet Singh, could not attend. Fifty nine
ex-servicemen were present, including some veterans of World War I such as
Subedar Major and Honorary Captain Chajja Singh, Sardar Bahadur, O.B.I.,
Jemadar Govind Fadtare, I.D.S.M., Havildar Magh Singh and Sapper Bhag Singh,
I.O.M. Each pensioner was measured as soon as he arrived and was presented with
a set of mufti (white trousers and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
coats) the very next day! Among the senior serving officers who attended were
Brigadiers A.C. Iyappa (SO-in-C), B.S. Bhagat,
Apar Singh, H. Chukerbuti, M.N. Batra and T. Barreto.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Most of the events associated with
earlier reunions such as the Inter Command games, variety show, pagal gymkhana,
demonstration of signal equipment etc. were held in 1958 also. A unique event
was the shooting of a tiger by Jemadar Kalyan Singh of 1 Technical Training
Regiment from a distance of ten yards on 11 February. Apparently, the party had
gone on a shikar expedition looking for deer, but bagged a tiger instead. Next
morning, the dead tiger was laid out on the shooting range, during the Inter Command
shooting competitions. This probably demoralized the other teams, enabling the
STC to win the Cariappa trophy!<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> There was a social get together in the
Officers Mess on 12 February for signal officers and their wives. In a
departure from norms, honorary officers were also invited. The next evening,
the Nerbudda Club hosted a dinner dance in honour of General Cariappa who
arrived the same evening. A unique event was the performance by Sachin
Shanker’s ballet troupe on 14 February. The events on 15 February included the
ceremonial parade, followed by the bara khana, athletic meet, PT display and
the Corps Dinner at night. The last event of the reunion was the closing
address by the General Cariappa in the Pollard Arena on 16 February.<b>16<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Since the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary
of the Corps was falling in 1961, the next reunion was held after a gap of
three years instead of four. The reunion was celebrated as the Golden Jubilee
Anniversary of the Corps of Signals from 12-16 February 1961. The Inter-Command
Games and Shooting competitions that formed part of the reunion were held
earlier, from 7-11 February 1961. In keeping with importance of the event, the
celebrations were on a lavish scale. A large number of British officers
attended the reunion, prominent among them being Major General R.J. Moberly,
C.B., O.B.E., Colonel Commandant, Royal Signals; Brigadier C.H.I. Akehurst,
C.B.E., Brigadier E.C.R Blaker, O.B.E., Chief Signal Officer, Scottish Command,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>;
Major E. Lawton-Summer; Major H.K. Milward and Captain W.E. Holloway. Among the
Indian retired officers were Brigadier B.S. Bhagat, Major J.R. de Souza, Major
Sahib Singh, O.B.I., Sardar Bahadur, Captain Khushal Singh, Captain N.C. Ray
and Lieutenant V.K. Oliver. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Among serving officers, the most
prominent visitor to the reunion was General K.S Thimayya, D.S.O, Chief of the
Army Staff. This was unique, because apart from those of his own regiment, the
only reunion that General Thimayya attended during his tenure as Army Chief was
that of Signals. Other prominent Indian visitors were Lieutenant General
Harkirat Singh, Engineer-in-Chief and Major General B.D. Kapur, Chief
Controller, Research & Development. The senior Colonel Commandant,
Lieutenant General Daulet Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command, could not be present
due to the illness of his wife and the reunion was presided over by the
SO-in-C, Major General A.C. Iyappa, who had been elected as Colonel Commandant
in place of General Cariappa in 1959.
Almost all senior officers of the Corps attended the reunion. This
included Brigadiers Apar Singh, H. Chukerbuti, T. Barreto, I.D. Verma and
Jaswant Singh; Colonels E.G Pettengell, S.N. Gairola, M.B.K. Nair and R.Z.
Kabraji. All commanding officers were
invited and the serving officers comprised 29 lieutenant colonels, 24 majors,
26 captains, eight lieutenants and seven second lieutenants. These were in addition to the officers posted
in STC, which was then under the command of Colonel Prem Singh. The number of
serving JCOs was also large – 24 subedar majors, 37 subedars and 71 jemadars. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This being the Golden Jubilee
Anniversary of the Corps, every pensioner who could be reached was invited to
attend. The response was overwhelming. The list of attendees included 43
subedar majors, 14 subedars, 17 jemadars, 36 havildars, 19 naiks, 12 lance
naiks and 60 signalmen. Some of these veterans had joined even before the birth
of the Corps in 1911. Among them were Subedar Major (Honorary Captain) Chajja
Singh, Sardar Bahadur, O.B.I. (1908-1944); Subedar Major (Honorary Captain)
Mohd. Shahab Khan, Sardar Bahadur, O.B.I. (1909-1939); Subedar Major (Honorary
Lieutenant) Tej Singh Gurung (1908-1920); Subedar Ujagar Singh
(1907-1938); Jemadar Govind Fadtare,
I.D.S.M., (1908-1929); Havildar Magh Singh (1904-1929); Havildar Ganesha Singh
(1906-1934); Havildar Thakar Singh (1906-1921) and Havildar Achharu who had
joined in 1901. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Two major events that occurred
during the 1961 reunion were the unveiling of the War Memorial and the
establishment of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></st1:place>, both of which had
been proposed and designed by Brigadier Barreto. The Roll of Honour was placed
on the War Memorial with due ceremony.
An attestation parade was held on <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Anderson</st1:place></st1:city>
grounds in front of the War Memorial, a custom that has been followed ever
since. The para drop scheduled on 13 February had to be cancelled due to strong
winds, after the Air Force instructor who jumped first landed among the
spectators. However, the motor cycle trials were held as planned. A ceremonial parade comprising 2,500 all
ranks, the largest ever in the Corps, was held on 15 February. Colonel Prem
Singh commanded the parade and General Thimayya took the salute. After the
Corps Dinner that evening, the golden rose bowl that had been presented earlier
by General Moberly on behalf of Royal Signals was filled with champagne and
passed around to all officers for a sip. Brigadier Akehurst, on behalf of Mrs.
Akehurst and himself, presented a silver sugar sifter to officers of the Corps.<b>17 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
fifth post-war reunion was held at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>
from 18-23 February 1965. The reunion week had to be delayed due to the
presentation of the Regimental Colours by the President, which took place on 20
February. The reunion was planned on almost the same scale as the Golden
Jubilee Anniversary that had been celebrated five years earlier. The events
were presided over by the two colonel commandants, Lieutenant General A.C.
Iyappa and Major General R.N. Batra, the SO-in-C. The Chief of the Army Staff,
General J.N. Chaudhuri attended the reunion. Other prominent guests were Major
General A.M.W Whistler, C.B., C.B.E., Colonel Commandant, Royal Signals; Major
General Harkirat Singh, Engineer-in-Chief; Major General D.C. Misra, M.C., GOC
Madhya Pradesh Area; Major General M.N. Batra, Director of Military
Intelligence; Air Commodore K.A. Joseph, Director of Signals, Indian Air Force;
Captain E.J. Debu, I.N., Director of Naval Signals and Captain R.B.
Fanderlinden, I.N, Director Joint Communications Electronics Staff.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though not as large as in 1961, the
number of pensioners was substantial. The old stalwarts – Chajja Singh, Tej
Singh Gurung, Mohd Shahab Khan, Thakar Singh – were present, along with many
other veterans of World War I and II. Another distinguished visitor was Mrs.
Daulet Singh, who presented to the Corps the sword of her late husband, our
Colonel Commandant, who had died in tragic circumstances two years earlier.
Advantage of her presence was taken by requesting her to personally hand over
the Daulet Singh Trophy for personal high endeavour, which had been donated by
her husband in 1959, to Naik Dharam Chand Dhilan, VrC. The full dress uniform of late Subedar Major
and Honorary Captain Narain Singh as ADC to King George V had already been
presented to the museum. To acknowledge the donation, a life size portrait was
presented to his son, Captain Hardev Singh. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps Dinner was held on 19
February in the Officers Mess as a regimental guest night. The COAS was the
chief guest. The highlight of the reunion was the presentation of Regimental
Colours by President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan at a ceremonial parade on <st1:date day="20" month="2" w:st="on" year="1965">20 February 1965</st1:date>, a
detailed account of which has been given elsewhere in this chapter. The
President was accompanied by General K.M. Cariappa, the first Indian C-in-C and
former Colonel Commandant. After attending the parade, General Cariappa also
attended the pagal gymkhana in the afternoon along with General Chaudhury and
other visitors. The most popular event was ‘donkey review’, in which only
brigadiers and above could take part. General Whistler, a veteran equestrian and
one time Master of the Nerbudda Vale Hunt, won the contest.<b>18</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The reunion ended on 23 February.
After the closing address by the SO-in-C, some pensioners made impromptu
speeches, expressing their feelings. A welcome change in the dispersal
arrangements was the special train that had been arranged from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. The train was gaily decorated,
especially the engine, leading spectators to mistake it for a <i>barat </i>(marriage party).<i> <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_9"
o:spid="_x0000_i1032" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:349.5pt;height:267.75pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image015.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="357" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image016.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_9" width="466" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
President meets pensioners during the 1965 <st1:place w:st="on">Reunion</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The sixth post-war reunion was held
at 1 STC <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>
in 1970, five years after the fifth reunion. By this time, the third colonel
commandant had been sanctioned for the Corps and the rank of the SO-in-C
upgraded to lieutenant general. Consequently, the Corps had had three colonels
commandant attending the reunion - Lieutenant Generals A.C. Iyappa, R.N. Batra
and I.D Verma (SO-in-C). Prominent Indian guests were Colonel T.K. Mukerji,
Brigadier Ajit Singh, Colonel M.S. Krishnmoorthy, Lieutenant Colonel Shiv
Singh, Major H.D. Vyse and Major P. Thakoor. The two officers from Royal
Signals present were Major Eric Lawton Sumner and Captain W.E. Holloway. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Compared to previous reunions, the
number of events had been reduced in order to curtail the duration of the
function and make it less hectic for the visitors, many of whom felt that it
was too strenuous. The Inter-Command games had been done away with, and
replaced by the 1 STC Boxing Championships. The formal events consisted of the
wreath laying ceremony at War Memorial, attestation parade, ceremonial parade
and the Corps Association dinner. These were interspersed with events designed
to entertain visitors, such as the torchlight PT display, fireworks, DR display
and para drop.<b>19 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">War
Memorial<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After World War II ended, the Indian Signal Corps
War Memorial Fund was opened, to commemorate the sacrifices of signallers who
had lost their lives in action. During the 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the Indian
Signal Corps Committee held on <st1:date day="10" month="9" w:st="on" year="1946">10
September 1946</st1:date> it was decided that a school at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
and later a second school at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Coimbatore</st1:place></st1:city>
run entirely by the Corps would be a fitting Indian Signals War Memorial. The
object of the school would be to help the education of sons of signalmen and
NCOs either killed in action or missing. Boys would be accepted at the age of
10 or 11 and should aim at reaching the high school standard at the age of 17.
There would be no undertaking to join the Army in due course by boys entering
the school though every effort would be made to encourage the boys to take up
an Army career in the Indian Signal Corps. This would help in the induction of
good material into the Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This decision was reaffirmed during
the next meeting held on <st1:date day="15" month="5" w:st="on" year="1947">15
May 1947</st1:date>, which decided that the school at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
should cater for 30 boy boarders with additional educational facilities for 70
day scholars. Apart from the sons of deceased sepoys and NCOs and those who are
orphaned, the school would also accept sons of retired and serving soldiers
including VCOs, if vacancies were available, but there would be a small charge
according to the parents’ means. It was estimated that the annual recurring
expenditure on the school would be approximately Rs. 10,000. The only fund
available to meet this expenditure was the interest accruing from the Indian
Signal Corps War Memorial Fund which then stood at Rs. 60,000. To meet the
shortfall the Committee decided to levy a compulsory annual subscription on
Indian signal officers equivalent to half a day’s basic pay and a compulsory
annual contribution from all signal units in proportion to their strength with
the proviso that the contributions from VCOs and other ranks will be voluntary.
Based on this decision, units were asked to send their contributions to the
Commandant Indian Signal Corps Centre, <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
by <st1:date day="31" month="12" w:st="on" year="1947">31 December 1947</st1:date>.
The amount collected from officers’ subscriptions was estimated as Rs. 3,000
while the remainder Rs. 7,000 was to be contributed by units.<b>20</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparently the funds collected fell
short of the requirement and at the next meeting of the Indian Signals
Committee held in April 1948 it was decided that the Rs. 40,000 available be
spent to provide a lasting war memorial in Jubbulpore. Suggestions regarding
the form and design of the memorial were invited from all ranks by <st1:date day="31" month="7" w:st="on" year="1948">31 July 1948</st1:date>. In the next
meeting held in May 1949 it was stated that the form which the war memorial to
be built at Jubbulpore was to take had not yet been decided, and that the
majority of the suggestions received so far favoured the construction of a
pavilion. The committee decided that as the cost of construction at present was
extremely high the matter should be pended for some time. Further suggestions
should be called for and the matter would be reconsidered at the next meeting.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the next meeting held in March 1952 Brigadier B.D. Kapur suggested that the war
memorial should take the form of a pavilion to be built at the STC, which was
accepted. Brigadier Kapur further
suggested that in order to economize on expenditure, the possibility of MES
undertaking the construction of the pavilion should be investigated. Nothing happened for the next four years
until the point again came up for discussion at the 9<sup>th</sup> Meeting of
the Signals Committee on <st1:date day="11" month="4" w:st="on" year="1956">11
April 1956</st1:date> when it was stated that the scheme outlined by Commandant
STC for a children’s school was beyond the means available. Although the
Committee generally favoured a farm, no decision could be reached and the
matter was again deferred. Meanwhile,
Commandant STC was asked to investigate the availability of land. If land adjacent to STC was not available,
the feasibility of running a farm outside <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
could be considered. It was also stated that sufficient funds were not
available to build a museum as a war memorial.
However, Commandant STC was asked to work out a plan and submit
estimates for a suitable building for consideration.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1959 the Corps Committee decided that a memorial
should be built at the STC at a cost of not exceeding Rs. 7,000. Brigadier Barreto was requested to produce a
design of the memorial after consulting consultant engineers/architects. The war memorial would be unveiled during the
Golden Jubilee Celebrations. At the next meeting in 1960 the plan of the war
memorial was generally approved. It was
decided that it will bear only one Jimmy of the erstwhile Indian Signal Corps
and would be inscribed with the words: <i>“In
Memory of Those Who Gave Their Lives In the Service of The Country</i><b>”.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Construction of the war memorial commenced soon
afterwards under arrangements of the STC. The actual construction was carried
out by M/s Anand Construction Company, <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>.
The total cost of the project was Rs. 8,309 of which Rs. 7,000 was paid from
the War Memorial Fund and the balance from the regimental funds of the STC. <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The site for the memorial was
selected after considerable thought, as described by Brigadier T. Barreto in
the following words:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 3.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The actual site
of the monument was given some thought but sentiment eventually pointed to the
drill square in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Anderson</st1:place></st1:city>
Lines. This ground has been watered by
the sweat of the recruits of the Corps since the Training Centre was
established in <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place> in 1920. It was on this square that they swore loyalty
to the Country. No other part of the
Centre is as familiar to the majority as this area; and now that some of the
feet that had stamped on its surface are silent and still, having fallen in the
field, away from home and country, it is only appropriate that the recruits of
the future swear their loyalty in the shadow of a memorial erected in honour of
their predecessors who died in the service of the Corps</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.21</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
monument, consisting of a ten-foot wall of Katni stone with the original emblem
of the Indian Signal Corps in brass and a dedicatory plaque was unveiled on <st1:date day="13" month="2" w:st="on" year="1961">13 February 1961</st1:date>, during
the Golden Jubilee Reunion at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>. The unveiling ceremony was performed by Major
General A.C Iyappa in the presence of a large number of visitors and all ranks
of the STC. The parade consisting of a guard of honour and representative of
the Corps was commanded by Major D.B. Lahiri. The Roll of Honour (researched
and drafted by Brigadier Barreto) was brought under escort from the Museum and
placed on the War Memorial. After the ceremony, wreaths were placed by General
Iyappa, Brigadier Akehurst, Colonel Muhammad Iqbal Khan, the Pakistan Military
Attaché (on behalf of the Pakistan Signal Corps), Colonel Prem Singh,
Commandant STC and Subedar Major Amar Singh, the oldest and senior-most
pensioner (on behalf of retired VCOs). Following this, wreaths were also laid by
Colonel M.B.K. Nair (on behalf of Lieutenant General Daulet Singh), Major
General R,J. Moberly (on behalf of the Royal Corps of Signals), Major General
B.D. Kapur, Lieutenant Colonel R.L. Anand (on behalf of the Corps of Engineers), Colonel T.K. Mukerji
(on behalf of retired officers), Havildar Achharu, the oldest OR present (on
behalf of retired OR) and by Subedar Inder Singh (on behalf of serving JCOs and
OR). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_10" o:spid="_x0000_i1033" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:228.75pt;
height:329.25pt;rotation:90;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image017.jpg"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="305" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image018.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_10" width="439" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The War Memorial<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Subsequently, it was decided to add
the present emblem of the Corps, and this was mounted below the original device
in 1970. Today, attestation parades are
held in the shadow of the memorial, during which recruits pledge their loyalty
to the nation and the service. Wreaths
are laid at the memorial on special occasions, and a ceremonial guard performs
a ritual each morning, during which flowers are offered in memory of the
martyrs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Corps</span></u></b></st1:placename><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></span></u></b></st1:place><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></st1:place>
is located within the precincts of 1 STC at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>.
The museum is the outcome of the efforts of a very distinguished
signaller whose abiding interest in the Corps has been instrumental in the
establishment of several regimental institutions, in addition to compilation of
the first volume of the history of the Corps of Signals. Were it not for the
sustained efforts of Brigadier T. Barreto spread over several years and his
personal initiative to collect memorabilia, often at his own expense, it is
doubtful if the museum would have come up when it did. Sadly, his sterling
contribution remains largely unrecognized and few signallers of the present
generation are aware of the odds against which the museum was established. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There is an indication that a
museum existed in the officers’ mess of the STC prior to 1933. “Printed précis,
notes and orders on Signalling 1879-1889” loaned from this museum formed part
of “Notes on the Historical Record of the Indian Signal Corps” compiled by
Major C.E.J. Reynolds and submitted to the SO-in-C that year. Although the main
portion of the Notes is available in original, the items obtained from the mess
museum were never found. Nor is there any trace of a museum register or any
other item in the mess that may have belonged to it. At the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, there was
no museum in existence in the Corps. The first effort in this direction was
made in 1948 by Lieutenant Colonel T. Barreto, who was then commanding the
Technical Training Regimental at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>.
He built up a small museum of signal equipment mainly for instructional
purposes in his unit. The first pieces to be exhibited were a DIII telephone
which Barreto purchased from a <i>kabari </i>(scrap
dealer<i>) </i>for five rupees at Kamptee
and an SX-DX baseboard which he obtained from an Ordnance depot. <b>22 </b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1951, guidelines for establishment of signal equipment museums were issued by
Signals Directorate. This letter gave out the aim and scope of signal equipment
museums and the method of display, along with a suggested diagrammatic layout.
Both antique and modern equipment was to be displayed, in such a manner that it
reflected the historical evolution of signal equipment from the early days of
inception of the Corps to the modern times. Captured equipment was also to be
included to indicate the equivalent equipment of the enemy, to cater for an
appreciation of comparative standards. The letter was addressed to the STC and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> with copies to CSOs, Army
Signals School Poona, CAFSO and signal officers posted in all major training
institutions.<b>23</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
next significant step was taken in 1956 when Brigadier Barreto submitted a
proposal for a museum for consideration of the Corps Committee. Noting that the
War Memorial Fund had remained unutilized from 1947 for want of an acceptable
proposal, he suggested that the war memorial should take the form of a museum.
To buttress his argument, he quoted a letter issued by Signals Directorate in
1953 which had stated that <i>“in order to
inculcate pride in one’s corps, it is necessary that each member of it must be
familiar with the past history, traditions and achievements of the Corps”</i>.
In order that history be taught, he argued, a historical record must exist.
Although a history was being compiled, the lack of a Corps archives and Corps
museum had made the task extremely difficult. Even after the history had been
complied, it would have little effect on the recruit or the young officer who
would be bored by a mass of detail. But were he to see for himself relics of
the Corps’s past history, not only would history fix itself in his mind but he
would also take an interest in reading the history. Most historical pieces in
existence were spread over a number of officers’ messes. Consequently, most
officers remained unaware of their existence. As for the men, they never got a
chance to see them. Many relics such as medals and photographs held by veterans
would disappear after their death, since there was no organisation where these
could be collected and preserved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The proposal envisaged the
construction of a building which in addition to being a monument for the Corps
dead, would also house the Corps museum and archives. The names of the martyrs
who had fallen during operations from 1911 to 1947 could be inscribed on the
front face of the structure. The building could also house the offices of the
Corps Association, whose secretary would also function as the curator of the
museum, keeper of the archives, the Corps historian and the editor of the
Signalman. In hindsight, the proposal was not only cogent, but brilliant. Had
it been accepted in toto, it would have resulted in the establishment of a
number of regimental institutions at one go. It would have also filled up
several voids, such as the absence of an archive, a regimental headquarters and
a permanent historian, which exist even today. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Barreto’s
proposal was considered by the Corps Committee during the 9<sup>th</sup>
Meeting held on <st1:date day="11" month="4" w:st="on" year="1956">11 April
1956</st1:date>. The Committee felt that cost of the scheme was beyond the
financial resources then available but agreed that a museum to house items
connected with the history and traditions of the Corps was desirable. Accordingly, it directed the Commandant STC
to take steps for the collection of such items and to arrange for housing them
in existing accommodation. Accordingly, on 31 May 1956 the Commandant STC wrote
to CSOs Command, Commandant School of Signals, CAFSO and CO 1 Army HQ Signal
Regiment asking them to direct units to despatch to the STC ‘any items
connected with the raising, development and history of the Corps of Signals and
any other item that may have connections with the tradition of the Corps’.
Considering the vague and half-hearted appeal, which did not indicate the type
of items that were being solicited, it is not surprising that the response was
lukewarm. After a year, when the Corps Committee met again, Barreto stated that
unless every senior officer of the Corps takes a special interest and
approaches ex-officers and JCOs, it will not be possible to collect items of
interest for the Corps museum. The Committee asked him to give a list of
individuals who might be in possession of old war relics and such other items
of historical value to the Officer-in-Charge Signals Records who in turn will
supply CSOs/Commandants with a copy of the list with the addresses of these
individuals. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
next meeting of the Corps Committee held on <st1:date day="14" month="2" w:st="on" year="1958">14 February 1958</st1:date> at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
was chaired by General K.M. Cariappa. Brigadier Barreto, President of the Corps
History Committee, pointed out that there were occasions when payments had to
be made to the dependents of an ex-serviceman for certain items which were
considered useful for the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></st1:place>. It was agreed to place a sum of Rs 1,000/- at
the disposal of the President, Corps History Committee, for such expenditure,
which would be debited to the Corps of Signals Fund in the first instance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the decision to establish the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></st1:place> in 1956, some
items had been transferred from the signal equipment museum and others from the
officers’ mess at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>. Gradually
certain other items were added mainly due to the efforts of the Corps History
Committee. The collection was housed temporarily in the sand model room in the
headquarters building of the STC. An appeal for items for the museum was
published in the July 1959 issue of the Signalman, but the response was far
from enthusiastic. Fortunately, at this time a museum-cum-library building was
sanctioned as part of the plan for construction of permanent accommodation for
the centre. This building was completed shortly before the Golden Jubilee of
the Corps in 1961 and the items were hurriedly transferred from their temporary
location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></st1:place> was formally inaugurated by the
SO-in-C, Major General A.C. Iyappa, during the Golden Jubilee celebrations of
the Corps in February 1961. Though the
collection was meagre, considering that the Corps was fifty years old, there
were a few items of value. One of the most interesting items was a manuscript
letter dated 1880 from Lord Roberts (later Field Marshal Lord Roberts of
Kandahar) to Captain Wynne (later General Sir Arthur Wynne) on the subject of
heliograph signalling which was then in its infancy. Other valuable exhibits
were ‘The Manual of Signalling 1884’; the manuscript correspondence between
Major Powell and Major Wright, commanding the Telegraph Battalion in Aldershot
in England; and Powell’s printed report on the Deoband Manoeuvres of 1908. A
striking exhibit in the clothing section was the uniform of Subedar Major
Narain Singh worn by him in 1925 while employed as Indian Orderly Officer to
the King. The medal section had the original <i>sanads</i> of three awards of the Indian Order of Merit, two of them
relating to World War I. Another exhibit was the battle scarred flag used by 7<sup>th</sup>
Indian Divisional Signals during the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Battle</st1:place></st1:city>
of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ngakeydauk</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> in 1944. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The interest shown by pensioners
more than made up for the scanty collection, as described by the Chairman of the Corps History Committee in the following
words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the re-union, a
large number of pensioners were conducted round the museum on the morning
allotted on the programme but several of them visited it again during their
spare time. Their interest in the exhibits, their comments as they recognised
colleagues in the photograph albums, the way they fondled the heliograph and
the signalling keys, gave the greatest satisfaction to the organizers of the
museum. If the glint in the eyes of the more aged pensioners was any
indication, we have been more than amply rewarded in our efforts</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.<b>24</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Efforts
to increase the collection continued and contributions began to be received
from units as well as retired officers, JCOs and OR. In an effort to enhance
the range of items held in the museum it was decided in 1964 that old items of
mess silver of historical value should be preserved in the Museum. CSOs and
Commandants were asked to ascertain from units details of regimental mess
trophies of pre-1920 vintage and forward these to the Chairman Corps History
Committee, who would recommend to the Corps Committee items that were
considered suitable for transfer to the museum. It was also decided to obtain
the Royal Signals trophy presented to the IMA in 1934 and used as a boxing
trophy up to 1940, but which was not now being used for this purpose. If
necessary, an offer would be made to present another trophy to the IMA in place
of the original. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1966 the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Museum</st1:placetype></st1:place> was officially recognized as one
of the Army Museums by Army HQ. Certain changes were carried out in the layout
of the museum, which was reorganized into pre-independence and
post-independence sections. Captured items of equipment were displayed in a
separate hall. In 1967 the Corps Committee decided to initiate efforts to
transfer the ACVLP (Armoured Command Vehicle Low Power) named ‘<i>Drona’ </i>held by 1 Armoured Divisional
Signal Regiment to the museum. In 1970 it was suggested that a horsed wagon
cable layer be obtained for the museum. In view of the increase in expenditure
on maintenance of the museum, in 1971 the Corps Committee approved the creation
of a new fund known as the Corps Museum Fund for maintenance of the museum.
Until then, 50% of the annual intake into the General Fund was transferred to
the Sports Fund. It was decided that henceforth 25% each would be transferred
to the Sports Fund and the Museum Fund.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Headquarters
Mess<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">Throughout its
existence from 1911 to 1947, the Indian Signal Corps did not have a Headquarters
Mess of its own, being officered almost entirely by Royal Signals officers, who
were members of the Royal Signals Headquarters Mess at Catterick Camp in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The only
large officers’ mess in the Corps during World War II, when a large number of Indian
officers were inducted, was the </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers Central Mess
at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>. After the
establishment of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> at Mhow in October
1946, it was decided to shift the Central Mess from <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
to Mhow. In early 1947, it was known that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> would be partitioned and
become independent on <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1947">15
August 1947</st1:date>. The princely states were given the option to join
either <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
or <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Due to uncertainty about the attitude of the Holkar of Indore, there was a
possibility that the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> may have to move out
of Mhow. (The Holkar signed the Instrument of Accession on 11 August 1947, just
four days before Independence). In view of this, it was decided to defer the
move of the Central Mess till the final location of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
was decided.<b>25 </b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, it became known that the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
would continue at Mhow. The proposal for
establishing a Headquarters
Mess was considered by the Corps Committee in 1948 and it was decided that the officers’
mess at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> should be the ‘Indian Signals
Headquarters Mess.’ In view of the fact
that no facilities for a proper mess existed at Mhow at that time, it was
decided that Indian Signals Centre Officers Mess at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
will continue to be regarded as Headquarters Mess for the time being. The Committee decided that
‘financing’ of the proposed Headquarters
Mess should be commenced immediately.
Half a day’s basic pay (on new pay code) annually was agreed as the
basic subscription towards this fund from all officers of the Corps. Signals Directorate (Signals Adm) was asked
to open a separate account for this fund and devise means of collection of the
subscription from officers through their units annually.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
year later, the above decision was modified, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of
the Indian Signals Committee held on 24-26 May 1949 decided that with immediate
effect the officers’ mess of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> as opposed to
that of the STC will be known as the ‘Indian Signals Headquarters Mess’. <b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">The officers’
mess of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> was initially established in
small hutments north of the Guard Room. This was later shifted to Block No 4,
Roberts Lines during October 1947<b>. </b>This building had originally been a
gun park that was later used as the Sergeants’ Mess in the days of STC (B),
during the war. Initially the mess was run by Messrs Salig Ram & Sons, the
School canteen contractors. For some time, a lady supervisor was also employed.
However, their services were dispensed with as soon as a mess committee was
properly constituted, which began running the mess. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
February 1949 a separate ante-room for the use of the permanent staff was built
and a bar added. In 1949 Government
approval for a project (estimated originally at Rs. 26 lakhs) was accorded but,
due to financial stringency, money could not be allotted. In lieu, local sanction for a number of minor
works was accorded and in 1950 the mess underwent an overhaul. In 1952 a ladies room was added and a number of
alterations and renovations were carried out.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 28.05pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1953, dining tables and chairs
to seat 100 officers were ordered from the Forest Research Institute, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dehra Dun</st1:place></st1:city>. The walls of the dining hall were panelled,
indirect lighting installed and the ante-room refurnished and redecorated. Additional furniture and silver brought by
the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
helped further to improve the general appearance of the Mess. A ‘shikar’ room
was started, with tiger and panther skins presented by members of the School
shikar club. As more trophies fell to
the shikar club guns these were added to the shikar room. A small shikar library was also made. In 1954 a squash court was constructed not
far from the site of the proposed mess.
This court was officially opened on <st1:date day="8" month="4" w:st="on" year="1954">8 April 1954</st1:date> by Brigadier C.H.I. Akehurst
during his farewell visit to the School. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 28.05pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_11" o:spid="_x0000_i1034" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:355.5pt;
height:273.75pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image019.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="365" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image020.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_11" width="474" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 28.05pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">The
HQ Mess - 1954<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
this time the new site for the Headquarters Mess had been selected in the area
close to the BI Bazaar. In the A.E. (approximate estimates) for the project, Rs
50,000 had been earmarked for the rehabilitation of the inhabitants of the BI
Bazaar. However, subsequently the Chief Executive Officer of the Cantonment
Board expressed his doubts about the possibility of evicting and rehabilitating
them without causing repercussions in ministerial circles. This resulted in the
selection of an alternative site on the airfield. The matter was referred by HQ
Delhi Area to HQ Western Command for reconsideration in May 1954. In June 1954
Colonel H. Chukerbuti, Commandant School of Signals wrote to CSO Western
Command, Brigadier R.N. Batra (at that time, Central Command did not exist) as
well the Director of Signals, Brigadier A.C. Iyappa pointing out the advantages
of the new site. The original site would have resulted in obliteration of the
BI Bazaar, which would have been a good thing from the health and security
point of view. However, the entrance to the mess would be through the School
lines. Moreover it was adjacent to the
JCO and OR family quarters. On the other hand, the airfield site was ideal in every
way for a mess. It also had plenty of
room for construction of single officers’ quarters and ancillary buildings and
was capable of unlimited expansion. Colonel Chukerbuti recommended: “<i>We should plumb for this site</i>”. <b>26</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The new site was approved and the
building plans were prepared by the Engineer-in-Chief’s Branch, using the plan
of the CME Officers Mess as a guide. In September 1955, Brigadier Batra
discussed the plan with the Chief Engineer Western Command and suggested
certain improvements, such as the addition of a guest room, a small
library/study room and a room for the Mess Secretary/Receptionist; and shifting
the ladies lounge away from the card and billiard rooms. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On <st1:date day="30" month="9" w:st="on" year="1955">30 September 1955</st1:date> Brigadier Batra wrote to the
Commandant School of Signals, Colonel I.D Verma and the Director of Signals,
Brigadier A.C. Iyappa, forwarding copies of the line drawings of the proposed
Signals Mess and the CME Mess, mentioning that the Engineers had consented to
incorporate the changes, if requested. He also mentioned that the Chief
Engineer had agreed that our Headquarters Mess should be better than the CME
Mess, which has certain obvious shortcomings. Brigadier Batra asked Colonel
Verma to send his comments to him and to the Signals Directorate, after which
they could both come to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and finalise the plan in conjunction with the Director of Signals.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Colonel
Verma responded on <st1:date day="10" month="10" w:st="on" year="1955">10
October 1955</st1:date>. While agreeing with most of the changes proposed by
Brigadier Batra, he added some of his own, such a front verandah for the entire
building, a room for mess clerks and storage of
stationery and ledgers, increase in the size of the dining hall and so
on. The plans for the building were discussed between the senior officers of
the Corps during Exercise ‘Damini III’ which was held later that year in Mhow.
Construction of the building started soon afterwards and progressed at a
satisfactory pace under the watchful eyes of the Commandant School of Signals.
Even as the construction was going on plans were made for furnishing the mess
once it was ready. In 1958 the Corps Committee met under the chairmanship of
General K.M. Cariappa. One of the items on the agenda was the proposed
expenditure on the new Headquarters Mess which was then under construction. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Commandant School of Signals
placed before the Corps Committee a rough estimate of Rs. 83,500 as the cost of
essential items required to furnish the HQ Mess when it was completed. This
included purchase of furniture, furnishings, linen, electrical appliances,
crockery, garden implements, cutlery and curtains for 100 single officers. The
Committee decided that the final details of items and the expenditure to be
incurred from Corps Funds will be decided between the SO-in-C and the
Commandant School of Signals. However,
certain general principles were laid down with regard to the expenditure on
these items. Expenditure on furniture,
furnishings (curtains and carpets), electrical appliances (vacuum cleaner and
standard lamps only), crockery, cutlery and lawnmower would be met from the
Headquarters Mess Fund. All expenses on the upkeep of the mess including items
purchased out of the Headquarters Mess Fund and the maintenance of the garden
would be met from the present officers mess fund of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>.
<b>27</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The new building of the
Headquarters Mess was completed in March 1961. The Mess was brought into use
for the first time on <st1:date day="26" month="8" w:st="on" year="1961">26
August 1961</st1:date>. It was formally
inaugurated on <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1961">1 October
1961</st1:date>, the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>,
by the SO-in-C, Major General R.N. Batra, O.B.E. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Mess is located in an area covering six acres which was part of a disused
airfield, known as ‘One Tree Hill’ because of the lone Baobab <i>(adansonia digitata</i>) tree that has been
there since ages. It provides the best panoramic view of Mhow and its
surroundings. A large lawn was planted
in front of the mess building to cater for the needs of officers of a summer
evening. The ground to the rear of the building sloped downwards. Trees like Ashoka, Jacaranda and Gulmohar
were planted in this area in a manner to ensure an unrestricted view of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Berchha</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Ranges</st1:placetype></st1:place> even after they were full grown.
The anteroom was furnished with new furniture which was specially made to order
by a firm in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Indore</st1:place></st1:city>. The dining room could seat up to 200 officers
and was furnished with new dining chairs.
The kitchen had a modern cooking range which could work with either
diesel oil or kerosene and was fitted with electric blowers. A novel feature of the mess was the provision
of utility rooms such as a change room for bearers, ample store rooms and staff
rest rooms. A sum of Rs 60,000 was spent
on the furnishings, furniture and other requirements of the new Headquarters
Mess. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="314" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image022.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_12" width="465" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The HQ Mess - 1961<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon after it was brought into use,
the rapid expansion in Corps in the wake of the 1962 war made it too small,
since a large number of officers had to be given pre-commission training at the
School of Signals. To cater for the cadets, an additional temporary mess and
associated temporary accommodation was constructed in 1963. Known as the ‘B’ Mess, this was subsequently
used for officers once cadet training was stopped. This later became the
Airfield Mess and still later the Annexe.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1963, Brigadier T. Barreto,
Commandant School of Signals brought to the notice of the Corps Committee
certain losses that he had discovered during an inspection of the Headquarters
Mess and requested that these be written off. One related to the sword of
Lieutenant Colonel Rosenburg and the other to loss of a collection of antique
weapons. The Presentation Book opened in December 1946 contained an entry
relating to a sword belonging to the late Lieutenant Colonel Rosenburg who was
drowned at sea off Malaya in 1942. This
entry had been carried over to the new silver book opened in 1951. However, the actual sword held against this
entry was an NSP sword with the inscription of Jat State on the guard. When questioned by the Commandant, the Mess
Supervisor who had been in the mess since 1950 stated that he knew of no other
sword. As regards the antique weapons,
according to the printed History of the School of Signals published in 1953,
the Maharaja of Jaipur had presented a collection of antique weapons and
shields to the mess in 1950. These items
were not in the property ledgers nor were they traceable in the mess or elsewhere
in the School. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
15<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Corps Committee was held on 14 and 17 February
1964 at Delhi under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General A.C. Iyappa, with
the SO-in-C, Major General R.N Batra as Co-Chairman. The Committee considered
the recommendations of the sub-committee which had been convened under the
chairmanship of the Commandant School of Signals, to examine the recurring
maintenance expenditure on the Headquarters Mess, vis-à-vis the income from
subscriptions and also to fix the amount to be transferred annually to the
depreciation fund. The recommendations
of this sub-committee regarding cutlery, portraits and other matter concerning
the Headquarters Mess were also discussed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Co-Chairman had many queries regarding the expenditure incurred on purchase of
curtains and cutlery without prior approval.
It was decided that items needed for daily use would be purchased from
the officers’ mess fund of the School and in future, only items specifically
sanctioned by the Corps Committee will be paid for out of the Headquarters Mess
Fund. It was also decided that a sub-committee
under the chairmanship of Deputy Director Signals with Commandant School of
Signals and CSO Central Command as members would study the requirements of
capital expenditure and the recurring maintenance expenditure of the
Headquarters Mess. All unspent balances
with the School which were sanctioned from the Headquarters Mess Fund would be
frozen and no further expenditure would be incurred from this Fund until the
recommendations of the sub-committee had been examined. <b>28<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
proceedings in the Corps Committee failed to dampen the ardour and commitment
of Tery Barreto. During the next year he carried out wide ranging improvements
that laid the groundwork of the Headquarters Mess. The Annual Report on the
Corps of Signals Headquarters Mess for the year 1964-1965 that he prepared for
consideration of the 16<sup>th</sup> Corps Committee Meeting is a comprehensive
document, covering every aspect of the Headquarters Mess. Due to constraints of
space the entire report cannot be reproduced in its entirety. However, some of
the major improvements were mounting of mental Corps badges on the main
building and gates; placing the brass statuette of Mercury (Bengal & Assam
Signal Regiment Sergeants Mess) on a black terrazzo column and placed in the
centre of the hall; mounting a glass case with the Corps badge engraved on the
front to hold closed visitors books; replacement of iron curtain rods with
brass rods; placing a heavily carved half-round side table (presented by
Brigadier T. Barreto) against the wall; construction of show cases to display
the pre-war mess jackets presented by Major General B.D. Kapur and Brigadier
B.S. Bhagat, the Katangese Flag presented by Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Roy Chowdhury,
the Italian sword presented by Brigadier Bhagat and the Pashupathinath Temple;
a new table top for the 14-foot long head table, two tables (10’x4’) and two
sideboards in the during hall, a show case for the mess silver, round leather
chairs, magazine racks and a book shelf in the reading room; improvement of the
ladies room by repainting the cane furniture, putting up three oil paintings
(including one presented by Maya Barreto), provision of an 8-foot long side
table with shelf for buffet meals; two additional mirrors with fluorescent
lighting in the ladies tiolet; two small rockeries and fire hydrants in the
front garden; development of the rear garden with lawns, paved pathways and a
pond; and a coal stove (in addition to the oil burning stove) and a water
cistern in the kitchen. A number of
additions and alterations to main building were in an advanced stage of
planning/construction, such as a verandah in front of the lounge and dining
room, a cycle and scooter shed, a roof for the rear patio, a shelter for
officer’s bearers, broadening of culvert over front drain and conversion of a
store room into an office.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The report covered several other
points such as utilization of mess silver presented by the Colonel-in-Chief and
by Brigadier Akehurst, the statuette of the Madrassi Signalman on loan from 5<sup>th</sup>
Divisional Signal Regiment, purchase of two silver coasters for decanters from
Barton & Company, Corps reserve of scotch whisky (451 bottles worth Rs.
17,000), repair of leather furniture, disposal of old mess property, writing off deposits with
bankers Rai Sahib Ramchandra & Sons which had become insolvent, reduction
in monthly expenditure on water and electricity, projected expenditure on
purchases, and plans to dig a bore-well
to offset the acute water shortage being faced for the mess garden.<b>29<u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The 16<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the
Corps Committee was held form 19-22 February 1965. In the absence of the Senior
Colonel Commandant, Lieutenant General A. C. Iyappa, it was chaired by the
Co-Chairman, Major General R.N. Batra. Brigadier T. Barreto also attended the
meeting. Surprisingly, the report of the Headquarters Mess was not discussed at
all during the meeting. However, the reports of the Corps History Committee and
the Corps Traditions Committee, which were headed by Brigadier Barreto, were
discussed. This was the last meeting attended by Brigadier Barreto, who retired
soon afterwards. The two committees headed by him became defunct, and were
never revived. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1965 a letter was issued laying down the composition of the mess committee of
the Headquarters Mess and its functions. It was laid down that the PMC
(President Mess Committee), not below the rank of lieutenant colonel, will be
nominated by the Commandant School of Signals. The Headquarters Mess Managing
Committee would be set up for the purpose of supervising expenditure incurred
from the Headquarters Mess Central Fund, making recommendations to the Corps
Committee regarding capital expenditure to be incurred from the Central Fund
and accounting, purchase and sale of property purchased out of the Central
Fund. The Commandant, School of Signals
would be the chairman of the Managing Committee, the other members being
representatives of CSO Central Command and SO-in-C and the PMC. The Mess Secretary would be the secretary of
the Managing Committee.<b>30 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1966 the mess received a number of gifts. Colonel T.K Mukerji presented a
Japanese dagger surrendered to him by a Japanese officer during World War II in
Burma. A framed replica of the
Regimental Colours of the Corps was received from the SO-in-C. A full sized
statuette of Buddha made of clay was presented by the Chief Engineer Project
Dantak. The King of Bhutan presented a
helmet, sword and shield to the Headquarters Mess. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1967 the Commandant School of
Signals proposed the construction of a third mess or extension of the
facilities of the Headquarters Mess and ‘B’ Mess. This was on the ground that
the new PE (peace establishment) of the School was likely to be sanctioned in
the near future and the number of officers, permanent staff and students in the
School at any time will be in the region of 400. The alternatives were to either extend the
facilities in the existing Headquarters Mess and the ‘B’ Mess or ask for
construction of a third mess. The Corps
Committee felt that the Headquarters Mess does not lend itself to expansion and
we should, if possible, have a third mess when the new PE is sanctioned. If, this cannot be justified then expansion
of the ‘B’ Mess may be considered. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1972 the Corps Committee examined several
proposals for improvements in the mess.
It accorded ex-post-facto sanction of Rs 1,200 for the installation of a
3-feet Jimmy on a pedestal on the front porch of the building. It sanctioned Rs
10,000 for the purchase of six carpets for the ante-room, directing that the
used carpets would be transferred to 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment Officers’
Mess. For the ladies room, the expenses
were to be met by MCTE from its own funds. It also sanctioned Rs 2,700 for
resurfacing of the two tables in the dining hall. However, a proposal to for
air conditioning the guest room was not approved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
Band<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The history of the Corps Band
from the time it was raised in 1926 by Colonel E.F.W. Barker, the Commandant
STC, up to 1947 has been covered in Appendix 2 of Volume II. After </span><span lang="EN-GB">partition of assets between India and Pakistan in 1947, the strength that remained in India
was one pipe major, nine pipers and eight drummers </span><span lang="EN-GB">(bass, side and tenor) and the band was named as Pipes and
Drums. The Pipe Major at that time was
Subedar Sarwan Singh. Though the band was located at Jabalpur, its expenses
were met from the Pipes Band Fund which was maintained at Delhi. During the 2<sup>nd</sup>
meeting of the Corps Committee on 26 May 1949, the rates of subscription to the
fund from the STC, School of Signals and individual officers were laid down.
However, a proposal to transfer the fund from Signals Directorate to STC was
not accepted. During the meeting, it was
brought out that a number of princely states were disposing off their bands and
good musical instruments and bandsmen would be available for raising a brass
band for the Corps. However, due to high
cost and non-availability of Government sanction, no decision was reached and
Signals Directorate was asked to look into this subject. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The
5<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee on 7 March 1952 agreed to the payment of extra
duty pay as also some increase in the rates of subscription to the Pipes Band
Fund. It was also decided that the
expenditure for raising the brass band could be incurred from the Pipes Band
Fund. On 5 March 1953 the 6<sup>th</sup>
Corps Committee was informed that 14 Gorkha Training Centre is transferring
seven bandsmen to the Corps to form the brass band. The Commandant STC was requested to look for
persons having an aptitude for music and also to demand vacancies for training
existing bandsmen in the School of Music, Pachmarhi. Some band equipment was received free of cost
from the Government and this was kept with the STC, pending sanction to raise
the military band which was still awaited.<b>
<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The
Military Band was raised in 1953 at 1 STC, comprising one bandmaster and 20
bandsmen. The responsibility for looking after the Military Band was given 1
Military Training Regiment. Havildar Bawa Singh of the Bengal Engineer Group
was appointed the first Bandmaster for a period of one year. In 1954 Havildar
Chandra Bahadur, who was one of the bandsmen transferred from 14 Gorkha
Training Centre became the Bandmaster and remained for five years. He was
relieved by Havildar Sheikh Mansoor of the Maratha Light Infantry, who had
joined the band as sepoy in 1953 and was the Bandmaster for 17 years from 1958
to 1975, retiring in the rank of Subedar Major.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">On
15 February 1954, the 7<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee renamed the Pipes Band
Fund as SO-in-C’s Signals Band Fund. The
tours policy of the Pipes and Drums was laid down by the 10<sup>th</sup>
Signals Committee on 14 March 1957. It
was ruled that the Pipes and Drums should not be away from the STC for more
than four months in a year, that it should be present in the School of Signals
on 1 October every year and that it should be available to HQ Southern Command
during the month of September each year during the Southern Command week
celebrations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 11<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee
on 14 February 1958 sanctioned a sum of Rs. 1000 for maintenance, Rs. 200 for
music and Rs. 2340 for payment as extra duty pay to the bandsmen. At that time, Havildar Sheikh Mansoor was the
Bandmaster for whom a special extra duty pay of Rs. 20 per month was approved
by the 12<sup>th</sup> Signal Committee on 20 March 1959. In the same meeting Rs. 1400, Rs. 3800 and Rs.
200 were allotted for the items mentioned above. A proposal to provide winter uniforms was
turned down for reasons of high cost, deterioration during storage and
climate. On 25 March 1960, the 13<sup>th</sup>
Signal Committee decided that the expenses to maintain the Corps Band would
hence forth be met from the funds available with the Commandant STC. However, a
year later, the 14<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee on 17 March 1962 agreed to
provide a sum of Rs. 4070 for maintenance/dress. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the raising of 2 STC in Goa
in 1962, it was decided that it should have its own band. The existing band at
1 STC was renamed as No. 1 Pipes and Drums while No 2 Pipes and Drums was
raised at 2 STC on 9 December 1962. The minutes of the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup>
Signal Committee meetings held on 16/17 March 1962 and 14/17 February 1964
respectively do not give any indication about the formation of a separate band
for 2 STC. However, the existing peace establishment (PE VI/46/1946/5) of 1 STC
which was made applicable to 2 STC included an authorization of two JCOs, six
NCOs and 43 bandsmen (total 51). At 1 STC, this strength was sub-divided into
the Military Band and No. 1 Pipes and Drums. But the Government did not agree
to provide a brass band for 2 STC and effected a reduction of one JCO, five
havildars, nine naiks, nine lance naiks and 16 bandsmen (total 34). As a
result, only an authorization of one JCO and 16 bandsmen (total 17) was permitted
in the PE of 2 STC to form No. 2 Pipes and Drums. Some of these 17 personnel
were transferred from No. 1 Pipes and Drums while the remaining were newly
recruited and subsequently trained. Havildar Dev Singh was the first Pipe Major
of No. 2 Pipes and Drums. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the Reunion held in 1965, a dress
combination was tried out for the bands.
This was further pursued during the 17<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee
meeting at Delhi on 4 March 1966 both by the Commandants of the School of
Signals and 1 STC. The change in colour
of cummerbund to light blue was also suggested.
The 19<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee agreed to provide a winter coat
for the bandsmen but in view of the high cost involved, the SO-in-C suggested
that two woollen vests per bandsman may be provided. The cost of this was met from the SO-in-C’s
Signals Band Fund. On 1 February 1969,
one white woollen gabardine jacket per bandsman was proposed and Commandant 1
STC was requested to look into this matter.
A sum of Rs. 7000 was sanctioned by the Adjutant General’s Branch in
1970 for procurement of new band equipment ex-import. This proved to be inadequate but one flute,
one piccolo and one bassoon were purchased. On 22 April 1972, the 23<sup>rd</sup>
Signals Committee agreed to sanction Rs. 6000 for making the winter dress. A
committee comprising the Inspector Signals Trade Training and Commandants 1 and
2 STCs was appointed to examine the whole issue of uniform and accoutrements
for the Corps bands. Based on the report of the committee, a sum of Rs. 20,131
was sanctioned for modification of the band dresses on 10 February 1973. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Bagpipers
carry banners on their bagpipes which are customarily presented by the senior
officers. On occasions when senior officers were present at the function where
the Pipes and Drums or pipers were playing, it was customary that the pipers
carry the banners presented by the concerned officers. This British custom was
followed by the Corps of Signals after Independence in respect of No. 1 Pipes
and Drums which was the only band in existence then. Over a period of time, the
number of banners outnumbered the number of bagpipes and drums and it was
decided during 10<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee on 14 March 1957 that the old
banners will be displayed in the Corps Museum.
The 13<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee accepted three new banners and
laid-up two old banners on 25 March 1960.
In 1962, when No. 2 Pipes and Drums was raised at 2 STC some banners
were transferred to them along with the pipers from No.1 Pipes and Drums. The 22<sup>nd</sup> Corps Committee examined
a proposed design of banner on 12 February 1971. The design, size, cloth,
lettering and crest in respect of the banner were standardized five years
later, on 14 February 1976. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">According to the Corps Memoranda of
1942, <i>“All The Blue Bonnets Are Over The
Border” </i>arranged by D. Mathaison, DCM, was<i> </i>accepted as the Corps marching tune. The tune is peculiar to the Pipes and Drums
and is not played by military bands using brass/woodwind musical
instruments. The Pipes and Drums adopted
this tune after Independence. The 3<sup>rd</sup>
Signals Committee, which met on 10 March 1950, discussed whether the Royal
Signals march tune should continue to be used by Indian Signals. After deliberation, it was agreed that the
Royal Signals march tune should be in addition to Mathaison’s composition. During the 17<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee
meeting on 4 March 1966 it was decided that <i>“All
the Blue Bonnets Are Over The Border”</i> should be tape-recorded and issued to
signal units. It was suggested during
the 24<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee meeting that the Corps Military Band
should also play this tune. However, it
was realized that the traditional tunes of Pipes and Drums are peculiar to them
only and cannot be played by the brass bands. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When
the Corps of Signals military band using brass instruments was raised in 1953,
it played the traditional martial tunes composed by western experts. The 8<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee
considered a new march past tune on 16 February 1955. It was decided to refer the tune to the
Director, Military Music School, Pachmarhi.
In the next Signals Committee meeting on 11 April 1956, this tune was
not accepted. It was then decided that
the military band will play <i>“Cariappa
March”</i> if they could, otherwise <i>“Veer
Bharat March”</i> can be accepted as an alternative. However, both tunes were
found unacceptable by the 10<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee meeting on 14 March
1957 and the Corps military band was left without a Corps march tune. Two new tunes were heard during the 19<sup>th</sup>
Signals Committee meeting on 11 February 1967.
At this point of time, two more tunes proposed earlier were also under
consideration. However, all the four
tunes were rejected by the 20<sup>th</sup> Signals Committee on 1 February
1969. In 1970, it was once again decided
to look for new Corps tunes. It was only
in 1975 that a tune composed by Master Warrant Officer J.A. George, of the
Indian Air Force Band was accepted. This was named the ‘<i>Signals March’</i> which became the <i>“Teevra
Chaukas</i>” march, many years later. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DR
Display Team <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
history of the DR Display Team of the Corps, popularly known as the ‘Dare
Devils’ , from the time of its first performance at Annandale,
Simla on 9 and 11 March 1935 up to 1947 has been covered in Volume II. Soon after Independence a show was
organized during the Inter Service Exhibitions and Military Tattoo held at the
National Stadium in Delhi in April 1948. The team was led by Colonel S.N
Bhatia, with Captain H.K. Ranji and Jemadar
N.G. Rajan as his assistants. In March 1950 the Corps Committee was apprised
that there was a great demand for the Corps DR Display Team and as the men
comprising the team were widely dispersed, considerable difficulty was being
experienced in collecting them when required.
To obviate this, it was suggested that all members of the team be concentrated
at the STC with necessary dress and equipment. The Committee decided that only
a nucleus of the DR Display Team comprising six or seven key men be held
centrally at the STC and the remainder of the team be made up from trainees. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_14" o:spid="_x0000_i1037" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:357pt;
height:272.25pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image025.jpg"
o:title="DSC08896 Adventure - Corps Museum"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="363" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image026.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_14" width="476" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A “dare devil” goes through a ring of
fire and over a jeep, during a show<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In October 1950 the team performed
at a show at the National Defence Academy, Dehradun. The officer in charge of
the team was Major P.V. Atma Ram with Jemadar N.G. Rajan as the team leader. At
this time, the DR Display Team was not formally sanctioned and was formed by
milking signal units. In 1952 the Corps Committee directed Commandant STC to
forward his recommendations for the formation of a Corps of Signals DR Team. In
1956 the Committee was informed that official raising of the team was not
possible due to financial stringency. Commandant STC stated that motor cycles
were in short supply even for training.
It was suggested that a DR section be located in Jubbulpore to enable
the STC to hold he necessary machines.
CSO Western Command agreed to make a DR section available for this
purpose. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">Formal sanction for the
DR Display Team was received only on 1 May 1965. The team was stationed at
Jabalpur and placed under Commandant 1 STC.
The strength of the team was two officers, two JCOs and 38 OR. In
subsequent years the team toured various stations where it gave
performances. The tours were controlled
by the Staff Duties Directorate at Army HQ. The team also took part in the Army
Day Parade on 15 January and the Republic Day Parade on 26 January on Rajpath
in New Delhi. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1972 a proposal was placed
before the Corps Committee to raise a second DR Display Team. This was
discussed at length. The Committee felt
that it would be difficult to post a second DR team to 1 STC, but emphasized
that efforts be made to release additional motor cycles for training
purposes. The Committee accepted the
necessity for dress being provided to the DRs and directed that the required
amount be sanctioned in 1974, so that the personnel are properly dressed for
the 1975 Reunion. On the question of ED
(extra duty) pay, the Committee was not in favour. However, it was agreed that the team may be
given the actual expenses incurred for coolie hire and so on during tours. The Committee accepted the recommendation of
Commandant 1 STC to have the scale of insurance increased and agreed to meet
the expenses from Corps Funds on account of insurance premiums for men and
vehicles. The rest of the expenditure
would continue to be borne by 1 STC. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dress
& Accoutrements<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The changes in dress and a</span><span lang="EN-GB">ccoutrements
of the Indian Signal Corps from the time of its inception in 1911 to 1947 have
been covered in Volume II. However, brief details are recapitulated to assist
readers in getting a better perspective of the subject. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; tab-stops: list 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">From 1911 to 1916,
signallers wore the same uniform as the Sappers and Miners. The distinctive
Signal Service colours, blue and white, were permitted in the <i>‘pullah’</i> in 1916 and in the <i>‘jhalar’</i> of the headdress in 1920. Indian ranks started wearing
brass shoulder titles ‘SIGNALS’ in 1922. In 1923, all ranks of the Corps began
to dress as mounted men, wearing breeches and short-putties, in addition to
trousers and shorts. In 1927 the colours
of Royal Signals – light blue green and dark blue - were adopted for <i>‘jhalars’</i>,
replacing the blue and white. In 1928 it
was ruled that the blue and white Signals arm bands would be worn only on
active service. In 1935 Madrassis were
permitted to wear felt hats, instead of the heavy <i>pagri</i> which often came off while riding a horse. The length of the
Punjabi Mussulman’s ‘<i>safa</i>’ was reduced, with a small k<i>ullah</i> being
worn. Sikhs and Dogras wore a small <i>pug</i>
under their turbans. With mechanisation, breeches and spurs gradually
disappeared. During World War II, all
personnel, except for Sikhs, started wearing the blue beret and the jungle hat.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: list 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">After Independence, the Corps Committee reviewed the
various items of dress and a</span><span lang="EN-GB">ccoutrements in 1948 and
approved the following:-<b>31</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormalIndent" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: list 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dark (Navy) blue colour
lanyards of cord type would be worn on the left shoulder by officers and JCOs.
OR would be permitted to wear the lanyard only for ceremonial parades and with
walking out dress, only if a free issue is sanctioned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers and JCOs would
carry canes (polo stick type) without covering or varnish of 2 feet length and
¾ inch thickness. OR should carry canes for walking out. The knob of the cane should be of white metal
with the Jimmy embossed on it.
Regimental Havildar Majors would carry Malacca canes, to be provided by
the unit commander. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Shoulder titles “IND
SIGS” in block letters with no full stop after IND or SIGS, and only one letter
spacing between them, would be worn by all ranks. On battle dress for all
ranks, “INDIAN SIGNALS” in full in white lettering on dark (Navy) blue background
will be worn on the shoulder. If free
issue was not authorized for OR, they will not wear the shoulder title. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Only one type of
regimental mufti would be worn in summer and winter by OR and Boys. This would
comprise a black cap (white turban for Sikhs); jodhpur coat of white drill
(three patch pockets in front and two slits down the side of the back); white
drill trousers; black shoes; ordinary civil type white pearl buttons; socks
(issue or black) and standard cane.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Band personnel would
continue to wear turban with slight modifications by the addition of
gold/silver braid, the initial cost of which would be borne by the Band Fund.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For the ISC School a
formation sign of a light blue/dark green with a silver streak of lightning
across it was approved. The Commandant was asked to submit six painted
specimens for obtaining formal approval of Army HQ.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The pre-war system of
Orderly Havildars wearing red sashes was recommended. Units could implement
this if their unit funds permitted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In May 1949 there was a proposal to
introduce a hackle consisting of blue and white plumes as part of the head
dress to be worn on top of the cap badge, but this was not approved by the
Corps Committee. However, it was decided that badges of rank would be worn with
light blue backing. The Corps badge worn with the <i>pugree</i> would not have a backing. The size of the cap badge
(excluding the star) and the collar badge would be of identical size i.e. 1¼
inch. It was clarified that shoulder titles of .35 inches height consisting of
letters ‘IND SIGS’ on summer uniform of all ranks should be embroidered in
black on olive green background. It was also decided that all Indian Signals
personnel on signal intercommunication duty will wear blue and white arm band
subject to the discretion of unit commanders.<b> 32<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In March 1950 the Corps Committee
was informed that the C-in-C had approved the new lanyard for Signals, and
orders had already been placed on Messrs Saharan & Sons. Stocks would be available by approximately 1 May
1950. These would be stocked at the
School of Signals for purchase by officers. It was also informed that with
effect from 26 Jan 1950 the use of ‘Indian’ in the Corps designation had been
discontinued, as already approved by the Committee. The replacement of the
shoulder title “IND SIGS” by “SIGNALS” had been put up to the C-in-C for
approval. The Committee reviewed all types of shoulder titles to be worn by
officers on different types of dress and approved the following:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For Shirts OG/Bush
Shirt OG/Battle Dress OG, the shoulder title “SIGNALS” would embroidered in
black lettering as hitherto fore on an OG sleeve.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As already in use,
shoulder titles for serge battle dress would be in black lettering .35 inch in
width stitched around the base of the blouse shoulder strap. The OG background would extend the whole
width of the shoulder strap. The Committee directed the Secretary to obtain a
specimen of light blue lettering .35 inch in height on scarlet background .75
inch in width to be affixed in the same manner as above for consideration by
the Ad Hoc Committee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For service dress,
shoulder titles would be in brass, .35 inches in height. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In October 1950 the Corps Committee
decided that as part of the summer mess dress officers could wear white cotton
or blue barathea overalls with monkey jackets provided that all officers in any
one unit were dressed alike, the choice being left to the discretion of COs,
having regard to the climate of the station. It was stated that since Signals
was a mounted arm all officers should be permitted to wear spurs with
Wellingtons. This was specified in the Dress Regulations but AO 8/S/50 did not
make any provision for this. It was decided that Army HQ should be approached
to issue necessary amendments tot AO 8/S/50.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Committee also reviewed the
dress items of JCOs and OR. The
Committee approved the proposal that JCOs should be permitted to wear the new
lanyard (officers’ pattern) which would be supplied to them on payment as was
done earlier. As regards the wearing of arm bands it was felt that in the
interests of uniformity specific instructions should be issued on the wearing
of blue and white arm bands and that the matter should not be left to the
discretion of the COs as was decided earlier in 1949. The Secretary also
pointed out that according to Indian Signals Dress Regulations, arm bands are
required to be worn on the right arm. The Committee approved of the proposal
and decided that necessary instructions would be issued by Signals Directorate.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1950 Army HQ issued orders that regimental mottos would in future be written in
Devanagri script. Signals Directorate decided that in the interests of economy
the change will take place in a phased manner, and that existing
cap/pugree/collar badges will continue to be used until wasted out. Existing
stocks of cap/pugree badges held at the STC and School of Signals with the
motto in Roman Hindustani will continue to be issued until disposed off. Corps
flags with the motto in Roman Hindustani will also continue to be used until
wasted out. The same would apply to Corps stationery, which would continue to be
used until wasted out. However, Messrs Thacker & Co. were instructed to
supply all future demands of stationery with the motto in Devanagri script.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1952 it was decided that a Corps scarf could be worn with the Corps blazer. A
proposal to permit Sikh officers to wear white <i>pugree</i> with winter mess kit was considered but not accepted. It was
clarified that white <i>pugree</i> could be
worn with mess kit only by officers of the rank of colonel and above. Other
officers will continue to wear a light blue <i>pugree
</i>with a dark blue <i>pug </i>as already
decided. It was felt that the existing system of centralised stocking of all
items of dress at the School of Signals and STC was not feasible for financial
reasons. Hence it was decided that in future all items of Corps dress would be
obtained under arrangements of CSOs/Commandants. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1956 the Corps Committee agreed
to a proposal to replace the existing blazer buttons with embossed buttons. It
also permitted the use of blazer buttons with evening dress (Jodhpur) style).
However, it did not agree to the use of trousers instead of overalls with
winter dress of officers and to the removal of the blue piping on the jacket of
the summer mess kit. The decision on the provision of lanyards to OR was
deferred until a satisfactory dye was obtained. A proposal to introduce mufti
for JCOs was not accepted and it was decided that they could be permitted to
wear the Corps blazer if they wished. The specifications of the regimental
mufti for OR was approved. This was to consist of a white shirt with one
outside breast pocket and one pocket inside, the outside pocket large enough to
hold AB-64 (pay book); white trouser with bottom turned up and a hip pocket;
black oxford pattern shoes and black socks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1960 a sample side cap to be
worn with regimental mufti was placed before the Corps Committee but not
approved as it resembled an existing article of official dress. The necessity
for having a regimental mufti was discussed. Subedar Major M.S. Pondia
suggested that if mufti was considered necessary, a monetary allowance should
be provided to individuals. The Committee felt that for reasons of being able
to distinguish our men and to provide a suitable dress for certain official functions
when men turn out as a body, regimental mufti was necessary, and on those
occasions, caps must be worn. With regard to wearing caps when OR go out
individually, the matter will be referred again to AG’s Branch. Pending further
clarification, the status quo would be maintained. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1967 it was proposed that officers should be permitted to wear the Corps crest
on the blazers. The Chairman of the Corps Committee, Lieutenant General Iyappa
mentioned out that this point had been considered earlier in 1952 and 1956 and
rejected. Several members felt that the blazer without a crest looked bare.
General Iyappa pointed out that wherever the Corps colours are awarded for
proficiency in games and sports by any Arm or Service, the practice of allowing
all officers to wear crests was not in vogue. The SO-in-C, Major General I.D.
Verma pointed out that the Corps blazer already had the crest affixed on the
blazer button which was enough representation of the Corps. Without the crest
on the pocket, the blazer could be worn on informal occasions, but with the
crest affixed, its use would be restricted for sports only. If the proposal was
accepted, it would have to be made obligatory, resulting in additional
expenditure for every officer. In view of this, and the desire for economy, the
proposal was dropped and it was directed that this case will not be taken up in
future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Committee also considered a proposal for a narrower Corps tie with the Jimmy
embroidered on it. A photograph of the Royal Signals tie with the Jimmy was
shown to members. After some discussion it was decided that a cheaper tie with
the traditional design of diagonal stripes would continue for use by JCOs and a
more expensive one with the Jimmy embroidered on it could be used for officers.
The design of the second type of tie would be examined by a sub-committee and
submitted to the SO-in-C for approval. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1969 AG’s Branch asked commands for their comments on a proposal to introduce
leather belts for officers. It was clarified that the cost of the belt would be
defrayed by the individuals concerned and its use would be confined to unit
lines. The leather belt would not be allowed on official functions or formal
visits of VIPs to the unit. The Corps
Committee discussed this point and it was generally agreed that these belts
were already being used by certain units and were quite popular. The Committee
asked CSOs to express the views of the Corps when the Army Commanders asked for
their views. The Committee approved the
dark brown belt with the white buckle with the Signals crest embossed in the
centre of the buckle<b>. <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1971 the Corps Committee discussed the proposal to permit OR to wear the
lanyard. Opinion on the issue was divided and some members felt that the men were
not in favour of purchasing the lanyards. When asked for his views Subedar
Major Gyan Singh said that wearing of lanyards is desirable and everyone should
wear it. The Committee decided that OR would be permitted to wear lanyards and
Signals Directorate should issue a directive on the subject to all concerned.
It was also decided that to ensure quality control, demands of signal units
would be supplied centrally by the Signals Directorate.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1972 The Corps Committee was apprised that the existing mufti being provided to
recruits during their training period was of inferior quality and not in good
condition by the time they left. The Committee decided that the mufti for OR
would comprise white terry cot shirts, charcoal grey terry cot trousers, black
shoes and black socks. As a precaution against early wear and tear the
Commandants of the two STCs were directed to equip the recruits with mufti only
in the passing out stage, when they were about to leave the training centres.
The expenses would be met by the OR and could be collected in monthly
instalments.<b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
Publications<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the period 1947 – 1972,
there were a number of publications dealing with various subjects. Some had
very short life spans, becoming redundant with time or being replaced by other
publications. Others continued and some exist even today. The publications
covered in this chapter are the Indian Signals Quarterly Journal, Signalman,
Corps Bulletin, Corps Planning/Liaison Notes, Corps Gazette, Signals List,
Technical Newsletter, and the pamphlet Corps Customs & Traditions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
decision to publish a quarterly journal called the Indian Signals Quarterly
Journal was taken during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the Indian Signal Corps
Committee on 15 May 1947, shortly before Independence. The journal was to be
published by the Commandant Indian Signal School, Mhow, in English and Roman
Urdu and one vernacular, the latter if there were enough contributions. The
objects of the journal were to be a source of information and a record of units
and members of the Corps thus strengthening the bonds of comradeship; to keep
members up-to-date in the latest technical and tactical developments affecting
the Corps; to be a source of information on general Corps matters and of
activities of the Corps Committee and Corps Association; and to widen interest
by short literary contributions in general subjects. An initial non-recurring
grant of Rs 2000 was made from the ISC Fund as initial capital for staring and
running the Corps Journal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In April 1948 the Corps Committee
agreed that a Corps magazine was very desirable. It should be an all ranks
publication like the “Wire” in Royal Signals and not in the form of a journal.
The magazine should be printed in English and Roman script and produced by
Commandant Indian Signals School. A publication sub committee consisting of CSO
Southern Command, Commandant Indian Signals School and Commandant STC were
appointed to go into the details of production, editing etc. and put up
recommendations to the Secretary. The first issue of the magazine should be published
within six months from now. An initial non-recurring grant of Rs 2000 was made
from ISC Fund as initial capital for starting and running the Corps Magazine. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The first issue the Signalman, the
Corps magazine, was published on 1 January 1949 by Brigadier B.D. Kapur, CSO
Southern Command. (The first issue is a collectors’ item – it is the only issue
that had the Corps emblem on the cover without the motto in the scroll). It was
a quarterly magazine, and the first three issues (January, April and July 1949)
were published from Poona, before the magazine moved to Mhow, where it began to
be published by the Commandant, School of Signals. The cost of the magazine was
one rupee per copy for officers and JCOs and 12 annas for OR. At that time, it
was felt that it was as yet premature to think of having life membership of the
magazine. In 1950 it was decided that the magazine should have a standard cover
design. The Editor was authorised to ask for suggestions to improve the
magazine in this regard and offer prizes drawn from the profits of the
magazine. It was also decided that promotions of JCOs should also be published
in the Signalman. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Apart
from information about postings, promotions and retirements, the magazine
published news about activities of units under the heading Home Stations
Calling. In 1952 the Corps Committee was apprised that news about units in
forward areas should not be published in the interests of security. While the
Committee agreed that in the interests of security only static signal units
should contribute notes for inclusion in Home Stations Calling, it felt that
such a measure would result in a decrease in the circulation of the
Signalman. It was, therefore decided
that CSOs would consolidate the notes of field units under their command for
inclusion in Home Stations Calling without specific mention of designations of
units, particularly field units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the initial years, very few JCOs
and OR contributed articles to the magazine, in spite of prizes being offered
for the best contribution in every issue. In order to motivate JCOs and OR to
write for the magazine it was decided to include a Hindi section in the
magazine. The first article in Roman Hindustani was published in January 1951
and the first article in Hindi in the Devanagri script came out in October
1952. . CSOs and Commandants were asked to stimulate efforts for encouraging
personnel to contribute to the magazine. The Corps Committee Directive No. 2
issued in February 1953 laying down the charter of duties of editorial staff of
the Signalman also specified the inclusion of a Hindi section in the magazine.
It was also decided that every JCO and OR who contributes articles to the
Signalman would be given a complimentary copy of the issue in which his article
is published. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1954 it was proposed that the popularity of the Signalman could be enhanced if
it was combined with the Technical News Letter. However, Commandant School of
Signals felt that this was linked with expenditure from the Technical Grant. It
was then decided that only certain selected articles from the Technical News
Letter should be reproduced in the Signalman. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1962 it was proposed to introduce life membership for the Signalman. It was felt that the scheme though desirable
could only be fully implemented when the circulation of the magazine goes
up. It was decided that as an interim
measure life membership should be thrown open only to officers and JCOs over 40
years of age. The subscription for life
membership would be calculated by the following formula:-<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Life Subscription = (60 – age) x Rs.
2.50 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1964, it was decided that complimentary copies of the Signalman should be sent
to training institutions such as the Indian Military Academy, National Defence
Academy, Officers Training School and Army Cadet College. Sufficient copies
were to be sent to provide one per ante-room for the above institutions. The cost of these complimentary copies would
be borne by the Corps Funds. It was also decided to increase the number of
complimentary copies sent to pensioners from 25 to 50, the cost being borne by
the Reunion Fund. Complimentary copies would also be sent to ex-Signals
officers of the Commonwealth countries, who were present in India. Colonel T.K. Mukerji offered to send a list
of such persons with their addresses to the Secretary. The cost of these would also be met from the
Reunion Fund. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By the year 1972 the Signalman had
matured into a well rounded magazine. It contained articles in English and
Hindi by individual contributors, in addition to several features of
informative value, such as retirements, demises, promotions, honours and
awards, latest orders regarding pay and pension, and so on. It was widely read by serving and retired
personnel of all ranks, including many who are living abroad. For many old signallers, the Signalman had
become the only link with their colleagues, and most of them looked forward to
receiving their copies in time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
first Corps Bulletin was issued on 1 September 1949. It was felt that in the
formative period of the Corps, there should be a separate medium for
disseminating Corps domestic matters such as information on customs, etiquette,
procedure etc. in a distinct consolidated form for all units and members of the
Corps. It consisted mainly of decisions taken by the Corps committee. In the
preface of the issue, the SO-in-C, Brigadier C.H.I. Akehurst wrote: “<i>It is said that anyone who tampers with a
Regiment’s traditions would soon find that he had laid hands on a very ‘angry
tigress’. I have no doubt that the decisions contained in this Bulletin will be
proudly adhered to by all of us to bring us strength through uniformity and
pride in creating a common personality.”</i><b>33</b><i> <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The second Corps Bulletin was
issued in February 1953. This was more exhaustive than the first issue. It
contained the gist of almost all decisions of the Corps Committee after 1949.
It also contained photographs showing various items of dress and the correct
method of wearing them. Almost all subjects covered in the first issue were
repeated, with the latest amendments. Army HQ advised all units and
establishments to procure sufficient copies so that all ranks had access to it.
It also recommended that all officers should obtain a personal copy. The cost
of the Bulletin had been fixed as Rs. 1/4/- per copy, based on an anticipated
demand for 500 copies. After this, no further Bulletins were issued. From 1953
onwards, the Corps Committee began issuing directives. Between 1953 and 1965,
ten such directives were issued, each dealing with a specific subject.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon after Independence, the
Planning Note began to be issued by Signal Directorate with the object of informing
all concerned about changes in establishments, equipment and technical matters
before they were promulgated through normal channels, as well as to give
publicity to Corps domestic, personnel and training matters of general
interest. The Indian Signals Planning Note was started in January 1948 on a
monthly basis and brought on to a bimonthly basis in June 1948. From 1950 onwards, the frequency was changed
to once a quarter but this was not always adhered to. From April 1950 onwards,
it began to be called the Corps of Signals Liaison Note. Between 1948 and 1972,
a total of 98 Planning/Liaison Notes were issued, No. 98 being issued in October
1972. Covering every aspect of the Corps such as organisation, personnel,
training, procedure, development in communications, equipment and so on, they
are an invaluable source of information and reference material for a historian
or monographer. Unfortunately, most units and establishments have destroyed old
issues, which are now untraceable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Technical News Letter (TNL) was
the technical journal the Corps, published by the School of Signals. It
contains technical articles dealing with developments in communication
techniques and equipment. Usually, each issue concentrates on a specific
subject. The first TNL was published in February 1950. After the publication of
TNL No 42 in January 1971, it was renamed the Journal of Military
Telecommunications and Data Processing (JMTDP). By the end of 1972, a total of 47
issues of the journal had been published. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The first Corps Gazette was
published in 1951, giving details of all officers borne on the strength of the
Corps of Signals, such as their date and type of commission, seniority, dates
of acting and substantive ranks, and qualifications. These gazettes continued to be published at
intervals of two or three years up to 1957. From 1961 onwards it was called the
Signals List. Although it is a useful source of information with regard to the
officer cadre, it cannot be quoted as an authority. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The pamphlet Customs of the Corps
of Signals was published in 1950. It was based on a similar pamphlet produced
by Royal Signals, whose permission was taken before publication of the pamphlet
in India. It covers customs most of which are in vogue throughout the Indian
Army. The subjects covered include saluting, conduct in the officers’ mess,
calling, financial matters, behaviour towards JCOs and OR, correspondence and
various other related aspects. Many years later, when Brigadier T. Barreto was
nominated as the Chairman of the Corps
Traditions Committee he pointed out that there are hardly any customs peculiar
to Signals and it would be best to follow the book ‘Customs and Etiquette in
the Service ’ written by Lieutenant Colonel H.R. Roach. This was accepted by
the Corps Committee. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
History Committee<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">Though no
history of the Corps was published during the period 1947-72, most of the work
including the writing of the script of Volume I covering the period 1911-39 was
completed during this time. The story of
the ups and downs connected with the publication of the book has been covered
in ‘History of the History’ which forms Appendix 1 of Volume II. However, the
deliberations of the Corps Committee concerning the history of the Corps and
other subjects within the purview of the Corps History Committee which are
relatively unknown will be covered here. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps
Committee, in its very first meeting held in September 1946, ‘agreed that it
was most desirable that the history of the Indian Signal Corps should be
compiled’. However, nothing much seems to have been done during the next few
years except a visit to the Historical Section in Simla by the Deputy Director
Signals in early 1953 and the initiation of a case for a lieutenant colonel to
write the Corps history. The lieutenant colonel and his staff were sanctioned,
but due to acute shortage of officers in the Corps, no officer could be
provided for this task. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"> Fortunately, Colonel T. Barreto was posted as
Deputy Director of Signals from 1953-56. Without any mandate from the Corps
Committee, he had begun collecting material in 1951, when he was at the Staff
College, and continued his efforts during his tenure at Delhi. This naturally
came to the knowledge of the SO-in-C, Brigadier Akehurst, and Brigadier Iyappa,
who succeeded him in 1954. In 1957, the Corps </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Committee
agreed that the compilation of the history of the Corps is a long outstanding
necessity. They appreciated the effort
already put in by Brigadier Barreto and requested him to accept the
responsibility to complete the Corps history, sanctioning
a sum of Rs. 1000 for expenses. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">By this time Brigadier
Barreto had moved to Poona as CSO Southern Command. He was nominated Chairman
of the Corps History Committee, an appointment he held until his retirement in
1965. During his tenures at Poona (1956-60); Simla (1960-63) and Mhow
(1963-65), he continued to work assiduously on the project. He presented the
first report of the Corps History Committee during the 11<sup>th</sup> Corps
Committee Meeting in 1958. Thereafter, he presented progress reports in every
meeting of the Corps Committee up to 1965, which was the last meeting he
attended. During the meeting held from 19-22 February 1965, he informed the
Committee that the manuscript </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">of Volume I of the
History of the Indian Signal Corps was almost ready. In the absence of the Chairman, Lieutenant
General Iyappa, the meeting was chaired by the Co-Chairman, Major General
Batra, who stated that he had discussed the matter with the Senior Colonel
Commandant. As the printing of the
Volume would require last minute coordination with the printers, it would be
printed in India. It had been decided
that the services of Lieutenant Colonel Proudfoot be engaged for technical
vetting of the manuscript and processing till its final publication. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Due
to some reason, within a month the proposal to engage </span><span lang="EN-GB">Colonel
Proudfoot appeared to have been dropped. By this time, Brigadier Barreto had
already put in his papers and was due to proceed on retirement on 30 April
1965. On 23 March 1965, General Batra, in his capacity as Co-Chairman of the
Corps Committee, wrote a letter to Brigadier Barreto, the Chairman of the
History Committee, extracts from which are given below:-<b>34<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB">......In view of the fact
that after 1 May 65 it is possible that you may have a little more time
available and also because of your detailed background knowledge of the history
of the Corps, I feel that you may like to consider following through with
Volume I of the Corps History until its final publication, and continue
with the compilation of subsequent
volumes. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB">If you do decide that you
can take this commitment on, you would naturally be entitled to the fee of Rs.
2,000.00 that we were proposing to give to Lt Col PROUDFOOT for Volume II. ....<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB">Also, in view of
your great interest in Corps domestic matters, I would appreciate it if you
would agree to continue to serve on the Corps Committee after you
retirement.....<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB"> </span></i><span lang="EN-GB">Brigadier Barreto replied on
2 April 1965. His emotional letter brings out his anguish at having to leave
the service and the dilemma that he faced, torn between his domestic
obligations and his love for the Corps. Extracts from the letter, a copy of
which was endorsed to General Iyappa, the Senior Colonel Commandant, are given below:-<b>35<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB">It has always been my
intention that I would continue to do my bit for the Corps after retirement. I
have, however, now come up against a major obstacle. My wife is extremely bitter
about the whole business of my premature retirement and the real reasons behind
it, and she is adamant that I shall not spend any time after retirement on this
type of work....... I can understand her feelings because she has suffered much
during these years when I have greatly neglected her and the children while I
devoted so much of my spare time, including my holidays, to voluntary work for
the Corps.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB">I am still hoping that time
will heal the wounds and that she will come round. To me personally, her decision
is a great blow, as I have identified myself to such an extent with the Corps
that it is almost impossible to conceive myself isolated from it...... <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB"> In the
circumstances, I would request you to keep your offer open. I am not interested
in the fee. In fact, I hope I shall not reach the stage when I shall have to
accept money from my Corps. Mine has been a labour of love, and I feel morally
bound to complete it.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB"> Regarding my member ship of the Corps Committee, the same
prohibitions apply. I would however, suggest that I am formally nominated to
the Corps Committee though I might have to remain a passive member until the
atmosphere is more</span></i><span lang="EN-GB"> <i>congenial. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> On 26 April 1965,
General Batra replied, informing Brigadier Barreto that in view of the
necessity to publish Volume I of the Corps History with all dispatch, it had
been decided to entrust it to Lieutenant Colonel Proudfoot, as decided earlier.
To enable him to do the job properly, the drafts of Volume I and all relevant
correspondence, documents and connected material that had been acquired by
Brigadier Barreto in his capacity as Chairman of the History Committee would be
collected from him before he proceeded on retirement. For this purpose, Major
Mirza, who was looking after the Corps Museum, had been asked to proceed
immediately to Mhow. The material would have to be properly listed before being
handed over to Major Mirza, who would also collect all material pertaining to
the Traditions Committee. As regards his membership of the Corps Committee, since
he would not be able to take active part, he could not be nominated as a
member.<b>36<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> The above letter
reached Mhow on 28 April, two days before Barreto was to retire. In a long
letter addressed to the Secretary of the Corps Committee, he wondered why he
was being subjected to such humiliating treatment, on the day of his
retirement. By this time, he had already
packed most of the documents and files that he had used for the draft of Volume
I and despatched them with some of his personal baggage to Jabalpur, where he
was planning to settle down. These books and documents, collected during the
previous 14 years, filled four large crates and had not been catalogued. Even
if they were readily available in Mhow, it would take months to sort them out.
Since the draft of Volume I was already completed, the papers that had been
used to compile it could not be of much use, immediately. Since it was known
that he was going to settle down in Jabalpur, surely these papers could be
collected from him after he reached there. In a final gesture, he decided to
return the amount of Rs. 1000 that had been given to him by the Corps Committee
in 1957 to meet the expenses in connection with compilation of the Corps
History. Barreto attached a cheque for this amount with the letter, a copy of
which was endorsed to all members of the Corps Committee. <b>37<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> In a gesture of
reconciliation, Brigadier I.D. Verma, the Brigadier Signals Staff, wrote to
Brigadier Barreto on 18 January 1966, renewing the offer to complete the
publication of the Volume I of the Corps History and inviting him to attend the
next Corps Committee meeting that was to be held in March 1966. Barreto
declined the offer. Though the manuscript had been
completed by the time he retired, the project went into limbo after his
departure, with the Corps not being able to find a suitable replacement to head
the Corps History Committee. The next meeting of the Corps Committee records: -
<i>Since the retirement of Brig T
BARRETO a new Chairman of the Corps History Committee has not yet been
appointed in his place. No report has,
therefore, been prepared for discussion.</i><b>38</b><i> <b><o:p></o:p></b></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> In1967 the Corps Committee was informed that the only
nomination received so far for ‘writing’ the Corps history was that of
Lieutenant Colonel A. Asirvadam of the School of Signals. Brigadier K.D. Bhasin
stated that he had informally contacted Brigadier Barreto who had declined to
undertake the task. The Chairman, Lieutenant General Iyappa, asked the SO-in-C,
Major General I.D. Verma to discuss this issue with Brigadier Barreto during
his next visit to Jabalpur. Meanwhile, all the material still held with
Brigadier Barreto was to be taken over from him and properly compiled to
facilitate further work. Major G.Y. Sowani of 1 STC was to carry out processing
of Volume I and start writing the draft for Volume II. The draft written by
Major Sowani was to be passed on to Colonel S.N. Mehta for vetting and
finalisation.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> For
the next four years literally nothing was done with regard to the Corps
history. The subject was also not discussed by the Corps Committee during the
meetings held in 1968, 1969 and 1970. In 1971 Commandant 1 STC placed before
the Corps Committee the list of items which had been collected from Brigadier
Barreto and kept in the Corps Museum. The Chairman, General Iyappa then
suggested that it is time some concrete action was taken to publish the Corps
history. CSO Southern Command stated that Lieutenant Colonel G.Y. Sowani had
volunteered to do the work. (This had been approved by the Committee four years
earlier). Initially he should be moved to Jabalpur on temporary duty to make an
assessment of the volume of work involved and later he may be posted to
Jabalpur if necessary.<b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; tab-stops: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In
the event, Colonel G.Y. Sowani also begged off. Various other writers were
approached, including Lieutenant Colonel C.L. Proudfoot, Colonel Pyara Lal,
Colonel V. Anantharaman, Major K.S. Kapur, Brigadier K.D. Bharagava and
Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Dhamija. Volume
I of the Corps History was finally published in 1975, ten years later after its
completion by Brigadier Barreto. The book was a verbatim reproduction of the
original draft except for a change in the title. The preface written by
Brigadier Barreto was omitted and so was his name as the author.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; tab-stops: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Corps Traditions Committee<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1962 Brigadier T. Barreto, CSO
Western Command, proposed that there was a requirement for appointing a Corps
Tradition Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of a senior member of the Corps
to examine Corps customs and traditions and put up suggestions for approval of
the Corps Committee. Details regarding the composition and charter of the
Sub-Committee would be issued as a Corps Directive. The Corps Committee
approved the proposal and appointed Brigadier Barreto Chairman of the Corps
Traditions Committee.<b>39</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
annual report of the Traditions Committee was considered by the Corps Committee
on 14 and 17 February 1964. With regard to a proposal to name certain
buildings, roads and grounds in Mhow and Jabalpur, the Committee asked CSO
Central Command to pursue the case with the Army Commander for naming of the
Iyappa ground at 1 STC. As regards naming of buildings in the School of
Signals, it was decided that except for the Mercury Theatre and Akehurst Hall,
the remaining names will be deleted. Commandant School of Signals was asked to
submit specific recommendations for naming roads and buildings in the School to
the Corps Committee for approval before the case was taken up through staff
channels. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Traditions Committee had recommended that certain commemorative days be
celebrated by the Corps as was being done by other Arms and Services. It was
recommended that the battles of Neuve Chapelle (1915) and Ngakyedauk Pass
(1944) in which the Corps had taken part may be celebrated in this manner. However,
the Committee decided to restrict the commemorative days or the time being to
15 February, until the case for battle honours for the Corps was finally
decided. Colonel T.K. Mukerji was requested to forward a write up on the
Irrawaddy battle, which was recommended by him as being a notable day for the
Corps.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Traditions Committee had also recommended that adequate publicity must be given
to personnel who earned honours and awards. The Corps Committee decided that
CSOs and Commandants must obtain and transmit to the Editor of the Signalman
information pertaining to honours and awards and any other distinction gained
by personnel of the Corps, in units under their command. The constitution of
the Corps Traditions Committee was also amended. Brigadier Barreto was to
continue as Chairman, with members being three serving officers of the Corps,
preferably those who had earlier been secretaries of the Corps Committee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
the next meeting of the Corps Committee in 1965, the report of the Traditions
Committee was considered. CSO Central Command was directed to expedite the case
of the naming of the Iyappa ground with HQ Central Command. Commandant School
of Signals sought a clarification on the policy for the naming of specific
buildings and places, particularly as to whether these should be named after
battles or individuals. It was decided that Brigadier Barreto would examine the
priorities in consultation with the Chairman and Co-Chairman, and recommend
suitable names for specific places, for approval of the Corps Committee. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
mentioned earlier, Barreto retired in 1965. No report of the Corps Tradition
Committee was placed before the Corps Committee in 1966, since no Chairman had
been appointed. The Corps Committee decided that this will be considered at a
later stage together with the appointment of an officer to perform the duties
of Chairman, Corps History Committee. In the event, this never happened, both
committees becoming defunct. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Cariappa Trophy<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Cariappa Trophy was donated by General K.M. Cariappa, the first Indian C-in-C
of the Indian Army, who was the Colonel Commandant of the Corps from 1949-59.
After his retirement in 1953, General Cariappa was appointed India’s
High Commissioner in Australia, where he remained until 1956. Even while he was
in Australia, the Colonel Commandant continued to take a keen interest in the
Corps. During the 8<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Corps Committee on 16 February
1955, the SO-in-C, Brigadier Iyappa informed the members that General Cariappa
had offered a trophy for a Corps championship in chess. The Committee felt that
before this game is introduced in the Corps, the number of individuals who are
interested in the game should be ascertained. CSOs/Commandants were asked to
take steps to popularize the game in all units and report progress after six
months. It was decided that if the progress is satisfactory, General Cariappa
will be asked to present the trophy so generously offered by him.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Based on the feedback from
CSOs/Commandants, it was decided to request the Colonel Commandant to present
the trophy for a competition in musketry instead of chess. After obtaining his
concurrence, it was decided that it would be a floating trophy in the field of
musketry and will be competed for by all major signal units. The trophy was presented by General Cariappa
on 14 February 1958 after delivering the closing address of the 11<sup>th</sup>
Corps Committee Meeting, during the third post-war reunion held at Jubbulpore. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the early years, a team from each command selected by the CSO competed for the
trophy. Subsequently, in view of the commitments of the units deployed in
forward areas, it was decided to restrict the competition to teams from the
STCs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Iyappa Trophy<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Iyappa trophy was presented by Major General A.C. Iyappa, the SO-in-C and
Colonel Commandant during the Golden Jubilee in February 1961 at Jubbulpore.
While presenting the trophy to the Corps Committee, General Iyappa announced
that it was for ‘Inter Unit Technical Proficiency.’ Since no meeting of the
Committee was held in 1961, there was no record of his announcement nor was
there a photograph of the actual presentation. This created some confusion,
which was eventually cleared.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
September 1961 Colonel R.Z Kabraji, Commandant School of Signals and Editor,
The Signalman, wrote to Colonel Prem Singh, Commandant STC that he intended
publishing a detailed article on the Iyappa Trophy in the January 1962 issue.
He asked for a suitably illustrated article with details such as the dimensions
of the trophy; significance of various plates mounted on it, details of the
proposed competition and photographs of the trophy. In his reply, Lieutenant
Colonel R.K. Vats Officiating Commandant STC, wrote as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Reference your
DO No 868009 G(SM) dated 15 Sep 61 addressed to Col Prem Singh.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I am enclosing herewith
a photograph of the trophy and its dimensions.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I feel it would
be better if the significance of the plates mounted on the shield could be
obtained from the Colonel Commandant himself, as any wrong interpretation on
our part might be an unforgivable error. I have spoken to Lt Col SRI RAM at
Signals Directorate and he is obtaining the necessary information. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As regards
details of the competition, we have only held individual competitions in Morse
and teleprinter and DR trials, details of which were submitted to you vide our
No 1038/A/28 of 18 Mar 61 and HQ 1038/A/28 of 17 Mar 61. A copy of the rules of
these competitions is enclosed. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The trophy has
been donated for ‘Inter Unit Technical Proficiency but we have neither framed
the rules for this competition nor has it been run so far. We have asked Signal
Directorate to give us further instructions. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It will
therefore be seen that at present, we are not in a position to give more
details.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">40</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">All would have been well if the above
letter had not mentioned the individual competitions in Morse and teleprinter
and DR trials. Due to delay in receipt of the photographs from Delhi, the
article was finally published in the July 1962 issue of the Signalman, with the
title ‘The Iyappa Trophy - Morse and Teleprinter Operating Competition’. The
article referred to a decision taken during the 12<sup>th</sup> CSOs/Commandants’ Conference held in March
1960, in which it was decided that a prize would be given to the best Morse
/teleprinter operator in the Corps and a suitable trophy would be awarded to
the winning team in the Inter Command Proficiency Competition. It gave details
of the competitions held in 1960 and 1961, marks obtained by the participants
and the names of the winners. It ended with the statement that the Iyappa
Trophy was awarded to the winning team (STC) on 13 February 1961 by Major
General A.C Iyappa, the Director Signals and SO-in-C. A photograph of the
trophy was published below the article. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
reading the article, on 9 August 1962 Brigadier T. Barreto, then CSO Western
Command, wrote a letter to the Secretary, Corps Committee, with copies to the
other CSOs and Commandants School of Signals and STC. He pointed out that the
article gave the impression that the Iyappa Trophy was only for operating
competitions. He clarified that while presenting the trophy during the Golden
Jubilee celebrations, General Iyappa had stated that it was for ‘Inter Unit
Technical Proficiency.’ Though there was no record of his speech nor a
photograph of the presentation, the representations on the face of the trophy
clearly depicted four trades – lineman, despatch rider, radio mechanic and
switchboard operator. Brigadier Barreto also observed that the Corps Committee
had still not drawn up a set of rules to govern the annual competition for the
award of the trophy. Also, no expression of gratitude to General Iyappa had
been published either in the minutes of the Corps Committee or in the Signalman
for his magnanimity. <b>41</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
this, there was flurry of letters between the Signals Directorate, School of
Signals and the STC. Finally, a draft Corps Committee Directive was prepared
and circulated to all members of the Corps Committee in August 1963. It was
clarified that the trophy would be awarded annually to the unit adjudged best
in the Corps in technical efficiency. All signal units commanded by
majors/lieutenant colonels would be eligible for award of this trophy. It had
originally been proposed that the award would be based on the results of the
inter unit technical proficiency competitions. However, in the conditions then
prevailing (the 1962 war had just ended) it was not possible for units to
actively take part in such competitions. As an interim measure, it was decided
to have a simpler procedure for the award of the trophy which could be revised
later. According to the interim procedure, CSOs/Deputy Director Signals/CAFSO
would recommend the best units under their technical control, from which the
SO-in-C would select the best unit for award of the trophy, <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
draft directive on the award of the Iyappa Trophy was discussed during the 15<sup>th</sup>
Corps Committee Meeting held on 14 and 17 February 1964. It was felt that with the large number and
variety of signal units, it would be difficult to conduct this competition
equitably. It was then decided that the
competition should be limited to divisional signal regiments only. CSOs Command would select the unit judged by
them to be the best as regards technical proficiency in their commands and the
finals of the inter-command competition will be conducted between the best
divisional signal regiment from each command. The competition would be held in
one of the commands annually in rotation.
Details of the competition were to be issued in the form of a Corps Committee
Directive. This resulted in the issue of
Corps Committee Directive No 7. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Daulet Singh Trophy.<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major General Daulet Singh was appointed the Colonel
Commandant of the Corps in 1955, when the Corps was authorised a second Colonel
Commandant, in addition to General Cariappa who had been appointed in 1949. In
1957 he offered a floating trophy to be presented to an officer for personal
‘high endeavour.’ The offer was considered by the Corps Committee during its 10<sup>th</sup>
Meeting on 13-14 March 1957 and accepted. CSOs/Commandants were asked to send
in their suggestions by 30 April regarding personal high endeavour. It was
believed that some articles had been written previously on the subject in some
magazine. The Secretary was asked to obtain a copy of such an article, if
available. In September 1957, the
Secretary of the Corps Committee wrote to CSOs/Commandants, asking them to
forward suggestions regarding personal high endeavour. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the 12<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Corps
Committee held on 19-20 March 1959, it was agreed that wide publicity should be
given to the trophy and citations for the award be asked for from units. It was
also agreed that the award should cover a wide field and not be confined to
technical achievements only. Based on suggestions received from various sources
a draft Corps Committee Directive was made and circulated to members of the
Corps Committee for comments in August 1963. Corps of Signals Committee
Directive No 6 dealing with the ‘Lt Gen Daulet Singh Trophy for High Endeavour’
was issued on 5 November 1963. It stipulated that the trophy would be kept
permanently in the Headquarters Mess, School of Signals Mhow. All Corps of
Signals personnel would be eligible for the award. It stated that while it was
not possible to lay down rigidly what constitutes high endeavour, this could be
in any of the following fields:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Technical Field (a
discovery/invention/improvisation/research in the field of electronics
culminating in outstanding improvement in the concept/technique of signal
communication system or electronic equipment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Special Mission in a
Signals Sphere (sustained personal effort in establishing and maintaining
signal communications under extreme conditions)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Special Mission in a
Non –Signal Sphere (a feat of personal endurance in an effort to explore/recce
territory on the frontiers of India; an act of sustained effort which enhanced
the prestige of the Corps; an achievement
in mountaineering or other expedition resulting in acquisition of useful
information and data)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sports (national or international
recognition or record)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General (any
achievement of personal high endeavour which earns national/international recognition or enhances
prestige of the service). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 15<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the
Corps Committee held on 14 and 17 February 1964 decided that the award for the
year 1962 will be given to Lance Naik Dharam Chand, VrC. As sufficient data on
or recommendations for the award for 1963 had not been received, no award was
announced for the year 1963, and CSOs/Commandants were asked to send further recommendations.
It was also decided that the award would be given for performance in a calendar
year. The award would be given for acts of personal endeavour of any type and
not necessarily for gallantry only. As regards the location for the trophy it
was decided that it would be kept permanently in the Quarter Guard of 1 STC and
will be shown on bara khana and similar functions. The miniature replica to be awarded to each
recipient would be in the form of a medal or a plaque the design of which would
be decided by a sub-committee.<b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The decision to award the trophy to
Lance Naik Dharam Chand had been vehemently opposed by Brigadier T. Barreto
during the meeting, who protested that the donor had clearly stated that it was
to be awarded only to officers. (By this time, Lieutenant General Daulet Singh
was no more, having died in an air crash the previous year). On 7 July 1964
Brigadier Barreto wrote to the Lieutenant General A.C. Iyappa, the senior
Colonel Commandant and Chairman of the Corps Committee, endorsing a copy of his
letter to Major General R.N. Batra, the SO-in-C and Co-Chairman of the Corps
Committee. In his letter, he wrote:<i>“A
dead man’s wishes keep haunting me and in view of my close association with him
at the most critical period of his life, I feel that am honour bound to get the
Corps Committee to amend its decisions in accordance with the wishes of the
donor”.</i> (Brigadier Barreto had been CSO Western Command from 1960 to 1963.
He had served under General Daulet Singh, the GOC-in-C, during the 1962
Sino-Indian Conflict and later up to his tragic death in 1963).<b>42</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Unfortunately, Brigadier Barreto’s
plea went unheeded, and the Corps Committee refused to amend its decision. In
subsequent years most of the awardees have been officers, prominent among them
being Captain P.K. Ghosh, VrC and Captain M.A. Rasheed. <span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Plaque
of Honour<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Shortly
before Independence, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the Indian Signal Corps held
on 15May 1947 agreed to present a miniature bronze ‘Jimmy’ mounted on a wooden
plinth to the best Young Officer passing out of the ISC School. The award was
to commence with the first batch (PAT-1), which was then under training. This
decision was reconfirmed in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Meeting of The Indian Signals
Committee (1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the newly reconstituted Committee) held on
1-2 April 1948, which decided that the cost of the award (up to an approximate
amount of Rs 50/-) be met from the Officers Central Mess Fund. The Commandant
ISC School was asked to forward a design of the presentation to the Secretary.
At the next meeting of the Committee held in May 1949 a bronze replica of the
Corps Emblem manufactured by Orr & Sons of Madras was displayed. The Committee did not approve of this trophy
and directed the Secretary to obtain a better specimen. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
the next meet held in March 1950 the progress on the manufacture of the Best
YO’s trophy was reviewed. The Secretary
pointed out that the original idea of presenting a bronze Jimmy had been
dropped and instead signal officers of Army HQ, Air HQ, Army HQ Signal Regiment,
Air Formation Signal Regiment, and those on ERE were presenting a ‘Plaque of
Honour’ as the best YO’s trophy. Orders
for the manufacture of this had already been placed on Messrs Hamilton &
Co. Ltd. New Delhi. Soon afterwards the
trophy was ready and drew appreciation from everyone. The plaque comprises a
bronze replica of the painting known as ‘Through’ by Patrick Martin. It depicts
the immortal lineman who made the supreme sacrifice after joining two ends of a
broken cable and uttering the words ‘Through’ which are part of the lexicon of
signallers all over the World. In 1952 it was decided that a medal should be
presented to the best YO along with the trophy. Since then, the ‘Plaque of
Honour’ and ‘Through’ Medal are presented by the Commandant to the best Young
Officer during the farewell dinner at the end of the course. It is much sought
after and there is keen competition among young officers for the award.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">SPORTS & ADVENTURE<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Sports<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Sports
and games have always been an important part of military life. The games played
in the Army can broadly be divided into two categories. Troop games are
basically team games such as hockey, football, basketball, volleyball and so
on, in which officers and men both participate. These are usually played in all
units during the games parade. Individual games are non-team games, where
individual skills count. For officers, these comprise games such as tennis,
squash, badminton etc. which are played outside office hours, in a club or
officers’ mess. There are also other
individual events such as shooting, boxing, weight lifting etc. in which both
officers and men take part. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
games were being played in units of the Indian Signal Corps even before
Independence, it was only in 1953 that it was decided to organise teams on a
Corps basis. It was decided that the Corps of Signals teams would be formed on
the ‘gladiator principle’ and located with signal units in different stations.
The responsibilities allotted to signal units for various teams were as given
below:-<b>43</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Western Command Signal
Regiment (Delhi) - Hockey <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">20 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment (Calcutta) - Football
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Army HQ Signal Regiment - Basket Ball <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">STC - Shooting<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1955 it was decided that a Corps
Sports Fund will be created and maintained by transfers from the SO-in-C’s
Signals Fund. The annual subscriptions
to the Fund were raised from four to eight annas with effect from 1 April 1955.
Regimental cuttings would not be increased, but units were asked to meet this
contribution from other sources of regimental income. It was also decided that the Corps Basket
Ball and Athletic teams would be disbanded and all effort concentrated on the
Hockey Team. At the end of the current
season this team would be located at the STC, where the Commandant would be
responsible for it and would examine the employment of a suitable coach. Though
the Corps Football team would not be disbanded, expenditure on its account
would be restricted. It would not move
out of Calcutta to take part in tournaments.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1964 it was decided to form a Corps Sports
Control Committee to promote sports activities within the Corps and to
endeavour to improve the standards of the teams in certain selected games viz.
hockey, football, basketball, volleyball, athletics, boxing, swimming and
wrestling. Corps teams would be maintained only in four games (hockey,
football, basketball, volleyball), while in the case of the remainder,
promising individuals would be selected and given coaching at the STCs. For
this purpose, potential sportsmen would be posted to 1 STC for athletics,
boxing and 2 STC for swimming and wrestling.
The Chairman of the Corps Sports Control Committee was Commandant 1 STC
with members being the deputy commandants of the two STCs, one representative
from each command and from Signals Directorate. After the appointment of
Inspector Signal Technical Trades (ISTT), he replaced Commandant 1 STC as
Chairman. It was stipulated that the strength of the Corps teams would not
exceed 18 for hockey and football and 15 for basketball and volleyball. Each
team would be captained by an officer or JCO. If an officer of the required
standard could not be found as a ‘playing member’, an officer would be
appointed as officer-in-charge and non-playing captain.<b>44 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Hockey <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Corps Hockey Team has had a
chequered history, having changed it location four times in the first 11 years
of existence, before finally settling down at Jullundur (now called Jalandhar.
In spite of these frequent moves the team performed creditably, winning several
national level tournaments during the period 1953-72. It also produced 15
players for the Services team and three who represented India - Noel Toppo, M.P.
Ganesh and Raminder Singh. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The team was raised in April 1953 at
Jullundur under Jemadar Ajit Singh. The
team was located at 3 Company Western Command Signal Regiment with the CSO
being responsible for it. In September 1953 CSO Western Command felt that team
was not progressing as it should and decided to attach it to XI Corps Signal
Regiment in Jullundur. During the 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Corps Committee
held on 14-15 February 1954 it was suggested that the team should be located at
Bombay where there was more scope for practice. However, it was decided that
there should be no change in the location for the present. At the next meeting
held in 1955 it was decided to move the team to Jubbulpore. Colonel T.K.
Mukerji, Commandant STC was made responsible for the team and asked to examine
the employment of a suitable coach.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1956 the team won the Dhyan Chand Gold Cup at New Delhi. However, after this
its performance was lack lustre and it did not win any major tournament for the
next four years. In 1960 a proposal to move the team back to Jullundur under
CSO XI Corps was included in the Agenda of the 13<sup>th</sup> Corps Committee
Meeting that was scheduled to be held at Jullundur. This drew a strong protest
from CSO Southern Command, Brigadier T. Barreto, who wrote:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
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height:264pt;visibility:visible'>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">THE CORPS HOCKEY TEAM 1964</span></u></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Front : L/Nk Syed Mustafa, L/Hav Surinder Singh, L/Hav D Balachandran,
Hav Noel Toppo, L/Nk Arvind Kadam, Nk Duli Chand.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Back : Maj Harbhajan Singh, Nk Gurdial Singh, Hav AS Shinde, Brig SR
Khurana, Lt Gen JS Dillion, Lt Col DB Lahiri, Jem
Gurbachan Singh, Hav Balbir Singh, Jem Malkiat Singh.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It appears that this point has been raised by the
Secretary. The Secretary is not a member of the Corps Committee and is not
empowered to raise points other than procedural. The item states “it is
desired….” but does not state by whom it is so desired. Are we to assume that
the Secretary desires the location of the Corps Hockey Team to be changed<b>?</b></span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I do hope a complete
brief giving the reasons for the previous change from JULLUNDER to JUBBULPORE
and the reasons for reverting to the old location will be issued before the meeting</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
<b>45<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No brief was issued before the
meeting. However, the point was discussed and not accepted. Surprisingly, it
was omitted from the minutes of the meeting, which refers only to the formation
of the Corps Sports Control Committee. This again drew a letter of protest from
Brigadier Barreto to Army HQ, which replied that the point will be considered
by the Commandant STC on the formation of the Corps Sports Control Committee. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1962 the 14<sup>th</sup> Corps Committee felt that the Bombay was perhaps a
better location than Jubbulpore from the point of view of training of the team.
CSO Southern Command was asked to examine this and intimate whether this change
could be effected. Shortly afterwards, 12 hockey players were posted to 2
Company, Southern Command Signal Regiment at Bombay. In September 1962 CSO
Southern Command wrote to Signals Directorate bringing out several problems
connected with the team. Of the 12 players who had been posted to Bombay, one
had been sent to STC for an upgrading course. No officer or JCO had been posted
with the teams, as decided by the Corps Committee. The team had arrived without
any hockey gear, which would have to be purchased. Giving out his plan for
training of the team and its participation in various tournaments, some of which
had an entry fee, the CSO asked for an additional allotment of Rs. 2500 for the
hockey team. He went on to say: <i>“One of
the reasons for locating the team at BOMBAY was perhaps the healthy state of
regimental funds of the signal company at BOMBAY. The assets of this company
derived from the income of coconut trees at the transmitter site are under
dispute and we may have to refund the entire amount to the Government. Efforts
are however being made to retain the assets as regimental funds.”<b>46</b></i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
team was not destined to stay in Bombay by for long. Though not listed in the
Agenda of the 15<sup>th</sup> Meeting that was held in February 1964, the Corps
Committee decided that the Hockey team would be located at Jullundur, provided
CSO Western Command finds this suitable. If Jullundur was not suitable, the
team will be located at Jabalpur with 1 or 3 STC. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This
decision took many by surprise, since the move of the team had not been
proposed by the Corps Sports Control Committee and neither had there been any
discussion on the subject. One person who had been watching the ups and downs
of the Corps Hockey Team closely was Brigadier Barreto, now Commandant School
of Signals. After coming to know of the move of the team from Bombay from the
minutes of the meeting, in July 1964 he addressed a letter to Lieutenant
General A.C. Iyappa and Major General R.N. Batra, the Chairman and Co-Chairman
of the Corps Committee. He analysed the reasons for the indifferent performance
of the Hockey team and felt that it was primarily due to lack of interest of
the officers responsible and absence of a playing officer in the team. The
standard of hockey in Bombay was high and the competition was on par with the
best in India. Making strong pleas for continuance of the team at Bombay, he
wrote:-<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I
have had discussions with Torun Mukerji on the subject earlier this year, and
he told me that he has been watching the team at work in Bombay. He claims that
the team consists basically of sound players, but that it lacks discipline and
guidance. As you know, one of the reasons for moving the team from Jullundur to
Jubbulpore was that Torun was there to nurse it, and there is no doubt that he
succeeded. He is now prepared to do it again in Bombay, and I strongly
recommend that we accept his offer and leave the team where it is.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It
was Torun Mukerji and Roby Sen who were responsible for ‘finding’ Noel Toppo,
the one and only National Hockey player the Corps has produced in its whole
history. And the argument I have against Jullundur is that had the team
remained there, we would never have had a Toppo. The answer is to keep the team
at Jullundur during the non-playing season so that it is fed with fresh blood.
During the playing season (and for a short period before for coaching purposes)
it should remain in Bombay.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">47</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the event, the team moved to Jullundur in 1964 as decided by the Corps
Committee. Major (later Lieutenant General) Harbhajan Singh), a hockey player,
took charge of the Team<span style="color: blue;">.</span> Fortunately its
performance during the subsequent years was commendable. It won a number of
tournaments including the Beighton Cup (1966), Obaidullah Khan Gold Cup (1967),
Rene Frank Trophy (1969), Murugappa Cup (1970) and the Jawahar Lal Nehru Gold
Cup (1970-72). Two of the three international players that the Corps had
produced were also nurtured at Jullundur. Naik Noel Toppo, who was part of the
team while it was at Jubbulpore, played for India in the 1962 Asiad. Lance Naik
M.P. Ganesh donned India’s colours at the World Cup in Barcelona (1969), the
Munich Olympiad (1972) and the World Cup at Amsterdam (1973), the last one as
the team captain. He was given the Arjuna Award in 1973. The third
international player was Captain Raminder Singh, who played for India in 1970. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Football<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
decided by the Corps Committee in 1953, the Corps Football Team was located in
Calcutta with 20 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. The team took part in a
number of tournaments but could not make its mark. In 1962 the Corps Committee
was informed that a number of individuals, though up to the required standard
for inclusion in the Corps Teams, were not coming forward and in certain cases
units were not making them readily available.
The minimum number required to train a team for events like hockey and
football was between 16 and 18, yet in the case of football only 9 players were
made available so far. It was decided
that the Chairman of the Sports Control Committee will send names of all
football players who took part in the football tournament during the Reunion in
1961 to CSO Eastern Command for making a selection. The teams must be brought up to the strength
and the training must start as soon as possible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964 the Corps Committee decided that the Corps
Football Team would be located with 2 STC in Goa. After its move to Goa the
team took part in a number of tournaments but did not win any. According to
Brigadier Barreto, this was because the standard of football in Goa was high.
Commenting on the reasons for shifting the team to Goa, Brigadier Barreto
writes: “<i>As a Goan, I knew that the
Portuguese had introduced football to Goa and had a high standard. I advised
Apar Singh to locate the team in Goa for this reason”.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Basketball<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps Basketball Team was
raised in Army HQ Signal Regiment in 1953 as a result of the decision of the 6<sup>th</sup>
Signals Committee Meeting held on 4-5 March 1953. Two years later, in 1955 it
was decided that the Corps Basketball and Athletic teams would be disbanded and
all effort will be concentrated on the Hockey Team. The team was raised again
in February 1961 at Meerut and was later shifted to Delhi under Army HQ Signal
Regiment. The Corps Committee during its
14<sup>th</sup> Meeting held in March 1962 sanctioned a sum of Rs. 500 for the
team. Brigadier Barreto, then CSO Western Command, felt that this amount was inadequate
and took up the matter with the Corps Committee in October 1962. He wrote that the team under the guidance of
Colonel R.N. Sen had recently won four major tournaments in Delhi viz. Royal
Club Tournament, All India Butlerian Tournament, Delhi & Rajasthan Area
Inter-Station Tournament and Delhi State Championship. In view of their
success, the team could now be considered as one of the best in India. He
stated that the Rs 500 sanctioned by the Committee had not proved adequate and
signal units in Delhi Cantonment had borne the balance of the expenditure from
their unit funds. He recommended that an additional sum of Rs 500 be allotted
to compensate the units in part. <b>48<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Almost a year later, in August 1963
the Secretary of the Corps Committee, Lieutenant Colonel Sri Ram, replied to
Western Command pointing out that from the accounts sent by them it appeared that Rs. 119 were
still unspent. He asked HQ Western Command to reconcile the accounts. (By this
time, Brigadier Barreto had moved to Mhow as Commandant School of Signals). In
1964 the Corps Sports Control Committee was formed to promote sports activities
within the Corps and improve the standards of the teams in certain selected
games. Basketball was one of the four games in which Corps Teams were to be
maintained. The strength of the team was not to exceed 15 and it would be
captained by an officer or a JCO. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
report of the Commandant Army HQ Signals on the performance of the Corps
Basketball Team was discussed during the 18<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Corps
Committee held in February 1967. The
Committee commended the performance of individual members of the team during
the year. An amount of Rs 1500 was
sanctioned tentatively for the year 1967-68 for the maintenance of the team.
Any unspent balance from the allotment for the previous year as considered
necessary by the SO-in- C would be deducted from this amount of Rs
1500.00. Commandant Army HQ Signals was
instructed to plan expenditure within the sanctioned amount.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
team took part in several tournaments and produced a number of players of
national level. In 1969 the team participated in twelve tournaments of which
they won six and were runners-up in two. The team won the Delhi Area Basketball
Championship for the 10<sup>th</sup> year in a row in recognition of which the
Championship Cup was given permanently to Army HQ Signals. A few promising
players were selected for teams at the national level. Naik Mohan Singh and
Naik Nambiar played in the Services team in 1963 and 1965 respectively.
Havildar Gulzar Singh played in the Indian team in the Bangkok Asiad in 1966.
In 1969 Havildars Karnail Singh and Ajit Singh and Lance Naik Mewa Singh were
selected to represent Delhi State in the National Championship. <span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Volleyball<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Volleyball was not included among
games in which Corps teams were raised in 1953 viz. Hockey, Football,
Basketball and Shooting. In 1955 the proposal to raise a Volleyball team was
placed before the Corps Committee but not agreed to. Apparently the team was
raised soon afterwards and started showing good results. Lance Naiks Sri Ram
Yadav and Jaikaran were members of the Services team which won the National
Volleyball Championship in 1960-61. After the creation of the Corps Sports
Control Committee in 1962, it was decided that Corps teams would be maintained
in Hockey, Football, Basketball and Volleyball. For selection and training of
the team, the Corps Sports Control Committee would be assisted by the
Volleyball Sub Committee, as for other games.
The strength of the Corps Volleyball was fixed at 15, with an officer or
JCO to be included as team captain.<b>49</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Corps Committee during its 14<sup>th</sup>
Meeting held in March 1962 sanctioned a sum of Rs. 500 for the team. In the
next meeting held in February 1964, the Committee felt that the Corps teams
could do better if properly organised, encouraged and trained. The locations of
the teams were also decided. The Volleyball and Basketball teams were to be
located in Delhi, one each with 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment and Delhi &
Rajasthan Area as decided by CSO Western Command. The Committee also sanctioned
Rs. 1000 each for the Volleyball and Basketball teams, specifying that if the
CSO/Commandant needed additional financial assistance, he could bid for more,
and the further allotment would be considered provided the performance of the
team was satisfactory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The report of the Commandant Army
HQ Signals on the performance of the Corps Volleyball Team was discussed during
the 18<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Corps Committee held in February 1967. The Chairman commended the performance of the
team and Havildar S.R. Yadav who was selected for the National team for the
Fifth Asian Games at Bangkok. The requirement of Rs. 1667 projected by
Commandant Army HQ Signals for the maintenance of the team for the year 1967-68
was also discussed. The Committee
sanctioned an amount of Rs. 1000 tentatively.
Any unspent balance from the allotment for the previous year as
considered necessary by the SO-in-C would be deducted from this amount of Rs.
1000 now sanctioned. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1969 the team produced
commendable results, winning the Butlerian, Shastri Memorial and several other
tournaments. Havildar Banwari Lal was
awarded the Services Colours while Naik Daniel was declared the best volleyball
player in the All India Young Players Volleyball Tournament held at Jullundur
and was given a special prize. In 1970
the team participated in seven tournaments winning four of them. The team won the Delhi Area Volleyball
Championship for the 12<sup>th</sup> year in succession in appreciation of
which this trophy was permanently awarded to Army HQ Signals. Six members of the team were selected to
represent Western Command in the Services Championship held at Kota. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The two most well known players of
international standard produced by the team were CQMH Sri Ram Yadav and
Havildar Jaikaran, who participated in the Asian Games at Jakarta in 1962 and
Bangkok in 1966, winning the bronze medal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Triangular
Sports Meet<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Triangular Sports Meet was held every year from 1960 onwards, between the Corps
of Engineers, Regiment of Artillery and the Corps of Signals. Teams comprising
selected officers and ladies competed in three games – squash, tennis and golf,
the last being added only in the second year i.e. 1961. The event has a very interesting history,
which has been described by Major H. A. Marley (Engineers) in the following
words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Once upon a time the
top brass of the Regiment of Artillery, the Corps of Engineers and the Corps of
Signals met to talk over means of fostering the spirit of camaraderie among the
three Arms. The main outcome of their
deliberations was to pass the buck to their staff officers. And so ……….<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On a historic Saturday
in 1959 (the 25<sup>th</sup> of April, to be exact), and having nothing better
to do between their post-breakfast elevenses and pre-lunch twelveses, (this was
at Army HQ, you must know), three officers got together in a room at Kashmir
House (that’s where the Engineers hang out) in New Delhi, and began to discuss.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The officers were
Brigadier Shiv Dial Singh (the Brigadier, Engineer Staff), Brigadier Apar Singh
(the Deputy Director, Signals) and Lieutenant-Colonel RS Seth (the Officiating
Deputy Director, Artillery). And their
terms of discussion were : ‘A proposal to further foster and develop the
traditional association between the Artillery, Engineers and Signals by having
a get-together for their officers and their wives on the lines of a sports meet
to be held at least once a year’.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The proposal was
discussed and agreed to in two minutes flat.
The representatives of the three Corps then called for tea and settled
down to a game of rummy, thereby inaugurating what was in fact the very first
Triangular Meet, if rummy can be considered to be a sporting event<b>.</b></span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">50<i> <o:p></o:p></i></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Actually, the proposal had already
been formally considered a month earlier by the top brass of the three Corps.
During the Corps Committee Meeting held on 19-20 March 1959, the SO-in-C read
out a letter from the E-in-C’s Branch which proposed that to foster and further
strengthen the historic association and friendship between Artillery, Engineers
and Signal, sports meetings in Cricket, Tennis and Squash be held annually in
rotation at Deolali, Mhow and Kirkee.
The teams were to be raised from officers volunteering for a particular
sport and no organized and lengthy training was envisaged. The main idea was to have a social
‘get-together’. The Corps acting as the host would look after the accommodation
and feeding of the visiting teams. Other
expenses would be met by the respective teams from their own resources. The Chief of the Army Staff had been apprised
of the proposal and had also been requested for some financial assistance from
his funds. The Committee examined the proposal from all angles but was not
fully convinced of the real value of the scheme in view of the expenses
involved. However, it approved of a
trial for games like Tennis and Squash. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 1<sup>st</sup> Triangular
Sports Meet was hosted by the Corps of Engineers at CME, Kirkee in 1960, when
only Tennis and Squash were played. Golf
was introduced during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meet at held Deolali in 1961. The 3<sup>rd</sup>
Meet was hosted by the Corps of Signals at Mhow in February 1962. Thereafter,
it became a regular feature and the Triangular Sports Meet was held in rotation
at Kirkee, Deolali and Mhow. The expenditure in connection with the Meet held at
Mhow was initially paid from the Signals Sports Fund. Subsequently, the Corps
Committee decided that it should be debited to the Headquarters Mess Fund. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the 1<sup>st</sup>
Triangular Sports Meet which commenced at Kirkee on 25 January 1960, the Corps
of Signals was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel and Mrs. R.N.R. Sawhny, Major
H.L. Pandit, Captains Kalyan Singh, B.P. Murgai, R.P. Singh and S.C. Choudhuri
and Lieutenants Pran Nath and Nagrajan.
The ‘sparrows’ were well and truly beaten in all matches except one
–Sawhny won his tennis singles match against a Gunner. In squash, the Sappers played the current
National champion, the runner-up for the National title, the Southern Command
champion and a Services semi-finalist and won all their matches. The social events were plentiful, leading the
Signallers and Gunners to suspect that it was planned to tire them out before
the games! The night before the first
day of the sports programme the visitors attended the Republic Day Dance at the
Rajendra Sinhji Institute in Poona. The
remaining days were filled up by a visit to the National Defence Academy at
Kharakvasla, a variety entertainment by the CME music circle, a cinema show at
the CME open air theatre, a ride on the “Puffing John” (the CME circular
railway), a rowing meet on the Mula Rivera and a supper and dance at the
Officers’ Mess of the Bengal Engineer Group.
On 28 January, the visitors joined the Corps of Engineers in celebrating
their Corps Day, the major event being the Corps of Engineers’ Dinner. <b>51 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 3<sup>rd</sup> Triangular Meet
was held at Mhow from 13-15 February 1962. This being the first Meet being
hosted by Signals, which also coincided with the Corps Day, the functions were
planned with meticulous care. The SO-in-C, Major General R.N. Batra was also a
participant. In tennis, the Corps was represented by Major and Mrs. J.C.
Dhamija, and Captains S.S. Das, N. Kovoor and P.V. Banker. In tennis, Engineers
stood first, Signals second and Artillery third. The Signals golf team
comprised Major General R.N. Batra, Brigadier R.Z. Kabraji, Major M.S. Sodhi,
and Captains S.C. Roy and S.C. Khurana. This event was also won by Sappers,
with Gunners being runners up and Signals standing third. The squash matches
were conducted at the recently renovated Akehurst Squash Court. The Signals
team consisted of Majors S. Ghosh and R.A. Rajan, and Captain B.P. Murgai. In
this game, Gunners came first, beating the Sappers, who had to be content with
second place. Signals again took third
place. There were a large number of social and cultural events. These included
an evening party at Berchha on 13 February, a DR Display followed by band
performance and Beating Retreat by the Pipes and Drums, culminating in a gala
dance at the Central India Club on 14 February and the Corps Dinner on 15
February.<b>52 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 6<sup>th</sup> Triangular Meet
was held at Mhow from 4-6 October 1967, just after the College Anniversary on 1
October. Lieutenant General A.C. Iyappa, now the Chairman and Managing Director
of Bharat Electronics Ltd., flew down from Bangalore to participate in the
event. The SO-in-C, Major General I.D. Verma also came down from Delhi to play
for the Corps. The Signals team in golf comprised General Iyappa,
Lieutenant-Colonel Phalwant Singh, and Majors V. Khanna and O.L. Matta. When
the overall results came in, there was a tie between Artillery and Engineers
for the first position. However, the Gunners were announced the winners based
on their score for the first nine holes. In tennis, the Corps was represented
by General Verma, Major and Mrs. Inderjit Singh and Major N. Kovoor. The event
was won by the Sappers, with the Gunners coming in second. The squash team of
Signals consisted of Captain C. Dalal and Lieutenants Bansal and B.N. Khera.
The Sappers and Gunners had several Services players and vied for the top
honours. Finally, Engineers carried the day, with Artillery a close second. As
in the previous meet held at Mhow, there were several social functions,
including a dance at the Central India Club, a four act play staged by the
College dramatic club, an exhibition football match, a DR display, a band
display and the social in the headquarters mess. The dinner was followed by a
suckling barbecue at 2 a.m. and a sit down breakfast of eggs and ham at 4 a.m.,
and that too because the SO-in-C had to catch his train from Ratlam.<b>53</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 9<sup>th</sup> Triangular Meet,
the third time when Signals played host, was held in Mhow in October 1970. It
proved to be third time lucky for the Corps, which won two of the three
tournaments. The tennis team comprised Brigadier J.V. Pinto, Major S.S. Das,
Major and Mrs. Inderjit Singh and Lieutenant A.J.S. Bhalla. Signals made a
clean sweep, beating both Engineers and Artillery in all matches. The Engineers
came in second and Artillery was third. The Signals golf team had Brigadier
K.D. Bhargava, Colonel Y.S. Desai, Lieutenant-Colonel S.N. Vishawanath and
Major V. Khanna. In the overall results Signals and Artillery tied for first
place, but Signals were declared winners based on their victory in the medal
round. In squash, the Corps was represented by Major B.P. Murgai, Captain S.K.
Jain and Second-Lieutenant Girdhar. The Engineers team had the current National
Champion, Major K.S. Jain, while the Artillery team had the current Services
Champion, Captain V.K. Paul. The final placing was – Gunners, Sappers, and
Signals. The social events included a get-to-know supper at the Headquarters
mess, a diner dance at DSOI, (the erstwhile Central India Club) and a play <i>Boeing Boeing </i>staged by the Amateur
Dramatic Society.<b>54</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">W.I.A.A. Reliability Trials</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Western India Automobile Association (W.I.A.A.) began holding Reliability
Trials, which later came to be known as Motor or Car Rallies, soon after
Independence. The trials were a test of road worthiness of motor vehicles under
touring conditions normally available in India. It was based on similar
competitions in Europe, such as the Monte Carlo Rally and the R.A.C.
Rally. The competition was not a speed
race but a test of the ability to maintain a prescribed speed over different
sections of the route. Competitors were started off at intervals of about five
minutes and scheduled times of arrival at check points were laid down. Arrivals
and departures at check points earlier or later than one minute were penalised
by one point for each minute. Time lost or gained in one section could not be
made up or adjusted in the subsequent sections. (The format remained the same
when the author was a member of the Signals team in the Himalayan Rally from
1982-84, except that early arrival was penalized by ten points for every
minute)!<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Indian Army took part in the event for the first time during the 6<sup>th</sup>
Reliability Trial held in 1959, with one team of staff cars and two teams of
motor cycles, the latter in the 350 c.c.
class. One of the motor cycle teams was entered by Southern Command Signal
Regiment and the other by Bombay Sub Area, which included Signals personnel
from 2 Company Southern Command Signal Regiment and 502 Coastal Battery Signals
Section (TA). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
route covered a distance of 314 miles, starting from the National Sports Club
in Bombay and passing through Thana, Igatpuri, Nasik and Bhiwandi, finishing at
Thana. The first section between Bombay and Peint (314 miles) was to be
completed in 3 hours 54 minutes; the second section in the ghats between Peint
and Ponda (36 miles) was to be covered in 3 hours 36 minutes; the third section
between Ponda and Pardi (17 miles) was to be done in 34 minutes; and the final
stretch from Pardi to Thana (114 miles) was to be completed in 3 hours 15
minutes. The Southern Command Signal Regiment team was extremely unlucky, all
three drivers suffering breakdowns, one just six miles short of the finish. The
Bombay Sub Area team fared much better, all three entries finishing in good
time, Signalman Abdul Khader of 502 Coastal Battery Signal Section (TA) on a
Matchless was adjudged the best in 350 c.c. class and awarded a handsome
trophy. Signalman K.B. Rangaih of 2 Company Southern Command Signal Regiment
was awarded a certificate of good performance. Thanks to these two signallers,
Bombay Sub Area won the trophy for the best motor cycle team. <b>55</b>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
7<sup>th</sup> Reliability Trial held at Poona on 26 November 1960 had 23 cars
and 24 motor cycles taking part. The Army entered one team of three cars and
four teams of three motor cycles each in the 251-350 cc. class. Two motor cycle
teams of the STC took part, representing the Corps of Signals. On team was
entered by Bombay Sub Area from signal units in Bombay and one by Southern
Command Signal Regiment. The course for the event covered 293 miles, starting
from the Armed Forces Medical College (AFMC) in Poona to Lonand, Satara, Koyna
Nagar, Poladpur, Mahableshwar and Wai, finishing at the AFMC after going over a
driving test circuit at the Golibar Maidan. The performance of the Signals
teams was much better than in the previous year. Out of 12 despatch riders who
started, 11 completed the course, including Signalman P.L. Veluswamy who
sustained injuries when his motor cycle hit a boulder. In spite of injuries to
his face and arms he decided to continue after first aid. Naik Ram Nath won the
first prize in 251-350 cc. class as well as the prizes for the best rider and
best motor cycle. The Corps B Team from STC comprising Havildars Dev Raj and
Perumal and Naik Isaiah won the prize for the best motor cycle team. <b>56<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Buoyed by the success in the
W.I.A.A. Trials, it was decided to hold similar trials at the STC, to select
the best despatch riders in the Corps and train them. In February 1961 five
teams – one each from Southern, Western and Eastern Commands, Army HQ and STC -
took part in the motor cycle trials at Jubbulpore. Motor cycles were provided
by the STC, after drawing lots. Competitors were thereafter responsible for the
maintenance of their machines and were allowed to practice on the actual route.
The trials commenced on 14 February after an inspection of the motor cycles by
an EME team. The first event was a flexibility test, in which riders had to
drive in slow and fast time, stopping at the designated stop without using the
brake or clutch. This was followed by a 23 kilometre course which included two
timed sections, three observed sections and one map reading section. The final
event was the cross country course of 8 kilometres which consisted of stony
ground, loose sand, mud and rock, with steep ascents and descents. The course
was to be completed in 20 minutes. When the final results were tallied, the STC
team consisting of Havildar D.G.S. Sandhu, Naik Ram Nath and Lance Naik Chanda
Singh came first. The first three places in individual rankings went to Lance
Naik Chanda Singh, Naik Ram Nath and Lance Naik Manohar Singh. <b>57<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 8<sup>th</sup> W.I.A.A.
Reliability Trials were held at Bombay on 9 December 1961. Four teams from
Signals took part, two from the STC and two from Southern Command Signal
Regiment The distance of the course was 263 miles, covering Bombay- Thana-
Bhiwandi – Vada- Kasa- Jawahar - Mokhada– Jarwar Badrukh – Trimbak – Nasik –
Ghoti – Igatpuri Shahpur – Thana. Company Havildar Major Dev Raj of STC won the
title of best motorcyclist, winning the individual championship for himself and
the Noble Shield for his motor cycle. The title for the best team performance
was won by the STC A team, led by Company Havildar Major D. Govindaswamy Naidu.
<b>58. <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For some reason, the Corps did not
enter a team in the W.I.A.A. Trials for the next six years. In the 11<sup>th</sup>
W.I.A.A. Trials held at Bombay in 1967, a total of 29 motor cars and 17 motor
cycles took part. Southern Command
entered three unit teams each of three despatch riders in both individual and
team events in the 151-350 cc. class. The teams were drawn from Southern
Command Signal Regiment, 2 STC and Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment. The
course was 410 miles, covering Bombay (Flora Fountain), Panvel, Kashedi, Khed, Rajapur, Savantwadi,
Dodamarg, Bicholim, Ponda, Old Goa and Panjim. Of the nine despatch riders
fielded by the Corps, eight reached the finish point in the order in which they
had started. Naik Popat Deshmukh of Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment won
the first prize in the 251-350 cc. class and the Ruperal Trophy and cup for the
best rider amongst all classes. The trophy for the best motor cycle team was
won by Southern Command Signal regiment, comprising Havildar P.K.P Kamet, Naik
V.N. Chellapan and Naik S. Swamynathan. <b>59<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The<b> </b>Trials in 1968 were conducted at Ahmedabad by the Gujarat Branch
of the W.I.A.A. This was the first part
of the Trials, the second being planned later in the year at Nagpur. It was
done at short notice and four teams were hurriedly organised and sent to
Ahmedabad. Two teams were drawn from the Corps DR Display Team which was then
performing at Poona, and the other two were from the Southern Command Signal
Regiment and Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment. The route selected was Ahmedabad-
Baroda- Narbada Bridge – Kodara and back to Ahmedabad. The distance was about
350 miles, and 30 cars and 28 motor cycles took part. Lance Naik Raghbir Singh
of 1 STC won the Ruparel trophy and individual cup by W.I.A.A. for the best
driver in the Trials. The Southern Command Signal Regiment team was awarded the
special trophy for the best team performance. The team comprised the same
members who had won the team event the previous year.<b>60<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
regimental institutions covered in this chapter reflect the character of the
Corps, and the changes that have taken place in the 25 years since
Independence. A few of these institutions, such as the Colonels Commandant,
Corps Emblem & Motto, Reunion and DR Display Team existed even earlier. However,
most of the institutions covered here came into being only after Independence,
when the Corps developed its distinct identity, quite different from that of
Royal Signals on which it was heavily dependent earlier. However, the influence
and contribution of Royals Signals, which provided the bulk of the officer
cadre and a large number of men during the pre-Independence period, cannot be
discounted. The Corps of Signals readily adopted the models already in
existence in UK, modifying them to suit Indian conditions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sports and games have always formed
an important part of daily routine in units. The participation of personnel in
pursuits such as trekking, mountaineering etc was on an individual basis. Their
development into regimental institutions reflects the growing influence of
sports and adventure in fostering pride and <i>esprit
de corps. </i>The teams that take part in these events act as flag bearers of
the Corps, their successes and failures affecting all ranks. There is little
doubt that the splendid performance of the hockey team and of stalwarts such as
M.P. Ganesh added inches to the chest of every signalman in the Corps, when it
was announced in the print media or on radio. It might also have helped in
drawing recruits to the Corps, though data on this subject has never been
collected. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ENDNOTES
TO CHAPTER 12<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This chapter
is based mainly on the Minutes of the Corps of Signals Committee and its sub
committees; records available in the Corps Museum; articles in The Signalman;
and inputs from veterans. Specific references are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Minutes of the 12<sup>th</sup>
Corps of Signals Committee Meeting,
19-20 March 1959.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Minutes of the 18<sup>th</sup>
Corps of Signals Committee Meeting, 8-11
February 1967.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Minutes of the 23<sup>rd</sup>
Corps of Signals Committee Meeting, 22 April 1972.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">4.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Minutes of the 3<sup>rd</sup>
Meeting of the Indian Signals Committee (1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the Newly
reconstituted Committee), 1-2 April 1948.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Minutes of the 15<sup>th</sup>
Corps of Signals Committee Meeting, 14 & 17 February 1964. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article ‘Brigadier T.
Barreto’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April, 1966.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">School of Signal letter
No 0102009 HQ of dated 28 June 1963.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Army HQ Letter No
04391/15/Sigs Adm dated 7 August 1963.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">School of Signals Letter No TB/CC/101 dated 13 August 1963.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Army HQ Letter NO.
34770/GS/Sigs Adm dated 21 October 1948.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps of Signal Liaison
Notes No 8 of 23 December 1948 & No 9 of 28 February 1949.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">12.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Minutes of the 1<sup>st</sup>
Indian Signal Corps Committee Meeting, 10 September 1946. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Editorial, <i>The Signalman, </i>July 1950. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article ‘Re-Union-
Corps of Signals 1950’, <i>The Signalman, </i>July
1950.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article<b> </b>‘Second Post-War Reunion- Corps of
Signals’, <i> Reunion Supplement, </i>1954.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">16.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Col I. D. Verma, ‘The
Editor’s Impressions’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April
1958<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">17.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article ‘The Signalman
goes to the Reunion’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April,
1961<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">18.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article ‘Fifth Corps of
Signals Reunion’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April,
1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article ‘The Signalman
Goes to the Reunion’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April,
1970<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">20.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">GHQ Letter No.
0311/4/Sigs 3 dated 10 June 1947<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">21.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article<b> ‘</b>The Indian Signals War Memorial’, <i>The Signalman,</i> April 1961.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">22.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Article<b> ‘</b>The Corps Museum’, <i>The Signalman,</i> April 1961.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">23.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Army HQ Letter No.
50349/GS/Sigs 5 dated 14 September 1951. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">24.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Article<b> ‘</b>The Corps Museum,’, <i>The Signalman,</i> April 1961<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">25.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Minutes of the 2<sup>nd</sup>
Indian Signal Corps Committee Meeting, 15 May 1947<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -16.65pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">26.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">School of Signals,
Mhow, DO Letter No. 0160049 dated 12 June 1954.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">27. Minutes of the 11<sup>th</sup> Signals
Committee Meeting, 14 February 1958.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">28. Minutes of the 15<sup>th</sup> Corps of
Signals Committee Meeting, 14 & 17 February 1964<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">29. Annual Report on the Corps of Signals
Headquarters Mess for the year 1964-1965, dated 9 February 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">30. Appendix A to Army HQ Letter No
37082/HQM/Sigs Adm dated 7 May 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">31. Minutes of the 1<sup>st</sup> Indian
Signals Committee Meeting, 1-2 April 1948<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">32. Minutes of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Indian
Signals Committee Meeting, 24-26 May 1949<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">33. Corps of Indian Signals Bulletin, Issue
No 1, September 1949<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">34. Army HQ Letter No. 00602/A/Sigs Adm dated
23 March 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">35. School of Signals Letter No. CH/101 dated
2 April 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">36. Army HQ Letter No. 00602/A/Sigs Adm dated
26 April 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">37. School of Signals Letter No. CH/GEN/101
dated 30 April 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">38. Minutes of the 17<sup>th</sup> Signals
Committee Meeting, 1-4 March 1966. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">39. Minutes of the 14<sup>th</sup> Corps
Committee Meeting, 16-17 March 1962.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">40. STC Jubbulpore DO No HQ 1036/A/36 dated 1
December 1961. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">41. HQ Western Command Letter No. TB/CC/101
dated 9 August 1962.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">42. Commandant MCTE DO Letter No TB/CC/101
dated 7 July 1964<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">43. Minutes of the 6<sup>th</sup> Signals
Committee Meeting, 4-5 March 1953.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">44. Corps Committee Directive No. 5 dated of
6 February 1964. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">45. CSO Southern Command Letter No
PERS/SIGS/2 dated 18 February 1960<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">46. CSO Southern Command Letter No. 210126/
SIGS 4 dated 2 September 1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">47. School of Signals Letter No. TB/CC.101
dated 8 July 1964. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">48. HQ Western Command Letter No. 2601/2/SIGS dated 12 October 1962.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">49. Corps Committee Directive No. 5 dated 6
February 1964.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">50. Major H.A. Marley, ‘How It All Began’, <i>The Signalman</i>, January 1967. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">51. Article ‘The First Triangular Sports
Meet’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April 1960.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">52. </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Article
‘The Third Triangular Sports Meet:
1962’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April 1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">53. Major Leslie Herbert, ‘The Sixth Triangular Meet:1967’, <i>The Signalman, </i>January 1968.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">54. Article ‘Ninth Triangular Sports Meet’, <i>The Signalman, </i>January 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">55. Article ‘The Sixth W.I.A.A Reliability
Trial-1959’, <i>The Signalman, </i>October
1959. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">56. Article ‘Seventh Western India Automobile
Association Reliability Trials-1960’, <i>The
Signalman, </i>January 1961. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">57. Major W.V. Ferris, ‘Motor Cycle Trials’, <i>The Signalman, </i>July 1961. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">58. Article ‘The Eighth W.I.A.A Reliability
Trials-1961’, <i>The Signalman, </i>April,
1962<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">59. Article ‘Signals in Eleventh WIAA
Reliability Trials, <i>The Signalman, </i>October,
1967<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -16.65pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">60.
Article ‘W.I.A.A Reliability
Trials-1968’, <i>The Signalman, </i>October
1968. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-5649996830340208842016-01-16T07:26:00.001-08:002016-01-16T07:26:28.254-08:00CHAPTER 11 - DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUIPMENT & SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h6 style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB">CHAPTER 11 <o:p></o:p></span></h6>
<h6 style="text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB">DEVELOPMENTS IN
EQUIPMENT & SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS <o:p></o:p></span></h6>
<h6 style="line-height: 150%;">
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">EQUIPMENT
: <i>General
— Wireless Sets — Radio Relay — Cable —Exchanges & Telephones — Line
Equipment — Teleprinters & Fuller Phones — Power Equipment & Batteries —
Crypto Equipment — Specialist Vehicles</i>. STATIC COMMUNICATIONS : <i>Wireless — Line Communications — Signal
Centre Procedure — Communication Boards & Committees — Amateur Activities</i>.
TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS : <i>Tactical
Communications Committee — Line Communications — Signal Despatch Service — Plan
AREN — Electronic Data Processing Systems (EDPS)</i>. CONCLUSION.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">EQUIPMENT<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">General<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">From
the time of its inception in 1911 up to 1947 and even for a few years
thereafter, the equipment and communication policy concepts of Indian Signal
Corps were based those of the Royal Signals in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This was perhaps unavoidable
since the Corps was officered entirely by Royal Signals which also provided a
large share of the technical personnel. Also, since the equipment in service in
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was produced in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
or one of the Commonwealth countries based on British designs, it was natural
that the policy for its exploitation be similar to that prevalent in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
World War II several shortcomings were noticed in the existing equipment in service
with signal units in the corps and divisional signal units. A comprehensive
review was carried out in 1944 and the following changes were recommended in
the organisation and equipment of divisional signals, which then had only two
companies:-<b>1</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No 1 Company<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo15; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
Wireless Sections A & B, the 22 set was to be replaced by 19HP. For
rearward links to corps, the SCR 399 would replace SCR 177B. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo15; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Cable Section (C) would hold <st1:metricconverter productid="50 miles" w:st="on">50 miles</st1:metricconverter> of D8 and <st1:metricconverter productid="30 miles" w:st="on">30 miles</st1:metricconverter> of D3 cable.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo15; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Despatch Rider Section (D) would be given motor cycles as well as jeeps.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo15; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Operating Section (O) would be capable of establishing two light and two
heavy signal offices. This would cater for advance or step up offices for
the main and rear divisional headquarters.
<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo15; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
the H Section, for the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA), the 22 sets would
be replaced by two 19HP sets, one for the forward net and the other for
the rear link to Commander Corps Royal Artillery (CRRA). Artillery lines would be laid by C Section.
<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo15; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
artillery, anti-air craft and anti-tank regiment signal sections would use
the 19HP instead of the 22 set for rearward communications. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No 2 Company<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l18 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Since
the 19HP could not be mule packed, brigade signal sections would use the
22 set with the 76 set as an alternative.
The battalion detachments would use the 22 set. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l18 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
N Section for Commander Royal Engineers and the R Section for the
divisional reconnaissance regiment would use the 19HP set.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l18 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For
infantry tank cooperation, the 38 set would be used. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A
new war establishment of the divisional signals was issued in 1946, superseding
the one that had been in existence since 1926 with several amendments
(Ind/WE/I/26/8). Shortly after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, the War
Office Policy Statement No 25 of <st1:date day="30" month="4" w:st="on" year="1948">30 April 1948</st1:date> was issued in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Though this policy statement
was applicable only to Royal Signals, it is of interest to us because the
equipment policy in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was then dependent on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
for supply of all signal equipment, including wireless sets. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
<st1:metricconverter productid="1949 a" w:st="on">1949 a</st1:metricconverter>
Signal Equipment Policy Statement was drawn up by Signals Directorate under two
heads i.e. ‘Short Term’ and ‘Long Term’.
The Short Term Policy was to be applicable a maximum period of five
years. It was based on the following
factors:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo16; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
the next five years existing stocks of American and British types of
obsolescent equipment will continue to be used for reasons of economy.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo16; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">New
items of equipment will be introduced only when stocks of existing types
of equipment waste out. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo16; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
substitution of existing equipment when wasted out would depend upon
stocks of new equipment received from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> and also on indigenous
production and development. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Long Term Policy was intended to
follow the Short Term Policy, for which no firm date was given. It was based on
the available information of the War Office Policy and its stability would
depend on the supply of equipment ex-UK and the results of trials of this
equipment in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
General Staff Policy Statement No 76 Issue No <st1:metricconverter productid="2, a" w:st="on">2, a</st1:metricconverter> basic policy document on
signal equipment, was approved by the General Staff Equipment Policy Committee
in April <st1:metricconverter productid="1955, in" w:st="on">1955, in</st1:metricconverter>
order to guide the development and production of the first series of indigenous
equipment with the aim of achieving self-reliance and in order to inject an
orderly family of equipment conforming to the then tactical doctrine. The
salient features of GSPS No. 76 of <st1:metricconverter productid="1955 in" w:st="on">1955 in</st1:metricconverter> respect of signal equipment are given
below:-<b>2</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Regimental
communications would be based on line telephony on field cable and direct
link radio telephony. Wireless sets would be a mix of HF (mobile) and VHF
(manpack). <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
infantry units, battalion to company nets would use a VHF manpack set with
a range of <st1:metricconverter productid="5 miles" w:st="on">5 miles</st1:metricconverter>.
Company to platoon nets would be based on a light weight VHF pouch set
having six pre-set channels and a range of <st1:metricconverter productid="1.5 miles" w:st="on">1.5 miles</st1:metricconverter>. HF sets
would be used if use of VHF was precluded due to terrain or long ranges
(jungle, desert etc).<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
armoured units, regimental nets would be based on HF sets with a range of
15-<st1:metricconverter productid="20 miles" w:st="on">20 miles</st1:metricconverter>.
Communications within troops and with infantry would be on VHF sets. Sets
would cater for intercommunication between crew and re-broadcast
facilities between HF and VHF sets. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless
sets in field artillery and anti-tank units would be similar to those in
armoured units. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communications
in coastal batteries, light anti-aircraft and heavy anti-aircraft units
would be based on two types of wireless sets, with ranges of 15-20 and <st1:metricconverter productid="100 miles" w:st="on">100 miles</st1:metricconverter>
respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For
line telephony, magneto telephones with facility to work on central
battery (CB) and magneto switchboards of 12 lines would be used. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Existing
assault and D class cables would be replaced by general purpose twisted
field cable weighing less than <st1:metricconverter productid="50 lbs" w:st="on">50 lbs</st1:metricconverter> per mile with speech range of 8-<st1:metricconverter productid="10 miles" w:st="on">10 miles</st1:metricconverter>, capable of
being laid from dispenser packs or drums. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Charging
sets of 150 watt (manpack) and 500 watt (vehicle mounted or capable of
being carried on a mule) would be authorised. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
addition to regimental communications, GSPS No 25 of 1955 laid down the
requirements for wireless and line communications in corps and divisions that
were to be provided by Signals. This included the types of wireless sets,
exchanges, cable, telephones, carrier equipment, voice frequency telegraphy
equipment and so on. In brief, the requirements were as given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 49.5pt; mso-list: l22 level1 lfo18; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless communications would be on HF,
using three different types of sets, having ranges of 15-<st1:metricconverter productid="20 miles" w:st="on">20 miles</st1:metricconverter>, <st1:metricconverter productid="30 miles" w:st="on">30 miles</st1:metricconverter> and over <st1:metricconverter productid="100 miles" w:st="on">100 miles</st1:metricconverter> respectively,
the last two using separate sets for transmission and reception. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 49.5pt; mso-list: l22 level1 lfo18; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A simple man transportable radio relay
of range <st1:metricconverter productid="15 miles" w:st="on">15 miles</st1:metricconverter>
capable of working with 1+4 carrier telephony and voice frequency telegraphy
equipment would be provided. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 49.5pt; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo12; tab-stops: list 49.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In addition to light field cable of
range of 8-<st1:metricconverter productid="10 miles" w:st="on">10 miles</st1:metricconverter>,
D8 cable of range <st1:metricconverter productid="15 miles" w:st="on">15 miles</st1:metricconverter>
would be provided. Quad cable would be suitable for use with carrier equipment
such ACT (1+4). A 10 pair multi core cable would be used in place of the 7 pair
VIR. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 49.5pt; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo12; tab-stops: list 49.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Switchboards would cater for 40 lines,
capable of being built up to 200 lines.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 49.5pt; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo12; tab-stops: list 49.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Multi channel equipment such as (1+1)
and (1+4) would be provided, the latter catering for expansion up to (1+12).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 49.5pt; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo12; tab-stops: list 49.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Single and multi channel voice frequency
telegraphy (VFT) equipment would be provided, for use with fuller phone. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 49.5pt; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo12; tab-stops: list 49.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On line cipher machines with page
printer would be catered for. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
next major change in equipment policy occurred in 1961 with the issue of
General Staff Policy Statement No 76 (Revised). The reasons that necessitated
the revision of the existing policy were the advent of nuclear weapons,
enhancement in ranges and lethality of tactical weaponry and greater mobility of
fighting formations and units which were likely to be widely dispersed and
communications would have to be provided over longer ranges. The emphasis on
electronic warfare and the additional requirement of circuits for surveillance
and warning systems also had to be taken into account. Due to congestion in the
available frequency bands, there was a need to exploit higher frequencies and
reduce the transmission bandwidth by use of new techniques. <b>3<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">GSPS
No. 76 (Revised) was issued on <st1:date day="22" month="5" w:st="on" year="1961">22
May 1961</st1:date>, superseding GSPS No. 76 of 1955. It was decided that the
short term policy issued earlier vide GSPS No. 61 would continue and be
reviewed from time to time within the framework of the new long term policy
statement. Since the development of the new equipment was likely to take
considerable time, it was also decided that an interim policy would be
formulated to bridge the gap between the equipment under development and the
final requirement as visualised in the long term policy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An
important feature of the new policy was with regard to the nomenclature of
wireless sets. It was felt that the existing system did not convey any
information about the equipment, necessitating frequent reference to data
books. The new system would consist of alphabets and figures that would
indicate the frequency band (HF, VHF, UHF or SHF); type of carriage (manpack,
vehicular or static) and the range in kilometres. In addition, an ‘A’ would be
used to indicate an amplifier used with a basic wireless set. As an example, a
HF manpack set having a range of <st1:metricconverter productid="8 kilometres" w:st="on">8 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> would be called HM8. If this was
associated with an amplifier unit that was also man-transportable increasing
the range to <st1:metricconverter productid="25 kilometres" w:st="on">25
kilometres</st1:metricconverter>, the nomenclature of the complete station
would be HM8AM25. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another
notable feature was to standardize the various types of signal equipment thus
reducing the size of the inventory and giving greater flexibility in their
employment. For regimental communications three types of VHF and comparable HF
counterpart wireless sets were to be developed. The first of the series would
be crystal controlled with a ground range of <st1:metricconverter productid="3 kilometres" w:st="on">3 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>; the
second in the series would be continuously tuneable with a ground range of 10-<st1:metricconverter productid="12 kilometres" w:st="on">12 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>; while
the third would have a ground range of 25 <st1:metricconverter productid="-35 kilometres" w:st="on">-35 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>. For
use at higher echelons, wireless sets would have ground ranges of 80, 150 and <st1:metricconverter productid="800 kilometres" w:st="on">800 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>. In
the immediate future the sets would be in the HF band but would be shifted to
the VHF band as VHF technique progressed. Sets for ground to air communication
would use frequencies in the UHF band. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
salient features of the long term policy enunciated by GSPS No. 76 (Revised) of
1961 are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For
regimental communications, the first family of HF sets would be used if
VHF could not be used due to terrain. HM-10 would be used between
battalion and company and HM-30 for rearward links. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
case VHF sets could be used, the sets used would be VM-3/VV-3, VM-10/VV-10
and VM-30/VV-30. All sets in the VHF family would be inter-workable, with
frequency coverage of 30-70 Mc/s. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Formation
wireless sets from brigade upwards and operated by Signals would use the
second family of HF sets, with frequency coverage of 1.5 – 30 Mc/s. The
sets in this family were the wireless senders HV-80, HV-150 and HV-800 and
receivers HR-1and HR-2. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio
relay equipment would comprise two types of sets. The forward area radio
relay set (RR1A, RR1B and so on) would have a range of 30-<st1:metricconverter productid="35 kilometres" w:st="on">35 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
per hop and be capable of handling up to 12 carrier channels. The rear
area radio relay set (RR2A, RR2B and so on) would have a range of 45-<st1:metricconverter productid="55 kilometres" w:st="on">55 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
and be capable of handling up to 16 carrier channels. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Scatter
sets (RR3, RR3A and so on) would have a range of 200-<st1:metricconverter productid="300 kilometres" w:st="on">300 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>.
They would be integrated with radio relay sets of the RR2 system. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless
sets for other applications were the HM-800 for CW only; UV-1 for tanks;
UM150/UV 150 for ground to air communication; and the general purpose VHF
receiver VR-1. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Regimental
field exchanges would have 12 lines while formation exchanges would have
40/160 lines. A general purpose field telephone would be used at all
levels. For mortar and anti-tank platoons and artillery sub units sound
powered telephones would be provided. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For
clearance of message traffic, fuller phones would be used in brigades and
divisions. Upwards of division, teleprinters would be used. Other
equipment such as facsimile, tape relay equipment, teleprinter exchange
and automatic data corrector would also be used at higher headquarters. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparatus
carrier telephone (ACT) 1+1 would be used at division and brigade. At
higher headquarters, ACT 4/16 channels would be provided. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparatus
voice frequency telegraph (VFT) speech plus duplex (<st1:place w:st="on">S+Dx</st1:place>)
would be used at corps, division and brigade. Apparatus voice frequency
telegraph 4/16 channel would be used at corps and division. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Two
types of speech secrecy equipment would be developed. The lighter version
for use in brigade and battalion would work off batteries, while the
heavier version for use in formation headquarters would work off AC
mains. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An
off line cipher machine would replace the existing Type ‘X’ Machine Mk II.
In addition, an on line cipher machine would be designed. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo19; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Carrier
quad capable of providing <st1:metricconverter productid="95 kilometres" w:st="on">95 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> range with ACT (1+4) and
carrying 16 carrier channels over short line tails would be used. For
forward troops, field cable providing range of 30-<st1:metricconverter productid="40 kilometres" w:st="on">40 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
between telephones would be provided. For local lines and line tails, 10
pair cable would be used. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon
after the issue of the GSPS No. 76
(Revised) of 1961, the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 took place. A large
quantity of signal equipment was received from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>, for use in formations facing
the Chinese. In addition, considerable quantity of equipment was purchased from
foreign countries. This upset the planned induction of equipment as envisaged
in GSPS of 1961. Another factor was the formation of the Tactical
Communications Committee (TCC), which recommended several changes in the
communications set up of the Army. Two important changes were the decisions to
go over largely from HF to VHF radio communications, and the introduction of
radio relay in the divisions. This necessitated the development of various
types of new equipment. Due to shortage of time, much of this equipment was
acquired from foreign countries. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless
Sets<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, almost all wireless sets in
service with the Indian Signals Corps were of British, American or Canadian
origin. Most of these sets had been developed during World War II and given to
India through the Lend-Lease scheme, under which war material being produced by
all Allied nations was pooled and allocated to theatres that needed it most.
This proved to be a boon for countries such as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> that produced hardly any
equipment of their own. In addition to imports under the Lend Lease scheme,
some equipment was obtained after the war from ex-US Army surpluses. The wireless sets that were in service at
that time were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Set <st1:metricconverter productid="22 A" w:st="on">22<span style="text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"> A</span></st1:metricconverter><span style="text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"> general purpose HF set that could be used in vehicle, animal
or manpack role, with an output of 8 watts on CW and 3 watts on RT. It had a
range of 25-<st1:metricconverter productid="30 miles" w:st="on">30 miles</st1:metricconverter>
and was used for forward communications in divisions and brigades. Was
subsequently replaced by WS 62. <o:p></o:p></span></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Set 19 Low Power/High
Power</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A versatile HF set used in armoured
formations and also for communication between corps and division. With a power
output of 9 watts it gave a range of 20-<st1:metricconverter productid="30 miles" w:st="on">30 miles</st1:metricconverter>, which could be
doubled by converting the set to high power using Amplifier RF No. 2. Versions
‘B’ and ‘C’ were used for intra squadron communications and communications
within the tank, respectively<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio Set SCR 399 </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This
was a medium power set used for communication rearwards of division. It was
used in conjunction with generator PE 75/PE 95. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Set 53</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a general purpose HF medium power
set that could be used in mobile as well as static roles. With a power output
of 250 watts, it gave a range of <st1:metricconverter productid="100 miles" w:st="on">100 miles</st1:metricconverter> on rod aerial which was mounted on
the roof of the vehicle when working on the move. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Set 62</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A general purpose HF set that could be used
in vehicle, animal or manpack role, with
an output of 1.1 watts on CW and 0.8 watts on RT. It gave a range of <st1:metricconverter productid="25 miles" w:st="on">25 miles</st1:metricconverter> on CW and <st1:metricconverter productid="15 miles" w:st="on">15 miles</st1:metricconverter> on RT when
stationary using a <st1:metricconverter productid="14 foot" w:st="on">14 foot</st1:metricconverter>
rod aerial. The set was not hermetically sealed but splash, rain and immersion
proof. It could be remote controlled from half a mile on D3 cable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Set Burndept BE201/CN348</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The CN348
was used for air to ground communication. It had a power output of 3
watts and a range of <st1:metricconverter productid="60 miles" w:st="on">60
miles</st1:metricconverter> with aircraft at a minimum height of <st1:metricconverter productid="5000 ft" w:st="on">5000 ft</st1:metricconverter>. The BE201 was a
crystal controlled set and an improved version of CN348. It had a wider
frequency coverage, slightly higher power output and better performance. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Sender Marconi SWB8X </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
was a high power sender for long distance CW, RT, RTT and SSB transmission in
the HF band. The power output was between 2 to 4 kilowatts depending on the
mode and the range was <st1:metricconverter productid="2500 miles" w:st="on">2500
miles</st1:metricconverter> depending on frequency and aerial used. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Receiver R201</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
A diversity receiver used for reception of high speed telegraph signals over
long distances. It had automatic frequency control (AFC) and used three rhombic
aerials connected to the receiver by 75 ohms impedance feeders.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Set 76/R209</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The crystal control sender (76) could work off
mains or batteries giving ranges of up to <st1:metricconverter productid="500 miles" w:st="on">500 miles</st1:metricconverter> on wireless
telegraphy. The receiver (R209) was a general purpose field receiver with a
built in vibrator power supply unit and loudspeaker. It replaced R 106, R107
and R109 receivers.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless Sets 48/18/46 </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> These were very low power wireless sets used
by units of Artillery, Engineers, Signals and Military Police. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 3.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, it was decided to import WS 88
from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
for regimental communications. Two models of the set, known as Type A and B,
were approved. WS 88 Type A had four spot frequencies viz. 40.2, 40.9, 41.4 and
42.15 Mcs. It was meant for use primarily between infantry company and
platoon. WS 88 Type B also had four spot
frequencies (38.01, 38.60, 38.30 and 39.70 Mcs) and was intended for use in
mortar and artillery roles. The first 100 pieces of WS 88 Type A were received
in early 1948. Type B was then still in
the development stage and was received a little later. It was used for
communication in mortar platoons and by Engineers during bridging
operation. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Along
with the 88 set, WS 31 was also imported in 1948 for regimental communications.
It was a light weight manpack set used for RT communication between battalion
and company. With frequency coverage of
40-48 Mcs and power output of 0.3 watts, it had a range of 2-<st1:metricconverter productid="4 miles" w:st="on">4 miles</st1:metricconverter>. Being dust and waterproof, it was suitable
for infantry during assault landings. Shortly afterwards, it was discovered
that it was an exact replica of the American SCR 300. It was then decided to take over all
available stocks of radio set SCR 300 at the US Army Surplus Stores Depot in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>. (The words
wireless and radio are interchangeable. The British used ‘wireless’ while the
Americans used ‘radio’. In India, ‘wireless’ continued to be used until 1965,
when it was replaced by ‘radio’ in all forms of military writing vide Army
Order 583/65. Similarly, cycles per second or c/s was replaced by Hertz or
Hz). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In <st1:metricconverter productid="1949 a" w:st="on">1949 a</st1:metricconverter> new policy regarding the employment of
very low power wireless sets viz. 46/48/18 being used by units of Artillery,
Engineers, Signals and Military Police was issued. It was decided that instead
of all units using all three types of sets, each would use one or at the most
two types. Accordingly, WS 48/18 was earmarked for Artillery and Engineers; WS
46 for Infantry and WS 48 for Military Police. Only Indian Signals units were
permitted to use all three types. These sets had actually been superseded by WS
31 but were still being used because only limited stocks of the latter were
available. Once sufficient stocks of WS 31 were received, WS 48/18/46 were
phased out<b>.4</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Indigenous research and development
and the electronic industry in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was in a stage of infancy in 1947 and remained in this state up to the 1960’s.
Most of the radio sets which had been in service for over a decade were
approaching obsolescence in their country of origin and needed constant
attention due to ageing. Communication
concepts were essentially governed by the necessity of conforming to the
equipment available rather than on an integrated system tailored to meet the
tactical requirements of command and control.
Most of the radio sets operating in the HF band, rear of the unit or
equivalent level, had a very restricted part of this band available for
usage. Radio frequency congestion and
attendant interference coupled with the susceptibility of the HF to the
vagaries of natural and manmade disturbances and seasonal/diurnal propagation
constraints set the thought process of switching over to the VHF for most of
the short-haul radio links forward of the main divisional headquarters, range
and terrain conditions permitting.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the late 1950’s some new
equipment of post-war origin such as the radio sets C11/R210, C42 and C13,
which had been introduced in the British Army, were tried out with a view to
make up the deficiencies of comparable equipment supplies of which had
virtually dried up due to their obsolescence in their country of origin. For regimental communications, the 6-channel
VHF crystal controlled radio set ‘P’ had been under development by M/s Bharat
Electronics Ltd (BEL) since 1954, to replace WS 88. It was then expected that production would
commence in 1956. However, certain
defects were noticed in the proto-type trials during October 1955 and the sets
were returned to the designer for modifications. User trials on RS P Type ‘A’ were again
carried out in April 1958 and certain defects were brought out. In October 1959, four prototypes of RS P Type
‘A’ (for infantry company to platoon communications) and two prototypes of Type
‘C’ (used for infantry-tank communications) were sent to 50 Independent
Parachute Brigade Signal Company for short trials. A considerable amount of interference between
channels was experienced and the sets were returned to BEL for aligning them on
a new set of frequencies. The
Electronics Research and Development Establishment (LRDE) completed technical
trials on RS P Types ‘A’ and ‘B’ in July 1961.
Short user trials revealed that the battery life of the set was low and
it was not omni-directional. In October
1962, technical trials on the AFV version of the set were completed by
LRDE. 1 Armoured Divisional Signal
Regiment was ear-marked to carry out user trials in the first quarter of
1963. Meanwhile, orders for limited
quantities of the equipment had been placed on BEL, much against the wishes of
the Signals Directorate. During October
1964, it came to notice that inter-channel interference was prevalent in the
sets of the first production batch.
Stability of the set below -20ºC was also found unacceptable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In early 1963 it was learned that
the RS DA/PRC <st1:metricconverter productid="261, a" w:st="on">261, a</st1:metricconverter>
12 channel crystal controlled low power VHF set had been developed by M/s
Philips (<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Holland</st1:place></st1:city>)
for the Dutch Army. Six pieces of the
equipment were procured immediately for assessing their suitability for
introduction into the service to replace RS 88, instead of the RS P, which had
still not been accepted. The Dutch sets
were subjected to user trials in Ladakh and their performance was found to be
vastly superior to that of RS 88 or RS P.
An indent for quantity 900 of RS DA/PRC 261 was floated for immediate
procurement in January 1964 and the supply was expected to commence from
September 1964. A letter of intent was
also given to M/s Philips (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
for assembling 3,500 sets during the last quarter of 1964. It is pertinent to
note that RS DA/PRC 261 was the first transistorized equipment to be introduced
in service in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> From 1948 onwards, the wireless set
used for communications between a battalion and company headquarters was WS 31,
and that between company and platoon was WS 88. After the Sino Indian conflict
in <st1:metricconverter productid="1962, a" w:st="on">1962, a</st1:metricconverter>
considerable amount of equipment was received from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This
included 500 pieces of RS AN/PRC 10, which were to be issued to units facing
the Chinese. It was decided to use the set for communications between a
battalion and company headquarters, replacing the WS <st1:metricconverter productid="31. In" w:st="on">31. In</st1:metricconverter> January 1963 the
first lot of RS AN/PRC 10 sets was issued to 20, 17 and 27 Divisions. The WS 31
sets rendered surplus in these formations were utilized to make up deficiencies
of Eastern and Western Commands. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By
this time, the US Army had switched over to the RS AN/PRC <st1:metricconverter productid="25, a" w:st="on">25, a</st1:metricconverter> new generation
equipment which was the first set using the principle of frequency
synthesis. In October <st1:metricconverter productid="1963, a" w:st="on">1963, a</st1:metricconverter> formal request was
made to the United States Indian Supply Mission (USISM) to provide two sets for
trials, as replacement of RS 31 and AN/PRC 10.
The two sets arrived in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
during April 1964 and were put through successful user trials. Subsequently, in October 1964, trials
conducted in 4 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment re-affirmed the suitability
of the set. An indent for six sets was
initiated which on arrival were put through trials in a number of units including
6 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment.
As in the case of RS DA/PRC 261, besides procuring some initial quantity
by direct import, a contract was signed between M/s BEL and M/s RCA, the
manufacturers in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
to produce the set under collaboration in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Subsequently, a booster unit was developed
for the set indigenously by BEL, which later started producing a fully
transistorized version of RS AN/PRC 25 as well as the booster.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Till the development of the booster
unit of RS AN/PRC 25, the only VHF set available with 15 watts of radiated
power for obtaining longer communication range was the C42, being used in the
British Army. Four sets were procured
from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in October 1955 and issued to Technical Development Establishment
(Electronics), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>
(it later became the LRDE) for technical trials and subsequently to 1 Armoured
Divisional Signal Regiment for user trials. The trial report from the unit
received in July 1961 recommended introduction of the set in the Army. A case
was initiated for procurement of quantity 2,000 of this set from BEL, which was
to manufacture the same under licence. Subsequently, BEL incorporated an
improvement in the set for operation from 12 volt DC (for use in B vehicles)
and with 50 KHz channel separation as against the original 100 KHz. Production of the RS C42 was later stopped
when it was decided to replace the equipment by RS AN/PRC 25 with booster
(transistorized). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After it was decided to switch over
command links from HF to VHF in 1963, the RS <st1:metricconverter productid="62, a" w:st="on">62, a</st1:metricconverter> low power HF set used
for regimental communications needed replacement by an indigenous set both as a
backup set to VHF communication as well as for issue in lieu of the VHF set
pending adequate production in the country.
In 1963 the LRDE developed RS HM 30 which was suitable for operation by
a hand/pedal generator in order to cut down logistical problems in the high
altitude areas. Trials were carried out
in ‘R’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment in January 1964. The set was not recommended for acceptance.
However, to make up the acute deficiencies of RS 62, it was decided to procure
2,000 pieces of this set from BEL. The
set was later declared obsolete and replaced by ‘one time’ imported GR345 and
TRA922, both of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
origin, and the indigenously produced LHP202 and subsequently by RS HB, a Plan
AREN era equipment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another
wireless set that was introduced in armoured units as the companion set of RS
C42 was RS C13, an HF set with phase modulation which gave longer range. Twelve
pieces of RS C13 were procured from M/s British Communication Corporation (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>) in January
1958 for use in A vehicles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Divisional
Signals is responsible for provision of communications rearward from units up
to brigade and divisional headquarters. The wireless set in general use for
formation level communications was the RS 19 LP/HP. This set had been in use
for several years and needed replacement by a more efficient and reliable set.
The set indentified for this purpose was the RS C11/R210, then in use by the
British Army. In July <st1:metricconverter productid="1955 a" w:st="on">1955 a</st1:metricconverter> statement of case for
procurement of six pieces of RS C11/R210 was initiated along with an FSK
(frequency shift keying) appliqué unit for radio teleprinter working. In
January 1958, information was received that trials conducted in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> on FSK
operation with RS C11/R210 had not proved satisfactory. The idea of FSK working on the set was
dropped and the indent was accordingly amended.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The RS C11/R210 was found suitable
after trials conducted in January 1961, and a case for bulk procurement of this
set was initiated to replace RS 19 HP and C52.
The set was subsequently formally introduced in service in July 1963 and
an indent for quantity 500 was placed on BEL, which was to produce the set in
the country under collaboration. By
October 1963, the total quantity under indent on BEL was 2,475. However, the production was later halted
when several defects were noticed. A major shortcoming was the very high
battery drain of 23 amperes on ‘send’, which resulted in the requirement of
bigger and a greater number of secondary batteries. In 1972, the RS HC, a Plan AREN era equipment
with better power efficiency and higher power output was developed and began to
replace RS C11/R210.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Till <st1:metricconverter productid="1963, a" w:st="on">1963, a</st1:metricconverter> variety of radio
stations had been procured from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>
as medium power sets for use in divisions and corps. The two main sets in this category were the
RS 53 ex-UK and SCR 399 ex- <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Both sets were available in two versions –
mobile and static. The American RS SCR 399
was more popular because of its ruggedness and low fault liability. RS D11/R230, quantity 25 of which had been
received as aid from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1963, was not found satisfactory due to its high fault liability. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The large variety of equipment posed
problems for procurement and positioning of their spares. To reduce the variety and to minimize the
logistics by dove-tailing the basic design of medium and high power sets, a
search was on for suitable basic equipment in 1962/63. The 400 watt set
developed by M/s Siemens of West Germany was tried in 1963 and was adjudged as
better than RS D11/R230. The firm was
also willing to grant licence for indigenous production within the
country. The set had a number of
advantages over the older types of wireless sets in this category. It provided
both simplex and duplex operation; in addition to RT and CW, it provided
RT-SSB, FSK and FSK with RT-AM; it had better frequency stability because of
frequency synthesis; there was quick change-over from one class of emission to
another and there was a facility of space diversity reception.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1965 it was decided to
manufacture RS 400 Watt (Siemens) under licence at BEL. Subsequent development was the complete
transistorisation of the transmitter except for the power amplifier valves and
incorporation of RT-ISB emission in the transmitter. After the introduction of Plan AREN
equipment, the 400 Watt (Siemens) was ultimately replaced by RS HD. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> High Power transmitters BC 339L and
ET 4331 (RCA) were procured during World War II from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> for providing long range HF
communications. These sets did not have
the teleprinter and single side band facilities and were used on Static
Wireless Army Network (SWAN). They had
to be phased out after the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) decreed
that all static networks were required to work on SSB. Some pieces of RS-63 procured from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> during late
1940’s were also held by the RTT sections.
This set was extremely bulky and had restricted mobility. A search was made to find a suitable set to
replace these older types of sets. RS D 13
(<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Marconi</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place>), AN/TRC 115 (<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Collins</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">USA</st1:country-region></st1:place>)
and AN/GRC 108 (General Dynamics, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>) were considered. The RS D13 was already developed and two sets
were ordered in 1964 for ascertaining their suitability.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At the same time, M/s Siemens of
West Germany had designed a booster unit for the 400 watt medium power radio
station capable of giving 1 KW power output.
Since it had already decided to go in for the 400 watt set based on
Siemens design, it was decided to procure the 1 KW transmitter as well of
Siemens design. The production commenced
in 1965 at BEL and by 1972 about 80 static sets had been inducted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Mobile high power stations were
authorized to corps signal regiments and some communication zone signal
regiments to bridge communication gaps which could not be covered by medium
power radio stations. Attempts were made
to convert the 1 KW Transmitter (Siemens), which is basically a static station,
into mobile role. However, two major problems were encountered. Firstly, the station had to be accommodated
in one vehicle which was not possible due to the weight and dimensions of the
equipment and its accessories. Secondly,
the transmitter was designed to operate off three-phase power supply which is
not always available in the field. M/s
BEL re-designed the equipment to work on single-phase AC mains. However, the proposition to use only one
vehicle was technically not found feasible and it was agreed to have the entire
station in two vehicles – one 3-ton vehicle for installing the transmitter and
another 1-ton vehicle to accommodate the receiver segment. Two mobile stations were procured, but the
performance of the equipment was not found acceptable. The design of the equipment was also
out-dated. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Transmitters 5 KW are required for
communications over distances beyond the ranges obtained with 1 KW
transmitters. The older versions of such
equipment in service were SWB8X, SWB11E and HS31. These transmitters were imported from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> to provide
RTT and SSB circuits in static role. A
few of these sets were still in service in 1972, but it was difficult to
maintain them for want of spares. In order to have only one family of radio
equipment with the Siemens 400 watt as the basic set, it was decided to induct
Transmitter 5 KW developed by Siemens (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">West Germany</st1:place></st1:country-region>) which would be
indigenously produced by BEL under licence.
Quantity 14 sets had been inducted by 1972. Subsequently, BEL offered an
improved 4 KW transmitter designed by them instead of the Siemens equipment.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the approval of Plan AREN by
the Government in 1971, orders were placed on BEL, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city> for development and production of
the complete range of radio equipment that would ultimately replace the
existing sets. Details of the new radio equipment are given below:-5<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">VHF
Radio Sets<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">VA
(platoon sets) to replace VM2 1A, VM2 5A.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">VB
(company sets) to replace AN/PRC 25.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">VC
(battalion sets) to replace AN/PRC 25 with booster.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HF
Radio Sets<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HB
to replace HM30 or equivalent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HC
to replace C11/R210.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HD
to replace Siemens 400W (Mobile).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HE
to replace Siemens 1KW (Mobile).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HX-special
purpose trans-receiver.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio
Relay Sets<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">RR
(light weight) to replace AN/PRC 25 (radio relay).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">RRA
to replace C41/R222.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">RRB
to replace FM200.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Receivers<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HRA - medium grade HF receiver<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HRB - high grade HF receiver<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Ground
to Air sets<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">UA
to replace GU 734<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">UB
(UA with high power).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio Relay<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Radio
relay came to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
only in the early sixties, though it had been in use in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> for several
years. During World War II and for several years thereafter all equipment used
in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was imported. Also, many signal officers were sent abroad for training. As a
result, developments in <st1:place w:st="on">Europe</st1:place> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region> were
generally known to the Signals Directorate, which tried to obtain the latest
equipment for use in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1955 it was learned that M/s
Siemens and Halske had produced a transportable six channel radio link system
with pulse modulation (PPM6/400) with frequency coverage 335-420 Mcs. The
use of pulse width modulation gave a very favourable signal-to-noise radio and
low cross-talk values. The system operated with six channels and thus
provided up to six simultaneous telephone conversations each covering a band of
.300 to 3.400 Kcs. Distances of about <st1:metricconverter productid="30 miles" w:st="on">30 miles</st1:metricconverter> were covered in a
single hop in reasonably flat country. With relay stations the range
could be increased. The equipment was divided into portable cases,
with no case weighing more than <st1:metricconverter productid="154 lbs" w:st="on">154
lbs</st1:metricconverter>. It could be fitted in a 3 ton vehicle for
mobile use. It was decided to procure the radio link system with two relay
stations for trials to ascertain its suitability for introduction in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <b>6</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="color: red;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB">Shortly afterwards it was decided to conduct trials on the SPO 50-<st1:metricconverter productid="50, a" w:st="on">50, a</st1:metricconverter> multi-channel radio
relay system then being used by the British Post Office in UK. To conduct the
trials an independent unit - 1 Medium Radio Relay Section - was raised in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> in 1959 under the
command of Captain A.S. Kahlon. However,
the SPO 50-50, being designed for civilian use, could not meet the stringent
requirements of terrain and climate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1960 eight pieces of RS C41/R222 were
imported from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
This was developed by ATE Bridgeworth<b> </b>for
the British Army. It was a multi-channel, FM- VHF set with frequency coverage
of 50-100 Mcs and power output of 50 watts. It was used for communicating over
visual or quasi-visual distances of 25-<st1:metricconverter productid="30 miles" w:st="on">30 miles</st1:metricconverter> using a high gain yagi aerial mounted
on a <st1:metricconverter productid="36 feet" w:st="on">36 feet</st1:metricconverter>
high mast. The range could be increased with the help of relay stations. The
equipment could work as a ground station or mounted in vehicles. It was also
capable of being transported by animals. The complete station could work as a
terminal station or a relay station, with facilities to drop channels at relay
stations. The equipment was compatible
with indigenous multi channel carrier equipment such as ACT (1+1) and ACT (1+4),
as well as voice frequency telegraph equipment such as S+Dx and 3 Channel
Duplex. The system was found suitable
and accepted for induction in the Indian Army.
Additional sets were ordered and received during 1961. Some of these were used during the <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> operations in 1961 and proved their worth. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In 1963 another radio relay equipment FM 12/800 manufactured by M/s
Siemens and Halske of West Germany was procured for trials. During
preliminary examination the equipment worked successfully between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and Karnal with
relay stations at Sonepat and Panipat. However, during detailed user trials by
1 Medium Radio Relay Section it was not found suitable for use in the field on
account of its weight. Subsequently, a considerably lighter equipment, FM
12/400, operating in the 400 – 470 Mcs band, which provided 12 voice channels,
was obtained. During trials, it was found that the ‘line of sight’ range was as
good as that obtained with WS C41; with the squelch system provided in the
receiver the background noise was less;
tuning and operation was easier; front-to-back ratio of radiation was low and
aerial alignment was not critical.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The RS FM 12/400 was also tried out in Jammu & Kashmir, where it
was found that although it was lighter than the C41 and was fully
transistorized, it suffered from certain defects. Being crystal controlled, it
could only be used for single channel operation. There was a high back
fire of the aerial, which was conspicuous and could be easily detected from
air. In 1966 comparative trials of FM 12/400, C41/R222 and AN/PRC 25 (in radio
relay role) were conducted in 4 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1968 multi channel radio relay
equipment THC618 offered by a foreign firm was evaluated by Special Signal
Regiment. The equipment operated in the frequency range of 70 – 150
Mcs and provided 640 channels. Trials carried out in Special Signal
Regiment brought out that the set was comparable to RS C41/R222 and offered no
distinct advantage over it except that the aerial mast provided with the
equipment being of pneumatic type was easier to install. The aerial was a
three element yagi with transmitting and receiving arrays mounted at right
angles to each other on the same mast. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1968 M/s BEL produced a lighter
version of RS C41/R222. The light weight set known as RS C41/R222 (Modified)
was smaller in size by about 50% and in weight by about 80%. It was housed only
in two cases viz. transmitter and receiver which carried their own power supply
units. The power consumption was also less. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1968 another radio relay set FM
200 was received for trials from Siemens. The set was an improved and
transistorized version of FM 12/800, developed for multi channel radio relay
communication for use in rear areas. The frequency coverage was from 225 to 480
Mcs and 810 to 900 Mcs continuously tuneable with channel spacing of 125 Kcs.
It provided <st1:date day="12" month="4" w:st="on" year="2024">4/12/24</st1:date>
channels plus one service channel on FDM and PCM/TDM. With power output of
12-20 watts, it gave a range of <st1:metricconverter productid="35 kilometres" w:st="on">35 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>. The power supply used was
110/220 volts AC single phase or 24 volts DC with automatic change over from
mains to battery supply. The set was tried out by Special Signal Regiment and
two corps signal regiments and was found to be much superior to RS FM 12/800. Since it fully met our requirements it was
decided to purchase 24 sets immediately from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">West Germany</st1:place></st1:country-region>. A case was also taken
up for indigenous manufacture of the sets by BEL in collaboration with M/s
Siemens.<b> 7</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cable<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1947, the types of cable in service were the same as those that had been used
during World War II. At the Field Force level, the lines were based on field
cables like D3 and D8, Assault No. 2, 7-pair VIR and carrier quad. Multi air
line cable using cadmium copper wires was authorized for higher formations. The
cable was laid using various types of cable laying equipment from vehicles,
animals or manpack. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1950 trials were carried out with
three types of manpack cable layers with the intention of selecting the most
suitable type for the Army’s requirements. These were the Manpack Cable Layer
(German); the Packboard Cable Layer No. 4 developed by Technical Development
Establishment (Instruments & Electronics), Dehradun and the American cable
laying apparatus known as Reel Equipment CE-11. The German type cable layer was
found to be the most suitable, being lighter, easier to handle and faster. It
also had the facility for intercommunication between the layer and the
originating end during the period of laying. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1951 it was decided to discontinue the use of obsolete types of cable layers
and standardize the cable laying apparatus in the Army. The various types of
apparatus cable laying (ACL) that was approved were the ACL No.10, ACL No. 6
(to replace ACL No. 2), ACL No. 6A (for snow covered regions only), ACL No. 11
(to replace ACL No. 3) and ACL No. 8 (for troops equipped with mules). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Till
that time, cable on manpack basis was laid from drums and the process was very
slow and strenuous. In <st1:metricconverter productid="1949 a" w:st="on">1949 a</st1:metricconverter> lighter version of
the cable was developed in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
which could be laid from a dispenser pack, resulting in greater speed and less
fatigue. The Cable Electric D10 was a
light weight general purpose field cable intended to replace existing D3, D8
and Assault No. 2 cables, for use mainly at divisional headquarters or lower
levels. The cable consisted of three
strands steel and four strands copper, all strands being <st1:metricconverter productid="0.011 inches" w:st="on">0.011 inches</st1:metricconverter> in
diameter and provided in the form of a twisted pair only. It was insulated with
polythene and sheathed with nylon and was to be supplied in half mile lengths
in dispenser coils, capable of being laid at speeds up to <st1:metricconverter productid="100 miles" w:st="on">100 miles</st1:metricconverter> per hour. The coils were packed in canvas to withstand
free dropping from air. It was decided to import the D10 cable to replace the
existing types of field cable D3 and D-8. The TDE (I&E), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dehra Dun</st1:place></st1:city> was asked to design winding
machines to enable the coils to be wound in the field.<b>8<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
the 1962 war, considerable amount of cable was procured from foreign countries.
This included JWD1/TT from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Japan</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
WD1/TT from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and D10 from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. During preliminary trials they were found
suitable in electrical and mechanical performance, except for some minor
defects. In hot weather the cables became so hot that it was difficult to hold
them in a naked hand; due to their smooth surface and the
cables being thinner than the existing cables, they slipped when pulled for
tying back; except for D10, all other cables had a shining surface
which gave a shine up to a distance of 200 to <st1:metricconverter productid="300 yards" w:st="on">300 yards</st1:metricconverter> in bright
daylight. All these cables had generally the same
electrical and mechanical properties. The cables were subjected to
detailed user trials by 26 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. All cables
were found suitable. The range obtained
with existing field telephones was 15 to <st1:metricconverter productid="16 miles" w:st="on">16 miles</st1:metricconverter>. Speed when
laid by hand was <st1:metricconverter productid="2 miles" w:st="on">2 miles</st1:metricconverter>
per hour and when laid from a vehicle with ACL No. 11 was 3 to <st1:metricconverter productid="4 miles" w:st="on">4 miles</st1:metricconverter> per hour.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indigenous
manufacture of WD1 and D10 cable was subsequently taken up at the Ordnance
Cable Factory, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chandigarh</st1:place></st1:city>.
By 1965 the position of field cable had improved and it was decided decontrol
field cable D3, D8 and assault cable and use the existing holdings of these
cables for training. The hard scales in
respect of cable were removed and additional issue of up to 50 percent of
authorisation in respect of WD1 and D10 cable was also approved for training to
all units<b>.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1967 it was decided to rationalise the authorization and holding of the four
types of carrier quad cable viz. P Mk I, P Mk 2, P Mk 3 and heavy duty
Bulgarian P 270. The Bulgarian heavy duty cable was considered most suitable
for corps arteries and was authorised to brick type line sections. It was also
issued to medium radio relay sections and command signal regiments. P Mk 3 was
suitable for divisional arteries and issued to divisional signal regiments. The
P Mk 1 and 2 being old and unreliable were utilised for providing carrier tails
at division, corps and communication zone headquarters.<b>9</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Cable Carrier Quad Type ‘P’ Mk 3 also began to
be manufactured at the Ordnance Cable Factory, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chandigarh</st1:place></st1:city> from 1969 onwards. Another cable that was introduced at the same
time was light weight communication quad cable. This was tried out in Special
Signal Regiment along with couplers and loading pots and found satisfactory. The cable had four copper and three steel
strands. About <st1:metricconverter productid="400 metres" w:st="on">400 metres</st1:metricconverter>
of cable were bound on one drum. The cable had excellent electric
characteristics with very low attenuation, high insulation resistance and a cut
off frequency of 30 KHz when loaded. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Before the commencement of the 1971
war, action was taken to make up the deficiencies of cable and also cater for
the likely operations in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> where
additional lines would have to be laid behind the advancing troops. Cable Carrier Quad P 270 was imported from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bulgaria</st1:place></st1:country-region> in <st1:metricconverter productid="1971. In" w:st="on">1971. In</st1:metricconverter> addition large
quantities of cable were ordered from indigenous sources. This included an order of <st1:metricconverter productid="44,000 kilometres" w:st="on">44,000 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
of cable WD1 and <st1:metricconverter productid="1400 kilometres" w:st="on">1400
kilometres</st1:metricconverter> of cable carrier quad 1A on Ordnance Cable
Factory, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chandigarh</st1:place></st1:city>.
In addition, an order for <st1:metricconverter productid="500 kilometres" w:st="on">500 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> of Cable 10 pairs plastic was
placed on M/s Indian Cable Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Exchanges
& Telephones<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">In
1947 the various types of exchanges and telephones in service were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo20; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Switchboard
Command 200 Line </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a magneto type switchboard with
conference facilities for use at larger headquarters. It could accommodate
20 junctions and 180 extensions, the former being able to work to any type
of exchange e.g. magneto, CB and auto. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Switchboard (F & F) 20, 40 and
60 Line</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a general purpose magneto switchboard for
use in the field. The capacity could be
20, 40 or 60 lines according to the requirement. It had the facility for
conference calls and the junctions could work to magneto, CB and auto
exchanges. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Switchboard Magneto 10 Line (WD) </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A portable magneto switchboard for use in
units and smaller headquarters. It was very rugged and could be used in any
climate or weather. It was used with a telephone set L or equivalent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Exchange Magneto (WD) Unit Type N
Positions </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A magneto exchange that provided 50 magneto
extensions and 10 universal exchange lines per position. It could be built up
to a maximum of 300 magneto extensions and 60 universal exchange lines. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Exchange CB Multiple (WD) Unit Type
N Positions</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A central battery exchange for use at
large headquarters; it was capable of providing 50 extensions and 10 junction
lines. The maximum capacity of the exchange was 900 extensions and 50 junction
lines.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telephone Set J </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A light weight tropicalised field telephone
for use with magneto or CB exchanges or
point to point circuits. It gave a range of 18-<st1:metricconverter productid="20 miles" w:st="on">20 miles</st1:metricconverter> on D8 and 13-<st1:metricconverter productid="15 miles" w:st="on">15 miles</st1:metricconverter> on D3 cable. It
was housed in a sheet metal case and was designed to be immersion proof. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telephone Set L </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A portable set for use in forward areas and by
linemen. Ranges obtained were slightly less than those from Telephone Set J,
which replaced it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telephone Set TP-6 </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was designed for use on common battery
lines of corps and army headquarters. It was similar to a commercial telephone
but was treated for tropical use. It could operate over a 30 db net loss
circuit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telephone Set EE8, EE8A and EE8B </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
was a compact, rugged and portable American field telephone that could work on
CB and magneto. It was carried in a leather/nylon/canvas case with straps and
could work on a line with 30 db loss.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Telephone
Set F</u> A portable telephone that could be used with magneto or CB
switchboards. It gave ranges of 14-<st1:metricconverter productid="16 miles" w:st="on">16 miles</st1:metricconverter> on D8 and 8-<st1:metricconverter productid="10 miles" w:st="on">10 miles</st1:metricconverter> on D3 cable. A
buzzer or magneto generator was used for calling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telephone Set F (HP)</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
The telephone was provided with an amplifier unit which increased its range two
and a half times. <u> </u><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Tele Set ‘F’ Mk-II TMC<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There
was almost no change in switchboards and telephones until the early sixties,
when some equipment was procured from abroad. This included the 40 lines
switchboard manufactured by M/s Ericsson of Sweden. Known as the AMB 1012, this
exchange used the latest technology such as spring loaded cords and had a very
low insertion loss of .25 db. It was housed in slip-in type units complete with
speaking, ringing and clearing circuits. Another switchboard produced by
Ericsson was the 12 line AEM 1022 which had similar facilities. Two switchboards imported from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> were the
30-60 line SB 86 and 12 line SB 22. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indigenous
manufacture was also started at the same time. The Switchboard Field 1A, a 40
line single position switchboard that was to replace the F & F, was
fabricated by the P&T Workshop, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>.
It was rather bulky (<st1:metricconverter productid="132 Kg" w:st="on">132 Kg</st1:metricconverter>.)
compared to the Ericsson 40 line whose weight was only <st1:metricconverter productid="57 Kg" w:st="on">57 Kg</st1:metricconverter>. However, in view of
the shortages of switchboards it was decided to induct the equipment in
service. By 1967 over 400 pieces of Switchboard Field 1A had been procured. A
12 line magneto switchboard designed by the Electronics Research and Development
Establishment (LRDE) was also tried and found acceptable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Telephone TA/PT-1 (Sound Power) was procured from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. A field
telephone was developed by ITI to replace the existing field telephones. Trials
carried out by Special Signal Regiment and 26 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment in 1964 found that the telephone apart from being comparatively
heavier did not give adequate range. Hence it was not accepted. However, the
field telephone manufactured by Bell of Belgium was found suitable. Switchboards
TU 11 (10 lines) and TU 21 (20 lines) were imported from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Czechoslovakia</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and the M194-M (40 lines) from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USSR</st1:place></st1:country-region> for trials in 1965. TU 11 was
not found suitable and rejected. However, the TU 21 and M194-M were found
acceptable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The transistorized Repeater Field Telephone No 1 was designed by
LRDE in 1966 based on the design of the equipment received earlier for trials
from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
An order was placed for 200 pieces to make up the deficiency of Telephones F
(HP) and Amplifiers Field Telephone, which would be replaced by this
equipment. The utility of this equipment was however different from those
it was replacing. Whereas Telephones F(HP) and Amplifiers Field Telephone
were individual subscriber equipments, the Repeater Field Telephone No. 1 could only be used between exchanges and was thus a
common subscriber equipment. <b>10</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1967 the Indian telephone Industries (ITI) developed a new telephone set that
gave a range of 30-<st1:metricconverter productid="40 kilometres" w:st="on">40 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
on all types of cable. The telephone was subjected to trials in two infantry
divisional signals regiments and found acceptable. A manual 40 line switchboard
developed by ITI was also subjected to intensive trials in an infantry
divisional signal regiment, but its performance was found to be inferior to
that of the switchboard F&F and switchboard Field 1A. Hence it was not
recommended for introduction into service. In <st1:metricconverter productid="1968 a" w:st="on">1968 a</st1:metricconverter> 15 line switchboard
developed by LRDE Bangalore was made available for trials. It had a low
insertion loss of .3 db and its capacity could be increased to 30 lines.
However, its performance as not found to be satisfactory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1970 it was decided to authorize
the ITI field telephone and the magneto telephone to all units. An order of
8340 field telephones was placed to cater for the requirements during the next
five years. Meanwhile the indigenous Switchboard Magneto 50 lines (Ericsson)
had been cleared for production in 1971. Deliveries of this exchange started in
1972. Simultaneously, orders were placed on M/s Ericsson for 1000 pieces of
their 15 line exchange. A 15 line cordless exchange developed by LRDE was also
accepted, though it had certain limitations for use in the field and could be
used in vehicular role only. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
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o:spid="_x0000_i1026" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:385.5pt;height:264pt;
visibility:visible'>
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="352" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image004.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_2" width="514" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Telephone exchange in Calcutta, July 1971<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line
Equipment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Other than exchanges, telephones and
teleprinters, various types of equipment were in use for deriving additional
telephone and telegraph circuits on trunk lines. Some of the equipment in use
in 1947 was as given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparatus
Selective Carrier No. </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1 This provided a point to point circuit
on a open wire route. It used 28 spot frequencies and 14 circuits could be
set up simultaneously on the same route without mutual interference. The
range was <st1:metricconverter productid="100 miles" w:st="on">100 miles</st1:metricconverter>
at lower frequencies and <st1:metricconverter productid="20 miles" w:st="on">20
miles</st1:metricconverter> at higher frequencies. The ACT (1+4) could be
used simultaneously on the same pair of wires. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparatus Carrier Telephone (1+1)</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This provided an additional speech
circuit on open wire lines, unloaded or lightly loaded cables with cut off
frequency above 9 Kcs. It had an output of +18 db and a range of 5 db for
the carrier circuit over line with attenuation of 46 db at 9 Kcs. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparatus Carrier Telephone (1+4)</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
This provided one audio and four carrier channels over two or four wire
lines. The output was + 5 db and the range was 3 db on carrier circuit
over two wire line of attenuation 40 db at 40 Kcs or four wire line with
attenuation 42 db at 16 Kcs. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparatus Carrier Telephone 3-Channel
Types SAS & SAT</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> These provided high grade permanent long
distance communications giving one audio and three carrier circuits over a
two wire physical line. The output was +17 db and the range was 0 db over
a line with uniform attenuation of 34 db at 30 Kcs. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apparatus Voice Frequency Telegraph
(<st1:place w:st="on">S+Dx</st1:place>)</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This
provided simultaneous telephone and telegraph duplex channel over a
physical or carrier telephone circuit. It could be used over a line of 50
db attenuation at 1.9 Kcs. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In <st1:metricconverter productid="1949 a" w:st="on">1949 a</st1:metricconverter> new version of the
ACT 3-Channel SAS/SAT system known as SUS/SUT was subjected to bench trials at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Eastern Court</st1:address></st1:street>,
Central Telegraph Office, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
under supervision of the manufacturers Automatic Telephones Equipment (ATE), <st1:place w:st="on">Liverpool</st1:place>. The equipment was identical in purpose to
SAS/SAT, and the same carrier frequencies had been used for the 3 channels in
each case. However, the equipment had been reduced in size to one <st1:metricconverter productid="10 ft" w:st="on">10 ft</st1:metricconverter>. <st1:metricconverter productid="6 in" w:st="on">6 in</st1:metricconverter>. high bay instead of
three <st1:metricconverter productid="8 ft" w:st="on">8 ft</st1:metricconverter>.
<st1:metricconverter productid="6 in" w:st="on">6 in</st1:metricconverter>.
bays that were used for SAS/SAT. The bench trials were successful.
However, the P & T Department preferred Standard Telephones and Cable
Limited equipment to that of ATE, because the former had been found more
reliable and its supply of spares was more regular. Manufacturers of ATE
offered to mount SUS/SUT equipment in two or three bays of smaller size in
lorries for use by the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another piece of
equipment evaluated at this time was the Two Tone Voice Frequency Carrier
Telegraph System of Standard Telephones and Cables Limited. This system
converted double current telegraph signals into voice frequency tones suitable
for modulating a radio carrier wave and similarly converted tones from the
output of a radio receiver into double current signals which could be
associated with a teleprinter or with any other telegraph instrument up to a
maximum speed of 75 bauds. A maximum of 18 carrier frequencies were
available spaced 120 cycles apart, the lowest being 420 cycles and the highest 2460 cycles. These
corresponded to the 18-channel VFT system that was in extensive use in this
country. Thus a maximum of nine 2-tone channels could be obtained for
working over radio links, or a suitable combination of 2 and 4-tone channels
could be worked, e.g. five 2-tone channels and two 4-tone channels.<b>11<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In January 1963
channelling equipment for radio relay working Carrier
Telephone Terminal ACT (1+4) was received from M/s Radio Engineering
Products, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Canada</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The equipment comprised Telephone Carrier Terminal TA 5006; Group Modem F 35700
and Communication Patching Panel SB 611/MRC. The equipment was capable of providing up to
24 channels in frequency range of .3 to 116 Kcs and had a range of approx <st1:metricconverter productid="40 miles" w:st="on">40 miles</st1:metricconverter> on spiral four
cable on 4-channel working. Accelerated trials carried out revealed
that the equipment was lighter and more compact than any of the carrier
equipments in use. It was recommended that 250 pieces of the equipment be
procured from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Canada</st1:place></st1:country-region>
for the medium radio relay sections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Telegraph Regenerative Repeater DE- 229000/1 to remove
distortion effects of land lines and wireless links was developed by ITI at
this time. The equipment was designed for insertion in telegraph circuits to
correct distortion and send out fresh distortion-less signals at the correct
speed. A case for the procurement of the equipment for trials to assess
its suitability for Army was initiated. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The General
Staff Policy Statement of 76 (Issue No 2) of 1961 specified that carrier
equipment such as ACT (1+4) and ACT (1+1) and voice frequency telegraph
equipment such as S+Dx would be used at formation headquarters down to brigade
level. Within two years the requirement of the number of channels visualized
to be provided by Apparatus VFT and ACT, vide GSPS No 76 (Issue No 2) had to be revised to cater for 6/12 and 2/24
channels respectively, instead of 4/16 channels in both cases. This
became necessary because the Apparatus VFT as visualized in the GSPS was
required to work at speeds up to 100 bauds for rapid clearance of
traffic. To work the telegraph equipment at this speed, the bandwidth
required as per CCITT recommendations was such that it was possible to obtain
only 12 and 6 interference free channels on 4 wire and 2 wire basis
respectively. As for the ACT, the amendment aimed at bringing future carrier
equipment in line with other telephone carrier equipments developed and
manufactured by technologically advanced countries and the equipment of P&T
pattern. These equipments, with the help of group modulation units, could
build up to 12 or 24 channels and multiples of 12 channels. The revised
GSPS was amended to guide development of future carrier equipment which should
be capable of providing <st1:date day="12" month="4" w:st="on" year="2024">4/12/24</st1:date>
channels. <b>12<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964 the
Tactical Communications Committee recommended that radio relay with associated
carrier equipment be authorised to all mountain divisions. A year later this
was authorised to infantry divisions as well. These decisions gave a fillip to
the design and production of line equipment in the country. The ITI and LRDE,
which were mainly responsible for the design of line equipment, were also given
the task of producing lighter and more rugged versions of the equipment already
in use by the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
1965 both LRDE and ITI had designed and fabricated transistorized versions of
Apparatus VFT (<st1:place w:st="on">S+Dx</st1:place>) against the General Staff
requirement for the existing equipment to be replaced by really light and
compact equipment. Preliminary examination of the equipments carried out
by Special Signal Regiment revealed that both equipments were likely to meet
our requirements. Simultaneous Phase 1 trials were conducted by IV Corps
Signal Regiment, followed by Phase 2 trials at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>.
The equipment was found acceptable and cleared for introduction into service.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1966 orders were placed for the supply of ACTT
(1+4+4) quantity 56; group modem quantity 50 and VF
attachments quantity 304. The components for the ACTT (1+4+4) were
already available in the country and the equipment was being assembled in 509
Central EME Workshop <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>
while the group modems and VF attachments were being imported from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Canada</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The VF attachments were for use with the ACTT 1+4+4 which provided one physical
speech channel of reduced band width,
four carrier speech channels and four VFT channels. The
output at the terminals of the four VFT channels was available in the form of
VF tones, and not DC. These VF tones were converted by the VF attachment
into DC Signals for the teleprinter. In turn the DC signals from the
teleprinter were converted into VF tones by the VF attachment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1967 production models of transistorized ACT (1+1) and ACT (1+4) were made
available by ITI for troop trials. Phase I trials were conducted in
Special Signal Regiment and Phase II and Phase III trials in two corps signal
regiments and selected divisional signal regiments. The equipment performed well during troop
trials and was cleared for introduction into service. Production of these
equipments commenced in 1968 but it was only in 1970-71 that they began to
reach the units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="0.7_graphic15"></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1968 prototypes of group modem developed by ITI were made available for trials,
which were conducted in Special Signal Regiment. The equipment provided 3+12+12
channels on radio relay path or carrier quad cable in conjunction with three
each of ACT (1+4) 3A and Apparatus 4 channel Telegraph (ITI). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the troops trials of ACT (1+4) 3A some discrepancies were noticed in the
performance of the equipment while working on radio relay system C41/R222. The
reasons for these were investigated by a team of engineers from ITI attached to
Special Signal Regiment. As a result of this, a suggested procedure for lining
up the radio relay system while mounting ACT (1+4) 3A was issued by Army HQ in
February 1970. This was also issued as an Appendix to the User Hand Book on ACT
(1+4) 3A. Proving trials of the equipment on radio relay were conducted
in Special Signal Regiment, I Corps Signal Regiment and XI Corps Signal
Regiment to assess the performance of the equipment in light of lining up
procedures issued by ITI. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By
1971 the transistorised versions of ACT (1+4) 3A, ACT (1+1)1A and App VFT (<st1:place w:st="on">S+Dx</st1:place>) 4A had reached the units but the quantities were
small. For example, the authorised/held quantities of the three equipments in
divisional signal regiments were 50/8, 75/6 and 100/8. The situation in corps
signal regiments was slightly better, where the figures of authorised/held
quantities were 50/18-24, 50/12 and 60/12-14 respectively. However, it was
ensured that each field unit would have a minimum of two pieces of each
equipment.<b>13 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Teleprinters
& Fuller Phones<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At
the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
there were basically two pieces of equipment that were used for transmission of
telegraph signals - the fuller phone and the teleprinter. The Fuller Phone Mk 4
was a portable direct current telegraph instrument for use in forward areas
that was practically immune from interception. It was highly sensitive and
provided reliable communications at extremely low currents of 2-5 micro
amperes. It could be used over twin lines or a single line and earth return. It
could also be used on a simple series superposed circuit or superposed phantom
circuit. Under field conditions it gave a range of 15-<st1:metricconverter productid="20 miles" w:st="on">20 miles</st1:metricconverter> which could be
increased many times over PL. Several models of the instrument were available,
with additional facilities. The Mk 4* was fitted with radio suppression to
reduce the possibility of radio interception. The Mk 5 had a tropical finish
and was fitted with a crash limiter which reduced acoustic shock from ringing
currents when a telephone was used in series. The Mk 6 was fitted in a metal
case and was immersion proof and </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;">tropicalised</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
In addition to Signals, fuller phones were authorized to Infantry and Artillery
units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Teleprinter 7B (WD) provided a means for rapid and accurate transmission of
intelligence over land line and wireless. It was an automatic telegraph machine
that used the start-stop principle and employed the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Murray</st1:place></st1:city> code.
It could be used on single wire and earth, 2-wire or 2-wire and earth
return circuits. The Teleprinter 7B (WD) used a power supply of 24 volts DC for
the motor and 12+12 or 80+80 volts (depending on the line condition) for telegraph signalling. The speed was 50
bauds or 66 words per minute. It had a
keyboard similar to that of a typewriter and could be operated by a typist. The
teleprinter was used by Signals and authorized to almost all signal units from
brigade upwards. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_3" o:spid="_x0000_i1027" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:330.75pt;
height:354pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image005.jpg"
o:title="Teleprinter 7GB PO Main "/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="472" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_3" width="441" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Teleprinter 7B
(WD)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In <st1:metricconverter productid="1950, a" w:st="on">1950, a</st1:metricconverter>
new teleprinter was offered by M/s Creed, a British firm. Two versions of the Teleprinter Creed Type 50 were offered,
one for base use and the other for relatively forward areas. Both sought
to overcome errors due to omission from the transmission of ‘line feed’ or
‘carriage return’ signals. They were to be smaller and lighter than
earlier models. The specifications required them to operate for 1000
hours without adjustment and 5000 hours without major overhaul. The
project was then still in the early stages and it was not known when the
teleprinters would be produced. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In 1956 The Government decided to establish a teleprinter factory in
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The proposed factory would also satisfy the
requirements of Army in respect of teleprinters and ancillaries. In order to
find out the latest techniques used in the manufacture of such machines so as
to produce a suitable qualitative requirement (QR) on teleprinters and other
five unit code machines, it was decided to import a few pieces of equipment for
trials. Accordingly, two models of teleprinters were obtained from Siemens and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Halske</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">West
Germany</st1:country-region></st1:place>. These were the Tape Teleprinter
Type 68 and Page Teleprinter Type 37, along with a Tape Transmitter.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Another equipment
obtained from Creed for user/technical trials was the perforator typewriter
which has been developed in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
With the existing perforators it was not possible to obtain local record copy
and as such correctness or otherwise of punched tape could not be ascertained
at the time of punching. With a perforated typewriter a local copy
simultaneously with the punched tape was obtained. The typewriter keyboard
was simpler than the teleprinter keyboard. Its operation would also be
easier with the result that the traffic clearance capacity of an operator would
increase. The machine would be useful in static signal offices where the
traffic load was heavy<b>.</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Along with the Creed
perforator typewriter the Cocoqulet
teleprinter produced by Ateliers de Construction Electriquits, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Charleroi</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Belgium</st1:country-region></st1:place>
was also requisitioned for trials from the British concessionaires, Pye
Telecommunications, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambridge</st1:place></st1:city>. The
teleprinter used a 32 character system similar to the Murray Code. The speed of transmission was 50 bauds. The
special advantages of the system were reduced distortion, better immunity
to interference, slow fading and selective fading. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Though
the decision to establish a teleprinter factory in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> had been taken in 1956, it
was only in 1962 that it bore fruit. The two firms in contention were Siemens
of Germany and Olivetti of Italy. There is an interesting story of how the
matter was decided. The SO-in-C, Major General R.N. Batra gave a presentation
to the then Defence Minister, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, on the various types of
equipment to be purchased for the Army. Also in attendance were the Army Chief,
the Defence Secretary and the Financial Advisor. Since teleprinters were needed
by Defence as well as the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the SO-in-C
recommended that both departments should procure the same model, for the sake
of standardization He gave a number of reasons to support his view, such as
economy in production, repairs and training. After hearing him out the Defence
Minister said, <i>“I will not have the
teleprinter in Defence that the ‘Postman’ is going to have. If they go in for
Siemens, we will have Olivetti, and vice versa.” <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Fortunately, the 1962 war erupted
soon afterwards and Krishna Menon had to resign. Wiser counsels prevailed and
Olivetti was selected for Defence as well as the Department of Posts and
Telegraphs. The new factory of Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd. was set up at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> in collaboration
with Olivetti and started production in 1963. The first model produced was the
Teleprinter T2CN (Olivetti). Shortly afterwards, a ruggedized version known as </span><span lang="EN-GB">Teleprinter T2CNF (Olivetti)
was produced for use in field units of the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1028"
type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:345.75pt;height:376.5pt'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image007.jpg"
o:title="PictureT2" cropbottom="8170f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="502" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image008.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1028" width="461" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Teleprinter T2
BCNF</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The Teleprinter 3A (T2B-CN) and Teleprinter 4A (T2B-CNF) began to be
issued to units in 1966. Shortly afterwards, two new models known as the T2BSN
and T2BSNF were designed for exclusive use of the Army. The Teleprinter 5A
(T2BSN) began to be issued to units in 1969, while the first batch of
Teleprinter 6A (T2BSNF) was issued a year later in 1970. However, the rate of
production was very slow. The supply of
field teleprinters was about 500 every year, while that of static teleprinters
was only 100 each year. It was estimated that the complete requirement of
teleprinters would be met only by 1975. Accordingly, units were advised to
continue using the older Teleprinters 7B (WD) and GPO Mains until they became
unserviceable and beyond economic repair. <b>14<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Power
Equipment & Batteries<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> All electronic devices need
electrical power. Depending on the size and complexity of the equipment, the
power can be supplied by primary cells, secondary batteries or generators. In
addition, charging sets are needed for charging secondary batteries. Some of
the power equipments in use in 1947 were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l26 level1 lfo22; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Charging
Set 60 W No. 1</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
This was pedal driven charging set with an output of 4 amperes at 15
volts. It was used with WS 22, 62 and 76.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Charging
Set 80 W</span></u></b><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A light weight charging
set that used petrol as fuel and gave an output of 18 volts DC. It was used
with WS 62 and 76/R209.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Charging
Set 300 W Johnson Chorehouse CHI 395.5</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A petrol driven air-cooled charging set<b> </b>that gave an output of 15 volts DC. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Charging
Set 550 W No. <st1:metricconverter productid="1 A" w:st="on">1<span style="font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"> A</span></st1:metricconverter><span style="font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"> petrol
driven air-cooled charging set that gave an output of 18 volts DC. The No. 2
model also had a switchboard. The Charging Set 550 W SCR 169 was smaller in
size and lighter, with the output voltage being 32 volts DC.<o:p></o:p></span></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Charging
Set 1260 W No. 1</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
A petrol driven air-cooled charging set with 35 volts DC output and a
switchboard. The No. 2 model had the same characteristics except that the
voltage that could be varied from 18 to 36 volts. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Charging
Set 4 KW Lister</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A petrol driven air-cooled charging set
that delivered 80-125 volts DC.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Generating
Set 2 KVA Onan</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A petrol driven air-cooled generator
that delivered 230 volts AC at 60 cycles. It was used with WS 36. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Generating
Set 3 KVA Onan</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a petrol driven water-cooled
generator that delivered 230 volts AC at 60 cycles. It formed part of WS 10 and
WS 53 stations. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Generating
Set EDC 3.5 KVA</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a petrol driven water-cooled
generator that delivered 230 volts AC at 50 cycles. It was used with WS 53. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Generating
Set 15 KVA Lister</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A diesel driven water-cooled generator
that delivered 230 volts AC at 50/60 cycles. It was carried in a two wheeled 1
ton trailer and used with WS 63. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Generating
Set PE-75</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a 2.5 KVA petrol driven
air-cooled generator of American origin that delivered 115 volts AC at 60 cycles.
It had to be started by hand and was used with a large number of American radio
sets of the AN/TRC and SCR series. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Generating
Set PE-<st1:metricconverter productid="95 A" w:st="on">95 A</st1:metricconverter>
to D</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> These 5 KVA
petrol driven air-cooled generators delivered 115 volts AC at 60 cycles. They
had electric starters and were used with the SCR 299, 696 and 698. The G and H
models had an output of 5-10 KVA at 115-230 volts. They were used with SCR 299,
399 and 499. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Secondary
batteries of various types were used for wireless sets. There was an acute
shortage of ‘battle batteries’ used with WS 38 and <st1:metricconverter productid="48 in" w:st="on">48 in</st1:metricconverter> the early years and it
was decided to declare this item as rationed. Under the rationing
scheme, a bulk allotment was made to commands every quarter at the scale of 12
batteries per set on operational tasks and three batteries per set under
training. Indigenous production was started in December 1947 and 4,000 each of
battle batteries for WS 38 and 48 were produced. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the war
the ‘Ruben Mallory’ type dry battery had been designed in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> and used
with the VCR 300 set which was similar to the British WS 18 and 38. The War
Office in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had adopted this design in 1946 and started making dry batteries that were sent
to all theatres for trials. 60 batteries were sent to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> by air
and 60 were despatched by sea in March 1947. Trials were conducted on the
batteries that arrived by air at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>, Mhow with WS 38
under normal working conditions. It was noticed that the shelf life of
these batteries was very low. The time lag between the date of manufacture and
their arrival at Ordnance Depot in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> needed to be greatly reduced,
to prevent deterioration ‘on the shelf’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Out
of the 60 batteries sent to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
by sea, 39 were found to be unserviceable on arrival (their life then being 8
to 10 months) and others were rapidly deteriorating. When this was
reported to the War Office it was learned that the batteries sent were the
first of this type produced in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and were not expected to be perfect in the first instance. A fresh lot was
despatched to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in December 1947. These were sent directly to units with a questionnaire
for their comments and feedback. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By 1949 the position of battle
batteries had improved considerably and instructions were issued to make full
use of these battle batteries both for operational and training purposes. However, due to their shelf life being 9 - 12
months, it was noticed that large quantities of battle batteries were becoming
unserviceable whilst in storage. Within
six months approximately 17,000 batteries became unserviceable while lying in
storage, involving financial loss to the extent of Rs. 3,54,000. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The indigenous
production of dry batteries in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> also started around 1950. The
firms in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
could produce only ‘Can’ type batteries and not the ‘Layer’ type, which were
more compact, lighter and had greater shelf life. The two firms which had
been meeting service requirements of dry batteries were M/s Estrella Batteries
Limited and National Carbon Company. They were approached to produce
‘Layer’ type batteries but expressed their inability to do
so. Meanwhile TDE (I & E) Dehradun succeeded in producing a
‘Layer’ type battery and arrangements were made for the manufacture of such
batteries in the Ordnance Factory. The rate of production of batteries
162/3 volts was expected to be 1000 per month. The Ordnance Factory also
undertook to manufacture batteries 90/1.5 volts used with WS 88. Production
of these batteries was expected to commence towards the end of the year
1951. The number of dry batteries, which could be produced in the
Ordnance Factory, Dehradun was limited, due to shortage of accommodation.
In view of the very large number of dry batteries of various types needed, it
was recommended that an Ordnance factory be established to produce dry
batteries only. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> There were not many changes in the
charging sets and generators being used during the 1950s. As in the case of
other equipment, it was only in the early sixties that several new models were
developed. The </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">150 watt constant current
petrol/kerosene charging set was intended to be used for charging secondary
batteries of low power wireless stations in forward areas. It would replace the
Charging Set 80 watt. The Charging Set 500 watt was also developed for charging
secondary batteries of low power wireless sets and was to replace the Charging
Set 300 watt. The <a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="0.8_graphic03"></a>Charging Set 2 KW was to
replace the Charging Set 1260 watt. The Charging Set 5.4 KW was developed as an
interim replacement for the Charging Set 6 KW. In the category of generators,
the Generating Set 3.5 KVA was developed as a replacement of all existing
generating sets in the power output range of 2 to 3.5 KVA.<b>15</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1963 two portable charging sets were received from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> for trials.
The Generating Set Tiny Tiger No 302 was a small portable
manpack generator/charging set, with an output of 0.6 amperes at 250 volts
AC or 12.2 amperes at 12 volts DC. Out of the 12 sets examined by the Signals
Trials and Demonstration Unit, two failed after 50 hours running due to heavy
carbonization. The Charging Set 150 watt (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>) was tried by the same unit and
also failed due to the same reason. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
that time the batteries being used with WS VM50 were the 12 volt, 20 ampere-hour
silver zinc type, at the scale of one battery per set. The silver zinc
batteries were non-spillable and came in a foam case provided with a shoulder
strap attached to a cane basket for easy carriage. The battery was extremely
sensitive as regards the charging rate and specific gravity and was frequently
damaged due to negligence. The problem was overcome in 1964 with the
introduction of the Battery Secondary 12 volt, 20 ampere-hour of indigenous
manufacture, which replaced the existing batteries 12 volt, 14 ampere-hour and
12 volt, 22 ampere-hour. However, since the rate of supply was very slow,
these batteries were issued only to units holding WS VM50 and WS <st1:metricconverter productid="62 in" w:st="on">62 in</st1:metricconverter> the first instance<b>. </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the authorization of radio relay equipment to divisions the issue of suitable
power equipment for the WS C41/R222 had to be decided. Since the Power
Unit PE-75 was lighter as compared to Generating Set 3 KVA/3.5 KVA and could be
broken up into mule loads, it was decided that radio relay sections forming
part of mountain divisional signal regiments would be issued PE-75 while
medium radio relay sections would use the Generating Set 3 KVA/ 3.5
KVA . Subsequently, the holdings of Generating Sets 3 KVA/ 3.5
KVA were rationalised within commands. The bulky and a heavy generating
sets such as the 3.5 KVA Lister/Coventry Climax were issued to command, corps
and communication zone signal regiments, while the lighter generating sets in
this category were issued to divisional signal regiments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In <st1:metricconverter productid="1967 a" w:st="on">1967 a</st1:metricconverter> new policy was issued
regarding the various types of charging sets to be used with low power
radio stations in the interim period and at the final. The salient points were
as given below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Type
of Radio Station</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Type
of Charging Set</u><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 252.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Interim</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Final</u> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">RS 62 (Manpack) 80
W 150
W <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">RS HM 30, 62 (TPSU), R105D 80 W/150 W 150 W<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">AN/PRC-25
with booster, VM-50, <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">GG
733 and GR 345 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo6; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">S76/R209, BE 201, CN 348, 150 W/300
W 150 W<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">62
(Rotary) and AN/GRC-9 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo6; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">RS 19, C11/R210, C42, C52, 300 W 500W<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> C-13, R112, R113 and GR 345<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It was also decided
that the project for development of Charging Set 8 KW as visualized in GSPS No
81 would be closed, since the requirement could be met by Charging Set 6 KW
that was under production. It was also
felt that the various types of heavier generating sets in the range of 10-18
KVA could be rationalised. Since the Generating Set 12.5 KVA could meet the
power supply needs of all field signal units, it was proposed that this should
be standardized, as a replacement for the Generating Set 15 KVA, 17 KVA (or
18.75 KVA) in addition to Generating Sets PE-95 and 9 KVA.<br />
In 1968 the policy
regarding Generating Sets 3.5 KVA had to be reviewed after it was brought
out during trials of 400 Watt Mobile station that a power source of 3.5 KVA is
not quite adequate. Further for radio relay station a generating set of 2
KVA capacity was adequate both from the point of view of power rating as well
as of weight and size. The development of the 3.5 KVA generator was not
making headway due to non availability of an indigenously produced prime mover,
where as feasibility of the indigenous production of 2 KVA existed. Hence, it
was decided to amend the GSPS No 81 so as to change the requirement of generating
set 3.5 KVA to one of 4 KVA and include the requirement of generating set 2
KVA.<b>16 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
order to diversify the sources of production/supply of the Charging Set 150
Watt (Indigenous) and to complete existing deficiencies expeditiously,
letters of intent for the supply of 500 pieces were placed on three different
firms in 1968. These were M/s J. Stone & Co, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>, M/s Aviquipo, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> and M/s <st1:place w:st="on">Beni</st1:place>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>. The
first two firms would use the indigenous Villiers engine while M/s <st1:place w:st="on">Beni</st1:place> would use the indigenous Veegal engine. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At this time M/s
Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd. developed a lighter and much improved version of
the Generating set 5.5 KW installed on a 1-Ton, 2-wheeled GS Trailer. The
complete set including engine, alternator, control and charging cubical,
accessories and tool box were mounted on a common slid base, making it one
compact unit. The set gave an AC output of 8 KVA at 230 volts single phase and
DC output of 5.5 KW at 15-110 volts, in three different circuits. The
control and rectifier units could also be used as a static charger from AC
mains where available. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1970 the prototype Generating Set 11.25 KVA developed
by LRDE was received for trials. The generating set had been designed as a
power source for both ground and trailer mounted roles for supplying single
phase AC power to radio sets, field equipment and lighting of divisional and
corps headquarters. During preliminary trials in Special Signal Regiment the
performance of the set was found generally satisfactory. The equipment was then
sent to a field unit where it performed well and was accepted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By the end of
1972, various types of power equipment were being produced by a number of
Indian companies. The Charging Set 150 Watt was being made by M/s
Intercontinental Agencies, M/s <st1:place w:st="on">Beni</st1:place> and M/s
Dasani Engineers (P) Ltd. The Charging Set 500 Watt was being supplied by
M/s Aviquipo and M/s <st1:place w:st="on">Beni</st1:place>. Orders for Charging Sets 2 KW had been
placed on the Viman Engineering Co as well as <st1:place w:st="on">Beni</st1:place>.
Charging Set 5.5 KW was being manufactured by Kirloskars. Generating Sets 4 KVA were being produced by
M/s <st1:place w:st="on">Beni</st1:place>, Viman and Siemens. The Generating Set 11.25 KVA developed by
LRDE in collaboration with M/s Parrys was being manufactured by the latter and
M/s Greaves Cotton, who were also supplying the Generating Set 18.75 KVA. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Crypto Equipment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Up
to the end of World War, the only crypto equipment in use in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> was the
Machine Type ‘X’, though several countries had made rapid strides in the use of
mechanical and electrical machines for on line encryption and decryption of
classified messages. The story of Enigma, developed by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Germany</st1:place></st1:country-region> has
been described by F.W. Winterbotham’s in his book <i>Ultra Secret </i>and<i> </i>in Peter Calvocoressi’s <i>Top
Secret Ultra,</i> both published in 1974. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region> had broken the code being
used on Enigma, and was able to get advance information of German plans
throughout the war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">At the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
Indians were handling all types of equipment in use in the Corps with the
exception of cryptographic devices, which were the exclusive preserve of
British personnel. It was only after 1947 that Indian cipher operators started
operating the Machine Type ‘X’, which was used for mechanical enciphering and
deciphering of classified messages. These were used at divisional headquarters
and above only. At brigade headquarters and below, messages were
enciphered in book cipher. It was only in 1955 that action was initiated
to procure Hagelin Cryptographer Type C52B and CX52B machines for trials to
replace low grade cipher (Linex). These machines were electrically
operated but could also be hand operated. The major advantages of this
machine over the low grade cipher in use were that it was less tedious and
easier to operate; was quicker in enciphering/deciphering (200 groups per hour
could be enciphered and 250 groups per hour could be deciphered as compared to
Linex where only 120 groups per hour could be enciphered and 150 groups
deciphered); and that it was portable, being lighter in weight and smaller in
size.<b>17</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Another machine that was obtained for trials was the Portex Literal Cipher Machine. This was
a small hand operated off-line, tape printing cipher machine, with alphabet
wheel input, designed for use at lower headquarters. It had an electrical
permuting maze operated from a self-contained 45-volt dry battery good for over
100,000 operations. The speed was 10 words per minute. The
cryptographic unit consisted of an eight 26-point rotor maze with a crossover
at the cipher end. Each rotor consisted of an insert and a housing. The
insert was selected from a set of sixteen and could be fitted in the housing in
any one of twenty-six possible angular positions; the housing was fitted with a
rotatable alphabet type. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In 1956 the Machine Type ‘X’
Modified 80+80 Signalling was
subjected to trials by 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment. Subsequently a
statement of case for modification of ‘On the Line Cipher Machine’ to
incorporate the facility of tape relay working was submitted to the
Modification Sub Committee and approved in 1957.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1962 infantry brigade signal sections were authorised one
Machine Type ‘X’ each. However, due to shortage of this equipment, it could not
be issued to all infantry brigade signal sections. A year later the EME
demonstrated the first ‘On Line
Cipher Machine’ at the Army HQ signal centre. The existing Machine Type ‘X’ was modified
for ‘On Line’ working by using the existing auto-head and punching unit. This
increased its traffic clearance capacity. It also had the facility of getting
the crypt and punched tape simultaneously for multi address messages and
obtaining corrections during transmission, thereby avoiding check and repeat
messages and subsequent delays. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1963 the Air Force demonstrated a machine Type X Mk 2, modified as Mk 22, using
the available cross over units. These were tried out along with the
original Machines Type X Mk 22 imported from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. It was found that the
performance of the modified machines was quite good. Shortly afterwards 300
pieces of Machine Type X Mk 22 were received from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> under the
‘Aid Programme’. These could be issued to ‘aided’ units only, the requirement
of ‘non-aided’ units being met by conversion of Mk II machines to Mk 22 at the
509 Central EME Workshop, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>. It
was expected that by end of 1965 all units would be issued with the new
machines. However, it was only in 1967 that Machine Type ‘X’ Mk 22 was
introduced into service.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1966 Model 1 of Equipment ‘X’ (On Line Cipher
Machine) was developed by Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL) <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hyderabad</st1:place></st1:city> and issued to
units for trials. The first ten electronic cipher machines ex DLRL Defence
known as Equipment Cipher Line 1A were distributed to Army HQ Signals and
command signal regiments in early 1968. Two months later, another ten
pieces were received and issued to command and corps signal regiments in
addition to MCTE.<b>18</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1968 two prototypes of the
Equipment Cipher Line Mk II developed by DLRL were made available for
trials. This machine was smaller, lighter, more compact and had many new
features for improved reliability and maintainability. It had better and
cheaper switches than those used in Mk 1 version of the machine. The
machine was fully compatible with the older Mk I version in regard to the
performance in electrical circuit design. After trials carried out in
Army HQ Signal Regiment, certain improvements/modifications were recommended in
the production model of the machine. The ECL Mk II was introduced shortly
afterwards, followed by the ECL Mk III. By <st1:metricconverter productid="1972 a" w:st="on">1972 a</st1:metricconverter> more sophisticated
version of the machine (ECL Mk IV) was being developed by DLRL. These had
in-built cryptogram and were expected to be issued during 1973/74. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In 1970 two prototypes of Equipment
‘CADDIS’ developed by LRDE has were received in Special Signal Regiment for
preliminary examination and trials. This equipment was intended for forward
area speech security role for use with RS AN/PRC-25. It was claimed to have the
facility of secure voice communication for durations of 6 to 8 hours, over the
simplex radio link set up by means of the terminal radio sets. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Specialist Vehicles<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> A
large variety of </span><span lang="EN-GB">signal specialist vehicles had
been developed in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
during World War II. Some of these vehicles were held by units at the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> in 1947.
With import of vehicles having ceased after the end of the war, there was an
acute shortage of signal specialist vehicles in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> in the initial years. In 1950
efforts were made to obtain some vehicles from trade in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>, after the
War Office expressed their inability to provide any from their own stocks.
However, it was not certain that the required number and types of specialist
vehicles could be obtained from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">It was learned that approximately 165 Lorries 3-Ton 4 x 4 with box
type bodies were held in Vehicle Depot, Dehu. It was decided to utilize
these for conversion to suitable signal specialist vehicles. The EME
commenced work in October 1950 for conversion of two types of vehicles viz.
Command Low Power and Terminal Equipment Vehicle Type D. The
responsibility for conversion of Lorry 3-Ton 4x4 Command LP was given to
512 Command Workshop, Kirkee while that of Lorry 3-Ton 4x4 TEV Type
D was entrusted to 505 Command Workshop, Delhi Cantt. Deficiencies
in respect of other specialist vehicles such Lorries Wireless High Power G 53
were being met by mounting WS SCR <st1:metricconverter productid="399 in" w:st="on">399 in</st1:metricconverter> cabins on Lorries 3 Ton GS. In
lieu of Trucks 15-cwt 4x4 Wireless, Trucks 15-cwt 4x4 GS with Conversion Kit No
16 were to be issued. Simultaneous action was also be taken to install
fittings in 152 Trucks 15-cwt 4x4 with box type bodies held in vehicle depots
to convert them into Trucks 15-cwt 4x4 wireless. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> By 1951 the prototype Lorry 3-Ton
4x4 TEV Type D converted in 505 Command Workshop had undergone user trials with
4 Divisional Signal Regiment. The vehicle provided facilities for easy
installation and working of the major items of equipment such as one 20/40/60
line switchboard; one teleprinter 7B(WD) complete station; one ACT 1+1 No. 2;
one Apparatus VFT S+Dx No. 2, up to eight fuller phones and two telephone sets.
When fully staffed, four of the personnel had to be accommodated in an
adjoining collapsible shelter, carried in the vehicle on the move. The
vehicle carried a 550 watt charging set and its own secondary batteries
adequate for equipment power requirements, lighting and fans. When fully
or partially unequipped, the table space available was suitable for the use of
the signal office staff. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The Lorry 3-Ton 4x4 Command LP converted in 512 Command
Workshop had also undergone user trials with 5 Divisional Signal Regiment. It
had the staff compartment in front and the equipment compartment in the rear in
contrast to the Bedford Command LP produced during the war. It carried
the same wireless sets (WS 19HP and WS 19) but provided additional control
facilities. The vehicle was self-sufficient for power requirements and
carried a 1260 watt charging set and adequate secondary batteries for the
purpose. The vehicle was slightly overloaded, but it was hoped that this
could be adequately rectified by strengthening of the rear springs or reduction
in the weight carried. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Meanwhile, work on the prototype Truck 15- cwt 4x4 Wireless had also
commenced in 505 Command Workshop. The vehicle was designed to accommodate up
to two wireless sets, which could be a combination of WS 19, WS 19(HP), WS 22,
WS 62, WS 76/R 109/R 209 or WS CN348. Alternately, it could carry one
WS 62/CN348 or one WS 52 Canadian. There was provision for carriage of
charging sets and batteries corresponding to the above sets and for an additional
light field set in exceptional cases. However, it was found that the prototype
using the Chevrolet 8444 chassis when fitted with the WS 52 Canadian or WS
19(HP), if carried as complete truck/ground stations, would overload the
vehicle. For the carriage of these sets it was decided to use the Dodge 1 ton
Power Wagons. For all other sets
corresponding to WS 19 truck/ground station in bulk, the Chevrolet 8444 chassis
would be suitable. The existing bodywork of the house type body was also
bulky. As such the prototype had to be redesigned with lighter furniture
and fittings so that adequate load carrying capacity was left for the signal
equipment, the crew and their kit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">At this time General Staff Policy Statement No 35 was issued which
gave out the design of the basic house type body for the 3-Ton vehicle to meet
the long term requirements of Signals. A team consisting of one signal officer
and three OR was attached to the Technical Development Establishment
(Vehicles), Ahmednagar to oversee the progress on the design of the vehicles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In 1963 the General Staff Policy Statement No <st1:metricconverter productid="90 in" w:st="on">90 in</st1:metricconverter> respect of signal
specialist vehicles was issued. Based on this, priorities for the
development of various signal specialist vehicles were worked out. Higher priority
was given to vehicles required for the mountain divisions, prototypes of which
were expected to be ready by December 1963. Prototypes of the other
vehicles required urgently, were expected to be ready by December 1964.
The vehicles were as under:- <b>19</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%;">
<u><span lang="EN-GB">Prototypes to be ready by
December 1963 <o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Wireless (HP) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Wireless <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Command Vehicle (LP) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Signal Centre (Light) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
TEV (Light) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Cipher Office (Light) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Air Support Tentacle <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Radio Relay (Light) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Wireless Reception <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Mobile Signal Workshop <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Lorry 3 Ton 4x4
Command Vehicle (HP) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Lorry 3 Ton 4x4
TEV (Medium) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%;">
<u><span lang="EN-GB">Prototypes to be ready by
December 1964 <o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Truck 1 Ton 4x4
Line Construction & Maintenance <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Lorry 3 Ton 4x4
Cipher Office (Medium) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Lorry 3 Ton 4x4
Signal Centre (Medium) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Lorry 3 Ton 4x4
TEV (HP Basic) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Lorry 3 Ton 4x4
Teleprinter Office <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 115%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Lorry 3 Ton 4x4
Mobile Signal Workshop<br />
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In 1964 it was decided that all future development of specialist
bodies will be based on Trucks 1 Ton Nissan and Lorries 3 Ton Shaktiman.
While development action already in hand for building of specialist bodies on
other types of vehicles would not be discontinued, no fresh development of
specialist bodies on other chassis was to be undertaken without the specific
approval of the Government. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Since the requirement of signal specialist vehicles was unlikely to
be met soon, units were permitted to modify GS vehicles on their own. Funds for
this purpose were sanctioned by the Government but these were woefully
inadequate. Units resorted to various types of innovations and improvisations
to modify vehicles in accordance with their needs. Since these modifications
were of a temporary nature, units were advised not to improvise hard plywood
roofs and retain the canvas canopies for the interim period. Some units managed
within the allotted funds by making full use of timber and other expendable
items authorized on WET. The restriction imposed on issue of GS vehicles
(75 percent of WE) was not applicable to the GS vehicles issued in lieu of
signal specialist vehicles. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> After the authorization of radio relay to mountain divisions
it became necessary to design a suitable vehicle to house the radio relay
station. 509 <st1:place w:st="on">Central EME</st1:place> workshop started work
in 1965 to modify Truck 1 Ton 4x4 Dodge bodies for the installation of WS
C41/R222. The first lot of 21 modified vehicles was issued to the seven
divisions deployed in the East, at the scale of three per unit. Subsequent
issues were made to divisions in the West and medium radio relay sections. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">STATIC COMMUNICATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless
<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During World War II, fairly extensive
wireless networks were established in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, which then included <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Burma</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ceylon</st1:place></st1:country-region>, where
South East Asia Command was located. High speed wireless links existed between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">London</st1:place></st1:city>, in addition to
several overseas stations such as <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Melbourne</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Colombo</st1:place></st1:city>. Wireless links also existed to all commands
and operational theatres. Transmitter stations had been established at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Lodi Road</st1:address></st1:street> in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and at Bagjola in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> from where
operations of the Eastern Army were controlled. After the end of the War, a
large number of wireless links became redundant and were closed. According to
the new general staff policy for static communications formulated in 1946, the
scale of wireless circuits was one RT and one WT circuit down the chain of
command from Army HQ to sub area headquarters. This formed the basis of the
Static Wireless Army Network (SWAN) that existed at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>. Apart from internal links, SWAN
also included links to foreign stations such as <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">London</st1:place></st1:city>. After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, several others such as <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>,
Kathmandu etc. were added to SWAN. The link to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city> was subsequently closed in April
1948. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1948 it was decided to establish
speech communications on wireless to Mhow. The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> – Mhow RT Duplex link was opened and
Mhow became the third station on the Command RT net that existed between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. Shortly afterwards, due to frequent
breakdown of line communications between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city>, it
was considered necessary to split the above RT net in November 1948. The
Command RT net H21A would now work to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
and Mhow, while the H21B would be exclusively for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1949 wireless links were established between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>
and Naushera – Kotli for the use of the United Nations Commission for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
Pakistan (UNCIP). The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> and
Naushera terminals were manned by Indian Signals personnel while the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city> and Kotli
terminals were manned by Pakistan Signals.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It
was observed at this time that each command was following a different system of
nomenclature for wireless circuits. The sequence of various circuits was not
uniform and consecutive, and different prefixes were used within the same
command. It was decided that suffixes used in wireless diagrams would be
standardized. Links at Army HQ would be affixed by the letter A, Southern
Command with S, Eastern Command with E and Western Command with W. In September
1949, Ahmednagar and Deolali were added to the RT link working to Mhow. The
three RT links working from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
were re-grouped as given below:-<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 58.5pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l20 level1 lfo13; tab-stops: list 58.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Delhi</span></st1:place></st1:city><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
– <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> A5<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 58.5pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l20 level1 lfo13; tab-stops: list 58.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Delhi</span></st1:place></st1:city><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
– <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city> A8<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 58.5pt; mso-list: l20 level1 lfo13; tab-stops: list 58.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Delhi-Ahmednagar-Deolali-Mhow A16<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
the move of Officers Central Record Office from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> in 1949, it was decided to close the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city> terminal on A13,
the Delhi-Simla-Jhansi CW net. Since the
advance party of HQ 1 Armoured Division had moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>, it was decided to retain this
terminal for some time for schedule working on A13 (Delhi-Simla) and E3
(Ranchi-Lucknow) nets. Subsequently, the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>
terminal on A13 was closed and replaced by one at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>, manned by 1 Armoured Division. In
view of the fact that wireless link between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> – Gangtok existed and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> had no direct interest in Gangtok,
the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> –
Gangtok wireless link was closed down in 1950. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In <st1:metricconverter productid="1950 a" w:st="on">1950 a</st1:metricconverter> new policy for Post
Emergency Static Intercommunications was issued. It laid down that Army
fixed wireless networks will be installed providing radio telephony and hand
speed Morse/radio teleprinter signalling facilities in the normal chain of
command down to and including sub area headquarters and for field formations
down to brigade headquarters. In exceptional cases fixed wireless links would
also be provided to certain important depots/installations such as <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Defence</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Services</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Staff</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype></st1:place>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Wellington</st1:place></st1:city> and Central Ordnance Depot, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>. Rear link sets at
field formation headquarters would be provided from within the resources of
field formation signal units.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The hand speed Morse wireless links
from Army HQ to command headquarters as also wireless links from command
headquarters to area headquarters would progressively be converted to radio
teleprinter signalling. Eventually all
wireless links from Army HQ to command headquarters would be converted to
combined radio teleprinter signalling and radio telephony working (single side
band). As a long term policy it was
hoped to convert these hand speed Morse links to radio teleprinter
signalling. If additional wireless
communications were warranted from static formation headquarters to units,
these would be provided by from within the working sets at the formation
headquarters and the units concerned. The above fixed wireless network entailed
the provision of permanent transmitter and receiver sites in the normal chain
of command down to area headquarters.
Only transmitter sites would be provided at sub area headquarters and
independent sub area headquarters where receiver stations would be established
in respective signal offices.<b>20</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A
wireless link with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was established in 1953 for the Custodian Force <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> that was sent there under the
aegis of the United Nations. Wireless communications were also established with
the International Commissions in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. These consisted of one RTT
and one CW hand speed link between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> and
one standby CW hand speed link between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> and subsequently between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>. Details of communications
with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
have been given in Chapter 8.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An interesting development was with
regard to the Hindi Morse Code. In accordance with AO 6/S/51, it had been laid
down that the common language of the Army will be Hindi and the common script
will be Devnagri with effect from <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1956">1 October 1956</st1:date>.
Since Hindi was to replace English as the official language of the Army
at a later date, it was visualized that this would affect the Corps of Signals
in several ways. The three main areas requiring attention were the preparation
of Hindi codes for use on Army telegraph circuits; modification/manufacture of
telecommunication equipment such as teleprinter and automatic telegraphy
equipment for transmission/reception of Hindi codes; and preparation of ciphers
and codes in Hindi. To prepare personnel for use of the Hindi Morse Code
training was also organised at Central Telegraph Office, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>. In 1953 one officer and three OR
underwent the training in Hindi Morse Code.
Vacancies for one officer and three OR were demanded on the next course. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> However, in 1955, on the
recommendations of the Traffic, Procedure and Codes Committee, the Radio and
Cable Board felt that since the Ministry of Education had not completed action
on finalizing the Hindi script it is premature to evolve a Hindi Telegraph
Code. It was decided that the working group of the Traffic, Procedure and Codes
Committee will examine the existing Devnagari Script and put up suggestions
regarding any modifications required to cater for the requirements of
telecommunications using that script. The Radio and Cable Board would then
approach the Ministry of Education to take these modifications into
consideration while evolving the revised Hindi script.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
the 1965 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
a wireless link was established between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>.
The CW link to GHQ Pakistan Army began working on <st1:date day="21" month="1" w:st="on" year="1966">21 January 1966</st1:date>. The daily scheduled hours of
working were 1000-1300 hours and 1600-1900 hours IST. Subsequently an RT duplex
communication link <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
– <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>
was established on <st1:date day="19" month="9" w:st="on" year="1966">19
September 1966</st1:date>. A land line
speech circuit between Amritsar-Lahore was established on the same date. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A revised policy for the provision
of Static Signal Communication (STATCOM) in the Army was issued vide Army
Headquarters letter No 64603/Sigs 7(a) dated <st1:date day="15" month="7" w:st="on" year="1970">15 July 1970</st1:date>.
The revised policy letter took into account the transfer of
responsibility for Signal Despatch Service to Army Postal Service, extension of
the STATCOM network to field formations (down to division/independent brigade
level) in their permanent/semi-permanent locations and policy for the
introduction of new techniques/equipment such as use of ARQ equipment on all
unstable long haul VFT circuits and on all RTT circuits. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
accordance with the provisions of No. 465 Radio Regulations, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Geneva</st1:place></st1:city> 1968 to discontinue the use of double
side band radio telephone transmissions in fixed services in the band below 30
MHz, in 1970 the Department of Communications asked all user departments to
implement this decision with immediate effect.
In keeping with the above policy, it was decided that progressively all
Army static radio telephone links would be changed over to single side band
(SSB). As a first step, all radio
telephone links ex Army HQ command headquarters would be converted to SSB
working. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line
Communications <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
first telegraph line in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was established in 1851 between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Diamond</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Harbour</st1:placetype></st1:place>, followed by the first telephone
circuit between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Fort</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">William</st1:placename></st1:place> in 1877. Four years later, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> got its first
exchange in <st1:metricconverter productid="1881 in" w:st="on">1881 in</st1:metricconverter>
Army HQ at Simla. Though <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was ahead of most other countries in the field of telecommunications, the
network was sparse and under developed. It was only when World War II came to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
door-step after the Japanese invasion that urgent measures were taken and a comprehensive line communication system was established in
conjunction with the P&T Department. The system comprised a military trunk
telephone network and a teleprinter network, both manned entirely by the Army.
It also catered for private telephone and telegraph circuits required to
augment the civil system. The
construction and installation of the system was carried out jointly by the Army
and the P&T Department. Wherever
qualified P&T technicians were not available, these installations were
manned by military line mechanics.
Maintenance of the lines was carried out jointly by the Army and the
P&T. At the end of the war, the
entire line network was handed over to the P&T Department, which became
responsible for its operation and maintenance.
However, certain sections in the west that had not been completed when
the war ended were handed over in 1946 and 1947, concurrently with the
demobilization of the Army.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The telephone system in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
had come up during the war in an ad hoc manner to meet urgent requirements at
short notice. The network consisted of three auto exchanges and number of small
manual exchanges with inadequate junction arrangements. The switchboards
were either obsolete or unsuitable for an area where telephone density was
high. The P&T Department exchanges
with the number of AFHQ subscribers shown in brackets were located at the
Secretariat (350); Connaught Place (100); Lothian (10); Old Secretariat (25); South
Avenue “41” (500); Shah Jehan Road (10) and Air HQ (350). With the
departure of a considerable number of their trained technical staff to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> after
Partition in 1947, the P&T Department was hard
pressed to keep the exchanges going. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Plans were made to do away with the manual
exchanges and furnish all subscribers in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
with auto telephones by August 1948. The Secretariat auto exchange would be
allotted for the sole use of AFHQ both in the South Block of the Secretariat
and in the hutments around it. This was a short term plan suitable for use
in peace time. The ultimate object was to centralize auto connections in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> on one exchange
i.e. the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Connaught Place</st1:address></st1:street>
exchange. In this scheme AFHQ notified their requirements to the P&T Department as 1200 connections for use in
peace time capable of expansion to 2000 to meet requirements during war or
emergency.<b>21</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In <st1:metricconverter productid="1948 a" w:st="on">1948 a</st1:metricconverter> new all weather road
was built between Pathankot – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>,
as the earlier road ran very close to the India-Pakistan border. The P&T trunk route to Pathankot along
the old road was abandoned and a new route was constructed along the new road
alignment. With this, the lines of communications to Jammu & Kashmir became
safer, more reliable and less liable to interference by the enemy. Direct trunk
communication was provided between Delhi-Srinagar using the 1+3 carrier system
that was installed between Jammu-Srinagar. The equipment for this project was
flown in to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> and
the circuits engineered in record time by the P&T Department. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The policy for Post Emergency Static
Intercommunications enunciated in 1950 laid down guidelines for provision
of static communications in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and the responsibility of the P&T
Department in this regard.
It was clarified that the P&T Department would be responsible for the provision
of trunk telephone and telegraph circuits required by the Army in
non-operational areas. This included the provision and maintenance of
carrier and VFT equipment and alternate circuits in the case of
breakdown. Depending on the volume of traffic, trunk telephone and
telegraph circuits would be rented from the P&T Department for the
exclusive use of the Army in the normal chain of command down to and including
sub area headquarters. Telegraph circuits down to area and independent
sub area headquarters would be on teleprinters, which would be provided and
operated by command signal regiments. Telegraph circuits from area
headquarters to sub area headquarters, where installed, would be provided by
the use of fuller phone. Teleprinter switchboards would be provided down
to command headquarters only. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1966 two new concepts were
introduced in the plan for development of static communications. These were the
Defence Engineered Network (DEFNET) and Border Permanent Lines (BOPEL). Earlier, speech and telegraph circuits rented
by the Defence Services from the P&T Department were provided by patching
up links on communication systems engineered primarily for commercial use. The
DEFNET proposal envisaged that between major stations such systems should be
provided on carrier and VFT systems engineered exclusively for Defence
requirements. It also included measures for better maintenance, liaison,
protection of important installations and exclusive attention to Defence
circuits. The BOPEL catered for construction of PL routes in the border areas,
where none existed earlier, which may be needed by Defence in the event of an
emergency. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
implementation of DEFNET had to be held over for two years due to shortage of
funds and representation from the P&T Department that improvement in
Defence communications could be brought about by them with means easier and
cheaper than DEFNET. The two year
moratorium of DEFNET expired in June 1969. However, the P&T Department was
still not inclined to implement the DEFNET proposal on technical grounds. They suggested extension of Defence trunk
speech circuits on 4-wire basis from their carrier centres to Army premises as
an alternative to DEFNET. It was then
decided that both the schemes viz. extension of Defence circuits on 4-wire
basis and installation of carrier group systems in Defence premises as
envisaged in DEFNET, would be tried out on a limited scale to evaluate the
performance, feasibility and advantages of each. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
early 1971 measures were taken to introduce troposcatter communications as part
of the static communication network. In view of the vulnerability of P&T
Department telecommunication networks to enemy action in certain border areas,
a necessity was felt for having medium range systems of communications which
could be deployed at short notice to extend P&T Department circuits to the
field formations. Though rear area radio
relay sections were included in the establishment of signal units, the
distances envisaged would be beyond the capabilities of these sections. With this in view, a case for procurement of
some thin line mobile troposcatter (TLT) terminals was taken up with the
Government for approval.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
<st1:metricconverter productid="1971 a" w:st="on">1971 a</st1:metricconverter>
large number of circuits were hired form the P&T Department in anticipation
of the imminent hostilities with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. These included speech and
telegraph circuits on line and microwave as well as multi channel VHF links.
After the conclusion of the operations most of these circuits were
surrendered. However, new circuits were
hired between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
– <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>. Considerable work was done by
signal units to rehabilitate static communication networks in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>
which had been severely damaged during the war. Communications were also
provided for resumption of railway services in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> to facilitate the
evacuation of prisoners of war and move back of refugees. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
the Simla agreement of July 1972 senior military commanders of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> met at
Suchetgarh and Wagah to delineate the line of actual control. At Wagah, the talks were held on the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> side
and resulted in a major signal exercise.
Elements of both corps and divisional signals were deployed to provide
skeleton command headquarters communications for the visiting dignitaries using
both field and P&T systems. Speech
and telegraph circuits were engineered to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and
Udhampur from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signal
Centre Procedure<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The signal office, which later
became the signal centre, is an important area of concern for Signals. To
ensure that urgent messages were not delayed, precedences are allotted by
originators. The precedence given to a message does not indicate its importance
but its urgency, and the priority that is accorded to it in the signal centre.
In 1949 the nomenclature of precedences was changed, to bring them in line with
those being used by the Navy and the Air Force. The new precedences were as
given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> <u>Old </u> <u>New </u><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> MOST
IMMEDIATE “OU” FLASH “OC” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> EMERGENCY “O” EMERGENCY “O” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> IMMEDIATE “OP” OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE “OP” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> IMPORTANT “P” PRIORITY “P” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> ROUTINE “R” ROUTINE “R” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> DEFERRED “D” DEFERRED “NM” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The policy for Post Emergency Static
Intercommunications issued in 1950 had some provisions concerning signal office
facilities and signal staff. It was laid down that minimum essential signal
office facilities including personnel from signal office working, cipher
working, switchboard operating and local signal despatch service will be
retained in each static formation headquarters in the normal chain of command
down to sub area headquarters. In
localities where two formation headquarters existed e.g. area and sub area
headquarters, or command and sub area headquarters, duplication of signal office facilities would
not be effected unless absolutely essential. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
<st1:metricconverter productid="1957 a" w:st="on">1957 a</st1:metricconverter>
new phonetic alphabet was issued, superseding the one that had been in
existence for several years. The new alphabet was as under:-<b>22<u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Letter</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Word </u> <u>Letter</u> <u>Word<o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A ALFA N NOVEMBER<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">B BRAVO O OSCAR<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">C CHARLIE P PAPA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">D DELTA Q <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">QUEBEC</st1:place></st1:state><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">E ECHO R ROMEO<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">F FOXTROT S SIERRA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">G GOLF T TANGO<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">H HOTEL U UNIFORM<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">INDIA</st1:place></st1:country-region> V VICTOR<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">J JULIETT W WHISKEY<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">K KILO X X-RAY<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">L <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">LIMA</st1:place></st1:city> Y YANKEE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">M MIKE Z ZULU <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In December 1971 certain changes
were made in the designation of the staff employed in signal centre, exchange,
crypto centre, transmitters and receivers. The old and new designations which
came into effect from <st1:date day="1" month="4" w:st="on" year="1972">1 April
1972</st1:date> were as given below:-<b>23<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Existing</u> <u>New<o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Duty
Signal Officer Officer
in Charge Signal Centre<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Assistant
Duty Signal Officer Duty Signal Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officer
Commanding Exchange Officer in Charge Exchange.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> - Duty
Exchange Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Senior
Cipher Officer Officer
in Charge Crypto Centre<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Duty
Cipher Officer Duty
Chief Officer<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officer
Commanding Transmitters. Officer in Charge Transmitters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officer
Commanding Receivers Officer in Charge Receivers<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communication
Boards & Committees<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">During World War II a number
of inter-departmental and inter service boards </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">were created for
co-ordination, planning and speedy execution of communication projects. Some of these were the Wireless Telegraphy
Board (India); the Signals Board (India), later renamed the Departmental
Telecommunications Board; the Services Communication
Board (India); the Defence Service Line Communication Board; and the
Telecommunications Development Board. The composition, charter and
responsibilities of these boards underwent several changes as the war
progressed. Some of these boards were still in existence at the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, in some
form or the other. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In <st1:metricconverter productid="1950 a" w:st="on">1950 a</st1:metricconverter>
Frequency Planning Committee was formed under the Ministry of Communication
with a view to examine in detail the Draft Frequency Plan and analyse the
overall percentage of the radio spectrum space allotted to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. It
was also asked to integrate the minimum frequency requirements of all
telecommunication users in the country for presentation at the Radio
Administrative Conference to be held in September 1950 at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">the Hague</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In May 1950 the Services Communication Board met to decide on the
division of responsibility the three Services on signal matters on which
no clear cut orders existed. It was decided to constitute a sub-committee,
consisting of one member from each Service and the CAFSO, to examine and draw
up recommendations on ‘The Division of responsibility of the Three Services on
Signal matters’. The recommendations of sub-committee would be then
examined by the Services Communication Board and submitted to the Chiefs of the
Staff Committee for approval. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In June 1950 during its 38<sup>th</sup> meeting the Inter
Departmental Wireless Board noted that the Atlantic City Convention of 1947 did
not cater for any allocation to the Off Route (OR) Frequency requirements in
the VHF band of 80-20 Mcs for the use of the Indian Armed Forces and the Civil
Aviation Department. The European countries, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Australia</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Zealand</st1:place></st1:country-region> had
set aside 132-144 Mcs for the exclusive use of the ‘OR’ Services. The
Inter Departmental Wireless Board decided to allot 132-144 Mcs band for the
exclusive use of the Defence Services and the Civil Aviation Department for
ground to air working. Since WS No CN-348, then used for air to ground
communication, had the existing range of 100-118 Mcs, arrangements would be
made for the modification of this set to operate on 118-144 Mcs. <b>24</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> In <st1:metricconverter productid="1951 a" w:st="on">1951 a</st1:metricconverter> delegation of
the Services Communication Board attended the Extraordinary
Administrative Radio Conference (EARC) at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Geneva</st1:place></st1:city>.
On its return the delegation submitted its report to the Government. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> accepted
the Aeronautical Plan, the Maritime Mobile Telephony Plan and the Region III
Plan (10 Kcs – 4,000 Kcs). The Conference had decided to implement the Atlantic
City Radio Regulations progressively, spread over a period of about six
years. This would result in further congestion of the spectrum space in
‘fixed bands’, in which almost all the Army circuits were operating. The Army
would have to re-distribute the frequencies for various circuits to ensure
economical use on time/geographical sharing basis. Certain frequencies in
use would become ‘out of band’ according to new allocations and the operation
of such frequencies ‘would have to be discontinued to allow other services to
operate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">A frequency sub-committee under the auspices of the Services
Communication Board was set up to study the implications of Final Acts of
the Conference. Meetings of the sub-committee were held daily for a
period of one month, at the end of which it prepared a list of frequencies in
use by the three Services, for submission to the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). It is interesting to note that the
countries of the Soviet Block did not sign the Final Acts of the Conference and
thus reserved their right to use any frequency at any time for any
Service. This was likely to affect our radio communications because of
the fact that the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USSR</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Peoples</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Republic</st1:placetype></st1:place> of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> are quite close to our
Northern Frontiers.<b>25<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">A meeting of the Secretaries of the various Ministries
was held in March 1952 to consider the report of the Indian delegation to the
EARC. It was agreed at the meeting to set up the Radio and Cable Board
immediately, which could then set up a technical sub-committee to deal with the
work arising out of the EARC. The committee also recommended that a
committee of the Cabinet be constituted to deal with telecommunications
problems. The Cabinet Committee could be advised by the Radio and
Cable Board, composed of technical representatives of Defence, Communications,
Commerce and Industry, Natural Resources, Scientific Research and Information
and Broadcasting. All matters relating to ciphers would be excluded from
the purview of the Board. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> After prolonged discussions
between various Ministries of the Government of India, an agreement was reached
to form a Telecommunication Committee of the Cabinet as also a Radio and Cable
Board to advise the Committee on matters affecting wireless and line
communications in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The Telecommunication Committee of the Cabinet would be chaired by the
Minister for Communications and the Radio and Cable Board by the technical
representative of the Ministry of Communications. The Defence
Services were to be represented in the Cabinet Committee by the Defence
Minister and in the Radio and Cable Board by the Chairman, Joint
Communications-Electronics Committee, as the Services Communications Board was
now known. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> The Services Communications Board functioned mainly as an
advisory body to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on all signal matters. In addition the Board was charged with the
responsibility of co-ordination of all signal matters affecting more than one
Service. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in February 1952 approved the revised charter
and also agreed to the re-organisation and expansion of the Services
Communications Board in keeping with its enlarged charter of responsibilities,
which now included joint signal planning; standardisation of signal equipment;
methods and procedure; planning of wireless transmitting and receiving stations
and frequency planning. It was also felt that Services Communications Board
should be renamed as an appropriate joint committee in line with the other
advisory committees to the Chiefs of Staff e.g., Joint Planning Committee,
Joint Intelligence Committee. Accordingly the Services Communications Board
was redesignated the Joint Communications Electronics Committee (JCEC) on <st1:date day="14" month="7" w:st="on" year="1952">14 July 1952</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
three service members of the JCEC were the heads of Signals in the three
Services viz. Director of Signals, Army HQ; Director of Naval Signals, Naval
HQ; and Director of Signals Air HQ. The
service member having served longest on the committee was the chairman. Service
and civilian officers could be co-opted from other departments as necessary for
the consideration of specific matters. The secretary of the committee was a
service officer from the secretariat of the JCEC. To cope with the added
commitments, additional staff was sanctioned in January 1953 and the number of
officers increased from two to five. According to the revised establishment the
JCEC Secretariat, which was also known as the Joint Communications Electronics
Staff (JCES), would now have two lieutenant colonels/majors or equivalent, two
captains or equivalent and one scientific officer (Signals). <b>26<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> After
the return of the Indian delegation from the EARC, the Ministry of
Communications formed a new organisation known as Wireless Planning and
Co-ordination Branch directly under the Ministry to consider and implement the
decisions of the EARC. The Frequency
Sub-Committee of the Joint Communications Electronics Committee periodically
reviewed the recommendations of the Ministry of Communications with the view to
coordinate action by the three Services. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Several important developments took
place in the wake of the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. The Defence Services
Line Communication Committee (DSLCC) was sanctioned by the Government in July
1963. The secretariat for the committee was provided by a newly raised section
in the Signals Directorate (Signals 7).
The DSLCC would be responsible to plan and coordinate the requirements
of line communications for the Defence Services. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
the 1962 operations, it was revealed that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> had gathered a lot of
information by intercepting wireless links of Government agencies such the
Political Department, Police, P&T Department and the Assam Rifles. Unlike the Army, these agencies did not
follow an elaborate RT procedure and the standard of wireless discipline of
their operators was also not satisfactory.
A good deal of valuable information was, therefore, being given away by
them to neighbouring countries. At the instance of the Signals Directorate, the
Central Monitoring Agency was set up under the Ministry of Defence to detect
breaches of wireless security in the border areas and to bring them to the
notice of the Ministries concerned for remedial action. <b>27<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Tactical Communications
Committee was also formed at Army HQ with the SO-in-C as Chairman. The charter of duties of the committee was as
under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Examine General Staff Policy Statement
No 76 (revised) 1961 and recommend systems and techniques of signal
communications to be adopted in the Army; <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Examine signal communications systems of
field units and formations up to and inclusive of corps headquarters;
independent artillery and anti aircraft artillery brigade headquarters and
units; and air support signal units.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Examine cases sponsored by Directorates
at Army HQ and recommend to the most suitable type of signal equipments, scale
and establishment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Periodically review the systems,
establishment of communications, personnel and equipment of field formations
and units and recommend changes where necessary. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 22.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Recognising the urgent need to develop the electronics industry in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, an
Electronics Committee was set up by the Government in August 1963 under the
chairmanship of Dr. H. J. Bhabha. The SO-in-C was a co-opted member of
this committee, which was asked to assess the total requirements of the country
in respect of various items of electronic components and equipment; survey
the existing and potential sources of supply and to recommend how best these
could be tapped; recommend measures for the planned development of electronics,
so that the country could become self-sufficient in this field during the next
10 years and in the most economical manner. The committee submitted six
interim reports before the final report was prepared. Among the important
recommendations of the committee were the setting up of additional electronic
factories in the public sector; production in collaboration with foreign
firms; and encouragement to the private sector to undertake the production
of smaller electronic equipment and components.<b>28</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 22.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> Along with the case for creation of Central Monitoring
Organisation (CMO) in 1963, Signals Directorate had also recommended the
formation of the Communications Electronics Security Agency (CSA) and the
Communications Electronics Security Policy Committee (CSPC). However, the
formation of the CSA and CSPC was then not agreed to by the Government. In
1970, the case for creation of these two agencies was again initiated, since
the CMO, due to its limited resources, had not been able to undertake work
connected with the monitoring of microwave links and allied subjects of
important nature. The CSA would be
responsible for communications security policy, doctrine and coordination;
control of the CMO; control of clandestine radio operations; and collation,
cataloguing and dissemination of electronics intelligence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 22.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During World War II, owing to heavy
losses of ships, it had become necessary to print certain documents in India so
as to make them available for quick distribution in the Eastern Theatre and for
that purpose a section called GSI (s) was established in the Military
Intelligence Directorate. At this time, there existed a combined inter-service
Signals & Cipher Security Committee. Main instructions about the security
of Army ciphers continued to come from the War Office in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> and in
respect of Navy and Air Force ciphers from the Admiralty and the Air Ministry
respectively. After cessation of hostilities, the Joint Cipher Bureau was
formed in July 1946. In 1947, the Joint
Cipher Bureau became an inter-service and inter-departmental organization.
After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
it was decided that the Joint Cipher Bureau should remain with Ministry of
Defence. The charter of the JCB was
discussed in the 6<sup>th</sup> meeting of JCEC held on <st1:date day="4" month="8" w:st="on" year="1953">4 August 1953</st1:date>. It provided the permanent
secretariat for the Cipher Policy Committee and the Director JCB was the
chairman of the Cipher Technical Sub Committee. It was responsible for
production, supply, distribution and central accounting of crypto material. It
was also responsible for keeping existing systems under technical review and
render advice to the services on cases of loss and compromise.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The International Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR) was one of the permanent organizations of the International
Telecommunication Unit (ITU), which was set up in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Geneva</st1:place></st1:city> to maintain and extend international
cooperation for the improved and rational use of telecommunications of all
kinds. The CCIR dealt with technical and
operating questions relating specifically to radio communications. In 1970 the JCEC submitted a paper to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee recommending that since the Services were one of the
major users of radio communications in the country, they should be included in
the CCIR deliberations right from the earliest stage and adequately represented
in all future assemblies. It recommended the setting up of a National Committee
under the Wireless Advisor to the Government of India for coordinating the work
of the CCIR studies and also to systematize the programming and presentation of
the work to the concerned International Study Groups and thence to the Plenary
Assembly. The Director JCES was to be
nominated as a permanent representative on this Committee. These recommendations were approved by the
Chiefs of Staff Committee.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Amateur
Activities<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Amateur radio has been a popular
hobby ever since the invention of wireless. Known as ‘Hams’, amateur radio
enthusiasts have often rendered valuable service during natural calamities and
accidents. In <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
the hobby was quite popular not only in the military but also among civilians,
many of whom developed an interest in the activity during their visits abroad.
After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>
the growing expansion of radio amateur activity amongst the service personnel
was noted with interest and encouraged.
Besides being a modern scientific hobby it provided a means of making
service personnel more radio minded and played a part in the advancement of
technical development and research in the field of radio.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Within the first year after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> amateur
radio clubs had been formed in a number of service institutions and signal
units. These included Army HQ Signal Regiment, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>; <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>,
Mhow; Signal Training Centre, <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>; UP
Area Independent Signal Company, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>;
Southern Command Signal Regiment, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>;
Eastern Command Signal Regiment, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city>
and IMA, Dehradun. The Amateur Radio Club at Mhow progressed very rapidly and
had a membership of over 150 at that time.
It was affiliated to the IRAL, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
and to the RSGB, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">London</st1:place></st1:city>. It had its own QSL bureau and was a pioneer
in publishing a magazine devoted to radio amateur interests known as the
‘QRZ’. This magazine was designed to
cover world amateur activities as well as to give hints and tips to new comers. The club had its own building, generators, workshop
and component stores besides having a station ready to go on the air on all
amateur bands below 56 Mc/s.<b> 29<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Fortunately,
many senior officers in the Corps were themselves ardent radio amateurs and
encouraged the activities of the radio clubs<b>. </b>Some of the well<b> ‘</b>Hams’<b> </b>in Signals were Major General B.D. Kapur, Major General R.Z.
Kabraji and Brigadier P.S. Gill. The latter was responsible for setting up the
radio club in IMA, Dehradun, where he was posted as an instructor in the rank
of major in 1947. He has described his experience in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On reaching the Academy
on <st1:date day="11" month="1" w:st="on" year="1947">11th January 1947</st1:date>,
I learnt I was to replace Major (Titch) A. C. Iyappa - our senior-most Indian
Signals officer, later to become our first Indian Signal-Officer-in-Chief. He
was to soon go away on promotion (Lt Col) as Commander Signals 4th Indian
Division, to gain experience, as he put it, and to make up for lost time as POW
of the Japanese, in the war years. It must be said to his credit that despite
being offered a higher position and rank, he voluntarily chose to first command
a Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ACI was a thorough
gentleman, a natural leader and a dependable friend. He believed in (and
practiced) setting the highest example in all matters. And, this remarkable man
showed me the ropes and informed me that Signals must attract the cream of the
2nd and 3rd (Post-war) Courses of cadets, under training at the time. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There existed in those
days at Dehra Dun itself, the Signals Research & Development Establishment
under Colonel Watnam of the Royal Signals. On the Signals Net so to
speak, an idea was born - the IMA should have a Radio Club complete with a Ham
Radio Station to introduce Cadets to the exciting world of Amateur Radio. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Watnam’s boys soon put
together a 25 watt Radio Transmitter on a (wooden) Bread Board capable both of
CW (Morse) and voice using what the Radio Hams now-a-days call the Ancient
Modulation (AM), instead of Amplitude Modulation. A Dipole Antenna and a
disposals Receiver - Hillicrafters BC-342, remnant of some discarded SCR 399 -
completed the Station which could operate on 7 & 14 Mhz Ham-bands. Thus was
born the IMA Radio Club, and with it my own initiation into HAMMING. The Club,
on week-ends especially, became a hive of activity and a popular gathering place
for all and sundry. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1947, an
organization for allocating Call Signs and such like was as yet unknown. So,
after scanning the Ham Bands along with <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state>
Watnam, it was thought that call sign VU2MA was not in use and was adopted. And
soon enough, it became well known far and wide, as the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place>
Station in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Dehra Dun</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region></st1:place>.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The HAM Radio Station
VU2MA went from strength to strength. The Second Course Sword-of-Honour Cadet
(HBS Grewal) opted for the SIGNALS, and a little later, this Station received a
bigger and a better Transmitter from CSO Southern Command – Brahm Kapur (VU2HM)
- ever keen to encourage Amateur Radio. Thus over a half Century ago, I
acquired the thrilling and the most absorbing hobby of all hobbies – the
Amateur Radio</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <b>30</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1948 the Government decided to
help amateur activity in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and instructions were issued to the provincial governments to recommend fresh
licenses or renewal of licenses even if the applicant was not desirous of
conducting experiments/research. At that time there were approximately 50
licensed amateurs in the country and 20 fresh applicants. It was expected that by the end of the year <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> would
have approximately 100 amateurs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Services Club at Mhow continued
to progress. It applied for a second license to experiment on VHF facsimile,
for mobile working etc. The QRZ became a printed magazine and was considered to
be the best Ham organ in the country. The club, in adopting the activities of
RSGB, began conducting Morse training on the air on 14.1 Mc/s from 2000-2030
hours daily. The QSL Bureau was functioning well and it was hoped that a Bombay
PO Box number for the Bureau, when allotted, would greatly facilitate Indian
Hams. A new amateur call book was being compiled for <st1:place w:st="on">South
East Asia</st1:place> including dominions of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
this would be published shortly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
his stint at Dehradun, Major P.S. Gill was posted to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>, where he set up another radio club.
Describing his experiences, he writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 23.4pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Having
been bitten already by the Ham Radio bug, it was but natural to get myself a
Ham-Radio set up. Soon a BC 610 Transmitter Station (VU2KD) was installed in
Officers Mess to work the Ham-bands. It served also to retain contact with
VU2MA at the IMA <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dehra Dun</st1:place></st1:city>
and to see how it was fairing. While it was exciting contacting distant
stations overseas, it was also a lot of fun listening to all and sundry
stations that filled the air and to acquire a fairly accurate picture of who
all operated when and from where and on what frequencies. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 23.4pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One
fine morning the Signal Company Commander at Colaba Point Bombay, which formed
an integral part of SCSR reported that vast quantities of transmitters and
receivers and accessories had been washed ashore directly into its area, some
of it still in original protective packing. It seemed the departing British or
American troops had dumped at sea surplus signal equipment but had not made a
very good job of it. Around two and half wagon loads of equipment were brought
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> and,
after cleaning and minor repairs some twenty mobile half KW stations (SCR 399)
were recreated, which later in the year were to play an important role in the
Operation Polo. Apart from this, Ham Radio Clubs at the IMA Dehra Dun &
School of Signals Mhow were gifted a BC 610 transmitter each.</span></i><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">31 </span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1949 the P&T authorities permitted amateur radio clubs to send slow Morse
for practice. Until then Services personnel had to obtain a “Non-Commercial
Certificate” from the P&T Department before amateur transmitting licenses
were granted to them. The Services
Communication Board (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
sponsored a case to exempt certain qualified Services personnel from technical
and/or Morse examination. This was
accepted and it was decided that Army personnel applying for amateur
transmitting licenses will be exempted from the Morse/technical examination
provided they possess the requisite qualifications. This was an
experimental measure for one year from <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1949">1 October 1949</st1:date>. Detailed instructions in this regard were
published in Army Order 1104/49. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1962 Brigadier K.S. Gill was
appointed CSO of the newly created HQ IV Corps, which was raised after the
Chinese attack. During an earlier tenure as CSO XXXIII Corps in 1961, he has
written about his Ham activities as under:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 32.4pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Shillong,
the beautiful hill-station, turned out to be an excellent Ham Radio location -
ideal for experimentation. I remember a case of freak (VHF) reception - we
picked up Bn to Coy VHF links from nearly a thousand miles away. We gathered
from the intercepted conversations that our troops (17th Division I think) had
gone into <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> to see off the Portuguese. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With
a 60 watt Rig fed into a rotatable Cubical Quad 3 Bander Antenna there was no
dearth of contacts world-wide. The Corps Commander, Lt Gen K. Umrao Singh
-VU2US- was an ardent Ham. Then there was in Shillong’s EME Workshop, Ram
-VU2TN - <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Captain</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">TN</st1:state></st1:place> Ramakrishan, another very keen Ham. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 27.9pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
April <st1:metricconverter productid="1962, a" w:st="on">1962, a</st1:metricconverter>
DX-Expedition to AC5 Land, otherwise known as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>, led by VU2US was mounted,
with the station call sign VU2US/AC5. This Station was operated by the four of
us almost continuously for 96 hours from <st1:place w:st="on">Eastern Bhutan</st1:place>,
thus affording Radio Hams the world over a chance to bag a rare AC5 contact. My
good friend, Brigadier Rustom Kabraji -VU2BK- fondly known as KAB on the air-
and Commandant School of Signals at the time, joined us from Mhow to complete
the Team. As expected, among the World HAM Fraternity it was a major event, as
AC5 (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
had come alive on the HAM-Radio firmament after a gap of several years.</span></i><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">32</span></b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Amateur radio activity in the Army
continued to flourish and by 1964 Amateur Radio Clubs had come up in several
other establishments such as the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Artillery</st1:placename></st1:place>, Deolali; No
1, 2 and 3 Signal Training Centres and all command signal regiments.
Subsequently, the authority to conduct tests in respect of service personnel
was delegated to CSOs Command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Tactical
Communications Committee<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For
the first 15 years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
there was little change in communication philosophy and techniques. Tactical
communications followed the chain of command and were based on line, wireless
and despatch riders. At regimental level, field cable was used for line and VHF
sets for wireless. Line communications above brigade employed a mix of field
cable and permanent lines, supplemented by HF wireless sets. The Corps was also
responsible for the Signal Despatch Service (SDS), using a variety of
transport, such as jeeps and motor cycles. In inaccessible areas, aircraft,
river-craft and animal transport were also used for carrying SDS mail. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 brought to light several lacunae in the existing
tactical communications, especially in the mountains. An important event was
the formation of the Tactical Communication Committee (TCC) that was set up at
this time, largely due to the efforts of the SO-in-C, Major General R.N. Batra.
The TCC was chaired by the SO-in-C and had representatives from all important
directorates of the General Staff Branch and Heads of Arms. The first report
submitted by the committee was in regard to the signal communications for a
mountain brigade group. The report was approved by the COAS who directed that
the recommendations of the committee should be tried out in a mountain brigade
group selected for the task and that the committee should now study the signal
communications at a mountain division level. Accordingly, an exercise was
conducted in 4 Mountain Division in which the communications of a brigade group
operating in the mountains were tested. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
second meeting of the TCC was held on <st1:date day="2" month="11" w:st="on" year="1964">2 November 1964</st1:date>, during which many important decisions
were taken. The committee made detailed recommendations in respect of
communications provided by a mountain divisional signal regiment to formation
headquarters and supporting arms. A summary of the recommendations is as
follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Wireless
Communications</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">
The following should be changed over to VHF :-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Mountain Division </span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">-
Divisional command RT net (D1).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Artillery Brigade</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
- Brigade net to regiments (D5).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Mountain Brigade</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">
- Brigade forward net (B1).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Artillery Regiments</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">
- Regimental and battery nets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Divisional Engineer Regiment</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">
- Regimental and company nets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Infantry Battalions</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
- Standby sets (AN/GRC-9 or WS 62 or equivalent) provided for special roles
should be replaced by manpack VHF sets of equivalent power output (AN/PRC-25
with a booster unit or equivalent).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A pool of HF sets should also be held at
formation headquarters to provide the necessary HF back-up to cater for
occasions when VHF links may become ineffective due to abnormal dispersion or
heavy screening.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Level And Scale Of Communications<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Infantry
Battalions</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Wireless communications from
platoon headquarters to sections
are not considered necessary. Commanders of RCL, MMG and Mortar platoons
should have wireless communications and should work on the battalion
forward net. The control set of the battalion forward net should be
AN/PRC-25 with a booster unit, or equivalent. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Artillery
Regiments</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The existing system of regimental
and battery net or a combination thereof should continue. Radio-wire integration
should be provided at each battery command post and regimental
headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Engineer
Regiments</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> All wireless communications in the
regiment should be provided by the Corps of Engineers. The signal section attached from the
mountain division signal regiment would cease to exist. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Mountain
Brigade Headquarters</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The B21 net should be
eliminated, and there is also no requirement for the brigade headquarters
to be an outstation on the divisional D4 (radio telephony ‘Q’) net, since
the mobility in a mountain division is limited. One wireless set of the
same type as is used on the battalion forward net should be available for
the brigade commander to listen-in on such nets, during the interim phase
when B-1 net remains on HF. A VHF receiver should be provided in addition
to a HF receiver. Two wireless sets VM-50 or equivalent should be held at
the brigade headquarters for improvised ground-to-air communications
within the brigade. In an independent mountain brigade group, rear links
should be provided using medium power wireless sets of the VC-102 type and
a pool of four low-power HF sets should be provided for the B21 net (to
‘B’ echelon and the services). Radio-wire integration facility should be
provided at brigade headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Artillery
Brigade Headquarters</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> One low-power wireless
detachment should be included for wireless communication to the Air OP
flight. One VHF detachment should be provided for working on the
divisional command net (D1 net). No wireless detachment need be provided
for rear links to the corps artillery.
If such links are required they may be provided either from the
resources of the divisional signal regiment or from the corps. Radio-wire
integration should be provided.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Divisional
Headquarters</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Wireless sets deployed in the
headquarters should be carried in pairs as far as possible, two in each
vehicle in order to reduce the number of vehicles. The D1 (Divisional
Command RT ‘G’) net should be a VHF net.
An automatic rebroadcast detachment should be included to cater for
extended ranges. The D6 net for traffic control is essential and should be
included as a normal commitment. Two AN/PRC-25 or equivalent sets should
be authorized to the divisional signal regiment for local protection
duties. Two detachments should be provided for step up of two of the
divisional nets (D1 and D2 or D1 and D4). I Section should have three VHF
receivers and two HF receivers. One standby HF detachment should be
provided at main divisional headquarters to cater for various commitments
e.g. back-up for VHF nets, wireless communication for the services,
provision of B21 nets for brigades which are sent out on independent
roles, and so on. A wireless detachment for working on the D4 net should
be provided for the divisional maintenance area. Facilities for radio-wire
integration should be provided at both main and rear divisional
headquarters. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I
and FS Company</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A pool of five manpack HF
low-power sets should be provided for the I and FS Company for patrols, to
be manned by the company itself.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Standby
wireless sets are required to be held with units to provide immediate
replacement of faulty equipments or casualties. A scale of 16 percent of the number of
operational sets should be provided as standby equipments. Standby wireless
detachments which include both equipment and personnel should also be
provided on an adequate scale to meet special or additional
commitments. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
committee recommended that, conforming to the policy, existing wireless
sets should be replaced as indicated below:-<o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <u>Existing</u> <u>Ultimate</u> <u>Interim (until ultimate equipment
is available)<o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> WS 88A DA/PRC-261 WS P type A<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> WS 88B DA/PRC-261 WS P type B<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> WS 31 AN/PRC-25 AN/PRC-10<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> WS 62 low power SSB set AN/GRC-9, WS 62 or HM-30<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> (yet to be decided) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 216.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -144.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">WS
C 42 VHF set (AN/PRC-25 with WS C-42 can be retained <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> booster or equivalent) in certain nets<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo27; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Certain existing HF nets were
recommended to be changed over to VHF.
AN/PRC-25 with a booster unit or equivalent was recommended as the
standard VHF equipment in the mountain division for this purpose. Until this equipment becomes available, WS
C-42 was recommended for interim issue only in certain units where portability
is not vital (e.g. battery headquarters and to the rear in artillery
regiments). Where man portability is
vital, it was recommended that the nets
concerned should remain on HF using AN/GRC-9 or equivalent until the
one-manpack VHF low-power set is available (e.g. infantry battalion, mountain
brigade headquarters). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> The recommended revised basic wireless communication
layout for mountain division signal regiment is as show below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1029" type="#_x0000_t75"
style='width:443.25pt;height:376.5pt' o:ole="">
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="502" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image010.gif" v:shapes="_x0000_i1029" width="591" /><!--[endif]--></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo27; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio Relay Communications</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
Radio relay is necessary within the mountain division to provide high-capacity
communications as quickly as possible after establishment of headquarters and
before lines can be laid. Radio relay should be provided down to headquarters
of mountain brigades. All the
detachments, however, should be provided by the radio relay section of the
divisional signal regiment. The present C-41, though too bulky for mountain
warfare, will have to be retained as an interim measure, but a lighter set for
radio relay working should be found as soon as possible. The recommended
typical radio relay layout is shown below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-no-proof: yes;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1030" type="#_x0000_t75"
style='width:468pt;height:351.75pt;visibility:visible'>
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o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="469" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image012.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1030" width="624" /><!--[endif]--></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telephone</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
The scale and level of line communications provided at present was
considered adequate. However,
provision should be made for a telephone exchange specifically for the
divisional maintenance area. Line communications from company headquarters
to platoon headquarters in infantry battalions are not considered
necessary. The scale of telephones
in a mountain composite (pack) regiment should be increased so as to
provide quantity 73 telephones in the regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telegraph</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
There was a requirement of fuller phone links between mountain brigade
headquarters and infantry battalions, and between artillery brigade
headquarters and the artillery regiments. A teleprinter link was required
between divisional headquarters and each mountain brigade headquarters. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Patching
Panel</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In view of the increase in the number of
circuits in the main divisional headquarters, there is need of a patching
panel to be provided to enable testing of circuits and flexibility in the
use of equipment. This patching
panel should be capable of providing alternative switching of line, radio
relay and wireless circuits.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio-Wire
Integration</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> These facilities should be
provided at main and rear divisional headquarters, mountain brigade
headquarters, artillery brigade headquarters and artillery regiments.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Facsimile</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
In view of the advantages offered for this type of communication for
clearance of survey data, fire plans and traces, facsimile terminals could
be provided at the divisional headquarters and at mountain and artillery
brigade headquarters, and artillery regiments in the first instance.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line
Communications<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Line has always been the primary
means of tactical communications, except in mobile operations. Line
communications in field formations was usually provided by field cable laid on
the ground or slung on poles/trees. In the forward defended localities the
cable often had to be buried. In 1947, the types of field cable used were D3,
D8 and Assault No.2. Rearwards of brigade/division, carrier quad was usually
laid, especially in the plains. Sometimes, PL routes were constructed rearwards
of division and corps, in case time and resources were available. Cable in the
mountainous regions and forward areas was laid by man pack from dispenser
packs. Wherever possible, cable was laid from vehicles using ACLs. PL was constructed by line construction
sections authorised to static signal units such communication zone signal
regiments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the initial years line
construction in the border areas was carried out by the Border Roads
Organisation, based generally on their road construction programmes. Manpower for line construction tasks was
provided by Signals, in the form of line construction sections attached to each
task force of the Director General Border Roads (DGBR). The line construction programmes were worked
out in consultation with the E-in-C and the CPWD, and approved by the
Directorate of Military Operations.
These programmes were forwarded to CSOs Commands for their
recommendations of priorities for line construction, taking into account the
operational plans of the command headquarters concerned. In 1963 it was decided that the Army will be
responsible for the construction and maintenance of all PL routes in the border
areas. All regular Army line construction sections under DGBR would be reverted
to the Army HQ. All PL stores not required by DGBR would also be transferred to
the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
the period 1965-66 several PL routes were constructed in the North East where
communication infrastructure was almost non-existent. Most of these routes were
constructed by the Army, using the resources of local signal units. A large
number of PL routes were also constructed in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region> by 41 Signal Task Force
(GREF). The BOPEL scheme was also introduced, under which it was proposed to
construct PL routes in the border areas for use by Defence in the event of an
emergency.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
1971, considerable amount of PL, multi core cable and carrier quad was laid in
the Eastern Theatre in anticipation of the operations in <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place>, details of which have been given in Chapter 6. These
routes were laid by the P&T Department and signal units deployed in the
area. In addition, multi channel VHF links were hired from the P&T
Department to the projected locations from where operations were to be
launched. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signal
Despatch Service<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Before commencement of the World War II,
Signals were responsible for the delivery of important messages through the
Despatch Rider Local Service (DRLS). The carriage of mail, both official and
private, was the responsibility of the P&T Department. During the war, when
Indian formations were deployed overseas, this system had to be modified. Field
post offices were set up by the Army Postal Service (APS) for handling mail,
while the DRLS continued to be manned by Signals. After some time, even this system
was found unworkable, due to increase in volume of official mail and
considerations of security. The responsibility for carriage of official mail
was given to Signals and the Signal Despatch Service (SDS) came into being.
Depending on the mode of transport used, the sub-divisions of the service were
known as Motor Despatch Services (MDS), Air Despatch Service (ADS) or Train
Despatch Service (TDS).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At Army HQ in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, the delivery of official mail was
carried out by couriers held on the establishment of the Chief Administrative
Officer (CAO). Soon after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
this responsibility was transferred to the Signals Directorate. The Army HQ couriers held on the strength of
the CAO were transferred to Army HQ Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="1" month="9" w:st="on" year="1948">1 September 1948</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In <st1:metricconverter productid="1956 a" w:st="on">1956 a</st1:metricconverter> meeting was held in
the Ministry of Defence to consider the possibility of dispensing with the SDS
and sending all army mail through the postal channels in the interests of
national economy. The P&T
Department, when asked to state the amount of security that could be afforded
to army mail in transit, stated that no special treatment can be given to army
mail other than that which is afforded to the normal unregistered, registered
and insured mail. Maximum protection is
afforded to insured mail but in case of loss of insured mail the postal
authorities could be held responsible only for payment of the amount for which
the missing article had been insured. As
the risk involved even in the occasional loss of a security document sent
through postal channels was not acceptable, it was decided that SDS would be
retained. <b>33<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After more than ten years, the
proposal was revived. A work study team was constituted to study the system of
handling SDS and postal mail in the Army.
The team examined the possibility of establishing one agency to handle
the entire postal and SDS mail in peace as well as field areas. Based on the report of the study team it was
decided to hand over the SDS to Army Postal Service with effect from <st1:date day="1" month="7" w:st="on" year="1969">1 July 1969</st1:date>. Instructions for implementation of the scheme
were issued vide Special Army Order 21/S/69 and Army Order 213/69. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Along with the transfer of
responsibility, the terminology was also changed. Since the term SDS was well
known in the service, it was decided retain the acronym and the new service was
redesignated as Scheduled Despatch Service, which became the responsibility of
the Army Postal Service. The Despatch Rider Service (DRS) was to continue with
the Corps of Signals<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The issue of clearance of ‘live
traffic’, which was cleared by SDS under special contingencies, also had to be
resolved. With the transfer of SDS commitments to the Army Postal Service
certain precautions had to be taken by Signals to ensure speedy clearance of
live traffic. To distinguish live
traffic from other traffic envelopes containing live traffic had to be
distinctly marked “LIVE TRAFFIC”.
Detailed instructions in this regard were issued by Signals
Directorate. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After shedding the responsibility
for SDS, the Corps of Signals remained responsible for operating non-scheduled
despatch rider services forward of corps headquarters. All official mail would be cleared by SDS
with the exception of Top Secret despatches and other such despatches of
operational importance which the originators wished to send through special
couriers under their own arrangements.
If, in an emergency, it was not feasible or secure to send sealed SDS
bags through Railway Mail Service or the P&T Department, the formations
concerned would organize ad-hoc train courier service and augment the resources
of APS for running this.<b>34</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Plan
AREN<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Army Radio Engineered Network,
better known by its acronym AREN, was conceptualized by Major General R.N.
Batra, who headed the Corps of Signals during the period 1961-<st1:metricconverter productid="66. In" w:st="on">66. In</st1:metricconverter> fact, the seed was
sown in 1957-61 when he was the Military Attaché in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Washington</st1:place></st1:state> and germinated when he was the
helmsman of the Corps in 1961-66. The story of the birth of AREN is best
described in the words of its progenitor. Speaking on the occasion of the Plan
AREN commemoration on <st1:date day="11" month="10" w:st="on" year="1990">11
October 1990</st1:date>, General Batra had this to say:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">And now for a little
background on the beginning Plan AREN. I had not only been CSO Eastern and
Western Command having attended several exercises in the field, but also had
the subsequent advantage of seeing the Signals communication systems working in
the American field force, as also a two weeks course at their Signal Corps
School at Fort Monmouth whilst I was the Military and Naval Attaché in USA.
These were made possible by developing good personal relationship with Major
General Nelson, the American Chief of Signals (equivalent of our SO-in-C).
Later, as SO-in-C, I attended the Commonwealth SO's-in-C conferences in 1962
and <st1:metricconverter productid="1964 in" w:st="on">1964 in</st1:metricconverter>
the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
On both these occasions the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
SO's-in-C were my old friends from pre-World War II days in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. On one
of these visits, I not only spent a few days with the British corps
headquarters in Europe, namely the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR), to study
their Signals communications within their corps, but got a good briefing from
the Commandant of their Signals School at Catterick Camp on their future
thinking with regard to Signals communications in the field. It became apparent
that both in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
they were not only depending on secure
radio relay, but also going in for digital techniques. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With this background, and having
studied the limitations of linear Signals communication system in India with
its good and weak points, and also realising that in the event of war our Armed
Forces would basically either remain within our own territory, or at best
exploit success to about a <st1:metricconverter productid="100 miles" w:st="on">100
miles</st1:metricconverter> or so within enemy territory, I came to the conclusion that we too must plan
out future Signals communications within each corps on the basis of secure
radio relay systems but on an interconnected area grid system covering roughly
100 x <st1:metricconverter productid="100 miles" w:st="on">100 miles</st1:metricconverter>,
each terminating at a nodal point, using computer controlled digital automatic
electronic switch (AES). Divisional headquarters and brigade headquarters could
then hook onto the nearest such nodal point. There were of course to be
additional radio relay and AES terminals to meet the need of movements forward
or backwards. This system should enable us to give each crucial appointment a
fixed number, and no matter where he moved within the corps area, he could
receive speech, teleprinter, FAX and data communications automatically.</span></i><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">35</span></b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Commonwealth Military Communications Electronics
Conference was held biannually in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United Kingdom</st1:place></st1:country-region> to discuss mutually
the current and future problems connected with the communication electronics
activities of the three services of the various Commonwealth countries during
the Sixties. The 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>
meetings held in August/September 1962 and
September <st1:metricconverter productid="1964 in" w:st="on">1964 in</st1:metricconverter>
London were attended by the SO-in-C who was also the Chairman, Joint
Communication Electronics Committee (JCEC) at that time, as the head of the
Indian delegation. On his return from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1964, the
SO-in-C quickly assembled a team of officers, to give concrete shape to his ideas.
Apart from Brigadier I.D. Verma, the Brigadier Signals Staff, and Colonel K.S.
Garewal (later replaced by Colonel Harchand Singh), the Deputy Director
Telecommunications, the team included Lieutenant Colonels M.S. Sodhi, J.
Mayadas, M.B. Hart and S.L. Juneja; and Majors R.K. Gupte, B.S. Paintal, M.K.
Ghosh, M.C. Rawat and Sushil Nath. (Four of them - Verma, Garewal, Sodhi and
Ghosh - rose to the rank of lieutenant general, and became SOs-in-C, while the
others - except for Dick Hart who retired prematurely - became major generals).
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 24.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> Recalling
his experiences as a GSO1 in Signal Directorate in 1964-66, Major General J.
Mayadas wrote:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 24.0pt; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> <i>It was
in March 1964, I think, that Raj attended Mountbatten’s conference in UK on the
new PTARMIGAN concept (area grid communications). On his return his enthusiasm
was boundless. He quickly assembled a
planning team (Gary, Dick Hart, Lall Juneja, myself and others) to
listen to his concepts of the combat zone and communication zones of the
future, and to translate all this into block schematic communication
(radio/line/RR etc) diagrams; translate all this into the 10 mountain divisions
that were to be raised; come up with many answers to questions regarding
equipment backing, how many communication zone signal regiments would be
required to support the new field formations (12 eventually I think); how many
new training centres to provide manpower (initially two more); select/nominate
development and production agencies for the hardware; start costing exercise
and so on. Plan AREN had arrived and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> Patil joined the planning
team. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 24.0pt; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> From then on it was a frenzied process, till
the 1965 Pak war started. After the dust settled we were off again and AREN
became the buzzword in the Army. There were monthly presentations – Raj’s
enthusiasm and courage of conviction slowly brushed off on everyone, including
General Chaudhuri and the Financial Adviser.</span></i><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">35</span></b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 24.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> The
new communication system conceived by General Batra was named AREN, which is an
acronym for Army Radio Engineered Network. It sounded as 'RN', which were the
two initials of his name. Batra’s ardour
and conviction were infectious, and with his persuasive skills he was able to
convince General J.N. Chaudhuri, the Army Chief. In late 1965, he made the
first formal presentation of Plan AREN to the Army Chief, the Army Commanders
and Principal Staff Officers. Their response was heartening, and Batra knew
that he had won the first round. His grasp of fundamentals, and their
application in the field of combat communications, coupled with his domineering
personality, convinced those who mattered in South and North Blocks that Plan
AREN was essential, at any reasonable cost. Once this was achieved, it was easy
to justify the associated raisings, and the funding for the project. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
general philosophy guiding the Plan AREN system of communication was as
follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Voice communication will be the basic
medium of two way traffic.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Traffic, for the purposes of record,
will be cleared over teleprinter, facsimile and computer data channels. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commanders will also be provided
communication on move.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Step ups will be provided to ensure no
break in communications.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">All communications will be integrated
and cryptographically secure.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 54.0pt; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The communications system will be
reliable, effective, highly survivable, quick to establish, capable of handling
large volume of traffic with speedy clearance, multi axial in nature and with
longer ranges.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
system was to consist of a network of communication centres/nodes inter
connected by multi channel radio relay and forming a communication overlay
covering the whole of the corps operational zone. Direct trunk dialling would be provided for
both static subscribers at headquarters and mobile subscribers, throughout the
combat zone. There could be 15 to 30
communication nodes. The formation of the grid network would depend on the
operational situation of the corps. A
typical diagram, depicting area grid system of communications for a division,
is given below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1031" type="#_x0000_t75"
style='width:424.5pt;height:489pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image013.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="652" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image014.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1031" width="566" /><!--[endif]--></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The fifth meeting of Tactical
Communication Committee (TCC) held on <st1:date day="18" month="8" w:st="on" year="1967">18 August 1967</st1:date> discussed the future concepts of integrated
signal communications for the field force in the post 1976 period. The entire range of the equipment was to be
developed and manufactured indigenously.
The report conceived that the futuristic signal communications must be
quick to establish, reliable and secure with survivability and high traffic
handling capacity and should provide longer ranges with improved and lighter
equipment. The General Staff Policy
Statement No 76, Issue No 3, was issued during December 1968. To implement the
AREN project speedily, a Steering Committee was formed during November, 1969 to
lay down major policies and speed up the developmental efforts. To assist the Steering Committee in the
implementation of the Plan, a Project Management Organisation (PMO) was
sanctioned during November 1971. The
first Project Director was Brigadier N.A. Patil. The paper on Plan AREN was
cleared by the Steering Committee on 1 November1971 and subsequently by the
Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet (CCPA) on <st1:date day="25" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">25 November 1971</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There
is an interesting anecdote connected with the presentation of the paper to the
Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet which was chaired by the Prime
Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The
SO-in-C, Lieutenant General E.G. Pettengell, was required to brief the Chief of
the Army Staff, General Sam Manekshaw about the salient features of Plan AREN,
before the meeting took place. Due to
certain pre-occupations the Chief could not find time to get the detailed
briefing. He asked the SO-in-C to brief him during their ride in his car from
his office to the Parliament House, where the CCPA meeting was to be held. It is believed that the Cabinet was so impressed
by the projected plan that sanction was accorded immediately. However, while conveying the sanction, the
Prime Minister wondered why the Army was content to have a brigadier heading
such an important organization which was responsible for implementing such a
modernistic plan of large proportions.
The Chief is supposed to have remarked that Brigadier Patil was the
ideal man for the job and they were temporarily accepting a brigadier as he was
not yet due for his promotion!<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <b><u>Electronic
Data Processing Systems (EDPS)<o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; tab-stops: list 27.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As in many other countries, when
computers started to be used in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
they were considered to be a tool for statistical purposes. The systems dealing
with computers were called EDPS (Electronic Data Processing System) or at times
ADPS (Automatic Data Processing System). In the 1950’s a major project was set
up that marked the birth of EDPS in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This was the National Centre
for Software Development and Computing Techniques at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> under Prof. R. Narasimhan and his team
from the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) which took up high level
software development projects. The national entry of computers in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> was the
pioneering design of the TIFR pilot machine (1955) and TIFRAC automatic
computer (1957) with ferrite memory 2048 words (40 Bits), single address, the
state of art system at that time! They
were designed from scratch by Prof. R. Narasimhan, the doyen of computer
development in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
and built by a team of six at the TIFR.
The first computer in the Ministry of Defence was established at the
Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) in 1962 and was devoted to
significantly the first of the defence computer applications during the War,
working at range tables for weapon systems!
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Use of EDPS and computers for the
Indian army was conceived in early 1960’s by the Corps of Signals. The Army
Headquarters EDP Steering Committee was formed with the SO-in-C as the Chairman
in January 1964, to examine the need for introduction of EDPS in the Army both
for static and field applications. The committee was also asked to submit
recommendations with regard to the progressive introduction of these systems
and the agency that should be made responsible for their detailed study,
planning, coordination, installation and operation. Four project teams were set up to carry out
feasibility studies to uncover EDP prone areas in Military Secretary’s,
Adjutant General’s and Master General of Ordnance’s branches and to develop an
integrated system for Army HQ. EDPS trained signal officers were positioned
with the first two branches to assist in these studies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
This Steering Committee submitted its first
report in May 1964 and among its more prominent recommendations was one which
in effect urged the Government to accept EDPS as a tool of management in the
Army. The COAS approved the following recommendations of the Steering
Committee:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo24; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Introduction of EDPS is essential to
process data relating to administrative and logistical support operations in
the Army.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo24; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps of Signals should be made
responsible for detailed study, planning and coordination of the EDPS.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo24; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Government approval in principle should
be obtained to the implementation of Phase I of the EDPS plan which envisaged
installation of punch card equipment at Central Ordnance Depot, Delhi and of
electronic computer system at Army HQ.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Defence
Minister’s Inter Services Committee established the EDP Advisory Group in July
1965 to look into the total requirements of the Services for use of EDP as a
tool for decision making at all levels.
A study group was formed under the chairmanship of Dr S. Bhagavantam,
the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, to examine the introduction of
EDPS in the Defence Services. The SO-
in-C was the Army member of the study group, which had representatives from the
other two Services and the Ministry of Defence. Lieutenant Colonel A.
Balasubrahmanian (Signals) was the Technical Secretary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
first meeting of the study group held on <st1:date day="20" month="2" w:st="on" year="1967">20 February 1967</st1:date> took a number of major
decisions. It was generally agreed that
the programme of automation should be undertaken Service-wise. Detailed studies
should be instituted by each Service for the examination of the use of
computers for command and control applications, and nucleus cells should be
created in each Service HQ to guide the conduct of these studies. For the
obvious inventory control and personnel management functions, a sub-committee
consisting of Lieutenant Colonel A. Balasubrahmanian, Principal Scientific
Officer and Chief Statistical Officer, Army Statistical Organisation was formed
to assess the load that would be generated by the three Services in terms of
computer hours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During those days only main frame
computers were available, which required centralized facilities called computer
centres. It was essential for one agency to manage them efficiently. Also in a
large organization like the Army, in order that the EDP systems could be used
by various users and data base shared by them efficiently, it was imperative
that all planning and development took place on an integrated basis. With this
end in view, the Chief of Army Staff entrusted the SO-in-C with the
responsibility of developing EDPS in the Army. The choice was apt because the
basic vehicle for integration of an EDP system is efficient communications. Without a data communication network to
interconnect the various EDP centres, it would not be possible to share the
computing power and the same updated data base by systems of various
branches/directorates and echelons of headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Based
on the decision taken at the first meeting of the EDPS Study Group, a nucleus
cell for EDPS was formed at Signals Directorate on <st1:date day="1" month="4" w:st="on" year="1967">1 April 1967</st1:date>. Lieutenant Colonel (later Major
General) B. S. Paintal, who had attended a course at Fort Monmouth in USA, was
the first GSO1 of Signals 9, as the cell was designated. With his vision and
dynamism, planning in all aspects of EDP including formal training of manpower
was taken up with vigour.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
The second meeting of the EDPS Study Group held on <st1:date day="6" month="5" w:st="on" year="1967">6 May 1967</st1:date> recommended that the
Honeywell computers being installed in the computer centre of the Department of
Statistics, Cabinet Secretariat, be hired to handle workloads of the three
Service Headquarters. Also, that the Government accept, in principle, EDPS as a
tool of management and the proposals of
the three Services for staff to conduct systems analysis to extend the
application of EDPS into as many areas as is necessary; and that the training
facilities for EDPS which are currently available be explored for arranging defence oriented
courses. The Government computer centre was inaugurated at RK Puram, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="9" month="11" w:st="on" year="1967">9 November 1967</st1:date>. Two
Honeywell computer systems were operational and two more were installed shortly
afterwards. Out of the four computers, one was allocated for defence users,
which included one for the Army, one for the Joint Cipher Bureau (JCB) and two
for other Government users. <b>37</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Army’s integrated EDP Plan
(1969-78) was conceived in 1968. It visualized the use of computers for
management information systems (MIS), command and control, fire control and war
gaming. To ensure that information was timely, up-to-date and accurate, a data
communication network interlinking static computers was also proposed. For
field applications, use of area grid system part of Plan AREN was
envisaged. The integrated data plan
also took note of the need for building up in house training capability in EDPS
as also training of officers abroad and with civil institutes within the country.
The plan was formally approved by the Army HQ EDPS Steering Committee on <st1:date day="30" month="11" w:st="on" year="1970">30 November 1970</st1:date> and by
the Ministry of Defence Advisory Group in June 1972.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -4.5pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A
top down philosophy for automation of management information systems at various
headquarters was adopted. Accordingly, the process of automation was to
commence at Army HQ and then percolate downwards to commands and lower
headquarters. As a result, the Army HQ EDP Centre was raised with effect from <st1:date day="18" month="9" w:st="on" year="1969">18 September 1969</st1:date>, to
automate functions at Army HQ. It comprised staff for systems development,
operation of a computer system and data preparation. Lieutenant Colonel V. M.
Sundaram had the privilege of raising the computer centre. He also had the
unique distinction of commanding it in successive ranks as a lieutenant
colonel, colonel and brigadier. It was due to his foresight, meticulous
planning and dedication that this organization was able to develop a number of
systems and provide excellent support to the staff, both during peace and war.
Initially, the Honeywell 400 system installed in RK Puram, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> by Government of India was used. An
ICL 1904 computer system, a second generation computer, was later installed in
Signals Enclave, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
for exclusive use of the Army. This computer became operational in mid - 1971. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The first MIS system was developed for
Military Secretary’s branch for officers management, dealing with promotion
boards; panels for various foreign postings and courses; and important
appointments and courses in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Initially, records of only officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and below
were computerized. Subsequently, records of senior officers up to the rank of
major general were automated. The initial team of signal officers under Colonel
Sundaram comprised Major Ganga Prasad and Major Purshotam Singh, who were
commended by the Chief of the Army Staff for their pioneering work in the EDP
field. Subsequently, a number of other important applications were automated,
ranging from grant of honorary commissions to JCOs/OR on Republic Day, conduct
of entrance examinations for entry into the Armed Forces Medical College,
system of issue and release of soft – skinned vehicles and controlled stores,
and relief programmes of infantry and artillery units.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; tab-stops: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Some special applications were automated at
short notice during the 1971 Indo – Pak war. The EDP centre was urgently tasked
to compile the lists of Pakistani POW and detainees held at the end of the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>
operations. HQ Central Command had attempted to undertake the task manually,
but the lists were full of errors and suspect. The EDP Centre took on the task
on war footing. Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Kahlon was made responsible for data
creation and Lieutenant Colonel Inderjit Singh entrusted with report
generation. Nearly one lakh (hundred thousand) records were created within four
days using over sixty punch card machines and staff available with all
government agencies including statistical organizations of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. System software
was used to delete duplicates and create turn around documents by trips to
camps/detention centres for verification. These were taken under arrangements
of Adjutant General’s branch by road/rail and air to concerned locations and
updated and authenticated lists brought back within two days. The magnetic
files were updated and the manpower group generated the first authenticated
lists of nearly two thousand POW/detainees within a day, as they had written
and tested the programmes while data authentication and creation was on. The
assignment was completed within a week. A battle casualties report generation
system was also developed for the Adjutant Generals branch. The commandant and
staff of EDP centre were highly commended by the Adjutant General and SO-in-C
for completing these assignments so speedily and accurately.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
addition to setting up the Army HQ EDP Centre, a number of pilot projects and study teams were sanctioned
during the period 1969 to 1971 to examine the feasibility of automating other
applications. These included a pilot punch card machine project for Signals
Records, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>
sanctioned on <st1:date day="18" month="9" w:st="on" year="1967">18 September
1967</st1:date>, which was later upgraded to a computer based system, a pilot
project for Central Ordnance Depot, Delhi Cantonment, automation of Infantry
records office functions and feasibility study team for HQ Technical Group EME.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -9.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Corps did significant work in EDP field and many signal officers received
recognition at the national level. Brigadier V.M. Sundaram, the first
commandant of the Army HQ EDP Centre later became the President of Computer
Society of India. He was also the chairman of the expert committee for
government computerisation ordered by the Department of Electronics at the
express wish of the Public Accounts Committee. Major General A.
Balasubrahmanian, AVSM was the technical secretary of the Ministry of Defence
advisory group on EDP from 1966 onwards. During the years 1972-79 he functioned
as officer on special duty (computers) in the then newly set up Department of
Electronics. He was the founder secretary and president of the Computer Society
of India, the principal professional body of computer experts in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and was
also <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
representative in International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP).
Lieutenant Colonel S. K. Mair and Major C. L. Anand were selected for
deputation with the External Affairs Ministry for automating the functions of
the supply wing at the High Commission of India in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">London</st1:place></st1:city>.
Major R. Thiagarajan was one of the first to undergo computer training
at the Statistical Research Institute, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.
He did pioneering work for National Informatics Centre (NIC), the Planning
Commission, various universities and departments. He became an internationally
recognized personality in IT field and toured many countries giving talks and
participating in seminars and so on. The
Corps can justifiably be proud of introducing EDPS in the Army, seeing it
through the gestation period, nurturing it in its infancy and bringing it to
the present stage. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 40.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The story of developments in signal
communications and equipment during the period 1947-72 is in essence the story
of the growth of the Corps of Signals.
During the first twenty five years of its existence as a fully
Indianised force, the Corps literally grew from childhood to manhood. The rapid technological advancements in the
field of electronics resulted in radical changes in the type of equipment in
the inventory of the Corps. Thermionic valves were replaced by transistors,
leading to increased sophistication and miniaturization. The use of single side
band and the exploitation of higher frequency bands had considerably enhanced
the coverage of the radio frequency spectrum. Improved techniques in carrier
telephony had augmented the availability of telephone and telegraph circuits on
the available lines and radio links. Automatic exchanges had replaced manual
switchboards and lighter and stronger cable had made the task of laying lines
in forward areas easier. Similar advancements had been made in power equipment
such as generators, charging sets and batteries.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Perhaps
the most significant change was the introduction of radio relay, which combined
the advantages of both radio and line. It gave communication planners greater
flexibility in rendering communication support to field formations, which were
able to get reliable telephone and telegraph circuits as soon as they arrived
at a new location. It also led to the birth of revolutionary concepts like Plan
AREN, which promised to provide commanders and staff a degree of flexibility
unimaginable in the past. The decision to switch over from HF to VHF in radio
links in field formations enhanced reliability and survivability of radio
communications, which were earlier prone to interference from climatic
conditions and diurnal changes in the stratosphere. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Between
1947 and 1972 the Indian Army fought four major wars - the Jammu & Kashmir
operation in 1947-49; the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962; the Indo Pak war in
1965; and the war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1971 that resulted in the liberation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>. As would be apparent
from the detailed accounts of these operations, developments in signal
communications and equipment was a major factor that affected the final
outcome. The most radical changes occurred during the early 1960’s after the
debacle in 1962. It was primarily to these far-reaching measures that he Corps
acquitted itself with credit in 1965 and 1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-IN;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 11<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 18.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
chapter is based mainly on the Corps of Signals Planning/Liaison Notes for the
period 1948-57 and 1963-72; General Staff Policy Statement No. 76 of <st1:date day="18" month="3" w:st="on" year="1955">18 March 1955</st1:date> and No. 76
(Revised) of <st1:date day="22" month="5" w:st="on" year="1961">22 May 1961</st1:date>;
and personal inputs from officers. Specific references are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo9; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">GHQ (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>) Letter No. 29175/Sigs (5) of
<st1:date day="24" month="5" w:st="on" year="1944">24 May 1944</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="2" style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo9;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General Staff Policy Statement
No. 76 – Signal Equipment, issued on <st1:date day="18" month="3" w:st="on" year="1955">18 March 1955</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo9;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General Staff Policy Statement
No 76 (Revised), issued on <st1:date day="22" month="5" w:st="on" year="1961">22
May 1961</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<ol start="4" style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo10; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps of
Signals Liaison Note No 11 of July 1949. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo10; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps of
Signals Liaison Note No 95 of December 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">6. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 32 OF January
1955. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">7. </span><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals
Liaison Note No 81 of August 1968. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="8" style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 23 of July 1952. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 76 of July 1967. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">10.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 71 of May 1966. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="11" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 13 of
January 1950 <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 64 of
October 1963. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 90 of
December 1970 <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">14.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 96 of April 1972 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="15" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 62 of
April 1963<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 79 of
March 1968<o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">17.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 34 of July 1955 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">18.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 80 of May 1968<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">19.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 62 of March 1963. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">20.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 15 of July 1950.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="21" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 3 of
March 1948. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No
40 of January 1957. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No
95 of December 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">24.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 15 of July 1950. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">25.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB"> Corps of Signals
Liaison Note No 22 of April 1952. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="26" style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 24 of
January 1953. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No
64 of October 1963. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">28.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB"> Corps of Signals
Liaison Note No 66 of April 1964. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 5.0pt; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB">29.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB"> Corps of Signals Liaison
Note No 6 of August 1948. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="30" style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-outline-level: 1;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Brigadier P.S. Gill, ‘</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-font-kerning: 18.0pt;">Tales from HAM Radio –
1 </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">(IMA Dehra Dun -1947)’, <i>The Signalman,
</i>January 2001. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Brigadier P.S. Gill, ‘</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-font-kerning: 18.0pt;">Tales from HAM Radio –
2 </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">(<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
1948<b>)</b>’, <i>The
Signalman,</i></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> May 2001.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Brigadier P.S. Gill, ‘</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-font-kerning: 18.0pt;">Tales from HAM Radio –
3 </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">(Shillong & Tezpur 1962)’, <i>The Signalman</i>-
September 2001</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No 37
of April 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No
88 of May 1970. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">35.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Extract from speech of Lt Gen R.N. Batra
(Retd) on the occasion of the Plan AREN commemoration, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:date day="11" month="10" w:st="on" year="1990">11 October 1990</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">36.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Extract
from letter dated <st1:date day="22" month="4" w:st="on" year="1996">22 April
1996</st1:date> from Maj. Gen. J. Mayadas to Maj. Gen. Prakash Gokarn, giving
inputs for proposed biography of Lt. Gen. R.N. Batra. (Mayadas and Batra were
both Cottonians - alumni of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Bishop</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Cotton</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
Simla - though there was a seven year age difference between them). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ol start="37" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo11; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No
79 of March 1968. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
</h6>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-46837632439135477872016-01-16T07:24:00.003-08:002016-01-16T07:24:35.443-08:00CHAPTER 10 - TRAINING<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt;">CHAPTER 10 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt;">TRAINING<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 54.9pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Preview</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">. TRAINING OF OFFICERS
: <i>The School of Signals/MCTE – Young Officers Course – Technical Courses –
Refresher & Functional Course s– Foreign Courses (Officers) – EDPS Courses –
Cipher Courses</i>. TRAINING OF JUNIOR COMMISSIONED OFFICERS & OTHER RANKS :
<i>No. 1 Signal Training Centre – Foreman of Signals Course – Recruits Training
– Upgrading & Remustering Courses – Foreign Courses (JCOs and NCOs) – No. 2 Signal
Training Centre – Boys Regiment</i>. CONCLUSION. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Preview<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
was set up in Mhow in October 1946 primarily to train officers, though it also
provided specialised training to JCOs and OR of cipher and workshop categories.
In August 1947 the School was partitioned, with one third of its assets going
to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Soon after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>
it was redesignated as the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>. Later, the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> was moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> to Mhow and
amalgamated with the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>. Apart from
training officers, the School sometimes provided pre-commission training to
cadets, who were subsequently granted regular, temporary, or emergency
commissions on passing out. This happened in the early years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> (1947-50)
and again in 1963, after the Sino Indian conflict. In 1967 the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> was redesignated as the Military
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">college</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Telecommunication Engineering</st1:placename></st1:place> (MCTE), in
keeping with the advanced technical training being imparted therein.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Signal Training Centre was established at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
(now <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>)
in 1921 after reorganisation of the Signals Service Depot that had moved there
a year earlier form <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Wellington</st1:place></st1:city>.
For many years, this was the only institution where personnel of Signals were
trained. During World War II additional training centres were raised but these
were disbanded when the war ended. Of the two centres in existence at the time
of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city> and
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>, the
latter was closed and its assets transferred to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This left only the STC at
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city> where
all training of Signals personnel was carried out until 1963, when two
additional centres were raised, <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>. In 1967, the second centre located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city> (3 STC) was
disbanded. This left only two centres –
1 STC at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>
and 2 STC at <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
STCs are responsible for providing basic training to recruits and technical
training to all categories of tradesmen, except ciphers. It also conducts
re-mustering and conversion courses for OR, as well as refresher and functional
courses for JCOs. The Signals Records, Depot and Boys Regiment form part of 1
STC. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The growth of the major training
institutions of the Corps - MCTE and STCs – is covered in this chapter. Details
of major courses conducted in these institutions from 1947 to 1972 have also
been dealt with. Courses conducted abroad and in other institutions have been
mentioned briefly. Some details about Signals Records, Depot and Boys Regiment
have also been given, though these do not strictly fall with the definition of
training. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoTitle" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">TRAINING
OF OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The School of Signals/MCTE<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">During World War II,
several establishments were created to train officers of the Indian Signal
Corps. These were the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Telecommunication</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>; the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Communication</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Security</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
(Ciphers) at Mhow; the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Inter-Communication</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> at Mhow and the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Officers</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Training School</st1:placetype></st1:place>, which
was part of the Signal Training Centre (British) at Mhow. After the war, these
institutions were disbanded and their functions taken over by the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Corps</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
which was established at Mhow on <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1946">1 October 1946</st1:date>, with Lieutenant Colonel H.L. Lewis, Royal
Signals, as the first Commandant. The
original charter of the school included training of officers commissioned into
Signals after passing out from the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place>;
cipher training; higher signal training, both technical and tactical, of all
ranks; experiments and trials of new equipment and refresher courses for senior
signal officers. The establishment of the school included a headquarters and
four squadrons - HQ, 1, 2 and 3. The
Commandant (lieutenant colonel) was assisted by the Chief Instructor (major)
and the Adjutant (captain). The squadrons were commanded by officers of the
rank of major. Subsequently, in March
1947, the squadrons were re-designated as companies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the time of Partition, the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
was also split, with one third of its assets going to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The
Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel H.L. Lewis opted to go with Pakistan Signals and
left on <st1:date day="27" month="10" w:st="on" year="1947">27 October 1947</st1:date>,
handing over to the Deputy Commandant, Major I.D. Verma, who was promoted
lieutenant colonel, taking over as Officiating Commandant. On <st1:date day="26" month="6" w:st="on" year="1948">26 June 1948</st1:date> the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
was redesignated as the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>. The
organisation of the school at that time was as shown below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</span>Commandant (Lt Col)<span style='mso-tab-count:3'> </span>
<span style='mso-tab-count:2'> </span><span
style='mso-tab-count:2'> </span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Chief Instructor (Maj)<span
style='mso-tab-count:2'> </span><span
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<span lang=EN-GB style='font-size:11.5pt;mso-bidi-font-size:
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<span lang=EN-GB style='font-size:11.5pt;mso-bidi-font-size:
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</span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<br clear="ALL" />
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<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td height="47" style="vertical-align: top;" width="160"><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso]--><span style="left: 0pt; mso-ignore: vglayout; position: absolute; z-index: 251649024;">
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 115%;">No 3 Sqn <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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</tbody></table>
</span><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso & !vml]--> <!--[endif]--><!--[if !vml]--></td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
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<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td height="47" style="vertical-align: top;" width="164"><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso]--><span style="left: 0pt; mso-ignore: vglayout; position: absolute; z-index: 251648000;">
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="width: 100%px;">
<tbody>
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<td><!--[endif]-->
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 115%;">No 2 Sqn <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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</tr>
</tbody></table>
</span><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso & !vml]--> <!--[endif]--><!--[if !vml]--></td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
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<span style="height: 47px; left: 0px; margin-left: 296px; margin-top: 20px; mso-ignore: vglayout; position: absolute; width: 164px; z-index: 251648000;">
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<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td height="47" style="vertical-align: top;" width="156"><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso]--><span style="left: 0pt; mso-ignore: vglayout; position: absolute; z-index: 251646976;">
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 115%;">No 1 Sqn <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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</span><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso & !vml]--> <!--[endif]--><!--[if !vml]--></td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
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</span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td height="47" style="vertical-align: top;" width="148"><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso]--><span style="left: 0pt; mso-ignore: vglayout; position: absolute; z-index: 251645952;">
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<td><!--[endif]-->
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 11.5pt; line-height: 115%;">HQ Sqn <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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</tr>
</tbody></table>
</span><!--[endif]--><!--[if !mso & !vml]--> <!--[endif]--><!--[if !vml]--></td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The HQ Squadron was designed to
provide administrative and logistic cover for the school; No. 1 Squadron was
responsible for the training of young officers; No. 2 Squadron conducted
training in wireless and line subjects and No. 3 Squadron was responsible for
training of cipher personnel. All squadrons were commanded by majors. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It was soon realised that existing
organization was inadequate to meet the increasing commitments which the school
was being called upon to undertake. In August 1949, the establishment was revised.
Squadrons were redesignated as companies, of which a large number were created.
These were grouped under two wings, responsible for basic and advanced training
respectively. </span><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:line id="_x0000_s1039" style='position:absolute;
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
reorganization provided for a separate demonstration section, a pamphlets and
translation section and a methods section which were under the school
headquarters. The wing commanders of No. 1 and 2 Wings were upgraded to
lieutenant colonel on <st1:date day="1" month="4" w:st="on" year="1951">1 April
1951</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
July 1953 the establishment was again revised. The <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>, which had moved
from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> to
Mhow in September 1952 and was functioning as an independent entity until then,
was merged with <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, becoming No 3
(All Arms) Wing. Another feature of the
reorganization was that all aspects of training were brought under the Deputy
Commandant, who also became the Chief Instructor. Hitherto, the wings had been responsible for
their own administration. This function now became the responsibility of the
Administrative Wing, leaving the instructional staff free to deal solely with
training without being burdened with administrative duties of their Wings. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By the end of the decade it became evident
that the increased training commitments of the school necessitated another
review of the establishment in order to maintain the instructional and
administrative efficiency of the organisation. A new organization was therefore
proposed with a view to provide a more appropriate rank structure to the
faculty and administrative staff commensurate with their responsibilities and
duties; overcome the inadequacy of administrative staff; and reduce the load on
instructors. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The salient features of the revised
establishment implemented in 1961 were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l31 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Commandant was
upgraded to the rank of brigadier.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l31 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No. 1 and 2 Wings were
re-designated as Tactical and Technical Wings.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l31 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cipher Company which
previously formed a part of No. 2 Wing was organized as a separate wing under a lieutenant
colonel/major.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l31 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No. 3 Wing was
re-designated as All Arms Wing under a lieutenant colonel. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
establishment sanctioned in 1961 once again proved inadequate to meet the
increasing commitments of training and administration of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>. Two ad hoc increments were sanctioned in 1962
and 1963. The second increment was
sanctioned basically to meet the training commitments of officers granted
emergency commissions that were introduced in the aftermath of the 1962 war
with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The Cadets Wing had to be established on an impromptu basis to train the large
number of cadets who began arriving from the IMA and OTSs at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> even before completing their cadet
training. On <st1:date day="30" month="6" w:st="on" year="1963">30 June 1963</st1:date>
a total of 140 officers were commissioned directly from the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>,
including 55 emergency commissioned officers. There was a sudden increase in
the number of courses being run for young officers, with no less than 16 such
courses being conducted during the next two years. Since these officers had
undergone only a truncated version of the YOs course, a large number of short
courses were started to enable them to fill specific appointments in
units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another
major development was the creation of the Advisory Board for the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> in July 1965, on the pattern of
the one that already existed for the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Military Engineering</st1:placename></st1:place>
in Kirkee. The board was chaired by the Scientific Adviser to the Defence
Minister and had representatives from several government departments,
universities, engineering colleges and professional institutions. The task of
the Advisory Board was to make recommendations relating to the syllabus,
equipment and method of instruction; receive and discuss the annual reports on
the progress made by the school; periodically review the functioning of the
school and recommend areas of expansion as well as those for induction of new
activities. It also reviewed the budget estimates including various grants
pertaining to the school. During its first meeting held in January 1966 the
Advisory Board recommended the adoption of the three years degree engineering
course, which had also been recommended by the Advisory Board of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Military Engineering</st1:placename></st1:place> in 1963. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As
a result of the large scale expansion and reorganisation programme undertaken
in the wake of the 1962 war, the strength of the Corps more than doubled,
increasing from 1000 officers and 27,000 JCOs/OR in 1962 to 2500 officers and
62,000 JCOs/OR in 1966. Besides this
increase the Corps had undergone a process of modernization. Both these factors increased the training
commitments of the School. On <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1967">1
October 1967</st1:date> the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> was
re-designated as the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering (MCTE)
in keeping with the advanced technical training of degree and post-degree
levels being imparted to the officers, JCOs and OR of the Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1968 the establishment of the
MCTE was once again revised. The salient
points of this revision were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Technical and
Tactical Wings were redesignated as Faculty of Communication Engineering (FCE)
and Faculty of Combat Communications (FCC) under colonels as faculty commanders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Demonstration
Brigade Signal Company was placed under FCC.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Technical
Maintenance & Technical Administration (TM & TA) Wing was made responsible for the technical
maintenance of all equipment in the college and design and production of training aids.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Equipment and
Quartermaster Wing was created to centralize all aspects of quartermaster
duties both technical and general.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">REVISED
ESTABLISHMENT OF MCTE (1968)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Training
in electronic data processing systems (EDPS) which was earlier being conducted
at the Government Computer Centre, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, was decided to be carried out in MCTE. The third meeting of the Advisory Board for
the College which was held in 1969 recommended the creation of a separate
computer wing for the college. The
Computer Wing, sanctioned as an increment to the existing establishment of the
college in June 1971, was designed to run courses on programming and system
analysis for the officers of all arms and services. The wing was commanded by a lieutenant
colonel. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
the 1971 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
it was decided to suspend all courses of instruction at the College, so that
units involved in the operation were up to full strength. However, since the
war lasted for just two weeks, most of the students reached their units towards
the middle of December, just a day or two before the cease fire, some arriving
even afterwards. Normal training was resumed only after about three months when
the students returned. Due to lack of vacancies of majors in the units, most of
the instructional staff at the college could not be posted to units and remained in Mhow, carrying out
administrative jobs and mundane activities such as revising précis and training
pamphlets.<b><span style="color: blue;"> </span></b> In hindsight, it appears strange that the
services of these highly qualified officers were not made use of during the war
in units that were heavily committed in operations. Apart from depriving the
units of experienced officers, it caused great resentment and frustration among
the affected officers. A study on signal traffic during the 1971 war was
undertaken at under then Lieutenant Colonel Harbhajan Singh, OC Computer Wing.
For this study signal centre records including the messages from many units
were sent to MCTE. The report brought out the pattern and extent of traffic
(precedence, security classification, branch wise) during various stages of the
war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By
the end of 1972, several changes had taken place in the Corps of Signals. After
the issue of General Staff Policy Statement 76 concerning Plan AREN in December
1968, developmental work in regard to hardware had already commenced. The plan to switch over to the pattern of
communication envisaged in Plan AREN had been finalized and it was appreciated
that personnel of the Corps would have to be trained on the modern electronics
technology and techniques used in the new family of equipment. The Corps had also been entrusted with the
responsibility of planning, organizing and manning of electronic data
processing system (EDPS) for the Army.
Electronics Warfare (EW) was one of the responsibilities of the Corps
and there was need to build up competence and capability in the college to
impart training in this sphere also.
Accordingly, a fresh proposal was drawn up to include the following on
the establishment of the college:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A Faculty of Studies to
be created. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An EW Wing to be part
of the FCC.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Upgradation of the EDPS
Wing to Faculty of Computer Technology.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Re-designation of the
Cipher Wing as the Faculty of Cryptology.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l20 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Upgradation of All Arms
Wing to a faculty.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Many of these changes were implemented after 1972
and have therefore not been covered in detail in this chapter. However, in the
first 25 years of its existence, first as the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
and then as the MCTE, the institution had expanded in size and scope. Initially
the School was designed to handle simultaneously a maximum of eight
courses. By the end of 1972 it was
conducting almost 30 courses of all types.
Basically, the courses run by the school/college were as given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals
Officers Courses<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Young Officers course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signal Officers Degree
Engineering course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals Junior
Commanders Course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals Company
Commanders Course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Senior Signals Officers
Course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signal Officers
Advanced Telecommunication Engineering.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals
NCOs Courses (Supervisory)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Foreman of Signals
Course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Yeoman of Signals
Course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Upgrading
Courses (Instruction)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio Mechanics Class
1.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line Mechanics Class 1.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telegraph Mechanics
Class 1.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cipher
Courses<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Basic Course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Upgrading Course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Refresher courses
(Officers and JCOs).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; tab-stops: 40.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">All
Arms Courses<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Regimental Signal
Officers course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Regimental Signal
Instructors course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">EDPS
Courses<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l29 level1 lfo10; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Programmer and Systems
Analyst course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l29 level1 lfo10; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Fortran Language
course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Plan AREN Orientation
course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Functional
Courses<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Duty Signal Officers
course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Duty Exchange Officers
course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers Line
Construction course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers Radio Relay
and Line Equipment course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers Radio
Equipment course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l21 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";">o<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">TOT refresher course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Miscellaneous
Course - </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Seniors Officers Study Fortnight.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Young Officers Course <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The term young officer, or YO, is
generally used for a newly commissioned officer who has passed out from one of
the cadet training institutions such as the Indian Military Academy (IMA) or
the Officers Training School (OTS). The training of a young officer has always
been given the highest consideration, since it forms the foundation on which
the officer’s future career and his utility to the Corps and the Army are
eventually built. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the period preceding World War
II, young officers commissioned into the Indian Signal Corps (ISC) from the IMA
were trained for 18 months at Signal Training Centre (STC), <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>,
followed by a three month course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> and then a six month attachment with a
non-Indianised Signal unit (Waziristan District Signals). They were seconded
for duty with the ISC and formally posted to an Indianised signal unit (4
Indian Divisional Signals), only after they had been found up to the required
standard. When World War II began in 1939, the grant of regular commissions was
suspended and officers began to be granted emergency commissions after short
periods of training at Officer Cadets Training Units (OCTU) located at
Dehradun, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>,
Mhow and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>.
Officers destined for Signals were then sent to the Cadets Wing at STC (B) at
Mhow, which was established in 1940, primarily for training BORs arriving from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. From 1943
onwards, British and Indian officers began to be commissioned from the OTS,
which was part of the STC (B). After the end of World War II, when STC (B) was
disbanded, newly commissioned officers began to be trained at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
in Mhow. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
young officers commissioned from the IMA came to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
for attending the Young Officers’ course. The first few courses did so after
attending a short course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Infantry</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>, Saugor. The
duration of the course was initially 52 weeks but was subsequently reduced to
six months. The course formed part of what was then known as the Post Academy
Training (PAT) course, after which students went to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> and the Armoured Corps Centre and
School, Ahmednagar for further instruction in regimental signalling and
armoured communications. This was
discontinued from 1951 onwards as it was felt that this knowledge would be
picked up by the officer when he was posted to a signal section in a brigade or
a field regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The experiences of the first few
officers who did the PAT course make interesting reading. One of the officers
who did the first course was Lieutenant General M.S. Sodhi, who writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals YOs
Course (<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Post</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place> Training Serial 1) being
abbreviated to PAT I is the correct designation. YO and PAT are not synonymous.
Our course which commenced in January 1947 included one officer Lieutenant
Saeed Ahmed. He later opted for Pak Army well before conclusion of the course
in June 1948. The duration was 18 months. I suppose details of syllabi
were being worked out on a continuing basis as we got on
with basic Signals training on the lines of the Signals OTS! The Platoon
Weapons Course that we did at Saugor for 8 weeks (26 January to 26 March)
was along with all other officers who had passed out with us from the IMA
in December 1946. From there we came back to resume the YO's Course which had
officially started on <st1:date day="14" month="1" w:st="on" year="1947">14
January 1947</st1:date>. In January 1948 we went to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> for the Regimental Signal Officers
Course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
(7January to 24 March). All others also came to Mhow for the Junior Leaders
Course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Infantry</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> which we did not
have to do. </span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It
is pertinent to remember that during the first few years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, there was an acute shortage of
training material and trained instructional staff. The British officers who had
received formal training in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had all left. The dozen odd regular officers who had been trained at the STC
and the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
were either commanding units or holding appointments on staff. The officers
available for instructional duties, who had mostly been commissioned during the
war, had not undergone any technical training. This naturally had an impact on
the quality of instruction, which improved with time. Lieutenant Colonel
Chittaranjan Soni, from the 2<sup>nd</sup> course, has described his
experiences in the following words:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Training
facilities at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> Mhow during PAT2
were almost non-existent (except in elementary Electricity and Electronics
Theory). There were no précis issued to us in PAT2, as I would assume were
issued to YOs, CC, SO and later on. If my memory goes right there was a
meeting under Colonel I D Verma where it was decided that some
2nd Course Officers themselves would conduct classes! We mostly did some
exercises with Wireless Set 48 and spent time on digging pits for
Telephone GI poles with some outdoor exercises where nobody knew what was
happening! Instruction on Signals Procedure and Morse Training were good. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> under <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state> MBK Nair was well
organised. At Ahmednagar we had some joy rides in Stuarts and Shermans with
extreme heat inside when turrets were closed and learned operating WS 19.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I
was Instructor at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals Mhow</st1:placename></st1:place> from Oct
57 to Jun 61 (initially Class C and later Class B) in Tactical Wing and
had taken classes for YOs, Company Commanders and SO courses in addition to
being Course Officer. The School was better organised by then. While standard
of instruction had considerably improved with good instructor material the
policy of awarding gradings was somewhat close minded which generated fear
psychosis in students’ minds. This wasted energy could be well spent on
voluntary imbibing knowledge; there being hardly any A or D but liberal C, E
and F and possibly a stringent one or two B gradings awarded. </span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Young officers of PAT-I during an
outdoor exercise at Beka village near Mhow, in Sep 1947.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 115%;">From left to right : 2/Lt EN Ramadoss, 2/Lt
KT Bopaya, Lt Balkar Singh, 2/Lt KK Poonawalla, Lt Norman (Instructor),<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2/Lt MS Sodhi and 2/Lt SN Mookerjee<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">PAT courses were discontinued in
1951, when a new policy was laid down regarding the training of the young
officers. This was as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On completion of the
course at the IMA, young officers proceeded to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
to attend the Young Officers course of 25 weeks. The object of the course was to train them
for employment as section officers in a divisional signal regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the end of their
training at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, young
officers were sent to the STC for attachment for two weeks, after which they
were posted to divisional signal regiments for regimental duties for two to two
and a half years.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During their service in
a divisional signal regiment, young officers had to do some additional courses.
These were the Platoon Weapons Course at the Infantry School; the Physical
Training Course at the Army School of Physical Training and the Signal Officers
Course at the Army Signal School.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On completion of two to
two and a half years service with units young officers attended the Signal
Special Engineering Course at the School of Military Engineering (SME), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. The duration of the course was 84 weeks and
only one course was conducted each year. This meant that two batches of young
officers did the course at the SME together.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After completion of the
course at the SME, the young officers went to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
to attend the Officers Short Telecommunication (OST) course. This would bring them up to the standard
required for employment in any type of signal unit.<b>3</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Consequent to the amalgamation of
the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
with the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, the sequence
of training of YOs was again revised. It was decided that the basic YOs course
would be of 24 weeks duration, followed by the Regimental Instructors Course in
the All Arms Wing. YOs would then be attached to the STC for one week before
being sent on attachment to divisional signal regiments for 24/30 weeks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the Eighth CSOs/Commandants
Conference in 1953, the consensus of opinion was that the young officers’
training policy should be revised with a view to allocating more time to them
to appear in their retention/promotion examinations. Based on these
recommendations the training policy of young officers was revised and
promulgated in the General Staff training pamphlet ‘Post Commission Training
Regular Officers’. According to the
revised policy, the YOs basic course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
would be of 27 weeks duration, including six weeks at the All Arms Wing and one
week at the STC. This would be followed by a three-year tenure in a divisional
signal regiment and two years in a higher formation signal unit. After this the
officers would attend the Signal Officers Special Engineering course of 84
weeks at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Military Engineering</st1:placename></st1:place>,
followed by the Short Telecommunication Course of 31 weeks at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals.<b>4</b></st1:placename></st1:place><b> </b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Within a year, the above policy was
again revised. It was decided that after the YOs course whose content and
duration remained unchanged, officers would be posted to a field signal
unit. After 2½ to 3 years with a unit,
they would be divided up into two categories, to be known as Technical Officers
and General Duties Signals Officers. The first category, comprising about 40%
of the young officers with better technical aptitude, would undergo the Signal
Officers Special Engineering Course Part I (Basic Engineering) at the CME,
Kirkee followed by its Part II at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>,
Mhow. The remaining 60% would do a new course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
which would be known as Young Officers Course Part II with the aim of bringing
them up technically to the standard required for a general duty signal officer
of the rank of captain.<b>5<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">However, the above policy was never
implemented as envisaged. At a later date, when it was decided to increase the
duration the CME/OST course to three years and rename it as Signal Officers
Degree Engineering Course, only officers who qualified in the entrance
examination were sent on this course. When graduate officers who had a
technical degree started joining the Army, they were detailed to do a basic
course with a slightly different syllabus than the YOs course. This was due to the fact that basic subjects
such as Electricity and Magnetism, Electronic Theory and other technical
subjects had been taught to these officers in civil colleges before
commissioning. In lieu of these subjects, graduate officers were given
instructions on circuitry, fault finding and operation of complex line
equipment and medium power radio sets which was not part of the syllabus of YOs
course. However, this practice was discontinued when it was found that the
performance of graduate officers even in technical subjects was below average
as compared to the YOs. It was then decided to combine the YOs and graduate
officers’ course and run it on a common syllabus. This move helped to create a healthy spirit
of competition between the two and the performance overall improved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The duration of the YOs course
remained unchanged until 1962, when a major upheaval occurred as result of the
1962 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
In December 1962, two courses – 30<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> – passed
out together from the IMA. Both courses proceeded to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
together for their YOs course, which was reduced to three months. They were
then sent to units without going to the STC in accordance with the standard
practice. The three subsequent courses - 32<sup>nd</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup> and
34<sup>th</sup> – were sent to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> together in
March 1963, after having completed only part of their training at the IMA. They
were commissioned on <st1:date day="30" month="6" w:st="on" year="1963">30 June
1963</st1:date> after undergoing the truncated two and half month YOs course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By this time OTSs had started functioning
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> from where
emergency commissioned officers (ECOs) began to arrive at Mhow. The first such
course reported to Mhow along with the regular officers in April 1963, passing
out with them on <st1:date day="30" month="6" w:st="on" year="1963">30 June
1963</st1:date>. During the period 1963 to 1965, twelve emergency courses
passed from out the IMA and the two OTSs, in addition to the regular courses.
As a result, 16 truncated YOs courses were conducted at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>.
The situation returned to normal only in June 1965, when the 35<sup>th</sup> course
passed out from the IMA and proceeded to Mhow to undergo the full YOs course of
26 weeks duration. In the event, this course too had to be terminated about a
month earlier than scheduled, as a result of the 1965 war with Pakistan, and
the officers were sent to their units in November 1965, without visiting the
STC at the end of the course. After 1965 the grant of emergency commissions was
stopped. However, short service commissions began to be granted to officers
passing from the OTS at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>
from April 1966 onwards. Since the dates of passing out in the OTS did not
match those of the IMA, separate YOs courses had to be conducted for these
officers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the 1971 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> the
courses at the IMA were curtailed. The 46<sup>th</sup> course passed out on <st1:date day="14" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">14 November 1971</st1:date>, a month
earlier than scheduled. A
short Young Officers course of 15 weeks duration was conducted for these
officers from <st1:date day="25" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">25 November
1971</st1:date>. The next course at the
IMA was shortened by three months, passing out on <st1:date day="31" month="3" w:st="on" year="1972">31 March 1972</st1:date>. After this the situation returned
to normal, and regular YO’s courses of six months began to be conducted for
officers passing out from the IMA and OTS, which was later redesignated as the
Officers Training Academy (OTA). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Technical
Courses<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, facilities for technical
training of officers in the Corps were virtually non-existent. In earlier days,
the officer cadre of Corps comprised a large number of Royal Signals officers,
many of whom had undergone technical training in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. With the departure of these
officers in 1947, there were very officers left in the Corps who were
technically trained. To remedy the situation it was decided to commence
technical courses at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> at Mhow and also
to send selected officers to the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> for technical courses at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Royal</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>, Catterick. The
first Officers Telecommunications Course (OTC-1) commenced at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>
in 1947, followed by a second course in April 1948. The course was of 28 weeks
duration and officers were selected after qualifying in an entrance
examination. This was the forerunner of the Officers Long Telecommunication
(OLT) course that was later redesignated as the Signal Officers Advanced
Telecommunication Engineering (SOATE) course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To fulfil the immediate requirement
of updating the technical knowledge of officers after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, Officers Advanced Wireless
(OAL) and Officers Advanced Line (OAL) courses were conducted at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
These courses were discontinued when the OLT course was started. However, they were
again introduced in 1951. Selection for these courses was done through an
entrance examination as was being done for the OLT course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1950 it was decided to conduct the Signal
Officers Special Engineering Course at the School of Military Engineering
(SME), Kirkee. The first course commenced at the SME in January 1951, ending in
August 1952. The duration of the course was 84 weeks and officers were sent on
the course after having spent two to two and a half years in a signal unit. Since only one course was conducted in a
year, two batches of YOs did the course together. On completion of the course
at SME these officers did the Officers Short Telecommunication (OST) of 31
weeks duration at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, Mhow. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1953 it was decided to review the syllabi of the
Signal Officers Special Engineering and the Short Telecommunication Courses.
This was done with the view to eliminate portions of the syllabus of the
Special Engineering Course which were superfluous to the study of
telecommunication engineering and transfer some portions to the Short
Telecommunication Course. Some portions that were common to both syllabi would
be amalgamated and the total duration of the courses would be reduced. As a
result of this review, it was decided that all instructions pertaining to Army
equipment will be transferred to the Short Telecommunication Course and only
theoretical principles will continue to be taught at the Special Engineering
Course. The duration of these courses would be 72 and 36 weeks respectively,
making a total of 108 weeks i.e. a little over two years.<b>6<u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964-65 a new policy was issued
for the training of officers. It was decided that all regular officers, except
engineering graduates, would undergo the Signals Officers Degree Engineering course.
The Advisory Board for the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Military Engineering</st1:placename></st1:place>
had been formed in September 1963. After examining the syllabi of various
degree engineering course in 1964-65, the Board recommended that the duration
of the Signals Officers Degree Engineering course should be increased to three
years and syllabus brought up to the standards prevailing in degree engineering
courses of the universities. A similar recommendation was given by Advisory
Board that was established for the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> in 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As a result of these
recommendations, the duration of the Signal Officers Degree Engineering Course
Parts I and II run at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Military Engineering</st1:placename></st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> was increased from 113 weeks to
156 weeks with effect from the course which commenced in July 1966 (SODE-18).
The two parts of the course, which were earlier abbreviated as ‘CME’ and ‘OST’,
were redesignated as Signal Officers Degree Engineering Course Part I (SODE
Part I) and Signal Officers Degree Engineering Course Part II (SODE Part II).<b>7<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An important step was the
introduction of the scheme for post graduate training of officers in civil
universities in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and abroad. In order to train officers of the technical Arms in the latest
technological developments in the field of engineering, a scheme was sanctioned
by the Government during 1965-66, as an experimental measure for a period of
five years. The scheme was open to the
regular commissioned officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force. 15 vacancies were allotted to the Army during
1965-66. Two officers from the Corps of
Signals were nominated on the ME course in Electrical Communication Engineering
at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Institute</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Science</st1:placename></st1:place>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city> in 1966-67.
Thereafter, officers were sent for similar courses to various universities and
institutes, including the Indian Institutes of Technology.<b>8<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1966, approval was obtained for
selected signal officers to do engineering courses in civil engineering
colleges and universities. One officer attended the three year degree course in
Telecommunication Engineering at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Government</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Engineering</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city> in
1966, followed by two officers in 1967. However, after two years the scheme was
discontinued and no more officers were detailed for BE courses in civilian
universities. However, the nomination of officers on ME courses continued.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An important decision regarding the SODE
course was taken in 1968, when the revised policy on post commission training
of officers was issued. The revised pamphlet titled ‘Post Commission Training
of Permanent Commission Officers 1968’ had two main features pertaining to
officers of the Corps. It laid down that SODE is a basic course and is to be
attended by all permanent commissioned officers. It also stated that the Senior
Signal Officers and Signal Company Commander’s courses had been designated as
career courses.<b>9<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As already mentioned, the Officers
Long Telecommunication Course (OLT) was introduced in 1947 as the Officers
Telecommunications Course. This course, initially, was conducted as an
equipment oriented course. Selected
officers of the Corps were given training in the circuitry, operation, repair
and maintenance of all radio and line equipments in use in the Army. The duration of the first two courses was 28
weeks. It was later increased to 40 weeks
and later on to 88 weeks. The aim of the
course was also modified ‘to train selected officers in the more advanced
theory and practice of telecommunication with special reference to application
of modern telecommunication techniques to the practical requirements of Army
Signal communications’. Even at this
stage the emphasis was on ‘Equipments’ though Electronics Theory subjects had
been included in the syllabus to the extent of almost 50 percent of the total. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">According to the revised policy for
training of officers laid down in 1964-65, it was decided that the course will
be of post graduate standard and entry will be restricted to officers who are
engineering graduates or have qualified on the SODE course. Selection of
officers for the course was through an entrance examination. It was found that general performance of the
course was not very satisfactory. Even
though officers qualified in the entrance tests, they could not keep up with
the pace and depth of instruction. With the level of the course elevated to
post graduate standard, it was essential that officers with sufficient
technical background and proven aptitude for higher studies in
telecommunication engineering are selected for the course. In 1971 it was decided that the system of
entrance examination be discontinued and that selection of officers be carried
out by Army HQ (Signals Directorate).
Officers selected for the course should have a degree in engineering (BE
Telecom or equivalent) or qualified on SODE course with a minimum grading of
‘B’ and recommended for higher studies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Since the input level of students
was already of degree standard and the course was given the status of a post
graduate course, the emphasis on equipment orientation was removed. The course was re-designed to train selected
officers in advanced telecommunications practice to enable them to plan and
design communication system and to function as communication staff officers and
equipment staff officers at higher headquarters. The duration of the course was also changed
to 60 weeks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Officers Long Telecommunication
(OLT) Course was redesignated as Signal Officers Advanced Telecommunication
Engineering (SOATE) Course with effect from course serial OLT-14 which
commenced at MCTE on <st1:date day="15" month="1" w:st="on" year="1970">15
January 1970</st1:date>. It was also
decided to do away with the entrance examination for the course with effect
from SOATE -15. The selection of
officers for this course was done by interviews at the Signal Directorate on
the same lines as that of the Technical Staff Officers course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In anticipation of the imminent
hostilities a number of measures that affected training were taken in August
1971. The SOATE and Signal Company Commanders courses were postponed
indefinitely. The period of training in respect of the YOs course was also reduced. On commencement of the war In December 1971,
all courses in CME and MCTE were suspended or postponed, including the SODE
course. The officers undergoing these courses were despatched to the units from
which they had joined the courses. However, the majority of officers arrived in
the units when the war had almost ended. The SODE courses in MCTE were resumed
in March 1972 and those in the CME in May 1972. The SOATE course (SOATE-15)
that had been postponed indefinitely eventually commenced on <st1:date day="29" month="5" w:st="on" year="1972">29 May 1972</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Refresher
& Functional Courses <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
addition to the YOs course and technical courses such as the OST and OLT, a
number of refresher and functional courses were conducted for officers from
time to time. In the initial years
before the commencement of the OST course, the following courses were conducted
at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ISC</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> for officers:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Assistant Duty Signal
Officer (ADSO) course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Direct Commissioned
Officers course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Temporary Commissioned
Officers course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers’ Basic
Refresher course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Graduate Officers
course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers RTT course.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Senior Signals Officers
Refresher course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Signals Company Commanders course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals Junior
Commanders course<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964-65, a new policy was issued
for the training of officers. The aim and scope of the Signals Junior Commanders
and Company Commanders courses were rationalized. Until then, officers who had
not done the OST/SODE course were sent on the Signals Junior Commanders course.
It was decided that different types of Signals Junior Commanders courses would
be conducted for engineering graduate officers and those non-graduate officers
who for any reason were unable to qualify on the SODE course. The Senior
Signals Officers course was to be a discussion-cum-study group course of
shorter duration. Refresher courses were also conducted for technical officers
telecom (TOT) and cipher officers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964-65 a number of short
functional and equipment oriented courses were introduced. These were basically meant for the
non-regular officers and those regular officers who had undergone abbreviated
YOs courses during the Emergency. The courses in this category were the Duty
Signal Officers course, Duty Exchange Officers course, Officers Line
Construction course, Officers Radio Relay and Line Equipment course and
Officers Radio Equipment course. These courses continued for about five years
and were discontinued once the emergency commissioned officers began to be sent
on the SODE course after grant of regular commissions from 1969 onwards. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">However, some refresher courses for
officers and JCOs continued to be run at the MCTE. These were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Duty Exchange
Officers/JCOs course <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Duty Signal
Officers/JCOs course <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">TOT/Foreman of Signals
Refresher course <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Junior Cipher
Officers/JCOs course <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
addition to the courses being conducted at the MCTE, functional courses were
also conducted in other establishments and institutions. These were as given
below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Joint Electronic
Warfare course <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Naval Signal School</st1:city>,
<st1:state w:st="on">Cochin</st1:state></st1:place> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Systems Analysis and
Design course at the National Institute of Training in Industrial Engineering,
Powai, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo16; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Troposcatter course at
the National Physical Laboratory, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l16 level1 lfo16; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Satellite Communication
Technology course at the Experimental Satellite Communication Earth Station,
Ahmedabad. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Foreign Courses (Officers)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
the early years, due to lack of availability of advanced technical training
facilities in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
selected officers as well as JCOs and NCOs were sent abroad for undergoing
specialised training, mostly to the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>. At that time, most of the equipment
in service was of British and American origin and equipment oriented training
was available only those countries. These courses were conducted at training
institutions of the Royal Signals and US Army Signal Corps as well as in some
civil institutions. Some of these foreign courses for officers were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">General Radio
Engineering course at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Marconi College</st1:city>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Transistor Theory and Practice course at Messrs Mullards Ltd, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt left 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Telecommunication
Engineering course at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Catterick</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt left 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Long Telecommunication course at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>,
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Catterick</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Short Telecommunication
course at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Catterick</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Senior Officers
Refresher course at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Catterick</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Army Wireless Chain
course at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Catterick</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Land Air Warfare course
at Old Sarum, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt left 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Basic Signal Course at
the Combined <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Operations</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Signal</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Fermington</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">UK</st1:country-region></st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Special
Telecommunication course at the General Post Office, London, UK (officers &
JCOs).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Signal Material
Maintenance Officers course, USA.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Microwave Radio
Officers course, USA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Telephone &
Teletypewriters Officers course, USA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Associate Signal
Officers Career course/Signal Officers Career course, USA.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ADPS Plans/Operations
Officers course, USA. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Signals Advance course,
USA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Defence Management
Systems course, USA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Logistics Executive
Development course, USA<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l24 level1 lfo17; tab-stops: list 18.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Single Side Band
Wireless Repair course, USA (officers & JCOs). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The normal allotment of vacancies
was two to three per year. However, after the sudden increase in the size of
the Corps in the period 1963-65, additional vacancies were allotted, especially
in the USA. In 1964 alone, six officers were sent to the USA on various
courses. There were instances when vacancies on foreign courses allotted to the
Corps could not be availed due to lack of foreign exchange. Most of the courses
in USA were conducted at US Army Signals School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
From 1971 onwards, some ADPS courses were also conducted at the US Army
Adjutant General School, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964 information was received
from the War Office in UK that due to certain changes in syllabus, the security
grading of the Telecommunication Engineering course had been upgraded and
vacancies on this course could no longer be allotted to India. The matter was
taken up with the British authorities who intimated that it had been decided
not to allow foreign students on the regular TE course because of security
reasons. However, they were planning to
start a new course for the overseas students which would be designated as
Telecommunications Engineering (Overseas) Course. The duration of this course was 42 weeks and
the first course commenced in April 1969, on which one vacancy was allotted to
India. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In addition to courses conducted in
foreign countries, officers were sometimes trained through correspondence
courses conducted by training institutions abroad. This had the advantage of a
larger number of officers being trained at the same time. An example of this
was the Radio Relay and Automatic Data Processing Correspondence courses
conducted by US Army Signal School. The course had two parts or sub courses,
one dealing with radio relay and the other with ADPS. About four to five
officers were nominated to undergo each part of the course separately. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With the improvement of facilities
for advanced training in India and the introduction of indigenous equipment in
service, the number of foreign courses was gradually reduced. After 1966,
officers began to be sent to civil institutions such as the Indian Institute of
Science Bangalore or the Indian Institutes of Technology for post graduate
training. With this, the need for sending officers abroad ceased. Though
selected officers continued to be sent abroad for post graduate courses, their
numbers were small. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">EDPS
Courses <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
the introduction of Electronic Data Processing Systems (EDPS) in the Army in
the mid sixties, a need was felt for training officers in this new field. Major R. Thiagarajan and Major O. A. Pereira
were the first two officers to attend an intensive course in EDP in 1966 at
Indian Statistical Organization, Calcutta.
Thereafter, several officers attended various courses in programming and
systems analysis at the Government of India Computer Centre, New Delhi, on
Honeywell-400 system. Major N.S. Parmar (Engineers), Major S.S. Bains (Signals)
and Major Kaushal (EME) were amongst the officers selected to attend the first
course in early 1967. The duration of the course was ten months and included
comprehensive instruction in system analysis and design, programming and
hardware maintenance. Based on course performance of the graduating class of
thirty, Majors S.S. Bains and N.S. Parmar were retained as instructors for
subsequent courses. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Consequent to the decision to
install ICL 1904 system for the Army in early 1971, the vendors ICL (UK)
conducted two comprehensive systems and programming courses at Bangalore where
similar ICL computer systems were already operational. Nearly thirty officers
of Army HQ EDP Centre and those selected for further assignments attended these
courses. In addition to the courses being conducted in India, a few<b> </b>officers were nominated to attend EDPS
courses in the USA, which had already made rapid strides in this field. Courses
in automatic data processing (ADP) conducted at the US Army Signal School in
Fort Monmouth in USA were attended by Major M.S. Sodhi and Major R.P. Singh.
These courses were later shifted to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, where
Major Harbhajan Singh, Major Navani and Major Kulwinder Singh did the
courses. <span style="color: magenta;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Training in EDPS in MCTE, Mhow started in 1970.
Major A. S. Kahlon and Major Purshotam Singh were posted to MCTE after the
first ICL Course to organize systems design and programming courses. They
conducted two courses each of three months duration for sixteen officers each
of Army, Navy and Air Force. The first ad-hoc course on EDPS commenced at the
MCTE on 2 February 1970. This was a Programmer-cum-Systems Analysts course
based on the Honeywell 400 System and concluded on 25 April 1970. The second
course scheduled for May 70 had to be postponed owing to reorientation of the
syllabus necessitated by the sanction of a new ICL 1904 computer system
exclusively for the Army. Training of personnel who were to man the computer
was conducted under the arrangements of the suppliers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Subsequently in 1971, a computer
technology wing was formally
sanctioned at MCTE to provide a
base for training of service personnel including Army, Navy, Air Force and
civilians belonging to other cadres of the Ministry of Defence. Lieutenant
Colonel Harbhajan Singh was the first officer to command this wing on return
from USA after attending the ADP course.
He has described his experience in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I was posted as
Officer Commanding of the newly sanctioned EDP/Computer Wing at MCTE Mhow in
May 1971, on return from ADP Plans and Operations Course at Fort Benjamin
Harrison, Indiana, USA. The Wing, a rather small set up, was located in a
barrack near the old FCC Office. Two ad-hoc courses had been conducted before I
took over.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Those days there
were only Main Frame Computers, with a number of Magnetic Tape Decks and
Removable/Fixed Disc Drives. Programs
were written on coding sheets. The
programs and data were punched on 80 column cards, nearly the size of a post
card, then verified using a Verifier Machine by keying in every character a
second time and fed in to the computer using a Card Reader. The card decks
could fill boxes at times and if the cards fell down or got mixed up, they had
to be sorted on a Sorter Machine!! <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The programming
training was oriented towards ICL 1904 Computer installed at the Army
Headquarters EDP Centre, at Delhi. In
MCTE there were just a few Punched Card and Verifier Machines and no other
hardware. The students wrote the programs on coding sheets from which cards
were punched and sent to Delhi for compiling. On receipt of the errors from
Delhi, the programs were corrected by students in Mhow and sent again for
compiling!! Quite a time consuming and tedious process!! The whole course was
also taken to The Computer Centre at Delhi for two weeks for compiling and
running programs and doing a project. This was not the ideal situation but a
good make shift arrangement till a computer was installed at Mhow. The course
at MCTE was designed on the lines of the ones conducted in USA. COBOL, FORTRAN
and assembly language were covered along with systems analysis and design and
operation of an EDP Centre. The courses were conducted for all arms. Some
officers from the Navy and Air Force as also Ministry of Defence also attended
the courses. The instructional staff was also from all arms/services viz. Major Amarjit Singh Kahlon, Major S.S. Bains,
Major J.L. Chatterjee (all Signals), Major B.K. Kalra and Major (both Ordnance)
and an EME officer. </span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></i><i><span lang="EN" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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type="#_x0000_t75" alt="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/49/Ibm704.gif/280px-Ibm704.gif"
style='position:absolute;left:0;text-align:left;margin-left:0;margin-top:0;
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<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image007.gif"
o:href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/49/Ibm704.gif/280px-Ibm704.gif"/>
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img align="left" alt="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/49/Ibm704.gif/280px-Ibm704.gif" height="183" hspace="12" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image007.gif" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_31" width="280" /><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">
A Main Frame Computer<i> </i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Blue-punch-card-front-horiz.png"><i><span style="color: blue; mso-no-proof: yes; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_4"
o:spid="_x0000_i1027" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="500px-Blue-punch-card-front-horiz"
style='width:375pt;height:168.75pt;visibility:visible' o:button="t">
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image008.png"
o:title="500px-Blue-punch-card-front-horiz"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="500px-Blue-punch-card-front-horiz" border="0" height="225" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image009.gif" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_4" width="500" /><!--[endif]--></span></i></a>80
Column Punched Card<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<table align="left" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td height="3" width="216"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><img alt="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/48/IBM26.jpg/220px-IBM26.jpg" height="147" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image010.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_30" width="220" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
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style='position:absolute;left:0;text-align:left;margin-left:162pt;
margin-top:2pt;width:165pt;height:110.25pt;z-index:251671552;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image010.jpg"
o:href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/48/IBM26.jpg/220px-IBM26.jpg"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]-->
<!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> </span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<br clear="ALL" />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Punched
Card Machine<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cipher
Courses<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
World War II, cipher officers at formation headquarters functioned under the
Intelligence Branch. In 1943, the responsibility for operation of ciphers
including training of cipher personnel was transferred to Signals. A cipher
school was established at Mhow as part of STC (British). Before Independence,
codes and ciphers were handled by British personnel. The first course for
training 20 Indian cipher operators commenced in early 1947 at the Indian
Signal Corps School that had been established at Mhow in October 1946 after the
disbandment of STC (British). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the departure of British
personnel in 1947, recruitment of cipher operators was initially done by
transfers from other arms/services. This was stopped after 1948 and cipher
operators began to be re-mustered from other within the Corps. To make up the
deficiency of cipher officers volunteers were asked from other arms/services.
These officers were transferred to Signals as cipher officers after undergoing
a conversion course at the School of Signals. In addition, selection boards
were held to screen suitable JCOs for grant of SSRC as cipher officers. As
result, two cipher officers (Balakrishna Nair and Rajinder Singh) were given
SSRC for 5 and 3 years respectively on 1 January 1948. Five months later, two
more cipher officers (N.G. Bakshi and R.K .Nambiar) were given SSRC for similar
periods. The type of SSRC (5 or 3 years) depended on the rank (Subedar or
Jemadar) held by the JCOs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When the Indian Signal Corps School
was established at Mhow in October 1946, it included No. 3 Squadron which was
responsible for cipher training. It was then commanded by Major Prince who was
succeeded by Captain W.A. Tornay in October 1947. In August 1949, when the
establishment of the School of Signals was revised, squadrons were redesignated
as companies which were grouped under two wings. The cipher company formed part
of No 2 Wing that was responsible advanced training. In 1961 the cipher company was organized as a
separate wing under a lieutenant colonel/major.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There was no direct recruitment in
ciphers, the personnel being re-mustered from other trades. Cipher courses for
officers as well as JCOs and OR were conducted at the Cipher Company/Wing at
School of Signals. These include the basic and upgrading course for cipher
operators and refresher courses for cipher officers and JCOs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1952, the first Officers Basic Cipher course
(OBC-1) was conducted for seven temporary commissioned officers who volunteered
to join as cipher officers. From 1954 onwards an entrance test was introduced
for volunteers for transfer from other trades as cipher operators. Those who
passed the test were sent to do the basic cipher course at the School of
Signals. In addition to the basic course, upgrading courses were conducted for
class 2 and 3 cipher operators. Periodically, refresher courses were also run
for cipher officers and JCOs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In addition to personnel from
Signals, the Cipher Wing sometimes trained personnel from other establishments.
In 1954/55, a course of eight weeks duration was conducted to train civilian
staff employed in the Joint Cipher Bureau of the Ministry of Defence. In
1950/51 and again in 1956/57 basic courses of eight weeks duration were run for
cipher operators of the Indian Railways. A six-week refresher course was also
run in 1956/57, followed by a four-week course in 1958 for training Railway
Cipher Inspectors in the use of a certain new cryptosystem proposed to be
introduced in the Railways.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A large number of officers were
given emergency commissions in 1963-64. Many of these officers who were in the
higher age group volunteered to serve as cipher officers. Two conversion
courses were conducted during 1965/66 for these ECOs to make them eligible for transfer
to the SL cadre as cipher officers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Consequent to the introduction of
equipment cipher line (ECL), non-cipher technical subjects such as E&M, AC
Theory and Mathematics were included in the syllabi of all cipher courses
during 1970. Since most of the intake to
the cipher category was from mechanic and operator group, this training was
felt to be of little use. It was
therefore done away with it in 1972. However, for entrants who did not belong
to mechanic/operator categories, a two weeks pre-course training on technical
subjects was arranged at 1 STC prior to the commencement of the basic cipher
course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The various types of cipher courses
conducted by the MCTE were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo32; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cipher Basic Course</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
This was a conversion cum basic course for OR for transfer from other trades to
cipher category. Personnel with 3 to 8
years service experience were selected to undergo training after passing a test
conducted by the MCTE. The duration of
this course has been varying from time to time between 8 and 23 weeks. In 1972 the duration of the course was 14
weeks, which was subsequently increased to 20 weeks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo18; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cipher Upgrading
Courses Class 2 and 1</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> These were conducted
to upgrade operators cipher from class 3 to 2 and class 2 to 1
respectively. The personnel for these
courses were detailed by Signals Records according to seniority and
recommendations of the unit commanders received through the CSO Commands. The duration of the Class 2 course has been
varying between 8 and 17 weeks from time to time. In 1972 the duration was 12 weeks. The
duration of the Class 1 course has been varying between 10 and 19 weeks. In 1972 the duration was 10 weeks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo18; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Junior Officers
(Cipher) Course</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a mixed course for
officers and JCOs who are potential officers, the duration of the course being
six weeks. The aim of the course was to
impart training to junior cipher officers to appreciate and plan cipher cover
in varied situations and to function as cipher and signal security staff officers at formation headquarters. The first such course (JOC-1) was conducted
in 1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo18; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cipher Officers
Refresher Course</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was run up to 1962. Due to pressure on the Wing in imparting
training to OR to meet the increased requirement of cipher personnel as a
result of sudden expansion of the Army after Chinese aggression in 1962, this
course was discontinued. <span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">TRAINING
OF JUNIOR COMMISSIONED OFFICERS & OTHER RANKS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No
1 Signal Training Centre<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the end of World War
II, there were two training centres for personnel of the Indian Signal Corps.
These were the Signal Training Centre (Indian), Jubbulpore and the Signal
Training Centre (Indian), Bangalore. On
15 August 1946 the Signal Training Centre (Indian), Jubbulpore was redesignated
as No. 1 Signal Training Centre (Indian) and placed under the Indian Signal
Corps Centre that had been created at Jubbulpore, which also had under it the
Records, Depot and the Demobilisation Wing. The Commandants of the ISC Centre
and No. 1 STC (I) were both of the rank of colonel, though the former had the
disciplinary powers of a brigade commander. Similarly, the Signal Training
Centre (Indian), Bangalore became No. 2 Signal Training Centre (Indian). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In June 1947, No. 1 Signal
Training Centre (Indian) was re-designated as No. 1 Indian Signal Corps Centre
and No. 2 Signal Training Centre (Indian) was re-designated as No. 2 Indian
Signal Corps Centre. At the time of Partition in August 1947, No. 1 Indian
Signal Corps Centre consisted of HQ, the Military Training Regiment, the
Technical Training Regiment, the Boys Regiment, the Depot and Demob Regiment
and the Indian Signal Records. The composition of No 2 Indian Signal Corps
Centre was similar, except for the Depot and Records. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Since
the newly created state of Pakistan did not have any training centre, - the one
at Sialkot had been closed after the War – it was decided to close the centre
at Bangalore and transfer its assets to Pakistan, where a new centre would be
established at Murree Hills. However, since the Muslim personnel who were to go
to Pakistan were being trained at Jubbulpore and the non-Muslim personnel who
were to remain in India were at Bangalore, this involved the shifting of a
large number of personnel from Bangalore to Jubbulpore before the division
could be effected. Approximately 1500 personnel of No. 2 ISC Centre had to be
moved from Bangalore to Jubbulpore and 486 personnel of the Boys Regiment from
Bangalore to Mhow. Approximately 2500 personnel from Jubbulpore and 150 from
Bangalore moved to Murree Hills; while 643 from Mhow and 107 from Poona moved
to Rawalpindi. Heavy stores and equipment accompanied all these moves, which
took place well after Partition. These moves were expected to be completed by
January 1948 but in view of the worsening communal situation, in September 1947
it was decided that the personnel to be transferred to Pakistan should move
without waiting for the courses in progress to be completed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 12 September 1947, a small party
under Captain Kelsey, Royal Signals, proceeded to Western Pakistan to finalize
arrangements for locating the Pakistan Signals Centre. On 1 October, a small
detachment of Signals Records reached Ambala to receive the personnel in
Pakistan who had opted for India and send them directly to the units earmarked
for them. They were also to assist personnel on leave who had been stranded in
Eastern Punjab because of disturbances and floods. Between 24 and 24 October,
the advance party of No. 2 ISC Centre arrived in Jubbulpore with the stores and
equipment which had been allotted to Pakistan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 27 October 1947, the first
contingent of personnel who had opted for Pakistan, comprising three officers,
ten JCOs and 174 OR left Jubbulpore for Western Pakistan by a special train
under command of Lieutenant Colonel J.N. Barker. On the same day, Major Feroze
Khan, commanding the Depot and Demob Regiment, and his adjutant were placed
under close arrest for rendering a false certificate in connection with search
of the contingent going to Pakistan. During October, the Warrant Officers and
Sergeants Mess, Royal Signals was finally closed. The silver and trophies were divided, half
being presented to Officers Mess STC and the remainder sent to Catterick in UK.
On 01 November 1947, the establishment of Depot and Demob Regiment, No. 1 ISC
Centre was further reduced and the unit re-designated as Depot and Demob Wing,
STC (I). The move of personnel to
Pakistan continued during the month, the fourth and last contingent departing
on 22 November 1947. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 1 December 1947, Colonel Apar
Singh, MBE, the first Indian to command the Centre, took over as Commandant No.
1 ISC Centre from Colonel R.J. Moberly, OBE, the last British Commandant.
Giving an account of the division of the Centre, Colonel Moberly has written: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The writer was responsible
for dividing equipment, money and regimental property in the ratio 2 to 1 for
India and the future Pakistan. The Record Office was divided into two and all
equipment and stores were selected by boards of officers, always consisting of
equal members of Indians and Pakistanis. Priority signal equipment for a new
Signal Training Centre to Pakistan was earmarked for carriage in four trucks
followed in the backs of special trains carrying soldiers, and Records Office
personnel to Pakistan. Money and Trophies were divided in consultation with
General Headquarters, the writer having to travel there to make detailed
arrangements.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">As the railways were
disrupted by floods, two months after Independence in 1947 there were still
2500 Punjabi Mussalmans under the writer’s command in Jabalpur. In the end the trains left, and the long task
of division, a very sad one for the writer, was completed”.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">11</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In June 1948, the designation of
No. 1 ISC Centre was changed to Signal Training Centre. A month later, the
establishment of the Military Training Regiment was increased and it was
reorganised on four company basis i.e. one headquarters and three training
companies. The rank of the officer
commanding was upgraded from major to lieutenant colonel. Shortly afterwards,
on 3 August 1948, the Boys Regiment arrived from Mhow and occupied the Napier Lines which had by
then been vacated by the ‘G’ Company, Technical Training Regiment consequent to their move to the Roberts
Barracks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In December 1948, the Technical
Training Regiment was enlarged and split into two regiments – 1 Technical
Training Regiment and 2 Technical Training Regiment. The two units were,
however never actually separated. The
senior lieutenant colonel commanded both units as a whole and the junior acted
as chief instructor for them. In view of
this increase, the establishment of HQ STC was also revised to include a Deputy
Commandant (lieutenant colonel), a GSO 2 (Technical Training) and a GSO 2
(Methods). The staff officer (major)
formerly authorized in the establishment was redesignated GSO 2 (Staff Duties).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
01 July 1950, the establishment of the Depot and Demob Wing, STC, was further
reduced and it was re-designated as Depot Company, STC. The rank of the officer
commanding was downgraded from major to captain. In October 1950, the two technical training
regiments were separated and commenced functioning as separate units. Their training responsibilities were divided.
No. 1 Technical Training Regiment took over training of mechanics, linemen,
despatch rider and mechanical transport drivers while 2 Technical Training
Regiment was made responsible for training operators, clerks, draughtsmen,
carpenters and storemen technical.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The organisation of the STC as
revised in Apr 1951 was as shown below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if gte vml 1]><v:line id="_x0000_s1041" style='position:absolute;
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<u>HQ STC<o:p></o:p></u></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
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<div>
<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:36.0pt'>
<span lang=EN-GB>Mil Trg Regt<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
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<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
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<div>
<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>1 Tech Trg Regt<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
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<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1047'>
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<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>2 Tech Trg Regt<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
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<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>Boys Hostel<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
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<div>
<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>Depot Coy<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
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<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>Records<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><span style="height: 99px; left: -31px; mso-ignore: vglayout; position: relative; top: 13px; width: 722px; z-index: 251657216;"><img height="86" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image012.gif" v:shapes="_x0000_s1040 _x0000_s1042 _x0000_s1043 _x0000_s1044 _x0000_s1045 _x0000_s1046 _x0000_s1047 _x0000_s1048 _x0000_s1049 _x0000_s1050 _x0000_s1051 _x0000_s1052 _x0000_s1053" width="722" /></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In November 1953 the establishment
of the STC was again revised, with the headquarters and each training regiment
having its independent peace establishment (PE). This continued up to 1957 when
there was another revision that became effective from 1 Jun 1958. Salient features of the revised PE were as
given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ STC comprised the
Commandant (colonel); Deputy Commandant (lieutenant colonel); Technical
Training and Methods Officer (major); Major Staff Duties; Training and Methods
Officer (captain); Technical Officer Telecommunication (major); General Duties
and Accounts Officer (subaltern); and the Physical Training Officer (captain).
The Methods Team and Telecommunication Maintenance Section formed part of the
headquarters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Military Training
Regiment, which was designed to hold 1150 recruits at any one time. It
consisted of the regimental headquarters, HQ Company and three military
training companies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No 1 Technical Training
Regiment, which was designed to cater for 1280 trainees at any one time. It comprised the regimental headquarters, HQ
Company, Workshop Wing and Other Trades Wings. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No 2 Technical Training
Regiment, which was designed to cater for 1152 initial technical trainees and
for 192 Army HQ courses at any one time.
It comprised the regimental headquarters, Administrative Company, A and
B Wings. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In January 1962 an additional military training
regiment was sanctioned for the STC and the raising was be completed by 15
August1962. Soon after wards the Chinese aggression resulted in major changes
in the organisation of the training establishments to cater for the large
number of new signal units that were raised. Two additional signal training
centres were raised, one each at Panjim (Goa) and Jabalpur. The signal training centre already existing
at Jabalpur was redesignated as No. 1 Signal Training Centre. The new centres
raised were No. 2 Signal Training Centre at Panjim and No. 3 Signal Training
Centre at Jabalpur. No 4 Technical Training Regiment was raised as part of No.
3 STC to train personnel of operator, clerk, draughtsman and carpenter trades.
This unit was initially raised along with 2 Technical Training Regiment of No.
1 STC but started functioning independently with effect from May 1963 and moved
to Mandla Road in September 1963.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The establishment of No 1 STC was
revised in January 1967 and for the first time the independent establishments
of the units were merged and only one PE was issued for the whole Signal
Training Centre except for the Boys and Depot Regiment. According to this revised PE No. 1 STC was
designed to train at any one time 3496 Recruits, 32 Army HQ promotion (S)
course trainees and 464 Army HQ conversion and upgrading technical course trainees. The main features of the PE were as follows:-<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ STC, comprising the
Training Aids, Methods and Training Team; Trade Allotment and Trade Testing
Team and Mechanical Transport Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Military Training
Regiment comprising HQ Company, six military training companies and one
Promotion (S) Course Trainees Section (1080 recruits, 32 trainees)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Technical Training
Regiment (Type ‘A’) comprising HQ Company and technical training companies for
workshop trades (608 recruits, 192 trainees).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Technical Training
Regiment (Type ‘B’) comprising HQ Company and
technical training companies for
operator trades (880 recruits, 240 trainees)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Technical Training
Regiment (Type ‘C’) comprising HQ Company and
technical training companies for
other trades, (928 recruits, 32 trainees)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1967 No. 3 STC at Jabalpur was
disbanded. The Other Trades Wing of 1 Technical Training Regiment which was
training linemen, drivers and DR moved to 2 Technical Training Regiment. The
Operator Trades Training Company of 2 Technical Training Regiment moved to 4
Technical Training Regiment, which became a part 1 STC. Thus No. 1 STC was
reorganized and comprised four training regiments - 1 Military Training
Regiment; 1 Technical Training Regiment (Type A); 2 Technical Training Regiment
(Type C); and 4 Technical Training Regiment (Type B). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1971 a fresh PE was issued for
No. 1 STC incorporating minor changes such as the authorization of a Chief
Instructor (lieutenant colonel) in HQ STC in addition to the Deputy Commandant
(lieutenant colonel). This PE was
designed to cater for 3500 recruits and to conduct courses for 500 trainees at
any one time. The organisation of STC
was as shown below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Foreman
of Signals Course<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon after Independence, it was
decided to introduce a new category for JCOs in the Corps, to be known as
Foreman of Signals. This was to fill the vacuum created by the departure of
British personnel in 1947, who had been looking after repair and maintenance of
signal equipment. Promotion to this category was made from selected personnel of
workshops trades, after they had undergone a course of one year’s duration at
the School of Signals, Mhow. Initially, the personnel selected to undergo the
Foreman of Signals course were not fully trained, qualified or experienced to
discharge their duties according to the standards envisaged for this category.
Also, there was no provision for the development of their JCO qualities in one
year training period.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As conditions improved, the
training policy of Foreman of Signals category was revised in 1953, in order to
eradicate the shortcomings mentioned above. The course was divided into two
parts, each of approximately one year duration. After having successfully
completed Part I, an NCO became eligible to attend Part II of the course after
gap of three years. He was promoted to
JCO rank and given the designation ‘JCO’ Foreman of Signals’ only after
completion of both Parts I and II and the NCO’s ‘S’ Course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1963 it was decided to
amalgamate both parts of the course, and increase its duration from 52 to 58
weeks, to cater for mid-term breaks of 10 days and annual leave of one
month. In 1969, the duration of the
course was increased from 58 to 91 weeks.
In 1972 efforts began to obtain approval of the Technical Education
Board of Madhya Pradesh Government to for recognition of Foreman of Signals
course as equivalent to the Diploma course in Electronics and Telecommunication
Engineering. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Recruits
Training <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One of the immediate sequels of Independence and
Partition was the shortage of trained manpower, consequent to the repatriation
of British tradesmen and the departure of Muslim personnel to Pakistan. Since training of fresh recruits would take
some time, it was decided to tide over the shortage by asking for volunteers
from other Arms and Services and inducting them the Corps after suitable
training. The conversion training of workshop trades was conducted at the
Indian Signal Corps Centre, which later became the Signal Training Centre,
Jubbulpore. The conversion training of operators and other trades was carried
out partly in the Centre and partly in the units/commands, which were asked to
put up with the difficulties of lack of equipment and proper class rooms the
wider interests of the Corps. Courses
for instructors were organised at the Centre. <b>12<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The training of recruits at the STC
Jabalpur continued up to 1957 generally in accordance with the General
Headquarters Directive “Training of the Indian Army Recruits” issued on 8
October 1946. The training was reorganized to meet the qualification requirements
as laid down in AI 39/S/47. The STC was responsible for training of the
following categories of recruits up to class 3 standard with some exceptions as
indicated:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Group ‘B’<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Clerk
GD<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
Mechanic<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Telegraph
Mechanic<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Line
Mechanic (School of Signals, Mhow)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Storeman
Technical (AOC School, Jabalpur)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Group ‘C’<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Draughtsman
Signals<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Electrician
Fitter Signals (Driver MT training at STC, EFS training at EME Centre)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator
Key Board and Line<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator
Switch Board and Line<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator
Wireless and Line<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Group ‘D’<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Carpenter
and Joiner<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lineman
Field<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lineman
Permanent Line<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Group ‘E’<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Despatch
Rider<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Group ‘G’<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Bandsman/Bugler/Drummer/Piper/Trumpeter
etc<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Driver
MT<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Group ‘H’<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Cook
Unit (ASC Centre North)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Equipment
and Boot Repair (AOC Centre)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tailor
Unit (ASC Centre North)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The policy for training of direct
entry recruits was changed in August 1951. According to the new policy,
training was to be carried out in three phases as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase I - Pre Basic Military Training (2 Weeks)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase II - Basic
Military Training (19 Weeks)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo21; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase III - Corps
Training (17 to 86 Weeks, varying for different
trades)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
1954 the STC commenced courses for training line mechanic class 3 which
was being done at School of Signals, Mhow till then. In June 1956 a fresh directive for training of recruits of the
Corps was issued under which phase III period of corps training was revised as
17 to 82 weeks against 17 to 86 weeks earlier. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In Nov 1962 due to declaration of
Emergency consequent to the Sino-Indian war the period of training of direct
recruits was reduced. The reduced training was followed during the whole of
1963 and partly in 1964. In was only in
October 1964 that recruits training for the Corps reverted to the pre-emergency
period. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1963 to meet urgent requirements of radio
mechanic, wireless operator and driver mechanical transport it was decided to
utilize the facilities of some of the industrial training institutes and public
under takings in the country. It was
planned to train 250 mechanics, 586 wireless operators and 750 drivers under
this scheme. Accordingly recruits from No 1 STC were detailed to undergo a part
of their technical training at these institutions on completion of basic
military training. The training periods
of industrial training institutes/public under takings were six months for
radio mechanics, three months for wireless operators and two months for
drivers. On completion of their training at these civil institutes the recruits
of these trades had to undergo a further period of training at the STCs for 19,
14 and 9 weeks respectively. The scheme was finally terminated on 31 March
1964. By then 442 radio mechanics, 1152
operators and 1700 drivers mechanical transport had been trained in these
institutions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In addition to the above arrangement, some
recruits of lineman, driver, despatch rider and operator trade were diverted
for technical training under arrangements of CSOs Command. These recruits were posted directly to their
new units on completion of their technical training and did not come back to
the training centre.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In September 1965 during the Indo
Pak war the period of training of recruits was again reduced as an interim
measure to make up deficiencies. The
emphasis was on quick output while maintaining the standard of proficiency.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In March 1969 a fresh Training
Directive was issued for the training of recruits, superseding the instructions
in force since 1964. The organisation of
training was to be as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo22; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Pre-Basic Military
Training (2 weeks)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo22; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Basic Military Training
(18 weeks)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo22; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Technical Training (10
to 64 weeks)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo22; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Military Training for
Ex-Boys (12 weeks)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Considerable disruption had taken
place in the basic training of recruits since 1962 and it was hoped that the
fresh periods of training laid down in the directive of 1969 would bring things
back to normal. However, before the new directive could be fully implemented
the Indo Pak war of 1971 again dislocated the training of recruits. Reduced training was introduced in August
1971 and subsequently emergency training had to be resorted to.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the cessation of hostilities
it was decided to revert to normal training with effect from April 1972. However due to continuing shortages existing
in the Corps reduced training had to be continued. During the period September
1971 to August 1972 the output of No. 1 STC was approximately 5000 recruits,
because of the reduced periods of training. Because of the enhanced recruitment
in 1971 and 1972 the STC was heavily over loaded and due to shortage of
equipment training of operator categories had to be conducted in shifts. Due to
shortage of vehicles the drivers could not be given the full time and mileage
at the wheel. During this period all
training regiments exceeded their training capacity of recruits and the overall
holding of No 1 STC was equivalent to that of two training centres. The STC shouldered this responsibility
despite shortages of instructors, equipment, accommodation and administrative
staff and did a commendable job in training recruits up to the required
standards. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Upgrading
& Remustering Courses<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the period after Independence in
addition to recruits training the STC was also responsible for the following
upgrading/conversion courses:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lineman Test class 3
conversion course<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lineman Field
Instructors course<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lineman Permanent Line
Instructors course<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operator Keyboard and
Line Instructors course<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operator Wireless and
Line Instructors course<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Junior Leaders course
(for NCOs)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1950 the STC did not conduct any
class 2 upgrading training except for the workshop trades which was
subsequently shifted to the School of Signals in 1951. During this period the responsibility for
upgrading training to Class 2 for all other trades was that of the unit
commanders. All courses other than
recruit training at the STC were controlled by the Military Training
Directorate in Army HQ and were published annually in Special Army Orders. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Due to poor selection of students
for upgrading courses as well as the lack of pre-course training the students
were unable to assimilate fully the instructions imparted to them. Army HQ, therefore, directed that with effect
from 1 April 1953 the first four weeks of all upgrading courses will be devoted
to refresher training. During this
period the trainees were to be given every opportunity and guidance to refresh
their knowledge in subjects with which they may have been out of touch. A test was to be administered at the end of
this training and the result to be entered in Part A of the Technical Test
Certificate. Those obtaining grading C
and below in the above were to be returned to their units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A further decision taken by Army HQ
in 1953 was with regard to upgrading courses.
Due to continuing deficiencies in Classes 1 and 2 of workshop categories
it was decided that the following procedure would be followed:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l30 level1 lfo24; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commands would be
responsible for the training and trade testing of radio mechanics and telegraph
mechanics from Class 3 to 2. In order to
ensure uniform standard of tradesmen, the School of Signals would be responsible
for the preparation of test sheets and correction of test papers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l30 level1 lfo24; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The School of Signals
would continue to be responsible for upgrading from Class 2 to 1 of all
workshop categories and for upgrading from Class 3 to 2 in respect of line
mechanics.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l30 level1 lfo24; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The STC would be
responsible for upgrading radio mechanic LP/HP from class 3 to 2. Syllabi of
all courses from Class 3 to 2 would be revised to incorporate revised technical
standards as per AI 171/53.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1954 the STC also commenced
courses for training line mechanic class 3 and operator wireless and keyboard
class 3. In addition to line mechanic
class 3, the upgrading training of radio mechanic class 2 and telegraph
mechanic class 2 was also shifted to STC, Jabalpur from School of Signals,
Mhow. In 1956 the STC also began
conducting upgrading courses for operator wireless and keyboard classes 2 and
1.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A major problem at the time was the
poor performance of the students on upgrading due to lack of pre-course
training and Army HQ constantly admonished the commands to improve the
situation. Command training schools did
not have any authorized establishment and were therefore, not properly
organized. They also found it difficult
to run upgrading courses and to conduct direct tests due to lack of suitable
instructors. Another factor that affected
mustering/absorption was lack of educational qualifications. As a result of these factors serious
deficiencies existed in class 2 and 1 of various categories.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To improve the situation regarding
deficiencies, shortage of qualified instructors and instructional problems of
command training schools, the STC proposed certain changes in the existing
policy. Based on these proposals, Army HQ issued a fresh policy on upgrading
and re-mustering training in the Corps of Signals in August 1957. The salient points
of the new policy were as under: -<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l26 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Upgrading training from
class 2 to 1 of all categories except storeman technical and electrical fitter
Signals and from class 3 to 2 in workshop, cipher, operator wireless and key
board and lineman test recorder categories was to be carried out at the School
of Signals/STC.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l26 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">All class 1tradesmen
were to be capable of carrying out instructional duties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l26 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In view of large
deficiencies, commands were permitted as an interim measure to carry out
upgrading courses centrally for class 1 in operator wireless and line, driver
MT and lineman field categories. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l26 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Re-mustering training
was to be carried out as per SO-in-C’s policy Instruction No 8 of 1956.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l26 level1 lfo25; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In order to ensure
uniformity of standards where commands were permitted to carry out upgrading
training and hold trade tests, all test papers were required to be sent to the
STC for approval.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Until 1959, upgrading courses to be
run at the STC were published yearly in Special Army Orders. The vacancies on these courses were demanded
and allotted through staff channels.
This method of selection of individuals without reference to the
Officer-in-Charge Records was found unsatisfactory as merit and seniority of
individuals could not be balanced as the staff were not aware of the Corps seniority.
The policy for planning, demand and allotment of vacancies in respect of
upgrading courses was changed with effect from training year 1960-61. The main
features of the new policy were as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l28 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bulk requirement of
vacancies on upgrading courses would be based on deficiencies in the respective
trades after taking into account wastages and estimated output from the current
year. This requirement will be worked
out by OIC Records and forwarded to Army HQ.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l28 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Courses would be
planned at Army HQ. Courses to be run in
Class A establishments would be published in Special Army Orders but courses to
be run in Class B establishments would be communicated to OIC Records, with
intimation to commands. Vacancies on all
courses were to be allotted by OIC Records.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l28 level1 lfo26; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OIC Records would
nominate tradesmen keeping in mind eligibility, recommendations, seniority and
merit and arrange for adequate pre-course training to be imparted under command
arrangements.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -4.5pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Based on the
above policy all upgrading courses were to be conducted at the STC, except for
some that were conducted elsewhere. These were the class 1 courses in mechanic
trades at the School of Signals; the
class 2 courses in operator and lineman categories at the command training
schools; the class 1 and 2 courses for Storeman Technical at the AOC School and
the class 1 and 2 courses for Electrician Fitter Signals Class at the EME Centre. The duration of upgrading
courses conducted at the STC was between 18-20 weeks for operator categories;
16 weeks for mechanics and linemen test; 14 weeks for drivers and 12 weeks for
draughtsmen, linemen, despatch riders and clerks. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1961, it was appreciated that
proper facilities did not exist in units to impart pre-course training to radio
mechanic (LP) to qualify as radio mechanic (HP) class 3 and it was therefore,
decided that practical training in this should be imparted in STC and the
duration of radio mechanic class 2 course should be extended accordingly. The refresher training which was for period
of four weeks would therefore be six weeks. Due to continuing deficiencies in
operator wireless and line class 1, commands were authorized to run class 1
upgrading courses in this category in addition to those conducted at the STC in
the training year 1962-63.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In October 1962 due to the
operations in NEFA and declaration of Emergency, upgrading courses due to
commence after 1 November 1962 were postponed indefinitely, and in case of
those already in progress emergency syllabus was introduced. The dates of termination of all courses in
progress were advanced. Consequent to the Emergency all upgrading training and
trade testing boards as per Qualification Regulations for Soldiers 1958 were
decided to be conducted under command arrangements. Upgrading training at the STC was also
stopped as an interim measure. With the
decentralization of upgrading training it was not possible to maintain
seniority in filling up class 1 and class 2 quotas. The Government therefore, decided to remove
the quota restriction on upgrading to class 1 and 2 vide Army Instruction
132/62 and 290/62.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Due to the expansion of the Corps
during the period 1963-65 a serious problem had arisen regarding
upgrading. The training centres were
fully committed in training recruits and therefore could not undertake
upgrading. The requirements of upgrading
had also increased due to removal of quota restrictions in class 1 and class
2. There was a need to make sufficient
man power available in class 1 and 2 so as to keep up the technical efficiency
of the Corps and to provide for the selection and appointment of requisite
number of NCOs and JCOs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The requirement of upgrading
training was therefore, re-appraised and a new directive was issued effective
from April 1963. It was directed that
upgrading courses were to be conducted at School of Signals, the STCs and in
commands. In order to overcome the
problem of some commands being over loaded due to deployment of troops on the borders, as well as to maintain
seniority of OR attending courses it was decided that Signals Records would
allot vacancies centrally for class 1 and 2 courses for mechanic, operator,
clerk, draughtsman, line test recorder and carpenter categories. In addition to
the upgrading courses, direct tests were also permitted to reduce the training
load.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">All upgrading courses were
cancelled with effect from 6 September 1965 due to the declaration of emergency
during the war with Pakistan. However,
from 15 September 1965 some courses were started for students from unaffected
commands during the war. The duration of ‘S’ courses was reduced to eight weeks
during this period. After the end of the war full scale upgrading training was
resumed from 1 December 1965.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By 1966 the problem of upgrading
training was further aggravated due to increase in establishment of the
Corps. Although the ultimate aim was for
carrying out upgrading training for all categories in higher groups in the
higher classes at the STCs, this could not be implemented due to the large
influx of recruits. The directive for
1966/67 therefore, provided for a large portion of the load to be handled by
signal units. The direct tests were
abolished in order to maintain a uniform standard and to compensate for this
the number of upgrading courses was increased.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1966 since conditions were progressively
approaching a stabilized state it was decided to make a further effort to
increase the number of trainees for 1967/68 above the figure for the previous
year. The nomenclature of Army HQ and command courses was re-defined. The duration of Army HQ courses was also laid
down. It was 24 and 16 weeks respectively for class 1 and 2 of workshop
categories; between 18-20 weeks for class 1 of operator categories; 16 and 15
weeks respectively for class 1 and 2 of line test recorder and 12 weeks for
class 1 of draughtsmen. Direct tests
were not permitted for these courses.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Due to large influx of recruits
during the period 1962-68 there was a huge backlog of OR awaiting upgrading
training and the position was growing worse year by year. Since the training establishments were unable
to cope with the upgrading load it was decided to re-introduce direct tests
with effect from 1968/69. This was
initially for one year but with effect from 1969 it was accepted as a permanent
feature. The problem of lack of pre-course training was a constant bugbear in
the efforts to improve the holding of higher class tradesmen during this
period. It was found at the STC that
utility value of radio mechanic upgrading courses was only about 31% in 1968/69
as most of the students either failed to qualify initially or did not to come
up to the standard despite refresher training. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another problem faced in the matter
of upgrading training was the requirement of additional qualifications of
driving training. Due to shortage of
vehicles it was not possible to impart this in the STC and therefore it was
decided that the students should be given this training in the units prior to
coming on upgrading courses. However,
despite all instructions the students were still being sent on the course
without the necessary certificate. This point was also discussed during the
CSOs/Commandants Conference.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The problem of upgrading training
was formally studied during a training conference held in November 1971. Ever since the removal of restriction of
quota on class 1 and 2 there was no way of working out the requirement of
upgrading courses. During this
conference a study was carried out of the holding of personnel in different
categories vis-à-vis the requirement of trained personnel in various units. Though it was desirable to have maximum of
class 1 personnel it was felt that it was unattainable in the near future and
therefore it was decided that the ratio between class 1, 2 and 3 should be 2 :
4 : 4. In terms of percentage, this would work out to 20%, 40% and 40%
respectively. From the number of
personnel that would be required to be upgraded it was calculated that it would
take approximately two years to achieve this ratio. As a result of this study
it was decided to issue a SO-in-C’s Policy Instruction on planning of upgrading
courses for the future.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In view of impending war it was
decided to terminate upgrading training progressively with effect from November
1971. However in view of the early
termination of hostilities upgrading training was recommenced with effect from
15 February 1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The programme of re-mustering
training of operator special class 3 was modified in 1972 to make up the large
deficiencies in this category. It was
expected that after implementation of the modified programme, it would be
possible to re-muster 360 operator special against 180 that was being done
earlier. The training was to be
conducted in two phase as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo27; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase I</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
To be conducted at 1&2 STCs and was to consist of 13 weeks training to
upgrade ORL class 3 volunteers from class 3 to 2, followed by four weeks extensive training and six weeks technical
training. The duration of Phase I was 23 weeks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo27; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase II</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
To be conducted at No. 1 Wireless Experimental Unit, Delhi Cantt for imparting
specialized training. The duration of
Phase II was seven weeks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Foreign
Courses (JCOs and NCOs)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the period
before Independence, the workshop trades in the Indian Signal Corps were filled
mostly by British personnel and it was only in 1944 that three Indian NCOs were
admitted to the trade of Foreman of Signals. After the departure of British
personnel in 1947 the shortage of technical personnel in the Corps was keenly
felt, leading to a number of steps such as the recruitment of civilian
technical personnel and conversion from other trades. In addition, selected
JCOs and NCOs were sent abroad for undergoing technical training, mostly to the
School of Signals, Catterick, UK. A few JCOs/NCOs were also sent to the USA to
undergo specialised courses along with officers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The courses on which JCOs and NCOs
were sent in the period immediately after Independence were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo29; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Pre-Foreman of Signals
course, UK<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo29; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Crystal Maintenance
course, UK<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Foreman of Signals
(Telecommunication) course, UK<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Foreman of Signals
(Technical Maintenance) course, UK<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Foreman of Signals
(SQMS) course, UK<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After Independence, Foreman of
Signals courses had been started in India. The course was run in two parts,
with Part I being run at the STC and Part II at the School of Signals. A few
NCOs who performed well in Part I were sent to UK to do Foreman of Signals Part
II course at Catterick, while the remainder did the course at Mhow. In later
years, a few JCOs attended the Single Side Band Wireless Repair course, at the
US Army Signals School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, USA. This was a combined
course for officers as well as JCOs/NCOs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The normal allotment of vacancies was two to
three per year. However, after the sudden increase in the size of the Corps in
the period 1963-65, additional vacancies were allotted. With time, training
facilities in India improved and the practice of sending JCOs and NCOs abroad
for technical training ceased. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No.
2 Signal Training Centre<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In wake of the 1962 war with China,
a large number of formation signal units were raised. This naturally resulted in an increase in the
demand for trained manpower, which could not be met by the existing training
centre at Jabalpur. It was therefore decided to raise two additional training
centres for the Corps, one of them at Jabalpur itself and the second at another
location, preferably in the South. Goa was chosen for its sylvan surroundings
and the fact that if offered certain ready built accommodation which originally
was used by the Portuguese garrison which had been stationed there. What possibly was lost in the labyrinth of
bureaucratic paper work was the fact that Goa is not a city by itself, but
consists of numerous small townships spread throughout its area. The accommodation that was available was in
penny packets and was located at small outposts throughout the island. A decision however having been taken, the No.
2 Signal Training Centre was raised at Panjm on 9 December 1962.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The headquarters of No. 2 Signal
Training Centre was raised along with one military and two technical training
regiments. The headquarters was located
at Panjim, close to the Governor’s official residence. The task of raising the Centre fell on the
shoulders of Colonel R.N. Sen who had by then developed a formidable reputation
in the Corps. The difficulties and intricacies of raising the Centre can be
appreciated from the geographical locations of the various units and the
distances that separated them. The
Military Training Regiment was situated at Margao which was late renamed as
Madgaon. This was the rail head for the
Centre. Apart from the distance of over
30 km between Margao and Panjim, they were separated by a river between over
which no bridge existed and troops and vehicles had to cross by means of a
ferry. No. 3 Technical Training Regiment
was at Bambolim which was about 8 km off Panjim. No. 6 Technical Training Regiment was
located at Ponda which was over 20 km on a separate route from Panjim. Subsequently, in 1967 when No. 3 Signal
Training Centre at Jabalpur was disbanded and its assets divided between No. 1
and 2 Signal Training Centres, No. 5 Technical Training Regiment moved to Goa
and was located along side No. 3 Technical Training Regiment at Bambolim. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the beginning, there were a
number of other logistic problems which though common to new raisings had
peculiar overtones in the case of units in Goa.
Initially, the troops were housed under tents. Many problems which were faced in the Centre
were due to the fact that Goa was not a cantonment and as such did not boast of
any facilities normally available in a peace time location. The nearest military station was Belgaum
which was over 150 km away. The lack of
administrative back up and laboratories at the technical training regiments
placed a tremendous strain on the pioneers who had to raise this Centre. It is reported that the Commandant himself
went on an ‘exploratory trip’ to various stations in the country to obtain
administrative personnel such as cooks, washermen, sweepers, barbers, for the
Centre! Service transport had not fetched up and as such civilian transport had
to be hired. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">No. 3 Military Training Regiment
was raised on 9 December 1962 by Lieutenant Colonel P.R. Gangadharan at Margao.
On the same date No. 3 Technical Training Regiment was raised by Lieutenant
Colonel K.D. Bhargava at Panjim and then moved to Bambolim. The first few batches were sent to Industrial
Technical Institutes for their training as equipment and technical laboratories
had not yet been set up. Subsequent to
the reorganization in 1967, this regiment concentrated on producing mechanics
and electrical fitter Signals. No. 5 Technical Training Regiment was initially
raised under No. 3 Signal Training Centre at Jabalpur during March 1963. Once that Centre was disbanded, the regiment
was reorganized and moved to Bambolim in August 1967 and became part of No. 2
Signal Training Centre. No 6 Technical Training Regiment was raised by
Lieutenant Colonel K Gopinathan on 22 December 1962 at Panjim. Subsequently
during April 1963, it moved to Ponda to train operators of various categories. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Boys
Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During World War II, there were two
Boys Companies in the Corps, one at Jubbulpore and the other at Bangalore. The
general demobilization ordered after the war was speeded up after the mutiny in
Jubbulpore in February 1946. This caused a shortage of accommodation at the
Depot and the Boys Company was moved from Jubbulpore to Mhow in December
1946. On 26 May 1947, the status of both
companies at Bangalore and Mhow was raised to that of a regiment. After Independence,
when 2 STC was transferred to Pakistan, the Boys Regiment at Bangalore was
amalgamated with the one at Mhow on 17 December 1947. The Punjabi Mussulman
element of the Boys Regiment at Mhow was also sent to Pakistan along with the
OC, Major Abdul Rehman, who opted to join Pakistan Army Signals. Major Shambhoo
Singh took over as the OC of the Boys Regiment at Mhow.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Field Marshal, Sir Claude
Auchinleck, who was earlier C-in-C of India and then Supreme Commander of India
and Pakistan, was a great champion of boys training. Being himself a
distinguished soldier, his experience had shown that boys companies produced
excellent leaders. He was so impressed
with the boys on his visit to Mhow in March 1947 that he designed and made a
flag at his own expense to be presented to the Boys Regiment. This flag was presented on 29 January 1948 at
a colourful parade held at Mhow. As the
Field Marshal was unable to come himself, Brigadier Akehurst, the Director
Signals and SO-in-C presented the flag on behalf of the Supreme Commander. On 3
August 1948, the Boys Regiment returned to Jabalpur as by than the
demobilization and partition phase had been completed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With the issue of the pamphlet
“Boys Training Indian Army, 1947” the aim of the training was changed to produce
first an ‘incipient technician’ and then ‘the man’ in that order of
priority. The educational targets aimed
were Class II English and Class II Army Certificate of Education during two
years. The training of boys continued in
accordance with this pamphlet up to 31 December 1950.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The year 1951 saw a change in boys
training. A new training directive
issued by Army HQ on 20 November 1950 laid down that the aim of boys training
in the Corps of Signals was to produce a ‘skilled technician’ and ‘a leader’ in
that priority. Training was divided into boys training and ex-boys corps
training. The targets during boys
training of 130 weeks were laid down as class 1 English, class 1 Army
Certificate of Education and class IV of a technical trade (operator or workshop).
Under this scheme, after one year of boys training, a boy was to be allotted a
definite trade and trained for class IV in that category. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
new directive which involved re-introduction of technical training in the Boys
Regiment, which had been discontinued in 1942, resulted in considerable work
particularly in setting up technical installations. The technical training for Phase II was
required to be carried out in the technical training regiments of the Centre. The technical training in Phase II had to be
spread uniformly ever 72 weeks working out to two periods per day. This was most inconvenient due to the
location of the technical training regiments. The difficulty was brought to the
notice of Army HQ which directed that the technical training should be
conducted in the Boys Regiment itself.
To implement this, some technical instructors and items of equipment
were loaned to the Boys Regiment from the two technical training regiments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The existing policy on the training
of boys was causing difficulties and inconvenience. It was also felt that this policy gave the
ex-boys distinctive treatment during their man service and this form of
exclusiveness was not considered the best way of exploiting the sound technical
and military back ground of the boys. A
fresh policy on training of boys was therefore, issued by Army HQ in 1956. As per this policy the boys were to maintain
their identity only in the Boys Regiment.
On entering the military training regiment they would be treated as
normal recruits. The training was to be
conducted in phases as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase I - 52 weeks, at
the Boys Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase II - 65 weeks, at
the Boys Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 14.4pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo28; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Phase III - 12 weeks at
the military training regiment followed by 49-79 weeks at the technical
training regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During Phase I fifty percent of
training was for education and remainder for developing technical aptitude and
for military and recreational training.
Phase II was entirely meant for developing technical aptitude and
outdoor military training designed to develop qualities of leadership. As the boys would have completed a large part
of their military training in the Boys Regiment, the military training in the
military training regiment was reduced to only 12 weeks in Phase III. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1959, the training of the boys
was re-appraised and a fresh training directive was issued. The aim of the boys
training as per the new directive was to produce a man with educational back
ground in Science and Mathematics up to Matriculation standard; provide him a
general technical education designed to develop aptitude for Signals trade; and
enable him to adapt to the way life and the type of work required of a soldier
in the Corps of Signals. The boys were
to be trained up to Matriculation standard with a view to making them potential
soldiers for entry into Group B and C categories of the Corps. On completion of Phase II of their training
it was intended that the boys should attain the standard of Army First Class
Certificate of Education Examination and Army First Class English Certificate
Examination.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A new Training Directive for Boys
issued in March 1969 made major changes in the pattern of educational training
of the boys. The education objective
laid down in this directive was much higher than that laid down in the previous
directives. The aim of the boys training
as laid down in this directive was to produce a man who by the end of this
training was qualified in the Army Special Certificate of Education
Examination; had developed the technical aptitude for eventual entry into a
matric entry rate category of the Corps of Signals; and was physically tough,
mentally alert and adapted to the way of life of a soldier.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">About this time queries were raised
by the Adjutant General’s Branch in Army HQ as to why boys were being given
matric entry categories when they had not qualified in the Matriculation
Examination. As it is boys found it difficult to achieve the educational
qualifications laid down in the limited period they spent in the Boys Regiment. With the de-recognition of ACE I and AEC I as
equivalent to matriculation and Army Special being equated with matriculation
the position was further aggravated. It became imperative to carry out changes
in the training being carried out in the Boys Regiment if it was to be saved
from being extinction. Efforts were made
to obtain recognition of the unit as a Boys School by the Madhya Pradesh Board
of Higher Education. This enabled the
unit to send the boys for Matriculation Examination outside. The results of the first batch of students
were very encouraging, but just when this scheme appeared to have a promising
future the Matriculation Examination was abolished in the State due to
switching over to Higher Secondary system.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Efforts were then made to coach the
boys for the Higher Secondary Examination.
In March 1972 the unit sent 104 boys for this examination and obtained a
result of 78% passes. The educational training in the Boys Regiment was
completely revolutionized with intensive coaching being under taken and modern
training aids such as a language laboratory and science laboratories being
setup and utilized to obtain maximum results in both Higher Secondary and Army
Special Examinations. In addition to preparing boys for Higher Secondary
examination the Boys Regiment, being recognized as a school, coached boys for
class 10 which was considered equivalent to matriculation for the purpose of
entry in Matric Entry categories. The OC of the unit was made to qualify for
Bachelor of Education Examination of Jabalpur University thus enabling him to
function as the Principal of the Boys Regiment School. Advantage was taken of
visits to Naval Boys Establishment, Central Institute of English Teaching,
Hyderabad and establishments of Education Ministry, to institute changes in the
training being imparted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In addition to the changes in
education being imparted to boys, efforts were made to improve the standard of
intake of the boys by sending out recruiting parties. The results both from the point of view of
recruitment and education were very encouraging and gave promise of a brighter
future for the Boys Regiment in 1972. There was no inkling of the fate that
awaited the unit, which was destined to be disbanded a few years hence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The pre-Independence Indian Signal
Corps had created a number of training institutions modelled on those of the
Royal Signals in UK. Providentially,
most of these training institutions were already in India at the time of
Partition in 1947, obviating the need to set up new ones, as happened in Pakistan.
Some, like the ISC School in Mhow, had been set up just before
Independence. Being a technical arm,
with a variety of tradesmen, the requirement of specialised training needed the
closest attention. The foresight and acumen of those at the helm of affairs in
the Corps during its early years after Independence ensured that training
facilities were established and made functional without loss of time. This
enabled the post Independence Corps of Signals, now officered almost entirely
by Indian officers, to finds its feet very quickly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The challenge for the Corps has
been rapid changes in electronics technology in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup>
Century. The changes were phenomenal; from analog to digital, from thermionic
valves to transistors, integrated circuits (ICs) and solid state; induction of
new systems and equipment like radio relay, VHF radios, teleprinters, ECL
machines, tape relay and so on. The Corps was able to meet the challenge and
absorb all these changes due to upgradation of training at the MCTE and STCs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The story of the growth of the MCTE
reflects the transformation of the Corps from an arm of the service looking
primarily after communications to one with multifarious responsibilities,
including computers, electronic warfare, signal intelligence and many others.
From a small school running just eight courses under the command of a
lieutenant colonel in 1947, it became a college conducting over 30 courses in
1972, under the command of brigadier. (Today, it is commanded by a lieutenant general).
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 14.4pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The saga of the STCs is no less
remarkable. In 1947 the STC Jabalpur comprised two training regiments, one
military and one technical. For a short period in the early sixties, there were
three STCs, two at Jabalpur and one at Goa.
By 1972 there were two STCs, each having four regiments, one military
and three technical. In terms of size and capacity, it meant a four-fold
increase in the training facilities. This is in keeping with the strength of
the Corps that had multiplied more than six times during this period.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .9pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 10<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
chapter is based mainly on the Corps of Signals Planning/Liaison Notes for the
period 1948-57 and 1963-72; Review of Activities of the Corps of Signals,
covering the years 1961-65 dated 7 October 1965, and personal accounts from
officers. Specific references are given
below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -3.6pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Personal Account, Lt. Gen. M.S. Sodhi,.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -3.6pt 10pt 18pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -3.6pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Personal Account, Lt. Col. Chittaranjan
Soni<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -3.6pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -36pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 19 of
June 1951& SO-in-C’s Policy Instruction No 2/51.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 12pt -3.6pt 10pt 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">4. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 28 (January 1954).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">5. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 32
(January 1955).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 28
(January 1954).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">7. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 75
(April 1967).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">8. Corps of Signals of Liaison Note No 72
(August 1966).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">9. Pamphlet entitled ‘Post Commission
Training of Permanent Commission Officers 1968’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -3.6pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">10. Personal Account, Lt. Gen. M.S. Harbhajan
Singh,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -3.6pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">11. Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, <i>History of the
Corps of Signals, Volume II</i>, New Delhi: Corps of Signals Association, 2006,
p. 307.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -3.6pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">12. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 4 (April
1948),<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -3.6pt;">
<br /></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-35618500967178055852016-01-16T07:22:00.000-08:002016-01-16T07:22:11.008-08:00Chapter 8 - MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS (1947-72)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h2 align="center" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 20.5pt; tab-stops: 463.5pt 468.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chapter
8 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></h2>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 20.5pt; tab-stops: 85.5pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">MISCELLANEOUS
OPERATIONS (1947-72)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 3.6pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview – Background</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
KOREA (1953-54) : <i>UN Multinational Force
(1950-53) – Custodian Force India
(1953-54) – Signals in
Korea</i>. INDO-CHINA : <i>Background – International Commissions for Control and
Supervision in Indo China – Signals
in Indo-China</i>. GAZA (1956-67) : <i>Background – Operation ‘Shanti’ – Signals in
Gaza</i>. CONGO (1960-64) : <i>Background – Arrival of Indian Troops in Congo</i>. SIGNALS IN CONGO : <i>Indian Signal Company ONUC (1960 - 61) – Indian Independent
Brigade Group Signal Company, Congo – Indian Contingent Signal Regiment
ONUC Congo – Indian Signal Company (ONUC) Elisabethville (1961-62)</i>. NATHU
LA (1967) : <i>Background – The Events of 11
September 1967 – Signals in Nathu La – The Cho La Incident</i>. CONCLUSION.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Apart from the four major wars
(three with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and one with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
that Indian troops fought in the first 25 years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, they took part in a number of
relatively smaller campaigns. Most of these operations were undertaken on
foreign soil under the auspices of the United Nations, of which <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> became
one of the most active partners. Though the operations were conducted not
against an enemy, they often involved a fair degree of risk and resulted in
casualties.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The first such operation was
conducted in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in the early 1950s, when 60 Para Field Ambulance was sent as part of a UN
Multinational Force. Two years later, an Indian brigade was sent to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> as part
of the Custodian Force India (CFI),
under the control of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC),
which was also headed by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The successful conduct of this very sensitive assignment established <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
credentials in the international community, leading to several such assignments
in the succeeding years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The next major overseas assignment
was in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
(<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
when <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
contributed troops for the International
Commissions for Control and Supervision (ICSC) in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Of the
three nations (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Canada</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poland</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
that made up ICSC, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> contributed the maximum
troops, the major share coming from the Corps of Signals, in the form of a full-fledged
signal regiment. The assignment lasted for over 15 years, from 1954 to 1970. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> In 1956 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> sent
troops to form part of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city> during the <st1:place w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place> crisis. The Indian contingent comprised an
infantry battalion along with ancillary troops, including a signal section,
which was turned over every year. A total of 11 Indian contingents </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">served
in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city> from
November 1956 to June 1967. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
from July 1960 to June 1964 was the largest peace keeping operation mounted by
the United Nations until that time. Initially, in 1960, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> sent only
supply, technical and medical personnel. This included a signal company that
was located at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>. In 1961, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> sent an
independent brigade, along with its own signal company. The Signals complement
was later increased to a regiment, located at <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>.
The assignment in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
included a number of actions in which Indian troops suffered casualties. The
assignment lasted until 1964. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Another action in which Indian
troops were involved took place on Indian soil at Nathu La in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1967.
Though war was not declared, Indian troops clashed with the Chinese, leaving
several dead on both sides. A signal
officer, Second Lieutenant N.C Gupta, played an important role in this
skirmish. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">KOREA</span></u></b></st1:place></st1:country-region><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> (1950-54)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">UN Multinational Force
(1950-53) <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">During World War II, the Allies
captured the Korean peninsula, which was under Japanese control. When the war
ended, the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States of
America</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st="on">Soviet
Union</st1:place> divided the country along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel,
giving birth to two <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Koreas</st1:place></st1:country-region>:
the Communist-backed North, and the US-backed South. By mid-1950s, relations
between the two had worsened. On <st1:date day="25" month="6" w:st="on" year="1950">25 June 1950</st1:date>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> launched an attack on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
captured the capital, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Seoul</st1:place></st1:city>.
The UN Security Council demanded an immediate end to the hostilities. However,
when <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>
refused to comply, the UN asked member states to respond to the crisis by
furnishing assistance to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South
Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> and repel the aggression by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Troops from over 20 nations joined the UN Force under the leadership of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>. By the
time the force was deployed, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North
Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> had captured all of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>
except a small area around <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pusan</st1:place></st1:city>
where the UN command was located. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">With his abhorrence for war, Prime Minister Nehru declined to send
Indian combat troops to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
However, he agreed to send a field ambulance with an attached surgical unit.
The unit chosen for this assignment, 60 Para Field Ambulance, landed at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">port</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Pusan</st1:placename></st1:place> on <st1:date day="20" month="11" w:st="on" year="1950">20 November 1950</st1:date>, with a total strength of
346, consisting of 17 officers and 329 OR. The unit had to operate as two entities.
The principal part, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Rangaraj, was assigned
to 27th Commonwealth Brigade at Uijongbu. The remainder of the unit under Major
N.B. Banerjea worked at the South Korean field hospitals in the strategic town
of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Taegu</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">60 Para Field Ambulance remained in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> for more than three years,
taking part in several important operations undertaken by the UN force.
Hostilities ended after Armistice Agreement which was signed on <st1:date day="27" month="7" w:st="on" year="1953">27 July 1953</st1:date> at <st1:place w:st="on">Panmunjom</st1:place>. Though the role of 60 Para Field Ambulance
ended with the signing of the Armistice, it was ordered to join the Indian
Custodian Force in the De-Militarised Zone. The unit returned to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> in
February 1954 together with the Indian Custodian Brigade. The unit performed
exceedingly well during its mission, earning praise from all concerned. It won
two Maha Vir Chakras, six Vir Chakras<i>, </i>one Bar to the Vir Chakra, and 20
Mentions-in-Dispatches, a record not equalled even by combat units on similar
assignments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB">Custodian Force <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> (1953-54)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The armistice envisaged a complete
cessation of hostilities and establishment of a De-Militarised Zone between the
two <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Koreas</st1:place></st1:country-region>
from which all military forces would be withdrawn. The final exchange of
prisoners between the North Koreans and the UN forces commenced on <st1:date day="5" month="8" w:st="on" year="1953">5 August 1953</st1:date>. The UN
Command had 14,704 Chinese and 7,900 North Korean prisoners to hand over, while
the joint North Korea People’s Army (NKPA) and the Chinese People’s Volunteers
(CPV) Command had 359. However, the exchange ran into problems when many of the
NKPA and Chinese prisoners held by the UN Command, as also some UN Command
prisoners with the North Koreans did not wish to be repatriated to their
respective countries. A large number of Communist prisoners elected not to return
to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Peoples</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Republic</st1:placetype></st1:place> of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>; and 21 American prisoners
elected to stay with the Communist forces. This became a hurdle in the
implementation of the Agreement. Both sides exchanged lists of prisoners, but
no decision could be reached on the methods and procedures for repatriation.
Since the issue could not be resolved, the UN established two
organisations. The first was the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), which had members from five countries -
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sweden</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Switzerland</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poland</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Czechoslovakia</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
which was to chair the body. In addition, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> was asked to send a Custodian
Force, which was to take responsibility for all prisoners of both sides who did
not wish to be repatriated. All military and civilian personnel of the
Custodian Force India (CFI) required to assist the NNRC in carrying out its
duties were to be exclusively from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Lieutenant General K.S.
Thimayya, D.S.O., was appointed the chairman of the NNRC while Major General
S.P.P. Thorat, D.S.O., was nominated as the GOC, CFI. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Initially, it was visualized that the CFI would have
to take over an estimated 50,000 prisoners of war and a force consisting of a
divisional headquarters with two brigades would be required. However, before
the Agreement was signed, about 27,000 prisoners of war were suddenly released
by the South Koreans. This left only
about 24,000 prisoners that had to be guarded and the strength of the CFI was
reduced to a brigade. Accordingly, 190 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier R.S.
Paintal was earmarked to form the main body of the CFI. After a visit by the advance team comprising
General Thorat and the Foreign Secretary in August 1953 for an on-the spot
study, the CFI left for Korea in five contingents in August-September. The first four contingents comprising the
bulk of the force left by sea from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>,
while the last contingent comprising 2 Para and a company of 3 Mahar was
transported by air from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Inchon</st1:place></st1:city> by
the US Air Force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 7.2pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-indent: 28.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
CFI was housed in canvas tents, in three groups, at a place known earlier as
Tong-Jong-Ni. Thorat gave it the name Hindnagar, which soon became well known.
The prisoners were housed in compounds, with each accommodating about five
hundred. Each compound had tents for living, kitchen, dining hall, and
latrines. There was a double wire fence around each compound, with the space
between them used for patrolling. A number of compounds were grouped together
into an enclosure, which also had a double wire fence around it. Initially, prisoners of both sides were quite
friendly with the Indian troops guarding them. However, this changed, as soon
as some of the prisoners began to ask for repatriation. The other prisoners
resented this, and beat up those who wanted to surrender to the guards, for
repatriation. Sometimes, they even killed such prisoners. The Indian troops
tried to prevent such incidents, and this brought them in conflict with the
prisoners. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An essential part of the NNRC’s
mandate was the requirement for each side to explain fully to the benefits of
being repatriated to their own countries, without using any coercion. After the
explanation each prisoner was asked for his option. On <st1:date day="15" month="10" w:st="on" year="1953">15 October 1953</st1:date>, explanations
started. A large number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners, captured by the
UN Command, refused to be repatriated. The KVA-CPV Command contended that this
was because false information had been given to the prisoners regarding the
conditions prevailing in their homelands. They argued that if they were given a
chance to explain things to them, they would change their minds. This was to be
done by teams from the parent nations, who would be allowed to talk to each
prisoner, in camera. Each prisoner had to undergo the process of 'explanation',
but was free to make his choice, regarding repatriation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When the explanations started,
the prisoners refused to come out of their compounds. The troops of the CFI had
a difficult time in persuading the prisoners to come to the explanation tent.
The prisoners often spat on the members of the explanation team, or beat them
up. Sometimes, they even tried to rough up the guards. If force was used by the
troops, they were denounced by the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNRC, who
considered it a violation of human rights. On the other hand, if the CFI did
not do this, the Czech and Polish members accused them of not giving adequate
protection to the explanation teams. Ultimately, on the insistence of the Swiss
and Polish members, who threatened to withdraw if force was not used, the
matter was referred to the Government of India. It was decided that no force
should be used, and prisoners were to be given explanations only if they wished
to. After the ninety day period for explanations had expired, prisoners were
handed over by the CFI, to the side which had captured them. The UN Command
released its prisoners, in January 1954. KPV-CPV Command initially refused to
take back the prisoners captured by them, but eventually did so. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">A total of 21,805 prisoners were handed back
to the UN Command, and 347 to the Red Cross representatives of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
During the period in CFI custody, 441 Chinese and 188 North Korean prisoners
had asked for repatriation, and 10 prisoners of the NKPA-CPV Command had asked
to be sent to the UN Command. 88
prisoners (12 Chinese, 74 North Korean and 2 South Korean) were brought to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> with the
CFI pending a final decision about their fate. Most of them were young
students; others were doctors, engineers, tradesmen, technicians and farm
labourers. These soldiers were camped in Delhi Cantonment till their final
repatriation to other neutral countries such as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Brazil</st1:place></st1:country-region> which agreed to accept them.
In early 1954, the CFI returned to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB">Signals in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When 60 Field Ambulance went to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1950,
it was not accompanied by any element of Signals and was dependant on the 27<sup>th</sup>
Commonwealth Brigade for its communication requirements. However, a truncated
divisional signal regiment, known as the Force Signal Unit was created to
accompany the CFI. The unit was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.N.
Banerjee with Major K.S. Dhillon as his second-in-command. The other officers
in the unit were Captain D.B. Lahiri (adjutant), Captain J.S. Nanda (duty
signal officer) and Captain H.W. Tornay (cipher officer). In addition, 190
Infantry Brigade Section was also available, with Captain Salig Ram as the OC
and Second Lieutenant Harbans Bahadur as his second-in-command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Force Signal Unit was raised in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. The speed of raising can be gauged from the
fact that officers reported within a week between 30 July and 6 August. Leaving
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> in two
parts on 12 and 14 August, the unit reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> by <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1953">15 August 1953</st1:date>. Since only two Indian ships
were immediately available, the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United
Kingdom</st1:place></st1:country-region> offered to provide two additional
vessels for transporting the CFI to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The unit embarked on two
ships at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>.
The advance party, consisting of two officers including the CO, two JCOs and 39
OR with approximately 40 tons of technical stores embarked on 18 August on the
M.V. <i>Empire Pride</i> (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>). The
technical stores included all radio equipment, mast construction stores,
telephone exchanges and Typex machines. The balance of the unit embarked on the
T.S.S. <i>Jaladurga</i> on the same
day. Unfortunately both ships
encountered heavy weather. The <i>Jaladurga</i> ran into a typhoon and sea
water entered the holds of the ship. The
equipment carried by the unit were not packed in water tight containers as
neither were the original cases available nor was there time to obtain material
for making new cases. As a result, some equipment
was damaged. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 30 August, the <i>Empire Pride</i> cast anchor three miles off <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Inchon</st1:place></st1:city>.
Since President Syngman Rhee of South Korea had refused permission for
Indian troops to disembark or travel overland, the personnel and equipment were
first taken to the US aircraft carrier <i>Point
Cruz</i> and then flown in helicopters to the camp site area, Tong-Jong-Ni,
which was named Hindnagar by the Indian Force. The site selected for the camp
was unsuitable from the Signals point of view.
Political considerations dictated that the site be located within the
demilitarized zone and be mutually acceptable to both North and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Since no Signals representative had gone with the advance team, suitability of
the area for signal communications was not taken into account while selecting
the site.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The transmitter
aerial being erected at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Hindnagar</st1:city>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Korea</st1:country-region></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The site selected for the
transmitter station was all mined and the ground was soft and boggy. The help of UN Command Engineers was sought
for clearing mines and construction of approach roads and plinths for the
transmitters. The work was completed on
11 September and a transmitter BC 339 was opened on the next day. The link
finally got through on 13 September.
The second transmitter SWB 11 could not be effectively used as it had
got badly damaged in transit. Initially, some difficulty was experienced in the
erection of the aerial masts as the ground was soft and boggy. Later, cemented bases were made and proper
rhombic aerials erected for both transmitting and receiving aerials. The size
of the aerial park was gigantic with the long diagonal being 1500 yards long
(almost a mile) and the short diagonal measuring 400 yards. Having erected the aerials, what transpired
on switching on the transmitter is best described by Captain (later Lieutenant
General) J.S. Nanda who said:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“I had two
outstanding Foremen of Signals - Naib Subedar Nambiar and a radio mechanic
Havildar Kartar Singh. No amount of
praise is really sufficient to describe their deeds in those early days at <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>. They worked unceasingly and with great
ingenuity to repair the SWB 11.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When it was
thought that this transmitter had been put on road, everyone crossed their
fingers and waited for the transmitter to be switched on. As DSO, I gingerly switched on the
transmitter. Immediately, we heard a
huge bang and smoke emanated from the rear side of the set. Quickly I switched off the set.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The SWB 11
worked off a three phase power supply and it had an oil cooled power
transformer in each phase. Each transformer
was immersed in a huge cistern of oil.
The transformer was housed in a small hut and the explosion had caused
the roof of the hut to be blown off. We, therefore, had to obtain a crane not
only to remove the transformer through the hole in the ceiling but also because
the rest of the equipment had been bolted down to the plinth. Having removed the transformer we rewound the
winding, but on switching on the equipment, there was a repeat performance. We just could not repair the power
transformer.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> We then decided to work the equipment on two phases
alone. Accordingly, I loaded the third
phase with electric bulbs. When we
switched on the set, to our joy the equipment worked. It is quite likely that instead of the rated
10 KW output power we only radiated about 3 to 4 KW. Nevertheless that was quite sufficient.”<b>1</b><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Extensive line and radio
communications were provided to the Custodian Force. This included communications to infantry
battalions and the enclosures established by them to HQ NNRC and to Army
HQ. Forward radio communications were
based on radio sets 62/22 and the rear communications on 694/B399/SWB 11. The main line arteries, using multi-core
cable were laid by the UN Command personnel but all field cables were laid by
Indian linemen. The operation of SDS between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and Hindnagar was of particular
interest because of the abnormal procedures, which involved handling of the
bags by various agencies. The bags were cleared to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city> by Indian Airways and BOAC. At <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>,
the Military Attaché’s office handed them over to US APO for further clearance
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Seoul</st1:place></st1:city> and
then on to Hindnagar. It took nearly 10
days for the bags despatched from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
to reach the Custodian Force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
was soon realised that an alternate channel of communication was required when
the radio link between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and Hindnagar was disrupted, which was a frequent occurrence. When this
happened, messages for the CFI were routed from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> to the Indian Embassy at <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Washington</st1:place></st1:state> which in turn
cleared it through the US Army Signal Corps channels to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This, however, was not a satisfactory
arrangement. On <st1:date day="3" month="11" w:st="on" year="1953">3 November 1953</st1:date>, Brigadier C.H.I.
Akehurst, the Director of Signals, wrote to Major General L.P. Sen, the
Military Attaché in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>,
indicating the necessity of a separate radio link between Indian Embassy in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city> and Custodian Force
Headquarters at Hindnagar to provide an alternative channel of communication. A
copy of the DO letter is reproduced below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brig CHI AKEHURST, CBE DO No 56136/GS/Sigs 2<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Director of Signals <st1:date day="3" month="11" w:st="on" year="1953">03 Nov 53</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dear<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The present
message traffic to/from Custodian Force Headquarters and Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission is being cleared over the wireless link that has been
established between Army Headquarters and Custodian Force Headquarters. It is imperative, however, that in the case
of breakdown of the existing link, there should exist an alternative channel of
routing of messages to/from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">KOREA</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
At present this is being done through the Overseas Communication Service
channels to the Indian Embassy at WASHINGTON, who in turn clears it through <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>
Army Signal Corps channels to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">KOREA</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This arrangement although satisfactory is not
by far the best. As you know, routing
through the Indian Embassy at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">TOKYO</st1:place></st1:city>
was also tried but has been found impracticable as mentioned in your signal No
O 8712 dated <st1:date day="13" month="10" w:st="on" year="1953">13 Oct 53</st1:date>. Furthermore, any message traffic that the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission have for your Embassy or vice versa has
to be routed through <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">INDIA</st1:place></st1:country-region>
with the consequent delay. It is
therefore proposed to consider the setting up of an independent channel of
communication to the Custodian Force Headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Capt MS SODHI of
this Headquarters is proceeding on temporary duty to TOKYO/HINDNAGAR on or
about <st1:date day="8" month="11" w:st="on" year="1953">8 Nov 53</st1:date>. While at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">TOKYO</st1:place></st1:city> he has been directed to examine the
possibility and implications of establishing an independent wireless link
between Indian Embassy at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">TOKYO</st1:place></st1:city>
and Custodian Force Headquarters in HINDNAGAR.
Thus, there will be an alternative routing from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">DELHI</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">TOKYO</st1:place></st1:city> via Overseas Communication Service
channels and from there an Indian Army wireless link to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">KOREA</st1:place></st1:country-region> which can
be depended upon under all circumstances.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 40.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The issue of
formal instructions in this respect by Ministry of External Affairs to the
Indian Embassy at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">TOKYO</st1:place></st1:city>
is being arranged.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With
best wishes<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Yours<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Maj Gen LP Sen, DSO<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Military Attaché<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Embassy of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">TOKYO</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Captain M.S. Sodhi (he later became a lieutenant general
and the SO-in-C) was sent to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in early November to examine the feasibility of the radio link. On his return he submitted a detailed report,
an extract of which is reproduced below:-<b>2</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>I
was deputed on special duty to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>
and Hindnagar on <st1:date day="8" month="11" w:st="on" year="1953">08 Nov 53</st1:date>
to examine the feasibility of establishing this radio link. Besides investigating the normal
administrative problems having financial implications, I had to explore the
possibility of obtaining equipment for the radio detachment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city> from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Japan</st1:place></st1:country-region> itself. It also involved obtaining agreement to this
proposal from the Japanese Government.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I gave a detailed briefing of the problems to the
Military Attaché and he agreed to these proposals in principle. He also indicated that the agreement of the
Japanese Government for establishing this link could be obtained through UN
Command Headquarters in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>
after a formal request was initiated by our Ministry of External Affairs. This was received later and with liaison, the
radio equipment at the Custodian Force Headquarters was obtained on loan
through local UN sources and for the terminal at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city> from the Australian contingent of the
Commonwealth Forces, who were located there.
The radio link to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>
was put through on <st1:date day="13" month="1" w:st="on" year="1954">13 Jan 54</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During his visit, Captain Sodhi also went into
various problems being faced by the Force Signal Unit. He noticed that a
considerable amount of damage had been suffered by the equipment during
shipment from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
especially the SWB 11 transmitter. This
could be attributed to improper packing, bad weather and rough seas en route,
because of which salt water had seeped into the equipment. Certain fittings inside the equipment had
also got loose due to jolting and vibrations which had damaged the wiring. In fact, he had to carry a large number of
spares weighing 375 lbs for the damaged equipment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An interesting point brought out in
the report relates to automatic Morse telegraphy. Extensive trials were carried
out and after a detailed study it was found that automatic Morse telegraphy
could not be successfully used in East-West or near East-West direction on a 24
hour basis because of effects of fading on this type of transmission. Even for shorter schedules, it was necessary
to have a sufficient choice of frequencies and accurate prediction charts. It was observed in the Primary Tape Relay
Station of the UN Command in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>
that auto Morse telegraphy was not used at all but high speed RTT was employed
instead. In his report Sodhi included
the following extract from the well known book “Radio-Engineering” by Terman
which throws light on this subject:- <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “<i>Short
waves propagated over great distances in an East-West direction differ markedly
in their behaviour from waves travelling long distance in a North-South
direction. This is because of the way in
which the distribution of sunlight varies along the transmission path at any
one time. The distribution of sunlight along a great circle path lying between
two points at the same latitude is non-uniform so that one part of the path can
be in sunlight while another part is in darkness. Under such a condition it is difficult to
find a frequency that will propagate satisfactorily over the entire
distance. It is thus found that
North-South transmission across the Equator is more reliable and easier to
maintain continuously than is communication over a like distance in an
East-West direction”.</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain Sodhi spent about two weeks in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>. During this
period, he had the opportunity to visit the sacred and closely guarded
precincts of the Joint UN and US Far East Command HQ in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Pershing</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Heights</st1:placetype></st1:place>
no less than three times. These visits
gave him a glimpse into the vast organization that functioned in what must have
been the largest military headquarters in the East. It also made him curious
about the Signals set-up that must be meeting its demands. Not being sure in
what light a request for a visit to the operational signal installations would
be viewed, it was with a certain amount of hesitation that he approached the
Military Attaché, in his capacity of Chief of the Indian Liaison Group in the
United Nations Command HQ, to arrange the visit. After some informal contacts and assurances
to the general staff officers concerned that the visit was intended from a
purely technical point of view, a formal request was sent in by the Military
Attaché to the UN Command HQ. A week of
silence from the UN side convinced him that the letter must have got into the
hands of some distrusting intelligence or security chief and found its place in
his pending tray, while he scratched his head about Sodhi’s credentials. It was therefore quite a welcome surprise
when one morning a telephone call came through from the Military Liaison
Section of the UN Command HQ to say that a conducted tour had been laid on for
Captain Sodhi on <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1953">15
December 1953</st1:date>. Describing his experience, Sodhi writes:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the appointed
day I motored down early to Pershing Heights to avoid all the office-hours
traffic jams on the ‘avenues’ and ‘streets’ of Central Tokyo and be in
time. At the Communication Section I was
met by Commander Morrel and given a quick preview into the nature of my
tour. He then introduced me to a Warrant
Officer Thompson of the <st1:place w:st="on">Far East</st1:place> Command
Signal Service Battalion (FEC Sig Svc Bn) who was to be my guide for the
day. With little waste of time I went
down with him to the basement of the building to the Terminal Station Branch
(equivalent of our Signal Centre) of the FEC Sig Svc Bn which was a signal unit
organized on a ‘brick system’ for the provision of signal communications for
the UN Command HQ.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the Terminal
Station Branch I was taken around by an officer by the name of Capt Shannon
(Capt Shannon had met Brig AC Iyappa in Georgia during his visit to the US Army
Signal Corps installation and evinced great interest in explaining things to
me.) This Section was sub divided into
the following main sub sections:-<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communications
– the equivalent of our terminal equipment room having about 25 teletypewriters
which cleared traffic to the Primary Tape Relay Station. There were 100% standby VHF circuits to the
two 47 pair gas filled cables which provided keying lines to the relay station.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operations
and registration – the equivalent of our Counter Room.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Crypto
Centre – equivalent of Cipher Office.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Methods
and Results – a traffic scrutiny and analysis organization consisting of about
two clerks per shift (‘trick’). They,
apart from collecting statistical data, checked on the percentage of errors,
procedural and operational, committed by each shift and logged them on a chart
in the Signal Centre. The average number
of messages handled were 10,000 per day and average time taken in clearing each
message (clear and crypt included in average) about 20 minutes.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Tele
Conference Rooms – There were two conference rooms where the Commander, and or
PSOs and their staff got together to have a teleconference with their opposite
numbers in other places – e.g. <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Washington</st1:place></st1:state>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">San Francisco</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Manila</st1:place></st1:city> and so on. In each room there were two screens on which
the ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ messages were reproduced.
The radio link was operated by a teletypewriter which was installed next
door.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Maintenance
and Services – They looked after the standby power and maintained both the
teletypewriters and cipher machines. I
was not taken there.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An outstanding point of note was that messages were
handled by Signals only for the purpose of electrical clearance. The receipt and registration of ‘OUT messages
and fair copying and distribution of ‘IN’ messages was done by AGs Branch. The distribution of responsibility, they said,
was laid down in their Standard Operating Procedure Regulation which they would
give to me at the end of my visit but discreetly or otherwise forgot. I however got a copy from the UN Command HQ
later on.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Other than the Terminal Station Branch<i> </i>at<i>
</i><st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Pershing</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Heights</st1:placetype></st1:place>, Sodhi was also taken to several
other installations, such as the Primary Tape Relay station at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Drake</st1:placename></st1:place>;
the Receiver station at Owada; the Transmitter station at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Tsukeeshma</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Island</st1:placetype></st1:place>
in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bay</st1:placetype></st1:place>; and the Photographic Section in
heart of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>.
During the tour Sodhi covered about a 100 road miles and was able to visit all
the major signal installations of the UN Command HQ in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tokyo</st1:place></st1:city>. However, the fast pace of the tour
gave him little time to absorb the details.
Furthermore, he dared not take notes from fear of offending the sense of
security of the Americans. Still it gave
him an insight into the manner in which the US Signal Corps functioned. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_2" o:spid="_x0000_i1026" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="Image (10)"
style='width:303.75pt;height:244.5pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image003.png"
o:title="Image (10)"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="Image (10)" height="326" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image004.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_2" width="405" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Linemen of 190 Inf Bde Sig Sec making a track crossing
at
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Panmunjom</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>, in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The CFI returned to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> in five
ships in early 1954. They were seen off by General Maxwell Taylor and were
given a guard of honour by the 8<sup>th</sup> US Army. On their arrival in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>, they received a
tumultuous welcome. The Chief Minister, C. Rajagopalachari, and his entire
cabinet were at the quayside, to receive the contingent when their ship
berthed. They left for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
by special troops trains, which were greeted at every station en route, and
showered with sweets and garlands. At <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nagpur</st1:place></st1:city>,
the Chief Minister of the State was present, with his ministers. At <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, there was a huge
crowd at the railway station, when their train steamed in. The Prime Minister
was also present, to greet them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> In conclusion, it can be said that the work of
the CFI in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>
has a very special place in the history of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and of the Indian Army. Not only was it the first international peace
mission undertaken by the armed forces of independent <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the
problems they faced were novel and baffling.
The performance of the Force Signal Unit was commendable, even though it
had been raised in a hurry and was operating in an unfamiliar environment. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">INDO-CHINA<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Background<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indo-China was the collective name by which the
region of <st1:place w:st="on">South East Asia</st1:place> roughly
corresponding to the present-day countries of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
known during the period of European colonial domination. Historically and
culturally, the region has been influenced by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>, hence
its colonial name. The royal capital of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region> was Louang-Prabang but its
administrative capital was <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vientiane</st1:place></st1:city>. The capital of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region> was <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Phnom Penh</st1:place></st1:city>.
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>
was the capital of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
until the bifurcation of the country in 1954, after which it continued to be
the capital of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>,
popularly known as’ the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Paris</st1:place></st1:city>
of the East’, was the capital of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Indo-China was under French
colonial rule until the Second World War. With the German occupation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">France</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> became
a Japanese colony. On <st1:date day="2" month="9" w:st="on" year="1945">2
September 1945</st1:date>, after the August revolution, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam was formed under President Ho Chi Minh. However, by this
time the French forces had returned and were in control of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and parts of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Then followed nine years of fighting between the French and Viet Minh until the
decisive battle of <st1:place w:st="on">Dien Bien Phu</st1:place> in 1954</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 77%;">, </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">where
a large garrison of French forces was annihilated after fifty-five days of
fighting. During this period, similar liberation movements were being carried
on in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>
by the units of Khmer Resistance Forces and in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region> by the Pathet Lao Forces. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">International
Commissions for Control and Supervision in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">According to the provisos of the
Geneva Agreement of <st1:date day="20" month="7" w:st="on" year="1954">20 July 1954</st1:date>, the country was divided into North and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
with a demarcation line approximately at the seventeenth parallel. All foreign
troops were to be withdrawn and introduction into Indo-China of any troops,
arms, or ammunition was prohibited. French forces in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> were to withdraw into
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and general elections were to be held in 1956 for its re-unification. To
implement these provisos, three International Commissions for Control and
Supervision were established, one each in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Each commission was to
consist of three members (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Canada</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poland</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
as the Chairman. The headquarters of the Control Commission for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>,
in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
with an office at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The headquarters of the other two commissions
were located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Phnom Penh</st1:place></st1:city>
for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vientiane</st1:place></st1:city>
for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Each of the three commissions was headed by
an Indian who was known as Secretary General, who carried the status of an
ambassador. There were ambassadors of
the other two countries with each commission, i.e. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Canada</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poland</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Each of the three countries had an alternate
delegate, who was the also the military adviser to advise on defence
matters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The first three
chairmen of the commissions were Mr. M.J. Desai<b> </b>(<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>),<b> </b>Mr. G. Parthasarathi (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>) and </span><span lang="PT">Dr J.N. Khosla (</span><st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB">Laos</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span lang="EN-GB">). The first three alternate
delegates to these countries were </span><span lang="EN-GB">Major Generals K.P.
Dhargalkar, Sarda Nand Singh and P.S. Gyani. They functioned as the overall
commanders of the military contingents and chairmen of the senior military
adviser’s committees. The chairmen of the commissions and their members were
changed every two to three years; while the alternate delegates had tenures of
less than two years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB">India</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span lang="EN-GB"> provided the civilian and military leadership, security, logistics
and basic communications for all the three commissions. The first batch of
troops, comprising 50 officers and 280 men from 2 Guards were flown to
Indo-China by the Indian Air Force. I.N.S. <i>Magar</i>
was used to ferry the heavy equipment. By <st1:date day="13" month="6" w:st="on" year="1955">13 June 1955</st1:date>, the total Indian troop strength
in Indo-China was 946. In comparison to
this, the military observers who represented the Western and the Eastern Blocs
(Canada and Poland), matched each others’ contribution to the ICSC, which
amounted to 150 military observers each during the entire term of the
Commission. The Indian component included personnel from the Corps of Signals,
a medical team, an Ordnance detachment, a movement control detachment to
co-ordinate and control the movement of units, cargo and personnel, a postal unit
and a supply detachment. These personnel were placed in two categories,
designated as international and national components. The contingent also
included one observer each from the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy. All
personnel were rotated in September-October every year in accordance with a
relief plan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The Vietnam ICSC
was first established in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>.
In 1958, it moved to <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>, where it was
based until it moved back to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>
for three months in 1973. Due to paucity of funds and the ongoing war in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the
ICSC in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was closed down in December 1969, leaving a small detachment of one officer and
ten OR in place. The ICSC continued to maintain a reduced presence in <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> throughout the 1960-1975 Vietnam conflict. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>, a
Joint Commission was set up in the town of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Svay Reing</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="14" month="8" w:st="on" year="1954">14 August 1954</st1:date>. Elections were held on <st1:date day="11" month="9" w:st="on" year="1955">11 September 1955</st1:date> and the
political party backed by Prince Sihanouk won a majority of the seats. By the
first week of October 1955, the work of the ICSC in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region> had ended. Slowly the ICSC’s responsibilities in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region> were
reduced, though the Commission was finally closed only in March 1974.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Elections in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region> were held
on <st1:date day="4" month="5" w:st="on" year="1955">4 May 1955</st1:date>.
Three years later, at the request of the Laotian Government, the Commission was
closed down in July 1958. However, it was reconvened in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> on April 1961. The Commission was finally
withdrawn from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1968, leaving behind a small civilian component. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">As the work of the Commission continued, the
officers and the staff personnel serving with the mission were replaced.
Gradually, the requirements decreased. By 1970, the Indian contribution in
Indo-China had come down to a handful of officers and men and all commissions
ceased to exist by 1975. <b>3<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB">Signals in Indo-China<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">The International Commissions
Signal Regiment (ICSR) was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="4" month="8" w:st="on" year="1954">4 August 1954</st1:date>
to provide signal cover to the three International Commissions in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
Viet-Nam. The first CO was Lieutenant Colonel V. Mehta with Major S.N. Mehta
as his second-in-command. The other officers posted to the unit were Major </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">S.S.
Dhaliwal (OC Signal Detachment, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>);
Captain R.G. Singh (adjutant); Captain M.P.
Kunjunni Nair (quartermaster); Captain C.C. Bakshi (cipher officer);
Captain E.N. Ramadoss (DSO); Captain E.N. Pillai (wireless officer); Captain C.
Soni (OC Signal Detachment, Cambodia) and Captain V.P. Abbi (OC Signal
Detachment, Laos). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Lieutenant-Colonel Mehta flew to
Indo-China for an initial reconnaissance to gather information about the local
communications set-up, resources available, power supply, frequencies, etc. The
load tables, composition and priorities were worked out and the advance party
of two officers, four JCOs and 15 OR were flown to Indo-China on <st1:date day="17" month="8" w:st="on" year="1954">17 August 1954</st1:date>. They
reached well in time to receive four hundred tons of ordnance stores which
arrived two days later. On 20 August </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">elements of the
advance party deplaned at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vientiane</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Phnom Penh</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. By 21 August cipher offices were established at
all four locations and traffic was being passed over civil circuits. The first ‘operational immediate’ message from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> received
on 24 August took four days to reach <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>
over civil circuits. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">The first batch of the main
party arrived on <st1:date day="3" month="9" w:st="on" year="1954">3 September 1954</st1:date>, and the next day, the signal centre at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>
was established. Within a week, the
wireless links from <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Phnom
Penh</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vientiane</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city> had
been established. Wireless communications to the inspection team sites from
each commission were established within ten days of the arrival of the main
party. Most of the equipment was taken
from the French Command. Various types
of sets were used. The French provided BC-339,
SCR-399, SCR-188, SCR-193 and ANGRC-9 sets.
A few ANGRC-9, VB-40 and VR-101 sets were also received from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The total number of wireless stations
operating at one time was 78. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> The wireless nets were spread out over
unusually large distances and each net had a large number of stations, some as
many as thirteen. The choice of
frequencies was limited. Due to the
limitation on space, the dipole aerial or its modifications had to be used in
place of the preferable rhombic. The 110
volts power supply was very unreliable and unsteady, fluctuating sometimes
between 60 and 150 volts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> The
signal centres had a host of other problems. The political language used in
most messages made them verbose and the precedence was unduly high. In September 1954, 30% messages were Flash,
5% Emergency and 45% Operational Immediate.
Due to the commissions being composed of delegations of different
nationalities, the layout of messages could not be standardized for quite some
time. It was also not uncommon for two
similar messages to be originated by two delegations, one in clear and the
other in cipher. In the first few
months, the regiment was clearing an average of 250,000 groups per month. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Once
the communications had stabilised, matters improved. The signal communication
system in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
consisted of a major signal centre at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>
with smaller signal centres at the headquarters of the commissions for each
state viz. <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>
for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vientiane</st1:place></st1:city> for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region> and Phnom
Pen for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The rear link wireless communication consisted of one RTT and one CW hand speed
link between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> and one standby CW hand speed link
between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. The main internal wireless
communication in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
consisted of a one-to-one CW hand speed net with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city> as control and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vientiane</st1:place></st1:city> and
Phnom Pen as out stations. The three commission headquarters in turn had their
forward wireless nets to fixed and mobile observer teams. An air despatch
service (ADS) operated three times a week between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. There was also an ADS connecting the various
commission headquarters and motor despatch service (MDS) between the commission
headquarters and the fixed and mobile observer teams.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_4"
o:spid="_x0000_i1027" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:324pt;height:234pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image005.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="312" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_4" width="432" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Operators at work in the Signal Centre, <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Personal accounts by officers
who served with the ICSR give a vivid picture of the conditions prevailing in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> at that
time. Major S.N. Mehta, the second-in-command of the unit, writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> My posting as 2 I/C of the Regt (the
CO was <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place>
Vinayak Mehta) was the result of the usual administrative mix-up which occurs
when working under pressure. I had just
completed <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Staff</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype></st1:place> and had in fact been posted to
36 Inf Div Sig Regt. In 1951 I had
completed a Chinese language interpreter’s course from the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Foreign Language</st1:placename></st1:place>
in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. Some smart guy in MS Branch promptly linked
Indo-China with Chinese and I was posted as an Interpreter. Later somebody made the horrifying discovery
that nobody in Indo-China spoke Chinese (they speak either French or Tonkinese)
and consequently there was no requirement for any Chinese interpreter. My posting order was therefore changed to the
ICSR (International Commission Signal Regt).
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> We were concentrated at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> in the summer of
1954 and were flown in Indian commercial aircraft to <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. We carried no equipment, vehicles or arms
(the last was a blessing since it saved guard/kot duties) - just our personal
baggage and cipher documents. Throughout
our service in Indo-China we enjoyed diplomatic immunity and nobody’s baggage
(including OR) was ever checked or opened.
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> The original agreement was that the
French would supply all communication equipment in the South and the Viet Minh
in the North. However, the provision of
communication equipment, vehicles etc was beyond the capacity of the Viet Minh
(they were basically guerrillas) and so the French provided everything both at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Communication was entirely by radio (CW).
At Saigon we had two links to Hanoi (later cut down to one), two control
stations linking international teams located at places in the South and a link
connecting Saigon with the capitals of Phnom Penh, Vientiane and Hanoi. There was also the base link <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. All the
radio equipment provided was of American manufacture – I never saw any French
equipment. We were given only the
receiver terminals to operate. The
French kept all transmitters in their own transmitter station to which we were
not allowed entry. UG keying lines
enabled the receiver operator to key his transmitter. There was no hope of any line communications
because the war and guerrilla activity had long before this sabotaged all PL
out of existence. Generally too, the
only mode of communication was by air, all main roads having been rendered
unusable due to mining, ambushes and the like.
There was a regular air service twice a week between Hanoi-Vientiane-Phnom
Penh-<st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> and a seat was always reserved for
the signal courier and his SDS bag. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> The French provided staff cars (Peugeots)
with drivers to the HQ of the International Commissions in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. The share of the Signal Regt was, I think,
two staff cars – one 15 cwt. and one three-tonner. Telephones were given generously by the
French both at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> and to a lesser degree
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">In order to ease the language problem, the Signal Regt was allotted one
English-speaking French Sergeant for liaison duties. He was a great help since he was a signaller
himself and immediately understood our problems. He was a versatile fellow and
once we had established a happy working relationship, he would obtain for us
anything within reason from the French.
Talking to the Canadians was of course no problem. The Poles had brought
along their own English and French linguists, but the Viet Minh officials made
life complicated. Although I suspect all
of them could speak French, they steadfastly refused to do so, so their speech
had to be translated by one interpreter into French and then a second
interpreter translated the French into English.
The return journey was equally tedious.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">4</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Another interesting account has
been given by Brigadier E.N. Ramadoss, who was posted to the unit from the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> as a captain. He writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US">One of the planes or INS
Magar - I do not now remember which- brought two SCR 399 from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. One of
them was completely smashed in transit with extensive damage to the valves,
chassis and wiring. Since I had been taking classes on medium power equipment
in Mhow, I knew the circuits practically by heart then. I had a Radio Mechanic
Class I with me. So I decided to re-wire and replace the damaged parts, by
drawing the manuals and the parts from the French Depot. By working late into
nights, we got the set working and put them on the circuit in a couple of weeks. Even the look of the outer cover
and chassis \vas improved cosmetically by the
French mechanics. It was our best set. The French Signals officers and
mechanics were impressed by what we could do.
They used to borrow my mechanics to help them out. It was a great morale- booster for our men to
be treated on par by the French mechanics and be entertained by them.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-US">5 </span></b><i><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">Another interesting episode relates to the flap that occurred when
the SO-in-C, Major General A.C. Iyappa, wanted to talk on the wireless link
between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. Describing the incident, Brigadier
E.N. Ramadoss writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> <i> Towards the end of October 1954, Capt. E. N. Pillai and I switched over
as the Duty Signal Officer at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>. Brig Bhagat (he
was the Chief of Staff in the Commission) and <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state> Mehta told me that my first job was to
establish the RTT link to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
from <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. Our biggest problem was the lack
of knowledge of conversational French on the telephones between the
transmitter, receiver and signal centre. We had one non-technical French
Warrant Officer as the interpreter but he was not adequate. As the first step,
I got a triple diversity receiver and its aerials erected in our signal centre
by the end of November 1954, eliminating their receiving station from our
circuit. I underwent a crash course in French in the evenings at my own expense
under a civilian instructor. RTT got through to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> for a few hours towards the end of
November but the trouble was that the receiving frequency was fully 'captured'
by the powerful Reuters Far Eastern World News Service station so that our
printer was printing out all the news. We did not have to read a newspaper! The
French Saigon-Paris link's frequency was suitable but the French would neither
release their SWB 11 set nor that frequency for our link. After a lot of
negotiations by <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state>
Mehta and Maj Mehta over French wines and dinners with the French Chief Signals
Officer, we got a new transmitter and chose our receiving and transmitting
frequencies after trial and error. In the meantime, I had reduced our normal
technical queries to two dozen, which I got translated and taught our mechanics
to memorise or tell the number of query in French so that the French mechanics
at their signal centre and transmitter could comprehend our circuit fault and
take action to restore the circuit. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US"> Finally the circuit got through
towards the end of December and worked a whole morning session of six hours.
Next morning when we established communications
I got a message<b>
</b>from Lt SAP</span></i><i><span lang="EN-GB"> Rao</span><span lang="EN-US">, ADSO at Delhi signal centre, that Gen AC Iyappa, our SO-in-C, would be
coming to their centre and personally converse on the circuit. We all stood by
the circuit which </span><span lang="EN-US">packed<b> </b></span><span lang="EN-US">up promptly 15 minutes before his arrival. I heard
later </span><span lang="EN-US">that<b> </b></span><span lang="EN-US">ACI
arrived with a congratulatory message to hear of the 'let </span><span lang="EN-US">down'.<b> </b></span><span lang="EN-US">Well-meaning Lt SAP Rao volunteered to
send his message on the standby WT link - that was the last straw. I heard that
the General swore at all of us and stormed out angrily. Even after the circuit
stabilized, there was to be no congratulatory message from ACI. I mentioned
this incident to ACI in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>
in 1972, when he was </span><span lang="EN-US">BEL’s Chairman. He laughed in his usual hearty way and said that probably we never
deserved to be congratulated, that he meant no offence but that he
was so full of pride and wished so much to congratulate us on the establishment
of the first Army RTT link overseas fully manned by our own personnel. Thus the
first ever Army R'TT link overseas was established. It eased our traffic
clearance to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
considerably. We used to work it for four to six hours daily and clear about
4000 groups either way</span></i><b><span lang="EN-US">. 6<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">In April-May 1955,
inter-zone transfer of inspection teams was carried out. This involved a changeover of 78 wireless
stations but was carried out without any break in the communications. In August
1955 the first turnover of personnel took place. On 3 August the </span><span lang="EN-US">first plane from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
an IAC</span><span lang="EN-GB"> Skymaster</span><span lang="EN-US"> landed in <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> carrying one
officer, one JCO and 50 OR. The next day, an equal number were repatriated to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The CO,
Lieutenant Colonel</span><span lang="EN-GB">
Vinayak</span><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US">Mehta was relieved by </span><span lang="EN-US">Lieutenant Colonel V.D.</span><span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="EN-GB">Deshpande.</span><span lang="EN-US"> In January
1956 communications with Houei Thao were disturbed due to frequent exchange of
fire between Pathet Lao and Royal Laotian Army. In February 1956, the regiment handled a large amount of traffic
concerning Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s visit to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This included the messages from the Cambodian
delegation in <st1:place w:st="on">Peking</st1:place> to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
passed via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1028"
type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:342pt;height:308.25pt'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image007.jpg"
o:title="PictureA" cropright="14238f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="411" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image008.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1028" width="456" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-font-width: 122%;">Indian Signals
linemen maintaining lines in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cambodia</st1:place></st1:country-region></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">The third turnover of personnel
was carried out in July 1956. On 7 July </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major
K.K. Tewari, the CO designate arrived in <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>
with Captain J.L. Rathan, two JCOs and 70 OR. The outgoing CO, Lieutenant
Colonel V.D. Deshpande returned to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> on 28
July. The French High Command in Indo-China was dissolved in 1956. This had serious implications for Signals, as
the French were so far responsible for the provision of a major portion of
wireless equipment and the maintenance of the transmitter station at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>. The latter
task was gradually taken over by the Vietnamese Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> With the
improvement in the political situation in Indo-China, there was a gradual
reduction in commitments of the regiment from 1957. Wireless communications to
all team sites except two were closed in May 1957. The strength of the regiment was consequently
reduced to nine officers, five JCOs and 231 OR. In May 1958, the Laotian
element of Signals closed down, followed by the Cambodian element in July
1958. The size of the regiment was
further shrunk to that of a company in 1960. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> During
its stay in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
the regiment was visited by many distinguished persons. Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru visited the regiment on 30 and <st1:date day="31" month="10" w:st="on" year="1954">31 October 1954</st1:date> on his way to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The unit
had the privilege of providing a guard of honour for him at <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>
airport. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the
Vice-President of India, visited the regiment in 1957. Throughout their stay,
the regiment and its personnel faced many hazards. In April-May 1955, <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> saw a lot of street fighting for two weeks,
resulting in the disruption of keying lines for three days. In July 1955, there were violent
demonstrations against the Commission in <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place>.
Two Commission cars were burnt. One despatch rider was surrounded and plastered
with posters. As a result, the despatch
riders moved about in taxis in civil dress for a week. In September 1955, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:city> was hit by a typhoon with a speed of 80
miles per hour. All receiver aerials and
one transmitter aerial mast tumbled down.
Power failure continued for a few days.
It took about a week to put the things in order again. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> The unit
also had its share of physical casualties. Signalman K. S. Menon was wounded in
the leg in Plain Des Jars (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Laos</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
in 1956 and had to be evacuated to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Two signallers died in 1957, Signalman Gurmit
Singh as a result of police firing and Signalman Venugopalan in a jeep
accident. The President’s palace in <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> was bombed and damaged by two airplanes of the
South Vietnamese Air Force in February 1962.
One of the bullets hit the Senior JCO’s office. Subedar Bur Singh was
fortunately elsewhere at the time. There
was another narrow escape when the MDS courier to Cap St. Jacques was ambushed
by the Viet Cong in March 1962.
Signalman Pillai was lucky to come out of it with only scorched
trousers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> Commenting
on the accidents and casualties suffered during his tenure as CO of the
regiment, Major General K.K. Tewari writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Two or three incidents I remember distinctly. The first was when one of my chaps was shot
dead by the civil police in <st1:place w:st="on">Saigon</st1:place> on <st1:date day="6" month="3" w:st="on" year="1957">6 March 1957</st1:date>. Lots of inquiries were held, followed by a
number of meetings. I was very adamant
that the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
government must pay compensation on an unarmed person being shot down like
this. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> had very large police
and they used to wander all over the place.
In fact you could almost see one policeman to every two or three
civilians. They were all armed with sten
guns and pistols. It was one of those
incidents, when this boy Signalman Gurmit Singh had gone out, perhaps for a
walk or maybe he was out for something else; he was just shot without warning. My efforts to get compensation for his family
took about two months to succeed. But, ultimately, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">South Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> government agreed to
pay full compensation. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> Another incident was about my DR,
Signalman Venugopalan who was killed in a jeep accident on <st1:date day="21" month="3" w:st="on" year="1957">21 March 1957</st1:date>. He was brought back in a serious condition
but we could not save his live. He died
two days later. I remember I attended
the post-mortem and I was very sad. We had two Indian officers on the
Commissions who died, one was a Major who died in an accident on 11 December
1956 and the other a Colonel, a fine soldier of the Indian Army, who died in
Laos on 9 April in a helicopter crash. I
was one of the pall bearers and it was a very sad occasion. All these incidents brought a lot of load on
Signals by sudden increase in traffic.
All messages reporting such incidents were marked ‘Flash’.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">7</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">The regiment earned a good name
for providing reliable signal communications in Indo <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. In fact, General Tewari
recalls that his most vivid impression of his Indo-China tenure was that
Signals was the only Arm of the Indian Army which was in prominence. It was also the only Arm which was hankered
after by each of the three delegations. According to him, the people on the
staff were very jealous of this including the Indian staff in the office of the
Alternate Delegate, who was a major general of the Indian Army. In contrast,
officers from other countries were effusive in their praise. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">At a meeting of the Commission
in May 1956, the Polish Ambassador said, <i>“I
would like to mention particularly the personnel of Signals who have
incessantly and perseveringly managed to send all my Flashes with my errors and
mistakes, so promptly and efficiently”.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> A letter from Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Walker
of the Canadian Army, popularly known as a “<i>Sakth
Gora Sahib</i>” by the signal centre staff reads:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">“I
would be pleased if you would extend to your men that I am in contact with and
those behind the scenes, my sincere admiration for their patience, skill and
genuine co-operation. In the event that
I should ever serve again in war, I would be pleased to do so with the Indian
Signals”. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> In a
farewell message, M.B. Williams, the Canadian Ambassador at a special meeting
of the Commission in February 1956 said:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 40.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">“<i>Mr. Chairman, your
delegation has borne the major burden of the Secretariat work of the Commission
and we are grateful to those many unknown Indians who have processed accounts
and dispatched messages and telegrams.
Your Signal Regiment is a credit to your Service”.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> The names
of <st1:place w:st="on">COs</st1:place> of the International Commissions
Signals Regiment, Indo-China are given below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Name
of Officer</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;"> <u>From</u>
<u>To<o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Lieutenant
Colonel V. Mehta <st1:date day="2" month="9" w:st="on" year="1954">2 Sep 54</st1:date> <st1:date day="15" month="9" w:st="on" year="1955">15 Sep 55</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Lieutenant
Colonel V.D. Deshpande <st1:date day="16" month="9" w:st="on" year="1955">16 Sep 55</st1:date> <st1:date day="27" month="7" w:st="on" year="1956">27 Jul 56</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -9.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Tewari <st1:date day="28" month="7" w:st="on" year="1956">28
Jul 56</st1:date> 24 May57
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Lieutenant Colonel N.J.S. Sethi <st1:date day="25" month="5" w:st="on" year="1957">25
May 57</st1:date> <st1:date day="28" month="2" w:st="on" year="1958">28 Feb 58</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Lieutenant
Colonel Hari Singh <st1:date day="1" month="3" w:st="on" year="1958">1 Mar 58</st1:date> <st1:date day="2" month="10" w:st="on" year="1958">2 Oct 58</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major H.C.
Heffernan <st1:date day="3" month="10" w:st="on" year="1958">3 Oct 58</st1:date> <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1958">15 Dec 58</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major Rattan
Singh <st1:date day="16" month="12" w:st="on" year="1958">16 Dec 58</st1:date> <st1:date day="28" month="9" w:st="on" year="1959">28 Sep 59</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major G.S.
Sodhi <st1:date day="29" month="9" w:st="on" year="1959">29 Sep 59</st1:date> <st1:date day="1" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">1
Jul 60</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">In 1960, the strength of the
Signals complement was reduced to a company. The names of the officers
commanding International Commissions Signals Company, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> are as
under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major S
Subrahmanyan <st1:date day="2" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">2 Jul 60</st1:date> <st1:date day="19" month="3" w:st="on" year="1961">19 Mar 61</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major P.S.
Jauhal <st1:date day="20" month="3" w:st="on" year="1961">20 Mar 61</st1:date> <st1:date day="29" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">29 Dec 61</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major Harbans
Singh <st1:date day="30" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">30 Dec 61</st1:date> <st1:date day="21" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">21 Oct 62</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major P Thakoor
<st1:date day="22" month="10" w:st="on" year="1962">22 Oct 62</st1:date> <st1:date day="4" month="3" w:st="on" year="1963">4 Mar 63</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major A. L. Teri <st1:date day="5" month="3" w:st="on" year="1963">5 Mar 63</st1:date> <st1:date day="17" month="8" w:st="on" year="1963">17Aug 63</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major R.J.
Patel <st1:date day="18" month="8" w:st="on" year="1963">18 Aug 63</st1:date> <st1:date day="12" month="6" w:st="on" year="1964">12 Jun 64</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major P.N.
Kapoor <st1:date day="13" month="6" w:st="on" year="1964">13 Jun 64</st1:date>
<st1:date day="29" month="11" w:st="on" year="1964">29 Nov 64</st1:date>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Capt B.M.
Kapoor <st1:date day="30" month="11" w:st="on" year="1964">30 Nov 64</st1:date> <st1:date day="24" month="12" w:st="on" year="1964">24 Dec 64</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Major R.S.
Trehan <st1:date day="25" month="12" w:st="on" year="1964">25 Dec 64</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoCommentText" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">GAZA</span></u></b></st1:place></st1:city><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> (1956-67)</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Background<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The genesis of the <st1:place w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place> crisis of 1956 was the rise of President
Nasser of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and his ideology that put him on a collision course with the West. The three
factors that were directly responsible for the confrontation was his support
for the Palestinians against <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>;
the arms deal he concluded with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Czechoslovakia</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
a key member of the Soviet bloc and finally, in early 1956, <st1:place w:st="on">Nasser</st1:place>’s
recognition to Mainland <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
This antagonised the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
which staunchly supported <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Taiwan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
In retaliation, the Americans halted funding for the Aswan High Dam project, a
key development scheme of <st1:place w:st="on">Nasser</st1:place>’s. Needing an
alternate source of cash fast, <st1:place w:st="on">Nasser</st1:place> nationalised
the <st1:place w:st="on">Suez Canal</st1:place> in July 1956. After various
initiatives to avert war failed, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">France</st1:place></st1:country-region> colluded
with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
on a plan to restore the canal to British control. With the support of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">France</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> invaded <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region> on <st1:date day="29" month="10" w:st="on" year="1956">29 October 1956</st1:date>, starting
a chain of events that resulted in the <st1:place w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place>
crisis and UN intervention.<b>8</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Unfortunately, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region> had not
informed the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>
about the plan to invade <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
President Eisenhower reacted by calling for an emergency meeting of the UN
Security Council which met on 30 October.
As expected, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">France</st1:place></st1:country-region>
vetoed the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region>
resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli
troops. The virtually paralysed Security
Council decided to refer the matter to General Assembly, which on <st1:date day="2" month="11" w:st="on" year="1956">2 November 1956</st1:date> adopted the
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region>
resolution. Responding to an appeal from
Mr. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution for setting up an Emergency International UN
Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the <st1:place w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place>. Major
General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations’ Truce Supervision
Organisation was nominated as Chief of Command of the proposed UNEF. The five
permanent members of the Security Council were debarred from being part of the
UNEF. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Several nations offered troops for
the UNEF. However, finally troops from ten countries were accepted. These were <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Brazil</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Canada</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Colombia</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Denmark</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Norway</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Yugoslavia</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Finland</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sweden</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:place></st1:country-region>. In
September 1957 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:place></st1:country-region>
withdrew her troops, leaving only nine countries whose troops comprised the
UNEF. The contingents were approximately of battalion strength, with the
commanding officer reporting to the Commander of UNEF, Major General Burns, on
all operational and administrative matters. In addition, each country was
represented at HQ UNEF by a contingent liaison officer for dealing with
national governments or their military headquarters on questions of policy and
other administrative matters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The headquarters of the UNEF was located in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city> town. Apart from the
Commander, there was a Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and headquarters staff
consisting of operations, logistics and personnel, each headed by grade I staff
officer. The officers commanding elements of the supporting arms and services
also acted as advisers to the Force Commander. There was also a civilian
element with the Chief Administrative Officer and his staff consisting of
personnel drawn from the United Nations' Secretariat. They dealt with
administrative matters of policy, equipment procurement, finance etc. They
acted as a link between the UNEF and UN headquarters in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New York</st1:place></st1:state>. In addition to the above a number
of locally recruited civilians were also employed.<b>9</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operation ‘Shanti’<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As one of the founder members of the UN and an
unqualified supporter of its activities, the Government of India responded
without any reservations to the request to contribute an infantry battalion and
ancillary troops for this mission. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s participation in the
mission was code-named Operation ‘Shanti’.<i>
</i>The first Indian unit to be selected for UNEF was 3 Para, under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel Onkar Deva. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> also received a request for
ancillary troops for UNEF Headquarters. These included a signal section, a
composite company of Army Service Corps, a motor transport platoon, a field
post office, a public relations team, a medical team and a provost section. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> also
contributed a number of officers and men for service with the UNEF
Headquarters. To begin with, India was represented by seven officers, one JCO and
three NCOs, although this representation reduced over time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3 Para moved to its staging area in Bombay together
with other services components, where they were seen off by Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru, who addressed all ranks at a ‘Sainik Sammelan’ and asked them ‘to remember that they were
going as ambassadors of peace and friendship’. The battalion and other
components were airlifted to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>
by American Douglas Globe Master and Lockheed Super Constellation transport
aircraft, in fifteen batches, between 23 November and <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1956">4 December 1956</st1:date>. The Indian contingent
concentrated at Tiba Camp near El Ballah in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region> by the end of December 1956
and established its headquarters at a location known as Deir-el-Balah in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city> strip. <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">As the British
and French forces began to withdraw from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Port
Said</st1:place></st1:city> and Port Faud, the buffer zone on the <st1:place w:st="on">Suez Canal</st1:place> was taken over by 3 Para, deployed on both
banks of the Canal. Once the <st1:place w:st="on">Suez Canal</st1:place> area
was stabilised, UNEF HQ decided to re-deploy the battalion on the Armistice
Demarcation Line (ADL) in the Gaza Strip. In March 1957, the battalion took
over the Gaza Strip from the Israelis. There, the battalion set up company
camps, designated as <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Delhi</st1:placename></st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:placename></st1:place>,
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Chandigarh</st1:placename></st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Camp
David</st1:place>’s Field. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Delhi</st1:placename></st1:place>, which was located
next to the Port Said-Gaza railway line, also housed the battalion
headquarters. In August 1957, some months after the battalion had settled into
its tasks, there was a morale-boosting visit by the COAS, General K.S.
Thimayya, D.S.O. As is well known, Thimayya’s visits to troops were known as
‘Timmy tonic’ during those days. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">When it became known that the UNEF
would operate in <st1:place w:st="on">West Asia</st1:place> for a prolonged
duration, the contributing nations began rotating their troops periodically.
The Indian battalion groups were rotated annually, and a total of 11 groups
served in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city>
from November 1956 to June 1967, when <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region> asked all UNEF troops to
withdraw. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">Apart from
contributing troops to the UNEF, Indian provided several officers to man senior
appointments. Colonel (later Major General) Indar Jit Rikhye served with UNEF
as commander of the Indian contingent and Chief of Staff of the Force from
October 1957 to February 1960, when he was relieved by Colonel R.K. Ranjit
Singh. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> contributed two of the five
force commanders of the mission. Major General P.S. Gyani served in this
appointment from December 1959 to January 1964. Major General Indar Jit Rikhye,
then commander of the UN Observer Mission in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dominican Republic</st1:place></st1:country-region>, was asked to
assume charge of UNEF in February 1966 and remained in post till the final
withdrawal of the UNEF in June 1967. <b>10<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="22" month="11" w:st="on" year="1956">22 November 1956</st1:date> the raising of the Operation
‘Shanti’ Signal Section was ordered by Army HQ. Captain K.P.G. Kurup was
nominated as the OC. The composition of the section was one officer, one JCO
and 26 OR, who were drawn from various units.
The section comprised two radio detachments, one line detachment, two
cipher detachments and a signal centre detachment. Besides the above, there were four drivers,
one EFS and two radio mechanics. The raising was to be in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> as the complete Indian contingent was
due to emplane from there. Men had to be
kitted with special clothing for overseas, equipment had to be collected from
various Ordnance depots, checked, serviced, repacked and manifests made. Due to a restriction on the total weight to
be taken by aircraft, only the minimum essential technical equipment could be
carried. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
that time the role of the signal section was not defined, as the problems
facing the United Nations Emergency Force in its infancy were not clearly
visualized. However, an assurance was
given by the United Nations that items of equipment and transport which the
signal section would require for its efficient operation would be provided when
the section landed in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Although the equipment was never provided,
transport was provided on a limited scale to meet the requirements of the
section. A certain amount of training
was carried out by the section in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>
between the period of its raising and its departure from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. In the meanwhile the section was visited and
inspected by various senior officers including the Director of Staff Duties and
the Deputy Director of Signals who visited the Section on 29 November. On <st1:date day="7" month="12" w:st="on" year="1956">7 December 1956</st1:date> the signal section together with all their
equipment took off for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>
via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Beirut</st1:place></st1:city> by a
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region>
military transport aircraft. On 9
December the section landed on a bombed out Egyptian military airfield at Abu
Suweir near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ismailia</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> According to the planning at HQ
UNEF, the main responsibility for the provision of communications rested with
the UN Field Service Communication personnel and with the 56 Royal Canadian
Signal Squadron, the latter having at that time only an advance element on the
ground with little or no equipment. The
arrival of the Indian signal section, therefore, was welcomed by hard pressed
UN and Canadian personnel, who had been sharing communication responsibilities
during the earlier phases of the operations.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The signal section, with its
characteristic efficiency, got on to the task of providing essential
communications required by HQ UNEF and in particular to 3 Para, then deployed
in the buffer zone along the Suez Canal supervising the evacuation of the
Anglo-French forces. Inter-communication
within the battalion was provided from battalion headquarters to its companies
on both the banks of the <st1:place w:st="on">Suez Canal</st1:place> and this
was followed up when the buffer zone was being shifted as the phased withdrawal
of the Anglo-French forces took place.
No direct rear link was provided to HQ UNEF located at that time in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cairo</st1:place></st1:city>. However, a rear link was provided as a
temporary measure to the UNEF administrative base at Abu Suweir and from there
messages were relayed to HQ UNEF on the Field Service Communication
system. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the withdrawal of the
Anglo-French force from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Port Said</st1:place></st1:city>
on 22 December, 3 Para was re-grouped and rested in order to carry out the
second phase of the operations. The
battalion headquarters was located at Shandhura, some 16 miles north of Port
Suez and the remainder of the battalion proceeded along the east coast of the <st1:place w:st="on">Gulf of Suez</st1:place> to El Tor to take over the town from the
Israeli Defence Forces. El Tor is the
well known Egyptian port in the <st1:place w:st="on">Sinai Peninsula</st1:place>
from where Muslim pilgrims for centuries have taken the old pilgrim route to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mecca</st1:place></st1:city>. The battalion also took over the world famous
St. Catherine monastery near <st1:place w:st="on">Mount Sinai</st1:place>. The distance from the battalion headquarters
at Shandhura to the forward companies was approximately 150 miles and it is to
the great credit of the signal section that efficient RT/CW communications were
maintained on WS No 19 throughout the battalion’s stay in this area.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_6"
o:spid="_x0000_i1029" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:324.75pt;height:252.75pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image009.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="337" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image010.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_6" width="433" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The telephone exchange at Rafah in Gaza manned by the
Indian Signal Unit<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Not content with providing
communications for the Indian contingent, the signal section found time to help
out other national contingents with their communication problems. One line detachment which was attached to the
combined Danish-Norwegian battalion on the Mitla Pass road in the Central Sinai
desert laid a telephone line of approximately 40 miles in length through the
desert on WD1 cable providing a very efficient means of line communication from
the Danish-Norwegian (DANOR) battalion headquarters to its forward companies.
On relief of 3 Para by a Finnish company at El Tor, a wireless detachment of
the Indian signal section provided communication for the a Finnish company,
first from El Tor and later from Sharm El Sheikh to HQ UNEF. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By mid January 1957, the Royal
Canadian Signal Squadron had completed its raising and was subsequently
deployed to provide all communications to the military counterpart of the UNEF
thus relieving the Indian signal section of its communication commitments. The
section then moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="15" month="3" w:st="on" year="1957">15 March 1957</st1:date>,
after the UNEF’s entry into the strip.
On the deployment of 3 Para along the Armistice Demarcation Line,
covering the battalion frontage of approximately 12 miles, the signal section
helped the battalion to lay lines from battalion headquarters to its companies
and the platoons. The section also helped the battalion in carrying out their
annual classification and in general helped not only the Indian contingent in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>, but
other national contingents that sought its assistance. <b>11</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By June, 1957, the Air Transport Support Force
including 115 Communication Flight of the Royal Canadian Air Force was
established at El Arish which is approximately 50 miles west of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city>. Due to the
excellent rapport established between the Canadians and Indians it was decided
that the signal section would not be sent back to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, but given a specific role.
The section was tasked to set up a signal centre, crypto centre and exchange, and
lay local lines for the UNEF air base and the Yugoslav battalion at El
Arish. They were also to provide a SDS from
and to the UNEF maintenance base at Rafah a distance of about 35 miles and
lastly to receive and despatch all official mail to and from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This was done through diplomatic channels
from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cairo</st1:place></st1:city> in
conjunction with the Indian Postal Unit. The section also tried to establish
direct radio communications with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> using a Canadian set but it
was not successful. Radio communications
with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was possible only via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In accordance with the role allotted
to the section, cable routes were laid to the air transport unit and the
Yugoslav battalion. These routes were
subsequently replaced as soon as the cables deteriorated. The section was also
charged with the responsibility of clearing all official mail to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The SDS bag from the signal centre at El
Arish was despatched to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
twice a week. However mail despatched
through SDS was considerably delayed, due to the involved procedure then in
vogue. The bag from the SDS office at El
Arish was sent to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cairo</st1:place></st1:city>,
where it was handed over to the Indian Embassy, which in turn sent it in their
diplomatic bag to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. At <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
the bag was sent from the External Affairs Ministry to SDS office in Army HQ
before it could be cleared to the addressees.
As the quantum of official mail was quite negligible, this delay was
accepted and the procedure continued till the SDS was wound up in June 1963.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_7"
o:spid="_x0000_i1030" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:291.75pt;height:240pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image011.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="320" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image012.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_7" width="389" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Indian signallers settling down to work on the beach
near El Arish in 1957<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As the life of the contingent was extended,
the cable routes laid earlier were gradually transferred to permanent alignment
on telegraph poles. The cable used
initially was the American WD ITT reel which was later replaced by cable
telephone four conductor in September 1962. Most of the equipment for the
section was carried from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
except for vehicles and clothing which were provided by the Canadian Ordnance
company located at the administrative base at Rafah.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After spending about a year in Gaza
the signal section was turned over in December 1957. Captain B.P. Upasani was
the OC of the second contingent. One of the drawbacks of the first Indian
contingent was that there was no overall commander. The contingents from the nine other nations
had a commander designated as such before they left their countries. This was not the case with the Indian
contingent where the senior Indian officer had only been designated as liaison
officer and not contingent commander.
This was not a satisfactory arrangement and did not project a good image
of the country. Just as it took one year
to allot a role to the signal section, it took about the same amount of time to
rectify this anomaly of not appointing a contingent commander. The second contingent which replaced the
first in December 1957 was headed by Colonel I.J. Rikhye, who was designated as
commander of the Indian contingent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Some interesting details have been
given by Captain S.P. Sethi, who went with the 5<sup>th</sup> contingent in
November 1960. He writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“The ration
scales were plentiful and all modern facilities and amenities were provided for
the OR. Indians in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region> were
quite a privileged lot. They enjoyed
tremendous amount of good-will in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The influence of Pandit Nehru, the then Prime
Minister, was at its zenith. Anywhere
the Indian troops went, they were always welcomed with chanting of “Nehru
Nasser Swa Swa” (Bhai Bhai).<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“Al Hindi” was a
magical pass word which permitted move of Indian personnel and vehicles without
much hindrance. No doubt the contingent
members had a very heavy responsibility in that they were ambassadors of the
country and had to project the Indian image in the correct perspective. Nevertheless, there were some amusing
incidents when our troops were suddenly confronted with the Western ways
abroad.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Some of our
troops had never seen or known of lifts.
They were thrilled and amused to see these function and quite frequently
got into one and started riding up and down without permitting anybody else to use
it. Our section located at El Arish
excelled in traditional Indian Hospitality.
Members from units of UNEF were invited at functions hosted to celebrate
National Days. Periodic screening of Hindi films was a great attraction to
locals who literally thronged the improvised open air theatre</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">”.12</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> While the UNEF troops were finally
withdrawn in June 1967, the signal section was withdrawn and disbanded a year
earlier, in February 1966. Though the scales of communications provided in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city> were not large, the
section carried out its tasks efficiently, speedily and with the characteristic
modesty in keeping with the ethos and traditions of the Corps. The performance
of Indian signallers was admirable. Their efficiency, smart turn-out and good
behaviour endeared them to personnel of all nations, who thought very highly of
them. The names of the officers who commanded the Operation ‘Shanti’ Signal
Section in Gaza are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
K.P.G. Kurup November
1956 to December 1957<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
B.P. Upasani December
1957 to November 1958<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
K.V. Singh November
1958 to December 1959<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain K.K.K. Seth December 1959 to November 1960<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
S.P. Sethi November
1960 to November 1961<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain</span></st1:city><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<st1:state w:st="on">S.C.</st1:state></span></st1:place><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
Sharma November
1961 to November 1962<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
K.S. Caveeshar November 1962 to October 1963<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
Shiv Raj Kumar October
1963 to October 1964<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
M.S.K. Mohan October
1964 to October 1965<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
J.S. Narsimhan October
1965 to February 1966<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></li>
</ul>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONGO</span></u></b></st1:place></st1:country-region><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> (1960-64)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Background<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The UN Operation
in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
(<i>Operation des Nations Unies au <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region></i> or
ONUC) from July 1960 to June 1964 was the largest peacekeeping operation
mounted by the UN until that time. The Democratic Republic of Congo (presently
called <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Zaire</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
is the third largest country in <st1:place w:st="on">Africa</st1:place> with an
area of about one million square miles (nearly three-fourth the size of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>). This
country has an important strategic position and is exceptionally rich in
minerals, most of which are found and extracted in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">province</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Katanga</st1:placename></st1:place>.
This especially drew the interest of its neighbours as well as that of the
European powers during the colonial period. In 1960, when she became free of
Belgian rule, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
with fourteen million inhabitants comprising 200 tribes, was one of the most
sparsely populated nations in <st1:place w:st="on">Africa</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">In January 1959,
anti-colonial riots began in <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>, the
colonial capital. These were followed by more radical movements, such as the
Congolese National Movement (<i>Mouvement
National Congolais </i>or MNC), led by Patrice Lumumba. At a round-table conference
held in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Brussels</st1:place></st1:city>
in January 1960, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgium</st1:place></st1:country-region>
agreed to grant independence to the country on <st1:date day="30" month="6" w:st="on" year="1960">30 June 1960</st1:date>. During elections for the
Congolese Parliament and provincial assemblies, two rival dominant Congolese
leaders were elected to two key positions - Joseph Kasavubu became President of
the Republic while Patrice Lumumba became the Prime Minister. On <st1:date day="29" month="6" w:st="on" year="1960">29 June 1960</st1:date>, in a clever
manoeuvre to retain a stranglehold on the mineral rich country, a treaty of
friendship, assistance and cooperation was signed (but never ratified) between <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgium</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB">Confusion
enveloped the country soon after independence. The euphoria rapidly vanished
and tribal violence broke out in <st1:place w:st="on">Kasai</st1:place>.
Clearly, the common Congolese felt that their aspirations and expectations had
been ignored. There was also trouble in the <i>Force Publique</i>, which was
intended to promote and maintain internal stability.<i> </i>On <st1:date day="4" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">4 July 1960</st1:date>, Congolese
troops at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Hardy</st1:placename></st1:place> in Thysville demanded that all
Belgian officers of the Force
be expelled, and that the troops’ pay be increased. On 5 July, a mutiny broke
out in the <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> (now <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kinshasa</st1:place></st1:city>) garrison and spread to several
other cities in the country. In the course of these mutinies, some attacks and
atrocities were perpetrated against Belgians and other westerners in the
country. As a result of this, there was an exodus of Europeans from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB">Belgium</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span lang="EN-GB"> in the meanwhile sent its troops into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> for the declared purpose of
restoring law and order and protecting Belgian nationals without the agreement
of the Congolese Government. The resulting clashes with the Congolese forces
increased the level of tension and disorder in the nation. In a well-planned
move, Moise Tshombe, the president of mineral-rich <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Katanga</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Province</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
proclaimed independence from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> on <st1:date day="11" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">11 July 1960</st1:date>. <st1:place w:st="on">Kasai</st1:place>
province, under King Mulopwe Albert Kalonji, followed suit soon afterwards.
Alarmed at the possible disintegration of their country, President Kasavubu and
Prime Minister Lumumba sent a joint telegram to the UN Secretary-General on <st1:date day="12" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">12 July 1960</st1:date>, requesting UN
military assistance to protect the national territory of the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> against
the external aggression. They further clarified that they were not asking for
aid to restore the internal peace, but to respond to Belgian aggression.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">On <st1:date day="13" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">13 July 1960</st1:date>, UN
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, relying on the lessons of first UN
Emergency Force (UNEF) in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gaza</st1:place></st1:city>,
recommended establishment of a UN peacekeeping force (ONUC) to assist the
Congolese Government in maintaining law and order until its own national
security force was able to meet these tasks. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 143 (1960), calling upon <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgium</st1:place></st1:country-region> to withdraw her troops from
Congolese territory and UN member-states were requested to contribute forces
for the new mission. By <st1:date day="15" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">15
July 1960</st1:date>, the first units from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ghana</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tunisia</st1:place></st1:country-region> had
arrived in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
and were soon joined by troops from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Guinea</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Morocco</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Dr
Ralph J. Bunche became the head of the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mission</st1:place></st1:city>
and Lieutenant General Carl C. von Horn was appointed Supreme Commander from
July 1960 to December 1960.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB">While its
original mandate as outlined in Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) remained
valid, ONUC was given many new responsibilities and new tasks during the four
years of its operation, as the situation on the ground changed. The <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
operations can be grouped into four phases:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Phase I (July – August 1960):
withdrawal of Belgian forces and restoration of law and order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Phase II (September 1960 –
September 1961): constitutional crisis provoked by the sacking of the President
by the Prime Minister, and vice-versa.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Phase III (September 1961 –
February 1963): implementation of the UN
mandate, the restoration of freedom of movement of the people by the UN forces
and dealing with the secession of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Katanga</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Province</st1:placetype></st1:place>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB">Phase IV (February 1963 – June
1964): consolidation of the Congolese Government and the withdrawal of the UN
force.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB">Arrival of Indian Troops in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">During Phase I,
as a result of Bunche’s negotiations with the Belgian ambassador, UN troops
first deployed at the radio and power stations, as well as along the main
thoroughfares of <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>. Their presence
helped in defusing the tension and enabled the complete withdrawal of Belgian
troops from <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> by <st1:date day="23" month="7" w:st="on" year="1960">23 July 1960</st1:date>. By early August 1960,
Belgian forces had withdrawn from the rest of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> except for <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Katanga</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Province</st1:placetype></st1:place>
and the bases at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kolwezi</st1:place></st1:city>
and Kamina. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB">The Government of
India supported the establishment of the UN mission. Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye
was nominated as a Military Adviser to the UN Secretary-General. Mr.
Hammarskjöld also requested Prime Minister Nehru to permit Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal,
who had earlier served on the UN mission in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>, to head the UN Operations
in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
participation in ONUC began in July 1960, with the deployment of supply,
technical and medical personnel. In order to have a proper command and control,
the Government of India had also appointed Colonel Harmandar Singh as commander
of the Indian contingent in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
who also held the appointment of commander of the Station Headquarters, <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>. The Indian contingent included a signal
company commanded by Major N.A. Patil. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The assassination of Patrice Lumumba
on <st1:date day="17" month="1" w:st="on" year="1961">17 January 1961</st1:date>
shocked the world. President Gamal Abdel Nasser confiscated all Belgian property
in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
and on <st1:date day="14" month="2" w:st="on" year="1961">14 February 1961</st1:date>,
led the first moves with the <st1:place w:st="on">Soviet Union</st1:place>, to
recognise the Lumumbist government in the Oriental Province of North Eastern
Congo, with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">East Germany</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ghana</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Yugoslavia</st1:place></st1:country-region>
following suit. The political situation became highly volatile, leading to
further disintegration of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and civil war in many areas. In view of the withdrawal of several armed UN
contingents by the contributing countries, the UN Secretary-General requested
the Government of India to send armed contingents to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Responding to the request,
on <st1:date day="4" month="3" w:st="on" year="1961">4 March 1961</st1:date>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> nominated
99 Infantry Brigade located at Kasauli to deploy in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Though
it was part of 17 Infantry Division, for the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> assignment the brigade was
reconstituted as a self-contained independent brigade group with the necessary
communications, supporting arms and services. The brigade was under the command
of Brigadier K.A.S. Raja, who had earlier served with UNEFI, while Major P.D.S.
Sawhney was commanding the signal company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB">The Indian
brigade group arrived in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in March 1961 to find the situation very confused and uncertain. No clear and
feasible political and military objectives were communicated to the UN military
commanders, hampering effectiveness. The brigade spent two years in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>, during
which it took part in several important operations viz. Operation ‘Rumpunch’,
Operation ‘Marthor’ and Operation ‘UNOKAT’. After a successful peace mission,
Indian troops started returning in early March 1963. The main components of the
brigade reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
between 24 March and <st1:date day="19" month="4" w:st="on" year="1963">19
April 1963</st1:date>. The Indian contribution to ONUC was 28.3 percent of the
total forces deployed. The Congo Mission was a remarkable chapter in Indian
experiences in peacekeeping. The Indian troops displayed an exceptional sense
of duty in the service of the UN and the Government of India did not withdraw
the brigade, even when the casualties were mounting. It was a true reflection
of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
resolve to an international commitment. 39 personnel laid down their lives in
combat action for the restoration
of peace and to maintain the integrity of the country. <b>14<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB">SIGNALS IN CONGO<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="NormalArial" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indian Signal Company
ONUC (1960 - 61)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After it was decided to send a
signal detachment with the ONUC, towards the end of August 1960 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Garewal of Signals Directorate in Army HQ visited <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> on a
reconnaissance mission to study the operational situation and to decide the
extent of commitment in respect of signal communications. Based on his
assessment, it was decided to raise a signal company and volunteers of
appropriate trades were called for from all signal units. Major N.A. Patil was
nominated as the OC and Captain S. Ghosh as the second-in-command. The strength
of the company was two officers, two JCOs and 81 OR. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> DCSO Delhi and Rajasthan Area was
made responsible for raising the company at Delhi Cantt, in the precincts of 1
Air Support Signal Company. Major Patil arrived in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> on 11 September and the personnel
started arriving on 14 September. Medical boards were immediately arranged and
since no technical equipment was to be carried the unit was ready to depart on
18 September. The company was airlifted
from Palam in an American Military Air Transport Service Globe Master on 26
September, reaching <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Aden</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khartoum</st1:place></st1:city> on 28 September. On 29 September 1960
the company was put in two C119 aircraft and despatched to Elisabethville. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The initial role of the company was
to provide wireless communications down to the battalion headquarters in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
Kivu provinces and the signal centre at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>.
In addition to his duties as company commander, Major Patil was appointed Chief
Signal Officer for the two provinces and was made responsible for the
coordination of all signal communications. The headquarters of the Sub Command
Eastern Province (SCOME) was located at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>
along with the Swedish battalion. The Irish battalions were at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city> and Goma; the Ethiopian battalion
at Kaminaville; two Moroccan battalions at Jadotville and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kolwezi</st1:place></st1:city> and Moroccan troops of company or
platoon strength at Manono, Mitwaba, Dilolo, and Luena. The base headquarters was
at Kamina. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Communications to the above stations
was provided by four wireless nets as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">UN net (CW) - control
at <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> and outstations at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city>
and Goma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Canadian net (RTT) - one to one link between <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Moroccan net (CW) - control
at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> with outstations at
Jadotville, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kolwezi</st1:place></st1:city>,
Manono, Mitwaba, Dilolo and Luena.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Swedish net (CW) – one
to one link between <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> and Kamina
Base.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Moroccans
and the Swedish were using AN/GRC9. For
the distance involved this set could not provide reliable communications. Apart from the above wireless nets there was
no alternate means of communications. The initial problem was to reorient the
communications by installing medium power sets at battalion headquarters,
thereby releasing the battalion wireless sets for their internal
communications. It was, therefore, decided
to establish two radio nets, with the controls at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>. The first net had out stations at Goma,
Kabalo and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city>
while the second net had out stations at Kamina Base, Jadotville and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kolwezi</st1:place></st1:city>. The company had brought no technical equipment
from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
as it was to be provided by the ONUC on arrival. The equipment arrived on 20 October but
without essential components such as aerial gear, keys and earphones. Hence the
detachments could not be deployed immediately.
Improvisation had to be resorted to get the communications going. The
main problem was to obtain appropriate insulators, adaptors for the AN/GRC9,
and earphones to make them fit on the BC610 transmitter and AR88
receivers. By various combinations this
problem was solved and detachments, depending upon the availability of the air
transport, were despatched during October - November 1960. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Subsequently, depending on the
operational deployment of troops some adjustments to the wireless network were
carried out. The Kaminaville detachment was moved with the Indonesian troops to
Kabongo on <st1:date day="25" month="11" w:st="on" year="1960">25 November 1960</st1:date>
and closed on withdrawal of troops on 3 January 1961.The Kabalo detachment was
withdrawn on <st1:date day="15" month="1" w:st="on" year="1961">15 January 1961</st1:date>
when the Ethiopian battalion was placed under command of the Nigerian brigade.
The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kolwezi</st1:place></st1:city>
detachment moved to Luena on 13 February and closed on 20 April when troops
were withdrawn. One detachment was sent to Luluabourg on 18 July and another to
<st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> on 5 August. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At Kabongo interrupted electric
power was available only during the night.
Communication had, therefore, to be maintained on battery operated
sets. For battery charging no battery
chargers were available and the only source of charging the batteries was the
charger at the railway station. The
arrangements of charging batteries at the convenience of the Belgian station
master were not satisfactory and they had to be sent to Kamina for charging
with the UN train guard whenever trains were despatched. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 3.6pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Due to the disturbed conditions
that existed permanent lines could not be used.
Since complete reliance had to be placed on wireless, selection of appropriate
frequencies to provide twenty four hours communications was important. In the absence of appropriate frequency
prediction charts the frequency selection had to be done by a trial and error
method. The other great hindrance to reliable wireless communication was the
deliberate jamming by the local post and telegraph wireless station. This problem had to be overcome by proper
liaison and cooperation between the ONUC and the local civil authorities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The company took over signal centre
duties on <st1:date day="5" month="10" w:st="on" year="1960">5 October 1960</st1:date>. The maximum traffic handled was 23,000 groups
during the Niemba incident, the average traffic being 10,000 groups per
day. The standard of message writing was
poor and originators often sent letters in the form of messages with complete
disregard to use of precedence. Strict
observance of rules could not be implemented in view of the composite nature of
the force. For all the men this was a first experience to serve in an
international peace force and many lessons about administration and signal
communication were learnt. <b>15 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Indian Independent Brigade Group Signal Company, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The decision to send 99 Infantry Brigade to the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> was taken
by the Government of India early in March 1961. 99 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section was, accordingly, reorganised as an independent brigade group signal
company, later redesignated as Indian Independent Brigade Group Signal Company,
Congo. The section, then under the command of Captain Harcharan Singh, moved
from Kasauli to Delhi on 10 March and the reorganisation commenced on receipt
of the war establishment and war equipment tables on 11 March 1961. There was
to be an addition of three officers, two JCOs, 60 OR and three non combatants
to the existing establishment of the section to reorganise it as an independent
brigade group signal company. This was done within a period of 4 to 5 days. The
company was under the command of Major P.D. Sawhney. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It was initially planned that all personnel, light
vehicles and essential stores would be transported by air and heavy vehicles
and remaining stores by sea. However, owing to the non-availability of adequate
aircraft, personnel, vehicles and stores had to be transported by sea. The air
move was carried out in Globe Master aircraft of the Military Air Transport
Service (MATS) of the United States Air Force. Out of a total of 43 sorties,
the signal company was allotted six sorties spread over 24 days. The first
detachment of the company, attached to 3/1 Gorkha Rifles, left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> by air on 14 March and landed at <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> on <st1:date day="16" month="3" w:st="on" year="1961">16 March 1961</st1:date>. A total of 137 men, 11 jeeps, two wireless
sets SCR 399 mounted in trailers, two charging sets 6 KW and 55,050 pounds of
signal stores were moved by air. By 9 April, the air lift was completed and the
company less those elements which were coming by sea, was concentrated in <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The ‘sea move’ included the rail move from Delhi to
Bombay, the port of embarkation; Bombay to Mombasa/Dar-es-Salaam by sea;
Mombasa to Kamina-Leopoldville by air; and Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma by rail and
finally Kigoma to Albertville (Congo) by barges over Lake Tanganyika. The
personnel and stores included in the ‘sea party’ embarked from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> on 14 April. They were scheduled to
reach Matadi by the end of April but
owing to this port being closed for United Nations traffic, the ships were
diverted to Mombasa and then to Dar-es-Salaam. Personnel and stores were flown
to Kamina and then to <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>. The last
person of the party arrived at <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> on
<st1:date day="19" month="5" w:st="on" year="1961">19 May 1961</st1:date>. The
vehicle group which had arrived at Dar-es-Salaam was despatched by rail-cum-barge
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city>,
arriving there on <st1:date day="2" month="6" w:st="on" year="1961">2 June 1961</st1:date>.
The move of the company which had commenced on 14 March was completed after 81
days. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Based on the past experience of the Indian Signal
Company ONUC and appreciation of the prevailing situation in the Congo by
Colonel Garewal, the war establishment and war equipment table of the company
was tailored to provide extensive wireless communication between formation and
unit headquarters and adequate resources for the provision of the local
despatch service and local line communication. Wireless sets SCR 399 were
provided for communication between HQ ONUC and brigade headquarters and
wireless sets C 52 for communication from brigade headquarters to battalion
headquarters, and also to advanced brigade headquarters (tactical
headquarters). SCR 399 was used for communication between Leopoldville and New
Delhi in the initial stages until the HQ Company of Indian Contingent Signal
Regiment, Congo established an ET 4331 station and took over the commitment.
The distances over which satisfactory communication was provided by these sets
varied up to 5000 miles with SCR 399 and up to 1,000 miles with wireless sets C
52. Aerials used were mainly dipole with SCR 399 and end-fed with wireless sets
C 52. Secondary batteries were given an initial charge at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and transported by air along with the
wireless sets, thereby ensuring provision of communication immediately on
landing. In the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
small battery chargers of 10 amperes capacity were obtained from United Nations
Ordnance Depot; these became very handy for ‘float charging’ of batteries for
wireless sets C 52 and Typex machines. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It is interesting to note that there was no specific
allotment of frequencies for use in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> except for those allotted by
Army HQ for use on the link New Delhi-Leopoldville. Frequencies found suitable
for various other links were taken into use without any trouble. No
interference was experienced on these frequencies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 260.45pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_8"
o:spid="_x0000_i1031" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:291pt;height:192pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image013.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="256" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image014.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_8" width="388" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Indian
signallers in Congo<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 36.0pt 72.0pt 108.0pt 144.0pt 180.0pt 216.0pt 260.45pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signal centre staff and operators had to
re-orientate their ideas to conform to the United Nations message writing (or
letter writing in a message form). Personnel had to study and comprehend the
layout of various types of message forms. They also had to understand the
degrees of precedence in use in India vis-a-vis those in use in the United
Nations and learn how to replace one by the other. Against five degrees of
precedence in vogue in India – Flash, Emergency, Operational Immediate,
Priority and Routine – the UN had only three viz. Priority Nations, Priority
and Routine. One aspect which had to be constantly kept in view was that there
were no alternative means of communication. Traffic pending on one wireless
link could at best be routed only through another wireless circuit. The
alternative means of clearance such as teleprinters, fullerphone or SDS just
did not exist. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To start with, the cipher staff was overloaded.
However, the classified traffic decreased steadily and was brought down by
1000 to 1500 groups a day in each cipher office. Owing to the non-availability
of line circuits and the degree of secrecy to be maintained, especially in the
initial stages, battalion headquarters were provided with a cipher operator
each and rifle company commanders were trained to operate low grade ciphers
for communication between the battalion and company headquarters. It was
considered essential to continue this practice because battalion headquarters
were located hundreds of miles away from the brigade headquarters and had no
other means of encrypting/decrypting classified messages. United Nations
ciphers were being used but were available only at important stations where
civil or military headquarters were located, always away from battalions. These
ciphers could be used only between civil/ military headquarters. Indian ciphers
were used for all classified messages within the brigade as well as to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <b>16</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indian Contingent
Signal Regiment ONUC <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
view of the increase in communication commitments in Congo, it was decided to
raise a third signal company and a regimental headquarters in April 1961 under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel K.D.
Bhasin. The other officers in the unit were Major S.N. Mookerjee (company
commander); Captain S.N. Bhatia (company second-in-command); Captain A.K.
Minocha (adjutant) and Captain Gurdial Singh (TOT). The unit was raised at Delhi Cantt. at short
notice and stores collected hurriedly. Colonel Bhasin preceded the move of the
unit and emplaned at Palam along with the Indian Independent Brigade Group
Signal Company personnel on 1 April, arriving at <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>
on <st1:date day="3" month="4" w:st="on" year="1961">3 April 1961</st1:date>. The balance of the unit personnel embarked at
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> on 14
April, arriving at <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> on <st1:date day="6" month="5" w:st="on" year="1961">06 May 1961</st1:date> via Dar-es-Salaam.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On arrival at Leopoldville he discovered
that HQ ONUC and HQ Indian Contingent were unaware of the formation of the regimental
headquarters and HQ Company and its induction into the Congo, despite the fact
that Colonel Garewal had come shortly before the move for a reconnaissance
along with Brigadier K.A.S. Raja. This
was however soon sorted out and clearance for the induction of the unit
obtained from <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New York</st1:place></st1:state>
through HQ ONUC, <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>. Policy on command and control of the sub
units of the regiment was issued by the CO soon after his arrival. HQ Company and Indian Signal Company at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> (Patil) were to be generally under regimental
headquarters for all purposes whereas over the Indian Independent Brigade
Signal Company (Sawhney), mainly technical control was to be exercised. The CO of the Indian Contingent Signal
Regiment was also deemed to be the Commander Signals of the Indian contingent
taken as a whole.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Indian Signal Company at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> was being employed in providing ONUC
communications under orders of the CSO ONUC.
After the formation of the regiment this arrangement was not disturbed
except that hereafter executive orders on communication matters would be issued
through the regimental headquarters.
With proper liaison and good relations with the CSO and his staff, this
arrangement worked satisfactorily. The regiment was generally under HQ Indian
Contingent for national matters, under CSO HQ ONUC for general technical
control and directly under HQ ONUC for administrative purposes. For local matters it was under Station Headquarters,
<st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The establishment of HQ Company
provided for a link working back to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> plus a few sets working
forward to link up with the Indian Independent Brigade Group and other stations
where Indian troops were located. It
also had the capability of manning a signal centre besides necessary
administrative cover. Soon after arrival
of the Indian Independent Brigade Group in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region> a SCR 399 had been opened by
the brigade signal company on 22 March working from <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
After arrival of the regiment in May, this link was taken over by HQ Company on
<st1:date day="15" month="5" w:st="on" year="1961">15 May 1961</st1:date>. The ET 4331 provided on the establishment of
HQ Company for this purpose could not be opened up due to deficiencies in
essential stores required for a rhombic aerial array. In the event after a great deal of
improvisation, proper provision of power and technical accommodation, and local
manufacture of certain stores, the ET 4331 station was established with effect
from 15 June 1961. The link worked on
schedule for 8 hours a day in the beginning, which was increased to 12½ hours a
day with effect from <st1:date day="1" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">1
November 1961</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In August 1961 HQ ONUC issued a
policy letter whereby contingents were not authorized to operate separate
wireless links to home countries unless specially sanctioned by UN headquarters
in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New York</st1:place></st1:state>. This sanction was to be sparingly accorded,
if UN circuits were inadequate or uneconomical. Contingents were expected to
use the existing UN common user circuits for communicating to their respective
countries. If special UN sanction for
separate a radio link to home country was accorded, the cost of operation including
manpower and provision of stores, subsequent spares and so on was to be borne
by the country concerned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Even before the issue of the above
mentioned policy letter the unit had asked Army HQ whether sanction for the
operation of the link to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had been obtained. It was confirmed by
Army HQ that no such sanction had been obtained. On grounds of strength of Indian contingent,
heavy traffic to India and the UN radio link not being open on a full time
basis to New Delhi, a case for authorization of a separate link New Delhi
operated by the regiment was put up through the Ministry of External Affairs.
The UN headquarters did not agree to a separate radio link for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, since
this was likely to invite similar request from other countries. However, the
link continued until the contingent was finally withdrawn from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With the formation of HQ
Leopoldville Command with operational territorial jurisdiction over <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> and Equator provinces of the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the
regiment was asked to provide the control station for <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>
command net besides a rover for the commander. On <st1:date day="5" month="8" w:st="on" year="1961">5 August 1961</st1:date> the unit provided an officer to
function as signal officer for the command.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Weekly air despatch service (ADS) from
<st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city> and subsequently to <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> was introduced from middle of July 1961,
consequent to brigade units having concentrated in both places. On <st1:date day="27" month="1" w:st="on" year="1962">27 January 1962</st1:date> the couriers Havildar Prem Prakash Bhatt
and Signalman M. Ganapathy who were travelling back from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>
in a UN DC 4 aircraft along with other UN personnel force landed in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Luanda</st1:place></st1:city> (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Angola</st1:place></st1:country-region>), the
pilot having drifted off course due to bad weather. The couriers including other passengers were
detained by the Portuguese authorities and after intervention of UN headquarters
in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New York</st1:place></st1:state>
were allowed to take off again on 30 January.
The despatches were not interfered with.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Congo is generally good wireless
country and communications were been
maintained over distances which are not normal for the sets in use e.g. a WS
C52 was used between Leopoldville and Albertville, a distance of about 900
miles with generally good results. A wireless diagram of the regiment as on <st1:date day="15" month="3" w:st="on" year="1962">15 March 1962</st1:date> is shown
below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="435" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image016.gif" v:shapes="Object_x0020_1" width="624" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
operations in September 1961, the traffic load on all circuits increased
approximately threefold. The A31 link to
INDIA was ordered on 24 hours working from 14 September. All communications
were maintained although the strain on manpower was felt acutely. When drawing up the establishment of Indian
Independent Brigade Group Signal Company, a cushion of manpower had been
included in that establishment and the establishment of HQ Company which was
sanctioned later had been tailored down to the bare minimum. The intention was that some of the manpower
of the brigade signal company could be drawn upon as a reserve on the orders of
the CO for supplementing HQ Company. As
events proved, the brigade signal company was spread out and committed at
various places and drawing upon their manpower became impossible. A case for
increment of one cipher JCO and three cipher NCOs for the regiment was taken up
as a result of working experience during the operations. This was duly
sanctioned and these personnel arrived from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> by air on <st1:date day="13" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">13 November 1961</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A requirement was also felt by Army
HQ in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
for a link from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city>,
for quick clearance of traffic to and from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> to the Indian Infantry
Brigade Group. Trials for this were
started and link Poona-Albertville (A33) on schedule working established on <st1:date day="24" month="9" w:st="on" year="1961">24 September 1961</st1:date>. The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Albertville</st1:place></st1:city>
terminal used SCR 399. On move of the
Main HQ Indian Independent Brigade group to <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>
in April 1962 the link was re-established as Poona-Elisabethville with effect
from <st1:date day="4" month="4" w:st="on" year="1962">4 April 1962</st1:date>. The traffic carrying capacity of this link
was limited due to the distance and relatively low power of the set used.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the first <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
operations when the Katangese interfered with the movement of UN aircraft by
using a Fouga Magister Jet trainer aircraft for crude bombing and strafing, a
UN combat air force comprising Swedish and Ethiopian jet fighters and Indian
Canberras was introduced into the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. With the Indian Canberra Squadron arrived Air
Control Team No 1 and 2 which included Signals personnel and normal signal
equipment of a tentacle. No 1 ACT was
based at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> and No 2 at
Kamina. These ACTs were used with effect
during the second <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
operations and the Signals personnel comprising them did a good piece of work.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After completing a year at <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place> the regiment was turned over in April 1962.
The officers who formed part of the relieving unit were Lieutenant Colonel M.S.
Krishnamoorthy (CO); Major W.V. Ferris (second-in-command); Captain J.H. Moreau
(adjutant); Captain B.P. Murgai (company
commander) and Captain Santokh Singh (TOT). The unit was raised at Ahmednagar
where it was organised into cohesive elements.
From there it moved by train to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
and embarked on the 25,000 ton troop carrier U.S.N.S. <i>General Blatchford, </i>on<i> </i>which
it was transported by sea to Dar-es-Salaam.
After disembarking, the unit had to reorganize for air lift right across
the African continent to <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>, where they
took over from the outgoing contingent. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The regiment was accommodated out of the main city
on the highway to the airport along with the Irish unit. The living
arrangements were adequate and the men were reasonably comfortable. The regiment quickly settled down and
established communications as directed by HQ ONUC. A particular achievement was that Captain
Santokh Singh, despite tremendous constraints, established his RS ET 4331
transmitter as a link back to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The unit also had responsibilities for
communication in consultation with Canadian Signals and other elements of the
UN HQ located in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. It also established radio links with the
companies located at Elizabethville. All
of them worked satisfactorily.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> According to Major General Murgai, <i>“The exposure to new environment, different
organizational methods of working by the other nations of the World was very
educative and enlarged our horizons. All
ranks benefited from such experience”.</i>
During August 1963, Captain Murgai was selected to be a UN Military
Observer in West Irian. This was a six-week assignment after which he returned
to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and was later awarded the UN Medal for distinguished services rendered as a UN
Military Observer.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Another
year passed and the tenure of the contingent came to an end. The mercenaries had been pushed out of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st="on">Kasai</st1:place>
had joined the rest of the provinces forming part of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">republic</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Congo</st1:placename></st1:place>. The task of the UN having been fulfilled, the
troops were withdrawn to their respective nations. The regiment returned to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mombasa</st1:place></st1:city> and thereafter by
sea to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>. Most of the ONUC Signal Regiment formed part
6 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment which was raised at Bareilly.<b>17</b>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indian Signal Company
(ONUC) <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> (1961-62)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Indian Signal Company (ONUC) at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> was due for turnover in September 1961.
Major P.K. Roy Chowdhury was selected as the OC and Captain S.C. Mehra as the second-in-command.
The company was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
in July 1961 and the advance party under Captain Mehra moved by air on 3
August, arriving at <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> on <st1:date day="9" month="8" w:st="on" year="1961">9 August 1961</st1:date>. The main body
embarked at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
on the U.S.N.S. <i>General Blatchford</i> on
16 August, arriving at Dar-es-Salaam on <st1:date day="27" month="8" w:st="on" year="1961">27 August 1961</st1:date> where they were greeted by the CO,
Lieutenant Colonel Bhasin. The company
was transported from Dar-es-Salaam to <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place>
by air on 3 and 4 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The company was responsible for manning the wireless
links of the UN internal radio net work as directed by the CSO HQ ONUC, <st1:place w:st="on">Leopoldville</st1:place>. It
was also manning the signal centre and exchange at ONUC Elisabethville. Even
before the arrival of the main body of the company the advance party had taken
part in Operation ‘Rum Punch’, which is described by Captain Mehra in the
following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>On <st1:date day="27" month="8" w:st="on" year="1961">27 August 61</st1:date> at 2000 hrs Captain Ghosh my predecessor and
I were in our villa which was situated 500 yards behind main Gendarmerie <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Massart</st1:placename></st1:place>
while the outgoing Officer Commanding Major Patil had gone to Brig Raja’s
residence for a conference. At 2300 hrs
he returned and told us that operation ‘Rum Punch’ starts as UN forces in Elisabethville area
will implement the security council’s resolution of 21 Feb 61 by taking into
custody and expelling white officers and mercenaries of Gendarmerie. The operation was to take place simultaneously
in all sectors of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
Command.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
tasks given to our company were:-<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(a) Capt S Ghosh with one telegraph mechanic
to put out of action the civil telephone system from the city post office at
280500 hrs.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(b) Jem Bhaskar Ram, F of S, to put out of
action a subsidiary Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
Studio opposite <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> Post
Office. The task of capturing the Post
Office and above studio was given to D Company 1 Dogra and our technicians
accompanied them.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(c) Hav Packianathan and Nk Kewal Singh were
to accompany 3 Company XII Swedish Battalion to put out of action Radio
transmitter at Kilobelobe.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(d) I was given the task of taking over the
technical control of Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
main studio and to start broadcasting local music at 280600 hrs. Naik Fernandez was to help me. C Company 1 Dogra was given the task to
capture, hold and control the studio.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(e) Apart from the above additional tasks
given to our company we were to provide normal signal communications. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">We all reached
our respective assembly areas by 280200 hrs.
All objectives were captured without any major fighting. Exactly at 0500 hrs the telephone system of
the city was out off. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region> Radio
transmitter at Kilobelobe and studio opposite post office were also put out of
commission at 0500 hrs. Main <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region> Radio
studio was tested and was ready for broadcasting at 0545 hrs. However, during orders no mention was made to
switch on the transmitters at 0600 hrs and so the broadcasting from the studio
could not be heard at the specified time.
Transmitters could not be contacted as telephones were out. Immediately an escorted SDR was sent to
transmitters. At 0625 hrs transmitters
were switched on and by 0630 hrs the Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region> was on the air manned
exclusively by Indian Signal Company. By 1130 hrs same day political agreements
were made and control of all vital points was handed back to civilian <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
authorities”.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The after effects of Operation ‘Rum
Punch’ were not very pleasant for the UN.
The Gendarmerie who had shown no inclination for fighting so far started
digging in the positions vacated by UN troops on 28 August. On 5 September on receipt of information that
the UN headquarters in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Connaught</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Building</st1:placetype></st1:place> was going to be
blown up by plastic bombs the headquarters moved to a new location popularly
known as the Castle, which was just a three-storied building in a large garden.
The signal company had a large
quantity of heavy equipment like BC 610, generators etc. but was given only two
hours to move. Major Roy Chowdhury and I decided that the signal centre should
continue to function in the old building while reserve sets are installed in
the new HQ. The Canadian RTTY Terminal and the skeleton signal centre where BCs
610 were replaced by ANGRC-19 sets remained while the heavy equipment was moved
to the new HQ. The company did not have
any load carrying transport except a pick-up van. The signal centre was on the
2<sup>nd</sup> floor and all equipment had to be man-handled as the lift in the
old headquarters building was locked up by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region> authorities. However,
working with great determination the men moved everything in five hours and the
new signal centre, BC 610 transmitters and dipole aerials were ready at 1900
hours.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 12 September the company was ordered to move to
the Castle compound in preparation for Operation ‘Morthor’ which was to commence
next day. Working throughout the day the men moved all heavy stores to the
allotted area and started digging. The plan for Operation ‘Morthor’ was similar
to that of ‘Rum Punch.’ The signal
company had to provide technicians with assaulting troops to handle
installations like the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
radio station, <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> central
telephone exchange and the transmitters.
Captain Mehra and Naik A. Fernandez accompanied C Company 1 Dogra to
Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
studio while Jemadar Bhaskar Ram and Naik Chacko went with D Company to the
GPO. Lance Naik S.K. Mahendroo accompanied a platoon of 35 Irish Battalion to
the subsidiary studio of Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
opposite the GPO and Naik Kewal Singh went with A Company XII Swedish Battalion
to Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>
transmitters. During the assault on Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Katanga</st1:place></st1:country-region>, one Dogra sepoy was killed
and three others were seriously wounded. There was no immediate arrangement for
evacuating the casualties. Captain Mehra, at personal risk of coming under
enemy fire, evacuated the casualties to HQ Katanga Command building for onward
despatch to the hospital and went back to the studio to complete his job,
taking forward some reinforcements for the assaulting company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The tasks allotted to the company
were completed and during the next few days everyone was kept busy digging and
providing overhead protection using Eucalyptus logs and sand bags. On 16 September about 2030 hours the company
was subjected to a mortar attack. The
first mortar shell landed in the mess tent killing outright Lance Naik Chanchal
Singh, the mess NCO, who was getting stores ready for the next morning tea. The
two cooks were unscathed. However, Havildar Sowaran Singh, Lance Naik K. Kesava
Pillai and Signalman Sukumaran Nair received splinter injuries as they were
getting into the trenches. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On receipt of information of the injury to his men,
Mehra rushed from the signal centre to the mess tent amidst mortar shell bursts
and machine gun fire and evacuated the injured who were bleeding profusely, to
the headquarters building basement and arranged first aid for them. He then
took Lieutenant Colonel Oyen, Senior Medical Officer, to examine Lance Naik
Chanchal Singh who was unconscious, and who was eventually pronounced
dead. Next he went to the neighbouring
location, defended by the camp personnel of HQ Indian Independent Brigade and
evacuated Jemadar Thomas, personal assistant to Brigadier Raja who was unable
to walk due to a leg injury, and one OR of the Indian Independent Brigade Group
Signal Company who was also injured. For his daring acts on 13 and 16 September
Captain Mehra was later ‘Mentioned in Despatches’.<i> </i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At this stage the CO ordered that
Major Roy Chowdhury would maintain the static communications while Major
Sawhney would be responsible for the tactical communications of HQ Katanga
Command. Roy Chowdhury was directed to
provide whatever assistance he could to Sawhney to carry out his task. Towards
the end of November 1961 the Gendarmerie became active and starting kidnapping
UN soldiers and established road blocks on the airport road at Tunnel which
divided the city in two and particularly the UN dispositions on a diversionary
route called ‘Route Charlie’. Then they
started interfering with the movement of UN troops and vehicles. In the
meantime Sawhney was admitted in Leopoldville ONUC hospital. With the help of
the <st1:place w:st="on">COS</st1:place>, Major Dhar, Roy Chowdhury was able to
get four C 52 detachments from the Brigade Signal Company Albertville for the
tactical wireless network. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The operation commenced on <st1:date day="5" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">5 December 1961</st1:date> which involved
mostly clearing the road blocks, capture of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Massart</st1:placename></st1:place>
and elimination of hostile fire which mercenaries and a lot of civilians were
indulging in. During this operation
Indian, Swedish and Ethiopian Air Forces co-operated which was a great morale raising
factor. The company headquarters, unit lines and the 3/1 Gorkha Rifles lines
which were located in the Castle were subjected to very heavy mortar firing
almost daily from a mobile mortar group manned by white civilians. As the operations progressed this hostile
fire was silenced. By Christmas the
Gendarmerie was pushed outside the city.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The achievement of the five-month old company can be
summarized in the Force Commander’s words when on 16 December 1961 before his
departure for Leopoldville he sent for the signal officers (Major Roy
Chowdhury, Major Sawhney, Captain Mehra and OC Canadian Signal Detachment, an
infantry officer, Lieutenant Beau-Regard) and said “<i>I have no words to express my feelings towards you. The results of the operations prove your
devotion to duty, efficiency and morale.
Thank you very much. Keep it up
and God bless you”.</i> <b>18</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Shortly before New Year’s Day in
1962, the company composed a poem and sent it for publication in the Signalman.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">New
year’s eve in the town of E’ville<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Not a creature astir, all appear to be still.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
khukris are hung by the tent with care<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In hopes that gendarmes would not be there.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When
out of the bush, to the Gorkha’s delight<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">charge a horde of gendarmes, at mid-night.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
alarm is sounded, each man to his post,<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">the signallers are ready to return a fiery toast.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
attack is repulsed, there never was a doubt<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">the poor beggars lost heart, and turned back in a
rout.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
commander awoke in his room at HQ<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">he called for a drink, “what else is new?”<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">And
when he was told, he shouted with glee<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“begad! the Gorkhas are fighting for me”.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">He
hurries downstairs to a blacked out room<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">where he finds the signallers in a bit of a gloom.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“It’s
a bit of a shame,” they shout aloud<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“that such fun and games are ever allowed.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">New
year is ruined, we have to stay here<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">and all we can do is toil hard and sincere”.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">He
retorts “lads, you’re in your glory,<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">now it’s up to you to get out the story”,<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">So
the cables go out, one after another<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">addressed to all tiger, lion, and their brother.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There
were flashes in cipher and ops in plain<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">but throughout the ordeal, did we complain?<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To
the top of the list our company arose<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">and the wireless circuits never did close.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though
our hours are long and nights are dark<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">like jolly St. Nick our traffic do we park.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">So
while bullets may fly and shells may fall<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">a very happy new year we wish to you all<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Indian
Signal Company (ONUC)<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <st1:place w:st="on">Elisabethville</st1:place> <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In April 1963, the term of the ONUC came to an end
and all Indian troops returned home. During their stay in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>, they had
won the admiration of troops of all nationalities and the local population, due
to their professionalism and impartiality. Shortly before the departure of the
Indian contingent from Congo, the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Kebbede Guebre wrote to Lieutenant Colonel
Krishnamoorthy, commanding the Indian Contingent Signal Regiment, ONUC:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the eve of
your departure with your unit for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, I should like to express to
you my warm appreciation of the fine work done by the Indian Contingent Signal
Regiment during their tour of duty with the UN Forces.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Vast distances
separate various Formations and Units of UN Forces in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The absence of good road, rail and telephonic
communications means that in this country we have to rely on Signal
communication to an extent which is not normal in other countries. Your Unit therefore had a very important part
to play in the whole <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
Operation. The Indian Contingent Signal Regiment carried out their duties with
thoroughness and efficiency. They showed
a loyalty and dedication to their work which did credit to themselves and to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I understand
that on repatriation you are being redesignated as 6 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Mountain</st1:placetype></st1:place>
Divisional Signal Regiment. I therefore
wish you and your Unit good luck in the tasks that lie ahead and I know that
the high standards shown in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
will guarantee success in your new role. </span></i><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">NATHU LA (1967)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Background<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Nathu
La lies on the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Old Silk Route</st1:address></st1:street>
between <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
In 1904 Major <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Younghusband" title="Francis Younghusband"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Francis Younghusband</span></a>, serving as the
British Commissioner to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
led a successful mission through Nathu La to capture <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lhasa</st1:place></st1:city>. This led to the setting up of trading
posts at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyantse" title="Gyantse"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Gyantse</span></a>
and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gartok" title="Gartok"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Gartok</span></a>
in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
and gave control of the surrounding <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chumbi_Valley" title="Chumbi Valley"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Chumbi Valley</span></a>
to the British. The following year, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Great Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region>
ratified an agreement approving trade between <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>. In 1947,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region>
became an Indian protectorate. After <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> took control of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1950
and suppressed a Tibetan uprising in 1959, refugees entered <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region> through <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Nathu La.</st1:address></st1:street> During
the 1962 <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_War" title="Sino-Indian War"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Sino-Indian War</span></a>, Nathu La witnessed skirmishes
between soldiers of the two countries. Shortly thereafter, the pass was sealed
and was closed for trade. Five years later, Nathu La was the scene of a ‘border
skirmish’ between Indian and China, which resulted in heavy casualties to both
sides. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the first week of August 1967,
the border out posts (BOPs) at Nathu La were occupied by 2 Grenadiers,
relieving 18 Rajput. Lieutenant Colonel Rai Singh was then commanding 2
Grenadiers. Major Bishan Singh took over
as ‘Tiger Nathu La’, as the company commander holding the pass was generally
known, with Captain P.S Dagar as his second-in-command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Even while 2 Grenadiers was in the
process of taking over the defences at Nathu La, Chinese activities increased.
They were noticed repairing their bunkers on North Shoulder and making
preparations to construct new ones. On 13 August the observation post at Sebu
La reported that the Chinese had arrived on the crest line and dug trenches on
our side of the international border. When challenged, they filled up the
trenches and withdrew. On the same day
they added eight more loud speakers to their already existing 21 speakers on
South Shoulder. Due to this the volume
of their propaganda increased and could now be heard at Changgu. On the Indian side 30 watt transistorized
amplifiers with six speakers had been installed on South Shoulder by 112
Mountain Brigade Signal Company.
Propaganda was relayed through tape recorders from Hotel. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In view of the increase in Chinese
activity at Nathu La, Major General Sagat Singh, GOC 17 Mountain Division ordered
a three strand wire fence to be laid along the border from Nathu La to South
Shoulder. This task was completed by 2 Grenadiers by the end of August 1967<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 4 September Sagat went to Nathu
La. He directed that the wire fence be converted into a Cat Wire Type 1 obstacle,
using concertina coils. The task was assigned
to 2 Grenadiers. A platoon of 70 Field Company Engineers under Major Cheema was
allotted to assist them. On 5 September
work started at 0500 hours but the Chinese objected. There was an argument
between Colonel Rai Singh and the Chinese Political Commissar as to alignment
of the border. The work was stopped at 0800 hours. However, work on Chinese
defences on North and South Shoulder continued.
During the night the Chinese came up to the Bump and cut off one
shoulder so that if water was poured on the other shoulder it would flow into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Next
morning when our men went to straighten out some wire a few Chinese came
running up to the border with a bucket of water and poured it on the Bump
indicating the watershed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 7 September the work started
again on the laying the wire. This time
about a hundred Chinese came to the fence and there was hand to hand fighting
between the troops. Realising that they
were unequal to the Jats, the Chinese withdrew and began pelting stones, the Grenadiers
responding in the same manner. Because of all this fighting there was not much
progress in the laying of the wire. The
Chinese suffered a few casualties in wounded and we had two wounded. On 8 and 9
September things were relatively quiet but the Chinese continued work on their
defences. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> . On the night of 10 September the
GOC held a conference at HQ 112 Mountain Brigade in Changgu, where he
personally briefed everyone on how the operation for laying the wire was to be carried
out on 11 September. Additional
resources in men and material were moved for this purpose. One company of 18
Rajput was brought in to reinforce the defences. An ad hoc force of 90 men was
organised into a protection party to charge the Chinese positions if they
opened fire. Major Bishan Singh was in charge of the work with Captain P.S
Dagar as his assistant. Apart from the platoon of 70 Field Company, a pioneer
platoon was to assist in the construction of the fence.<b>19</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Events of <st1:date day="11" month="9" w:st="on" year="1967">11 September 1967</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As soon as work commenced on 11
September, the Chinese came up to the fence, and tried to stop it. There was a
heated discussion between the Chinese commander, who was accompanied by the
Political Commissar and CO 2 Grenadiers. Sagat had foreseen this eventuality
and told Rai Singh not to expose himself but remain in his bunker, where the
brigade commander, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, was also present. But this was not
heeded and Rai Singh, with an escort, came out in the open to stand face to
face with the Chinese officers. As the arguments became more heated, tempers
rose, with both sides standing their ground. Suddenly, the Chinese opened fire,
causing several casualties among the troops working on the wire fence. Colonel
Rai Singh was hit by a Chinese bullet, and fell down. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Chinese and Indian soldiers face-off at Nathu La, 1967<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The company of 18 Rajput, under
Major Harbhajan Singh, and the sappers and pioneers working on the fence had
been caught in the open, and suffered heavy casualties from the Chinese firing.
Realising that the only way to neutralise the Chinese fire was a physical
assault, Harbhajan shouted to his men, and led them in a charge on the Chinese
position. Several of the Indian troops were mowed down by Chinese machine guns,
but those who reached the Chinese bunkers used their bayonets and accounted for
many of the enemy. Both Harbhajan and Dagar lost their lives in the action,
which developed into a full scale battle, lasting six days. Sagat had asked for
some medium guns, and these were moved up to a height of over 10,000 ft. The
artillery observation posts proved their worth in bringing down effective fire
on the Chinese. Because of lack of observation, and the steep incline west of
Nathu La, most Chinese shells fell behind the forward defences, and did not
harm the Indians. The Indian casualties in the action were just over two
hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered
about three hundred casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals in Nathu La <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Second Lieutenant N.C Gupta was
commanding 112 Mountain Brigade Signal Company. He had recently relieved Major
R.K. Marwaha, who had proceeded on leave. Gupta had joined the brigade after
completing the Commando Course at the Infantry School, and was promptly
christened ‘Commando’ by the brigade commander, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, M.V.C. A soft spoken and affable officer with a
diminutive frame, Gupta made up in courage and diligence what he lacked in
size. For his fearless actions in the Nathu La operations, he was awarded the Sena
medal. Thanks to his innate modesty, very people in the Corps of Signals know
that he was in fact recommended for a Maha Vir Chakra. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though young in years, Gupta
maintained a diary of events as they occurred. Filling several foolscap sheets
of paper now yellowed with age, the record makes fascinating reading. The
Author of this volume was also serving in 17 Mountain Divisional Signal
Regiment in 1967. Most of the details given in this account are based on the
diary maintained by Gupta, and the biography. of Lieutenant General Sagat Singh
written by the Author, as part of </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">his book <i>Leadership in the Indian Army –
Biographies of Twelve Soldiers ,</i>published
in<i> </i>2005</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The communications set up within the
battalion was based on radio and line.
The B1 outstation was on radio set AN/GRC-9. The battalion radio net was
using radio set VM-25. There were lines from the battalion exchange to all
forward posts and rearwards to brigade headquarters. The line to HQ 112
Mountain Brigade at Changgu was on PL, the others consisting of WD1/D3 cable laid
on the ground or on ballies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The events of 11 September are
described by Colonel N.C. Gupta in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">GOC’s conference
of 10 September finished at around 2300 hrs. Throughout this period and over
the following night the Engineers were busy moving their stores to Nathu La for
the fence laying next morning. As part
of the signal plan a new line was laid overnight from Brigade HQ to Sherabthang
and patched backwards directly to the Divisional HQ. A back up Rover was created to be positioned
at Brigade HQ to be used by BM in case required. The primary Rover was to move with the
Brigade Commander to Nathu La in the morning.
An additional line was also laid between Sherabthang – Nathu La Exchange
at Hotel Section.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I left at around 0500 hrs on 11 September with the Rover,
one line party and an additional Radio Set VM 25 as part of the Commander’s
entourage to Nathula. We reached H
Section at around 0515 hrs and were met by CO 2 Grenadiers and OC 70 Field Company. CO of the Artillery Regiment was also with
us. After a quick review of the
situation CO 2 Grenadiers, OC 70 Field Company and CO of Artillery Regiment left for South
Shoulder where the fencing was to take place and I along with the Commander and Company
Commander of 2 Grenadiers went to area
of Central Bump. This was an
excellent vantage point. It also housed
a MMG Section. The visibility was good
and it was a clear day with a clear sky.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By the time we reached area of Central Bump laying of fence,
along the slope of North Shoulder and in this area of the pass itself, had
started. There was quite a lot of
shouting going on. We had around 120 men involved in the fence laying. They were working in small teams at around
six points on the slope and the pass.
All the posts at and adjoining Nathula were at full alert and
communications to these parts on battalion radio and on cable were
through. Artillery network was on and
cables also through. North Shoulder,
South Shoulder, Pass, and H Section were working directly to the Brigade
Commander on the B1 net, which also had CO 2 Grenadiers and Tiger Nathula on
it. The Chinese had around 150 troops
opposing the wire laying in a hand to hand battle. Barring the commotion and despite the hand to
hand opposition things seemed to be moving as planned and the fence appeared to
be getting into position. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> From the vantage
point we noticed that the number of Chinese opposing the fence had gradually
reduced. The PA equipment on the Chinese
side started a speech of Mao Tse Tung in Hindi.
The volume of the PA equipment was unusually high and had shielded the
noise of the commotion on account of the hand to hand fight. Just as we thought
things are in control all hell was let loose.
Every bunker and gun of the Chinese on North and South Shoulder started
firing on the Indian troops laying the fence.
They were in the open and bore the initial brunt of the firing. Our troops at South Shoulder who were hardly
30 mtrs from the Chinese were also taken by surprise.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Commander got onto the B1 net and started speaking to
the people at the other end. In due
course of time it was learnt that the CO of 2 Grenadiers had been injured. It was also learnt that the number of
casualties amongst the troops involved in fence laying would be high but no
exact figures/estimates were available.
Major Bishan Singh, Tiger Nathula, was in communication with the
Commander, who instructed him to try and evacuate the CO and other casualties
to H Section.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I suddenly heard a sharp whistling sound overhead. It appeared as though it was an aircraft that
had made a quick pass. It was no aircraft - it was the sound of artillery
shells that had overshot our position to land in the valley below. It was clear the Chinese had opened up their
artillery on the pass. After some
adjustments shells were falling all around us and in the entire area of
Nathula. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon I learnt my first lesson of war – if you hear the
whistle of a shell you do not have to duck (especially in the mountains) as it
will over shoot and you are safe. The
information of the Chinese opening fire was flashed to Divisional HQ and
upwards to Army HQ. However it took
quite some time before permission for retaliation was received. Our artillery fire was guided by the OP at
Camels Back. By later accounts it was
learnt that our fire in the rear areas had been very effective and had resulted
in a lot of casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By about 0930 hrs, Chinese fire had intensified and
gradually we started getting out of touch with the troops at North Shoulder and
South Shoulder. By 0945 hrs we had no
contact with anyone on the position on the shoulders even on the Artillery
network. It was a panic situation for
me. All the lines were down and so was
the B1 to the pass. I tried to enter the
battalion net and the company net but failed.
There was no response on any of the almost dozen frequencies of the
battalion in use that day for various nets.
I asked the operator at Brigade HQ to press in additional radio sets and
keep trying for a response directly on AN/GRC-9 working to the Artillery OP and
CO of the Field Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This created a panic for us. The Commander asked me to
call South Shoulder but there was no response. We tried to observe the area of
South Shoulder but could see no movement.
The shelling on the South Shoulder had also increased.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Under the circumstances perhaps there was no other option
for the Commander but to ask me to send someone to South Shoulder to restore
the communication. While I had a line party and spare radio sets with me it was
decided that a radio be sent to South Shoulder, a distance of around 500
mtrs. The route was open at places and
involved going down around 300 mtrs and then up around 200 mtrs. The linemen with me were new to Nathula and
had never gone to South Shoulder.
Havildar Bhakuni of the Rover had gone there many times. The choice was therefore between him and
me. Seeing the gravity of the situation
and the shelling, the Commander said, “OK, Commando (my pet name in Brigade
HQ), off you go”. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I reached South Shoulder at around 1000 hours. To my astonishment I found the post totally
abandoned. I informed the same to the
Commander. He asked me to look around for wounded if any and remain at the post
and keep him in picture. From the bunkers
on South Shoulder I could see the Chinese in their bunker across. By this time intermittent fog had started
setting in. I informed the Commander that I can see a few dead soldiers in the
area ahead of our defences close to the fence<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At around 1100 hrs the Commander informed me that
re-enforcements are on their way but would take at least three hours to reach
and that I must hold on till then.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By 1200 hrs the fog had intensified. As I was watching
from one of the bunkers I saw one of the bodies moving. He was just next to the
fence barely 10 mtrs from the Chinese bunker. Taking advantage of the fog I
went ahead to try and recover him. To my surprise it was Major Bishan Singh,
Tiger of Nathula who had been injured in the initial firing. He was a 6 foot
tall Jat. He was badly injured. With great difficulty I managed to lift him and
partly drag him into our defences. Once inside I made him speak to the
Commander.<b>21</b> <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The shelling was on off. On my way back I was hit by shrapnel
of one shell. However I never came to known of it at that point of time. I say
so because that was the closest any shell had exploded near me. I came to know
about it after three days when I was changing the uniform. My vest was full of
dried blood with a small wound on the chest. In our family we had a tradition
to give a silver coin when someone was going out on some important job. My
mother had given me this coin when I left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
for 17 MDSR after YO’s course. This coin was in my wallet along with the ID
card and had taken the brunt of the shrapnel saving me from certain death.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By about 1330 hrs the reinforcements had reached South
Shoulder. After passing necessary instructions the Rover Group decided to move
to area Steps and then to Sherabthang. Before moving I left Havildar Bhakuni
and the line party with the task of restoring the line in the battalion
defended area including those to South Shoulder, H Section and the OP. I took
the B1 radio myself and moved with the Commander. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The events of 11 September at Nathula had been an
experience for me. We lost around 70 troops in the day. The skirmish lasted
five days before being called off. The most amazing event was the recovery of a
wounded soldier from the fence after six days in the open. It was nothing short
of a miracle.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After returning to Sherabthang with
the brigade commander Gupta took stock of the state of communications in the
sector. He has recorded the events of 11 and 12 September in his diary. <b>20</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 72.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<st1:date day="11" month="9" w:st="on" year="1800"><i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11 Sep 1800</span></u></i></st1:date><i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> h</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
lines to forward locations were through.
B1 at Sherabthang was through with B1 at Nathula. But they needed some more dry batteries and
wire aerial which had been destroyed by shelling. Sigmn Daryao Singh, operator of PA equipment
at H Sec who had come down to Sherabthang when firing started was with me. He seemed to be quite fresh and he was the
only person with me who knew the Nathula area so I detailed him to take two dry
batteries & one wire aerial to Nathula & give it to L/Nk <st1:place w:st="on">Om</st1:place> Prakash I/C det.
This man I guess was rather afraid for he went about ¼ of the way and
returned two hrs later with an excuse that he has stomach ache in fact gas
trouble and cannot go to Nathula. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1830
h</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
the mean time I had got my three linemen ready with cable to go with me to lay
a new line to Nathula. They could not
move alone for none of them knew the route.
Any way I took two dry batteries & one wire aerial. The two linemen
took one drum each. The third lineman
Mannu showed cowardice and said that he cannot go because he has pain in
leg. At this time I felt like emptying
my sten magazine into his stomach.
Anyway I did not want any malingerers with me so I took the two linemen
& proceeded with line laying. With great caution due to the intermittent
fire that was going on we continued with the line laying.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It
was a well moon lit night & the enemy could easily have spotted us but we
were rather lucky. We reached Gole Ghar
at 2000 hrs but we fell short of cable by about 200 meters. I knew in the morning my rover det had
brought a coil of about 300 meters. I
went to Centre Bump & luckily found the coil there. So we joined it & put the line through to
Tiger Nathula & Nathula Exchange in parallel at 2030 hrs. There we wasted no time but returned to
Sherabthang. On our way back we crossed
many wounded soldiers slowly making their way back to Sherabthang. Most of them were without their arms &
equipment.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2200hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When
I reached Sherabthang the Commander was briefing & making liaison for the
plan which the GOC had given when he had come to Sherabthang. Same time Maj Balwant Singh came from Changgu
to take over as Tiger Nathula. Commander
briefed him of what he was supposed to do.
Maj Balwant left at 2300 hrs via area Steps with one radio det &
some dry batteries of VM 25-B. At 2400
hrs we had some dry chapattis which were lying in Sherabthang with pickle. We were really very grateful to SM for he
managed to give us a glass of hot tea which put us back into mood.<b>21 <o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2400hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Things were being married up for the
next morning’s operation which had three phases. In phase one two patrols under
JCOs would patrol area S Shoulder & N Shoulder for casualties and bring
back as many as they can. In phase two a
platoon under Capt Daniels would assault S Shoulder from Camels Back side,
destroy or capture as many enemy as possible, bring back enemy arms,
ammunition, dead, wounded, alive or any other souvenirs. Also Capt Rathor was to be on S Shoulder with
his platoon. As soon as S Shoulder would
fall Maj Cheema & Capt Rathor would go ahead with the rest of the wire
which was to be laid. Priority of laying
was to lay the wire on the Bump. We all
hoped that the weather should be bad for this operation but unfortunately it
was a moon lit night.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commander
also rang up Maj Chandrashekar and told him what was expected of him. The task given must be fulfilled under all
circumstances. He also told him that Maj
Balwant Singh was coming up to take over as Tiger & that he should stay at
South Shoulder & supervise the operation from there.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<st1:date day="12" month="9" w:st="on" year="300"><i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12 Sep 0300</span></u></i></st1:date><i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Capt
Lamba’s company which had gone to area Steps was to be in radio communication
with Tiger Nathula, Camels Back, Sebula, & Sherabthang but he was not
through with anyone. I knew that when
all the net was through, either he has not opened his set or his batteries are
drained out. Any way myself and Capt R.
Prakash took one VM 25-B set and left for area Steps via the road. On the way we met many wounded slowly making
their way to Sherabthang. We also saw a
lot of arms & equipment lying on the road.
Anyway when we reached area Steps we found that Capt Lamba’s set was not
put on. I put my set on & in the
very first call we were through. I then
put his set through, briefed the operator & returned to Sherabthang<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">0530hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Chinese opened fire on the party which went to lay the wire under Maj Cheema
with small arms. Most of them were
pinned down & two killed.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">0630hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I
took my line party of two linemen to lay a new line to area Steps. When we reached area Steps at about 0800 hrs
I found Capt Daniel was not there with his company. Anyway I went to look for his company. A
little below area Steps I met Capt Daniel with his platoon. He told me he has been ordered to report to Maj
Balwant Singh. I advised him to follow
the route via Sebula. Anyway I soon met
Capt Lamba, gave him a telephone & put the line through. We were back in Sherabthang at about 0830
hrs.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">0830hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Signal JCO of 18 Rajput came to me
for three drums of WD1 cable required for lines at Nathula post. I gave him three drums & then left for
Nathula via Sebula at 0900 hrs. In the
mean time we laid a new line to mortar position, which was completed by about
1000 hrs. As soon as this line was put
through the enemy opened up heavy arty fire on area Steps, mortar position
& Sherabthang. I was very close to
the exchange when this fire opened up. I
saw couple of operators running out of the exchange room. Thinking that it might be abandoned I went
inside but I saw that a Grenadiers operator was inside & still manning the
exchange. Anyway I stayed along with
him. The Corps Commander was also at
this time in area Sherabthang. Our B1
under Naik Bhakuni was through strength 5.
Anyway as we sat in the exchange the line to Steps & Camels Back
went out. The shelling stopped at about
1130. I at once sent a line party to
Camels Back.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1130hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
shelling had created lot of confusion in our adm tail that was going up to
Nathula via Sebula. One mule was killed
& six injured near mortar position and a message was sent on B1 to Brigade
for RVC doctor. Capt Lamba’s company in
area Steps had scattered, left the area & come down to as far as Kupup
road. Capt Daniel’s company took cover
there only and stayed there indefinitely. The Rajput Subedar carrying cable
also remained somewhere near mortar position <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1200hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">We
started work to shift the Sherabthang exchange from the wooden barrack to a
shell proof bunker. The work was
completed by 1400 hrs. The work done by
Signalman Mohinder Singh was commendable.
Unfortunately no sooner was the exchange shifted the lines to Mortar
position, Sebula, Nathula, Steps & Camels Back were out. The two lines to Brigade were also down but
B1 was through. Anyway, I sent a line
party to Nathula, one to mortar position & Sebula & one to Camels Back
& I myself went on Brigade line with one lineman. Luckily the Brigade was through by 1600
hrs. But at about 1630 enemy started
shelling Area Theguk & Haryana as a result these two lines were again out. The Brigade line party reached our location
at about 1730 hrs laying a new line. But
when they reached our exchange they could not get 112 Brigade exchange. Mortar position line was through at 1800 hrs,
Sebula at 2100 hrs, Nathula at 2330 hrs and Camels Back line was not through
that night. They were however through on
VM 25-B to Tiger Nathula. Line to Tiger
Steps was through but his telephone was faulty & as such no calls were
made. He was not through on wireless
also. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1800hrs</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commander,
CO 182 Light Regiment with his radio det, GLO & myself left for Nathula via
area Steps. At Kupup road junction we
met a party who were bringing back two casualties. A little ahead we met a section of D Company
18 Rajput resting. On questioning we
came to know that they had left area Steps and come down due to heavy shelling
and would be going up after darkness.
Commander ordered them to go forthwith.
A little short of Steps we met Capt Lamba with the rest of his
company. Commander questioned him &
took him to Steps and saw his position & told him to bring up his full
company & send one of his JCOs to
Nathula Tiger to take orders if his platoon was required to move up to South
Shoulder.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A
little ahead we saw lots of equipment like packs, steel helmet, ammunition
& cable drum lying on the ground. We
met a few men of Capt Daniels’ platoon who had left in the morning trying to
make their way to South Shoulder via <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">area</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Lake</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The road had been badly shelled and was in a
very bad state. We left the radio
detachment half way as going up via short cut was rather difficult for them
& we could not move via the road due to good visibility. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">We
reached Tiger’s Bunker. Commander had a
few words with him & told him his plan & how they were to bring out the
casualties from North & South Shoulders.
The plan to lay the wire had been dropped. We left Tiger’s Bunker at about 2000
hrs. On our way back we met the
stretcher bearer parties going up to bring back the casualties.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">22<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The skirmish at Nathu La continued for another five
days. As would be evident from the personal account and diary of Second
Lieutenant N.C Gupta, the events left a deep impression on his mind. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Gupta’s actions in holding South
Shoulder alone for a few hours, and saving the life of the badly wounded Major
Bishan Singh under enemy fire were indeed commendable and deserved to be
rewarded. His actions had been witnessed
by the brigade and divisional commanders and it was expected that he would be
given a gallantry award. Unfortunately, the fact that South Shoulder post had
been left unoccupied for some time was mentioned in his citation. On account of its likely repercussions the
portion about Indian troops vacating their posts was removed. In the event, N.C. Gupta was awarded a Sena
Medal instead of the MVC that he deserved.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An interesting sidelight of the
Nathu La incident has been given by Lieutenant General M.S. Sodhi, who writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I
recall the Nathu La incident too. I was commanding XXXIII Corps Signals. The
telephone lines were down and the GOC wanted immediate confirmation of action
proposed by him. He dictated his very clear cut and precise appreciation
of the situation on the telephone to me and had me send a message to the
GOC-in-C with copy to Army HQ !! General JS Aurora
considered dictation to me more expedient than sending
for his BGS/GSO 1. The message was encrypted and cleared on
RTT in a Flash. He got concurrence to his proposed action in very good
time.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I also recall a
conversation with General Sagat when I happened to meet him at the airport a
few days later. I asked him how the communications support was during the
operations. His response was, with tongue in cheek, "Bloody awful!
The Corps Commander could contact me in the most forward post!"</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">23<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Cho La Incident<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
incident at Cho La, another post located to the <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">north west</st1:place></st1:state> of Nathu La, occurred a few days afterwards.
The post fell under 63 Mountain Brigade, then under the command of Brigadier
Kundan Singh. It was occupied by 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles, which was being
relieved by 7/11 Gorkha Rifles during the last week of September 1967. On 1
October, There was a scuffle at Point 15,450, which had been taken over by the
Gorkhas on the previous day. There was boulder at the post, and Chinese and
Indian sentries usually stood on opposite sides. Since the Indians were new to
the post, the Chinese staked claim to the boulder, leading to heated argument
between the two post commanders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
the arguments became more heated, the Chinese opened fire, with the Indians
responding in like fashion. The Gorkhas charged the Chinese positions and there
was hand-to-hand combat, the kukris flashing repeatedly. The officiating CO,
Major K.B. Joshi, was on his way to Point 15,450 when the incident started. He
was at Rai Gap, held by 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles, which also came under
heavy fire and was attacked by the Chinese, <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The news of the firing was conveyed
to HQ 63 Mountain Brigade by Major Nair, the second-in-command of 10 Jammu
& Kashmir Rifles. Brigadier Kundan Singh, who was also officiating as the
divisional commander, immediately ordered the rest of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles to
move up from Tamze. He himself moved up to Twin Huts, to see things for
himself, where he met Major Joshi, who requested permission to recapture Point
15,450, which was granted. The attack was launched next morning and the
position recaptured by the Gorkhas. The battalion was awarded two Vir Chakras
during the incident.<b>24<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lieutenant General S.R.R. Aiyengar,
who was commanding 63 Mountain Brigade Signal Company, recounts the incident in
the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Cho La
incident took place barely a month after the Nathu La incident. Our Brigade 63
Mountain Brigade was operationally responsible for this Sector. On my numerous
visits to this Sector, I had seen visually the close proximity of troops on
either side of the LAC. In fact, there is a very famous snap of bayonets of two
soldiers –Indian and Chinese facing each other and bayonets pointing towards
each other and crossing across the face. I had also noticed the Chinese troops
walking side by side whenever we walked across the wire obstacle we had laid
after the Nathu La incident to demarcate our side of the LAC. In fact the
troops then occupying Cho La Post (10 JAK <st1:place w:st="on">RIF</st1:place>)
often used use to narrate how the Chinese troops would toss up Mao’s red badge
across the fence in return of any cigarette packets thrown across by our
troops. They had also installed a PA system similar to the one they had at
Nathula. My Sig Coy - 63 Mtn Bde Sig Coy had also installed one from our side
of the LAC beaming transmission towards the Chinese post. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On one morning
(I am not able to remember the exact date now), we had frantic calls from Cho
La that a heavy exchange of fire was taking place. CO of the Battalion (10 JAK <st1:place w:st="on">RIF</st1:place>) was returning from leave and his 2ic was manning the
fort. Reportedly at one of the forward posts a scuffle had taken place and some
hand to hand combat had followed thereafter. The post was also in the process
of being handed over to 7/11 GR troops. The Chinese started firing all across
our post especially on the Bn/Coy HQ locations and generally restricting any
movements in areas where could easily see. The matter was reported to Bde Comdr
(Brig Kundan Singh) and our attempt to speak to the 2ic was futile, his
telephone was ringing but there was no response. His bunker was also under heavy firing from
the Chinese side. I had asked my B-1
operator, I do still remember his name –L/Nk Moga Singh, a tall young man, full
of josh. I asked him to take our radio set to the 2ic‘s bunker taking advantage
of the lull in firing. We finally
managed to speak to him on the radio set, but my own feedback from Moga Singh
was that the officer was in a state of shock and the telephone was repeatedly
ringing. We got some version of the event from the 2ic. Commander then decided
to visit Cho la next day and wanted me to accompany him. I had done these
visits on number of occasions with him and he was appreciative of our attempts
to keep these communications going despite all the odds of weather and terrain
etc. In fact I do remember after almost every visit of his to Cho La post, he
would send some Rum to our boys and especially our linemen who used to maintain
a tenuous WD-1 route. On reaching the Cho la post next day, the Comdr had a
good idea of what had happened the previous day. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I had put up
L/Nk Moga Singh for a citation but somewhere down the line it got lost. My
Comdr did meet and congratulate him for his efforts to keep the communications
going .Yes, Moga did us proud.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">25</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As one of the original signatories
of the UN Charter, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
has played a pivotal role in the affairs of the World body, shouldering her
responsibilities towards the maintenance of peace. An important part of this
role is the contribution of troops to various commissions, peace keeping forces
and observer groups under the auspices of the United Nations. It is matter of
pride that Indian troops have always performed creditably in such assignments,
based on their impeccable behaviour, impartiality and professionalism. Not surprisingly, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> is one of the largest
contributors to UN missions even today.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A Signals complement has always
formed part of the Indian contingent that is send abroad on an UN assignment.
Without exception, they have delivered the goods, always and every time. One
reason is that unlike most other arms where an entire unit or sub unit is
earmarked for an overseas assignment, in the Signals contingent each man is
selected individually, based on past performance. As a result, almost every
signaller who forms part of an overseas mission is above average, and there are
almost no ‘bad hats’, a problem which newly raised units often face. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Nathu La operations in 1967 were an acid test
for the Indian Army, which faced the Chinese for the second time in five years.
Though the results of the skirmish were inconclusive, it proved that the
Chinese were not invincible. For Signals, the operation was significant,
bringing to light the high standards of professionalism and training of its
personnel, because of which even a young and inexperienced officer was able to
perform his role in battle without any disruption in communications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h2 align="center" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 20.5pt; tab-stops: 463.5pt 468.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ENDNOTES
TO Chapter 8<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></h2>
<div class="MsoBodyText">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-indent: 22.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">This chapter is mainly based on
Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar’s <i>For the Honour
of India – A History of Indian
Peacekeeping; </i>Captain M.S. Sodhi’s <i>Report on Performance of Force Signal Unit
In Korea; </i>Regimental History, Indian
Contingent Signal Regiment ONUC (Congo); personal diary of 2/ Lt. N.C Gupta and
personal accounts of officers,.
Specific references are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 85.5pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 22.5pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -22.5pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Col</span></st1:place></st1:state><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
V.A. Subramanyam, <i>The Signals: A History
of the Corps of Signals</i>, Macmillan, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1986, p. 126.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 22.5pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: -22.5pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Captain M.S. Sodhi, <i>Report on Performance of Force Signal Unit
In Korea, </i>1954.<i> </i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lt. Gen. Satish
Nambiar, <i>For the Honour of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> – A History of Indian
Peacekeeping</i>, Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR), United
Service Institution of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
(USI), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
2009, pp. 104-113<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Col. S.N. Mehta,
Personal Account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Brig.
E.N. Ramadoss,</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Personal Account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Brig.
E.N. Ramadoss,</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Personal Account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 122%;">Maj.
Gen. K.K Tewari, </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Personal Account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Nambiar, p. 134<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">9.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Lt</span></st1:city><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></span></st1:place><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">
S.N. Antia<i>, “</i>United Nations Emergency
Force :Its Creation And Problems”, <i>The
Signalman,</i> January 1958<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Nambiar, p. 152<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">11.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Shavey, “The Indian
Signal Section with the UNEF”, <i>The
Signalman,</i> October 1957. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain S.P Sethi,
Personal Account<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Nambiar, pp. 191-199<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; tab-stops: 22.5pt; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Nambiar, p. 222<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">15.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Regimental History –
Indian Contingent Signal Regiment ONUC (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">16.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Major P.D. Sawhney, ‘Indian Independent
Brigade Group Signal Company in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>’, <i>The Signalman,</i> January 1962</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">17.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Regimental History –
Indian Contingent Signal Regiment ONUC (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">18.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Lt. Col. P.K. Roy Chowdhury, Personal Account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">19.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Col. R.D. Palsokar, <i>The Grenadiers – A Tradition
of Valour</i>, 1980, p. 363<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">20.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">2/
Lt. N.C Gupta, Personal Diary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">21.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Major Balwant Singh was the Officiating CO of
18 Rajput. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">22.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">2/
Lt. N.C Gupta, Personal Diary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">23.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Lt. Gen. M.S. Sodhi, Personal Account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 3.6pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">24.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Lt. Col. Gautam Sharma, <i>Path of Glory – Exploits
of the 11<sup>th</sup> Gorkha Rifles</i>, Allied Publishers, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1988, pp 68-72.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">25.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Lt. Gen. S.R.R. Aiyengar,
</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Personal Account.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<br />
<h2 align="center" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 20.5pt; tab-stops: 463.5pt 468.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></u></b></h2>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-32902172182549540942016-01-16T07:17:00.003-08:002016-01-16T07:17:56.705-08:00Chapter 9 ORGANISATIONS & PERSONNEL<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chapter
9 </span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ORGANISATIONS
& PERSONNEL <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
ORGANISATIONS : <i>Signals Directorate – Army HQ Signals – Command Signals – Signals
Staff at Static Formation HQ – Corps Signals- Divisional Signals –
Communication Zone Signals – Air & Naval Formation Signals – Air Support
Signals – Signals Intelligence Units – Central Monitoring Organisation- Border
Scouts Signal Company – Border Roads Signals –Territorial Army Signals</i>.
PERSONNEL : <i>The Officer Cadre – JCOs
& Other Ranks – Trade Structure – Depot Regiment & Signals Records</i>.
CONCLUSION.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The state of the Corps at the time
of Partition and Independence has been described in Chapter 1, along with the
organisational changes that occurred immediately afterwards. Along with the
Indian Army, the Indian Signal Corps, as it was then known, was also
partitioned, leading to major changes in class composition, restructuring of
signal units and training establishments. The major problems, such as shortage
of officers and technical tradesmen, could not be solved overnight and it was
many years before the situation stabilised. Various operational commitments
such as the operations in Jammu & Kashmir immediately after Independence
were a severe strain on the already depleted resources of the Corps, which had
to resort to organisational ‘fire fighting’ in order to meet these
requirements. Measures such as keeping a few British officers and NCOs and
granting direct and short service commissions to JCOs alleviated the situation
marginally. Meeting the communication needs of the Indian Army in those early
years was a challenge, which was met head on by the stalwarts who occupied
positions of authority in the Corps at that time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> For the first 15 years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, there were very few changes in
the organisational structure of the Corps. The communications philosophy and
means remained virtually unchanged since World War II. After Partition, the
Indian Army’s tactics, strategy and organizations were mainly oriented for open
warfare, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
being considered as the main threat.
However, on account of the gradually increasing Chinese build-up in the
North, a progressively larger percentage of the Army had begun to be deployed
along the Indo-Tibet border from 1958 onwards.
Until 1962, the organisation and establishment was just sufficient to
meet the current commitments and there was hardly any reserve to meet
unforeseen demands. The two events that had a major influence on the
operational commitments, strategy and organisation of the Corps were the Chinese
invasion of NEFA 1962 and the Indian Army’s invasion of <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place> in 1971, resulting in the liberation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Chinese invasion in 1962
resulted in a large-scale expansion and reorganization of the Army. Most of these changes were carried out
hastily, in 1962 and 1963. In early 1964, the basic concepts for employment of
the Corps and higher formation signal units were approved by the Chief of Army
Staff. Salient points of these concepts were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Command headquarters
will not be required to move from their permanent located stations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The main corps
headquarters will carry out only one deliberate move from their present
location. A tactical headquarters may move frequently and be away from the rest
of the headquarters for a limited period. The rear headquarters are not
required to move. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps maintenance areas
being static, signal communications for them will be provided by communication
zone signal regiments affiliated to the corps.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Command, area and
sub-area signal units will be organized on ‘tailor-made’ establishments, based
on their actual work loads, only minimum essential transport being provided.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps and communication
zone signal regiments, which require a degree of mobility and flexibility, will
be organized on the ‘brick’ system of establishments based on their anticipated
work-load. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Reserves will be
authorised to provide flexibility in the future deployment of formations. Each command will be allotted a composite
signal company. One communication zone signal regiment will be held as Army HQ
reserve.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There will not be any
duplication of signal communications in stations. If a field formation is located in a station,
it will also cater for all static units.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Along with the basic concepts outlined above, the
requirement of higher formation signal units was also approved, as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l8 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Two regiments for Army
HQ, one at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
to operate signal centres; and one at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>
to operate wireless transmitters and receivers.
<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Four command signal
regiments plus one mobile reserve company per command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Five corps signal
regiments based on actual requirements, including a small reserve.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Twelve communication
zone signal regiments, including one as Army HQ reserve <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l12 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One signal company per
area and independent sub area, all on tailor made establishments, making a
total of eight companies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
organisation of divisional signal regiments was finalized based on the
recommendations of the Tactical Communications Committee that was formed in
early 1964, with the SO-in-C as Chairman. This committee first examined the
signal communication requirements of a mountain division taking into
consideration the experience gained since the operations in 1962 and the
exercises of 4 and 6 Mountain Divisions during 1963-64. This study formed the
basis of the organisation of the mountain divisional signal regiment. In 1965
the Tactical Communications Committee carried out an examination of the signal
communication requirements for air defence, offensive air support and
counter-bombardment, as well as the infantry and armoured divisions. Two important results of these studies were
the decisions to go over largely from HF to VHF radio communications and the
introduction of radio relay in the divisions.<b>1</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For the first time, a number of
purely indigenous types of establishments were created, which were not based on
the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
pattern as had been done in the past, but for purely Indian conditions. These
were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Mountain divisional
signal regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Special signal
regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air support signal
regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Independent anti
aircraft brigade signal company (later redesignated in 1965 as independent air
defence brigade signal company).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio monitoring
companies and sections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
large and rapid expansion of the Army between 1961 and 1965 resulted in the
Corps of Signals increasing to more than twice its size. The Corps expanded from an authorized
strength of approximately 28,000 (including 1,097 officers) in 1961, to an
authorized strength of approximately 62,000 (including 2,300 officers) in
1965. As against twenty major signal
units commanded by lieutenant colonels in 1961, there were sixty such units in
1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
next major change in the organisation of the Corps took place in 1971 when a
large number of signals units was raised. Unlike in the previous case, where
the changes were carried out after the 1962 war, in 1971 most of the changes
had taken place even before the war started. Information about the planned
invasion of <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> was available almost
eight months before the commencement of the operations. This enabled the
Signals Directorate and Eastern Command Signals to plan signal communications
well in advance and cater for resources, including manpower and equipment. The
major raisings that took place in 1971 were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bravo Signal Regiment
for Rear HQ IV Corps at Tezpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">II Corps Signal
Regiment for II Corps at Krishnanagar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Two signal companies
(mountain brigade) at Tezpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Ad-hoc signal company
for Operation ‘Jackpot’ with six sector signal sections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">H Communication Zone
Signal Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo4; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Kilo Sector Signal
Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Shortly after the war, HQ Northern
Command was raised at Udhampur in 1972, replacing HQ XV Corps which moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>. This resulted
in the raising of XV Corps Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> (The existing XV Corps Signal
Regiment at Udhampur was redesignated as Northern Command Signal
Regiment). In the same year, Southern
Command Mobile Signal Regiment was raised; 16 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was reorganised from Foxtrot Sector Signal Regiment and XI Corps
Signal Regiment from Bravo Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The sudden deficiency of personnel
immediately after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>
was primarily attributable to the repatriation of British officers and
technical tradesmen to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
and the partition of the Corps leading to the departure of Muslim personnel to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. To
overcome the problem, several steps were taken.
Fortunately, a number of British officers and NCOs agreed to stay on,
their tenures being extended from year to year. As a result, some continued to
serve in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
for 7-8 years, the most notable example being the SO-in-C, Brigadier C.H.I.
Akehurst, who left only in 1954. Another important measure that helped was the
decision to grant direct and short service commissions to JCOs and transfer
officers from other arms and services. The release of personnel on war time
engagement was deferred and those who wished to continue serving were offered
regular engagement. The recruitment of civilian technical personnel to fill the
appointments of Civilian Technical Officers (CTOs) and Foremen of Signals also
proved useful. These measures enabled the Corps to tide over the initial
deficiency of manpower. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With the Emergency in 1962, the
Corps was again confronted with the serious problem of shortage of officers
(particularly captains), JCOs and OR.
Expansion resulted in rapid promotions, leaving a lack of middle-piece
officers and experienced JCOs and NCOs.
The relaxation for promotion to the rank of acting captain before
completion of three years commissioned service in concessional areas partly
eased the position. The deficiencies of
Special List (SL) officers (Cipher and TOT) were met by rationalizing the
postings of JCOs (Cipher) and Foreman of Signals. The problem of shortage of quartermasters was
overcome by an equitable distribution of ‘old timer’ captains, posting of
re-employed officers and by planned positioning of ex-ranks emergency
commissioned officers and good JCOs to units.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
new raisings necessitated an increase in recruitment leading to the creation of
two additional training centres. A large number of officers were granted
emergency commissions during 1963-65, followed by the introduction of the short
service commission from 1966 onwards. These measures enabled the Corps to build
up its manpower to a fairly high level by the mid sixties. As a result, one of
the additional training centres was closed down. By the time the war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> broke
out in 1971, the Corps was well prepared to face the challenge. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ORGANISATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals
Directorate<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
the end of World War II in 1945, the staff of the Signals Directorate comprised
58 officers (there were only three officers in 1939, one of them being Major
C.H.I. Akehurst). Soon after the war, the establishment was reduced. At the
time of Partition, further reductions were effected with a part of the Signals
Directorate being transferred to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, the organisation of the Signals
Directorate underwent major restructuring, involving reductions in the number
of sections as well as the number and rank of officers. Under the Director
Signals and SO-in-C (Brigadier) and a Deputy Director Signals (Colonel), there
were just four sections - Signals 1, 2, 3 and 4 - each under a GSO II
(Major). Signals 1 looked after staff duties,
training, organisation, planning and scales; Signals 2 was responsible for
communications; Signals 3 dealt with ciphers and signal security while Signals
4 looked after personnel matters and administration of the Signals
Directorate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
above organisation underwent a change within the next few months. Signal
equipment was divorced from the section looking after staff duties and given to
a new section known as Section 5 that was formed. A GSO 1 was authorised to
look after three sections – Signals 1, 4 and 5. Signals Administration was also
separated from Signals 4 and became a new section. By early 1948, the
composition of Signals Directorate was as shown below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the war, from June 1943 onwards,
the Signals Directorate had begun issuing the SO-in-C’s Monthly Information
Summary. In January 1946, it was brought on a quarterly basis. Publication of Quarterly Information
Summaries ceased with No 34 published in April 1947. The Indian Signals
Planning Note which replaced the Quarterly Information Summary was started in
January 1948 on a monthly basis and brought on to a bimonthly basis in June
1948. The main object of these Planning
Notes was to give forecast of changes in establishments, equipment and technical
matters before they were promulgated through normal channels, as well as to
give publicity to Corps domestic, personnel and training matters of general
interest. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At that time, the establishment of
the Signals Directorate was sanctioned by the Ministry of Defence on a yearly
basis. In 1953, it was decided to reorganise Signals 5 into two sections -
Signals 5 and Signals 6. The charter of the newly created Section 6 was to keep
abreast of the changes and developments in signal equipment and specialist
vehicles that were taking place in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> and other foreign countries. The
appointment an additional lieutenant colonel was also approved, with the
designation GSO 1 (Communications), to look after Signals 2/3. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigadier C.H.I. Akehurst, the
SO-in-C, left for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1954, after having held the appointment for an unprecedented seven years.
With his departure, the rank of the SO-in-C was upgraded and Major General A.C.
Iyappa assumed the appointment on <st1:date day="25" month="3" w:st="on" year="1954">25 March 1954</st1:date>. In
1964, the appointment of Inspector of Signals Trades Training in the rank of brigadier
was sanctioned, along with a SO 2 (Signals) in the rank of major. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As already mentioned, there was
considerable activity taking place in the Signals Directorate during the period
1963-65. Lieutenant General Prakash Gokarn, then a young captain, gives a
glimpse of the atmosphere that prevailed during those momentous days, in the
following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 6.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964 when I
was posted to D Sigs, SO in C was Maj Gen RN Batra (SOH & 3 Blues IMA), Dy
SO in C was Brig Harry Chukerbuti (5 Blues IMA), D Tels was <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state> KS Garewal. The GSOs 1 were Lt Cols
Jaswant Mayadas [first in entrance exam DSSC), Lt Col Mobray Bennet ‘Dick’ Hart
(first Signaller and probably the last to be BM Para Bde), Lt Col Mahesh Rawat,
Lt Col W Patterson (followed by Lt Col RC Rawat), Lt Col M S Sodhi and Lt Col K
S Gill. Other officers were Maj Bir Paintal, Maj Sushil Nath, Maj Suresh
Sawhney, Maj Brij Bhatia, Maj DN Chhabra, Capt Malay Ghosh and Capt V K Kapoor.
There was one more - Maj BK Rai who within weeks of my joining side stepped to
LRDE/R&D and was later Chairman of UP Electronics. I do not remember the
name of the Cipher Head, but I do recall one Capt Sukhija as the SO3 Ciphers.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 6.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> D
Sigs consisted of 26 officers - of which 4 became Lt Gens and one (Rai) who
distinguished himself in the public sector – and I was its 'baby' with just 3
years of service. I was really treated like one off parade. But I had two
direct bosses to report to, with no major as a buffer - Cols Hart and Mayadas -
as GSO3 Organisation & Establishment (what is now Sigs 1 & Sigs 8).
True to their names, the former (Hart) was a man with a big heart and a fund of
knowledge but a heartless task master and Mayadas was all 'maya'- very
forgiving but a great human being. He had a clipped British accent and still does.
Many years later, I was lucky to serve on his staff just after Operation
‘Cactus Lily’. I never ever had a better teacher in my professional life. What
I learnt from Gen Mayadas, in all aspects of officer ship, both on and off
parade, shaped my personality and values forever. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 6.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I was given two ruled registers by
each of them. In relation to my tasks, Hart dealt, amongst other
things, with the raising of Communication Zone Signal Regiments and
reorganisation of Command Signal Regiments. Mayadas dealt amongst his other
duties with Corps Signal Regiments and below. In other words, one dealt with
'brick type units' and the other with 'tailored establishments'. I was given
about 175 ‘kalamazoos’, each with a maze of data giving the organisation,
establishment and broad equipment profile (the detailed equipment tables were
in the ‘kalamazoos’ with Sigs 5 (Patterson). <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 6.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> My job was to study the type of
manpower in each brick section, like say a Line Section or a Line Construction
Section and intelligently write it against a reorganised brick type unit,
say T Communication Zone Signal Regiment, whose role was to lay PL routes from
Srinagar into entre Ladakh. If some manpower was saved, it was written in green
pencil with an annotation ‘Asset for DSD' in one register. If the equipment
profile did not meet our needs they were specified in red in the other register
which I took to <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state>
Patterson to find out how he could help. He was a master of his trade. I
invariably got an answer in less than 30 minutes flat. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 6.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This way, a Captain was entrusted to
fill the 'jig saw’ puzzle for 125 units that were raised/reorganised in that
time. I completed the job in six 6 months and thankfully proceeded on
CME/OST Course. Under Gen Batra, the atmosphere in D Sigs was ELECTRIC. </span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1968 the appointment of SO-in-C
was upgraded from major general to lieutenant general. The appointment of the
Brigadier Signal Staff was also upgraded to major general and redesignated as
Deputy SO-in-C. (This appointment was in existence for barely eight years. It
was abolished in 1976 after the CSOs of commands were upgraded to major
generals). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The establishment of the Signals
Directorate was again revised in June 1971. An important change was the
upgradation of the appointment of Deputy Director Telecommunications from
colonel to brigadier. A new section, Signals 8, was also formally sanctioned,
though it had been in existence since 1969. It was responsible for preparation
and revision of peace and war equipment tables for all signal units including
TA and NCC signal units. Another new section was Signals 9, which was to deal
with EDPS. The organisation of the Signals Directorate in 1971 is shown below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Army
HQ Signals</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit looking after
communications at General Headquarters India before <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> was known as the GHQ Signal
Regiment. On <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1947">15 August 1947</st1:date>
this unit was re-designated as GHQ (Indian) Signal Regiment, to differentiate
it from the GHQ (British) Signal Regiment that was raised to look after the
communication needs of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters that was created at
that time. The first officer to command the unit was Lieutenant Colonel S.N.
Bhatia, while Lieutenant Colonel J.H.L. Crichton, MBE, continued to remain in
command of GHQ (British) Signal Regiment, in addition to being the overall
commander of both units. After the
disbandment of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters the GHQ (British) Signal
Regiment moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>,
where it was disbanded before embarkation of British troops for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>. On <st1:date day="1" month="1" w:st="on" year="1948">1 January 1948</st1:date> the GHQ
(Indian) Signal Regiment was re-designated as Army HQ Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
unit was then located in Plot 108 next to the Rakabganj Gurudwara behind North
Block, while the signal centre was in 'A' Block. No. 1 Company of the regiment, which provided the signal centre shifts, was
housed in a plot of land next to the present Parliament House<span style="color: #cc0000;">.</span> The transmitters were on <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Lodhi Road</st1:address></st1:street>, where
the present CGO’s complex is located, while the receivers were on the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Ridge Road</st1:address></st1:street> opposite
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Buddha</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Jayanti</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Park</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
their present location. In 1955 the new automatic exchange was installed in
Rooms No. 29 & 30 of South Block, while the signal centre was shifted from
'A' Block to Plot 30<span style="color: #cc0000; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">, </span>opposite the present Sena Bhawan<i><span style="color: #cc0000;">. </span></i>Shortly afterwards on 13
January 1956, the unit lost its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel H.K.
Bhagwat, in the most tragic circumstances when he was fatally stabbed by
ex-cook Chikanna. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
accommodation occupied by the unit on Plot 108 was inadequate and in 1958, a
reconnaissance-cum-siting board was ordered to select a suitable site for
locating the regiment in Delhi Cantt. The site finally chosen was where the
present day Signals Enclave is located on Rao Tula Ram Marg. The unit moved to
its present accommodation in Signals Enclave in February 1964. During the 1965
war, the signal centre was shifted to the basement of the South Block. Also
some of the transmitters at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Lodhi
Road</st1:address></st1:street> were made underground. After the war, the
signal centre moved back to Plot 30 in February 1966. (The signal centre and
exchange moved to their present location in Sena Bhawan only in 1983). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There was little change in the
organisation of the unit until 1964, when it was decided to split it into two
parts, one to be located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>
and the other to remain at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
The two units would function under the control of Commandant Army HQ Signals,
who would be of the rank of colonel. 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment located at Delhi
was to be responsible for the Army HQ signal centre and exchanges, while 2 Army
HQ Signal Regiment, to be located at Meerut, would be responsible for the Army
HQ transmitters and receivers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though the decision to split the
units and move one of them to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>
was taken in 1964, it took several years before it could be fully implemented.
The appointment of Commandant Army HQ Signals was approved in 1965 and the two
units started functioning, sharing the same accommodation in Signals Enclave.
The transmitters moved from <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Lodhi
Road</st1:address></st1:street> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>
in early 1971. The regimental headquarters was to move in April 1971 but the
move was held up because of the imminent hostilities. 2 Army HQ Signal Regiment
finally moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>
in 1972, with 2 Company remaining at the Ridge in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, where the receivers are located. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lieutenant Colonel M. Sathesan, who
served in 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment from 1969 to 1971, relates an interesting
incident, which was probably responsible for the redesignation of the
appointments of Assistant Duty Signal Officer (ADSO) and Duty Signal officer
(DSO). He writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sometime in late
1969 while I was carrying out the duties of Duty Signal Officer (now
Officer-in-Charge Signal Centre) of INDARMY Signal Centre I got a ring at about
10 PM from Maj Gen IS Gill then General Officer Commanding 17 Mountain Division
and on leave at Delhi. He asked me for some information about certain office
numbers and I replied that I shall check up and ring him back. He rang me again
at 1030 PM and at <st1:time hour="23" minute="0" w:st="on">11 PM</st1:time>
asking for additional info and I had to, on each occasion reply that “I would
check up and let you know”. When I gave him the final information at about 1115
PM he asked me whether I was in the office or at home. When I told him that I
was at home he wanted to know why the Duty Signal Officer was not on duty. I
replied that the term Duty Signal Officer is a misnomer and it is the Assistant
Duty Signal Officer who remains on duty in shifts all the time. Gen Gill
accepted my explanation at that time but next day wrote a note to his friend
Maj Gen EG Pettengell (then Deputy SO-in-C) asking why we have a name, that is
Duty Signal Officer, which is a misnomer. In pursuance of his note the Signals
Directorate asked all concerned for their views for a more suitable name for
Duty Signal Officer. Through Commandant Army HQ Signals I had recommended that
the only suitable name was OIC (Signal Centre).<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I
do not know if others also recommended the same name. Later vide AO 81/72 the
name of the Duty Signal Officer was changed to OIC Signal Centre and that of
Assistant Duty Signal Officer to Duty Signal Officer.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another interesting input
concerning the plans to set up a Joint Services Communication Complex during
the sixties when General Batra was the SO-in-C has been given by Lieutenant
General M.S Sodhi, who writes: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 48.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">We had earlier
projected for space for a Joint Services Communication Complex to
support a Joint Services HQ like the Pentagon. Towards this end in May
1965 I had even visited Admiral Mountbatten's HQ in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> to see the
facilities. The Joint Services HQ was being thought of where the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Army</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Public
School</st1:placetype></st1:place> now is on <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Ridge Road</st1:address></st1:street>. When that was abandoned, we,
with MoD concurrence, continued to project the additional
space for 'modernisation'. Just as well, because it came
in handy for our own facilities which included the Computer Centre. We could also
give space to the P&T Exchange which was installed for Sena Bhawan and
others.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4<i><u><o:p></o:p></u></i></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Command Signals <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
Partition in 1947, only two commands – Southern and Eastern– were left in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the
Northern Command having gone to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The headquarters of the two commands were located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city>. Soon after Partition, the Delhi &
East Punjab (DEP) Command was established at Delhi on 15 September 1947.This
was subsequently re-designated as HQ Western Command on 1 March 1948 and later
moved to Simla. In 1955, HQ Eastern Command moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
appointment of CSO at each command headquarters was held by an officer of the
rank of brigadier. There was no permanent establishment for the CSO’s staff,
which was extended from year to year. Usually, the Signals staff consisted of a
SO1 (Signals), a SO2 (Communications), a SO2 (Staff Duties & Training) and
a SO3 (Communications). In HQ Western
Command, there was an additional appointment known as SO3 (Equipment). There was
no officer looking after ciphers, and normally the cipher officer from the
command signal regiment was attached on a part time basis along with a couple
of cipher NCOs to look after this important function. This naturally affected
the functioning of the unit as well as the CSO’s branch and was an
unsatisfactory arrangement. It was only in 1951 that this lacuna was corrected
and the appointment of SO2 (Cipher and Signal Security) was created in each
command headquarters, along with cipher staff of two havildars.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the 1962 war, there was large scale restructuring of the military establishment
and several new headquarters, units and organisations were created. This included the creation of the new HQ
Eastern Command in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
in 1963 and the re-designation of the existing HQ Eastern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city> as HQ Central
Command. As a result, the existing
Eastern Command Signal Regiment was redesignated as Central Command Signal
Regiment and a new Eastern Command Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>. After a
detailed review of the existing establishments it was decided that command
signal regiments and area signal companies would be reorganized on tailored
establishments. In addition to the
establishments provided to the command signal regiments for their static
communication commitments, a command mobile signal company organized on the
brick system was raised in each command in 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the 1971 war, HQ Northern Command was raised at Udhampur in 1972, replacing HQ
XV Corps which moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>.
The existing XV Corps Signal Regiment was redesignated as Northern Command
Signal Regiment and a new XV Corps Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> in June 1972. In
November 1972, Southern Command Mobile Signal Regiment was raised on a tailored
war establishment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals
Staff at Static Formation Headquarters<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, apart from the signal regiments
with the existing commands - Southern and Eastern – there were three other
static units. These were the Bengal & Assam Signal Regiment (<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>); the Deccan
Signal Regiment (Kamptee) and the Madras Signal Regiment (<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>). The Bengal & Assam Signal
Regiment was reorganised to form the Northern Area Signal Regiment which was
later redesignated as the Delhi & East Punjab Command Signal Regiment which
finally became the Western Command Signal Regiment. In December 1947 the Deccan
Area was split to form two independent sub areas, at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>
and Secunderabad. As a result, the Deccan Signal Regiment was also split, to
form <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place> (Indep) Sub Area Signals and
Secunderabad Sub Area Signals. On <st1:date day="1" month="9" w:st="on" year="1948">1 September 1948</st1:date>, the Sholapur Independent Sub Area Signal
Company was raised. In 1950, the Madras Signal Regiment became the Madras Area
Signal Regiment. Two years later, the unit was redesignated as the Madras Area
(Indep) Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the early years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, no
dedicated signal unit or staff was authorised to headquarters of static
formations such as areas and sub areas. Some area headquarters had a DCSO,
whose term was extended from time to time. The communication needs of these
headquarters and other static establishments were met in an ad hoc manner by
providing detachments from the command signal regiment or TA companies. For
this purpose, the command signal regiments had been given standard ‘brick’ sub
units, e.g. medium wireless, technical maintenance, cipher and despatch rider
sections. This system had several drawbacks. The command signal regiments were
dispersed over wide areas making command and control difficult. It also
affected the recruitment and training of TA personnel. Since the establishment
of the DCSO was uncertain and extended for short periods only, it hindered
forward planning and organization of training.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
overcome these shortcomings in 1955 it was proposed to evolve a more suitable
organization for static headquarters. Depending on their location, TA
companies/detachments would be grouped to form a unit, whose commander would
render necessary technical advice to the area and sub-area commander as
required. The DCSO and his staff would be abolished. However, it was realised
that the proposal involved a considerable increase in manpower and was
therefore dropped. It was then proposed that DCSOs be authorised at area
headquarters on a permanent basis. Soon after wards, the appointments of DCSO
Delhi Area and DCSO Madras Area were approved. However, the appointment of DCSO
UP Area was abolished. This was due to the move of HQ Eastern Command from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>, where HQ UP Area
was located. There were some increments in the staff of CSO Eastern Command,
DCSO 20 Division and DCSO Bombay Area. This was made possible by disbanding the
regimental headquarters of 101 and 102 Communication Zone Signal Regiments (TA)
and the appointment of Inspecting Officer Coast Defence Fixed Signal
Communication.<b>5<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the review of communications after the 1962 war there were several changes in
the command set up of signal units deployed in communication zones. In 1964 a
DCSO (colonel) was authorized for Jammu & Kashmir to exercise technical
control over communication zone signal regiments north of Banihal. However, CSO
XV Corps continued to exercise technical control over the communication zone
signal regiments south of Banihal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A number of signal units were
raised for static headquarters in the sixties. In 1963, UP Area Signal Company
was reorganised as UP Area Signal Regiment. In 1964 Madhya Pradesh Area Signal
Company and <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> and Orissa (Independent) Sub
Area Signal Company were raised. In 1965 the Bengal Area Signal Company was
raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
and 2 Company of Southern Command Signal Regiment located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> was redesignated as <st1:place w:st="on">Maharashtra</st1:place>
and Gujarat Area Signal Company. In 1966 the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and Rajasthan Area was split into two,
becoming the Delhi Area and Jaipur Sub Area. At the same time, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and Rajasthan Area Signal Company
became the Delhi Area Signal Company. In 1967 No 4 Company of Z Communication
Zone Signal Regiment was reorganized to form <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>,
Haryana and Himachal Pradesh Area Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
July 1971 there were some changes in the set up in Central Command. The Bihar
& Orissa (Independent) Sub Area was placed under Madhya Pradesh Area. A new
sub area was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:place></st1:city>.
The new Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Area was created with its
headquarters at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city>,
to include under it the Jabalpur Sub Area (re-designated as MP Sub Area),
reorganized Bihar & Orissa Sub Area and newly raised Allahabad Sub
Area. As a result of the above, the
appointment of DCSO Bihar & Orissa (Independent) Sub Area was abolished.
The Madhya Pradesh Area Signal Company was re-designated as Madhya Pradesh,
Bihar & Orissa Area Signal Company. In July 1972, V Sector Signal Company
that had been raised in 1967 was redesignated as 31 Communication Zone Sub Area
Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1972, certain changes were
carried out in Western Command Signal Regiment.
Western Command Mobile Signal Company, which was located at Ambala, was
merged with the regiment at Jutogh, in Simla. The company was providing radio
relay communications at Karcham in the Sugar Sector, which was at a considerable
distance from Ambala. By this time, it had been decided to shift HQ Western
Command from Simla to the plains, to enable it function as a field army during
operations, and construction of the new cantonment at Chandimandir near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chandigarh</st1:place></st1:city> was in progress.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1947, there was no corps
headquarters in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
When the operations in Jammu & Kashmir commenced in 1947, they were
controlled directly by HQ Western Command. Subsequently, HQ Jammu & Kashmir
Force was created to control the operations of Jammu (JA) Division and Srinagar
(SRI) Division. On <st1:date day="5" month="9" w:st="on" year="1948">5 September 1948</st1:date> HQ Jammu & Kashmir
Corps was established at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>. Since there was no signal unit available, a
wireless detachment of Tactical HQ Western Command was re-designated Jammu
& Kashmir Corps Signal Regiment. In December 1948 the Jammu &
Kashmir Corps was re-designated as 5 Corps, and the JA and SRI Divisions became
26 and 19 Divisions respectively. The responsibility for providing
communications to HQ 5 Corps in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
was given to 5 Divisional Signal Regiment. The first DCSO of 5 Corps was
Colonel H. Chukerbuti, who assumed his appointment in early 1949. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5 Corps Signal Regiment was raised
in September 1949, in two parts. No. 2 Company, which was referred to as
Composite Company 5 Corps Signal Regiment, was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>, while the remainder of the unit was
raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>.
On <st1:date day="15" month="3" w:st="on" year="1950">15 March 1950</st1:date>
the unit was redesignated as XI Corps Signal Regiment and ordered to move to
Ambala. No. 2 Company located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> was removed from
the strength of the unit and designated as 5 Corps Signal Company. Another 2
Company was ordered to be raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>
to replace it. The newly raised 2 Company joined the regiment at Ambala on <st1:date day="18" month="7" w:st="on" year="1950">18 July 1950</st1:date>. In July 1951
the unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
The first CO of the unit, Lieutenant Colonel Lachman Singh, assumed his
appointment on <st1:date day="28" month="10" w:st="on" year="1949">28 October
1949</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To control the formations in the
North East, HQ XXXIII Corps was raised at Shillong in 1960 with Brigadier S.R.
Khurana being the first CSO. (By this time, corps were being designated with
Roman numerals, with divisions and brigades being denoted by Arabic numerals).
XXXIII Corps Signal Regiment was also raised at Shillong in June 1960. During the 1962 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>, HQ IV
Corps was raised at Tezpur in November 1962, with Brigadier K.S Gill as the
CSO. Shortly afterwards, I Corps Signal Regiment was raised in May 1963 at
Varanasi followed by XV Corps Signal Regiment at Udhampur in July 1963, by
splitting the existing Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment. On raising, XV Corps
Signal Regiment was made responsible for communications exclusively for HQ XV
Corps, with communications from Pathankot to Banihal remaining with Y
Communication Zone Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 44.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ
II Corps was raised at Krishnanagar shortly before the commencement of the 1971
war, with Colonel B.S. Paintal as the DCSO (The appointment was later upgraded
to CSO). II Corps Signal Regiment was raised at the same time under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel S.C. Chaudhuri. However,
3 Company of the unit was raised separately at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and joined the unit only in 1972 when
it had moved to Kotkapura in the Western theatre. After the creation of HQ Northern Command at
Udhampur and the move of HQ XV Corps to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
in 1972, the existing XV Corps Signal Regiment was redesignated as Northern
Command Signal Regiment and a new XV Corps Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> in June 1972. A
new corps – XVI Corps – was created at the same time, with its headquarters at
Nagrota. XVI Corps Signal Regiment was raised in July 1972 by reorganization of
the Bravo Signal Regiment, which had been raised at Tezpur during the 1971 war.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Divisional Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the partition of the Indian Signal Corps, only four divisional signal regiments
remained in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
These were 1 Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment, 2 Airborne Divisional Signal
Regiment, 4 Divisional Signal Regiment and 5 Divisional Signal Regiment. The
operations in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48 necessitated the induction of a
large number of signal resources, which had to be pulled out from other units
that were not so heavily committed. In addition, signal companies and sections
were raised in an ad hoc manner to meet the immediate communication needs of
the formations involved in the operations. Over a period of time, several new
divisional signal regiments were raised, or created by reconstituting existing
units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When
25 Division was raised during the operations in Jammu & Kashmir, it was
provided only a signal company, which obviously could not cope with the heavy
demands placed on it. In 1950 it was decided to reorganize 25 Divisional Signal
Company as 25 Divisional Signal Regiment. At the same time, 2 Airborne
Divisional Signal Regiment, which had been temporarily re-designated as 26
(2AB) Divisional Signal Regiment, was reorganized on the war establishment of
an infantry divisional signal regiment in 1951 and re-designated as 26 Divisional Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
manpower authorised to a divisional signal regiment was based on the provision
of three and a half reliefs. In 1952 the Army Standing Establishments Committee
(ASEC) objected to this and agreed to only two and a half reliefs. Since this
would have seriously affected the efficiency of the units, the issue was taken
up with the Ministries of Defence and Finance (Defence). Finally, it was agreed that units on war
establishment would be authorised manpower based on three and a half reliefs.
The organisation of the divisional signal regiment at that time was as given
below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="401" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.gif" v:shapes="Object_x0020_1" width="608" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
Exercise ‘Vijay’ and a signal exercise during the training year 1954-55,
certain inadequacies in the existing establishments of corps and divisional
signal regiments were noticed. The problem of a suitable establishment for a
divisional signal regiment was discussed during the 10<sup>th</sup> CSOs/Commandants’
Conference in 1955. After considerable deliberation, it was decided that
obtaining government sanction for a new establishment would take several years.
Also, the proposal may have to be amended again due to introduction of radio
relay which was expected to be inducted shortly. It was therefore decided to
ask for implementation of WE 2041/1946/1, accepting the reductions in some
sections proposed by the Army Standing Establishments Committee. It was thought
that even with the proposed reductions, there will be an increase in manpower
and vehicles. Also, units would be able to commence reorganization and training
on the revised WE which embodied the teachings of the post war period. In an
emergency, the full WE 2041/1946/1 could be adopted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An
important change occurred in the organisation of the divisional signal regiment
in 1961, when the signal sections (E, F and G) of 2 Company were transferred
from Signals to Artillery. Until then these sections were commanded by officers
from the Corps of Signals for whom it was probably the first opportunity of
independent command. Another major
change occurred in 1963, when a number of divisional signal regiments were
converted to mountain divisional signal regiments on WE 2051/1046/1. An
important feature was that a signal company was authorized for each mountain
brigade in place of a brigade signal section that existed earlier. Also a radio
relay section was authorized in 1 Company and a FASO Section in 2 Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
units that were reorganized on mountain establishments were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indian Contingent
Signal Regiment ONUC <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and Indian Signal Company ONUC to 6 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4, 20 and 23 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiments as Mountain Divisional Signal Regiments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7, 48 and 62 Infantry
Brigade Signal Sections as Mountain Brigade Signal Companies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9 and 99 Infantry
Brigade Signal Companies and 69 Infantry Brigade Signal Section as Mountain
Brigade Signal Companies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A
number of new divisional signal regiments/brigade signal companies were raised
in 1963-64. These were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo8; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo8; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo8; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9 Mountain Divisional
Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">35, 42 and 58 Mountain
Brigade Signal Companies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10 Mountain Divisional
Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964, a number of divisional
signal regiments/brigade signal companies were reorganised. The reorganizations
carried out were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2, 17 and 27 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiments were reorganised as Mountain Divisional Signal
Regiments<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7 Mountain Divisional
Signal Regiment was reorganised as an Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l11 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11, 63, 64, 82, 112,
77, 123, 164, 166, 167 and 190 Infantry Brigade Signal Sections were
reorganised as Mountain Brigade Signal Companies. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">48 and 54 Mountain
Brigade Signal Companies were reorganised as Infantry Brigade Signal Sections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">33 Infantry Brigade
Group Signal Company was reorganised as an Infantry Brigade Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">65 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company was reorganised as an Infantry Brigade Signal Section.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1964 a case was taken up for
revision of the establishment of the infantry divisional signal regiment. It
was proposed to include new techniques and communication systems such as radio
relay; RTT and teleprinters; and VHF for command nets. The existing 1 Company
was to be reorganised into two companies and brigade signal sections were to be
reorganised as brigade signal companies. A line section was proposed to be
included in the artillery brigade signal section. There was also a proposed
increase in administrative and maintenance staff. The overall increase of
personnel was 207, which included six officers, nine JCOs and 192 OR, along
with 24 vehicles.<b>6 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Since the proposal involved a
substantial increase in manpower, it was not immediately cleared by the Army
Standing Establishments Committee (ASEC). As a result, it was only in November
1964 that the new WE of the infantry divisional signal regiment (WE
2041/1946/2) was implemented. In the interim period, certain units were
reorganised on a reduced establishment with the approval of the Chief of Army
Staff. The revised establishment of the infantry divisional signal regiment is
given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3, 7, 14, 15 and 26 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiments were reorganised onto the new WE of an infantry
divisional signal regiment (WE 2041/1946/2) in 1966 followed by 10, 11, 19 and
25 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiments.
36 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment which had been raised in 1965 was
subsequently reorganized as 36 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. 39 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment along
with 87 and 323 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies was also raised in 1966. At the same time, the Rajasthan Sector Signal
Regiment comprising 30, 45 and 322 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies was
reorganized onto WE 2041/1946/2. Another
unit raised in 1966 was 54 Infantry Divisional Signal Regimental along with 47,
74 and 91 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 57
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was raised in 1969, along with 61, 73 and
311 Mountain Brigade Signal Companies. In July 1971, 11 Infantry Division was
reorganized to its full authorization of three brigades, with supporting arms
and services. As a result, 330 Infantry
Brigade Group Signal Company was reorganized as 330 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company and 340 Mountain Brigade Signal Company as 340 Mountain Brigade Group
Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the 1971 war, a large number of raisings/ reorganizations were ordered,
including some divisional signal regiments/brigade signal companies. In some
cases, the units were disbanded after the end of the war. 1001 and 1002
Independent Signal Companies (Mountain Brigade) were raised in 1971 and
disbanded in 1972. This was also the case with 1003 Independent Line Company
and 1004 Ad-hoc Signal Company. The units raised in 1971-72 were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo10; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Kilo Sector Signal
Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo10; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 and 6 Armoured
Brigade Signal Companies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo10; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10, 12, and 15 Infantry
Brigade Signal Companies <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1972, Foxtrot Sector Signal
Regiment was reorganized as 16 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. 67 Infantry
Brigade Group Signal Company became 67 Infantry Brigade Signal Company and 95
Mountain Brigade Signal Company was reorganized as 95 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company. 340 Infantry Brigade Signal Company was also reorganized in the same
manner. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As would be evident, there were
several changes in the organisation of the divisional signal regiment between
1947 and 1972. From just four such units in 1947, the number had risen to 26 in
1972, an indication in the large scale expansion of the Corps in the first 25
years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communication Zone
Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the early years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
communications along the L of C were being provided by L of C signal regiments
of the Territorial Army. These were later redesignated as communication zone
signal regiments. It was only after the 1962 war with China that regular units
of the Corps of Signals were raised to meet commitments in the communication
zone. In 1963, it was decided to raise twelve such units, in addition to the
field and static formation signal units.
The deployment of the units was need based, depending on the requirement
in the communication zone. Accordingly, they were organised on the ‘brick’ system.
In addition to deployment in the communication zone, one such unit was allotted
to each corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
allotment of communication zone signal regiments in 1964 was as given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">M Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - I Corps <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">V Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - IV Corps <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Z Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - XI Corps <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Y Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - XV Corps <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">L Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - XXXIII Corps <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">J Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - XV Corps <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">N Communication Zone Signal
Regiment - 101 Communication Zone Area<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">O Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - UP Area <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">P Communication Zone
Signal Regiment –Army HQ Reserve<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">R Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - P and HP Area<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; tab-stops: 31.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">S Communication Zone
Signal Regiment -101 Communication Zone Area<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo11; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">T Communication Zone
Signal Regiment - HQ XV Corps <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -4.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 22.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Subsequently, Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment
was raised in 1966 and H Communication Zone Signal Regiment in 1971, shortly
before the commencement of hostilities with Pakistan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -4.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 4.5pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air
& Naval Formation Signals</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Out
of the six air formation signal regiments that existed during World War II,
four were disbanded soon after the war ended. At the time of Partition in 1947,
there were only two air formation signal regiments in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, of which
one each was allotted to the two dominions. The unit left in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> was 1 Air Formation Signal Regiment
(Modified), located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Its strength had been reduced to a company, which accounted for the suffix
‘modified’ in its name. It was under the command of Major K.D. Bhasin. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After a few years, it became
evident that the resources of the existing unit were inadequate. It had to look
after IAF land lines throughout <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and cater for three IAF commands. As
part of the Radar Plan for the defence of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, radar stations were to be
set up at a number of locations during 1952.
For the installation and maintenance of land line equipment at these
stations, additional technical maintenance and terminal equipment sections would
be required. Hence, it became necessary to raise another air formation signal
regiment. However, in the interests of
economy it was not considered desirable to have two full scale air formation
signal regiments, each commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Accordingly, 2 Air
Formation Signal Regiment (Modified) was raised in 1951 at Begumpet comprising
a regimental headquarters (modified), a terminal equipment section and two wing
signal sections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The appointment of Chief Air
Formation Signal Officer (CAFSO) at Air HQ (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>) had existed during the World
War II but was discontinued after the disbandment of most of the air formation
signal regiments after the war. At the time of <st1:city w:st="on">Independence</st1:city>,
there was only an SO2 Air Formation Signals, at Air HQ (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>). The
appointment was then held by Major A.M. David who was relieved by Major D.C.
Barnett in December 1948. A few months afterwards, the appointment was upgraded
to SO1 and Major Barnett was promoted as lieutenant colonel. Subsequently, the
appointment was re-designated as CAFSO. In 1963 the rank of the CAFSO was
upgraded from lieutenant colonel to colonel. At the same time, the <st1:place w:st="on">COs</st1:place> of 1 and 2 Air Formation Signal Regiments were also
upgraded from major to lieutenant colonel.
Additional company headquarters and sections were raised in both units
and the suffix ‘modified’ was removed from their names. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the 1962 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>, a need
was felt for another air formation signal regiment for Eastern Command, which
had no such unit at that time. 3 Air Formation Signal Regiment was raised in <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> in November 1962 and subsequently moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>. Shortly before
the commencement of the 1965 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:country-region>,
4 Air Formation Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city> in May 1965 for Central Command. At
this juncture, the establishment of Air Formation Signal Staffs was again
revised. With the appointment of CAFSO already upgraded to colonel, a new
appointment of Deputy CAFSO in the rank of lieutenant colonel was created at
the Air HQ. In addition, one GSO 3 each
was provided at HQs Eastern, Western and Central Air Commands. The appointment
of GSO 3 in HQ Maintenance Command was upgraded to GSO 2. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><br />
At the time of Independence,
no Signals staff was authorised at Naval HQ. In 1956 it was decided to
authorise a Naval Formation Signal Officer (CNFSO) of the rank of major at
Naval HQ. In 1971, the appointment of CNFSO was upgraded from major to
lieutenant colonel in Naval HQ. This was subsequently disbanded after the Navy
took over the task of dealing with the P&T department directly for its land
line requirements. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air Support Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the end of World War II, all air support signal units were disbanded, except
for some contact cars (air), control detachments and airfield detachments which
were grouped to form one air support signal company for each dominion at the
time of Partition. 2 Air Support Signal Company that remained in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
re-designated as 162 Infantry Brigade Signal Section on 1 April 1948. Shortly
afterwards, 1 Air Support Signal Company was raised on 15 September at Delhi by
Major Lachhman Singh, who was relieved in early 1949 by Major Didar Singh. This was followed by the raising of 2 Air
Support Signal Section in 1950, which was subsequently reorganised as 2 Air
Support Signal Company in 1961. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though air support was not utilised
in the 1962 war, it was felt that the existing resources were inadequate.
Accordingly, 3 Air Support Signal Company was raised in April 1963 at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. Shortly
afterwards, it was decided to raise two air support signal regiments from the
assets of the three existing air support signal companies and the fourth air
support signal company (4 Air Support Signal Company) that was raised at that
time. The two units raised were 1 Air
Support Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> and 2 Air
Support Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1967 two independent air support
signal companies were a raised. These were 5 and 6 (Indep) Air Support Signal
Companies. After the 1971 operations, another unit - 3 Air Support Signal
Regiment - was raised in June 1972 at
Udhampur, where HQ Northern Command had recently been created. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals Intelligence
Units<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During World War II, signal
interception was carried out by the Tactical ‘Y’ Service, for which there was
no sanctioned establishment. This service was manned exclusively by British
personnel. After the war ended, the organisation was disbanded and all
documents related to the service were destroyed. After <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, the Censorship Sub Committee,
which had representatives of the Ministries of Home Affairs, Information and
Broadcasting and Communications, recommended that a strategic and tactical
organisation should be set up. The
Chiefs of Staff, at their meeting held on 13 October 1948 decided that the
organisation should be run by a Joint Signal Intelligence Board (JSIB) with the
Director of Military Intelligence as Chairman and that each Service should have
its own tactical units. Consequently,
three special wireless sections under the Military Intelligence Directorate
were sanctioned by the Ministry of Defence in October 1949. A fourth wireless
section was added in 1951. Subsequently,
the Strategical ‘Y’ Service was also set up under the JSIB. From the experience gained and results
achieved there were constant demands for enhancing this organisation. However there were only minor increments in
personnel and equipment up to 1962, when the Sino Indian conflict resulted in a
review of the entire defence set up in the country.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
credit for creation of the Signal Intelligence Directorate in 1963 goes to the
then SO-in-C, Major General R.N. Batra, and his cousin, Brigadier M.N. Batra
who had assumed the appointment of Director of Military Intelligence after
attending the first course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">National</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Defence</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
The appointment was later upgraded to major general, and M.N. Batra continued to
hold it, on promotion. Being signal officers, both of them were convinced of
the immense potential of signals intelligence, and the need to upgrade our
capability in this field. As a result of their deliberations, in 1963 the
SO-in-C sponsored a case for establishment of a Directorate of Signals
Intelligence, to function under the Director of Military Intelligence, which
was accepted. The new set up was an inter services organisation, which covered
intercept units of the Army, Navy and the Air Force. The Signals Intelligence
Directorate started functioning under the Military Intelligence Directorate at
Army HQ with effect from 10 September 1963.
The appointment of Director of Signals Intelligence was initially tenable
in rotation by officers of Army, Navy and Air Force of the rank of colonel and
equivalent. Colonel Tej Sarin was the first officer to hold this appointment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It was decided to create a new
category of ‘operator special’ in Group A, for employment in wireless
experimental units under the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Personnel for
the new category were to be recruited by re-mustering volunteers from operator
wireless and keyboard (OWK) and operator wireless and line (OWL), class 2.
Initially, four centres and signal intelligence units were placed under command
of the Director of Signals Intelligence.
In 1966 further re-organisation was carried out and two new units were
raised. The appointment of Director of
Signals Intelligence was also upgraded from colonel to brigadier. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Details of the operations of the
Signals Intelligence organisation cannot be revealed due to security
considerations. However, the wireless experimental units proved their worth in
the 1965 and 1971 operations, providing valuable intelligence of enemy
deployment and plans. A major success was the interception of the message
regarding the conference to be held in Government House at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> on 14 December 1971. The Indian Air Force bombed the venue,
causing a lot of damage. The Governor, Dr. A.M. Malik was badly shaken. He immediately wrote out his resignation and
accompanied by his cabinet and other civil servants, moved to the Hotel
Intercontinental, which had been occupied by the International Red Cross and
was treated as a neutral zone. This accelerated the surrender of the Pakistani
forces in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. <b>7</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Central
Monitoring Organisation<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the 1962 operations, an
Expert Committee was constituted by the Government of India to analyse the
reasons for the debacle. It was revealed that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> had gathered most of the
intelligence about our infrastructure, dispositions and build up from
interception of defence and civilian radio networks. In 1964 it was decided to
raise a central agency to monitor domestic radio networks to ensure security.
Since adequate resources in terms of equipment and manpower were not held with
the Ministry of Communications, the Army was entrusted with the task.
Accordingly, the Central Monitoring Organisation (CMO) came into being in 1964,
under the Ministry of Defence. The manpower, equipment and transport were to be
provided by the Corps of Signals, until the Wireless Planning Committee (WPC)
Wing of the Ministry of Communications could create its own resources. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Raising
of the first three radio monitoring companies commenced in November 1964. No. 1
Radio Monitoring Company was raised at <st1:city w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:city>,
No. 2 at Simla and No. 3 at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>.
Subsequently 4 and 5 Radio Monitoring Companies were raised in June 1966 at <st1:city w:st="on">Poona</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
respectively. Shortly before the commencement of the 1971 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
creation of Northern Command, No. 6 Radio Monitoring Company was raised at
Udhampur in October 1971. Brigadier Ajit Singh who was Director CMO from 1969
to 1976, was awarded the Padma Shri in 1976 for his services during the 1971
war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Border Scouts Signal
Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Border Scouts Signal Company
was raised in March 1951 at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:city></st1:place>
under the command of Major Mahinder Singh, with Captain Bhudrani as the
second-in-command, Second-Lieutenant Agarwal as the adjutant and
Second-Lieutenant G.L. Nanda as the communication officer. The company
comprised three wing signal sections, located at Gurdaspur, Amritsar and
Ferozepore, which were commanded by Second-Lieutenants R. Choudhary, P.C.
Chatterjee and Sukhjit Singh respectively. By September 1951 the company
headquarters and sections were fully raised and had taken over the
communications on the border from the respective brigade signal sections. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When the Border Scouts were raised
in 1951 it had been decided that all personnel for the signal company, totalling
345, would be seconded from the Corps of Signals and subsequently transferred
to the Border Scouts. Volunteers were called for and in August 1952 the first
batch of 154 was transferred from the Corps of Signals to Border Scouts.
However, after reporting to the unit 67 personnel represented that since the
terms of the transfer had not been fully explained to them, they did not wish
to be permanently transferred. This was taken up with Army HQ and it was then
decided that all personnel would be treated as ‘seconded’ from the Corps of
Signals as opposed to ‘transferred’ to Border Scouts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Border Scouts Signal Company
comprised seven officers, five JCOs and about 300 OR. It was under the command
of Commander Border Scouts, Brigadier A.S Sodhi, while technical control was
exercised by DCSO East Punjab Area, Lieutenant Colonel Bijai Singh. In July
1952 Major Mohinder Singh was relieved by Major W.S. Ambardekar as the OC. The
Border Scouts Signal Company was disbanded in July 1954. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Border Roads Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Border Roads Organisation (BRO)
was raised in 1960 to coordinate construction of strategically important roads
in the border regions of the country, in the North and North East, where civil
agencies were not available for such tasks. The General Reserve Engineering
Force (GREF) was also raised as the executive arm of the BRO. The personnel for
the force were provided from the defence services, with some being recruited
directly. The first Director General Border Roads was Major General K.N. Dubey,
who assumed charge in April 1960. The appointment of a CSO was also created in
HQ DGBR in June 1960, the first incumbent being Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Atal.
He was assisted by one staff officer, who was designated SO2 (Communication
& Cipher Security). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The BRO consisted of several task
forces, each of which was authorised a signal section. The first such section
was raised in July 1960 for Project Tusker which was established at Tezpur for
construction and maintenance of roads in NEFA. The first officer to command the
section was Captain R.S. Talwar. In 1963 the Tusker Signal Section became the
Vartak Signal Section after the names were Indianised. Between 1960 and 1967
several other signal sections were raised. These were Project Beacon (Ladakh);
Project Dantak (<st1:country-region w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:country-region>);
Project Deepak (UP-Tibet border); Project Setuk (Tripura); Project Sewak (Naga
Hills); Project Swastik (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
and Project Pushpak (Mizo Hills). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Territorial
Army Signals <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During World War II more than 20 L
of C units were raised by drawing personnel from the P&T Department to be
deployed in various theatres. The role of these units was to supplement the
static communication system, to provide L of C for operations and to provide
neutral Signals during training. All these units were disbanded at end of the
war, only one being retained for the General Reserve. This too was subsequently
disbanded. With the expansion in static
communication commitments of the Indian Army after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, it was found that the existing
resources of command signal regiments and the few area/sub area signal units
that existed were inadequate. It was therefore decided to raise L of C units
again to supplement the existing static communication resources. The
nomenclature L of C was retained with the words ‘Territorial Army’ or TA being
added in their names. Apart from
providing communications to static headquarters and establishments, TA signal
sections were also raised for a few units of the Armoured Corps, and Artillery
in various stations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The first such unit was 101 L of C
Signal Regiment (TA) which was raised in 1949. The regimental headquarters of
the unit and 1 Company was at <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> with 2 and 3
Companies being located at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> respectively.
This was followed by the raising of 102 L of C Signal Regiment (TA), with its
regimental headquarters and 1 Company at <st1:city w:st="on">Madras</st1:city>;
2 Company at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>
and 3 Company at Trichinopoly. At the same time, TA signal sections were raised
for 51 Light Armoured Regiment (Ambala), 140 Medium Regiment (Meerut); 144
Field Regiment (Nasirabad); 103, 104, 105, 106 and 107 HAA Regiments (Bombay,
Vizagapatam, Bangalore, Tatanagar and Calcutta); and 501 Coast Battery
(Bombay). The permanent staff required for these units was sanctioned for one
year in the first instance. Most of the
staff was to be provided by Indian Signals but deficiencies were expected to be
met by embodying TA personnel of equivalent ranks for full time duty. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another
commitment was the assistance provided to the Indian Railways, especially in
construction of PL routes. In 1951 a TA unit and a number of line construction
sections were raised. These comprised 968 HQ Railway Engineers at Ferozepore
and 969, 970, 971 and 972 HQ Railway Engineers Line Construction Sections (TA)
at <st1:city w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ajmer</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
the raising of 102 L of C Signal Regiment it was realised that though its
regimental headquarters and most of the other companies were in Southern
Command, 2 Company at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>
was in Eastern Command. At the same time,
the companies of 101 L of C Signal Regiment were widely dispersed, being
located at <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.
It was therefore decided to interchange the companies at <st1:city w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>, for
better command and control. Accordingly, 2 Company of 101 L of C Signal
Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on">Bombay</st1:city> became 2 Company of 102 L of
C Signal Regiment and 2 Company of 102 L of C Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city> was redesignated
as 2 Company of 101 L of C Signal Regiment.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In December 1951, five additional L
of C (TA) signal units were raised. These were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo12; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">105 L of C Signal
Regiment (TA) <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo12; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">106 L of C Signal
Regiment (TA) <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo12; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">107 L of C Signal
Regiment (TA) <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo12; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">108 L of C Signal
Company (TA) <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo12; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">109 L of C Signal
Company (Mob) (TA) Shillong <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Subsequently, there was a change in
the nomenclature of these units. Instead of L of C regiments, they began to be
called communication zone signal regiments, retaining their original numerals.
In 1956 the regimental headquarters of 101 and 102 Communication Zone Signal
Regiments (TA) were disbanded, the existing companies becoming independent
companies. Accordingly, 1, 2 and 3 Companies of 101 Communication Zone Signal
Regiment (TA) were redesignated as 111, 112 and 113 Independent Signal
Companies (TA). Similarly, the three companies
of 102 Communication Zone Signal Regiment (TA) became 114, 115 and 116
Independent Signal Companies (TA). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the 1962 war, there was a major reorganisation of static units of the Corps. In
1964, all the TA signal regiments and companies were disbanded, their
commitments being taken over by the communication zone signal regiments that
were raised at that time. In a few cases, some sections of these units that
were manned by Signals personnel were merged with existing units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the 1971 war, some TA units were embodied for the duration of the war. 107 and
109 Signal Companies (TA) P&T were embodied on 10 December 1971. These were
disembodied on 5 March 1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">PERSONNEL
<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Officer Cadre<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, the number of officers held in
the Corps was 293, against the authorized establishment of 462. Taking into
account the 26 British officers who agreed to serve in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> after 31
December 1947, the actual shortfall was 143 officers viz. almost 50%. Some of
the measures taken to make up the shortfall was the grant of regular or short
service commissions to VCOs; transfers from other arms; grant of temporary
commissions, transfer of serving and released officers of the Royal Indian Navy
Volunteer Reserve; recall of released officers, commissions to university
graduates under Army Instruction (India) 23/S/47; and employment of civilian
gazetted officers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A Signals Selection Board was held
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jabalpur</st1:place></st1:city> to
screen VCOs for grant of regular and short service commissions. On 1 January
1948 four VCOs were given direct regular commissions as second-lieutenants. In
addition, 12 VCOs were granted short service regular commissions for five years
and 11 for three years. IOR were not considered for the grant of such
commissions since a final decision on this had yet to be taken. At the same
time, 33 officers were transferred from the RIASC (Royal Indian Army Service
Corps). These officers were posted to the units after undergoing a conversion
course at the School of Signals, Mhow. With this the officer position improved
slightly. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another measure was the appointment
of CTOs (civilian technical officers) in lieu of TOM/TOT (technical officer
maintenance/technical officer telecommunications) and civilian Foreman of
Signals, who were to be employed as instructors and in Army HQ and command
signal regiments. By the end of 1948, 20 CTOs and 19 civilian Foremen of
Signals had been appointed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The intake of officers from the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place>, Dehradun was
also increased. Whereas the 1<sup>st</sup> Course that passed out in December
1946 had just five officers commissioned into Signals, 19 officers from the 2<sup>nd</sup>
Course joined Signals in December 1947, followed by 20 from the 3<sup>rd</sup>
Course in September 1948. British officers and BOR who had remained in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> were asked if they wished to
extend their service further. In the event, 21 British officers and eight BOR
agreed to extend their service for periods varying from three months to two
years. As a result of these measures by the end of 1948 the number of officers
in the Corps had risen to 431. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To make up the shortfall of
officers in the shortest possible time, a new type of temporary commission was
introduced in the Indian Army in 1949 vide Army Instruction (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>) 27/S/48.
All serving JCOs/OR were eligible to apply including those who had been
rejected by the Services Selection Board for direct and short service regular
commissions. To provide cadet training to these officers the Officers Training
School (OTS) was set up in the premises of the <st1:placename w:st="on">Deccan</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype> at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. The period of training was six months
for Infantry cadets and three months for those from other arms. It was intended
to train 150 cadets every month until the peak figure of 1,000 was reached. The
first batch (OTS-1) joined the OTS in September 1948 and proceeded to the
School of Signals in December 1948, from where they were commissioned on 30
April 1949. The last batch (OTS-7A) was commissioned in September 1950. These
temporary commissioned officers (TCOs) were expected to be discharged after
serving for a year. However, due to the shortage of officers in the Army, it
was decided to grant regular commissions to those who were found
acceptable. Three screening boards were
held for these officers during 1952 and a total of 29 officers who qualified
were granted regular commissions after successful completion of a seven-week
conversion course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>. These
officers lost seniority of about 18 months, to cater for the shortfall in
training vis-a-vis regular officers. After General Thimayya became COAS in
1957, he decided that all TCOs should be given regular commissions As a result,
the remaining TCOs were also given regular commissions which came to be known
as ‘Thimayya commissions’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Colonel M.K. Kotwal, who passed out
with OTS-2 in June 1949, has described his experiences in the following words:-
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Govt of
India decided as matter of policy to withdraw all British Officers from Indian
Army after Independence. In order to meet an acute shortage of officers,
Army established an OTS in the premises of Deccan College near Bund Garden
at Pune in August 1948. Selected cadets were to undergo three months basic
training and then to proceed for Arms and Services training of
approximately 3-4 months. The cadets selected by SSBs (same as for Regular
Officers) were to be granted one year's commission and were to be called TCOs.
The first course was started on or about 23 Sep 1948. They were
accommodated in the hostels of the Deccan College. The next few
courses were accommodated in the newly constructed temporary barracks. After
going through SSB Bangalore, I joined B Coy of OTS on 15 Oct 1948. Maj AN
Mathur (later Lt Gen) Signals, was A Coy Commander. Brig Kochar (Bhalu)
of Engineers was our Commandant. After three months basic training we were sent
to various Institutions such as MCTE then known as School of Signals for a
further period of training of approximately four months. When my Course
reported to MCTE, in Jan 1949, PAT 2 was half way through and PAT 3 was
almost four weeks ahead of us. In June my Course was commissioned and we joined
various Units. Most of OTS officers were granted Regular Commission after
screening by SSBs. A few also got Regular after appeal by the COs of the Units.
Those granted Regular earlier also managed to undergo SODE Course as it
was then known. Some like Brig Sibal (OTS 3) even managed to undergo Staff
College.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8</span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apart from the cadets who were
trained at the OTS, temporary commissions were also granted to 33 ex Army
Ordnance Corps officers who completed their training at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
on 3 September 1949. Another 11 officers from other arms and services who were
already holding emergency or short service commissions granted during the War
joined the Corps at about the same time. After 1950, temporary commissions were
stopped and short service regular commissions began to be granted. The first
batch of 11 officers granted 7 years SSRC passed out from IMA on 27 July 1952.
Another type of entry was from the National Cadet Corps (NCC), which had been
established soon after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>.
The first batch of NCC (Senior Division) comprising two officers, P.K. Banker
and K.M. Upadhyaya, was commissioned from IMA on 8 June 1952 along with the 9<sup>th</sup>
Regular course. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By the end of 1949 the holding of officers in
the Corps had risen to 692. However, only 238 of these were regular officers,
the balance comprising short service regular commissioned (SSRC), Indian
emergency commissioned (IEC) and temporary commissioned (TC) officers, in
addition to several other categories. Out of the 21 British officers then
serving in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
16 agreed to continue serving for two years or more even after 1950. The
position of officers continued to improve and reached a figure of 701 in March
1950. After this, the intake of officers became steady and the rate of increase
tapered off. In January 1954, the Corps had 718 officers against an authorised
establishment of 830, which was over 85%. At this time, there were only a
handful of British officers left, including the SO-in-C, Brigadier Akehurst,
who left on 31 March 1954. The last three British officers left a year later in
March 1955, when the officer cadre was fully Indianised.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Until the departure of Brigadier
Akehurst, the highest rank held by
Signals officers was that of brigadier. At that time, the Corps had only seven
brigadiers, of which three were holding staff appointments outside the Corps.
With the upgradation of the appointment of SO-in-C in 1954, the Corps got its
first major general. The number of colonels (five) was also quite small, since
the only appointments in that rank were in the training centres or as DCSOs of
areas. However, the number of lieutenant colonels (45) was substantial as were
the numbers of majors (142), captains (310) and subalterns (209). In most cases, lieutenant colonels were
promoted directly as brigadiers, as was the case in all other arms and
services. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the Emergency that was
declared after the 1962 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the intake of officers saw a
substantial increase. In December 1962, 23 officers of the 30<sup>th</sup>
regular course who had completed their training were given regular commissions
when they passed out. In addition, 31 officers of the 31<sup>st</sup> regular
course who had still six months of training left also passed out, with
emergency commissions. They were later given regular commissions, without loss
of seniority.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though the Chinese had declared a
unilateral a cease fire war on 21 November 1962, the Government decided to
increase the intake of officers. The Officers Training Schools (OTSs) at <st1:city w:st="on">Poona</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>
began to turn out emergency commissioned officers after three to six months of
training. The training period of the regular courses at the IMA was also
curtailed by periods varying from six months to one and a half years. In
addition to the OTSs, short courses for emergency commissioned officers were
conducted at the IMA also in 1963-64. These measures were implemented without
adequate thought being given to the long term effects on the officer cadre
which became apparent with time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In March 1963, three regular
courses - 32<sup>nd</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup> and 34<sup>th</sup> – passed out
from the IMA together. In the normal course, they would have passed out in
December 1963, June 1964 and December 1964 respectively. After undergoing
training at the IMA for periods varying from three months to fifteen months, 85
of them were sent to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place> where they
underwent the Signal Officers Cadet Course of approximately ten weeks, before
being granted permanent commissions on 30 June 1963. The first batch of 55
emergency commissioned officers of EC-1 course, which had joined them after
three months of training at the OTS Poona, was also commissioned on the same
date. During the period 1963 to 1965, twelve emergency courses passed from out
the IMA and the two OTSs, in addition to the regular courses. After completing
five years service, the ECOs who wished to be retained had to undergo screening
by the Services Selection Board. Those who were found fit were given regular
commissions after adjusting their seniority by the shortfall in training, which
was about one and a half years. However, the regular officers commissioned in
1963 and 1964, many of whom had undergone the same period of training as
emergency commissioned officers, did not lose seniority. This caused a lot of
heart burn, not only among the ECOs but also the ex-NDA regular officers, who
became junior to the direct entry officers who would otherwise have been
commissioned along with them or later. For the ECOs who were not found fit or
left voluntarily there was a silver lining - many were inducted into the
Central Services such as IAS and IPS, reaching top positions by virtue of the
fact that the Government agreed to count their Army service while deciding
their seniority in civil services.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Colonel B.V Shirali, has described
the situation in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I am one of the
officers commissioned on 30 June 1963. I joined 34<sup>th</sup> Regular (Direct
Entry) course at Indian Military Academy on 06 Jan 1963 or so as Gentleman
Cadet (GC). After 3 months of basic military training at IMA, I was sent to
School of Signals, Mhow along with other GCs of 32<sup>nd</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup>
and 34<sup>th</sup> Regular courses, who had by then completed basic military
training of 15, 9 and 3 months duration respectively, in end of
March/first week of April 1963 for undergoing YOs course. This YOs course
was called/ known as Signal Officer Cadet Course No.1 (SOC-1) of 12
weeks duration from April to end June 1963. GCs of EC-1 course after 3
months basic military training at OTS also joined us at Mhow in first week
of April 1963 and underwent 12 weeks of SOC-1 course. We all GCs
of 32<sup>nd</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup> and 34<sup>th</sup> Regular courses
and EC-1 course were commissioned on 30 June 1963 at School of
Signals ,Mhow.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers of 32<sup>nd</sup>,
33<sup>rd</sup> and 34<sup>th</sup> Regular Course were granted Permanent
Commission (PC) while officers of EC-1 course were granted Emergency
Commission. We all were allotted IC number arbitrarily irrespective of Course.
For example, although I was allotted IC- 15415 being from 34<sup>th</sup>
Regular Course, some officers of 32<sup>nd</sup> and 33<sup>rd</sup> Regular
course were allotted IC numbers greater than mine but that did not imply that
such officers were junior to me. The seniority of officers of above
courses was subsequently adjusted/ regularized as per the period of
pre-commission training actually undergone by each by publication
of necessary Gazette of India. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It is, indeed,
unfortunate that EC-1 officers who were found fit were given PC after adjusting
their seniority by shortfall in training where as regular officers of 32<sup>nd</sup>,
33<sup>rd</sup>, and 34<sup>th</sup> course did not lose seniority in spite of
shortfall in their training. The reason for that may be due to the terms
of engagement of regular course coupled with sanction of COAS to grant PC
to GCs with shortfall in training due to exigency of service after 1962
Chinese Aggression<b>.</b></span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9<i> <o:p></o:p></i></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After 1965 the grant of emergency
commissions was stopped. However, short service commissions began to be granted
to officers passing from the OTS at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>
from April 1966 onwards. An interesting sidelight is that from the first short
service non-technical course (SSNT-1), no officer was commissioned into
Signals. However, it was later found that many of them were post graduates in
science with specialization in electronics. When asked if they wished to join
Signals, many volunteered. As a result, a number of officers were transferred
to Signals after having spent about a year in units of Infantry, Cavalry and
Artillery. However, from the next batch (SSNT-2) onwards, which passed out from
the OTS in April 1967, officers began to be sent to Signals. Officers granted short service commissions
who were found fit were subsequently granted permanent commissions after loss
of seniority equal to the shortfall in training, which was about 14 months. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An interesting development was the
Compulsory Liability Scheme that was introduced in 1965. In order to make up
the deficiency of as many as 2,500 officers in the technical corps of the Army,
the Government decided that all entrants to the Government Class I and II
engineering cadres, of the Centre as well as the States, will be liable to
serve in the Army for a period of four years before they are appointed to civil
jobs. It was expected that the Army would be offered 750 engineering graduates
per year under this scheme. Out of this
number approximately 500 were expected to be selected by the Army and the
remaining 250 allowed to join their civil appointments. Those selected would undergo a 13 weeks basic
military training course at the OTS Madras, on conclusion of which they would
be granted provisional short service regular commissions in the Army. It was expected that 126 technical graduates
will be commissioned annually into the Corps of Signals under this scheme<b>. 10<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Unfortunately, the results were not very
encouraging. Colonel T.N. Shreevastawa, who was one of the officers who joined
under this scheme, writes:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Compulsory Service
Liability (CSL) Scheme started in 1965 with courses
named as CSL-1, CSL-2 , CSL-3 etc at OTS Madras with 14 weeks duration
for engineering cadres of Central/ State Govts. Later all these
officers went for YOs Courses with non-technical SS officers in SSNT-I in
1967 as their numbers were not more than 5 to 6. To the best of my
knowledge, only three courses from 1965 to 1966 were run at OTS. Most of these officers
went back to their engineering cadre of Central/State Govts after serving for 4
years in the Army. Only few selected to get permanent commission after going
through SSB.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
the 1971 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
the courses at the IMA and OTS were curtailed. The 46<sup>th</sup> regular
course passed out from the IMA on 14 November 1971, a month earlier than
scheduled. The next course at the IMA was shortened by three months, passing
out on 31 March 1972. The duration of the courses at the OTS was also shortened
from ten months to six months. After 1972 the situation returned to normal, and
regular courses began to be conducted at the IMA for permanent commissioned
officers and at the OTS, which was later redesignated as the Officers Training
Academy (OTA), for short service commissioned officers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">JCOs & Other Ranks<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
World War II and the period preceding it, personnel for the Indian Signal Corps
were recruited from four castes - Punjabi Mussulmans, Sikhs, Dogras and Mixed
Madrassis. In 1946 it was decided that instead of being caste based,
recruitment would be based on religion. At the time of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, the ratio of Muslims to
non-Muslims in the Corps was 44:56. With the departure of the Punjabi
Mussulmans to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
at Partition, the percentages were revised as shown below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Mixed Madrassi - 56.5%<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Hindus - 30%<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sikhs - 10.5%<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Hindustani Mussulmans - 3%<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon after the revision of the new
percentages, it was realised that this has resulted in considerable
dissatisfaction among Sikhs. There was a large number of very senior Sikhs in
the Corps, who could not be promoted within the class percentage laid down for
them. At the same time, other classes did not have enough qualified personnel
to fill the vacancies authorized for them. It was decided that promotions to
NCO/JCO ranks will be based on the following percentages:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>NCOs</u> <u>JCOs<o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sikhs 30 24<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Hindus 28 28<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">MMs 41.8 48<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Others .2 Nil<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As a result of this decision, the
class percentage for Sikhs in the Corps for promotion purposes was stepped up
by 5%. However, before the impact of the
decision could be felt Indian Army Order 8/S/49 was published, abolishing the
system of class composition in the Indian Army. Henceforth, promotions were to
be based purely on seniority and efficiency and not by classes. <b>12 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
biggest crisis faced by the Corps immediately after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> was the shortage of technical
tradesmen such mechanics, operators and draughtsmen. There was a large number
of personnel recruited during the war who could elect to be released according
to their terms of engagement. Efforts were made to defer the release of
technical tradesmen to tide over the situation. The SO-in-C wrote a personal
demi-official letter to officers commanding signal units stressing the
necessity of personal talks to the men in order to explain the needs of the
Corps for such personnel. It was also decided that technical tradesmen of
deficient trades would not be eligible to apply for cipher conversion training.
By March 1948, about 700 such personnel had asked to be released and another
100 were expected to follow suit. However, in view of the shortage of technical
personnel, their release was postponed.
Sanction was also obtained to employ civilians as Foremen of Signals for
a period of three years, by which time it was expected that the crisis would be
over. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
order to accelerate recruitment in the Corps, a Regimental Recruiting Party
under Captain Gurdial Singh toured <st1:place w:st="on">East Punjab</st1:place>
in March and April 1948. The results were very encouraging. The party recruited
104 Sikhs (63 matric, 41 non matric) and 124 Hindus (63 matric and 61 non-
matric). In addition it recruited 32 Sikh boys (4 matric, 28 non matric) and 39
Hindu boys (3 matric, 36 non matric). The matrics included several who had
FA/FSc and even a few graduates! <b>13<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
July 1948 a recruiting drive for ex-servicemen was launched for four months.
Special allowances were offered to ex-soldiers to enrol either on short term or
regular engagements. Physical and educational standards were lowered to that of
war time standards. Within a month, more than 600 ex-servicemen had joined,
including a large number of operators, mechanics, drivers and linemen. As a
result of these measures, there was some improvement in the state of personnel.
The state of JCOs and OR as on 1 December 1948 is shown below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>Authorised
Strength</u> <u>Actual
Strength<o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">JCOs <b> </b>443 337<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> OR 12712 11145 Recruits 2288 2915 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Boys 750 62<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An important change that occurred
concerned colour service. Vide Army Instruction 199/48, colour service was
fixed as 10 years for operators, draughtsmen and storemen, while it was 12
years for clerks and mechanics. The total period of combined colour and reserve
service was fixed as 15 years for all categories. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The National Service Ordinance
(XXIII of 1948) was promulgated under which any person serving in the Indian
Army whose services were required could be retained until December 1949. It
also provided for the recall of any person who had been released after 1
January 1946. It stipulated that extreme compassionate cases, medically unfit
persons and certain disciplinary cases would continue to be released as before.
After the issue of Indian Army Order 724/48 which laid down the rules and
procedure for recall of the personnel under the Ordinance, it was decided that
the following numbers of personnel would be recalled:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Workshop trades -
196<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operator trades -
444<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Drivers MT - 192<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Within a few months, orders were
received that the recall of personnel under the National Service Ordinance was
to be stopped and recall notices already issued were to be cancelled.
Fortunately, no recall notices had been issued to JCOs/OR. However, notices had
been issued to 19 officers of which four had reported for duty.<b>14</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An important decision regarding
promotion policy of JCOs was taken in 1948. It was decided that subedars of all
categories, including those on special rosters, Foreman of Signals, ciphers and
clerks would be eligible for promotion to subedar major provided they were
willing to come on the general roster of promotion. It was also decided that
NCOs who qualify in the Foreman of Signals course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>
would have to pass a Signals selection board before they are promoted to the
rank of jemadar, as was being done for JCOs of other categories. In 1950 it was
decided that qualification on the NCOs ‘S’ course would be a necessary
pre-requisite for promotion to a JCO rank, as was the practice before World War
II and for some time during the War. The first ‘S’ course of 16 weeks duration
commenced on 9 October 1950 at the STC. A year later it was decided that the
course would be run in two parts, with Part I to be conducted at the STC and
Part II at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Signals</st1:placename></st1:place>. This would
apply to all categories other than jemadar clerk, for which both parts would be
run at the STC.<b>15</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In view of the critical shortages
of manpower still existing, in 1951 all releases, discharges and transfers to
reserve of JCOs and OR were held in abeyance, except on medical grounds,
disciplinary cases, extreme compassionate cases and JCOs who had completed
their tenure or attained the service limits laid down. In 1952 these orders were modified and the
personnel who had earned the maximum pensions of their rank and those on short
term engagement who had completed their terms and were unwilling to serve
beyond this period were also permitted to be released. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1952 the orders on control of
postings of JCOs/OR were revised. It was laid down that the postings of all JCOs,
OR and NCsE would be controlled by Officer in Charge Signals Records, except
for those of subedar majors, JCOs cipher, foreman of signals and operator
cipher, which would be controlled by Signals Directorate at Army HQ. In an
emergency, CSOs and CAFSO could order postings within their respective commands
without reference to Signals Records. Vide a subsequent order of November 1954,
Signals Records was given complete responsibility for posting of subedar
majors, without reference to Signals Directorate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1953 it was laid down that an
NCO must qualify on Foreman of Signals Course Parts I and II before he could be
considered for promotion to the rank of jemadar. In view of the deficiency of
qualified mechanics, it was also decided that NCOs of workshop category who
were appointed CQMH, CHM, RQMH and RHM should be employed on repair of signal
equipments and not on administrative duties. To implement this decision, such
NCOs would be posted in vacancies of foreman of signals or JCOs GD wherever
possible. <b>16 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the declaration of the Emergency consequent to the 1962 war, several measures
were taken to deal with the situation. Jemadar (GD) of workshop categories
began to be employed in lieu of JCOs Foreman of Signals. The posting out of
JCOs/OR/NCs(E) on completion of normal tenure in units was suspended until 31
December 1963, except for new raisings, instructional appointments, extreme
compassionate grounds and disciplinary cases. The tenure of service of JCOs was
extended, with subedars and jemadars being permitted to serve up to the ages of
53 (later revised to 50) and 46 years respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
November 1962, all releases/discharges/transfers to reserve were held in
abeyance. Service limits and basic qualifications for promotion to havildar
except map reading standards were waived. The maximum age limit was fixed as 43
years for promotion of havildars of all categories to the rank of jemadar. A
new rank structure for cipher JCOs was introduced, the proportion of subedar
major, subedar and jemadar being 1:8:19 respectively. There were several
relaxations in the policy for promotion to naiks and havildar and appointment
of lance naiks. The duration of the ‘S’ course was reduced to eight weeks from
sixteen weeks.<b>17 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1963 Government sanction was received
for the introduction of a rank structure in the Foreman of Signals category,
the proportion of subedar major, subedar and jemadar being 1:7:11. A rank structure was also approved for
combatant clerks and storemen technical in the proportion given below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">JCO - 1 in 12.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Havildar - 3 in 12.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Naik - 3 in 12.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lance Naik - 1 in 12.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signalman - 4 in 12.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1964 a new category of JCO known as Yeoman of Signals was introduced in the
Corps. The new category was to be responsible for the following:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Detailed training and
supervision of all operating tradesmen;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Control and supervision
of signal centres including switchboards and telegraph circuits at all levels;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Setting up and
operation of radio networks and the operation of line and radio systems;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Advice on all operating
techniques and procedures and communication security.<b>18</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With the introduction of the new
category, the appointment of Assistant Duty Signal Officer (ADSO), hitherto
being performed by young officers, began to be filled by Yeoman of Signals. Though it relieved officers of a task that
they had been doing in addition to their section and company responsibilities
in units, many veterans felt that it had an adverse effect of the grounding of
young officers in their formative years. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the initial years after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>, the state
of manpower showed a steady rise. However, it could not keep up with the
increase in requirements due to new raisings and deficiencies remained in some
critical categories. After the 1962 war, there was a sudden spurt in the
strength of personnel due to the large number of units that were raised. In
spite of increase in intake, it was sometime before the STCs could produce
enough trained personnel to fill the vacancies in the units, which remained at
low strength for several years. Augmentation in the strength took place after
the 1965 and 1971 wars also, but these
were not as pronounced as boost that
occurred after 1962, as can be seen from the figures given below, which show
the strength of the Corps at end of the year mentioned:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>1950</u> <u>1955 </u> <u>1960 </u> <u>1965</u> <u>1972</u> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">JCOs 375 543 665 1967 2562<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OR 14042 19286 22356 46041 65890<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Trade Structure<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1946, shortly before <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>,
it had been proposed to change the trade structure in the Indian Signal Corps
and make it similar to that obtaining in Royal Signals. Certain trades such as
lineman and operator were to be split into three or four, indicating a higher
degree of specialization. In 1947, the
New Pay Code was introduced, in conformity with the new trade structure, which
was to be introduced by the end of 1947, by which time it was hoped that the
documentation and re-mustering would be completed. However, events overtook the
planned changes. The date of Partition and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> was advanced from June 1948 to
August 1947, leaving very little time for the new trades to be effective. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
comprehensive instruction giving the new trade structure of the Indian Signal
Corps was issued vide Army Instruction 39/S/47 which became effective from 1
July 1947. According to this instruction some existing trades were redesignated
while some new trades were introduced.
It also laid down the method of carrying out trade tests and detailed
qualifications for each trade and class. The trade structures approved vide Army
Instruction 39/S/47 were as given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Group</span></u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u>New ISC Categories<o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A Foreman
of Signals (VCO only)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">B Clerk
GD<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Line Mechanic<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator Cipher<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio Mechanic<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Storeman Technical<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Telegraph
Mechanic<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">C Draughtsman Signals<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator Keyboard and Line<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator Switchboard<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator Wireless and Keyboard<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operator
Wireless and Line<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">D Carpenter
and Joiner<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Fitter Signals<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lineman Field<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lineman Permanent Line<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lineman
Test<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">E Despatch
Rider<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Driver Special Vehicle<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Store
Hand Technical<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">G Bandsman/Bugler/Piper
etc<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Driver MT<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Store
Hand GD<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">H Blacksmith
(Unit)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Cook (Unit)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Equipment and Boot Repairer (Unit)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tailor
(Unit)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1951, based on the Corps of Signals
Categories Revision Committee Report and on subsequent recommendations received
from CSOs Command, it was decided to revise the existing technical standards of
the certain trades in Group B and C. The categories affected were radio
mechanic, line mechanic and telegraph mechanic (Group B); and operator keyboard
and line and operator wireless and line (Group C). The reason for the revision
was that the qualifications laid down for the various categories from the
technical view point did not cater for a progressive advancement in the
technical knowledge and functions of the respective categories. It was also
felt that a more detailed version of the technical standards was needed in
relation to the signal equipment policy of the Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It
was also decided to introduce a new category called ‘operator switchboard and
line’ under Group C. This would be an
additional category and the existing category of operator switchboard would be
allowed to remain in its present form, as it will be required to fulfil the
enhanced requirement of operator switchboard during war. During peace time, however, operator
switchboard category would be held in suspended animation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Another
change proposed was the upgrading of operator wireless and keyboard (OWK) from
Group C to Group B. The essential difference between an OWK and OWL was that
the former was able receive Morse code on a keyboard typewriter. As the requirement of this category was very
small, the provision of this trade was made in affected signal units by
re-mustering OWL and OWK from the same group under AI 39/S/47. It had been
found from experience that only an OWL/OKL Class 2 is suitable for re-mustering
as OWK Class 3. It was felt that this
category, owing to its requirement of higher standard of technical knowledge
and operating ability, deserved to be placed in a higher group than those from
which this category was re-mustered. An
amendment was suggested to the existing qualifications laid down in AI 39/S/47
under class 2 of operator wireless and keyboard to include the
stipulation:-“must be able to install, test, operate and perform operator’s
maintenance of a 40 line teleprinter switchboard.”<b>19 </b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Army Instruction 171/53 laid down
revised technical standards for operator wireless and keyboard, radio mechanics
high power and low power, operator keyboard and line, operator switchboard and
line, operator wireless and line and lineman permanent line. The operator wireless and keyboard was also
shifted from Group ‘C’ to Group ‘B’ as proposed. Fitter signals was also subsequently
redesignated as electrician fitter signals and shifted from Group ‘D’ to Group
‘C’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There were some major changes in
the trade structure after the 1962 war. In 1964 a new category of JCO known as
Yeoman of Signals was introduced in the Corps. Selection of JCOs Yeoman of
Signals was to be from NCOs of operator trades who had a minimum of 8 years
service, holding the rank of naik or above and class 1 in their trades. The new
category was to be in Group A. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another change was the creation of
a new category of ‘operator special’ in Group A, for employment in wireless experimental
units under the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Personnel for the new
category were to be recruited by remustering of volunteers from OWK and OWL,
Class 2.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the mid sixties the word wireless appearing in the designation of trades was changed
to radio and accordingly the existing operator wireless and line (OWL) and
operator wireless and keyboard (OWK) trades were redesignated as operator radio
and line (ORL) and operator radio and keyboard (ORK) respectively.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Depot Regiment &
Signals Records <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Indian Signals Depot and
Records had come into being as separate entities in 1927, after being
bifurcated from the Signal Training Battalion of the Signal Training Centre at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>. Both establishments were then commanded by
majors. During World War II, the ranks of the officers commanding were upgraded
to lieutenant colonel. At the end of the
war, a demoblisation centre had also been established. Hence, apart from the </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU;">Signal Training Centre at <st1:place w:st="on">Jubbulpore</st1:place>,
</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">there were three establishments – the </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU;">Indian Signals Depot; the Indian Signals
Demobilisation Centre and the Indian Signals Records, under the overall command
of the </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commandant </span><span lang="EN-AU" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU;">Indian Signal Depot & Records. In 1946, the
Commandant STC was Colonel L.C. Boyd, while Colonel R.T.H. Gelston commanded
the Indian Signal Depot & Records. The officers commanding the Indian
Signals Depot and the Indian Signals Records were Lieutenant Colonel E.W.
Anderson and Lieutenant Colonel C.M. MacDonald respectively. After the mutiny in February 1946, most of the
British officers were replaced by Indian officers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Shortly before <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> the Demob Centre was merged with
the Depot and became the Depot and Demob Wing, Indian Signal Corps. The ranks
of the officers commanding the Depot and Demob Wing and the Indian Signals
Records were reduced and the command reverted to major. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At the time of partition of the Indian Signal
Corps in 1947, the Signals Records was also divided into Indian and Pakistan
Signals Records. Once the division was completed, Pakistan Signal Records moved
to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Until 1954, the Signals Records was headed by an officer either from the Corps
or a Civilian Gazetted Officer. After
the introduction of Special List (SL) officers, all Records began to be staffed
by officers of this cadre. The
designation of the head of the office was Senior Record Officer (SRO). Major
V.M. Anantharaman was the first Senior Record Officer of Signals Records who
took over on 1 July 1956. In 1962, this
appointment was upgraded and redesignated as Chief Records Officer (CRO), the
first incumbent being Lieutenant Colonel Makhan Singh. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In July 1960, the Depot and Demob
Wing unit was redesignated as Depot Company. After the raising of Nos. 2 and 3
STCs in 1963, a depot company was authorised to each of them. No. 3 STC was
subsequently disbanded and in 1967, these three companies were re-organised as
Depot Regiment, Corps of Signals, under the command of a lieutenant
colonel. The first commanding officer of
the regiment was Lieutenant Colonel G.D. Bhide.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When
computers were introduced in the Army, one of the first establishments where it
was introduced was Signals Records. In 1967, a pilot punched card machine (PCM)
project was sanctioned by the Government for Signals Records to establish the
viability of mechanized systems in the field of personnel management. The sanction was accorded on an experimental
basis for a period of two years. The
procurement and installation of the equipment was to be completed by September
1968. The project was implemented by IBM World Trade Corporation.<b>20</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Corps of Signals was virtually transformed in the 25 year period between 1947
and 1972. In organisational terms, it grew from a small force of about a dozen
units to almost a hundred. In terms of personnel, the strength increased from
about 10,000 to over 65,000. The growth is dramatic when one considers it in
relation to the total size of the Indian Army. Along with the growth in size,
changes also occurred in the organisational structure. The types of units had
multiplied, in keeping with the variety of roles that the Corps was asked to
perform. The induction of new technology and communication techniques
necessitated changes in the trade structure of the personnel and the level of
their education and training. The Corps was able to fulfil its assigned role in
all major operations undertaken by the Indian Army since <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> primarily because it was able to
carry out organisational changes and adapt itself to the ever changing demands
placed on it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
growth in organisations and manpower in the Corps from 1947 to 1972 are
graphically shown below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="396" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image012.gif" v:shapes="_x0000_i1030" width="590" /><!--[endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ENDNOTES
TO CHAPTER 9 </span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -.9pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This chapter is based mainly on the
Corps of Signals Planning/Liaison Notes for the period 1948-57 and 1963-72;
Review of Activities of the Corps of Signals, covering the years 1961-65 dated
7 October 1965; and personal inputs from officers. Specific references are
given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 12.25pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -.9pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1. Review of Activities of the Corps of
Signals, 7 October 1965. (This document was prepared under the directions of
the then BSS, Brigadier I.D Verma, with the two-fold aim of maintaining a
record of the developments and progress made during the four years from
mid-1961 to mid-1965; and to have a comprehensive reference, which will be of
value for future planning). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 12.25pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2. Personal account, Lt. Gen. Prakash
Gokarn.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3. Personal account, Lt. Col. M. Sathesan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4. Personal account, Lt. Gen. M.S. Sodhi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 35
(October1955)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 65
(January 1964)<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0cm 12.25pt 0.0001pt 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">7. Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, <i>Leadership in
the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, </i><st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, Sage, 2005, p. 208.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin: 0cm 12.25pt 0.0001pt 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">8. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Personal
account, Col. M.K. Kotwal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9. Personal account, Col. B.V Shirali,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">10. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Corps
of Signals Liaison Note No<b> </b>68
(February 1965)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11. Personal account, Col. T.N. Shreevastawa<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 9
(February 1949)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 5 (June
1948)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 9
(February 1949)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15 Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 19
(June 1951)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">16. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 26 (July
1953)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">17. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 61
(January 1963)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">18. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 64
(October 1963)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 12.25pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 19 (June
1951)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 12.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">20. Corps of Signals Liaison Note No 80 (May
1968)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-40497149051728282462016-01-16T07:13:00.005-08:002016-01-16T07:13:51.790-08:00Chapter 7 THE INDO-PAK WAR – 1971 (WESTERN THEATRE) <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h2 align="center" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; tab-stops: 463.5pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chapter
7 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></h2>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE
INDO-PAK WAR – 1971 (WESTERN
THEATRE) <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview – Background – Indian Strategy</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
XV CORPS OPERATIONS IN JAMMU & KASHMIR : <i>Battle of Punch – Battle of Chhamb – Operations in Other Sectors of
Jammu & Kashmir</i>. I CORPS OPERATIONS
IN THE JAMMU SECTOR : <i>54 and 39
Inf Div – 36 Inf Div</i>. XI CORPS OPERATIONS IN PUNJAB : <i>The Battle of Dera Baba Nanak (15 Inf Div) –
7 & 14 Inf Div – Foxtrot Sector</i>.
OPERATIONS IN RAJASTHAN & SIND : <i>11
Inf Div – 12
Inf Div</i>. CEASE
FIRE AND SIMLA AGREEMENT. SIGNALS IN
WESTERN COMMAND DURING OPERATION CACTUS LILY : <i>Western Comd Sigs – Western
Comd Sig Regt –Western Comd Mob Sig Coy-XV
Corps Sigs </i><i>– XV
Corps Sig Regt – 25 Inf Div Sig Regt – 10 Inf Div Sig Regt -26 Inf Div Sig Regt – 3 Inf Div Sig Regt – 19 Inf Div Sig Regt – J
Comn Zone Sig Regt – T Comn Zone Sig Regt – Y Comn Zone Sig Regt – 121 (Indep)
Inf Bde Sig Coy – XI Corps Sigs - XI
Corps Sig Regt – 7 Inf Div Sig Regt – 14 Inf Div Sig Regt – 15 Inf Div Sig Regt
– 1 Armd Div Sig Regt – I Corps Sigs – 54 Inf Div Sig Regt – 36 Inf Div Sig Regt – 39 Inf Div Sig Regt
– Z Comn Zone Sig Regt – M Comn Zone Sig Regt – 1 Air Sp Sig Regt – 1 Air Fmn
Sig Regt – 51 (Indep) Para Bde Sig Coy</i>. SIGNALS IN SOUTHERN COMMAND : <i>Southern Comd Sigs – Southern Com Sig Regt – 11 Inf Div Sig Regt – 12
Inf Div Sig Regt – Q Comn Zone Sig Regt – 5 (Indep) Air Sp Sig Coy – P Comn Zone Sig Regt</i>. CONCLUSION.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 4.3pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.7pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">The war in Western Theatre started after air
attacks by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
on Indian airfields on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3
December 1971</st1:date>. The same night, Pakistani troops shelled and
attacked Indian positions in Jammu & Kashmir and <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>.
The attack on Punch, held by 93 Infantry Brigade of 25 Infantry Division, was
beaten back. Actions took place in adjoining areas during which Indian troops
captured some enemy posts. Another major action took place in Chhamb, held by
10 Infantry Division. The enemy attack was supported by armour and some Indian
positions were overrun. The battle lasted for several days and some localities
changed hands several ti`mes. The offensive ended on <st1:date day="12" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">12 December 1971</st1:date> with minor gains for
the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In addition to Punch and Chhamb, smaller
operations took place in other areas such as Partapur, Kargil, Tangdhar, Uri
and Chicken’s Neck, which were part of 3, 19 and 26 Infantry Division sectors.
Pt. <st1:metricconverter productid="13620 in" w:st="on">13620 in</st1:metricconverter>
Kargil sector was captured by 121 Infantry Brigade Group of 3 Infantry
Division. In the Tangdhar sector troops of 104 Infantry Brigade of 19 Infantry
Division captured Kaiyan across Tutmari Gali. Another major achievement was the
capture of Chicken's Neck in Akhnur
sector by 19 Infantry Brigade of 26
Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
sector, I Corps launched its offensive on 5 December. 54 Infantry Division with 16 (Indep) Armoured Brigade and 39 Infantry
Division with 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade advanced and captured their initial
objectives. After crossing the
minefields they beat back repeated attacks by enemy armour on the bridgehead.
During the Battle of Basantar on 16 and 17 December almost two tanks regiments
of the enemy were decimated. At the same time, 36 Infantry Division advanced
towards Shakargarh but came up against heavy opposition. In spite of several
attempts 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade could not cross the Bien river. The attack
on Shakargarh was launched by 87 and 115 Infantry Brigades on night of 14/15
December but got disorganised. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In the XI Corps sector (15, 7 and 14
Infantry Divisions) there were no major offensives by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> or <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
However, important actions took place at Dera Baba Nanak, Ferozepur and
Fazilka. In the 15 Infantry Division sector, 86 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier
Gowrishankar, Signals) captured the Pakistani enclave at Dera Baba Nanak by 7
December. In 7 Infantry Division sector, the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hussainiwala</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>
was lost to the enemy but Indian troops succeeded in capturing the Sehjra
bulge. In the 14 Infantry Division sector, some Pakistani enclaves south of the
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Sutlej</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> were eliminated and some posts
captured. In the Foxtrot sector, there was a serious reverse at Fazilka, held
by 67 Infantry Brigade. The main defences of the brigade on Sabuna distributary
were attacked and partially captured by the enemy, posing a serious threat to
Fazilka. Fortunately, the cease fire on 17 December frustrated the enemy’s
plan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In Rajasthan, 11 and 12 Infantry Divisions
were operating directly under HQ Southern Command which had moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city> for the
operations. Advancing towards Nayachor along multiple axes, 11 Infantry
Division captured Khokhropar and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place> by 5 December.
Purabat Ali was captured on 13 December and Nayachor contacted on 15 December.
However, the cease fire was announced before the attack could be launched. 12 Infantry Division commenced its offensive
on 4 December and captured Sakhirewalakot and Islamkot the same night. In
Longewala, a large column of enemy tanks was destroyed by the Indian Air Force
but the proposed offensive of 12 Infantry Division had to be called off.
However, 10 Para Commando raided Chachro and Birawah on 7 and 8 December and
took a number of prisoners. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">As always, Signals played an important role
in the success of the operations. Almost every signal unit in Western and
Southern Commands was involved, some directly participating in the operations
and others indirectly by providing manpower, equipment and transport. A
considerable amount of advance planning and preparatory work was done at all
levels, starting from Army HQ downwards. As a result, resources were rarely
lacking, as happened in previous conflicts. A welcome sign was the positive
attitude and cooperation extended by the P&T Department in provision of
additional PL routes, trunk circuits and exchanges demanded by units, often at
short notice. The part played by every major signal unit has been covered, to
the extent permitted by constraints of space and availability of archival
material. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Background<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The 1965 conflict with Pakistani ended with the
cease fire on <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23 September 1965</st1:date>, followed by the Tashkent Agreement of <st1:date day="4" month="1" w:st="on" year="1966">4 January 1966</st1:date>. For the next
five years or so, the situation on the Western Front remained relatively quiet
and except for occasional minor incidents, the cease fire was not violated. But
the events that occurred in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> in
early 1971 resulted in an increase in tension on the western borders,
especially in Jammu & Kashmir. As the situation in <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place> worsened, the likelihood of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> launching a pre-emptive
attack on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in the west increased. Though <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
began preparing for the liberation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> around April 1971, she
could not afford to let her guard down in other sectors. Even if <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> had
adequate troops at her disposal, she could not increase the forces in Jammu &
Kashmir, because of the Karachi Agreement of 1948. These restrictions did not
apply to other sectors such as <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and
Rajasthan, but here too <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
faced a problem, due to the large distances involved in moving troops from
their peace time locations to the borders. Another factor that inhibited
movement of troops to the border in anticipation of hostilities was that it
could lead to an apprehension that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> was preparing to launch an
attack in the west, simultaneously with an attack in the east. On the other
hand, if adequate forces were not moved forward, the defence of the country in
the west could be seriously jeopardized. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-US">India</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span lang="EN-US">’s
military planners were in a quandary and wisely desisted from large scale
movement of troops to the Western Sector in spite of clear indications of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
intentions. The threat from the Chinese on the northern borders precluded any
thinning out from that region until the onset of winter. In August 1971, Yahya
Khan announced that "war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> is very near and in case of
war <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
would not be alone". In September, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> started moving troops to
the likely battle areas. A month later, Yahya Khan made another provocative
statement denigrating Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, when he was quoted as
saying that he would "teach that woman a lesson". By the middle of
October, it was clear from various reports that a pre-emptive attack by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
imminent. It was only after this that certain covering forces were deployed and
formations were moved forward to their concentration areas closer to the border
in the Western Theatre.<sup>1</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Indian Strategy <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The movement of Pakistani formations to the
border led to pleas to carry out similar deployments from Western as well as
Southern Command. However, Army HQ accorded permission only after Pakistani
moves and preparations for offensives reached an advanced stage. Even then,
movement was allowed in a graduated and progressive manner. Considering the
time required for defensive preparations such as development of defence works, laying
of mines, dumping of ammunition and so on, the delay in movement of formations
to their battle locations meant that they were ready only by mid November,
whereas <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was more or less ready to launch an offensive by mid October. This was a
calculated risk taken by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
to avoid any provocation or cause for misinterpretation to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. In
hindsight, if <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had decided to launch an attack a month earlier, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> would have faced a grave
crisis! <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">At that time, Western Command was
responsible for defence of the territory from Ladakh down to Ganganagar
district of Rajasthan, while Southern Command was responsible for the remainder
of Rajasthan and <st1:place w:st="on">Gujarat</st1:place> (Northern Command was
created only after the war in 1972). The field formations under Western Command
were XV, I and XI Corps, while Southern Command had 11 and 12 Divisions. XV Corps,
which was responsible for the defence of Jammu & Kashmir, comprised 3, 19, 25, 10 and 26 Infantry Divisions. 3
Infantry Division was deployed in Ladakh, 19 Infantry Division in the Kashmir
Valley, 25 Infantry Division in the Punch-Jhangar area, 10 Infantry Division in
the Akhnur area and 26 Infantry Division in the Jammu area. I Corps comprising 36, 39 and 54
Infantry Divisions was responsible for the defence of the area
Samba-Pathankot-Gurdaspur. XI Corps
comprising 15, 7 and 14 Infantry Divisions and Foxtrot Sector was
responsible for the defence of <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and the
Ganganagar district of Rajasthan. In Southern Command, 12 Infantry Division was responsible for the Jaisalmer sector and 11 Infantry Division for the Barmer sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Formations all along the Western Front were
to remain on the defensive initially. If <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> started the war, commands
could retaliate by going on the offensive and secure the limited objectives set
for them by Army HQ. Some local counter-offensives were to be undertaken in
Jammu & Kashmir, depending on where <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> launched its offensive. The
main Indian counter-offensive was to be launched by I Corps in conjunction with
some formations of XV Corps. I Corps was to advance to Pasrur. Depending on the
situation, 10 and 26 Infantry Divisions of XV
Corps were to form part of the offensive, advancing towards <st1:place w:st="on">Gujarat</st1:place> and Marala respectively. XI Corps was to be
prepared to launch a limited offensive opposite its sector. 1 Armoured Division
was earmarked as the Army HQ reserve to be made available if an offensive was
decided upon. In Southern Command, 11 and
12 Infantry Divisions were to be
prepared to undertake limited offensive operations, depending on where the
enemy attacked. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On the war breaking out, Western Air Command
was to inflict maximum damage on the Pakistani Air Force, as well as render support
to Western Army Command in its operations. Western Naval Command was to carry
out a strong raid on <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Karachi</st1:place></st1:city>
harbour, inflict maximum damage to installations and assets of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s Navy. Western Command was commanded by Lieutenant
General K.P. Candeth, and Southern Command by Lieutenant General G.G. Bewoor.
Western Air Command was commanded by Air Marshal M.M. Engineer and Western
Naval Command by Vice-Admiral S.N. Kohli. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-US">Pakistan</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span lang="EN-US">
started the war on 3 December1971 with air attacks on Indian airfields and
surveillance units at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>,
Udhampur, Pathankot, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>,
Halwara, Faridkot, Sirsa, Ambala, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>,
Uttarlai, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jamnagar</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>. The
Indian Air Force responded appropriately within a very short period. After dark,
Pakistani forces started shelling Indian positions and launched ground attacks
in different sectors in Jammu & Kashmir and <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">XV CORPS OPERATIONS IN JAMMU & KASHMIR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-US">Battle</span></u></b></st1:place></st1:city><b><u><span lang="EN-US">
of Punch <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-US">Pakistan</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span lang="EN-US">
made repeated attempts to capture Punch, in 1947-48 as well as in 1965, but
failed on both occasions. In 1971 also, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> made a determined bid to
capture Punch, but again failed. From August 1971 onwards, abnormal vehicle
movement was observed on the Pakistani side, leaving no doubt that a heavy
build up was taking place and that an attack by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> on Punch was very likely.
93 Infantry Brigade of 25 Infantry Division was responsible for the defence of
Punch. It had four battalions, dispersed over a wide area. Appreciating that
this force would be inadequate against a major attack by the enemy, it was
decided to reinforce it with an additional brigade. 33 Infantry Brigade Group
of 39 Infantry Division was despatched to Punch towards the end of November
1971. Two battalions of this brigade were utilized for reinforcing the defences
of 93 Infantry Brigade, while one battalion together with the brigade headquarters
was kept as reserve.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Pakistani troops started shelling the Punch
defences at about 2000 hours on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3
December 1971</st1:date> followed by simultaneous attacks in different sectors.
The ferocity and repeated nature of attacks indicated that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
determined to capture Punch this time. 11 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
& Kashmir Militia was holding the Doda defended area, between the Darungli
Nallah and the Mandi Nallah. Soon after the shelling started, Gutrian was
attacked by the enemy. The defenders held their fire till the enemy reached the
minefield, when they opened up with everything. The enemy attack was beaten
back in the minefield itself. Again, at about 2330 hours, the position was
subjected to heavy firing from the enemy, followed by an attack from a
different direction, which was also repulsed. Subsequently, at about 0230 hours
on 4 December the enemy put in another
attack but this was also repelled with heavy casualties to the enemy.
Concurrent with the attack on Gutrian, the enemy attacked Shahpur and also
tried to raid the gun area. After the first attack was repulsed, the enemy
attempted two more attacks during the night on Shahpur, but these were also
beaten back with heavy casualties to the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">When Gutrian was under attack, a platoon was
sent from Thanpir which was held by a company minus of 11 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> & Kashmir Militia. During this
period, the enemy attacked and captured Thanpir on the morning of 4 December. He
also captured Chandak Spur and Nagali Spur, dominating the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kalai</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
While these main attacks were going on, an enemy battalion infiltrated and
secured the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kalai</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>, cutting off the main
road communication to Punch via Surankot. The task of clearing Thanpir of the
enemy was given to 13 Mahar, which captured Chandak Spur by last light on 4 December.
Continuing its advance, the battalion captured the complete Thanpir position by
last light on 5 December.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The area between Betar Nullah and Darungli Nullah
was held by two battalions, with 6 Sikh holding the northern part and 8 Jat the
southern part. At 2000 hours on 3 December, the enemy started shelling the forward
positions. Between 2230 and 2330 hours, the enemy attacked the helipad, Tund and
Chichian Bandi but the defending troops beat back the assault. The enemy
launched a second attack at about 0300 hours on 4 December, but was again repulsed.
A little later, the enemy launched a daylight attack on picquet 405. Apart from
the defenders' weapons, Indian Air Force aircraft also strafed the enemy.
However, the enemy managed to capture the helipad position. Picquet 405 was
reinforced with two platoons from 8 Jat and Tund was by a platoon from 6 Sikh.
During the night of 4/5 December, the enemy launched a number of attacks on
Picquet 405, but these were also beaten back with heavy casualties to the
enemy. On the morning of 6 December the enemy withdrew from the helipad, which
was re-occupied by 6 Sikh. Thereafter, the enemy offensive petered out. The
enemy made two more attempts to capture the helipad on 10 and 16 December,
which were repulsed with the help of accurate artillery fire. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The area between Tatan Di Rangur and Betar Nullah
was held by 1/4 Gorkha Rifles, on the picquet complex Durga, which included a
picquet Langoor that dominated the Betar Nullah approach. Along with the main
attack on picquet 405 the enemy launched an attack on Langoor at about 2330
hours on 3 December, which was beaten back. A second attack at 0300 hours next
morning got fairly close to the picquet but this was also beaten back. The
enemy shelled picquet 413, Durga and other picquets but did not attempt any
attack on these. On the night of 8/9 December, 1/4 Gorkha Rifles carried out a
raid on the enemy and occupied Mumtaz, a
piece of ground ahead of Durga. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Along with the main attack on Punch, the
enemy launched attacks on the picquets covering the shoulders of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Mendhar</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>, but failed to capture them. The
brigade was ordered to capture Daruchian, a feature which dominated the enemy's
line of communication to Kotli. On 10/11 December, 21 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
captured some posts around the place. On the night of 13/14 December, 14
Grenadiers attacked the Daruchian position repeatedly but as the enemy had been
alerted, the attacks were beaten back. During this period, a group of 9 Para
Commando raided a place called Mandhol, deep inside enemy territory and
destroyed an enemy gun position, killing a number of enemy gunners. Elsewhere
in the divisional sector, 4/9 Gorkha Rifles captured a place called Sukhanban
on night of 11/12 December.<sup>2</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-US">Battle</span></u></b></st1:place></st1:city><b><u><span lang="EN-US"> of Chhamb <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Due to its strategic importance, Chhamb has
always been a key objective for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
who succeeded in capturing it during the 1947-48 and 1965 wars. In the 1971 war
also, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
launched a sizeable attack and captured this area. Unlike in 1965 when <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> had to
return Chhamb after the cease fire, in 1971 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> was allowed to retain the
Chhamb area to the west of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Munnawar</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Tawi</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
where Pakistani troops had reached when the war ended. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In 1971, </span><span lang="EN-US">two brigades (191 and 28)
of 10 Infantry Division were
responsible for the defence of this area. The other two brigades (52 and 68) of
the division were located outside Jammu & Kashmir. By 15 October, 191 Infantry
Brigade· was moved from its peace time location in Akhnur to the Troti area
while 28 Infantry Brigade remained deployed on picquets in th0e Kalidhar area. However,
shortly before the commencement of hostilities, 191 Brigade was ordered to occupy defences on the west of the
Munnawar Tawi on <st1:date day="2" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">2 December
1971</st1:date>. At the same time, 52
Brigade was ordered to move forward to the area east of Munnawar Tawi and south
to cover the border, while 68 Brigade was ordered to move to the Jaurian area
for counter attack tasks. On the night of 3/4 December, some medium artillery
was also moved forward and the divisional headquarters moved to Andarwal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On the evening of 3 December, after the
bombing of a number of Indian airfields it became clear that a major attack in
the Chhamb Sector was imminent. BSF posts were withdrawn after dark. At about 2100
hours, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
started shelling the defended localities. The shelling lasted for an hour or so
after which tank noises were heard from several areas and screens were withdrawn
around 2130 to 2200 hours. With the withdrawal of BSF posts, a gap of about <st1:metricconverter productid="600 yards" w:st="on">600 yards</st1:metricconverter> was created
along the line of control between Red Hill and Pir Jamal. At about 2130 hours, a
platoon screen at Pir Jamal was also withdrawn. Advancing through the gap of
about <st1:metricconverter productid="800 yards" w:st="on">800 yards</st1:metricconverter>
that was now available, Pakistani troops contacted the main positions in the 5
Sikh defended area by 2330 hours. Attacks were also launched against positions held
by 5 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and 4/1 Gorkha Rifles and in the hill sector held by 28 Infantry Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The line of communication to Dewa through
Mandiala North in the 5 Sikh area was cut and Mandiala was overrun by 1230 hours
on 4 December. Moel in 5 Sikh area and Bokan and Burejal in 5 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> area were
overrun the same afternoon. Manawar and Jhanda in the 4/1 Gorkha Rifles area
were also attacked during the day. To counter the enemy moves on 4 December,
one company of 9 Para Commando and one troop of C Squadron 9 Horse were moved
to the east bank of the river during the night and were deployed to cover the
Mandiala crossing. 68 Brigade was ordered to move 7 Kumaon to the Kachreal area
and 9 Jat to Kalith. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">During the night of 4/5 December, two enemy
battalions advanced through the Sukhtar Nullah with the intention of attacking
Kachreal heights. During the attack, the enemy hit the two forward batteries of
216 Medium Regiment and two companies of 7 Kumaon, causing complete confusion.
The CO and four officers of 7 Kumaon were wounded and the battalion fell back.
The depth medium battery had to fire over open sites during which some of the
forward guns were damaged and the tanks got separated from the infantry. Next morning,
elements of 9 Jat and A Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment cleared the enemy from
the eastern bank. During the same night the enemy pushed back the troops at Mongolian
but failed to capture Dewa and Red Hill. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On 5 December, Pakistani attacks on
positions 5 Sikh and 5 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
were beaten back. Mangotian was re-captured by elements of 4/1 Gorkha Rifles
supported by tanks of 72 Armoured Regiment in the morning. The enemy attacked
Mangotian and Jhanda later in the evening but was repulsed. On night of 5/6 December,
the enemy persisted with his attacks. In the 5 Sikh area, Point 994 was attacked
twice and captured but was re-captured by a counter attack by a company 5/8
Gorkha Rifles and two troops of 9 Horse. In the 4/1 Gorkha Rifles area, Jhanda
and Manawar were attacked but these were repulsed. In the 5 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> area, the
enemy captured Ghogi but 5 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
counter- attacked and recaptured the position. The enemy attacked once again
but was repulsed in the early hours of 6 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On 6 December, the enemy captured Gurha in
the 5 Sikh area at 1530 hours but the position was recaptured at 1800 hours by a
company 5/8 Gorkha Rifles with two troops of 72 Armoured Regiment. In the 5 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> area,
Ghogi and Barsala were captured by infantry and armour after assaulting across
a dummy minefield. Mandiala South was captured by 1730 hours after repeated
attacks by the enemy. With the pressure
mounting by the enemy, at 1600 hours Commander 191 Brigade ordered 4/1 Gorkha to
fall back to line Manawar-Singri and 5 Assam to line Singri-Point <st1:metricconverter productid="303. A" w:st="on">303. A</st1:metricconverter> Squadron 9 Horse was
to deploy south of Chhamb to protect Chhamb and the Mandiala crossings. As
there were no prepared positions, and due to enemy interference, considerable
confusion was created during the withdrawal. Finally, 191 Brigade was ordered
to withdraw across the Munnawar Tawi by the divisional commander on the night
of 6 December. The area to the east of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Munnawar</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Tawi</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> was securely held by
52 and 68 Infantry Brigades. 191 Brigade
was withdrawn into the original defences in the Troti area and was in position
by morning 7 December. Before the withdrawal, the bridge at Mandiala was blown
up by the brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On the night of 7/8 December at about 0130
hours the 10 Garhwal Rifles company at
Chhatti Tahli was attacked, but the attack was beaten back. At about 0230 hours
the enemy attempted to secure crossings at Mandiala, Chhamb and Darh but these
were repulsed. At about 1800 hours on 8 December, the enemy attempted to secure
the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Raipur</st1:place></st1:city>
crossing by attacking in the 10 Garhwal
Rifles area but was evicted by an immediate local counter attack. The 9 Jat
company opposite the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Raipur</st1:place></st1:city>
crossing was also attacked and a portion of the locality overrun, but the enemy
was thrown back by a local counter attack. During daytime of 8 December, the
enemy continued to attack in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Raipur</st1:place></st1:city>
and Darh crossings areas but did not press home the attacks. In the 28 Infantry
Brigade Sector, however, the enemy attacked Dewa in strength and captured it by
about 1445 hours. On 9 December, the enemy continued with his attacks at the
different crossing places, particularly Mandiala, Darh and Sainth, but these
were beaten back by the battalions concerned. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On the night of 9/10 December, the enemy continued his build up and
attacked in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Raipur</st1:place></st1:city>
crossing area. After securing a foothold in the 9 Jat area, the enemy attacked
the 10 Garhwal Rifles company from the
north and overran it. In the 68 Brigade
sector, the enemy attacked in the Chhamb and Darh crossings area during the
same night. Some activity was also shown in the Mandiala crossing area. The
attacks in the Chhamb and Mandiala areas were foiled but the enemy secured the
Darh crossing in the 9 Jat area. Subsequently, the enemy enlarged his
bridgehead by capturing the depth company position of 9 Jat. Thus, by early
morning of 10 December, the enemy was
in possession of a reasonable lodgment covering the Darh and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Raipur</st1:place></st1:city> crossings. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">At about 0800 hours on 10 December, a
counter attack was launched with 3/4 Gorkha Rifles less two companies and
elements of 9 Horse and 72 Armoured Regiment. The tanks got bogged down in the
soft ground and the infantry could only get up to a place about <st1:metricconverter productid="1000 yards" w:st="on">1000 yards</st1:metricconverter> from the
objective. There was considerable confusion with regard to the strength and
further intentions of the enemy and it appeared that the divisional commander planned
to withdraw to the old main position. However, Lieutenant General Sartaj Singh,
GOC XV Corps, ordered that there will be no withdrawal from the present positions.
At about 1520 hours the corps commander arrived in the divisional sector and
assumed charge of the situation. He countermanded all orders for any rearward
moves including reconnaissance parties. He also ordered counter attacks to be
launched by elements of 52 and 68 Brigades to recapture Darh and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Raipur</st1:place></st1:city> crossings area and
throw the enemy back across the river. His arrival on the scene acted as a
tonic and restored the morale of the troops. The counter-attack was launched
during the night and the objectives were secured by 0030 hours on 11 December. After
this, the enemy offensive petered out.<sup>3</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Operations in Other Sectors of Jammu & Kashmir <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">While the battles of Punch and Chhamb were
the major operations in Jammu & Kashmir, smaller operations also took place
in other areas such as Partapur, Kargil, Tangdhar, Uri and Chicken’s Neck,
which were part of 3, 19 and 26 Infantry Divisional sectors. These are covered
in the succeeding paragraphs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The Partapur sector under Colonel Udai Singh
was responsible for the Shyok and Nubra river valleys lying to the north of
Leh, across the Khardungla pass. Some picquets area was occupied by a company
of Karakoram Scouts of Pakistan, with about two companies held in reserve. To remove the threat to the isolated Partapur
Sector, Colonel Udai Singh was assigned the task of capturing Turtok. The
operations commenced on the night of 7 December, with five companies of Ladakh
Scouts and about 500 personnel of the Nubra Guards. Though the enemy offered
stiff opposition, Turtok was captured by first light on 14 December, followed
by the capture of Thang on 17 December. During the operation Indian troops advanced
about <st1:metricconverter productid="22 kilometres" w:st="on">22 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
along the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Shyok</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> and captured over 800 square
kilometres of territory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In Kargil, the enemy was occupying some
features that dominated the strategically important Srinagar-Leh highway. Of
these, the most important was north of
the Shingo. The area was the responsibility of 121 Infantry Brigade Group which
was under 3 Infantry Division. The brigade
was given the task of capturing the Brachil pass-Hathi Matha area and clearing
the picquets that dominated the road. Since Pt. 13620 was very strongly held, it
was decided to tackle the position from the rear. During the night of 7/8
December, 2/11 Gorkha Rifles and 9 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles occupied some features
and captured a number of enemy posts, effectively isolating Pt. 13620,
which was finally captured by the Gorkhas in the afternoon after being
subjected to air strikes. While the attack on Pt. 13620 was in progress, 18 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> attacked and captured Brachil pass after bitter
fighting on 7 December. This was followed by the capture of several important
posts by 7 Guards on 8 December. After a long approach march, 5/3 Gorkha Rifles
captured Hathi Matha from the rear on 17 December, when the ceasefire was
announced. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The Tangdhar sector was held by </span><span lang="EN-US">104 Infantry
Brigade of 19 Infantry Division. In order to deny approaches to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place> through the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Nastachun</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place>
and the Tutmari Gali, several operations were carried out on the outbreak of hostilities.
On 5 December, 8 Rajputana Rifles captured Gasla Top and Ring Contour. On 12 December,
3 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> captured Wanjal. 9 Sikh was given the
task of capturing Kaiyan, across Tutmari Gali. The battalion captured several
important posts in the Kaiyan bowl. On the night of 14/15 December<i>, </i>9
Sikh attacked and captured Nankot, after a long and difficult approach march.
Subsequently, 4 Mahar also captured certain important positions in the Kaiyan
area and held firm against counter attacks by the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In order to eliminate the threat to Akhnur
through the salient known as Chicken's
Neck, the task of capturing it was given to 19 Infantry Brigade which was part of 26 Infantry Division. On the night of 5/6 December, 9 Para Commando
captured the Saidpur ferry while 3/5 Gorkha Rifles captured Khoje Chek and
Gondal ferry, cutting off the enemy's routes of withdrawal and reinforcement.
Concurrently, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles
captured Tibba during the night of 5/6 December. In the next Phase, 11 Guards captured Chanor followed by Phuklean
after overcoming some resistance. Later, they exploited up to the western
extremity of the salient. With the capture of Chicken’s Neck, the threat to
Akhnur was removed and 9 Infantry
Brigade was in a position to pose a serious threat to Marala Head Works.<sup>4</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">I CORPS </span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OPERATIONS IN THE <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">JAMMU</st1:place></st1:city> SECTOR <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The Jammu- Pathankot-Gurdaspur region was
strategically important for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
as well as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
It included the Indian base of Pathankot, through which the rail and road
communications pass to the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Another important area
was the Shakargarh bulge, which could be used to disrupt the line of
communications to Jammu & Kashmir and also pose a threat to <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> from the north. The responsibility for defence of
the area was with I Corps, the bulk of whose troops were located far away from
the area of operations in cantonments in Central and <st1:place w:st="on">Southern
India</st1:place>. Only 39 Infantry Division was available within the general
area, under command of XV Corps, till
the arrival of I Corps. Though Western
Command had made plans for launching an offensive, Army HQ had directed that
they were to remain on the defensive till attacked by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. It
was also mandated that no loss of territory was acceptable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Army HQ accorded permission on 4 October for
deploying troops all along the border and orders for induction of troops into
different sectors were issued on <st1:date day="12" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">12 October 1971</st1:date>. Starting their moves from their peace
time cantonments on 13 October by road and rail, formations of I Corps
completed their concentration by 26 October. 54 Infantry Division was made
responsible for general area Samba up to Bein river; 39 Infantry Division for
the area between Bein and <st1:place w:st="on">Ravi</st1:place> rivers; and 36
Infantry Division for the area south of <st1:place w:st="on">Ravi</st1:place>
river from Sherpur to Thakurpur. The offensive task of I Corps was breaking
into the Shakargarh salient south of Degh Nadi and capturing Zafarwal-Dhamthal-Narowal;
and subsequently, securing the line Marala-Ravi link canal and later Pasrur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">I Corps’ original plan for its offensive
envisaged launching 54 and 36 Infantry Divisions between Degh Nadi and Ravi
river, supported by 16 and 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigades, after the enemy
reserves were committed south and east of Degh Nadi. These plans were later
modified, based on reports of some enemy movements. The sector west of Degh
Nadi was styled as 'X' Sector comprising 168 and 323 Infantry Brigades. Subsequently, 33 Infantry Brigade of 39
Infantry Division was moved to Punch, depleting the strength of the division
and restricting its ability to carry out its original task of advance to
Pasrur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On 3 December, GOC I Corps issued his orders
based on the modified plans. 54 Infantry Division with 16 (Indep) Armoured Brigade less 16 Cavalry was to advance between
Degh Nadi and Karir river with a view to capturing line Laisarkalan-Bari Darman,
then Supwal and Barwal, and to be prepared to capture Deoli and Mirzapur. 39
Infantry Division comprising 72 Infantry Brigade ex-36 Infantry Division and 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade less 14 Horse
was to advance between Karir and Bein rivers and capture Shakargarh. 36 Infantry
Division less 72 Infantry Brigade and 14 Horse were to advance across the <st1:place w:st="on">Ravi</st1:place> on axis Thakurpur-Nainakot-Nurkot and capture
Nurkot. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><span lang="EN-US">Pakistan</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span lang="EN-US">
launched pre-emptive air strikes and land operations on the evening of <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date>. Army HQ ordered Western Command to launch I
Corps on its offensive task within 48 hours. I Corps launched its offensive on 5
December. Since the operations of 54 and
</span><span lang="EN-GB">39
Infantry Divisions are interlinked, they have been covered together, followed
by those of 36 Infantry Division.</span><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 107%;">54 </span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">and </span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 107%;">39 </span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Infantry Divisions<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">54 Infantry Division and 39
Infantry Division less a brigade commenced their offensives at 2000 hours on <st1:date day="5" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">5 December 1971</st1:date>. Both divisions advanced across minefields and
secured their initial objectives, beating back repeated counter-attacks at
various levels. In the process, they
suffered heavy casualties but made good progress, along with 36 Infantry Division
on the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:place></st1:city>
front. On 16 December they encountered very strong defences and a major tank
and infantry battle developed. At 1050 hours, two armoured regiments of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s 8
(Indep) Armoured Brigade launched a counter attack and a fierce tank-to-tank
battle ensued. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s 13
Lancers and 31 Cavalry lost a total of 30 tanks on the first day against ten
tanks lost by 17 Horse. The enemy counter-attack was beaten back and the
bridgehead was reinforced by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
16 (Indep) Armoured Brigade. The enemy launched
no less than six counter-attacks but all were repulsed. This battle later came
to be known as the Battle of Basantar.
Major Hoshiar Singh of 3 Grenadiers and Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal
of 17 Horse were awarded the PVC for gallantry of the most exceptional order,
the latter being posthumous.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">5</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 106%;">36 </span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-font-width: 92%;">Infantry Division <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">36 Infantry Division was to launch
its thrust from Landi and capture Shakargarh and Nurkot and to subsequently
capture Shakargarh. By the night of 7/8
December, 115 Infantry Brigade and 14 Horse were inducted into Lasian bulge. After capturing the border outposts on 8 December,
the troops captured Bakarwal, Hir, Dhadwal, Sadial, Karwal and Nargal on 9 December.
The bridgehead was enlarged and a class 40 bridge constructed the next day,
along with the capture of Kathel. On 11 December, Sultanpur and Nainakot were
captured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 11 December, 14 Horse commenced its advance towards the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Bein</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
Encountering minefields on the axes leading to Nurkot-Shakargarh, the regiment
carried out an outflanking move from the south towards Fatehpur Afghanan. By 1130 hours on 12 December, 14 Horse contacted the east bank of the Bein
River, but failed to cross it due to heavy tank, missile and artillery fire
from the west bank. However, Fatehpur Afghanan and Saroch Brahmanan were
secured by 10 Guards and 4 Guards respectively in the afternoon. By
the evening of 12 December, 14 Horse
was deployed in area Bisso Buzarg Saroch Brahmanan, securing both the northern
and southern flanks. In the 87 Infantry Brigade sector, 14 Rajputana Rifles
captured Garota and lkhlaspur. At this stage, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade and 1 Mahar joined 36 lnfantry Division through the
Lasian bulge. 87 Infantry Brigade group
was also placed under 36 Infantry Division and ordered to secure the east bank
of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Bein</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> along the axis
Ikhlaspur-Shakargarh. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">On 12 December, orders were issued for
crossing the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Bein</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>. 2 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade less one regiment was to effect a crossing in area Bisso-Buzarg, while 115 Infantry
Brigade and squadron 14 Horse was to hold the east bank of the river along axis
Nurkot-Shakargarh. However, 2 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade could not find a suitable crossing place. It was then decided to attack
Shakargarh on the night of 14/15 December.
The attack was launched by 87 and 115
Infantry Brigades but due to heavy shelling by the enemy, the attacking
battalions got disorganized and the attack did not materialize. In conjunction
with the operations of 36 Infantry
Division, 72 Infantry Brigade of 54 Infantry Division was to establish a road
block in area Km 38/39 on road
Shakargarh-Zafarwal, but this too did not happen. Once again, it was decided to
launch an attack on Shakargarh on the night of 17/18, but this became redundant
due to the cease fire on 17 December.<sup>6</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">X</span><span lang="EN-US">I CORPS </span><span lang="EN-US">OPERATIONS
IN <st1:place w:st="on">PUNJAB</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The state of <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
and the adjoining Ganganagar district of Rajasthan is strategically important
since an offensive by the enemy in this sector leads to the heartland of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and to
the capital city of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
It also has several important objectives close to the border such as Gurdaspur,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>,
Ferozepur, Fazilka, Abohar and Ganganagar. In addition, there are important
objectives in depth such as <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ludhiana</st1:place></st1:city> and Bhatinda. The defence of the sector was the
responsibility of XI Corps based in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
XI Corps had under it three infantry divisions, a sector headquarters and an independent
infantry brigade. 15 Infantry Division was responsible for the area between
Gurdaspur and the Grand Trunk (GT) Road opposite Amritsar; 7 Infantry
Division for the area between GT Road and
Ferozepur; 14 Infantry Division less a
brigade for the area between Ferozepur and Fazilka; 67 Infantry Brigade for
Fazilka and 51 (Indep) Parachute Brigade for the defence of Ganganagar. In
addition, 163 Infantry Brigade was
moved from Ladakh and made responsible for the defence of Suratgarh area.
Foxtrot Sector was responsible for the Fazilka-Ganganagar sector. 14 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade was also under command of the corps. 1 Armoured Division, the Army HQ
reserve, was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>,
with an advance headquarters at Kot Kapura. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Though <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> did not launch any major
offensive in this sector, nor did XI Corps undertake any major offensive enemy territory,
several important actions took place at Dera Baba Nanak, Ferozepur and Fazilka.
Apart from these, both sides took some minor actions in other places in order
to improve their defensive posture. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Battle</st1:place></st1:city>
of Dera Baba Nanak (15 Infantry Division)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">There was a bridge over the <st1:place w:st="on">Ravi</st1:place> near Dera Baba Nanak, where <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> had a
fairly large enclave on the south bank, for defence of the bridge. The enclave
was developed into a strong defensive position with pill boxes, wire and mines.
The responsibility for defence of the sector was with 86 Infantry Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier K. Gowrishankar, from the Corps of Signals. As soon as hostilities commenced, he was given
the task of eliminating the Pakistani enclave at Dera Baba Nanak. For this
purpose he was allotted 71 Armoured Regiment and 21 (Indep) Artillery Brigade.
He planned to carry out the operation by attacking from the flanks and the
rear. 10 Dogra and 71 Armoured Regiment less a squadron were to capture the
depth bund, rail bund, road bund and river bund from the east; 1/9 Gorkha
Rifles was to capture Dusi bund; and 1 Rajput with a squadron of 71 Armoured
Regiment was to subsequently to clear the Ranger posts at Kokhare and Sandhawan
Mardana. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Commencing it attack on the night of 5/6
December, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles captured Colonel's Hut by 0100 hours and 'T'
junction at 0600 hours. With the enemy's attention diverted, 10 Dogra launched
its attack at 0330 hours and captured its objectives after fierce fighting in
the early hours of 6 December. The enemy panicked and blew up the bridge over
the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ravi</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The enemy launched a counter
attack on the night of 6/7 December but was beaten back. Subsequently, 86
Infantry Brigade cleared all Pakistani posts on the southern and eastern side
of the river in the area. As a result of this operation, 86 Infantry made the
area secure against any Pakistani offensive. However, as the bridge was blown,
any scope for Indian troops launching an offensive to join with I Corps was lost.
Apart from these operations, a number of border posts and other useful areas
were captured by 15 Infantry Division in Ajnala, Fatehpur, Burj, Ranian, Attari
and Rajatal areas.<sup>7</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigadier<b> </b>Gowrishankar was awarded the MVC for this operation. (He later
became a lieutenant general and died in harness as Security Advisor to the
Government of Punjab). His photograph and citation are given below:- <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigadier
Krishnaswamy Gowrishankar was in command of 86 Infantry Brigade responsible for
the defence of Dera Baba Nanak on the western front during the Indo – Pak war 1971. His brigade was given the task of capturing a
well prepared and heavily fortified locality held in strength by the enemy.
Brigadier Krishnaswamy Gowrishankar showed boldness and originality in planning
of the brigade attack. During the attack
he was always in the forefront, directing operations and exercising personal
control, undeterred by heavy tank, medium machine gun and artillery fire. By his presence with the forward troops,
sharing their hardships and dangers, he not only inspired confidence but was
able to modify the plans to ensure speed and maintain momentum of the
attack. He displayed conspicuous
gallantry, outstanding leadership, personal bravery, great determination and
utter disregard to personal safety. His
skill and inspiring presence ensured success of this attack with heavy losses
to the enemy. For displaying exemplary
valour, leadership, professional skill of the highest order and utter disregard
to his personal safety Brigadier Krishnaswamy Gowrishankar was awarded the Maha
Vir Chakra. <o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">7 & 14 Infantry Divisions<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"> In
the 7 Infantry Division Sector, an Indian enclave across the headworks over the
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Sutlej</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> at Hussainiwala was held by 15 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. On the
evening of 3 December 3, the Pakistanis attacked the enclave after intense shelling.
The bridge was damaged and there were no tanks across the river. The CO, who was
on the eastern bank, did not go forward and lost control. The enemy was able to
overrun the position across the bridge though D Company fought gallantly. In
this sector another important area was the Sehjra bulge which was attacked and
captured by 1/5 Gorkha Rifles (FF). The
battalion crossed a river and attacked along the most difficult approach, taking
the enemy from the rear and achieving total surprise. 6 Mahar established road-blocks to cut off the
enemy’s route of withdrawal and 9 Sikh Light Infantry and 6 Mahar captured
adjoining posts. The operation was well executed
and any threat that the enemy could pose from the bulge was eliminated.<sup>8</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In the 14 Infantry Division sector, some
Pakistani enclaves south of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Sutlej</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> were eliminated and
some posts captured. These included Basti Anok, New Kishore, Donabetu, Peroke,
Kotsahu, Ghatti Bharola, Churka and Amin Bharisi. This division had only two brigades,
the third (58 Infantry Brigade) having been given to 15 Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Foxtrot Sector<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">In the Foxtrot Sector, a serious reverse
took place in the Fazilka area held by 67 Infantry Brigade. Pakistan had a
large enclave east of the Sutlej in the area of Suleimanke headworks, which not
only provided depth to the headworks but also enabled her to launch an
offensive into India if she so desired. 67 Infantry Brigade group of Foxtrot
Sector was responsible for the defence of Fazilka, a major town located nearby.
The main defences of the brigade were on
Sabuna distributary, well ahead of Fazilka and also in depth. One battalion (3 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>) was
responsible for the Sabuna distributary while the other two battalions were in
depth on the Sabuna drain. Covering troops comprising three companies of 3 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> were put
out ahead at Pakka, Right Guide Bund and Bridge guarding Amroha approach. The
main defences on Sabuna distributary and Sabuna drain were strong, comprising
concrete pill boxes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">On the evening of 3 December, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> shelled
the Indian positions and followed up with an attack by armour and infantry. In
the initial rush, they secured the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Beriwala</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> and got to the
Sabuna distributary on the flanks. When the enemy was getting behind their
positions, the covering troops fell back right on to Sabuna drain! In the ensuing
panic 3 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>
blew up all the bridges on the approaches to the Sabuna position. The enemy
pressed on and by 1930 hours secured a lodgment on the Sabuna drain, the depth
position. An immediate counter-attack was launched with a company of 4 Jat
supported by a squadron of 18 Cavalry on the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Beriwala</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
The tanks were bogged down and the Jats could only get a foot-hold on the eastern
side of the bridge. Some elements of 3 <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> were on the Sabuna distributor,
south of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Beriwala</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>. On 4 December, 4
Jat was subjected to heavy shelling and vacated their position, but later got
back to it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">There was considerable confusion and the
brigade suggested that it should fall back on the inner defences of Fazilka.
The Army Commander overruled this and ordered that the Sabuna drain position
would be held at all costs. On the night of 4/5 December, 4 Jat once again
attacked the Pakistani position but failed to capture it, though nine tanks
were lost. The brigade was reinforced by 3/11 Gorkha Rifles from 116 Infantry
Brigade and 115 Infantry Battalion (TA). The brigade commander was also
replaced. On 6 December, the divisional commander who had gone forward was
wounded but stayed on. 15 Rajput, who were relieved by 3/11 Gorkha Rifles,
launched a counter attack on night of 8/9 December, but did not succeed. 15
Rajput captured Muazzam post on the night of 11 December and Ghazi post on the
night of 13 December. However, the enemy launched a counter-attack and evicted the
Rajputs from their positions. The enemy counter attacked the position held by 4
Jat several times, but could not dislodge the Jats. It was later learned that the
Pakistanis planned to continue their attacks for capturing Fazilka, but the
cease fire on 17 December prevented them from doing this. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The reverse at Fazilka was attributable to
weak leadership and ineffective conduct of the battle. The large number of
casualties suffered - 189 killed, 425 wounded and 196 missing - did not justify
the results achieved. Although exaggerated reports indicated that two brigades
attacked the 67 Infantry Brigade position, in fact it was carried out by
elements of 105 (Indep) Infantry Brigade, which was the local Pakistani
formation responsible for the defence of the area. Apart from Fazilka, further south
near Nagi (opposite Jalwala headworks), there was a Pakistani intrusion, which
was cleared by 4 Para.<sup>9</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">OPERATIONS IN RAJASTHAN & SIND<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The border areas of Rajasthan and <st1:place w:st="on">Sind</st1:place> provinces of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> consist
of mostly desert terrain with very limited road and rail communications. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s Southern Command was
responsible for the area of Rajasthan and <st1:place w:st="on">Gujarat</st1:place>
with the exception of the Ganganagar sector of Rajasthan, which was the
responsibility of Western Command. It was appreciated that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> would
remain on the defensive in this sector and might only launch very limited
offensives in order to improve her defence posture. It was assessed that by
readjusting defences <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
could muster a force of a division less a brigade and a regiment of armour to
launch an offensive against either Jaisalmer or Barmer. Due to the difficult
terrain opposite <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city> not much was expected in these
sectors except local offensives. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Southern Command was responsible
for operations in the sector and an advance headquarters was set up at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city> for the purpose,
which had under it 11 and 12 Infantry Divisions for operations. 10 Para Commando battalion was also allotted for
special operations. Kilo and Kutch Sectors were responsible for
the defence of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> sectors respectively. These sectors
mainly had para military forces, though 13 Grenadiers, a camel battalion, was
allotted to Kilo Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Army Commander, Lieutenant
General G.G. Bewoor, planned to initially deploy a brigade each in the
Jaisalmer and Barmer sectors, to cover the concentration of the remainder of 11
and 12 Infantry Divisions from cantonments in the rear. Subsequently, the divisions
were to be prepared to launch offensive operations into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
territory. According to the plans, 12 Infantry Division was to advance on axis
Kishangarh--Rahimyarkhan, while 11 Infantry Division was to advance on the axis
Khokhropar-Gadra City-Naya Chor. The task given to 10 Para Commando was to raid
Chachro and Badin. Kilo and <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> sectors were
to carry out some local offensives, eliminate the enemy's border out posts and
improve their defensive posture. The firm bases were occupied by 26 October and
preparations completed by 3 December. After <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> carried out strikes at the
airfields at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>,
Utarlai and Barmer on 3 December, Southern Command was instructed to put its
plans into operation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11
Infantry Division<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11 Infantry Division started its
operations at last light on 4 December. Advancing from three directions, it captured
Ratok, Relnor and Mankor in the north; Kajlor, Vitala and Khokhropar in the
middle; and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place> and Khinsar in the south
by the evening of 5 December. Construction of a duck board track from Munabao
to Khokhropar and beyond towards Nayachor was started immediately. Concurrently,
work started on restoration of the railway track, which was found damaged in
places. Continuing its advance, the division captured Vasarabh, Sakana and
Parche ji Veri by last light on 7 December. The screen position opposite
Nayachor was pushed back on 10 December and Purbat Ali was contacted. This
position was strongly held by the enemy and an outflanking move by armour was
checked. Beyond this lay the Nayachor defences which were held by the better
part of a brigade. A deliberate attack was mounted on the Purabat Ali position
by the leading brigade and was captured after heavy fighting in the early hours
of 13 December. The enemy put in three successive counter attacks, but could
not recapture the position, suffering heavy casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11 Infantry Division contacted the
Nayachor defences on 15 December. Probing attacks and reports revealed that that
the position was strongly held, having been reinforced by a brigade and an armoured
regiment. Concurrent with the operations on the main axis, one brigade of 11
Infantry Division advanced in the south and captured <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
Kinsar, Dali, Chachro and Bagal by 10 December.<i> </i>One battalion was ordered to advance on axis Chachro-Umarkot,
to threaten the Nayachor defences from the south. The battalion captured Hingo
Thar about <st1:metricconverter productid="7 km" w:st="on">7 km</st1:metricconverter>
east of Umarkot on 16 December but
fell back on being counter attacked on the next day. In the north, 17
Grenadiers took over some of the captured areas and protected the approaches to
Miajar, although originally it was to advance on axis Relnor-Nayachor. The
attack on Nayachor could not be mounted due to the ceasefire on 17 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The performance 11 Infantry
Division during the operation was commendable. In spite of the extremely
difficult nature of the terrain which was devoid of communications and the
hazards involved, the division had advanced fairly deep into enemy territory
and posed a serious threat to the main enemy defences at Nayachor. Towards the end
of the operation, the division was reinforced by a brigade from 12 Infantry
Division, but it could not be utilized due to logistical problems involved and
shortage of time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12
Infantry Division<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The operations of 12 Infantry Division
started on the evening of 4 December and the leading brigade captured
Sakhirewalakot and Islamkot the same night. Next morning, a company of 23 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> deployed in the area of Longewala reported some
tank movement opposite its area. Subsequently, the air observation post of the division
reported a 20-kilometre long enemy armoured column moving on track Kharotar-Ghabbar.
The Pakistani column came quite close to the Longewala post and shelled it
heavily. The isolated company of 23 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> was
in a precarious position but held on to its defences in a most gallant manner.
The divisional commander called for immediate air strikes by the Indian Air Force,
which responded with alacrity and flew 11 air strike missions from first light
onwards, inflicting heavy casualties on Pakistani armour, vehicles and troops.
The enemy plans for advance to Jaisalmer via Ramgarh were thus completely
frustrated. The air strikes broke up the enemy advance, which could have
resulted in a serious rout for own troops in this area. As a result of the
enemy action, the Army Commander decided to give up his plans for the offensive
in this sector and instead go on the defensive and consolidate the position. 12
Infantry Division launched counter attacks on 8 December and cleared the enemy
from Kharotar by the evening. Sarkari Ka Tibba was captured by the next evening.
Thus, the entire area was cleared of the enemy. Later, it came to light that
the enemy had withdrawn from the area to his main defences.<sup>10</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">10 Para Commando raided Chachro on 7 December
and took a number of prisoners. Birawah was raided on 8 December and some
prisoners captured from there also. An ambush was laid on the track to Mithi, west
of Islamkot, and a number of enemy troops were killed or captured. However, he
raid on Badin originally planned was not carried out. Over all, the operations 10
<st1:place w:st="on">Para</st1:place> Commando of proved to be useful. The CO,
Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Bhawani Singh, was awarded a well deserved MVC for the
operation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">CEASE FIRE AND SIMLA
AGREEMENT<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">As soon as the war came to an end and <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> was liberated, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> unilaterally stopped
operations in the Western Theatre also on <st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">17 December 1971</st1:date>. Though <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> was in an
advantageous position to continue operations in the west by using forces
available from the east, she did not do so as she had no interest in capturing
and retaining any territory in <st1:place w:st="on">West Pakistan</st1:place>. She
also held about 93,000 Pakistanis as prisoners of war. After the cessation of
hostilities, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
proposed negotiations with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
through different channels, including the United Nations on <st1:date day="14" month="2" w:st="on" year="1972">14 February 1972</st1:date>. Although the
initial response of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was not positive, ultimately she agreed to talks at Simla. President Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met at and
Simla talks were held from 28 June to <st1:date day="2" month="7" w:st="on" year="1972">2 July 1972</st1:date>. After several rounds of talks and protracted
negotiations, an agreement was reached on the night of 2/3 July 1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">During the 1971 war, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> won a
decisive victory over <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and a new nation came into being. Apart from capturing almost a hundred
thousand prisoners the Indian Army had occupied several thousand square
kilometres of Pakistani soil in Ladakh. When the talks were held in Simla it
was expected that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
would be able to wrest some major concessions from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> and negotiate a permanent
solution to the <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place> problem.
Unfortunately, the Army was kept out of the negotiations and the Army Chief,
General Manekshaw was not consulted before or during the talks. Though Bhutto
and Indira Gandhi had informally agreed to accept the cease fire line in <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place> as the international border, this was not reduced
to writing. As a result, the military gains, achieved at great cost in human
lives, were frittered away. When the Prime Minister returned from Simla, she
told General Manekshaw about what had transpired during the meeting. Bhutto had
told her that he had recently taken over and was not in a position to take
major decisions. He needed more time and promised that in six months everything
would be done as she desired.<sup>11</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">In accordance with the terms of the Simla
Agreement, the process of delineation of the Line of Control was begun soon
afterwards. The Indian team was led by Lieutenant General P.S. Bhagat, VC,
GOC-in-C of the newly created Northern Command. The other members of the Indian
team were Major General M.R. Rajwade, Chief of Staff Northern Command and Major
General I.S. Gill, the Director of Military Operations at Army HQ. The
Pakistani team was led by Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan. The main task of
the teams was to delineate the Line of Control along the entire border in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state>. The
first meeting was held at Wagah, on <st1:date day="3" month="9" w:st="on" year="1972">3 September 1972</st1:date>. This was followed by others, at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>, on 28 November
and 7 December, between the two Chiefs, Sam Manekshaw and Tikka Khan. The final
meeting at which the Agreement was signed, took place on <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="1972">11 December 1972</st1:date> at Suchetgarh. After
the delineation agreement, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
returned 13,309 square kilometres of territory to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>, while she got back 916 square
kilometres of territory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US"> The
prisoners taken by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
were exchanged on <st1:date day="1" month="12" w:st="on" year="1972">1 December
1972</st1:date>. However, the withdrawal of troops of both sides had still not
taken place due to disagreement on the alignment of the Line of Control. There
was a deadlock due to conflicting claims of both sides over certain key areas,
including the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">village</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Thako Chak</st1:placename></st1:place> near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> and certain
features in Kaiyan, across the Tutmari Gali in <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>.
The enclave of Thako Chak in the Chicken's Neck had been occupied by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> during
the war. In the Kaiyan Bowl, a large area had been captured by an over
enthusiastic company of 9 Sikh, which was part of 19 Infantry Division. A small
hillock that had been reported as captured was discovered to be still held by
the enemy when cease fire was declared. The anomaly was discovered several
months later. To retrieve the situation, the divisional commander decided to
capture the feature. The strength on the feature was not correctly assessed and
the attack launched in May 1972 failed, with heavy casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">To resolve the issue, General Manekshaw flew
down to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city> and
had two meetings with his counter-part General Tikka Khan on 28 November and 7
December. Though the Prime Minister had authorised him to give up Thako Chak to
break the deadlock, General Manekshaw was not one to give up so easily.
Finally, he managed to get back Thako Chak, in return for some territory in
Kaiyan that was not as valuable. The withdrawal of troops commenced soon
afterwards and was completed by <st1:date day="20" month="12" w:st="on" year="1972">20 December 1972</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">SIGNALS IN WESTERN COMMAND DURING OPERATION ‘CACTUS
LILY’<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Western Command Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ Western Command was located at Simla in 1971. The
CSO was Brigadier J.S. Kalra, the other officers in the Signals Branch being
Lieutenant Colonel V. Balasubramaniam, SO 1 (Signals); Major Shivraj Kumar, SO
2 (Communications), Major Joginder Singh SO 2 (Staff Duties) and Captain
Vijay Chandra, SO 3 (Cipher & Signal Security). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By the middle of 1971, it was known
that operations for the liberation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> would be conducted
towards the end of the year. Plans for the operations in the Western Sector
began to be made concurrently with those in the Eastern Sector. The SO-in-C, Lieutenant General E.G
Pettengell and his deputy, Major General K.S. Garewal held several meetings
with the CSOs of Western and Southern Commands. They also visited the
formations that were likely to take part in the operations to find out their
problems at first hand. Unlike in the East, communications infrastructure in
West was well developed, especially after the 1965 war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. A
detailed assessment of the existing resources was carried out and steps taken
to make up shortages. Since almost every formation in the Army was likely to be
involved, there was little scope for diversion of resources or ‘milking’ units
in other sectors. To make up critical deficiencies in equipment, Ordnance and
production agencies such as Bharat Electronics Limited had to be tapped. The
shortages of manpower were made up by posting personnel from the STCs and
inter-unit transfers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As
in previous operations, the communications infrastructure of the P&T
Department was to form the backbone of signal communications, especially in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and Jammu & Kashmir. A large number of
additional circuits had to be hired and several new PL routes had to be
constructed. These required coordination and liaison with the P&T
authorities at the highest level. The Deputy SO-in-C, accompanied by the Deputy
Director Telecommunications, Brigadier M.S. Sodhi and Mr. Shenoy, a member of
the P&T Board visited each sector personally to take stock of the existing
resources. Decisions to augment the infrastructure such as PL, carrier centres
and exchanges were taken on the spot and demands placed on the P&T
Department, which reacted with commendable enthusiasm and alacrity. Wherever it
was felt that the P&T would not be able to provide the required assets in
time, it was decided to provide these from Army resources. If PL could not be
laid in time, alternate means of communications such as microwave or radio
relay was explored. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In mid October HQ Western Command
moved to its operational location at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
Static communications at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
were provided by Western Command Signal Regiment, part of which was moved from
Simla for this purpose. In addition, Western Command Mobile Signal Company was
moved from Ambala to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
to cater for radio relay communications. By the end of October, the subordinate
formations had also moved to their operational locations. Main HQ Western
Command was at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>;
I Corps at Samba; XI Corps at Kotkapura and XV Corps at Udhampur. The
communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and to subordinate formations were on line, using circuits hired from the
P&T Department. However, radio relay communications were established and
kept as stand by. <b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Western
Command Signal Regiment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Western Command Signal Regiment was
located at Simla, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ashutosh Kumar. The
other field officers in the unit were Major M.S Gujral (second-in-command);
Major B.K. Bhardwaj (1 Company); and Major H.G. Karkare (2 Company). The bulk of the unit was at Jutogh, where the
living accommodation and transmitters were located. The signal centre and
exchange were in Simla, alongside HQ Western Command, while the receiver
station was at Sanjauli.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="16" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">16 October 1971</st1:date>. The move included carriage of
all static signal equipment installed at the transmitter and receiver stations
at Jutogh and Sanjauli respectively. During the next few days, communications
for a full fledged command headquarters was set up at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. Radio links for radio telephony
and teleprinter working were established with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, Simla, Udhampur, Kotkapura, Samba,
Ambala, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
and Pathankot. A considerable amount of equipment was taken over from Z
Communication Zone Signal Regiment. This included six transmitters BC 610E, one
ET 4331and one RS 53. The forward links to the operational locations were kept
on listening watch, while the static links were used for clearance of traffic.
Radio silence was observed except for W-17 (RT net to Simla, Ambala,
Pathankot); W-18 (RTg net to Simla, Ambala, Pathankot); and A-37 (RTT link to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Speech
and teleprinter circuits were taken over from the P&T Department to the
operational locations of formations and several other communication centres. By
25 October the unit had taken over all communications at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> from Z Communication Zone Signal
Regiment, including the signal centre and exchange. A total of 12 teleprinter
and 39 speech circuits were functional. Equipment cipher line (ECL) was
transported from Simla to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
by helicopter and installed in the cipher office. To cater for the large number
of trunk lines additional trunk boards T43 were taken over from the P&T
Department. To ensure that communications were not disrupted due to enemy
action once the war started; alternate arrangements were made. An underground
operations room was wired up for eight telephones and five ECL positions. It
was tried successfully with the headquarters of the corps as well as with Army
HQ in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and
then handed over to the General Staff Branch. A dispersal hut was established
in which four transmitters were installed. External remote control lines from
transmitter hall to the dispersal hut were laid. In addition, diversity aerials were installed
for important radio links along with standby aerials. Standby power was
provided for the dispersal hut as well as the transmitter and receiver
halls. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
war started on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December
1971</st1:date>. Radio silence was broken at 1930 hours and all radio links
were activated. After the links had stabilised, they were closed down at <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time> with orders to outstations to
open on schedule and when line circuits fail. Thereafter all radio links worked
on schedule for two hours a day and two hours at night. For the first few days the line circuits
functioned well and there were no disruptions in communications. However, the
frequency on the link to Kotkapura was changed on 6 December, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> on 7 December, Samba on 8 December
and Udhampur on 9 December for security reasons. Strict blackout was observed
with black curtains fitted in the doors and windows of the signal centre. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The first break in line
communication occurred on 9 December when the coaxial system at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> was down for
almost the entire day. The Amritsar VFT system was also down for about two
hours in the evening. On 10 December the RTT circuit to Kotkapura was not
through and had to be changed to RTg after which it worked well. There was a
problem with the power supply on 11 December when the 3 phase 50 KVA voltage
regulator installed by the MES stopped functioning. The regulator was by passed
and the radio sets worked on standby generator until a new regulator was
installed next day. The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
line circuit also gave trouble on 13 December but the RT and RTT links
functioned well and there was no break in communications. The signal centre and
exchange were both heavily loaded and were handling about 1,75,000 traffic
groups and 3,000 calls every day. The highest traffic handled was and 3,336
calls on 13 December and 1,90,944 groups on 14 December. The war ended on 18
December after which normal routine was followed, with the radio links
continuing to work on schedule. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Western Command Signal Regiment was
a static unit, without the transport and equipment needed for a mobile role.
However, the unit rose to the occasion and moved from Simla to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> where the new command headquarters was
set up. A large quantity of equipment had to be moved, including transmitters,
exchanges and batteries from static installations. Especially commendable was
the role of the civilian switch board operators (CSBOs), many of whom were
women. Leaving their families behind, they volunteered to move to the war zone,
endured hardships such as separation from their children, crowded living
quarters and indifferent food. They also worked uncomplainingly for long hours,
often on two shift basis, ensuring that important calls were put through
without delay. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Western
Command Mobile Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Western Command Mobile Signal
Company was located at Ambala under the command of Major R.E. Colombowalla. On <st1:date day="17" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">17 October 1971</st1:date> the
company was ordered to move to its operational location at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
The move was completed by 21 October as ordered. Two radio relay
sections and one line carrier section were deployed at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. In addition independent
detachments were sent directly from Ambala to Dalhousie, Kasauli, Kotkapura,
Udhampur, Sambha, Bhatinda and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>.
By 0900 hours on 22 October, radio relay links were established between Main HQ
Western Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>,
HQ I Corps at Sambha, Main HQ XI Corps at Kotkapura, HQ XV Corps at Udhampur
and Rear HQ XI Corps at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>.
Relay stations were deployed at Dalhousie, Kasauli and Bhatinda. After
establishing communications the links were kept as standby to be opened on
orders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 7 November trials were conducted
for the integration of Army radio relay net work with P&T microwave
systems. The trials were carried from Pathankot to Dalhousie on radio relay and
Dalhousie to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
on microwave on an existing group. The equipment used was RS FM 200/C41 with
ACT (1+4)3A as channelling equipment. To
make this integration feasible some modifications were carried out on the ACT
(1+4)3A. On 14 November the modifications carried out were put into use and
final trials carried out. The circuit worked satisfactorily. The arrangement
was extended for all the four channels of the ACT (1+4)3A located at Dalhousie
and circuit extended to microwave station using 7 pair VIR of approximately 3½ </span><span lang="EN-GB">kilometres </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">with
an understanding with the P&T Department that in case of an emergency four
existing circuits from the microwave will be disconnected and patched on the
radio relay system.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After commencement of the
operations on 3 December the radio relay links functioned without any hitch. On
13 December the radio relay detachment at Bhatinda was ordered to move to Moga
in order to improve the speech level of the link and for better communications
with Main HQ XI Corps at Kotkapura. The new link was <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> – Kasauli – Moga – Kotkapura which
was found to be better than the one being used earlier. After the end of the
operations on 18 December the company continued to carry out trials for ECL
working on teleprinter circuits derived over radio relay between various
locations such as Sambha -<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>,
Sambha –Udhampur, Sambha – Kotkapura, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
– Udhampur, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
– Kotkapura and Udhampur – Kotkapura.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XV
Corps Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ XV Corps was at Udhampur in
1971. The CSO was Brigadier S.L. Juneja, while Lieutenant Colonel K. K. Tuli
and Major V.K. Puri were holding the appointments of SO1 (Signals) and SO 2
(Signals) respectively. The CSO drew up the signal plan for Operation ‘Cactus
Lily’ in consultation with all the commanders and staff. The plan was approved
by the Chief of Staff and discussed with the SO-in-C during the presentation
held on <st1:date day="15" month="9" w:st="on" year="1971">15 September 1971</st1:date>
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
The Deputy SO-in-C, Major General K.S. Garewal; Deputy Director
Telecommunications, Brigadier M.S. Sodhi and Mr. Shenoy, Member Operations, P & T Board, visited
Pathankot, Samba and Jammu on 21 and 22 October 1971. As a result of the
discussions held during their visit to 39 and 26 Infantry Divisions, several
important decisions were taken. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Based
on the Signals plan, which had been approved by the GOC, a signal instruction
was issued on <st1:date day="24" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">24 October
1971</st1:date>. Subsequently, the
SO-in-C, Lieutenant General E.G. Pettengell also visited HQ XV Corps, 10
Infantry Division and 19 Infantry Division from 15 to 18 November 1971, during
which he discussed the communications plans with the formation commanders, CSOs
and unit commanders. These visits proved extremely useful since on the spot
decisions were taken and implemented expeditiously. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During November 1971 several
measures were taken in preparation for the impending operations. Arrangements
were made to provide telephones and military trunk facilities to various
civilian officials and the control headquarters at various stations in Jammu
& Kashmir for close liaison with the formation and unit commanders to
regulate the affected civil population close to the border areas. To ensure
that radio discipline was maintained, special monitoring detachments from the
Central Monitoring Organisation were positioned at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>, Sunderbani and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>, in addition to the ‘I’ sections of
divisional signal regiments. All <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> cipher tables were withdrawn
from all brigades along with zonal linex from all battalions. Special
instructions were issued for safe custody and handling of documents. Ad hoc early warning radio nets were
established all along the border posts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio
silence was lifted on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4
December 1971</st1:date> when the operations commenced and all radio nets were
activated. During the entire operation, signal communications worked well in
the whole theatre. SITREPs (situation
reports) were cleared within three hours and other operational messages in less
than 18 hours. There was a sharp increase in message traffic, cipher traffic
and trunk calls. While the message traffic doubled from 1,20,000 to 2,50,000
groups, the cipher traffic increased more than
twenty times, from 2,000 to 45,000. The on-line cipher traffic on ECL
also rose from 2,000 to 12,000. As regards trunks calls, these registered a two
fold increase from 1,200 to 2,400. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio
and radio relay communications were extremely reliable and remained through at
all time. Line communications was
generally stable, except in 10 Infantry Divisional Sector, where the PL
suffered heavy damage due to intense enemy shelling even when the shells landed
at a considerable distance from the route.
A line construction section was inducted to continuously carry out
repairs on the route and restore communications on carrier quad which was
buried. Young officers and linemen did a commendable job in carrying these
tasks. The casualties sustained by Signals personnel in XV Corps Zone were not
inconsequential - five killed, two missing (later declared killed) and 15
wounded, including one officer.<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">XV Corps Signal Regiment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> XV Corps Signal Regiment was at Udhampur,
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.A. Newton, with Major N.B.
Phansalkar as his second-in-command. Other officers holding important
appointments were Major S.A. Rao (1 Company); Major S.K. Sikka (2 Company);
Major R.S. Jham (3 Company); Captain C.L. Kauldhar (HQ Company); Captain A.
Fotidar (adjutant); and Captain Iqbal Singh (quartermaster). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
October and November 1971 the unit carried out preparations in accordance with
instructions received from CSO XV
Corps. A large number of new speech and
telegraph circuits were taken over from the P&T Department viz.
Udhampur – Jammu Speech I & II (26 Infantry Division Main); Udhampur-Akhnur
Speech (10 Infantry Division Main);
Udhampur-Akhnur Bridge and Udhampur-Samba Speech. At the same time, a number of
circuits that were not required were handed back to the P&T Department.
These included Udhampur-Simla Speech I & II; Udhampur-Jammu (Airfield) and
Udhampur-Pathankot teleprinter circuits. Consequent to the move of Tactical HQ
XV Corps, the Signals element comprising one radio detachment and one signal
centre detachment was moved to Akhnur on <st1:date day="14" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">14 November 1971</st1:date>. One radio detachment also moved to Jindra to
provide communication on C-1 and C-2 links.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the operations from 4 to 17
December communications functioned without any break. During battle telephone
lines were damaged from enemy shelling and movement of own tanks. Though air support communications functioned
well, the non availability of crystals and adequate channels for the RS GU 734
was a constraining factor. Instances were reported of the enemy trying to join
our radio nets. There were also
instances where the enemy had got hold of our frequencies used by the Forward
Air Control (FAC) and directed our aircraft to our own positions. The air
support tentacles were issued with Rs 62, which was found to be bulky and
inhibited mobility. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">25
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">25 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was located at Rajauri under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.S.
Grover with Major S.C. Mehra as his second–in-command. Other officers holding
important appointments were Major Shri Krishan (1 Company); Captain J.S. More (2
Company); Captain Sudhir Kumar (3 Company); Captain A.G. Rajan (HQ Company);
Major A.K. Mahajan (93 Infantry Brigade), Major Hari Singh (80 Infantry
Brigade) and Major S.K. Seth (120 Infantry Brigade).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Preparations for the impending
operations had been going on for several months but the tempo increased in
November 1971, when the construction of underground splinter proof bunkers for
signal centre, crypto centre and carrier room commenced. Radio relay trials
from a new site within the unit were carried out and found successful. Dhanidhar Fort located on a hill across the valley at
Rajauri about <st1:metricconverter productid="4 km" w:st="on">4 km</st1:metricconverter> from the unit location
was planned to be used as a site for establishing radio relay repeaters and VHF
radio rebroadcast (RRB) station for the D1 and D1A links. To facilitate
extension of carrier tails and communication to the Fort, Second Lieutnant O.P.
Beniwal was tasked to carry out recconnaisance for laying of two pairs of PL
route from the divsional headquarters to the Fort on 22 November. The route was
laid the next day by utilising available
manpower including non combatants. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 30.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A
large number of PL routes were completed, linking important picquets in the
sectors of 80, 120 and 93 Infantry Brigades. After the induction of 33 Infantry
Brigade on 25 November, a number of new PL routes were constructed linking its
new location at Surankot with other formations and its own units. A large
quantity of radio equipment was received from the Central Ordnance Depot, 25
Infantry Division Ordnance Maintenance Company and 1 Signal Park. This included
several radio sets, line equipment and generators, which went a long way in
making up the unit’s deficiencies of these critical items. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 27.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 3 December the speech link to 10
Infantry Division was disconnected as the formation moved forward. All radio
links including tentacles were activated at 2200 hours and kept on listening
watch. During the night heavy enemy shelling in Punch and Naushera disrupted
line communication to and within 93 Infantry Brigade. All trunk lines near traffic
control post at Punch were destroyed. Telephone lines were also cut by
infiltrators near <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kalai</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The lines
were patched with field cable. A line party under
Havildar Murari carried out repairs of lines under difficult conditions and put
through the Punch -Mandi trunk line during the night. Second Lieutenant
Hoshiyar Singh with a line party went to Jhangar base for maintaining lines in
that area.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 27.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;">On 5 </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">December a radio relay link was established with 33 Infantry
Brigade by positioning the terminal at
Jarnawaligali and extending link tails to the brigade headquarters location at
Surankot. Line detachments were positioned at Thanamandi and at Narian for
maintenance of the PL routes to Surankot and Tarala-Keri village respectively.
An additional commitment given to the unit was to cater for communications to
the Mike Sector that was created at Mandi comprising two units of Jammu &
Kashmir Militia, and one each of the Border Security Force and the Indo Tibetan
Border Police. A signal detachment under a JCO equipped with radio sets,
telephones, cable and a 10 line exchange was sent in two vehicles provided by 93
Infantry Brigade Signal Company for this purpose. For operations in Thanpir area by
13 Mahar communications were established by 33 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
on line as well as radio. Lines from Punch to Banwat were cut by three civilians believed to be Pak agents. They were were caught by linemen and handed
over to the Police. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
6 December a line detachment was sent from
Rajauri to Naushera for maintaining the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Tarala-Siot Bridge PL</st1:address></st1:street> route. In Punch, the local lines disrupted due to heavy shelling were
repaired and put through ensuring no major breakdown in line
communication. Construction work on new
PL routes was stopped and line resources were diverted for maintenance of
existing PL and field cable routes. In Naushera a line party led by an officer was sent from 80 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company to regulate the Jhangar-Kalsian base route. Non Schedule
Despatch Service with a protection party from brigade resources carrying
important messages was sent by OC 80 Infantry Brigade Signal Company to 425
Medical Battalion, 214 Transit Camp and Supply Company. On 7 December another field cable route was laid between Mandi and
Thanpir to provide communications to 13 Mahar. In Naushera a line party of 80 Infantry Brigade Signal Company was
sent to FDC to restore the lines damaged due to shelling.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
view of increase in communication commitments as a result of induction of
additional troops, the unit asked for additional equipment which was loaned by
other units under orders of CSO XV Corps. On 9 December five radio sets AN/PRC – 25 , (including two with booster) and <st1:metricconverter productid="10 km" w:st="on">10 km</st1:metricconverter> of cable was sent to 93
Infantry Brigade Signal Company for the attack
by 21 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
and 9 Rajputana Rifles. Some additional manpower made avilable by Y
Communication Zone Signal Regiment was also sent to the signal company. The CO flew
by helicopter to Punch to tie up communications details for offensive operation
of 93 Infantry Brigade that was to be launched on night of 10/11 December 1971.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
10 December line parties of 93 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company were positioned at Jhalas and Jhoola bridge for quick
rectification of faults due to enemy shelling during offensive operations of 21
Punjab. In Rajauri a line party led by an
officer was sent to <st1:place w:st="on">Upper Krishnaghati</st1:place> to
maintain trunk lines during an offensive operation for capture of Jungle Tekri
area. Mike Sector, which had started functioning at Mandi was provided
extensive communications on radio as well as line, from the divisional as well
as brigade headquarters, apart from cipher cover. Naib Subedar Gian Chand was made responsible for signal communications at
HQ Mike Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;"> In
</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Upper Krishnaghati, Tactical HQ 33 Infantry Brigade moved forward and was terminated on the 9 Rajputana Rifles exchange. Communication details were tied up so that 33
Infantry Brigade could take over the operational control of Krishnaghati sector in case Punch sector was
threatened by the enemy. Line
communications was also provided to Tactical HQ 33 Infantry Brigade from Punch as well as Bhimbergali through 13 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> & Kashmir
Militia. Radio relay from Rajauri was provided by establishing a terminal at <st1:place w:st="on">Upper Krishnaghati</st1:place>. Net radio communications was provided
on the D-1 net, as well as the B-1 net of 93 Infantry Brigade, with another one
to one link to Surankot.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;">After the capture
of Jungle Tekri by 21 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> on 11 December,
lines were extended and kept through inspite of heavy shelling by a line party
led by Second Lieutenant Ravindra Singh. In </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bhimbergali
lines from T Junction to Krishnaghati came under
heavy shelling and were broken at several places. A line party from 120 Infantry <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;">Brigade was sent and repaired all
lines during the night. Three more line parties from 120 Infantry Brigade were
sent to maintain PL routes from Balnoi to FDLs
which were heavily shelled by the enemy. In </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Naushera
a line was damaged due to heavy shelling on the
night of 10/11 December in 80 Infantry
Brigade Sector. A line party under
Second Lieutenant Hoshiyar Singh repaired all the lines. Tactical HQ 80 Infantry
Brigade was established at a forward location.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
12 December Tactical HQ 33 Infantry Brigade
moved back to Surankot. In Naushera, line parties from the unit were sent
to lay lines for the impending offensive in 80 Infantry
Brigade Sector. The early warning link in the divisional sector taken over by
Air Force personnel, who were given two radio sets AN/PRC-25 for this purpose.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 13 December Colonel Grover proceeded to Bhimbergali and Surankot
alongwith the divsional commander to tie up communications for the attack by 14
Grenadiers. Due to heavy shelling by the enemy during the afternoon local lines
in Punch town were disrupted. All lines were repaired and communication
restored by 1600 hours by line parties of
93 Infantry Brigade. In Bhimbergali an additional radio set on
D-1 was opened at Tactical HQ 120 Infantry
Brigade for the attack at Daruchian.
Another set was kept on listening watch on the forward net of 14
Grenadiers. In addition, B-1A link was opened with 14 Grenadiers, with the two flanking battalions on listening watch.
In Naushera a line detachment ex 1
Company was sent for establishing line communications from Tactical HQ 80
Infantry Brigade for the impending attack. To cater for the operation in
Daruchian by 14 Grenadiers, a 10-line exchange was set up for the brigade tactical headquarters from
where PL was available to Bhimbergali
and Balnoi. Field cable was also laid to
14 Grenadiers exchange and a line to the artillery brigade exchange at T
Junction.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
14 December trials were conducted to patch up 10
Infantry Division on radio relay. At Naushera
additional divisional radio links were
established with Tactical HQ 80 Brigade
at FDL 546 for the impending offensive. Enemy shells fell in the MT park of 93
Infantry Brigade Signal Company at Moti Mahal and one shell hit the zero pole
near the central battery exchange. Many
lines were disrupted due to shelling but
were quickly restored by line parties.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
15 December the CO accompanied the GOC to HQ 80
Infantry Brigade for tying up communications for the attack. In Naushera,
Second Lieutenant Hoshiyar Singh and Subedar
Swaran Singh with linemen reached Kalsian base. They set up two
10-lines exchanges, an ad hoc air
support tentacle and line communications with Rajauri. Radio communications were established by
positioning the GOC’s Rover Group at Advance Tactical HQ 80 Infantry Brigade,
which was to come up as an out station on the divsional HF and VHF nets. In Bhimbergali
a radio detachament (C11/R210 and AN/PRC 25)
from 120 Infantry Brigade Signal Company accompanied 6/11 Gorkha Rifles for the
attack in 80 Infantry Brigade sector. Five officers joined the unit from
the signal officers’ degree engineering (SODE) courses which had been
terminated due to Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. They were Captains A.G. Rajan, J.S. More, N. Kumar, P.K. Sehgal and Raj
Seth. With Major P.P.S. Yadav having joined a day earlier, the strength of
officers saw a substantial increase. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
16 December CSO XV Corps, Brigadier S.L. Juneja
visited 80 Infantry Brigade, accompnaied by Colonel Grover. The FDC was
established at Kalsian for 80 Infantry Brigade’s attack. Line communications to the advance FDC was
provided by extending one of the support circuits derived from channelling
equipment working between advance tactical headquarters at FDL 546 and the
tactical headquarters of 80 Infantry Brigade. For the advance tactical
headquarters, two speech circuits were provided with tactical headquarters at
Naushera. One speech was on direct line
while the second speech circuit was derived from channelling equipment. Line communications were provided for
locations of all battalions which were to take part in the attack. ‘B’ Echelon
was established at Fort Hill of Kalsian base with full communication set
up. Second Lieutenant O.P. Beniwal with
a line party of 11 linemen was sent to 80 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
to assist in line communications for ‘B’
Echelon and the impending offensive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 17 December the unit received
the sad news of two fatal casualties that occurred in Naushera. Havildar Roshan Lal and Naik Inder Singh of 80
Infantry Brigade Signal Company were killed due to a direct hit from an enemy
shell at 1320 hours when restoring line communication at advance tactical
headquarters. Soon afterwards the operations came to an end and a cease fire
came into effect. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The excellent performance of 25 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment during
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ was commended by commanders as well as staff. This was
due to advance planning, attention to detail and the high level of motivation
of all personnel, the credit for which should go to the CO, his team of
officers and the dedicated JCOs and OR of the unit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was at Pathankot under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.
Balachandran. The other field officers in the unit were Major R.S. Anand (second-in-command),
Major M.S. Yadav (1 Company) and Major A.K. Mishra (2 Company). The officers in the brigade signal companies
were Major Vishnu Haritats (28 Brigade); Major A.S. Sandhu (191 Brigade); Major
Vinod Kumar (52 Brigade); Major H. P. Singh (68 Brigade) and Captain P.K
Sharma (10 Artillery Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit mobilized for operations
and moved to Akhnur on <st1:date day="12" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">12
October 1971</st1:date>. On arrival at the new location the unit established a
signal centre and exchange, on which local and trunk lines were terminated.
Speech circuits on line were available to Udhampur, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>, 28 and 191 Infantry Brigades, 10
Artillery Brigade and 61 Engineer Regiment. In addition a teleprinter circuit
was available to HQ XV Corps at Udhampur and telegraph circuits to the two
infantry brigades. Over the next couple of days, hotlines were provided to both
infantry brigades and the artillery brigade. Lines were also laid to 26 and 25
Infantry Divisions. Radio relay trials
were carried successfully with Udhampur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On <st1:date day="3" month="11" w:st="on" year="1952">3 November, 52</st1:date> Infantry Brigade which had moved
to the operational area from its permanent location at Dalhousie a day earlier
was provided communication on line. On 5 November the CO, Lieutenant Colonel V.
Balachandran, proceeded on a route reconnaissance from Khunda to Chhamb and on
wards along the road to Manavar and Barsala. He was accompanied by Major M.S
Yadav, OC 1 Company and Captain U.P. Sangwan, in charge of the line detachment. Next morning the line detachment comprising
13 linemen under Captain Sangwan commenced laying carrier quad cable and
completed up to 11-K</span><span lang="EN-GB">ilometre</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
milestone towards Chhamb. The cable had
to be buried at certain places. Continuing its work next day, the detachment built
overhead cable across Lokhikhad utilizing electric poles and ballies and
reached </span><span lang="EN-GB">square K</span><span lang="EN-GB">ilometre </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9. On 8 November the cables were
laid overhead from K</span><span lang="EN-GB">ilometre</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
9 up to village Palanwala. The same day
the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> –
Akhnur H-1 system was established. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cable laying continued during the
next few days. One channel to Udhampur was connected from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> on microwave and from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> to Akhnur on the H-1 system.
Communications were extended to 2 (Indep) Armoured Squadron and 510 ASC
Battalion from Rakhmuthi. During the night of 11/12 November two line
detachments, working under the command of Major R.S. Anand, laid <st1:metricconverter productid="28 km" w:st="on">28 km</st1:metricconverter> of carrier quad
cable. The two detachments, one from the
unit and the other from XV Corps Signal Regiment, comprised 20 linemen and two
officers, Captain Sangwan and Second Lieutenant S. Bhatnagar. They built six
cables from Khunda to Palanwala.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Throughout the month of November
the unit remained busy on tasks aimed at improving the communication
network. On 2 December the reconnaissance
and layout group of the main divisional headquarters left for the new
operational location along with arrangements for step up communications. Next
day, the step up signal centre was established at the new location. By the end
of the day communications on line had been extended to HQ XV Corps, 52 and 191
Infantry Brigades, 10 Artillery Brigade and the rear divisional headquarters.
The M3 group of the main divisional headquarters moved to the new location
during the night. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 3 December, after war was declared,
a radio relay detachment was despatched to 191 Infantry Brigade. All radio
links were activated and kept open during the night. Three line parties, each
under an officer, were organised to carry out repairs on lines as soon as they
occurred. Captain Varma of XV Corps Signal Regiment was made responsible for
lines to XV Corps and lines on the southern axis; Second Lieutenant Bhatnagar for lines on the
northern axis; and Second Lieutenant Vohra for patching forward lines from
Anderwar to the new location. Due to enemy shelling, there were frequent
breaks in lines to HQ 191 Infantry Brigade and 10 Artillery Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 4 December radio relay communications were through
with 28 and 191 Infantry Brigades.
However, the link with 191 Brigade was disrupted at 1600 hours when the
generator was hit by enemy shelling which also damaged the vehicle. Lance Naik
R.K.R. Kurup who was in the vehicle was seriously
injured and later succumbed to his injuries. There was another fatal casualty
at about 2000 hours when Signalman T.R. Sharma 191 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company was killed due to enemy shelling. At 2100 hours a spare radio relay detachment
was despatched to HQ 191 Infantry Brigade. However, it could not cross the River
Manawar Tawi due to enemy fire and had to return. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At 0700 hours on 5 December Major
R.S. Anand left for HQ 191 Infantry Brigade with a step up D1, a radio set on
commanders’ net and a spare radio relay terminal via the northern axis.
However, he could not proceed as <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Mandiala</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> was with the
enemy. He joined the GOC at Lam at 1000
hours and proceeded to HQ 191 Infantry Brigade at 1600 hours. The radio relay link
was finally through at 0330 hours on 6 December and the GOC spoke to the
brigade commander. The lines to HQ 191 Brigade and 10 Artillery Brigade were
frequently interrupted during the night due to enemy shelling and line parties
worked round the stock. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Next morning, Major Anand left HQ
191 Brigade with the step up D1 and radio relay terminal. The radio relay
vehicle got stuck near Chhamb and could not be recovered. Colonel Balachandran
left for HQ 191 Brigade with AN/PRC 25 sets but could not cross the bridge
which was under observed enemy fire. He proceeded on foot along Chhamb crossing. The line to 191 Brigade was put through
and the GOC spoke to the brigade commander from FDC. At 2000 hours HQ 191 Brigade started
withdrawing from Chhamb to Anderwal. The
brigade signal company destroyed crypto material before withdrawal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 8 December carrier quad was laid
to Troti to replace the WD-1 which had been laid earlier. Two speech circuits provided to 10 Artillery
Brigade were put through at 1400 hours. At about 1600 hours the line party
under Havildar Khan which was carrying out maintenance of the line to 68
Infantry Brigade came under heavy enemy shelling. Their jeep was hit and went
up in flames. The line party continued to
work and put through the line. The CO and CSO XV Corps, who were then visiting
HQ 68 Infantry Brigade, met the line parties a few minutes later. Shortly afterwards, the radio relay link to
HQ 68 Infantry Brigade was through and tails were extended to the exchange. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At 0600 hours on 9 December
frequencies were changed for all radio links. The line parties under Captain
Sangwan and Havildar Khan were positioned permanently at Khunda for maintenance
of 68 Infantry Brigade lines. Hotlines were provided to 68 and 52 Infantry
Brigades and 10 Artillery Brigade. Two more speech lines were put through to 10
Artillery Brigade on the southern axis PL route. In addition, laterals between all three
brigades were provided. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On <st1:date day="10" month="12" w:st="on" year="1957">10 December, 57</st1:date> BSF battalion was netted on
D-1A link. The CO proceeded on northern axis to provide communications for the
combat group consisting of a squadron of the Central India Horse and a company
of 7 Grenadiers. On 11 December, Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment started
laying carrier quad between main divisional headquarters and 68 Infantry
Brigade on the northern axis. A tentacle vehicle with 68 Brigade was destroyed
by enemy shelling. On 12 December a
lateral line between 52 and 68 Brigades was provided on PL on the southern
axis. The carrier quad cable laid by Y Communication Zone from the main
divisional headquarters to 68 Brigade was also put through. Five officers
joined the unit on 15 December from CME and MCTE, where the courses had been
terminated in view of the war. However, operations ended the next day on 16
December. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">26 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Before the commencement of
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, 26 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>, under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel K.P.G. Kurup. The second-in-command was Major A.C.
Sikand, the other field officers being Majors V.C Waie and B.P Sehgal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Early in November 1971 the main
divisional headquarters was at Beli – Charana, while the rear headquarters was
at Bahuwali Rakh. Speech circuits from the main divisional signal centre on
line were provided to 19, 36 and 162 Infantry Brigades, 26 Artillery Brigade
and 3 (Indep) Armoured Brigade, in addition to HQ XV Corps and flanking
formations viz. 10 Infantry Division and 54 Infantry Brigade. Telegraph circuits to all brigades were on
fullerphone, while a teleprinter circuit was provided to the corps signal centre.
Radio relay links had been established to 19 and 162 Infantry Brigades, 3
(Indep) Armoured Brigade and HQ XV Corps. However, they were seldom used as the
line circuits were stable and breaks in communication did not last long. Radio nets had also been established but
complete radio silence had been imposed after <st1:date day="2" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">2 October 1971</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 15 November the SO-in-C visited
the unit. He was accompanied by CSO XV Corps and two staff officers from
Signals Directorate. Around this time
there were changes in the order of battle. 3 (Indep) Armoured Brigade was
placed under command 10 Infantry Division, while Y Sector was placed under
command 36 Infantry Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 0800 hours on 3 December the
GOC in his morning conference said that an intercepted message indicated that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> may
soon launch a pre-emptive strike. Later in the day it was learned that
Pakistani aircraft had attacked airfields at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> and Pathankot. The following actions
were immediately taken:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ 3 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade moved to area Karanbagh. Speech
and telegraph circuits were provided by reorienting existing PL.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ 36 Infantry Brigade
moved forward and to Bishnah. Communications were provided by extending PL on
field cable from Gidar Galian to Bishnah and extending one line by Pindi route.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ 162 Infantry Brigade
moved to area Ranbir Singh Pura. Speech
and telegraph circuits were extended on copper routes constructed earlier.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8 Cavalry moved to area
Sunderpur and was placed under the armoured brigade. A line was provided to 8
Cavalry from 162 Infantry Brigade Exchange.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At about 0915 hours on 4 December,
there was an air raid on <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
air field. However, no damage was caused. After last light, 19 Infantry Brigade
moved to its concentration area for Operation ‘Glow Worm’, the code name for
the capture of Chicken’s Neck. The brigade headquarters moved to area
Kirpalpur. Speech circuits for operations room and exchange were extended on
physical lines to the new location. Second Lieutenant Suraj Bhan with one line
party was sent to 19 Infantry Brigade to assist in laying lines for the
operation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Next
morning the CO personally went to the location of HQ 19 Infantry Brigade to
coordinate the communications for Operation ‘Glow Worm’. He met the brigade commander and discussed
the communication arrangements, including those for infantry tank cooperation.
The attack on Chicken’s Neck was launched at 2000 hours by 19 Infantry Brigade
along with 4 Dogra (36 Infantry Brigade), one commando group from 9 Para
Commando and a squadron of 8 Cavalry. The GOC’s rover group was also at Kirpalpur
with the brigade headquarters, for which a telephone line was extended from the
brigade exchange. Radio was opened and kept on continuous listening watch. Radio relay was also opened for artillery
communications for fire support and as standby to lines.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
operations continued throughout the night. Next morning at about 0730 hours a
combat air patrol (CAP) consisting of two Hunter aircraft were in position over
Chicken’s Neck. Air support
communications were satisfactory and a GU 734 was provided to monitor
transmissions between the pilots and the ground troops. At about 0800 hours
four enemy Sabres appeared over the divisional headquarters and a dog fight
with own aircraft ensued. The enemy
aircraft fired rockets and machine guns but could not cause any damage. At
about 0900 hours the CO left for 19 Infantry Brigade to supervise the build-up
of line communications to the battalions advancing in Chicken’s Neck. For the
next couple of hours there was a flurry of calls from GOC XV Corps, and also the
<st1:place w:st="on">COS</st1:place> and BGS, which were put through to the
divisional commander. Fortunately, lines to HQ 19 Infantry Brigade remained
stable and there were no breaks in communication. But circuits remained busy
throughout and more than 80 calls were cleared in the exchange. At about 1830
hours information was received that area Chicken’s Neck had been captured and
mopping up operations were in progress.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
7 December there were reports of heavy enemy pressure in 10 Infantry Division
sector and sounds of intense artillery firing could be heard at Main HQ 26 Infantry
Division. Line communications from HQ 19
Infantry Brigade were extended to 11 Guards, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles and 3/5 Gorkha
Rifles in Chicken’s Neck. The line
laying was seriously hampered by sporadic enemy shelling and intense air
activity. Furthermore, the battalions
did not indicate clearly their locations, which changed frequently. Soon after the lines had been laid, 7/11
Gorkha Rifles and 3/5 Gorkha Rifles moved out of Chicken’s Neck area rendering
the line effort redundant. In area
Chicken’s Neck the only remaining battalion of 19 Infantry Brigade, 11 Guards, had
moved company groups to various ferry crossings on River Chenab, with the
battalion headquarters located at Khoje
Chak. In view of the distances involved
following steps taken to provide line communications in the area:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One line party was
requisitioned from Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment to lay carrier quad
cable between Alfa Chanor and Phuklian over a distance of <st1:metricconverter productid="11 kilometres" w:st="on">11<span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 92%;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter>.
For this purpose, <st1:metricconverter productid="15 kilometres" w:st="on">15<span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 92%;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter></span><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">quad
cable was issued from the ‘C’ Section of the unit to the battalion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One pair of this
carrier quad was connected to 11 Guards at Khoje Chak by patching on enemy PL. The second pair of the carrier quad was put
through to the battery of 176 Field Regiment near Phuklian in order to provide
communication to HQ 26 Artillery Brigade at Anorian Rakh. From Alfa Chanor to the battalion
headquarters the carrier quad was extended on existing PL.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Three line parties from
‘C’ Section were given to 19 Infantry Brigade Signal Company for laying lines
in area Chicken’s Neck. One of these
parties under Second Lieutenant Suraj Bhan was located with 11 Guards to lay
lines to forward ferry sites with the help of the battalion signal platoon. The
distance from the battalion headquarters to these sites varied from 10 to <st1:metricconverter productid="15 kilometres" w:st="on">15 <span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter></span><span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">and
was clearly beyond the capability of battalion signallers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ 26 Artillery Brigade
was connected to 19 Infantry Brigade by reorienting the existing border PL Allamaidi
- Kothi – Makhwal Khaika– Chanor – Kirpalpur.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the next few days own and
enemy air was very active. Numerous
aircraft flew over the divisional sector at low level going to and from 10
Infantry Divisional sector. Line communications were sometimes disrupted but
were quickly restored. On 10 December noise of intense artillery shelling was
heard from 10 Infantry Divisional sector. There were a large number of
telephone calls to HQ 26 Infantry Division for dispatch of reinforcements to 10
Infantry Division from HQ XV Corps as well as the concerned division and
brigades. Line communications to 10 Infantry Division from Akhnur CB exchange
were also disrupted. Fresh cipher documents were sent to all infantry brigades
through Second Lieutenant V.F. D’Souza and Second Lieutenant Jagdish Singh. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 11 December at about 1300 hours
four Sabre aircraft bombed and strafed the air field and surrounding
areas. However, there was no damage to
personnel or installations. At 1400 hours HQ 168 Infantry Brigade was warned
for move to 10 Infantry Division. On the
request of OC 168 Infantry Brigade Signal Company for a second officer, Second
Lieutenant V.F. D’Souza was sent. He reported to the company within two hours
of the request being made. At 2300 hours, the orders for move of 168 Infantry
Brigade were cancelled.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 12 December Central <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> Horse and
two companies of 7 Grenadiers rejoined from 10 Infantry Division. The same day
the cipher officer, Captain R.S. Nair, visited Chicken’s Neck. Earlier, some
cipher documents of Pak Rangers had been found hidden in the fields. These were
collected and brought back by Nair and later sent to CSO XV Corps after
obtaining the GOC’s verbal approval.
Later these documents were sent to Army HQ by special courier. HQ 39
Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the left flank and communications
were reoriented. On 13 December <st1:metricconverter productid="6 kilometres" w:st="on">6 <span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter>
of carrier quad cable was laid between Andrian Rakh and Ranbir Singh Pura to
extend the carrier quad cable to 162 Infantry Brigade as an alternative to
PL. Lateral communications between 162
Infantry Brigade and 26 Artillery Brigade were established. The forward PL to 19 Infantry Brigade was
terminated on 162 Infantry Brigade exchange. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 14 December five officers joined the unit from the CME
and MCTE where they were undergoing the degree engineering course. They were
Captains Shaktawat, Aggarwal, Rajan, Bareja and Grewal. Aggarwal was posted to
26 Artillery Brigade Signal Section to take over from Captain S.K. Budhwar. Second Lieutenant Jagdish Singh and Captain Bareja
were posted to 36 and 162 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies respectively as
seconds-in-command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 16 December at about 0800 hours
a transmission between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> was
monitored regarding surrender of Pak forces in <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place>. Soon afterwards it was officially learned that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> had
announced a unilateral cease fire from 2000 hours on <st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">17 December 1971</st1:date>. During Operation
‘Cactus Lily’, signal communications functioned well in spite of extended
ranges and wide dispersion of troops. Disruptions to lines caused due to
frequent moves and redeployment of armour and artillery were speedily
rectified. The capture of Chicken’s Neck was a very important victory for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Thanks
to advance planning and relentless efforts put in by all personnel of 26
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, communications during the operation were
excellent. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Cable being reeled up from Chicken’s Neck Sector,
1972.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was located in Leh, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.R.
Visvanathan, with Major B.P. Mamgain as the second-in-command. The other field
officers in the unit were Majors </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">R.P.S.
Rathore, S.K. Dhawan and N.C. Daspal. The role of </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3
Infantry Division in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ was mainly defensive, since no
major operations were conducted in this sector. A brief resume of the
activities of the unit during the period are given in the succeeding
paragraphs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="1" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">1 November 1971</st1:date>, Tactical
HQ 3 Infantry Division was established at Kargil, alongside HQ 121 (Indep)
Infantry Brigade. The Signals element sent with the tactical headquarters
consisted of one officer and 20 OR, along with necessary transport and
equipment. Shortly afterwards, 163 Infantry Brigade Signal Company moved out to
take part in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ under F Sector. The communication commitments at the location
of 163 Infantry Brigade were taken over by 3 Artillery Brigade Signal Company.
To supplement its strength, five OR were sent from the unit to man the signal
communications at Upshi. The Ladakh Scouts Signal Company also moved out from
its permanent location along with HQ Ladakh Scouts, which was converted into an
infantry battalion and placed under command HQ 3 Artillery Brigade. The signal
communications at Karu complex were taken over by a detachment of one JCO and
fifteen OR provided by the unit. The detachment of 2 Company, 1 Air Support Sig
Regiment that was attached to the unit was withdrawn and joined its parent unit,
leaving behind five OR.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 5 November a teleprinter circuit
was opened with Udhampur and RTT timings were extended to clear extra traffic.
Apparatus VFT 3 channel duplex was installed on HI system to provide telegraph
circuits Leh – Udhampur and Leh – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>.
Radio relay trials were conducted with Tangtse, with relay stations at Shakti
and Changla. After a visit by the CO to Kargil on 1 December it was decided to
increase the strength of the Signals complement at the divisional tactical
headquarters. Accordingly, Major Rathore was despatched to Kargil with 18
additional personnel on 5 December. A radio detachment that had been sent to
5/3 Gorkha Rifles was also ordered to move to Kargil. On 7 December the signal
centre at Kargil came under heavy enemy shelling. One 3-ton lorry (Shaktiman)
was destroyed by enemy shells. On 8 December one JCO and ten OR were sent from
the unit to take over signal communications at Gaik complex from 70 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company, which was to be kept in operational readiness.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Apparently
the number of personnel looking after the signal communications at Kargil was
still inadequate. On 9 December Major Mamgain, Second Lieutenant D.S. Pathak
and 15 OR moved to Kargil to supplement the resources of 121 (Indep) Infantry Brigade Group Signal Company. To
meet the communication requirements during operations the D1 and D2 nets were
split into three nets, two being controlled from the tactical headquarters at
Kargil and the third from the main headquarters at Leh. The out stations on D1A
and D2A, controlled from Kargil, were 70 Infantry Brigade, 121 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade and Partapur Sector, along with the main divisional headquarters. D1B,
controlled from Leh, had outstations at 14 Infantry Brigade, 3 Artillery
Brigade and 30 Light Regiment, which was at the permanent location of 70
Infantry Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
12 December Major S.K. Dhawan reported arrival on posting from MCTE, Mhow. Two
days later, additional strength of one JCO and seven OR moved to Kargil. The
signal centre at Kargil was taken over by 3 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment and J Communication Zone Signal
Regiment from 121 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Group Signal Company, which was relieved so that it could concentrate
on its forward communication responsibilities. The same day Signalman Nirmal
Singh who was part of the radio detachment attached to 5/3 Gorkha Rifles was
injured by a bullet when the battalion was putting in an attack. On 18 December
Colonel R.A. Bhola, DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh visited Kargil. By this time the
operations were over and a cease fire had been announced<b>. <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
was located at Baramula, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D.K. Vaidya. Other officers holding important
appointments were Major K.S. Nair; Captain S.N. Chatterjee (1 Company)
and Captain S.S. Dahiya (2 Company). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Due
to wide dispersal of the division even in cold war locations, the signal
resources were stretched to the utmost to meet normal communications needs.
Once the formations moved to their battle locations, the existing
communications were found to be inadequate and additional line and radio relay
circuits were provided to conform to the operational plans. To provide radio
relay communications between the divisional headquarters at Baramula and
Tactical HQ 161 Infantry Brigade, one radio relay terminal each was positioned
at Singhpora and Sher on <st1:date day="13" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">13
November 1971</st1:date>. However, the PE-95 generator mounted in a trailer
could not be taken up to Sher due to the low classification of the road leading
to the feature. An effort to transport the PE-95 by towing it with a jeep
failed due to sharp bends in the road and steep gradient. Another effort was made by means of manual
labour but this too was unsuccessful. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The idea of taking the PE-95 up to Sher
was abandoned and it was decided to keep the generator at the base and lay <st1:metricconverter productid="2.5 kilometres" w:st="on">2.5 <span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter>
of spaced PVC cable up to the location of the radio relay terminal at Sher.
This unorthodox solution worked and the radio relay got through at 1230 hours
on 16 November but from terminal to terminal only. The RF reading being low, the channelling
equipment could not be mounted. A cubical quad aerial was improvised locally
and tried out on the radio relay link working between Sher and Singhpora. However it did not give satisfactory results
for mounting the carrier equipment. The radio relay terminal at Singhpora was
then shifted to the animal transport lines, but this too was not successful,
using both cubical quad and yagi aerials.
The link finally got through and all channels were aligned on 21
November after shifting the Singhpora terminal by about one </span><span lang="EN-GB">kilometre</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. Carrier quad cable was laid from
Baramula to Singhpora road/track junction and PL route from there to the
terminal located at Singhpora was used for deriving tails at Baramula for the
radio relay chain to Sher. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
17 November the SO-in-C visited the unit accompanied by DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh
and was briefed by the CO on the Signals plan during offensive and defensive
phases. On the night of 24/25 November,
268 Infantry Brigade moved to its battle location in general area <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rampur</st1:place></st1:city>. One speech and one telegraph circuit was
provided between Baramula and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rampur</st1:place></st1:city>
for the brigade. Next morning the CO visited <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rampur</st1:place></st1:city> and Mandir-Bonyar area to assess the
communication requirements for 268 Infantry Brigade in their new location. On the subsequent day he also visited the
Kupwara radio relay terminal to check on the security arrangements in view of
268 Infantry Brigade having moved out from that area. On 30 November the GOC,
Major General E. D’Souza visited the unit and addressed all ranks. He told everyone to be prepared for war and
give out his best. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
3 December, it was announced that war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> had commenced. All radio
links were activated as ordered by HQ XV Corps. Next day it was learned that
there was a threat of paratroops being dropped by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. At 2300 hours a patrol of
one officer and six OR with LMG mounted on a jeep was sent to search the road
Baramula – Singhpura. The patrol returned at 0100 hours and again went out from
0300 hours to 0500 hours. At about <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time>
on 5 December orders were received for patching the radio relay channel between
19 and 25 Infantry Division through Udhampur-Srinagar. This was done and the
link was put through immediately. The
signal centre at HQ 104 Infantry Brigade location was established in an
underground bunker in view of enemy threat. One radio set AN/PRC 25 was sent to
104 Infantry Brigade Signal Company for immediate use by the battalion going
for an operation. A visual observation team of the IAF, consisting of two
airmen also arrived. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 8 December, OC 2 Company
went on a route reconnaissance to area Uri, Chaukas and Pt. 9108 for
providing line communication to 268 Infantry Brigade in case it moved to that area for
operations. A line detachment
consisting of one JCO and six linemen was positioned at Uri for maintenance of
PL routes Uri - Chaukas – Pt. 9108 and laying field cable in the area. The
laying of field cable between Chaukas – Khetar Dana commenced at 0600 hours on
10 December and was completed by 1500 hours.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
12 December at about 0800 hours the Baramula-Kupwara line was out. The line
party sent to repair the fault found that the copper line had been cut. The matter was reported to the police and
with the help of tracker dogs the culprit was traced and one person named
Rasool Pandit of village Warigam was arrested. He was handed over to the
Intelligence and Field Security Company for interrogation but nothing useful
was found. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: center; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="_x0000_i1027" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:328.5pt;height:275.25pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image005.png"
o:title="Misc Picture of Uri Sector -4408"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="367" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1027" width="438" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: center; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Signallers repairing equipment in the Uri Sector,
1971.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
13 December the Jeep based rover detachment went out with the GOC up to
Paro. Thereafter it accompanied the GOC
on foot to Tilpatra and Nargis which had been captured from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> during
the operations. Equipment Cipher Line (ECL) was successfully tried out with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> and
Udhampur. On 14 December a line party
consisting of one JCO and 14 linemen moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rampur</st1:place></st1:city> and Paro area for maintenance and
laying additional lines for the impending operation. Next day, consequent to the establishment of
KG Sector at Paro, line and radio communications were re-orientated. KG Sector was provided one telegraph and one
speech circuit from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rampur</st1:place></st1:city>.
It also became an out station on the D1 link.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
16 December three officers – Captains A.S. Tiwana, R.M. Shastry and R.K. Malik
-reported on posting, two from CME and one from MCTE. Next day, Tiwana and Shastry were sent to 161
and 268 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies respectively as seconds-in-command.
Malik was posted to 1 Company to relieve Captain S.N. Chaterjee. Captain J.
Babaja was sent to KG Sector to look after its communications. The same evening
Rampur-Uri and Sher-Uri physical PL routes were damaged due to enemy shelling.
Communication was restored at 2100 hours by using interruption cable. Next
morning about <st1:metricconverter productid="18 kilometres" w:st="on">18 <span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter>
of field cable were burnt in 104 Infantry Brigade due to enemy shelling and
subsequent fire in the area. By this time the operations had ended and cease
fire had been declared. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ had come to an end, the commitments of the unit did not
finish. A large area hitherto held by the enemy had been captured and occupied
by our troops who had to be given communications. This was true of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Lipa</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>
and Kaiyan Bowl that lay across the Tutmari Gali in the 104 Infantry Brigade
Sector. On 21 December, <st1:metricconverter productid="10 kilometres" w:st="on">10
<span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter>
of carrier quad cable was sent to Naugam for providing line communications in
the Naukot area liberated by 104 Infantry Brigade. Two days later another <st1:metricconverter productid="7 kilometres" w:st="on">7 <span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometres</span></st1:metricconverter> of
carrier quad and one charging set 500W was sent to 104 Infantry Brigade for use
in Kaiyan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_2" o:spid="_x0000_i1028" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:346.5pt;
height:255.75pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image007.jpg"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="341" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image007.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_2" width="462" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A message is received on radio in the Tithwal Sector,
1971.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the operations, the GOC,
Major General E. D’Souza wrote to the SO-in-C, CSO Western Command and CSO XV
Corps, commending the performance of the unit. He wrote:-<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I
have much pleasure in writing to you about the excellent work put in by the
personnel of the Signal Corps in my division, under the guidance and leadership
of my Commander Signals, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> DK Vaidya.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Signals personnel in my division
have worked most efficiently during the operation with a rare sense of duty,
devotion and determination. They have
undertaken hazardous tasks, braved enemy shelling and small arms fire, showing
complete disregard for personnel comfort and safety. The linemen and radio operators deserve a
special mention for the exemplary manner in which they ceaselessly worked to
maintain efficient communication inspite of heavy shelling and small arms
fire. On occasions when our lines were
cut, they were replaced expeditiously without any delay. It is entirely due to the efficient
functioning of the signal communication and the bravery and devotion of those
concerned that throughout the operations there was not a single case of any
circuit going out or the radio not functioning.
I was therefore able to keep in constant touch and formation commanders
were able to exercise effective command and control. It also goes to the credit of my Signal
Regiment that there was no occasion for me to use the radio relay link.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I would also like to mention about
the excellent work done by the backroom boys in the cipher office and signal
centre. The unprecedented increase of
traffic in classified and precedence signals was of a very high magnitude. The individuals however rose to the occasion
and working cheerfully round the clock, ensured that there was no undue hold
up.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I have recommended some of my
Signallers for suitable awards.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">J Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was at Leh, under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel B.B. Sarin, with Major Karam Singh as the second-in-command.
Other field officers in the unit were Major B.S. Bedi (2 Company) and Major K.
Deshpande (3 Company) The unit was responsible for line construction and
maintenance tasks in Ladakh under the technical control of DCSO Kashmir and
Ladakh, Colonel R.A. Bhola. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During Operation ‘Cactus Lily’
except for 2 Company which was involved in actual operations at Kargil in
support of 121 (Indep) Brigade, the unit’s resources were utilised to
supplement those of other signal units in Western Command. However, the unit
carried out construction of several new PL routes. In October a line detachment
of one JCO and 16 OR under Lieutenant A. K. Saini constructed the route Loma –
Hanle – Koyul. The PL route was to cross over the mountain range at Hanle for
connecting Fukche airfield. In November another line detachment comprising
Lieutenant A. K. Saini and Second Lieutenant P. Nambiar, Naib Subedar
R.C.Tiwari and 23 OR proceeded to Karu for realignment of the trunk PL route to
avoid STAKNA Hydel project. The situation has been described by Lieutenant
General Saini, who was commanding the line detachment, in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <b>The diversion of the <st1:metricconverter productid="10 km" w:st="on">10 km</st1:metricconverter> route involved crossing
of <st1:place w:st="on">Indus</st1:place> river at Karu for connecting back to
the original route. Probably, for the first and perhaps also the last time,
Pistol Schermally was actually used for throwing a line across the river span
of about <st1:metricconverter productid="80 metres" w:st="on">80 metres</st1:metricconverter>
for pulling the cables. Pulling of eight wires of <st1:metricconverter productid="242 lb" w:st="on">242 lb</st1:metricconverter> copper weld wires
took the entire day. It was an extremely hazardous and difficult task due to
the fast current and slippery, frozen river banks. The extreme cold and fog
added to the difficulty of pulling heavy wires across the river. The task was
completed by evening without any break. The test call to Leh on the new route
was the proudest moment for the 57 Line Construction Section</b></span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In December, a line party under
Lieutenant Saini and Naib Subedar Tiwari was tasked to lay a PVC route between
Thoise airfield and Turtuk via Chalunka. It was a <st1:metricconverter productid="28 kilometre" w:st="on">28 <span style="font-family: "Cambria","serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;">kilometre</span></st1:metricconverter>
route that was to connect HQ Partapur Sector to Turtuk, the last captured
location in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
territory. The orders for the mission were brisk and passed personally by the
CO to the officer in charge (OiC) line party: <b><i>“Lay a PVC route from Thoise to
Turtuk. Work out your logistics and be ready to move in 12 hours. Task is
extremely important and must be completed fast.” </i> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The line party was lifted
lock-stock and barrel next morning in an IAF Packet aircraft and dropped at the
Thoise ALG in the afternoon. At the ALG, a Ladakh Scouts NCO was waiting with
one horse, four yaks and six mules to ferry the stores to the start point. The
horse was for the officer in charge to reconnoitre the route and up and down
movement. In those days, Turtuk was connected only by a mule track. The laying
of the entire route on 8/16 feet wooden poles, using mules, yaks and porters
took about two months. The route passed through rugged mountains as well as
sandy desert stretches in high altitude area. The line party shifted its camp
three times. The last stretch involved crossing the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Shyok</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
near Chalunka post daily for a week on a ferry operated by the Engineers. The
line party was logistically maintained through para-dropped supplies and fuel
by the AN-12 aircraft. Retrieval of dropped supplies stretched over a vast area
during winter months was a very difficult task. The shortfall in fresh rations
was more than made up by the enterprising line JCO who caught fish from <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Shyok</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
using a mosquito net. Saini recalls that the burly and outstanding JCO always
felt that keeping up the morale of the line party was his primary task. He
advised Saini to focus only on the operational tasks and leave the
administration and logistics to him. The task was completed in February <st1:metricconverter productid="1972. A" w:st="on">1972. A</st1:metricconverter> test call from
Turtuk to Leh, on completion of the line was another glorious moment for the
line party. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the commencement of the
operations the PL route <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
– Kargil was damaged due to enemy
shelling near Harka Bahadur bridge. A
line party was sent from the unit on 7 December to repair the line. Lance Naik
Deepa Ram was killed by enemy shelling when repairing the damaged PL route. On
9 December a line party was sent to lay a pair of WD 1 cable to link up to
feature Point 13620 captured from the enemy.
This was the first line party to lay line in Pakistani territory. On 12
December, 2 Company took over the responsibility for manning the exchange and
maintenance of local lines at Kargil from 121 (Indep) Brigade Signal Company,
to enable it to concentrate on forward communications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the end of the operations on
17 December the unit was involved in rehabilitation of several PL routes that
had been damaged. A new PL route from
own Picquet 10 to Point 13620 captured from the enemy in Kargil sector was
constructed and handed over to 121
(Indep)) Brigade Signal Company. Lieutenant Lekhvir Singh, (known as Tambi
Khalsa due to his spoken proficiency in Tamil language) played an important
role in laying lines in the brigade sector.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">T Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>,
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel H.R. Swarup. The other field officers
in the unit were Major </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">M.A. Reddy (1
Company); Major B.C. Acharya (2 Company) and Major S.K. Chhibber (3 Company). The unit was responsible for manning the
signal centre at Srinagar and provision of static communications along the line
of communications between Udhapur-Srinagar and Srinagar- Gumri. It also
provided communications for traffic control of convoys along these routes. The
unit was under the technical control of </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DCSO
Kashmir and Ladakh.</span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;"> Shortly
before the commencement of Operation ’Cactus Lily’ the unit established radio
relay links and engineered direct speech circuits from Baramula to </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Rajauri, Kargil,
Udhampur and Srinagar. In order to improve radio relay communications between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> and Gulmarg,
cubical quad aerials were used and found satisfactory. On 4 December when the operations
started line patrols were sent on PL routes from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> to Baltal, Banihal, Khundru and
Khunmu during the night. A 26 kilometre long PL route to Awantipur airfield
that had been in disuse since 1969 was rehabilitated overnight. Extensive maintenance of the PL route to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> airfield was
carried out during the week.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -2.25pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 38.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
9 December some changes were carried out in the radio network. The control of
C64 net was taken over by 2 Company, J Communication Zone Signal Regiment and
out stations on C1, C2 and C2A were closed down. A new out station was opened on C25A. Next
day the Udhampur- Srinagar microwave channel meant for Leh was patched to
Kargil due to operational commitments. A
total of 14 line patrols were sent out on various PL routes during the week. To
control the rise in message traffic a staff message control centre (SMCC) was
established. This proved to be very
effective and resulted in reduction of total traffic by about 25 %. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the week a 3 channel
stackable system was tried between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
and Kargil and one channel terminated on the exchange at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>. The PL route to Kheruh was cut at
Khunmu and terminated in the Khunmu exchange from both sides. With this it became possible to contact Rear
HQ 68 Infantry Brigade and two junction lines were available to Khunmu. Trials
of ECL were carried out successfully with Udhampur and Baramula. An extra
speech circuit between Udhampur and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
was also provided. Radio relay chains
Udhampur – Leh, Udhampur – Kargil, Udhampur – Baramula and Udhampur – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> were stabilised.
The operations came to an end on 17 December. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.4pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R.K.Verma with Major K.C. Garga as the second-in-command.
The other field officers in the unit were Major K.G.K. Nayar (1 Company) and
Major P.P.S. Yadav (2 Company). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">During the months of October and November
1971 the unit was involved in preparations for the impending operations. A
number of PL routes were constructed and additional circuits engineered for
formations in their operational locations. Several radio relay links were also
established between important locations. To supplement the resources of the
unit, manpower and equipment was given by other units which were not so heavily
committed viz. J Communication Zone Signal Regiment. A traffic control net was
established using radio sets ANPRC-25, with the control at Udhampur and
outstations at Jindra Domail, Katra, Riasi, Paoni, Bhagot, Sunderbani, Naushshera,
Narian, Kalakot and Rajauri. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">War between <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
officially declared on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3
December 1971</st1:date>. The same day the enemy launched attacks in Punch and
Chhamb sectors occupied by 25 and 10 Infantry Divisions. This was followed by
the capture of Chicken’s Neck by 26 Infantry Division. Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment played
an important role in all these operations. Soon after the commencement of the
attack on Chhamb, Captain R.K. Kak was asked to check the communications at
Akhnur by CO 10 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. In view of the importance
of Akhnur, on 4 December direct communications were engineered to that location
from Udhamapur, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
and both 25 and 26 Infantry Divisions. Major K.G.K. Nayar went to Akhnur to
supervise the installation of ACT (1+4) to obtain the required channels. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">On 6 December a line party of J
Communication Zone Signal Regiment under an officer was sent Akhnur for
maintenance of PL routes between Akhnur and HQ 10 Infantry Division. The CO and
OC 1 Company personally went to the area to check the above lines. Major Nayar
was able to acquire two pairs of PL from the Irrigation Department from Akhnur
to Jaurian. By this time the operation in Chicken’s Neck had started. A line
party under Second Lieutenant Jayant Singh laid <st1:metricconverter productid="13 kilometres" w:st="on">13 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> of
carrier quad cable route in 19 Infantry Brigade sector in the Chicken’s Neck
area from Chanur (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
to Puklelian (<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -2.25pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 38.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At this time, the battle was still raging in the
Punch sector. On 8 December some manpower was sent to 25 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment to boost their strength. Power line from Jaunipura was taken
over and used to provide circuits Rajauri - Udhampur and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> -Udhampur using (S + DX). On 9 December
the PL stores kept at Rakh Muti were moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> in 24 lorries. Carrier quad cable was
laid on the ground from HQ 191 Infantry Brigade to HQ 10 Infantry Division for
extending the local leads for the radio relay link to Akhnur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -2.25pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 38.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
10 December Captain Kak while maintaining the lines near River Tawi saw a
suspicious character in the graveyard near the anti aircraft gun position. He reported the matter to Major Nayar who
discussed the matter with Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mr. Khurana. The
caretaker of the graveyard, Mr. Alia, was taken into custody by the police. A
large quantity of equipment and stores was sent to Akhnur for construction of PL
and carrier quad routes in 10 Infantry Divisional sector. During the next two
days <st1:metricconverter productid="12 kilometres" w:st="on">12 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
of carrier quad was laid from HQ 10 Infantry Division to HQ 68 Infantry
Brigade. About <st1:metricconverter productid="6 kilometres" w:st="on">6 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
of carrier quad was laid on <i>ballies</i>
along the canal on the northern axis for extending the local leads to Rear 10
Infantry Division. The work was a
supervised by Major K.C. Garga and Major D.K. Ghosh, who had recently joined
the unit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">121
(Indep) Infantry Brigade Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">121 (Indep) Infantry Brigade Signal
Company was located in Kargil in 1971. The company was under the command of
Major M.S.G. Rao, with Captain Gautam Singh as the second-in-command. It was
manning the signal centre and exchange at Kargil, in addition to the forward
communications to units under command of the brigade viz. 2/11 Gorkha Rifles,
18 Punjab, 7 Guards and 9 and 13 Jammu & Kashmir Militia. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Preparations
for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ began in mid October 1971, when radio detachments
from the company were sent to each battalion with a radio set 62. Major Rao and
Captain Gautam visited the forward posts held by the units, to check on the
communications. Colonel R.A. Bhola, DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh also visited Kargil
in late October and early November, to oversee the communication set up. In mid
November a telegraph circuit to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
was provided by 2 Company, J Communication Zone Signal Regiment. Type X machine
on loan from J Communication Zone Signal Regiment was returned and Linex issued
to the battalions was withdrawn. All <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> ciphers were returned to DCSO
Kashmir and Ladakh. All old cipher
correspondence was sent in a sealed box to the cipher officer of 3 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment for safe custody.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
4 December, a detachment of 12 OR along with a 10 line magneto exchange
was sent to Post 22 with the task of installing the exchange and
to provide line communication to 87
Light Regiment, 7 Guards, 18 Punjab and 9 Jammu & Kashmir Militia. Next
morning Captain Gautam also moved to Post 22 with the rover party. A line was laid from Post 22 exchange to
Observation Post (OP) for operations room and OC 87 Light Regiment. The B1 detachments of 7 Guards and 18 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> were given a detailed briefing and their equipment
was checked. Line parties were detailed for the two battalions for laying the
line to the forward area. One line
detachment consisting of 1 JCO and six linemen started laying the lines from
Post 22 to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Brachil</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> at 1900 hours.
Another line detachment started laying the line on move of 2/11 Gorkha Rifles
from Post 9A to Post 12 at 2359 hours, completing the job at 0100 hours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
7 December one JCO and one OR started laying the line on move of 2/11 Gorkha
Rifles from the new location at 1700 hours and completed up to Post 12 at 2100
hours. Major Rao went to Post 10 along
with a line party for laying a new line.
The brigade headquarters was subjected to heavy shelling by the enemy
from early morning. The line party
reached Conical which is <st1:metricconverter productid="6 kilometres" w:st="on">6
kilometres</st1:metricconverter> away from Post 22 at 0200 hours. The line party, weighed down by the cable
that they were carrying could not keep pace with the battalion and lagged
behind. They lost their way and strayed
into enemy held area. When challenged by
Pakistani troops they ran back and reached the same location at 0800
hours. In the mean time the line to Post
22 was damaged by mortar and artillery shelling. The post was cut off from the front as well
as from rear, as the line from the brigade headquarters to Post 22 was also
damaged by enemy shelling at 0900 hours.
Captain Gautam and one lineman went out to rectify the fault. They restored communications at 1330 hours
and reached Post 22 at 1700 hours. The
battalion headquarters of 18 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> was at
Post 22, hence the B1 out station was also available. Radio communication
between the battalion headquarters and attacking companies was on AN/PRC-25. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 8 December a line patrol
comprising Captain Gautam and one lineman started from Post 22 at 0730 hours
for <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Brachil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place>, putting the line through at about
1500 hours. The party reached Brachil at
2100 hours. They left at 2200 hours to
patrol the line up to Conical, where they reached at 0200 hours. Major Rao along
with a line party proceeded to Post 9A to lay lines to 2/11 Gorkha Rifles. The
line detachment consisting of two linemen moved with the battalion from Post 12
to Black Rocks and the line was completed at 2000 hours. Meanwhile the line
party under Captain Gautam started from Conical at 0800 hours and reached <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Brachil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> at 1300 hours on 9 December. A 10
line magneto exchange was installed and telephones were provided for 18 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> as well as 7 Guards at 1400 hours. A line patrol of four linemen under Captain
Gautam again left <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Brachil</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> at 2200 hours and
reached Conical at 0200 hours next morning. During the day Pt. 13620 was
captured at 1315 hours. Communications during the attack were excellent. Radio and line detachments from 3 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment and J Communication Zone Signal Regiment had
supplemented the resources of 121 (Indep) Infantry Brigade Signal Company for
this operation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
the subsequent days all personnel of the company continued to lay new lines to
posts that were captured and repair those that were damaged due to enemy
shelling. The line patrol was sent daily, leaving Brachil at about 2200 hours
and reaching Conical at 0200 hours. It started on its return journey at about
0800 hours, getting back to Brachil after <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time>.
New lines were laid from Chora Post to Pathar and Black Rock to Pt. 13620 on 10
December; and from Post 12 to village Gundarwan and Brachil to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Snow</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Peak</st1:placetype></st1:place>
on the next day. On 11 December, 20 OR arrived from 3 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment for signal centre duties.
On 12 December a signal was sent to 87 Light Regiment for installation
of exchange and laying cable at their new location. Major Rao went to Post 17 and then to Post 22
to check the radio communications at both locations. A detachment under Captain
Gautam installed an exchange at 18 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
location and extended a tie line from the brigade exchange. Another line was
laid from 7 Guards to a pass about one kilometre east of Brachil where the
battalion was fighting. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 14 December six OR and five porters
proceeded to Post 22 with batteries, dispenser packs and telephone sets. A
party of three OR was sent to Post 3 with one RS 62. Another party of 20 men
including non combatants enrolled (NCsE) was sent to Post 17, from where cable
was carried and dumped in area Gundarnan village occupied by 5/3 Gorkha Rifles.
Cable left by the enemy was utilized to extend the line from Post 16. On 15 December Major Rao proceeded to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Harka</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Bahadur</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> to carry out
reconnaissance of the line route along with seven linemen for maintenance. The
unit received <st1:metricconverter productid="100 kilometres" w:st="on">100 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
of cable from T Communication Zone Signal Regiment. A new line was laid from
Post 24 to Chora Post. Next morning a line was also laid to Chora Post from <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Brachil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass.</st1:placetype></st1:place> A line party consisting 20 linemen
with 25 dispenser packs was sent to Post 3 to lay line beyond enemy Post <st1:metricconverter productid="11 in" w:st="on">11 in</st1:metricconverter> accordance with move of
2/11 Gorkha Rifles. One RS AN/PRC 25 was stationed at Post 3 to facilitate
radio communication with the battalion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -3.15pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 39.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
17 December a line was laid from Brachil Pass to Post Bali, a distance of <st1:metricconverter productid="5 kilometres" w:st="on">5 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>. The
outstation on C-1 link was handed over to personnel of J Communication Zone
Signal Regiment. 26 linemen of that unit attached with the company were sent to
Post 10 for repairing the line. Radio and
line detachments with 15 porters advanced along with 2/11 Gorkha Rifles to Post
3. One NCO with five linemen and 10
porters moved from Post 3 at 0230 hours and reached Sarcha Gaon at 0700 hours. The party continued its task and moved from
Sarcha Gaon at 0830 hours, reaching base at 1400 hours. After resting with the battalion headquarters
for two hours, they moved out at 1600 hours reaching Jankar Top at 2030 hours
on the same day. The party rested at
Jankar Top till 0830 hours on 18 December, when they started for Post 11,
arriving there at 2030 hours, half an hour after the cease fire had been
declared. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 121
(Indep) Infantry Brigade Signal Company did a sterling job in providing
communications during Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. All personnel of the company
worked under exceptionally arduous conditions, moving with the battalions as
they moved. The two officers of the company were always on the move, often with
the line parties, ensuring that communications were always through. As always, the linemen worked the hardest,
laying and repairing lines without a break for several hours each day in
extremely cold weather and rugged terrain. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XI Corps Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ XI Corps was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. The CSO was
Brigadier M.S. Dhillon. The other officers in the Signals Branch were
Lieutenant Colonel V.L. Narayanan, SO1 (Signals); Major Prakash Gokarn, SO2
(Signals) and Captain Harbhajan Singh, SO3 (Cipher). During Operation ‘Cactus
Lily’, HQ Western Command moved from Simla to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> in mid October 1971. At the same
time, HQ XI Corps moved to its operational location near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>. In order to exercise effective
control over its subordinate formations, HQ XI Corps was split. Advance HQ XI
Corps (<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Pratap</st1:placename></st1:place>) was located at Kotkapura, near
Bhatinda while Main HQ XI Corps (<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Ranjit</st1:placename></st1:place>) was at Four
Fields near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The move of the corps headquarters
was planned, but the actual dates had not been decided. The manner in which
orders for the move were issued has been described by former SO-in-C, Lieutenant
General Prakash Gokarn, who was then SO2 (Signals), in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 40.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11 Corps had practiced
various operational roles under the command of Lt Gen PS Bhagat, VC (till early
1970) and Lt Gen NC Rawlley, MC (during the operation). CSO 11 Corps, Brig Mohinder Singh Dhillon
and SO 1 (Sigs) Col VL Narayanan had ensured that the Signals Branch and units
were well prepared for any eventuality.
They were out on recce on the night of 8<sup>th</sup> Oct 71, when I was
called by Lt Col (later Maj Gen) Bachhitar Singh, GSO 1 (Ops) HQ 11 Corps who
verbally informed me about the impending move to Kotkapura (which I had never
heard of till then), the likely ORBAT and locations of formations. I
immediately informed my superiors who gave me clear instructions and thereafter
conveyed these to the COs of the Signal Regiments i.e. Lt Col Bahl (11 Corps
Sig Regt), Lt Col YR Ratra (Z Comn Sig Regt) and Maj RS Arora (ASSU). Written Sig instructions were issued on 15<sup>th</sup>
Oct 71 after receipt of the HQ 11 Corps Op instructions. The concept of
splitting the Corps HQ into three i.e. Main, Advance and Rear HQ stretched our
resources but we met the comn demands admirably thanks to the infrastructure
(BOPEL) spadework done by our erstwhile CSOs Brig KS Garewal and Brig JV Pinto.</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Advance parties were sent to the
projected locations of the headquarters based on verbal orders received from HQ
XI Corps. By the time formal orders were received line and radio relay
communications had been established from the new locations. The advance and
main headquarters actually moved on 20 October, the Signals elements having
moved the previous week and set up communications. Teams from Z Communication
Zone Signal Regiment were positioned in P&T carrier centres at Bhatinda,
Abohar, Fazilka and Sriganganagar. Air force speech and air support telegraph
circuits were provided to airfields at Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot and
Sirsa. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By early November communications
had stabilised. One complete shift for the signal centre, crypto centre and
exchange at the advance corps headquarters was being provided by Z
Communication Zone Signal Regiment, which also sent a shift to Abohar to assist
F Sector Signal Regiment. Communications were also catered for a flooding
scheme for which a flooding control centre was established at Doburji Rest
House. Though communications were stable, the volume of traffic saw a marked
increase. On recommendations of the CSO, a staff message control centre (SMCC)
was established on 5 November, which was manned round the clock. This brought
down the traffic by more than half and also reduced the number of messages that
needed encryption. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An
interesting development was Plan ‘Delta’, a deception plan that was to be put
into operation under HQ Central Command, then being commanded by
Lieutenant General P.S. Bhagat, VC. It
comprised an infantry brigade, some armour and elements of Engineers, Signals
etc. Their vehicles would be painted with formation signs and the radio nets
would simulate traffic of 1 Armoured Division, leading the enemy to believe
that a major Indian offensive was planned in that area. Communications and
radio deception measures were being coordinated by a team of signal officers
under Brigadier V.C. Khanna (he was CSO Central Command earlier, but doing the
NDC course at that time). The other officers in the team were Colonel H.S.Gill,
Major Y.M. Narula and Major K.V. Nair, all from MCTE. Based on the requirements worked out by the
team, a composite signal company was created, resources for which were provided
by various units of Western Command. Z Communication Zone Signal Regiment
provided the company headquarters, line parties and administrative elements.
Composite radio detachments were provided by XI Corps, 1 Armoured Divisional
Signal Regiment, 14 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, 14 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade Signal Company and 474 Engineer Brigade Signal Section. Some radio
detachments were also taken from XV Corps.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
composite signal company under Major Mehta of Z Communication Zone Signal
Regiment reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="9" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">9 November 1971</st1:date>.
HQ XI Corps Signal Instruction No. 24 for Plan ‘Delta’ was issued on 11
November. Only three copies were distributed - one each to Brigadier Khanna,
Major Mehta and 474 Engineer Brigade Signal Section. In the event, Plan ‘Delta’ was never
implemented and the signal resources were returned to the respective units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 1 December the Deputy SO-in-C,
Major General K.S. Garewal arrived at Amristar. Accompanied by Lieutenant
Colonel R.N. Bhatia, GSO 1 Signals 7,
Mr. Rau of the P&T Board, Mr. Amrik Singh and other P&T Officials, he
visited Main HQ XI Corps (Camp Ranjit),
XI Corps Signal Regiment and 15
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, including the brigade signal companies. Next day the team visited Advance HQ XI Corps
(<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Pratap</st1:placename></st1:place>), 7 and 14 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiments and 1 Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment. During the visit a
number of decisions were taken regarding communication support provided by the
P&T Department. It was agreed that the two T43 and four CB exchanges from
Ambala would be moved to Kotkapura. XI Corps Signal Regiment was given
instructions to send three 3-ton vehicles and 10 OR to Ambala to report to SO2
(Signals), who would coordinate the dismantling of the exchanges and their move
to Kotkapura. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
1740 hours on 3 December <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
launched air strikes on several Indian airfields. At 2000 hours orders were
received from HQ Western Command for lifting radio silence. However, minimum
use was to be made of radio. These instructions were passed to all signal units.
At that time, the CSO, Brigadier Dhillon was in Abohar with the Deputy SO-in-C
visiting formations of F Sector. Based
on instructions from GOC XI Corps, he was asked to return to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Ranjit</st1:placename></st1:place>. At about 2100 hours the SO 1 (Signals) was
called by the GOC and COS in the Joint Operations and Information Room (JOIR)
and told about the creation of the Mike Force ex 14 (Indep) Armoured Brigade
under the command of the deputy brigade commander, Colonel Mehta, which was to
establish itself in area Gang Canal between Ganganagar and Suratgarh. Narayanan
was asked to arrange for radio and line communications for the Mike Force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the night<b> </b>communications were stable though
there was a flurry of trunk calls between command, corps and divisions. Direct
lines from the operations rooms of subordinate formations were extended to
JOIR. These hot lines were fully
utilised and important messages passed using ECL. The CSO left Bhatinda at 2300
hours and arrived at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Ranjit</st1:placename></st1:place> only at 0530 hours
next morning. En route, he visited Advance HQ XI Corps at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Pratap</st1:placename></st1:place>,
Z Communication Zone Signal Regiment at Faridkot and detachments of XI Corps
Signal Regiment at Harike. At all these locations communications were working
well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Describing his experience of the night the operations
started, General Gokarn writes:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">We were all completely in underground dugouts within
ten days of reaching our HQ. My
underground bunker was next to the GSO1 (Ops) at Kotkapura. CSO and SO1 (Sigs) were located at Jandiala
Guru. A shameful personal event
occurred on the night of 3<sup>rd</sup> Dec 71 when Pakistan Air Force launched
an air strike and bombed Bhatinda Railway Station. The intensity of the sound and fury of the
bombing was felt at Kotkapura. After
spending the entire night in the Sig Centre and Ops Room I returned for a wash
to my bunker. To my horror I found a
rifle, unused bullets and a note on my camp cot belonging to my helper who
stated that he was very afraid and was therefore running away. He was a Signalman from Bombay (Mumbai) and
to this date I have been looking for him ever since I retired! It was my first
and thankfully last experience of cowardice in service. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time> on 4 December communications for Mike Force at
Netawali had been established both on radio and line from Advanced HQ XI
Corps. Alternate line communications
from 51 (Indep) Parachute Brigade were also provided. It was learned that Plan
Delta was not being implemented and the signal resources that had been placed
at its disposal were being returned. An analysis of the traffic handled the
previous day revealed that it had almost doubled. At Main HQ XI Corps, it rose
to 140,000 groups from the daily average of 75,000 over the previous week. At
Advance HQ XI Corps, the rise was even more marked – from 27,655 to 77, 543
groups. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The communications provided were
lavish, thanks to advance planning and excellent work done by the previous CSOs
and the BOPEL routes laid during their tenures. From Main HQ XI Corps, there
were three speech circuits to the divisions and the advance headquarters, four
to the rear headquarters and two to HQ Western Command. The number of telegraph
circuits was equally generous - two to the divisions and three to command. As
regards Advance HQ XI Corps, the number of speech and telegraph circuits to the
divisions was three and two respectively. There were two speech and two
telegraph circuits to HQ Western Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> and one to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. From both headquarters, there were
circuits to administrative areas, airfields and Air Force units. The line and radio
diagrams of XI Corps are shown below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
line communications were reliable, radio and radio relay links were also
established and used when line circuits were disrupted, which happened rarely.
On 5/6 December, offensive operations were conducted in the Sehjra bulge and
Dera Baba Nanak. Communications to both 7 and 15 Infantry Divisions functioned
well during the operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At that time, XI Corps Artillery
Brigade did not have its own signal company. Before the commencement of the
operations, an ad-hoc artillery brigade signal company has been rigged up by
milking the resources of 3 Company, XI Corps Signal Regiment. The primary task of the company (in the
absence of an FDC so far) was to provide communications to air defence guns and
warn them of movement of own aircraft. Due to operational requirements, the
necessity was felt to establish an FDC at Fazilka. However, the resources of
the signal company with the artillery brigade were inadequate for this task.
Accordingly, orders were issued on 7 December for a major portion of 21 (Indep)
Artillery Brigade Signal Company to move from Fatehgarh Churian to Fazilka to
establish communications for the adhoc FDC to be set up under the Commander
Corps Artillery, XI Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
9 December it was learnt that six RS C41/R222, less generators and channelling equipment
were being despatched from Special Signal Regiment in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. It was decided to fit one set each in
a 1-ton vehicle for deployment as one-set stations wherever required. It was planned to use two of these stations to
provide radio relay communications from Main HQ XI Corps to 7 Infantry Division
to avoid the <st1:metricconverter productid="16 kilometre" w:st="on">16 kilometre</st1:metricconverter>
tail from Harike to the location of HQ 7 Infantry Division. The same afternoon
an Emergency message was received from Army HQ intimating that Air Support Code
Sox 762/Edition 40 had been compromised and the next edition should be taken
into use forthwith. A special courier
was immediately sent to Advance HQ XI Corps with the fresh ‘letter code’ and
instructions for putting it into use immediately. Couriers from 7 and 15
Infantry Divisions were asked to come and collect the instructions. By 0500
hours next morning the new set of documents were available with all tentacles
and airfield detachments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the next few days two new formations, 123 Mountain Brigade and 50 (Indep) Parachute
Brigade arrived in XI Corps Zone. On 13 December a speech circuit was extended
from Pratap Camp to Malaut, the location of 50 (Indep) Parachute Brigade via
Bhatinda on P & T system. Lateral
line circuits were also given from Abohar (F Sector) and Muktsar (1 Armoured
Division). Communications for 123 Mountain Brigade had been catered for in
Batala, where it was to be located. However, on 15 December it was learnt that the
location was being changed to Majitha and subsequently to Kohali. Since no spare P & T pair was available,
another circuit was disconnected and the pair utilised for providing
communications to 123 Mountain Brigade from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>. 63 Armoured Regiment also arrived
in Jandiala Guru on 15 December as corps reserve and was provided a speech
circuit on Army owned PL. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> There
was a major disruption of coaxial cable from 1030 to 1615 hours on 17 December,
probably due to power failure near Sangrur, in Ambala-Ludhiana sector. The coaxial was restored at 1615 hours but
went down again at 1800 hours due to a fault in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> area. Most of the circuits to Kotkapura, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> were
disrupted. However, minimum operational
circuits to Advance HQ XI Corps, HQ Western Command (<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>) and from JOC to air field were
provided on over head systems. Radio
relay was activated as standby during this period. The coaxial system was
repaired next day but remained disturbed for several days afterwards. The cease
fire came into effect on <st1:date day="18" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">18
December 1971</st1:date>, marking the end of Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XI
Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">S.K. Bahl, with
Major H.C. Dhodapkar as the second-in-command.
The other field officers in the unit were Major P.C. Nath (1 Company);
Major S.P.S. Sikand (2 Company) and Major
K.B. Kapil (3 Company). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">On 15
Sepetmber 1971 the Signals plans for XI Corps for defensive operations </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">were
presented by CSO XI Corps and were discussed at Jullundur. Those present
included the SO-in-C, Deputy SO-in-C, CSO Western Command, CSO XV Corps, CSO I
Corps, CO XI Corps Signal Regiment and other senior officers of the unit. This
was followed by a reconnaissance on 25 </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">September by the CO accompanied by </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major
Nath and officers from HQ XI Corps (Signals Branch). The area adjacent to Kotkapura town was
selected as the location of Advance HQ XI Corps because of availability of
P&T communications (coaxial and carrier), power supply and Kotkapura being
an important rail/road communication centre. During another reconnaissance on 3
October the area Manawala Khurd near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
was selected as the location of Main HQ XI Corps. However, during a subsequent
reconnaissance from 10 to 12 October by Major Dhodapkar it was decided that
Main HQ XI Corps would be located at Four Fields, near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The move of the unit was planned on
15 October. On 14 October a ‘Barakhana’ was being held for the men and their
families when a message was received that an enemy attack in area Fazilka was
anticipated that night. Major Kapil was ordered to move to Kotkapura with three
medium power sets and four low power sets at 2200 hours. At the same time, Major Sikand was to move to
Four Fields with four medium power sets and two low power sets. Major Kapil, Captain Sushil Kumar and
Lieutenant D. Sharma left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
with the radio detachments at 0130 hours on 15 October and arrived at Kotkapura
at 0700 hours. Line parties extended a line to HQ 116 Infantry Brigade that had
already reached their location near Muktasar. Radio relay had also been
established from Kotkapura to Abohar and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>. Meanwhile, the party led by Major Sikand had
reached Four Fields at 0515 hours.
Speech lines from the main exchange at Four Fields were working and test
calls were made to 7 and 15 Division. Radio relay links from to Kotkapura to
Abohar and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
were also established.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Describing
the move of the unit from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
to Kotkapura Brigadier </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Dhodapkar
writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> XI
Corps Signal Regiment moved from Jullundur to Main & Advance Headquarters
at Amritsar & Kotkapura on Night 14/15 October 1971. The quantum of
communications to be provided from these two locations was nearly equal. While
communications from Main Headquarters was already foreseen and planned; it was
at Advance Headquarters at Kotkapura where communications had to be
provided at short notice to the newly inducted formations. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 72.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The time gap between the information regarding the
induction of new formations and requirement for the provision of communications
was very short. Resources at Advance Headquarters were already utilised in
providing these communications. To our horror it was noticed that most of the
PL routes in Kotkapura area were affected by the high tension power lines laid
by Punjab State Electricity Board without any intimation to the Army
authorities. There were a few mishaps - though not fatal - when our line
parties were working on these PL routes. Special mention must be made of
Lieutenant M.K. Chaterjee, who was our OC Lines, and his men for their
dedication and hard work to maintain and keep these PL routes functional
despite these handicaps. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 72.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Our main priority was to establish RR
communications between Main and Advance Headquarters. Initially efforts were
made to establish a direct RR Link - success was achieved to some extent.
However we experienced a lot of interference and unreliability in this direct
link. It was then decided to scout for a suitable relay station and have a two
hop RR Link. A number of locations were tried out and ultimately a relay
station was located atop a village main water tank. We could thus obtain a
height of 100 - <st1:metricconverter productid="120 feet" w:st="on">120 feet</st1:metricconverter>
for this. Our RR between the two headquarters functioned very well thereafter. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 72.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A number of our generators and charging engines were not
in working order - awaiting repairs by EME workshop. Normal procedures to get
these on-road would have taken some time. While getting into our location at
Kotkapura, we had seen a large numbers of repair shops along the main highway.
Enquiries were made to find out if our generators and charging engines could be
repaired by these shops. The shop owners readily agreed to check them and
help us .Within 7 - 10 days they not only carried the repairs but asked to
approach them for any further assistance. When we wanted to pay them for these
repairs, no money was accepted. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
the end of November signal centres and exchanges at the advance and main rear
headquarters had been moved to dugouts. All radio and radio relay terminals had
been checked. The radio detachments from
1 Armoured Division, 14 Infantry Division and F Sector were called to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Camp</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">Pratap</st1:placename></st1:place>
and netted on the C1A net. The radio relay terminals working to these
formations were also checked. Due to commissioning of Moga-Muktsar 132 MV power
line, the PL route Kotkapura-Muktsar was disturbed, since it ran parallel to
the new power line. The problem was solved by getting a railway pair for
communications to 1 Armoured Division, thanks to the initiative of Lieutenant
M.K. Chatterjee. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Deputy SO-in-C accompanied by Mr. B.S Rau, Member (Planning) of the P&T
Board visited the unit in Four Fields on 1 December and Kotkapura the following
day. He was full of praise for the amount of effort put in by the unit. On 3
December the war started after air strikes by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> on Indian airfields. The
extent of surprise can be gauged from the fact that the same morning a party of
two officers, three JCOs and 55 men had left for Ramtirath ranges in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> for firing
practice! That evening there were a number of air raid alerts in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> town and anti-aircraft
guns engaged the Pakistani aircraft as they flew overhead. There were reports
of enemy activity in front of 7 and 15 Infantry Divisions. The same night
troops of 15 Infantry Division captured the first prisoner of war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
4 December, 1 Armoured Division moved to their new location south of Muktsar,
where line communications were extended to them. On 5 December <i>Mike</i> Force comprising 18 Cavalry and 62
Armoured Regiment was established at Netawali, south of Ganganagar and provided
communications. Instructions were issued
to the signal officer of 62 Armoured Regiment to come up on C2A link. On 6 December speech circuits Ferozepur –
Kotkapura and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
– Kotkapura were taken over from the P&T Department. In addition, speech
circuits were provided from F Sector to 1 Armoured Division and 116 Infantry
Brigade on existing PL routes in the area.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
8 December morning an intercept was received that the enemy is likely to bomb
all headquarters between 0900 and 1000 hours. One Pakistani aircraft came over
Kotkapura at 1000 hours and was engaged by own anti-aircraft guns. The aircraft
made two attempts to dive but fled without attacking. A similar intercept was
received on 9 December which gave out the exact grid reference of all
headquarters that were to be attacked. However, no aircraft were seen that day.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Between 7 and 15 December, nine
officers joined the unit, most of them from CME and MCTE. They were Captains S.
Nambirajan, A.K. Banerjee, M.N. Thadani, N.S. Vasavan, D.R. Bhatiani, S.K.
Chopra, S. Kulkarni and P. Dass. On 16
December Pakistani forces in <st1:place w:st="on">East Bengal</st1:place>
surrendered and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
unilaterally declared a cease fire with effect from 2000 hours on 17 December.
Though the war was officially over, shelling continued in some areas. On 17
December the advance party of 50 (Indep) Parachute Brigade reached Malout and
was provided communications from F Sector and 1 Armoured Brigade. On 18 December, the cease fire came into
effect along the Western Front. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The unit was located at Ferozepore
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R.
S. Trehan with Major </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">I.M.
Dawer as the </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">second-in-command. </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Other
officers holding important appointments were </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Major </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">H.C. Malhotra (HQ
Company); Major S.P. Karir (1 Company) and Major S.S. Bains (2 Company). The officers in the brigade signal companies
were </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Major </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">S.C.
Nautiyal (48 Brigade); Major D.A.P. Christy Davis (29 Brigade) and Captain V.K.
Chadha (65 Brigade).</span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 14 October the unit moved to its
concentration area at Patti Crossing. Three days later, it moved to its
operational location at Manakpura. The unit’s induction had an ominous
beginning, with the radio relay terminal of 29 Infantry Brigade catching fire
in the unit lines. After settling down
in the new location communications were established with the brigades and
rearwards with corps headquarters. In early November, the unit sent three radio
detachments to 15 Infantry Division for Plan ‘Delta’. Ferozepore being located close to the border,
it was vulnerable to artillery shelling. To prevent damage to communication
centres blast walls were built around the exchange and signal centre. The
P&T carrier centre at Ferozepore was sand bagged to protect it from damage
due to enemy shelling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 2 December the Deputy SO-in-C
visited the unit along with a team of officers from the P&T Department. On
3 December the enemy commenced hostilities in 7 Infantry Divisional sector by
intensive shelling of border out posts (BOPS) followed by a limited offensive
in Hussainiwala which was held by an
infantry brigade supported by approximately two squadrons of armour. Due to
heavy shelling, line communications to Hussainiwala were disrupted. </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Working through </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">continuous
shelling, the line was restored by unit linemen led by Captain Rajbir Singh of 35 Infantry Brigade Signal Company, which had
been placed under 7 Infantry Division for the operations. Indian artillery was
able to retaliate effectively, thanks to excellent line and radio
communications. A direct channel on
radio relay as stand by to line was provided from the artillery command post to
the fire direction centre at Ferozepore.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> There was considerable damage to the
PL routes in this sector due to shelling.
However, circuits were restored promptly. A large number of lateral and duplicate lines
had been provided and there was no disruption in communications. To boost outgoing
signals, mini amplifiers were installed in the telephones of commanders down to
battalion level. On <st1:date day="6" month="12" w:st="on" year="1935">6
December 35</st1:date> Infantry Brigade reverted to its parent formation, 14
Infantry Division. Operation ‘Lightning’ was conducted by 48 Infantry Brigade
the same night and the enemy thrown out of Sehjra bulge. Line detachments of 2 Company and 48 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company gave a good account of themselves in providing
uninterrupted communications in spite of heavy shelling by the enemy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the night of 7/8 December, 14
Rajput carried out their attack for which the battalion radio detachment of 65
Infantry Brigade Signal Company provided good communications. Signalman Surendera Pandey of the detachment
was reported missing during the battle but subsequently joined the battalion
after about 12 hours. Between 13 and 16 December four officers joined the unit
from MCTE, on termination of the SODE course. They were Captains S.K. Jain,
T.L. Francis, V.D.S. Mehra and B.P.S. Virk. The operations ended on <st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">17 December 1971</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7 Infantry Divisional did not carry
out any major offensive during Operation ‘Cactus Lily”, except for the
clearance of the Sehjra bulge by 48 Infantry Brigade. However, the unit did a
commendable job and there was no instance of communication failure. Lance Naik
Sri Kant of 48 Infantry Brigade Signal Company was awarded a
Mention-In-Despatches for his courageous action during the war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Clement</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Town</st1:placetype></st1:place>
in Dehradun under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Coutts, with Major
S.K. Behl as his second-in-command. The other officers holding important
appointments were Major R.N. Lambah (1 Company); Major D.S. Rautela (2
Company); Captain K.N. Thapliyal (HQ Company); Lieutenant K.I. Balasubramanian
(adjutant); and Captain S.D. Sharma (quartermaster). The officers in the
brigades signal companies were Captain Rajbir Singh (35 Infantry Brigade);
Major S.K. Datta (58 Infantry Brigade) and Major D.S. Cheema (115 Infantry
Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="11" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">11 October 1971</st1:date> the unit
received the warning order for move to the concentration area. The brigade
signal companies moved with their respective formation headquarters on 13 and
14 October, followed by the main and rear elements of the unit which moved on
17 and 18 October. The final destination was not disclosed until the first night
halt at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Patiala</st1:place></st1:city>
on 17 October, when it became known that the main and rear divisional
headquarters would be in area Bir Chahal, near Faridkot. 35 Infantry Brigade
was at Ferozepore, <st1:metricconverter productid="35 km" w:st="on">35 km</st1:metricconverter>
away and under command 7 Infantry Division; 58 Infantry Brigade was at Ajnala, <st1:metricconverter productid="150 km" w:st="on">150 km</st1:metricconverter> away under command 15
Infantry Division; while 116 Infantry Brigade was at Muktsar, <st1:metricconverter productid="45 km" w:st="on">45 km</st1:metricconverter> away as corps reserve.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By the end of October the unit was
settled in its new location and communications had stabilised. On 2 November
Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Sibal, Army HQ Liaison Officer visited the unit and 116
Infantry Brigade. On the same day Colonel H.S. Gill, Major Y.M. Narula and
Major K.V. Nair from MCTE visited the unit to carry out traffic scrutiny and analysis. On 12 November the unit sent five radio
detachments (three with RS 42 and two with
C11/R210) to 15 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Amritsar, for special a communication task (Plan
Delta). Shortly afterwards ten radio detachments (AN/PRC 25 with boosters) were
sent to Main HQ XI Corps for Plan Delta.
One air support tentacle (divisional terminal) was withdrawn from the
unit by HQ XI Corps and an adhoc tentacle was kept as standby. Three radio
detachments (C11/R210) were sent to Ganganagar under Second Lieutenant R. Kohli
for monitoring tasks. The detachments were deployed at Mukkalnwala, Mirzawala
and Karanpur to monitor enemy links and pass any information if picked up. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit suffered its first fatal casualty on 25 November when Lance Naik M. G.
Narayan Pillai of 2 Company died due to bunker collapse in 58 Infantry Brigade
location at Ajnala. He was inside the
bunker with his radio relay set when at about <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>, the bunker roof collapsed over him. Major
Rautela and Captain D.K. Sharma with a party of one JCO and ten OR attended the
cremation at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 29 November the CO left for
reconnaissance of the forward location near Jalalabad after information was
received that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was likely to attack that night. The GOC’s Rover, one DR and one line detachment
also left for the same location. The CO
returned at about 0400 hours next morning when it was confirmed that it was a
false alarm. However, the unit was kept in a state of readiness throughout the
night. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 3 December enemy aircraft
attacked several Indian airfields including Faridkot. Heavy shelling took place
in 35 Infantry Brigade throughout the night. Radio silence was lifted next day
at 1300 hours. In the evening line parties were sent to replace field cable by
carrier quad between main and tactical headquarters of 116 Infantry Brigade and
to patch it on PL to the divisional headquarters. Second Lieutenant Joshi also
left with an Ericsson exchange, BBFU and S+DX (3A) with the task of
establishing communications between main and tactical headquarters of 116
Infantry Brigade. At about 2140 hours
information was received that the 1-Ton Nissan truck in which Joshi was travelling
collided with a 3-Ton vehicle on Sadik-Muktsar road. Joshi and the driver Signalman
T. Sasidaran sustained minor injuries and were later admitted to the
hospital. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Next morning radio relay
communications were established with 116 Infantry Brigade and two speech
channels extended to the exchange. Radio
communications on D1 and D2 were established with 35 Infantry Brigade and the
sets kept on listening watch. A radio
relay link with Advance HQ XI Corps was also established and closed after
trials. Meanwhile Second Lieutenant
Kohli along with three radio detachments returned from Ganganagar after
completion of his monitoring task. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="5" month="11" w:st="on" year="1935">5 November, 35</st1:date> Infantry
Brigade reverted to 14 Infantry Division. Captain D.K. Sharma was sent with a
terminal to establish a radio relay link to the brigade. The carrier quad laid
to provide a direct line to the brigade developed a fault which was rectified
only next day at 1500 hours. On 6 December the GOC, Major General H.K. Bakshi
was injured in a mine blast and had to be hospitalized. A telephone was
provided to him in the military hospital, Fardikot by M Communication Zone
Signal Regiment. After a few days, Major General O.S. Kalkat was appointed the
new GOC. On 14 December three officers reported to the unit from the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Military Engineering</st1:placename></st1:place> after their courses
were suspended. They were Captains I.S. Bhinder, Ujagar Singh and A. S. Pujji. Next day Captain V.K. Grover who was
undergoing the course at the MCTE reported to the unit. The cease fire came
into effect at 2000 hours on 17 December. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>, under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel S. Mohan, with Major A.B. Singh as the second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were Major
Sharma (1 Company); Major J.W. Hunt (38 Brigade) Major H.S. Chahal (96 Brigade)
and Major B.K Rattan (54 Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit moved to its operational
location in early October 1971. By 10 October lines had been laid to 86, 96 and
54 Infantry Brigades and 14 (Indep) Armoured Brigade. Line communication with 38 Infantry Brigade,
which had concentrated at Khasa was established temporarily through 56 Armoured
Regiment exchange. Three junction lines were provided from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> to Main HQ 15 Infantry Division.
Within the next few days, radio relay links were also established with
brigades. On <st1:date day="19" month="10" w:st="on" year="1958">19 October, 58</st1:date>
Infantry Brigade located at Rajasansi was also placed under the division.
Communication was provided to the brigade by extending UG cable from Gumtala
bridge. The brigade subsequently moved to Ajnala where it was given a line from
the local exchange. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the months of November efforts to improve the communication layout continued.
Lines were buried wherever possible and laterals were laid between brigades.
The number of junction lines to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
was increased to seven to cater for the increase in traffic. In 38 Brigade
sector the BSF lines were integrated with Army lines. On 1 December the Deputy
SO-in-C visited the unit and discussed the problem of shortage of equipment, in
view of the additional brigades allotted to the division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
3 December Pakistani aircraft attacked Rajasansi airfield. Shortly after <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time> the line to Khangarh was
disrupted due to heavy shelling and an enemy attack was expected. Havildar K.S.
Negi went out and restored the line, working under shelling for more than two
hours. At 0500 hours another attack on Ranian was expected and the line from HQ
54 Infantry Brigade to 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> went out. Signalman Phool Singh the line detachment commander
went out with his line party and repaired the line under intense enemy
shelling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
the move of 86 Infantry Brigade to Dera Baba Nanak, certain changes were made
in the existing line communications. In
order to provide communications to 21 (Indep) Artillery Brigade that had moved
to the location earlier occupied by HQ 86 Infantry Brigade, the existing line
to the latter was split at Ajnala and terminated on Ajnala exchange. One pair going from Ajnala towards Batala was
terminated on Fatehgarh Churian exchange.
The second pair from Ajnala was given to HQ 14 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade. Of the two pairs from Batala to
Ajnala one was terminated on Fategarh Churian exchange and the other given
directly to 21 (Indep) Artillery Brigade.
An additional line was provided to HQ 86 Infantry Brigade from Ajnala
via Ramdas. This line was disrupted due to shelling at about 2300 hours but was
restored at 0230 hours next morning. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the night of 4/5 December,
during the capture of the Pakistani post
at Therpura, Signalman Keshri Prasad
Pandey of 58 Infantry Brigade Signal Company extended a line from Rajatal to
Therpura. In spite of enemy shelling, he carried out repairs and kept the line
through. At about 0100 hours on 6 December the line to HQ 86 Infantry Brigade
was again disrupted. The corps commander was put through to GOC 15 Infantry
Division at the location of HQ 86 Infantry Brigade on radio relay. Meanwhile,
line parties dispatched from Ajnala and Batala restored the line at 0300 hours.
The GOC was given a RS AN/PRC 25 for listening in on the B1 net. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the capture of Dera Baba
Nanak on 6 December there was a lull in the battle in the divisional
sector. However, at about 1730 hours on
10 December it was learned that the enemy tanks were was building up opposite
Ranian, which was subjected to heavy shelling at 1800 hours. The line to 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
was out and there was a lot of interference on the radio also. Signalman Ram Bahadur Singh went out and
restored it three times during the night, working on the line for more than four hours under
heavy shelling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
11 December a reserve VHF radio detachment was dispatched to HQ 96 Infantry
Brigade to supplement their resources.
During the battle of Fatehpur the same night radio was extensively used
by the brigade and proved very reliable.
Lance Naik Mira Singh Adhikari of 96 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
located at Chuchak Wal repaired the line to Dagtoot under heavy enemy shelling
and MMG fire. The line went out several
times but the NCO repaired it on every instance in a very short time. After the capture of Fatehpur post the NCO
also extended line from Dagtoot to Fatehpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 15 December Pakistani aircraft
strafed the railway station at Gurdaspur and damaged the PL route passing
through. The unit line party had a
narrow escape but 16 P&T hired labourers sustained injuries. The same evening a detachment from the wireless
experimental company with VHF Receivers D 28 was sent to Ajnala to intercept
enemy radio transmissions. The detachment was augmented by Captain K.G. Kutty
and two operators of the unit. Next day Captain Kutty was sent with the
detachment again to intercept enemy radio towards area Attari. He intercepted enemy transmissions but could
not interpret them as all transmissions were made in Pashto. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Shortly
before the cease fire was declared on 17 December the enemy started shelling HQ
54 Infantry Brigade. An enemy attack was
also building up opposite Ranian.
However, there was no line communication with 54 Infantry Brigade. Signalman Kashi Ram repaired the lateral line
between 96 and 54 Infantry Brigade spending more than three hours under heavy
shelling at Khamashke. Subsequently this
line was directly given to the operations room at Main HQ 15 Infantry Division
and used for passing important orders to the brigade.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">1 Armoured Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The unit
was at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>,
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel B.L. Kapoor, with </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major
Dinesh Chandra as the second-in-command. Other officers holding important
appointments were Major B.S. Dhillon (HQ Company); Major Gurbhej
Singh (1 & 2 Company) and Major P.S. Modak (43 Armoured Brigade)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit mobilized for Operation
‘Cactus Lily’ in mid October 1971. The advance party moved on 14 October,
followed by the harbour party and main body on 15 and 16 October respectively.
After staging halts at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mathura</st1:place></st1:city>
and Hissar, the unit reached its new location near Kilometre 4 on Muktsar-Sadiq
road on 18 October. HQ 1 Artillery Brigade was deployed in area Bura Gujar; 1
Armoured Brigade at Kotli Dewan and 43 Armoured Brigade north of Bura Gujar at
Km 10 on Muktasar-Sadik road. A signal centre was established and lines were
laid to the brigades by the harbour parties before the arrival of the main
body. After the arrival of Advance HQ XI Corps at Kotkapura speech and
telegraphs circuits were extended including an ECL circuit on 25 October. On 5
November the unit was ordered to move to a new location but these orders were
subsequently cancelled. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit remained at Muktasar
during the operations as 1 Armoured Division played no active role in Operation
‘Cactus Lily’. Captain Nikhil Kumar, who joined the unit from CME along with several other after the war
started relates some interesting highlights in these words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I was appointed as OC
Radio Section and sent as the rover officer to the GOC. The Rover group in the
Division consisted of five Topaz APCs in addition to the command troop of the
Divisional HQ Squadron. One APC was fitted with a 400 watt HP Radio set for
communication on the C1 (Rover) with the Corps HQ, another was fitted out as an
ad hoc ACT for effective close air support. The third APC was the command APC
in which communications were provided on the D1 as also facilities to listen on
to the three brigade B1 nets. The C1 extended a remote facility to this APC.
One APC was fitted out with two C41/R222 radio relay sets for speech and text
communications with the divisional HQ. The fifth APC was the administrative APC
for use by the GOC.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This setup of
communications for a rover group as early as 1971 was ground breaking and
futuristic. All the modifications for fitting these communication equipment
into the APCs was designed by the Regiment and executed in conjunction with the
EME workshop in a record time prior to mobilisation.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Rover Group was located in the cotton fields close to a Canal Inspection
Bungalow. While the GOC, the C Arty, G1 Ops and personal staff stayed in the
IB, we made ourselves comfortable by digging a trench under an APC and using a
stretcher as a bed. It was cold but a safe and comfortable home for those few
months. One had to deal with the large field rats though<b>!<o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">I Corps Signals <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ
I Corps was located in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mathura</st1:place></st1:city>.
The CSO was Brigadier J.S Nanda and Major J.P Singh was performing the duties
of SO2 (Signals). I Corps Signal
Regiment was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R.K. Gupte, with Major
G.K. Bhagat the second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were
Major S.S Sahney (1 Company), Major J.S. Sawhney (2 Company); Major K.B. Vohra
(3 Company) and Major M.S. Minhas (HQ Company). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; tab-stops: 63.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Orders for
mobilisation were received by the unit on <st1:date day="1" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">1 October 1971</st1:date>. A day earlier the CO had left
for a reconnaissance of the operational area along with the brigadier general
staff, HQ I Corps. A party of 20 OR from 1 Company under a JCO was immediately
despatched to Pathankot for liaison with the P&T Department, taking over of
circuits and extension of local leads. Line parties of the unit along with
those of M Communication Zone Signal Regiment proceeded to lay a 7 pair VIR to
extend the UG cable from the carrier centre. To supplement the strength of
personnel at Pathankot, another party of two JCOs and 31 OR was despatched from
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mathura</st1:place></st1:city> by road
on 7 October. A day later, Major S.S. Sahney also left with a small party for
movement control duties during move of the corps headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
main body of I Corps Signal
Regiment left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mathura</st1:place></st1:city>
on 11 October and reached its concentration area at Pathankot on 15 October,
after overnight halts en route at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
Ambala and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
The heavy baggage and vehicles were transported in two special trains, reaching
on 18 and 19 October. On 20 October the Deputy SO-in-C accompanied by Mr.
Shenoy, member P&T Board visited the signal centre along with several other
officers. During the next few days, officers of the unit proceeded in turn for
a reconnaissance of the operational area near Samba. Lines were laid from the
projected location to other formations and suitable locations identified for
relay stations for radio relay links. Work on preparation of defences was also
taken in hand along with setting up the communications facilities. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A number of civil trucks was
allotted to the unit for carriage of defence stores and heavy baggage to the
operational location between 15 and 17 November. The warning order for the move
to Samba was received on 1 December. The move of the unit commenced soon after
mid night and by 1000 hours next morning the unit had reached the operational
location. Communications were established to subordinate and neighbouring
formations and rearwards to HQ Western Command and Army HQ. Carrier systems
installed were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8 channel systems
Pathankot – Samba and Samba – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3 channel stackable
systems Pathankot – Samba, Pathankot – Dinanagar, and Samba -Main HQ 39
Infantry Division.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3 channel composite
system between Samba and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo6; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ACT (1+4) 3A between
Samba and Main HQ 54 Infantry Division.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Speech circuits were working to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>, Udhampur, Pathankot, Ranjit Camp (HQ
XI Corps); 36, 39 & 54 Divisions; 2 & 16 (Indep) Armoured Brigades; and
31 (Indep) & I Corps Artillery Brigades. In addition, hotlines were provided
to HQ Western Command and all divisions.
Telegraph circuits were established with Udhampur, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>, Ranjit Camp (HQ XI Corps) and
Pathankot. An ECL circuits was established between operations rooms at HQ I
Corps and HQ Western Command. The radio links working from Samba were C1, C1A,
C1B, C2, C2A, C3, C3A, C8, C21, WIC, W19, W25 and A 46. Radio relay links were
established to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
(12 channels, via relay at Dalhousie); Pathankot (12 channels); and Main HQ 36,
39 & 54 Infantry Divisions (4 channels each). <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 7 December four enemy aircraft
(MIG 19) flew over the unit area. A
light machine gun mounted for anti aircraft role opened fire. On 9 December a
speech circuit was extended to ‘X’ Sector comprising 168 and 323 Infantry
Brigades. Manpower and equipment including a radio relay detachment was sent
from the unit to provide communications to ‘X’ sector. On 10 December
information was received that some para troops have been dropped by the enemy
about a kilometre away from the corps headquarters. Patrols were sent out but they returned
without any news of the enemy. On 14 December Captain A.K. Dube, Captain R.M.
Awasthi and Lieutenant U. Dasgupta reported on posting from MCTE, Mhow. Captain
Alind Dayal had also reported a few days earlier on termination of the SODE
course. A day later another five officers reported on posting from CME and
MCTE. They were Captains D.B. Bhide, R.S. Bhatia, Rajeshwar Singh, Mohar Singh
and J.P.N. Srivastava. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
1630 hours on 16 December news of the Pakistani surrender in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> was broadcast by All India Radio. At 2330 hours the same night the sound of
light machine gun fire was heard and the unit was ordered to stand to. About 30
to 40 rounds appeared to have been fired.
The unit was ordered to stand to and a patrol was sent out to
investigate. It was learned that that fire was opened by the guard of 73 Medium
Regiment located nearby. At about 1300
hours on 17 December enemy aircraft circled over the unit area but were chased
away by anti aircraft fire. A similar attempt was made at 1500 hours. Shortly
afterwards information was received from M Communication Zone Signal Regiment
that Captain Mohar Singh had been injured in the strafing carried out in 54
Infantry Divisional area. The officer
was removed to the section hospital but was discharged after treatment as the
injuries were minor. The cease fire came
into effect the same day and the operations ended. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">54 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">54
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was at Secunderabad under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Malik. The other field officers in the unit were Major
M.S. Ahluwalia (second-in-command) and Major R.N. Dhawan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit received the warning order
for mobilisation on <st1:date day="26" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">26
August 1971</st1:date>. On 4 October a liaison group under the second-in-command
left for the concentration area. The main body of the unit left Secunderabad by
a military special train on 8 October arriving at Kartarpur on 12 October,
further move to Pathankot being carried out by road. The unit reached its concentration
area near village Wat Mangaon on 14 October. The move to the operational
location at Deani was carried out on 20 October. Two days later, 168 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company was placed under command 54 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 15 November the SO-in-C visited
the unit accompanied by CSO Western Command and CSO I Corps. He was highly
appreciative of the loop antenna fitted on rover jeep for radio communication
on the move. On 22 November information was received of a possible Pakistani
air raid during the next 48 hours. On 28 November there was an unfortunate
accident in the unit. After morning ‘stand to’ Signalman Uday Prasad Rai died
of gunshot wounds and Naik Dew Ram was injured when the <st1:metricconverter productid="9 mm" w:st="on">9 mm</st1:metricconverter> SAF carbine of Signalman
Jit Bahadur Rai went off by accident. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Codeword ‘Barish’ indicating
commencement of hostilities was received at 2345 hours on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date>. Next evening at 1730
hours all brigades moved to their firm bases except for 74 Infantry
Brigade. At the same time 168 Infantry
Brigade Group moved out of command of the division. As planned the troops
crossed the border at 2000 hours on 5 December and eliminated the border
outposts by next morning. The operation was conducted by 16 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade, 47 Infantry Brigade and 91 Infantry Brigade. The GOC’s rover was
located in Chamnakhurd, one of the border outposts that had been captured. A
line was laid between 47 and 91 Brigades at the new location. PL routes and cable were badly damaged due to
movement of tanks during the night. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For the next phase of the operation
– establishment of a bridgehead across the minefield - the main divisional headquarters moved to
area Mawa on the night of 6/7 December. On 8 December four Pakistani Sabre jets
strafed and bombed the main divisional headquarters and gun position areas
located nearby. A portion of the village Mawa was seen burning. At 2100 hours on 11 December an aircraft
emitting coloured light flew over the main divisional headquarters and forward
locations. It was assumed to have taken air photos with infra-red equipment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="12" month="12" w:st="on" year="1972">12 December 72</st1:date> Infantry
Brigade was placed under command 54 Infantry Division. A line was laid from
Main HQ 54 Infantry Division to 72 Infantry Brigade. However, next morning the
brigade moved to Shahbazpur, necessitating patching of the line from the old
location. Apparently, the communications to 72 Infantry Brigade were
unsatisfactory, as recounted by Major V.R.P. Sarathy, OC 72 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company, who writes:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When the brigade
was put under 54 Infantry Division the CO 54 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment (perhaps having already stretched his signal resources) could not
provide line and RR communication and signal centre traffic outlet to our
brigade resulting in total absence of
rearward communication (line, RR and traffic clearance facility) for more
than 48 to 72 hours in an actual war! Ad hoc arrangements like patching
up lateral line communication between the two forward battalions of the two
divisions deployed adjacent to each other or patching up our line to 39
Infantry Division from their “step up” to 54 Infantry Division did not work!
There were no dedicated line, RR and telegraph circuits to 54 Infantry Division
despite being under direct command. Surely this would be viewed extremely
adversely in any communication exercise during peace time! Hand written
messages (including death messages of officers and jawans of our formation) had
to be sent directly to Samba (geographically closer than any of the divisional
headquarters) to 1 Corps Signal Centre where they were accepted on course mate
net! <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Being the only available officer in
the company (the second officer authorized but not posted for the entire
duration of the war) the sparrow despite being in the thick of the war and
unable to give satisfactory answers to the brigade staff on absence of
secure rearward (line and RR) communication for talks with higher formations
was forced to go back on a personal visit initially to 54 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment to plead for
direct “rearward” line and RR communication and when that failed had to go and
meet CSO I Corps personally to get rearward line and RR communication and
an outlet to some formation HQ and to signal centre! <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A shocked CSO (Brigadier Nanda)
immediately ordered that we could open RR directly with immediate effect with
the Corps and engineer a telegraph circuit to Corps Signal Centre for traffic
clearance. He also ordered carrier quad communication to our brigade. In the
meanwhile probably on CSO’s instructions the sparrow 72 Infantry Brigade
received C41 crystals from 54 Infantry Division, 36 Infantry Division (with a
relay RR chain) and from I Corps Signal Regt with instructions from each of
them to immediately open links with each! With only one RR terminal, it was
prudent, possible and desirable to open the link with I Corps (geographical
proximity without relay) which was done and communication for higher divisional
HQs provided through the Corps Exchange!</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">12</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
On 14 December the main
divisional headquarters moved to Badala Gujran and 72 Infantry Brigade to area
Dusri. On 16 December eight enemy aircraft strafed the divisional headquarters
area. The GOC’s rover group located at Lagwal was also heavily shelled during
the battle of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Basantar</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>. However, communications
with the rover group and brigades in action was maintained throughout.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Between
14 and 16 December several officers rejoined the unit from CME and MCTE after
suspension of their courses. These were Majors U.S. Tiwari and K.G. Mathews; Captains J.S. Brar, P.K. Malhotra, P.K. Sanyal
and S.R. Biswas. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
17 December enemy aircraft raided HQ 54 Infantry Division nine times during the
day, the duration of each raid being 10 to 15 minutes. At 1650 hours the air defence battery located
near the divisional headquarters shot down one Pakistani aircraft, a Chinese
made MIG-19. During the day Signalman Bhup Singh (DR) was killed and Signalman
Ramanand (DR) was wounded during strafing by enemy aircraft and a 3-ton lorry
was completely burnt. The weapons (two rifles), equipment (four telephones and
six secondary batteries) and documents (personal and official mail of HQ 74
Infantry Brigade Signal Company) being carried in the vehicle were completely
destroyed. The heavy shelling of the location of 16 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> caused the death of Lance Naik B.D.
Rao, who was manning the B1A link of 47 Infantry Brigade. The operations ended with a cease fire at
2000 hours on 17 December. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">36 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The unit was located at Saugor in <st1:place w:st="on">Central India</st1:place> under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Harbans Bahadur with Major S.S. Bains as the second-in-command. Other officers
holding important appointments were Major </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">B.M. Kapoor (1 and 2 Companies), </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain
K.N.A. Narayana (adjutant) and Captain S. S. Davood (quartermaster).
The officers in the brigade signal companies were Major </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">S.P. Sahni (115 Brigade), Major </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">G.V.
Raju (18 Brigade) and Major V.R.P. Sarathy (72 Brigade). <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
October 1971, preparations for concentration of troops for the expected
operations against <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
commenced. On orders of the GOC, Major General B.S. Ahluwalia, the advance
party of HQ 36 Infantry Division moved out by road from Saugor for the
concentration area on 12 October. The advance party was led by Major B.M.
Kapoor, who was commanding both 1 and 2 Companies. For reasons of security,
this large group moved to the concentration area with halts at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gwalior</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mathura</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, Ambala and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. Beyond <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mathura</st1:place></st1:city>, the move was by night. No radio communications were provided during
the move. These long moves during the
night, even with the regulation halts every two hours, were a nightmare for the
drivers who had to think of ways to keep awake and alert. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
advance party reached the concentration area at Namala on Pathankot – Gurdaspur
road on 17 October and was joined by the main body by road and rail on 20
October. By 22 October, full scale line communications had been provided for
the division and its formations which had moved in by then. With 2 (Indep)
Armoured Brigade being placed under command and 72 Infantry Brigade going under command 39 Infantry Division, all
speech and telegraph circuits were reoriented and stabilized.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Planning and preparations for the
likely operations continued during November. Operational plans were rehearsed,
defences strengthened and local defence coordinated. Signal communication plans
were revised and updated, and construction of cable trunk routes to the likely
deployment areas was carried out. Senior commanders frequently visited the
formations and units to discuss the plans. On 28 November, the Prime Minister
visited the division and addressed the troops for which the public address
system was arranged by the unit. Captain
K.N.A. Narayana was the liaison officer with the Prime Minister’s secretary.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the evening of 3 December,
hostilities commenced after air attacks by Pakistani aircraft on Pathankot
airfield. Air raid precautions were brought into effect and the communication
centre moved underground. On 4 December, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade went out of
command of the division. The codeword for commencement of operations was
received and radio sets put on listening watch. With the advance of the
division into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
the divisional headquarters moved to a new location at Dodwan on 8 December and
communications to formations were provided accordingly. Rearward channels to
corps headquarters were put through on ACT (1+4) mounted on a PL pair extended
with spaced WD1 cable. Standby circuits
provided using ACT (1+4) on carrier quad were not commercial due to line
losses.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With the changing operational
situation, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade and 87 Infantry Brigade came under
command. The divisional headquarters moved into its first location inside <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> at
Nainakot on the night of 13/14 December and full scale communications were
rapidly established. Though line parties
had often come under fire and air attacks, the divisional headquarters and
Signals area experienced their first air raid at 1545 hours on 14 December,
when seven enemy MIGs strafed its location.
The incident has been described by Brigadier B.M. Kapoor in these
words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">All of us in the trenches watched the air attack and
the dogfight. And suddenly there were two bombs descending from the skies. We,
the Signallers, had a prayer on our lips that no hits come on to the
Communication Centre. The bombs landed right in the Div HQ area; we waited with
bated breath till we realized that these were not bombs but petrol tanks
ejected by the warplanes! These became our war trophies. There were no casualties
during this attack.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">13</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit had so far worked with reduced
scales of officers throughout, but finally got reinforcements of five officers
between 14 and 16 December, when Captains O. P. Bhatia, J. R. Purohit, Om
Prakash, S.B. Moitra and G.B. Tripathi reported to the unit from MCTE. The
cease fire was ordered on 17 December. During the subsequent period defences
were strengthened with bricks and line routes improved. The communications were
rationalized, lateral lines between brigades put through, and all lines to
brigades built up on ballies/trees/ poles. The SO-in-C visited the unit
accompanied by CSO Western Command and CSO I Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> For
their dedicated and outstanding work during the operations, three persons of
the unit, Lance Havildar Hari Ram, Naik Sansar Singh, Lance Naik Balbir Singh
and Signalman Randhir Singh were ‘Mentioned-In-Despatches’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">39 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">39
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was located at Yol Camp in Himachal
Pradesh, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel T.S. Anand, with </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Major K.K. Lakhanpal as the second-in-command. The other
field officers in the unit were Major S.S. Kapoor and </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major
R.B. Sharma.</span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
mid October 1971 the unit received orders to move to its concentration area
north of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ravi</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. Towards the middle of November the unit moved to
its operational location at Badali. 323 Brigade had moved to area Chak Chatakan
and placed under command 54 Division, while 72 Brigade ex 36 Division had been
placed under command 39 Division and moved to area Chak Mathal. 168 Brigade was located at Gadwal. On 18 November, 16 (Independent) Armoured
Brigade went out of command and was placed under 54 Division. On <st1:date day="24" month="11" w:st="on" year="1933">24 November 33</st1:date> Brigade had moved to Surankot and placed
under command 25 Division.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 2 December communication was
established with the corps signal centre which opened at Samba at 1400 hours.
On 3 December, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade moved to general area Jasrota and was
provided with two pairs of line on WD-1cable.
The same night radio silence was lifted.
At 2300 hours on 4 December the main divisional headquarters moved to
area Chappar. HQ 72 Brigade and 2
(Indep) Armoured Brigade moved and established at Rajpura and Sanora
respectively. Radio relay and radio
communications were established with both and line communication re-established
from area Chappar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
5 December<b> </b>Major Lakhanpal and
Second-Lieutenant Surinder Tyagi with two line detachments and a radio
detachment moved to Rajpura for MFC communication. Meanwhile the rear
divisional headquarters moved to area Jasrota on the night of 5/6 December and
to area Dayala Chak on the night of 7/8 December. The step up divisional headquarters had also
moved forward and line communications extended to 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade
and FDC. On 8 December Major R.B. Sharma was sent to Badali to establish ‘X’
Sector communication. The same day the reconnaissance and layout group moved to
area Nidhala where the main headquarters was to move that night but the move
was cancelled. However, HQ 72 Brigade moved to Bhopalpur, 2 (Independent)
Armoured Brigade to Chechwal and the FDC to Sarthikalan.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To establish line communications
Major S.S. Kapoor was sent to 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade with a line party on 9
December. Line communication with 72
Brigade was also established from the step up divisional headquarters at
Nidhala where Major Lakhnapal was stationed.
Second-Lieutenant L.K. Toshakhani stayed on with 72 Brigade with a line
party. After establishing communications with 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade Major
Kapoor returned to Nidhala relieving the second-in- command who proceeded to
the main divisional headquarters on 10 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
11 December there was an<b> </b>air raid
over 72 Brigade, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade and FDC. Three men from 39 Artillery Brigade Signal
Company were killed while two who were seriously injured were evacuated to the
section hospital at Samba, where one later died. On 12 December Main HQ 39
Division moved to area Badli. On 12
December line communication was established with 168 Infantry Brigade, 323
Infantry Brigade and 16 Cavalry which were at Keranwali, Chak Chatakan and
Sarwa respectively. During the next few days several officers reported to the
unit on posting. These were Captains S.S. Ahluwalia, R.N. Ganguly, I.P.
Khullar, V.K. Rao and Jaya Shanker. The
operation ended on 17 December and the cease fire came into effect at 2000
hours.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Z Communication Zone
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"> The unit was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Y.R. Ratra with Major Y.P. Mittoo as the second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were
Majors C.P. Khanna, Mehta and R.K. Bakshi, who joined after the commencement of
the operations from MCTE. With the move of HQ XI Corps to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> and Kotkapura, the unit also moved
to Faridkot in early October 1971. Before it moved, the unit had laid the local
leads for HQ Western Command which was due to arrive in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> shortly. It also sent detachments
to the airfields at Halwara, Pathankot, Adampur, Sirsa and Nal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though the unit was located at
Faridkot, it had to send out a large number of detachments to other stations.
It took over the static signal centres at Ferozepore and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> from 7 and 15 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiments respectively when they moved to their operational locations.
The unit also provided line communications for the corps/divisional maintenance
areas at <b> </b>Bhatinda, Kotkapura and Jandiala
Guru. Maintenance teams of the unit were
deployed at P&T carrier centres at Bhatinda, Abohar, Fazilka and
Sriganganagar. The unit provided one complete shift for the signal centre,
crypto centre and exchange at both Advance and Main HQ XI Corps. In addition,
manpower was sent to F Sector Signal Regiment at Abohar to assist the unit in
manning the signal centre in view of its commitments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB"> </span></b><span lang="EN-US">Another important
assignment given to the unit was in connection with Plan ‘Delta’, a deception
plan under HQ Central Command. Though manpower and equipment for the
project was collected from several units, the major component came from Z
Communication Zone Signal Regiment, which provided a composite signal company
under Major Mehta for the task. The
company reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
on 9 November. Signal instructions for the task were issued on 11 November,
with only three copies being distributed -
one each to Brigadier V.C. Khanna, (Plan Director), Major Mehta and 474
Engineer Brigade Signal Section. However, the plan was not implemented and the
company returned to the unit on 9 December.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_3" o:spid="_x0000_i1031"
type="#_x0000_t75" alt="1971.jpg" style='width:358.5pt;height:266.25pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image012.jpg"
o:title="1971" croptop="7305f" cropright="2184f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="1971.jpg" height="355" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image013.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_3" width="478" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Cable being laid across River Ravi
during 1971 operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">The unit was also asked to provide
communications for the ‘Mike’ Force that was created at the same time. For this
purpose one mobile radio detachment (C11/R210) was provided to work on the C2A
net with Advance HQ XI Corps. A line party was also provided by the unit to
extend line communications to this force.
The detachments were sent on 4 December and communications established
on both radio and line from Advance HQ XI Corps and HQ 51 (Indep) Parachute
Brigade. However, later in the day it was learned that the force was not being
deployed and the signal resources were returned.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">M Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">The unit was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Gwalior</st1:place></st1:city> under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel K.M. Upadhyaya. The other field officer in the unit was Major J.S.
Minhas. In mid October 1971 the unit moved to Pathankot to take part in
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. The unit subsequently moved to Samba towards the end
of November where it remained until the end of the war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was responsible for
manning the carrier centres at Pathankot and Samba, the exchange and local
telephones at the corps maintenance area (CMA) at Mirthal; and communications
at the airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. The unit provided some
manpower for signal centres duties at the main and rear headquarters of I
Corps. The unit was involved in the construction and maintenance of PL routes
in the area. It also laid field cable routes to formations deployed on the
border, including laterals. Maintenance
detachments were provided to formations at the scale of one per division along
the line of communication including line detachments at carrier centres for
fault control.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">1 Air Support Signal
Regiment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
unit was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.K. Ghorai, the other field
officers being Majors S.N. Capoor (1 Company), S. Ganguli (2 Company), and R.S
Arora (3 Company). In addition, Major P.D. Gera was recalled from reserve and
reported to the unit in October 1971. The regimental headquarters and 1 Company
were at Delhi Cantt., 2 Company at Udhampur, while 3 Company was at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. Shortly before
the commencement of Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, the regimental headquarters moved
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
where HQ Western command had been established. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the months of October and November air support tentacles and airfield
detachments were sent to join their respective formations. Radio sets GU-734 were issued to all
detachments for air to ground communications after carrying out suitable
modifications to match the frequencies being used by the aircraft. New crystals
were received from Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) just a few days before the
operations started. Extensive trials were carried out at Adampur during the
last week of November to test their working with aircraft. The crystals were distributed to companies on
3 December, the day the operations started.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 4 December, 15 ground plane
antennae received from Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) were distributed to
companies. All sets opened up and became
active as demands for close air support began to be initiated. Being located
with the forward troops, there were many instances of damage to equipment and
transport of tentacles. On 5 December the radio sets of the tentacle with 52
Infantry Brigade were destroyed due to enemy shelling. Next day, intimation was received from HQ 14
(Indep) Armoured Brigade that the tank in which the forward air controller
(FAC) of 71 Armoured Regiment was travelling along with two radio sets GU 734
was hit by enemy fire. Both the radio
sets were destroyed. Another tentacle was immediately sent to replace the destroyed
sets. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 7 December the tentacle with 191
Brigade in the Chhamb sector was completely destroyed due to enemy shelling.
The vehicle, equipment and documents as well as the personal kits of all men was
lost in the shelling. A few days later, on 11 December the tentacle with 93
Brigade suffered a similar fate. On 12
December the tentacle with 68 Infantry Brigade was also destroyed due to enemy
shelling. On 14 December enemy aircraft strafed 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade in
the Gurdaspur sector. Signalman Suleh Singh Yadav who was part of the tentacle
sustained injuries and was evacuated to the hospital. The equipment and
documents of the tentacle were damaged due the strafing. The cease fire came
into effect on 17 December. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1 Air Formation Signal
Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The regimental headquarters of unit
was located at Palam in Delhi Cantt., with 1 and 2 Company at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city> respectively. The unit was under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel K.C. Sud. The only other field officer in the
unit was Major P.N. Baveja. The unit was under the technical and administrative
control of the Chief Air Formation Signal Officer, Air Headquarters, Colonel
K.K. Poonawalla. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit took part in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ from 4 to <st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">17 December, 1971</st1:date>. Detachments of the
unit were located with various Air Force units such as Leh, Srinagar, Udhampur,
Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar, Jullundur, Ambala, Halwara, Adampur, Chandigarh,
Kotkapura, Faridkot, Abohar, Barnala, Sirsa, Bikaner, Nal, Jodhpur, Utarlai,
Jaisalmer, Jamnagar, Baroda, Rajokri, Hindon, Tilpat Range (Delhi) and Delhi
Cantt.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">51 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
company was located at Ambala under the command of Major C.J. Appachu. The
other officers in the unit were Captains </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">P.K. Janmeja, </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">S.S. Atri and A.P. Shahane. During
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ the company was placed under command HQ F Sector and
moved to Sadhuwali in August 1971. After spending a little over a month there,
it moved to a new location on the Abohar-Ganganagar road on the outskirts of
Ganganagar town on <st1:date day="6" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">6 October
1971</st1:date>. Two BSF battalions
were placed under command 51 (Independent) Parachute Brigade which was employed
in the role of covering troops. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -2.25pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon after arrival at the new
location, the company established an exchange and took over speech circuit
Raisinghnagar-Ganganagar. A radio relay link was established with HQ F Sector
on which standby speech and telegraph circuits were engineered. For the covering
troops role, speech circuits were provided between Karanpur – Raisinghnagar and
Ganganagar – Karanpur (via Padampur). In addition, tie lines were provided to
the Ganganagar civil exchange. By the
end of October all units in Ganganagar were connected by UG and overhead lines.
The signal centre was also shifted to an underground location. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In November with the move of ‘M’
Force additional speech circuits Ganganagar – Ganeshgarh and Ganganagar –
Kotkapura were taken over. About <st1:metricconverter productid="10 kilometres" w:st="on">10 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> of WD-1 cable was laid to provide
communications to 62 Cavalry on Ganganagar-Suratgarh road. The existing 40 line
exchange was reinforced with a 10 line magneto exchange to meet subscriber
requirements. On 1 December ‘Night Watch’ detachments comprising 40 men each were
placed at Chak 5 FD and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madera</st1:place></st1:city>. On 2 December the
line to ‘M’ Force was very badly cut due to tank movement. The line to covering troops was also
non-commercial. Line parties were sent
immediately to repair both lines. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -2.25pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 38.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio
silence was lifted on 3 December.
Detachments for battalions were despatched and radio communications
established. After this there was little activity until 14 December when a
radio detachment accompanied 3 Para in its raid on Hamewala. On 16 December
another detachment went with 11 Dogra in the attack on Kodewalla post. The same
night a radio detachment accompanied 4 Para in the attack at Lala Bamba post.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -2.25pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 38.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though
cease fire was declared on 17 December, certain operations continued in the
sector. An important action was the attack on Naggi post by 4 Para on the night
of 27/28 December. Before the attack, a line was laid from Karanpur to Naggi
during the night. One line party was positioned at Padampur to ensure that the
Karanpur-Ganganagar line remains through. The attack was launched at <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time> and 30r (opposite Naggi post)
was captured. The battalion lost three officers and 20 OR in the action, with
about 50 being wounded. There was no disruption in line or radio communications
during the operation. Next day the brigade tactical exchange was installed at
Karanpur and the radio detachment at Naggi post was withdrawn.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">SIGNALS IN SOUTHERN COMMAND<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Southern Command Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> HQ Southern Command
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> was
responsible for operations in <st1:place w:st="on">Gujarat</st1:place> and
Rajasthan (less Ganganagar district) along an international border of
approximately <st1:metricconverter productid="1350 km" w:st="on">1350 km</st1:metricconverter>.
The CSO was Brigadier S.K Batra, while the other officers in the Signals Branch
were Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Andhare,
SO 1 (Signals); Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Apte, SO 2 (Communications);
Major B.B. Vishnoi, SO 2 (Cipher & Signal Security) and Captain V.K. Azad,
SO 3 (Signals). Southern Command Signal Regiment was under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel G.Y. Sowani. DCSO Maharashtra & Gujarat Area, which was
responsible for static communications in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>,
was Lieutenant Colonel B.D Bhardwaj, while Major Khorana was commanding
Maharashtra & Gujarat Area Signal Company. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Southern Command theatre of
operations was divided into four sectors, each of which was the operational
responsibility of a different formation. The two infantry divisions – 11 and 12
– were responsible for the Barmer and Jaisalmer sectors respectively. HQ
Bikaner Sector (later re-designated ‘K’ Sector) was responsible for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city> sector while HQ
Bhuj Sector was responsible for the <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>
sector. In the <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city> sectors, the tasks were mainly of a
defensive nature. The initial directives outlining these tasks were issued
during March 1971. Thus a period of about nine months was available between the
commencement of detailed planning and the actual outbreak of hostilities. Since
no corps headquarters was available for this theatre of operations, the
operations were controlled directly by HQ Southern Command which established
itself at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
for this purpose. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
assets initially available to CSO Southern Command in terms of signal
resources, other than the integral signal units of field formations, for
planning of provision of signal communications in the Rajasthan and Gujarat
Sectors were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Southern Command Signal
Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Q Communication Zone
Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Maharashtra &
Gujarat Area Signal Company. <u> </u><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5 (Indep) Air Support
Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Radio Monitoring
Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A signal instruction for the
operations was drawn up by the CSO and issued to all signal units on <st1:date day="25" month="3" w:st="on" year="1971">25 March 1971</st1:date>, so that
signal planning down the chain of command could start. In the absence of a
corps headquarters, HQ Southern Command had to plan for forward communications
to the field formations from the tactical headquarters at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>, as well as rearward communications
both to Army HQ at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and Main HQ Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>.
In addition, it had to arrange manpower for manning of peace time static signal
centres and associated communication complexes at Jaipur, Bhuj, Ahmedabad and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>, as well as
several administrative installations.
Since signal resources available were inadequate to meet all these
requirements, a case for additional resources, which worked out to 739 men, was
projected to Army HQ after approval of the Signals plan by the Army Commander
in early October 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Another area that required attention
was the development of PL routes. The existing routes, most of which were being
used by the BSF, were in poor state of repair and required a lot of maintenance
effort. To cater for the planned advance, additional PL routes had to be built.
These requirements were projected to the Army HQ along with the demand for
additional speech and telegraph circuits. To cater for Tactical HQ Southern
Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>,
the existing 200 line exchange had to be expanded to 400 lines and the number
of T-43 trunk boards increased from two to six. For expansion of the
underground cable network at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>,
seven lengths of 14 pair PCQL type of UG cable totalling <st1:metricconverter productid="56 kilometres" w:st="on">56 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> were
made available to the P & T Department from Army stocks. Demands were also
placed for air defence circuits, which were inadequate or non-existent at many
places. For air support communications, additional tentacles were needed for <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>
sectors. A case for implementing modification ‘E’ to the war establishment of 5
(Indep) Air Support Signal Company was taken up according to which an
additional increment of three brigade tentacles was to be provided.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Extensive
trials on radio relay communications in the theatre of operations were carried
out during the period February to April 1971.
During May an administrative exercise with troops was conducted in the
Rajasthan sector where most of the line communications required for operations
were activated. The poor state of maintenance of the BOPEL routes was detected
during this exercise. As a result, concerted efforts were directed on these
routes and by October these routes had improved a great deal. Work on the
expansion of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
exchange commenced during August and new exchange was commissioned by the
beginning of October, when elements of Southern Command Signal Regiment and the
whole of Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment moved to Rajasthan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
radio communication facilities at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
also had to be enhanced. A number of transmitters were available at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> but no transmitter
station building was available at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
to house them. The existing transmitter station was enlarged and rewired to
cater for the increased number of transmitters. A separate building was also
wired up to function as the receiver station for the command headquarters. The
radio transmitters, receivers and associated equipment which had been collected
from many sources were locally tested and repaired to make them fully
serviceable. Aerial masts for the additional transmitters and receivers were
also constructed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
relay detachments from Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment were positioned
along the 11 Infantry Division axis at Barmer, Ramsar and Munabao and along the
12 Infantry Division axis at Jaisalmer, Ramgarh and Tanot. No radio relay links
were established between Jodhpur – Barmer and Jodhpur – Jaisalmer as no
equipment was available and as it was considered that line communications
between these places were less likely to be disrupted than in areas forward of
Barmer and Jaisalmer.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On <st1:date day="10" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">10 October 1971</st1:date>, Brigadier S.K. Batra presented
the Signals plan for the Southern Command theatre of operations to the SO-in-C
in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. During this presentation the paucity of
signal resources for implementation of the plan was clearly brought out.
Immediately afterwards the SO-in-C ordered six section bricks to be made
available to Southern Command from P Communication Zone Signal Regiment.
Meanwhile, detachments from Andhra (Indep) Sub Area Signal Company and Tamil
Nadu, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mysore</st1:place></st1:city>
and Kerala Area Signal Company were moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> to fill the void created by the move of
a sizable portion of Southern Command Signal Regiment and the whole of Q
Communication Zone Signal Regiment to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>. On 30 November, intimation was received from
Army HQ that a case for the raising of an additional communication zone signal
regiment (H Communication Zone Signal Regiment) for the Southern Command
theatre of operations had been taken up. This case was sanctioned and elements
of H Communication Zone Signal Regiment were able to join the Southern Command
Signals on <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">15 December 1971</st1:date>.
A case was also taken up for augmenting the line construction and maintenance
resources considering the vast area of operations in this theatre. On the same
grounds a case was put up for augmentation of radio relay resources. As a
result one line section ex 1003 (Indep) Line Company was allotted and the
deficiencies in Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment were made up to a
considerable extent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> HQ
Southern Command moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="20" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">20 October 1971</st1:date>.
On 12 November the raising of Kilo Sector Signal Company commenced at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>. On 24 November
orders for raising of H Communication Zone Signal Regiment were received. By <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date>, the signal
communications network was fully functional and the radio and radio relay
communications ready to open on lifting of radio silence. The radio and line
diagrams are shown on the following pages.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1032"
type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:486pt;height:435.75pt'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image014.jpg"
o:title="radio" cropbottom="2075f" cropleft="2300f" cropright="1150f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="581" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image015.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1032" width="648" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="439" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image017.gif" v:shapes="_x0000_i1033" width="616" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> For
the advance of 11 Division on the Barmer - Munabao axis, the divisional
headquarters was initially located at Ranasar. During this period only line
communication was provided by making use of existing PL pairs on routes between
Barmer and Munabao along the road and railway alignments. For formation
headquarters located away from the alignments, line was extended by using field
cable. A few days before launching the divisional advance on the night of 4/5
December, Main HQ 11 Division moved from Ranasar to Jaisindhar. The divisional
centre line was the axis Munabao –Nayachor.
Initially field cable was laid along this axis but soon the
international PL route along this axis was repaired and made serviceable. This route had three 300- lb. copper pairs
which could be utilized to provide a number of essential circuits. Since the rate of advance was very fast the
distance between divisional headquarters and forward troops tended to get
stretched. Communications with the GOC’s
rover group which was advancing close behind the forward brigade also became
difficult. A forward communication
centre was, therefore, established at Khokropar. By 8 December, the forward brigade advancing
along the centre line had gone about <st1:metricconverter productid="55 kilometres" w:st="on">55 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> ahead
of the main divisional headquarters, which was, therefore, ordered to move to
Rahal, a distance of <st1:metricconverter productid="50 kilometres" w:st="on">50
kilometres</st1:metricconverter>. It
took nearly 48 hours to complete this move due to difficulties in vehicle
movement over desert terrain. At this
stage, communications from and to the main divisional headquarters were
disrupted. The communications already
existing at Jaisandhar, however, remained through. The brigade operating on a southern axis and
a battalion operating on a northern axis away from the centre line also went
out of range of field cable communications.
Communication to these elements were therefore, maintained on radio and
radio relay only.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The radio and line communications between
HQ Southern Command and HQ 11 Division remained disrupted from 1500 hours on 9
December to 0800 hours on 11 December. For some reason, a radio relay terminal
had not been grouped with the divisional headquarters. The reasons advanced by
HQ Southern Command (Signals) for the disruption in communications are as
under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Main body (M-3) of 11
Infantry Division was ordered to move before communications could be
established by M-1 Group. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The ‘going’ in the desert
was very difficult for heavy vehicles of 11 Infantry Division. A number of
vehicles got begged down in sand. The
signal centre and radio vehicles could not reach the main divisional headquarters location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There was an acute
shortage of petrol for generating sets of C1 and C2 radio links. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo8; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The PL pairs to be used
for communication to 11 Infantry Division in enemy territory remained disrupted
due to enemy action. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The measures taken for restoring
communications are no less interesting. They are as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line communication was
established between Khokhropar and old location of main divisional headquarters
(Jaisindhar). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Additional line parties
were sent to repair the lines in enemy territory.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo9; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air support net was
kept open to pass message traffic. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">According to Lieutenant Colonel
Jaswant Singh, CO Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment, he prevailed on the
CSO, Brigadier Batra to order the move of two radio relay terminals of his unit
that were kept as reserve with 12 Division at Tanot to 11 Division sector on 8
December, but the GOC 12 Division refused to let them go. Finally, the
terminals were released only after the intervention of the Army Commander and
reached Jaisindhar on <st1:date day="10" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">10
December 1971</st1:date>. The radio relay link between Jaisindhar and HQ 11
Division was established on 13 December and channels patched to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In contrast, signal communications
in the 12 Divisional sector functioned well. Prior to the operation the
division was deployed between Jaisalmer and Ramgarh. Later on 31 October it moved to Tanot with a
view to occupying a firm base for launching its offensive operations. Due to the enemy thrust in the Longewala area
on 5/6 December, the planned offensive could not be undertaken and the division
remained in its second deployment area till the end of the war. Communications
to the division initially were on lines only. Radio links were established but
these were seldom used rear of brigade headquarters. Radio relay functioned effectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signal communications in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city> sector were
provided on line and radio. HQ Bikaner Sector was established on <st1:date day="19" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">19 October 1971</st1:date> by the
Artillery branch of HQ Southern Command. The troops allotted to this sector were
one infantry battalion (13 Grenadiers) and two BSF battalions, located at
Bikampur, Nachna and Pugal respectively, the distances varying from 100 to <st1:metricconverter productid="220 kilometres" w:st="on">220 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>. <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">A PL</st1:address></st1:street> pair was
available between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>
and Pugal. <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">A PCO PL</st1:address></st1:street>
pair was also available between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>
and Nokh, <st1:metricconverter productid="27 kilometres" w:st="on">27 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
short of Bikampur. This was extended to Bikampur by a spaced WD1 cable laid by
Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment. No line communications existed to Nachna.
A detachment of this unit also
established a signal centre at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>
which started functioning from 17 October.
Government sanction for raising of Kilo Sector Signal Company was
accorded on 9 November. By 2 December, one officer and 35 OR of the company had
reported at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>.
Seven radio sets, two exchanges and some other signal equipment had also been
received.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
29 November, the sector commander decided to shift the sector headquarters to
Bikampur. But after a discussion with the CSO, who explained the difficulties
that would arise in provision of signal communications from the new location,
the proposal was shelved. The communication layout, thereafter, consisted of
line speech circuits to 13 Grenadiers and 12 BSF Battalion, all other
communications being on radio. The line to Bikampur was not satisfactory as it
was a makeshift arrangement comprising D1 wire, PCO lines and a 27-kilometre
route of WD1 spaced cable. There were certain procedural and organizational
difficulties in communications by radio with the BSF units. Notwithstanding
these, satisfactory communications were provided for this sector during the
operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
operational responsibility for Kutch Sector was initially with the BSF. In July
1971 it was decided by HQ Southern Command that in the event of an emergency,
Commander Bombay Sub Area would exercise operational control of this sector.
Maharashtra & Gujarat Area Signal Company was given the responsibility of
providing signal communications to HQ Kutch Sector, at Bhuj. As the resources
of the company were inadequate, additional man power and equipment was provided
under arrangements of the CSO Southern Command. Communications in this sector
functioned effectively throughout the operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Southern Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel G.Y. Sowani. Shortly before the commencement of the
operations two senior officers from the unit were posted out. The second-in-command,
Major Yatindra Pratap moved on promotion as CO 6 Mountain Divisional Signal
Regiment in August, while Major Vinod Kumar proceeded to Indo-China on an UN
assignment on <st1:date day="30" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">30 November
1971</st1:date>. The only other field officer present in the unit at that time
was Major S.K. Ralhan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
main role of the unit was to provide static signal communications for HQ
Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. As such the unit was neither organized nor
trained to provide communications for the command headquarters when it
functioned in a field role. On 8 October the unit less HQ Company and 2 Company
was ordered to move to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. The advance party comprising part of the
regimental headquarters and 1 Company moved on 10 October, followed by the main
body on 15 October. HQ Company and 2 Company remained at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> to look after the signal communication
commitments at that station. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At Jodhpur the personnel provided
by Southern Command Signal Regiment and 2 Company of P Communication Zone
Signal Regiment worked in close cooperation with personnel from Q Communication
Zone Signal Regiment which was responsible for communications in the
operational area. They proved to be very useful in the expansion of the
transmitter and receiver stations at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
and in the establishment of the command signal centre. These ad-hoc
arrangements worked well and did not disturb the smooth functioning of signal
communications. A total of 10 officers, 18 JCOs, 145 OR and 20 CSBOs (civilian
switchboard operators) from Southern Command Signal Regiment took part in the
operations<b>. <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">11 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">The unit was located at Ahmedabad under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel </span><span lang="SV">B.N. Satyamurti, who
was relieved by </span><span lang="EN-US">Lieutenant Colonel Satish Chandra on <st1:date day="22" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">22 November 1971</st1:date>, just
before the operations commenced. The second-in-command, Major M.M. Bhanot, and
OC 2 Company, Major Ramesh Chandra both joined the unit after the operations
had started, on 7 and 12 December respectively.
The other field officers in the unit were Majors S.G. Mohiadin (1
Company), M.S. Chauhan (85 Brigade); Thomas (330 Brigade) and Arvind Vij
(31Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On <st1:date day="16" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">16 October 1971</st1:date> the unit received orders to
move to its concentration area in Marudi, about <st1:metricconverter productid="440 kilometres" w:st="on">440 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> from
Ahmedabad. The layout group moved out the same day, followed by the main body on
the next day. By 22 October communications had been established with 31, 330
and 85 Brigades as well as with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
and Barmer. On 29 October the main divisional headquarters moved to Ranasar,
from where communications were established to al brigades on line and to 17
Grenadiers on radio relay. Rearward communications
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>,
Barmer and rear divisional headquarters (Danta) and 330 Brigade were provided
by utilizing two pairs on the international route and two copper pairs on non
C-8 alignment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 4 November the SO-in-C
accompanied by CSO Southern Command visited the unit at Ranasar. On 19 November
the rear divisional headquarters moved up alongside the main divisional
headquarters. </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">By the end of the
month Tactical HQ Southern Command had been established at Gadra Road from
where comunications was extended to Ranasar on carrier quad/field cable. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In accordance with the operational
plans, the divisional headquarters commenced its move to a forward
concentration area near Jaisindhar after last light on 2 December.
Communications on line were provided to forward brigades and rear divisional
headquarters. A locality exchange was established at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Gadra Road</st1:address></st1:street> to provide communications to
31 and 330 Brigades, the air defence battery and other units in area Ranasar and Harsanti.
The M-3 Group reached only at 2330 hours due to many vehicles getting bogged
down in the sand. By <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time>
on 3 December line parties and radio relay detachments had joined 31 and 85
Brigades to provide communications for the impending offensive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At 0400 hours on 4 December, the
warning order was issued for crossing the International border at 1830 hours
the same evening. Shortly afterwards,
the GOC’s rover group moved to Munabao Rest House, where a 10-line exchange was set up providing local
communications. The divisional offensive commenced on three axes as planned at
1830 hours, with 11 Division less 31 Brigade on axis Munabao – Nayachor; 31
Brigade on axis <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Gadra Road</st1:address></st1:street>
– <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place> – Dali - Khinsar – Chachro and 17
Grenadiers on axis Saidau– Relnor– Nayachor. Next morning the rover group moved
to Khokhropar, where a forward communications centre was established after
patching the international route which was disrupted due to shelling and enemy
action. Radio communications functioned with all brigades except 85 Brigade,
due to ionospheric disturbance and fading during night and afternoon, as well
as frequent move of the brigade headquarters. Radio relay to 85 Brigade was
also not through as the vehicle carrying the terminal was stuck in the sand en
route. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At 1130 hours on 6 December
communications with 85 Brigade were restored when it was connected to
Khokhropar exchange. Shortly afterwards HQ 330 Brigade moved to Khokhropar and
was through on line. The same evening HQ
85 Brigade moved to area Bitala and was connected to Khokhropar exchange at
0245 hours on 07 December. At 1720 hours the same day HQ 31 Brigade reached <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place>
and was connected on the Gadra locality exchange. The CO had a narrow escape
when his jeep was strafed by a Pakistani aircraft at 1500 hours while he was
returning after restoring line communications. Next morning the rover jeep was
also strafed at Khokhropar railway station. However, no damage was caused
except for an empty fuel jerrican which was hit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 8 December all lines beyond
Munabao remained disturbed due to enemy air action. Three radio detachments (two C-11 and one Siemens)
reached Khokhropar to reinforce the resources of the communication centre. A
signal detachment sent to establish a forward communication centre at Jalu Jo
Chaunro could not reach the destination since it got bogged in the sand along
the railway line. After carrying out a reconnaissance of the next location
indicated by the GOC, Colonel Satish Chandra advised that no further move
should be carried out till the tracks are developed. However, next morning the GOC
ordered his R (reconnaissance) Group to move ahead of Khokhropar. At 1200 hours the CO and the divisional
commander’s ADC along with the R group vehicles left for the new location near
village Vasarabh. At 1430 hours the M1 group of the divisional headquarters
also moved, the last vehicle reaching the new location at 2300 hours on 10
December. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line communications were
established from Vasarabh with HQ 85 Brigade and Khokhropar. The main body of the divisional headquarters
was to start from Jaisndhar for Vasarabh at 2200 hours on 9 December. However,
at about 1830 hours a message was received from the GOC, who had gone to 85
Brigade location, that the location of the main divisional headquarters had
been changed to Rahal, six kilometres ahead of Vasarabh. The R group
immediately left for the new location with Captain T.C. Mathur, since OC 1
Company had not reached till then. The M 3 Group of the main divisional
headquarters left Jaisindhar at 2230 hours on 9 December. The essential
elements of this group reached the new location at 2200 hours on 11 December, i.e.
after almost 48 hours. This was even after the minimum functional vehicles had
been sent up, with 15 vehicles being retained at the previous location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
about 0230 hours on 10 December, one 1-ton and four jeeps of the R Group had
reached Rahal with great difficulty. Shortly afterwards, the GOC and the <st1:place w:st="on">COS</st1:place> (chief of staff), HQ Southern Command reached that
location. The few Signals personnel tried their best to provide some
communications. A WD-1 pair was laid across country on manpack basis up to the
PL pair to Khokhropar. Since the operations room vehicle had not reached and
neither had the exchange, a single telephone was made available to the staff to
enable them to communicate with 85 Brigade and HQ Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city> at 0400
hours. One pair on the badly damaged PL
was restored up to the exchange at Khokhropar.
This line was intermittently disrupted due to breaks in the PL and the
WD-1 cable. No radio vehicles had
reached, so radio communications was also not available. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Line
parties were working on the <st1:metricconverter productid="22 kilometres" w:st="on">22 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> of WD 1 extension from the PL from
Khokhropar which was temporarily restored at about 0700 hours. At 1000 hours the GOC spoke to the Army
Commander on the line, which was disrupted after the call was over. However, it
was again restored. Soon afterwards a 40 line magneto exchange that had been
retrieved from the broken down vehicle was installed. A radio relay link with
17 Grenadiers was also established at about 1830 hours. By the end of the day
D-1 and D-2 links were through from the new location. However, speech and telegraph communications
with HQ Southern Command remained unsatisfactory. There were no charged batteries for the radio
links and the vehicles were without fuel. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At about 0600 hours on 11 December
the second pair of the international route was restored and ACT (1+1) mounted
to engineer the channel between the new location and Barmer for further
extension to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>.
However, the line was again disrupted from 1700 to 2200 hours and from <st1:time hour="13" minute="0" w:st="on">0001</st1:time> to 0345 hours due to a break in
the PL caused by enemy air action. The
CSO, Brigadier S.K. Batra, arrived at Jaisindhar at about 1830 hours on 12
December and after spending the night there proceeded to Rahal next morning
accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Jaswant Singh, CO Q Communication Zone Signal
Regiment. He also visited HQ 85 Brigade near Nayachor on 14 December and
Munabao and <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Gadra Road</st1:address></st1:street>
on 15 December. He ordered the exchange
and radio relay terminals at Jaisindhar to move to Munabao and the exchange at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Gadra Road</st1:address></st1:street> to be
closed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 13 December five officers joined
the unit from CME and MCTE after suspension of the courses at these
institutions. They were Captains A.K. Ray, K.D. Kaushal, M.S. Rana, Jasbir Singh
and A.R. Patil. That evening the lines were again damaged due to extensive
enemy air action. However, all radio and
radio relay links were through except radio relay to 31 Brigade. On 14 December another officer, Captain B.N.
Dhingra reported to the unit. On 15 December at about 1630 hours there was a
severe enemy air attack on HQ 85 Brigade during which half a kilometre of cable
route was burnt by Napalm bombs, resulting in disruption of communications to
85 and 330 Brigades. This was followed by another severe attack next morning on
HQ 85 Brigade in its new location where it had moved the previous night,
resulting in disruption of trunk communications to 85 and 330 Brigades. At 1730
hours there was yet another air attack on the brigade headquarters, during
which the D-2 link vehicle and connected equipment were destroyed. The belongings of the men in the vehicle and that
of the newly arrived Captain A.K. Ray were also destroyed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At 0630 hours on 17 December the
radio detachment of 330 Brigade Signal Company attached to 18 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> came under heavy enemy artillery
shelling which damaged the complete station.
Lance Naik K. Vasavan displayed commendable courage and initiative in
salvaging the secret documents held by him at great personal risk. At 2000
hours the cease fire came into effect. Next morning the balance of the unit
left Jaisindhar to join the main body at Rahal. The unit finally moved back to
Ahmedabad in March 1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_4"
o:spid="_x0000_i1034" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:361.5pt;height:276.75pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image018.jpg"
o:title="Dad- Dec 1971- 11 Infy Div - OC MARS"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="369" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image019.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_4" width="482" /><!--[endif]--></span></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tps of 11 Inf Div adv in Pakistan,
using the railway line near Khokhropar, in Dec 1971.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">12 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city> under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel V.M. Jog with Major </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">D.S.
Anand as the second-in-command. Other officers holding important appointments
in the unit were were Major A.K. Bhakri (1 Company), Captain J.N. Kapil (2
Company), Captain M.S. Sarna (HQ Company),
Captain </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">S.S. Suri (adjutant) and </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Captain
Kishan Lal (quartermaster). The officers in the brigades signal compnaies were
Major U.K. Dewan (30 Brigade), Major B. Shirali(322 Brigade) and Major </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Khazan
Singh (45 Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">On 17 October
1971 the unit moved to its initial concentration area near </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Jaisalmer. The main and rear divisional headquarters as
well as the brigades were deployed on the road Jaisalmer - Ramgarh. By the end
of October, the unit moved to area Tanot. The main divisional headquarters and
45 Brigade were located at Tanot; the rear divisional headquarters at Ranoa; 30
Brigade at </span><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Ghantiali and 322
Brigade at Ramgarh. The entire stock of cable held by the unit had been used up
on</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> first deployment for leading in PL pairs to various
formation headquarters. For the second deployment, <st1:metricconverter productid="500 kilometres" w:st="on">500 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> of
WD-1 cable had to be issued from Army HQ stocks, in addition to some PL stores.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
relay links were established between the main and rear divisional headquarters;
main divisional headquarters and 30 Brigade; and rear divisional headquarters
and Ramgarh. In addition, Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment provided a link
between Ramgarh and Jaisalmer where they had established a signal centre. This link continued throughout the war.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Two pairs of PL were available
between Jaisalmer and Ramgarh. In addition there was a Public Call Office (PCO)
pair, on which a channel doubler was mounted. One channel was given to the PCO,
the other being used between 14 BSF Battalion at Ramgarh and their base in
Jaisalmer. Another two pairs were available between Ramgarh-Tanot-Kishengarh.
To supplement the existing PL routes, four PVC pairs were laid between main and
rear divisional headquarters and one pair on ballies between Tanot and
Longewala. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In preparation for the divisional
offensive towards Rahim Yar Khan on 4 December, 30 and 322 Infantry Brigades
moved to their concentration areas on 3 December. A deception plan and electronic
warfare measures were put into effect by the unit. The Pakistan Rangers radio
at Bhaikhenwala, whose frequency was known through the wireless experimental
unit, was jammed as soon as the operations started. To deceive the enemy, radio
relay aerials made out of wood were erected at Sadhewala and Tanot. Brigadier
V.M. Jog, who was commanding the unit at that time, relates some interesting
incidents regarding attempts made by the enemy to disrupt our communications.
He writes:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 1<sup>st</sup>
December Net Radio was opened. After the
tuning call the first outstation was PAKISTAN.
The operator said that he too was a Muslim and would ensure that no
working would be possible on the net.
Since all outstations were on line they were instructed not to reply on
the radio. Acknowledgement was given one
way by the Control and the net went on listening watch. Thus the enemy was kept guessing. The Divisional Command net radio frequency
was changed and remained ready for operation.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
3<sup>rd</sup> night Pakistani artillery roving OP party from Longewala side
came to Ramgarh and established an ambush.
The hired vehicles were stopped and drivers shot dead. Their bodies was pulled out and set on fire. They also fired about ten rounds at the PL
route breaking one wire out of the six wires.
The party appears to have gone towards Nachna. It is possible that this
could have been done by smugglers of Ramgarh.
Since only one company of Maratha Regiment ex 322 Infantry Brigade was
located at Ramgarh, this possibility is ruled out. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
the line carrying ACT 1+3 that had been broken, noise level increased on the
carrier channels and the physical got disconnected. The Commanding Officer himself detected this
and ordered a line party to move and check up.
The line party reached the spot at 0600 and reported the matter direct
to the Officer Commanding. Empty
cartridges bearing Chinese markings were handed over to the GOC in the morning.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
about 2300 somebody rang up the Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment radio
relay Naik from the BSF exchange telling him “I am Captain Dogra, change the
frequency of your set.” Since there was no Captain Dogra in the Signal Regiment
and RR frequency cannot be changed in isolation the NCO did not take any action
but reported the matter</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> For
the attack on Rahim Yar Khan the Divisional artery was being laid along the
duck track. Till 4<sup>th</sup> night <st1:metricconverter productid="15 Km" w:st="on">15 Km</st1:metricconverter> of carrier quad light
was laid under Captain M Khan’s supervision but it could not get through since
it being Siemens cable had a half turn coupler. Since at night the men had not
applied equal pressure with each hand, one pair used to get disconnected. This
was of course discovered after the war while investigating the cause but during
the war all kinds of doubts had arisen.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">14</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
few days earlier, buried carrier quad cable and poled PVC had been laid from
Kishangarh, where Tactical HQ No. 1 had been established, to Shakhere Wala
Khu. A skeleton line party was kept at
Kishangarh to maintain the lines from Kishangarh to Shakhere Wala Khu and
Tanot. On 4 December one speech channel
from Tanot to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
was terminated in the operations room, to provide a ‘hot line’ to HQ Southern
Command. A radio relay chain was established between Tanot and Longewala where
30 Brigade was located. Two channels of this link were terminated on the
exchange. Jamming of enemy links was carried out from 1530 to 1730 hours by a
Siemens 400W radio detachment sent to area Shakhere Wala Khu. This was partially successful. It appeared that the enemy had VHF
communications to the rear and possibly some line.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
divisional attack on Rahim Yar Khan scheduled for the night of 4 December was
postponed to next morning since marshalling of troops got delayed due to
shortage of second line transport. At
about 2000 hours that night Signalman S.M. Dey of a line detachment reported
seeing corpses burning along with vehicle <st1:metricconverter productid="20 kilometres" w:st="on">20 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> east of
Ramgarh. The line was also cut which was
repaired with field cable. At <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time> the platoon commander at the
border post beyond Longewala reported hearing sound of tanks estimated to be a
whole regiment. The matter was reported to Commander 45 Infantry Brigade at
Tanot who termed the report as an inexperienced officer’s fantasy. However, when the tanks reached Longewala at
about 0400 hours it left no doubts. Reports of the presence of enemy tanks were
conveyed right up to Army HQ. This was possible because of the foresight in
laying a PVC cable route from Tanot to Longewala via Sadhewala as part of the
deception plan. This saved the day since
the Army Commander at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
was in a position to communicate with the company commander at Longewala on the
night of 4 and 5 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During an air support exercise held
in June at Lathi it had been found that the air support sets of the Army and
the Air Force were not compatible. The
problem was discussed between CO 12 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment and
Commander 30 Brigade and satisfactorily resolved. This paid dividends during the battle of
Longewala.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> One outstation of D1 net was placed
at the Base Operations at Jaisalmer. Top
priority was given to calls for the Air Force on line. At first light Major Atma Singh of the air
observation post was air borne and kept the enemy armour under
observation. He was constantly in
contact with Longewala which in turn was through with the HQ 12 Division on
line. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When
the Air Force planes flew over the area for the first time they reported no
enemy armour. Major Atma Singh however
got in touch with them and directed them to Longewala. Once at Longewala the assorted aircraft fired
rockets which merely bounced off the enemy tanks. The enemy armour adopted evasive tactics but
the fuel drums being carried on the tanks proved to be their undoing. When the
rockets had been expended, our air craft opened up with machine guns and
punctured the fuel barrels which caught fire.
With this discovery the Air Force went for the kill taking a toll of 23
tanks out of the 40 odd that were seen. The rest got away and later were
concentrated at Naya Chor in 11 Divisional Sector.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
1100 hours the enemy had called off their attack. At this stage the enemy radio transmission
was intercepted and the tank commander was heard saying <i>“we have been asking for air support. If it does not come now there
will be no further need”</i>. The reply came <i>“Star fighters arriving indicate target by yellow smoke”.</i> This intercept was passed on to the Air
Force. However, by this time the battle
of Longewala had ended.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
30 Brigade attack developed two pairs of PVC pairs had been laid on the ground
and later built up on ballies between Ramgarh and Longewala. Radio relay was
also established, thus forming a triangular grid of PVC duplicated by RR.
During the entire period radio nets remained on listening watch since at no
stage did the line circuits break down. In view of the enemy attack on
Longewala the planned offensive of 12 Infantry Division did not take place.
However, during the next two weeks 45 Brigade captured Islamgarh along with 18
BSF Battalion. No secrecy was maintained on radio and the action was swift, the
enemy vacating the area as our troops closed in. Posts were established about <st1:metricconverter productid="25 kilometres" w:st="on">25 kilometres</st1:metricconverter> across
the border. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Shortly
after the operations started CSO Southern Command asked the unit to provide a C
11 set with an operator who could be air dropped. The GOC’s rover operator Naik
Ramnaiya was detailed for this task. He
accompanied 10 Para Commando during their raid on Chachro in 11 Division
sector. The frequency allotted was the D-1 net frequency of 12 Division which
also worked throughout the operations for 11 Division. The NCO did an excellent
job and was able to communicate directly with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>. He was awarded the Sena Medal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Between 14 and 15 December five
officers reported to the unit from CME and MCTE. They were Captains J.N .Kapil,
M.S. Rana, K.L. Sharma, Kailash Singh and G.V. Mehta. The operations ended on 17 December when the
cease fire came into effect. In view of its excellent performance the unit won
a number of awards. Naik Basant Pawar and Naik Ramnaiya were both awarded the
Sena Medal. Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Jog, Naib Subedar Gurmohinder Singh and
Lance Naik Inder Singh were ‘Mentioned in Despatches’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the occasion of the Corps
Anniversary on <st1:date day="15" month="2" w:st="on" year="1972">15 February
1972</st1:date>, the GOC, Major General R.F. Khambatta had this to say:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals have done a fine job throughout all theatres
in the last war. In particular 12
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment has given an excellent performance. Not once have they failed in any emergency. I have no doubt it was the capacity to
communicate which gave the Company Commander at Longewala the courage to hold
on successfully and finally, throw out the enemy. Throughout the divisional sector our small
and big fighting echelons have gone about carrying out difficult tasks
completely confident of their capacity to communicate. Truly you have fulfilled your motto “TEEVRA
CHAUKAS”. I wish you all success for the future. God Bless. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
unit was at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>,
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jaswant Singh, who took over from
Lieutenant Colonel N.C. Achia on <st1:date day="23" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">23 November 1971</st1:date>, shortly before the commencement of
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. Other officers holding important appointments in the
unit were Major N.N. Gupta (second-in-command); Major A.P. Fernandes (HQ Company);
Major R.S. Dhanota (1 Company); Major N.K. Joshi (2 Company); Major B.M.K.
Khosla (3 Company); Captain P. Thangavelu (adjutant) and Captain V.A. Paul (quartermaster).
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
early October 1971 the unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>.
At the same time 1 Company moved from Jaipur to Jaisalmer, No. 1 Detachment
(subsequently converted to 3 Company) to Barmer and a detachment of 2 Company
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>.
Smaller detachments were sent to various locations to look after static
communications at administrative installations. Six radio relay detachments
were placed at Jaisalmer and four at Barmer to provide radio relay chains
between HQ 12 and 11 Infantry Divisions and the forward maintenance areas at
these locations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After assuming command on 23
November, Lieutenant Colonel Jaswant Singh noticed that though the unit had to
provide communications to both 11 and 12 Divisions, all reserves were placed
with the latter. When he wanted to know the rationale for this deployment he
was told by CSO Southern Command that he would be informed at the right time if
considered necessary. Not satisfied with this response, Colonel Jaswant Singh
decided to visit both divisions and see things for himself. The rest of the
story is told by him in the following words:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After assuming command and familiarisation, I
decided to visit Headquarters of 11 and 12 Division. On hunch or intuition whatever one may call
it, I decided to visit 11 Div first on 29 Nov 1971. After briefing by Lt Col Satish Chandra, C
Sigs it was realized that the Div will go out of communication, the moment they
decided to move from the present location.
Realising this, I instructed Maj NN Gupta, 2IC to dispatch the reserve
line detachment under a JCO by the night
train to report to 11 Div Sig Regt, which he did. This detachment was then instructed to move
with the Div HQ and restore the damaged PL route to keep the Div HQ in
communication with Command HQ since there was no deployment of reserve RR
detachments on this axis for this purpose.
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
return from 11 Division, I requested the CSO to shift two RR detachments from
TANOT to 11 Div side and it took Army Commander’s intervention to shift these
only after 11 Div had gone out of communication. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
operations started on 4 December 1971. All radio links were opened and kept on
continuous listening watch. A radio detachment (C-11/R210) consisting of three
operators was sent to 10 Para Commando for communication with HQ Southern
Command during the special mission being undertaken by them. Radio links C-9
and C-10 were opened and kept on listening watch for communication with the
battalion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.5pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On the night of 4/5 December five
spans of PL route Jaisalmer – Ramgarh – Tanot were damaged by enemy
infiltrators about <st1:metricconverter productid="15 kilometres" w:st="on">15 kilometres</st1:metricconverter>
short of Ramgarh. Communications to 12 Division were restored on radio relay
that had been established for this purpose earlier. The PL route was repaired by 1600 hours. The
next day due to enemy bombing at Jaisalmer, the Air Force lines were damaged.
This was repaired by the line party from 1 Company with the help of linemen
from the P&T Department. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 9 December there was a break in
communications with 11 Division during its advance. Describing the crisis,
Colonel Jaswant Singh writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 09 December 1971, 11
Div which had since moved into Pakistan without meeting much opposition went
out of communication. On 10 December, I
proceeded to 11 Div to restore communication.
Two RR detachments from TANOT also reached JAISINDHAR. On 11 December, I reached KHOKHROPAR. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
12 Dec 1971, I along with a lineman of 11 Div Sig Regt started from KHOKHROPAR
along the Railway line to restore the International PL Route. After 11 Div had moved into Pakistan, the
line detachment under the JCO positioned with 11 Div Sig Regt earlier, had started
doing the same from their side. This
work was done under bombing and strafing by Pakistan Air Force. By about lunch time this line was restored
and when I was still talking to the line detachment JCO, Chief of Staff and GOC
11 Div came on the line and started talking before I could disconnect my
telephone. What transpired in that
conversation, I would not like to divulge.<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As recorded in the war diary of HQ
Southern Command (Signals Branch), communications with 11 Infantry Division
remained disrupted from 1500 hours on 9 December to 0800 hours on 11 December.
Even after the line was restored, it was subject to frequent interruptions.
Communications became satisfactory only on 13 December after the radio relay
link between Jaisindhar and Main HQ 11 Infantry Division was established and channels
patched to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 13 December five officers
reported to the unit from CME and MCTE. They were Captains Komal Singh, M.G.
Datar, A.K. Puri, A.K. Bhanot and D.K. Bewtra. The operations ended on <st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">17 December 1971</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commenting on the performance of
Signals in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, Colonel Jaswant Singh writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In my opinion
operational plans were faulty and did not cater for enemy’s
reaction/counterattack and speed of movement of our forces if there was no
opposition. We now well know what happened
on both the axes of operations. 12 Div
hardly faced towards RAHIM YAR KHAN when they were struck in the rear at
LONGEWALA by Pakistan. Thanks to Indian
Air Force, otherwise they would have easily captured JAISALMER, which shows
that there was no plan to protect the Rear.
All the communication reserves were concentrated on this axis and there
was no provision for communication to 11 Div once it moved out of
JAISINDHAR. Probably too much reliance
was put on International PL Route which was not correct as it was running along
the Railway line and was bound to be target of Pakistan Air Force. There was no flexibility to cover all
eventualities in case things went wrong.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">15</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">5 (Indep) Air Support
Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> 5 (Indep) Air
Support Signal Company was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>,
under the command of Major V. Khanna. The other officer in the company was
Captain Kuldeep Singh, who was replaced by Captain Vijay Raheja in November
after the company had moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ in mid October 1971. Soon after arrival at the new
location, tentacles were despatched to 11 and 12 Infantry Divisions and K
Sector in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bikaner</st1:place></st1:city>,
while airfield detachments were sent to Uttarlai, Jaisalmer and Nal. Later, a
tentacle was also sent to Bhuj sector with a detachment for one to one
communication with the airfield at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jamnagar</st1:place></st1:city>. In the first week of November the company
participated in Exercise ‘Mild Fever’, a joint Army-Air exercise conducted by
HQ Southern Command. This was followed
by two similar exercises codenamed ‘Sky Hawk’ and ‘Sky Wave, which were
conducted in the third and fourth weeks of November respectively. These
exercises proved to be extremely useful for the company and paid rich dividends
during the operations. . <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One
of the first tasks undertaken by the company was to coordinate the frequencies
to be used on the radio nets. <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Crystals</st1:place></st1:city>
for new ground to air contact frequencies received from Bharat Electronics
Limited (BEL) were fitted in the 16 radio sets GU 734 held by the company and
other units in Southern Command and alignment of channels carried out in field
conditions. A passive check of 35
frequencies was carried out with respect to interference and noise, with a view
to select suitable frequencies for the air support and ground liaison officer
(GLO) nets. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
2000 hours on 3 December information was received about the bombing of various
air fields in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and Jammu & Kashmir
by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). A quick joint conference was held at JOC in
which pre-planned missions, mostly in the shape of tactical reconnaissance (Tac
R) were decided. All air support links
were ordered to be opened at 0630 hours next morning. By a strange coincidence,
both Major Khanna and Captain Raheja were down with ‘Flu’ since early
morning. Khanna’s temperature was
recorded as 103 degrees Fahrenheit but he carried on after a shot of Penicillin
in the MI Room. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
2230 hours on 3 December the first air raid warning sounded in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>.
PAF bombers flew over the airfield and were engaged by air defence guns.
For many soldiers in the company the bombing of the airfield located only two kilometres
away was the first baptism of war. At about 0200 hours on 4 December there was
a second air raid warning. Bombs were
heard exploding about two kilometres away in the fuel dump area where a stack
of petrol barrels caught fire giving rise to a mushroom cloud screen. At about
0230 hours a message was received from the duty officer in the sub area
headquarters that another signal unit in the station, 12 Wireless Experimental
Unit, had been bombed. A party of 30 men under Captain Vijay Raheja was
immediately dispatched to provide assistance. On reaching the location of the
unit they found that a living barrack had received a direct hit. Raheja and his team helped in removing the debris
and taking out the dead bodies. In all, about a dozen personnel of 12 Wireless
Experimental Unit had been killed during the bombing. This was the maximum
casualties suffered by any signal unit during the 1971 war. The party of 30 men
led by Raheja was the only organized party that reached the scene of accident
and helped in the rescue operations. The party had to return at 0500 hours in
order to open the air support links.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
4 December the company had the chance to carry out its first operational task
since its raising in <st1:metricconverter productid="1967. A" w:st="on">1967. A</st1:metricconverter> Tac R mission report containing 68 words was
handed over to the detachment at Uttarlai by the GLO at 1243 hours. It was
cleared within seven 7 minutes and handed over to JOC at 1255 hours. The total
time taken between the initiation of the report and clearance was 12 minutes, a
commendable performance by any standards.
The contents of this report indicated that one aircraft was hit and the
pilot bailed out. Shortly afterwards the unit processed the first immediate air
support demand of Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. It was initiated by 12 Infantry
Division at 1435 hours, encoded in full, cleared over the radio net, decoded
and handed over to the JOC at 1450 hours.
The total time taken for processing was 15 minutes only, a fantastic
pace setter. The acceptance message for this demand was initiated by the JOC at
1555 hours, encoded and cleared to the air field at 1603 hours i.e., within 8
minutes.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The morning Tac R broadcast on 5
December indicated tank movement near Longewala. Repeat missions were ordered one after
another for 30 Brigade. The ground to
air communication with the air control team (ACT) with 30 Brigade was
excellent. One radio set GU 734 carried
by the forward air controller (FAC) in a tank was damaged due to enemy tank
fire at about 1630 hours. The set was replaced by CO 12 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment by 2200 hours the same day.
A total of four pre-planned and 22 immediate sorties were flown by the
IAF. The score of the day included 18
enemy tanks beside other things. All air
support links functioned smoothly, till they closed down at 1900 hours.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With
the battle of Longewala being won, operations in 12 Infantry Division sector
virtually ceased and the focus shifted to 11 Infantry Division which was advancing
into Pakistan. Air support demands were initiated every day and cleared without
delay. There was a flap on 8 December when a message was received from 11
Infantry Division that a tentacle was missing since the previous day. The
tentacle was through on radio and immediately contradicted this statement. When
challenged, it replied correctly. The tentacle clarified that the FAC and GLO
in the tentacle jeep were missing since 1000 hours on 7 December. Major Khanna spoke to the Colonel GS of 11
Infantry Division, who insisted that the tentacle of 85 Infantry Brigade was
not in his sector. When the tentacle was
asked to confirm its location it was revealed that it had been attached to 10
Sikh Light Infantry. The Colonel GS later confirmed that the tentacle had been
with the battalion throughout. However, the FAC, GLO and jeep were still
missing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 10 December the tentacle with HQ
11 Infantry Division reported that it had moved to a new location. However, due
to a complete breakdown in rearwards communications from the divisional
headquarters all pre-planned demands for 11 December were being cleared on the
immediate air support net. The NCO in
charge of the tentacle Lance Naik R.S. Yadav under the guidance of Naib Subedar
Sansar Singh did a wonderful job in encoding and clearing five pre-planned
demands without any delay. Due to
breakdown in communications the CSO Southern Command ordered that air support
links to 11 Division would l be kept opened throughout the night. A large volume of traffic from signal centre <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city> to 11 Infantry
Division was cleared on the air support net. This included many high precedence
- Flash and Emergency – messages. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In addition to clearing signal
centre traffic the tentacle had to clear pre planned demands along with immediate
air support demands. The tentacle was given six such demands on the night of
12/13 December. The whole night Lance
Naik Yadav and Naib Subedar Sansar Singh kept on encoding the demands and
cleared them between 0540 and 0800 hours.
The tentacle also reported that it had run out of white petrol (73 NL)
used for charging sets and could not charge its batteries. Since none was
available with the divisional headquarters or the signal regiment, the
detachment was ordered to use ordinary petrol (MT 70) for battery charging. A
similar problem was encountered in the 30 Brigade tentacle, where the NCO in
charge Havildar Armugham reported that he had not been able to get any petrol
for battery charging for the last two days.
However, displaying great initiative, he took his batteries to the
advance workshop detachment (AWD) of the brigade and got them charged. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
15 December the tentacle ex 322 Brigade was placed under command of 85 Brigade.
The NCO in charge Havildar Shinde came under heavy enemy artillery fire and air
strafing. However, in spite of all this
he maintained good communications on the air support net and cleared eight
immediate air support demands without any delay. On 16 December also 85 Brigade was in contact
with enemy and their tentacle cleared 11 immediate air support demands. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
17 December a total of 14 immediate air
support demands were processed, including 12 from 11 Division Sector. At 1500
hours information was received about the unilateral cease fire that was to come
into effect at 2000 hours. The last joint conference of the campaign was held
at JOC at 1700 hours, presided over by the Chief of Staff, who thanked the IAF
for their excellent co-operation and magnificent support given during the last
fortnight. He then referred to immediate
air support communications provided by 5 (Indep) Air Support Signal Company and
pointed out that the unit had provided excellent communications over extended
distances throughout without any break, especially when rearward communications
from 11 Infantry Division failed on 10 and 11 December and the only link that
worked not only to the divisional headquarters but even to the forward brigades
viz. 85 and 330 Brigades was the air support net.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Information
was received at 1730 hours on 17 December that HQ 85 Brigade had come under
heavy enemy strafing and Napalm attack.
The brigade operations room and signal centre vehicles were completely
gutted. The tentacle vehicle was only <st1:metricconverter productid="75 yards" w:st="on">75 yards</st1:metricconverter> away but just escaped from being hit.
The last Tac R broadcast of the campaign was made at 1900 hours after which all
links were closed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">P Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> The unit was
located at Alwar under the command of Lieutenant Colonel H.P. Bhardwaj, with
Major D.K. Sachar as the second-in command. The other field officers in the
unit were Majors R. S. Makker, Avtar Singh and H.S Goel, who was recalled from
regular reserve in October 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
unit did not play any active role in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. It was made
responsible for holding reinforcements on behalf of signal units. However, 2 Company under Major Avtar Singh
was allotted to Southern Command and moved out on <st1:date day="16" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">16 October 1971</st1:date>. It was later merged with H
Communication Zone Signal Regiment which was raised on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date>. Subsequently, some more
section bricks were allotted to H Communication Zone Signal Regiment and moved
out on 7 December. On 10 December the CO was also posted out and Major Sachar
officiated until the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel J. Bagchi in January 1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> The Indo- Pak War
of 1971 was fought on two fronts, against East and <st1:place w:st="on">West
Pakistan</st1:place>. The Indian Army’s offensive in the East resulted in the
liberation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and was the focus of attention of the authorities as well as the general
public. However, from a military point of view the Western Theatre was perhaps
more important, since it involved <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s strike forces that could
have posed a threat to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
security. The troops involved on both
fronts were almost equally balanced in numbers, though those in the West had a
larger complement of armour. Though territorial gains were small, several major
battles were fought, resulting in heavy casualties to both sides. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> For Signals, the
war in the West had few surprises, since troops were familiar with the area and
the existing communication infrastructure. The backbone of communications was
line, thanks to the extensive PL network that had been built up over the years.
Radio was rarely used and radio relay acted mostly as a standby to line. Since several months were available for
advance planning, shortages of equipment and manpower were made up well before
the operations. Signals Directorate played a crucial role in ensuring that
units had the wherewithal to perform their tasks. The SO-in-C, Deputy SO-in-C and
DD Tels visited almost every signal unit accompanied by senior officers from
the P&T Department to tie up loose ends. As a result, no unit could
complain of lack of attention or shortage of equipment that could affect its
functioning.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">Communications by and large were stable and
came in for praise by commanders and staff. However, there were a few serious
lapses that could have been avoided. There were two glaring instances of
communications failure during the operations. The first occurred in 72 Brigade of
36 Division which was placed under 54 Division. For more than two days, the
brigade did not have any speech and telegraph circuit, on line or radio relay,
to the divisional headquarters. Major V.R.P Sarathy, who was commanding the
brigade signal company, made desperate appeals without any result. It was only
after he brought this to the notice of Brigadier J.S. Nanda, CSO I Corps that
he was provided a line and radio relay link for rearward communications. Communication
breaks that occur due to equipment failure, terrain, atmospherics and accidents
can perhaps be condoned. However, the case in point can only be attributed to
faulty planning and lackadaisical attitude, which are unpardonable, especially
during war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 10.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.6pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">The second case of communication failure
occurred during the advance of 11 Infantry Division into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>, when
it was out of communications for almost three days. Inexplicably, the radio did
not function and there was no radio relay. In the absence of a corps
headquarters, rearwards communications was the responsibility of HQ Southern
Command. The unit responsible for rearward communications of both 11 and 12
Infantry Divisions was Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment. Apparently, the
reserve radio relay terminals of the unit were deployed with 12 Infantry
Division, in anticipation of its offensive which did not take place. According
to the CO, Lieutenant Colonel Jaswant Singh, the deployment was against his
express advice and the terminals were moved to 11 Infantry Division only on the
intervention of the Army Commander at a fairly late stage in the battle. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One
cannot help marvelling at this inexcusable lapse in signal planning, in sending
a division into battle without making adequate provisions for rearward
communications. This is all the more
surprising in view of the fact that there was no shortage of radio relay
equipment in 1971 and units were given whatever they asked for. Perhaps the
peacetime role of the formations played a part in the fiasco. Unlike the other
two commands – Eastern and Western – that participated in Operation ‘Cactus
Lily’, Southern Command had hardly any field formations with an operational
role in peace time. This probably bred a sense of complacency which was
difficult to shake off. Colonel Jaswant
Singh assumed command of Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment on 23 November
1971, just before the war started. When he arrived in the unit at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>, he discovered ‘<i>that the morale of all ranks was very low
and most of them wanted to go on leave to visit their families, especially
those whose families were at the permanent location (Poona). They did not
realize the importance of their being there and were of the view that there
will be no war in the near future. This
was due to the reason that no one has ever briefed them properly.’ <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It is pertinent to recall that a
similar failure in communications had occurred ten years earlier, during the <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> operations in 1961. At that time too, HQ Southern
Command was out of communications with 17 Mountain Division. As a result, 50
(Indep) Parachute Brigade, which was through on radio as well as radio relay,
was asked to capture Panjim, a task that had been originally assigned to 17
Mountain Division. In the jubilation of victory, these critical failures of
communication were overlooked in 1961 and 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Notwithstanding the few instances
of faulty signal planning, the performance of signallers was exceptionally
good. The testimonials from formation commanders bear testimony to the high
standard of communications provided to them. A large number of signallers
earned decorations and awards, and there were many who lost their lives in the
operations. As always, the young officers and signalmen surpassed the others in
initiative and intrepidity. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 1.8pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="mso-special-character: line-break; page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">ENDNOTES TO
CHAPTER 7<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 2.15pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
chapter is largely based on Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao’s <i>Prepare or Perish</i>, (New Delhi, 1991); Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo (ed), <i>The Indian Army – A Brief History (</i>New
Delhi, 2005); and personal accounts. Specific references are given below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">1. Gen K.V. Krishna Rao, <i>Prepare or Perish</i>, Lancer Publishers, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1991,p. 207<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">2. Krishna Rao, p.214<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">3. Krishna Rao, p.220<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">4. Krishna Rao, p.222<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">5. Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo (ed), <i>The Indian Army – A Brief History,</i>
United Services Institution of India (USI), New Delhi, 2005, p. 152<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6. Krishna Rao, p.234<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">7. Krishna Rao, p.235<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">8. Ian Cardozo, p. 153<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">9. Krishna Rao, p.237<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">10. Krishna Rao, p.240<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 2.15pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 2.15pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">11. Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, <i>Leadership in
the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, </i>Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, p.211.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 2.15pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">12. Personal input, Brigadier V.R.P. Sarathy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">13. Personal input, Brigadier B.M. Kapoor<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">14. Personal input from Brigadier V.M. Jog<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 1.8pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US">15. Personal input from Lieutenant Colonel
Jaswant Singh<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.4pt; margin-right: 1.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 2.15pt 0.0001pt 0cm;">
<br /></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-82590928785027166382016-01-16T07:11:00.001-08:002016-01-16T07:11:07.797-08:00Chapter 6 THE INDO-PAK WAR – 1971 (EASTERN THEATRE) <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h2 align="center" style="line-height: 200%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Chapter
6 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></h2>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">THE INDO-PAK WAR – 1971
(EASTERN THEATRE) <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview.
EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION OF <st1:place w:st="on">EAST PAKISTAN</st1:place>
: <i>Pak
Operation ‘Searchlight’– Planning and Preparations in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> – Pak and
Indian Strategies</i>. SIGNALS PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS : <i>Sigs Dte - 1 Army HQ Sig Regt - 2 Army HQ Sig Regt - Eastern Comd Sigs
– N Comn Zone Sig Regt</i>. OPERATION ‘CACTUS LILY’ : <i>Preliminary Operations - Outbreak of War</i>. OPERATIONS ON THE II
CORPS FRONT : <i>9 Inf Div - 4 Mtn Div</i> - OPERATIONS ON THE XXXIII CORPS FRONT : <i>71 Mtn Bde - 20 Mtn Div</i>. 101 COMN ZONE
AREA : <i>95 Mtn Bde - The Adv Towards <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city></i>. OPERATIONS ON THE IVCORPS FRONT : <i>8 Mtn Div -57 Mtn Div - 23 Mtn Div - Kilo
Force</i>. THE FALL OF <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">DACCA</st1:place></st1:city>.
SIGNALS IN OPERATION ‘CACTUS LILY’ : <i>Eastern
Comd Sigs – Eastern Comd Sig Regt - II
Corps Sigs - 9 Inf Div Sig Regt - 4 Inf Sig Regt</i> - <i>XXXIII Corps Sigs – 20 Mtn Div
Sig Regt - 6 Mtn Div Sig Regt -71 Mtn Bde Sig Coy - 101 Comn Zone Area Sigs - 2
Mtn Div Sig Regt - 95 Mtn Bde Sig Coy– 50 Para Bde Sig Coy - The Saga of
Captain P.K. Ghosh, VrC -IV Corps
Signals – 8 Mountain Divisional
Sigs – 57 Mtn Div Sig Regt - 23 Mtn Div Sig Regt - 2
Air Sp Sig Regt– L Comn Zone Sig Regt -
V Comn Zone Sig Regt - 107 Comn
Zone Sig Coy (TA) – Bravo Sig Regt (Corps)</i>. CONCLUSION. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the partition of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1947, a new nation – <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
– came into being. The two wings, called West and <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>,
were separated by fifteen hundred kilometres, with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> in between. Apart from the
physical distance between them, the two wings had wide differences in culture,
language, customs and standard of living. Generally speaking, the West
Pakistani political and military leadership looked down upon the counterparts
in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. These political, social and
economic disparities caused resentment and political unrest among the people of
<st1:place w:st="on">East Bengal</st1:place>, giving birth to the Awami League
led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. In the elections held in December 1970 the Awami
League won a majority of the seats in the Pakistan National Assembly, much to
the chagrin of the People’s Party led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Not willing to
concede power to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, President Yahya Khan postponed the
session of the National Assembly indefinitely and imposed martial law. This led
to violent demonstrations which were crushed ruthlessly. On <st1:date day="25" month="3" w:st="on" year="1971">25 March 1971</st1:date> Mujib was
arrested and Operation ‘Searchlight’ was launched by the Pakistani Army, in
which thousands of innocent people were killed in cold blood. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
escape the repression unleashed by the Pakistani Army, hordes of refugees began
to cross the border into the Indian states of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Bengal</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Assam</st1:country-region></st1:place>
and Tripura. As their numbers grew, it became a severe strain on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, apart
from creating problems of law and order in these states. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> appealed
to the international community to resolve the problem, but found them
unresponsive and began to evaluate various options, including military
intervention. The decision to undertake military operations was taken in April
1971. However, the Army Chief, General S.H.F.J Manekshaw advised that the
operations be postponed to the winter months. The Prime Minister accepted the
advice of the Chief, and gave him a free hand in planning and executing the
task. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
operations conducted by the Indian Army in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>,
code named Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, were planned to be conducted in December
1971. However, several preliminary operations were carried out in November in
order to secure suitable areas which would serve as launch pads for the
formations earmarked for the offensive. On <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date> the Pakistani Air Force bombed
several Indian airfields in the Western Sector. The same evening, orders were
issued by Army HQ for the invasion of <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>,
which commenced at day break on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4
December 1971</st1:date>. The task
given to Eastern Command was to destroy enemy forces and occupy the major
portion of <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> was not
one of the objectives in the plans made by Army HQ, the rapid progress of
Indian forces culminated in the fall of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
and the surrender of the Pakistani Army. A major factor in fall of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> was the three
broadcasts made by General Manekshaw, calling on Pakistani troops to surrender
and assuring them of honourable treatment. Indian troops entered <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> on the morning of
16 December and the formal surrender ceremony took place the same afternoon. In
front of a large crowd, General Niazi handed over his pistol to Lieutenant
General Aurora, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, and signed the Instrument of
Surrender at 1655 hours. Along with Niazi,
about 93,000 Pakistani soldiers became prisoners of war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Signals
played an important role in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. Unlike most other
operations, this was a rare occasion when Signals had almost six months to
prepare and they made good use of the time, ensuring that nothing was left to
chance. The SO-in-C, Lieutenant General E.G Pettengell and his deputy, Major
General K.S. Garewal began working on the Signals plan as early as April 1971.
The detailed planning and execution of the Signals plan was the responsibility
of Brigadier K.K. Tewari, CSO Eastern Command. However, the provision of
resources and synchronization with other agencies had to be done at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. This needed
coordination with a large number of government departments, such as the Ministry
of Defence, Finance, Posts and Telegraphs, Ordnance, production agencies and so
on.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1971, the military communication network in
the Eastern Theatre was under developed.
There was an acute shortage of resources, in terms of manpower,
equipment and vehicles. These had to be made up by new raisings and by
‘milking’ existing units. An additional commitment was the training and
equipping of some para military forces.
Signals played an important role in the deciding the locations of the
headquarters of the formations taking part in the operations, which had to be
built up as communication hubs, using own resources as well as those of the
P&T Department. Several hundred kilometers of PL routes were constructed by
signal units in the likely concentration areas of the formations that were to
take part in the offensive.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
account of the campaign has been divided broadly in two parts. The preparatory
phase has been covered under the heading ‘Events Leading to The Invasion of
East Pakistan’. This is followed by the description of actual operations under
the heading Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. The
role of Signals has been described in both parts, after an account of the
operations. Some units such as N Communication Zone Signal Regiment that played
a major role in the preparatory phase have been covered in the first part. The units affiliated to field formations that
came into the picture mostly after commencement of the actual operations have
been covered in the second part. For obvious reasons, Eastern Command Signals
has been dealt with in both parts. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">EVENTS
LEADING TO THE INVASION OF <st1:place w:st="on">EAST PAKISTAN</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Pak
Operation ‘Searchlight’ <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Rattled by the victory of the Awami League in
the National Assembly elections held in December 1970, Yahya Khan dissolved the
cabinet and imposed martial law in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> on <st1:date day="21" month="2" w:st="on" year="1971">21 February 1971</st1:date>. On 1 March he
announced indefinite postponement of the session of the National Assembly. This
led to violent demonstrations and clashes all over <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place> and the Army was called out to suppress the mobs,
resulting in the death of many Bengalis. Mujib, who had tried to keep the
agitation non-violent, demanded that the troops be withdrawn, or else he would
intensify the agitation. In a ploy to gain time Yahya announced that the
National Assembly would meet at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="25" month="3" w:st="on" year="1971">25 March 1971</st1:date>.
The Governor of East Pakistan, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yakub Khan was
replaced by Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, who was given the task of
suppressing the revolt, code named Operation ‘Searchlight’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After arresting Mujib on 25 March,
Tikka Khan embarked on a campaign of mass slaughter, rape and destruction that
horrified the World. Beginning with the intellectuals of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Dacca</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">University</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
Operation ‘Searchlight’ resulted in the killing of thousands of innocent people,
especially professionals and middle class Hindus. The campaign of genocide soon
moved from the towns to rural areas. Troops fanned out from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> and other cantonments to the country
side, burning villages and slaughtering the inmates. The terrified and defenceless people began to
leave their homes and seek shelter in neighbouring <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Starting from a trickle, the
stream of refugees entering <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
became a flood. By May 1971 more than ten million refugees had crossed the
border and entered the provinces of <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place>
and Tripura. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Within two weeks of the crackdown,
Tikka Khan had suppressed the revolt, punishing most of the rebellious troops
and non-cooperators. After carrying out his task, he handed over military
control to Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi, who took over as GOC-in-C, Pakistan
Eastern Command, Tikka Khan reverting to his role as Governor and Martial Law
Administrator. By the end of May, except for a few pockets of resistance in
inaccessible remote areas, the uprising appeared to have been smothered.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Planning
and Preparations in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
the numbers of refugees <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
streaming into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
grew, the situation worsened, forcing <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> to evaluate various options,
including military intervention. She soon realised that the international
community was not willing to exert any pressure on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> to end the genocide of her
own people, treating it as an internal problem.
During a meeting of the Cabinet on <st1:date day="27" month="4" w:st="on" year="1971">27 April 1971</st1:date>, to which General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw was invited as the Chairman of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked him if the Army
was ready to go into <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. General Manekshaw
asked for more time, as the area was unsuitable for large scale operations
during the monsoons. Time was also needed to make up shortages in warlike
material that the Army was facing. He advised postponement of the operations to
the winter months, when the Himalayan passes would be blocked, ruling out any
threat from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
in case she decided to assist <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
This would also give <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
more time to carry out diplomatic initiatives and convince the World about her
cause and that of the people of <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>.
The Prime Minister decided to go by the advice of the Army Chief, assuring him
of a free hand in carrying out his task.<b>
</b>In return, General Manekshaw promised her a victory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Once the decision to undertake operations was
taken by the Government, the Army Chief set about it in earnest. The Government
also decided to extend support to the freedom movement in <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place>, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. The Government of
Bangladesh, as the new nation was intended to be named once it became
independent, had started functioning in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
and Colonel M.A.G. Osmani was appointed the Military Advisor and C-in-C of its
Army.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
the Prime Minister had given him a virtual <i>carte
blanche</i> in planning the operations, General Manekshaw realised that major
questions of defence policy could not be dealt by the military alone; and would
have to be coordinated with foreign, economic and internal policies of the
nation. He pressed for the involvement of the government in evolving a broad
strategy and laying down clear cut objectives for the armed forces. Thanks to
his rapport with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, he was able to carry out several
changes in the organs responsible for planning and execution at the highest
level. For the first time a political representative, in the person of D.P.
Dhar, designated Chairman of the Planning Committee of the Ministry of External
Affairs, was inducted into war councils. A Joint Intelligence Committee was
formed under the Vice Chief of Army Staff, with members from the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW), Intelligence Bureau and the three services. The Joint
Planning Committee was reactivated and began functioning as the Combined
Services Operational Headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
the civil side, a Secretaries’ Committee comprising the Secretaries of Defence,
Home, Finance and Foreign Affairs was set up to take executive decisions
dealing with preparations for war. The Director General of Civil Defence and
heads of the para military forces were also brought in at appropriate stages of
planning. However, the control, coordination and supervision at the top level
remained with Manekshaw and Dhar, the Prime Minister being kept informed of the
latest developments and the Political Affairs Committee being briefed whenever
required. The Army Chief was always on the ball, giving direction and dealing
with glitches, in the headquarters as well as in the field. He had promised the
Prime Minister a victory, and he was resolved to get one.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">1</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On the diplomatic front, the Government went
all out to convince the World of the righteousness of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s stand.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited several foreign countries and personally
briefed the heads of government. Except the <st1:place w:st="on">Soviet Union</st1:place>,
none of the major powers supported <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s stand. In fact, some were
critical of her actions and the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>
as well as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
came out openly in support of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The Prime Minister, realising the threat of intervention by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> as well
as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
sent D.P. Dhar to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Moscow</st1:place></st1:city>
with feelers regarding obtaining support from the <st1:place w:st="on">Soviet
Union</st1:place>. The Russians responded favourably and the Indo-Soviet
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was signed on <st1:date day="9" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">9 August 1971</st1:date>. This was a major
achievement and effectively neutralised the threat from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>, giving <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
considerable freedom in deciding her course of action.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
success of Operation ‘Searchlight’, the lack of military response from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and the induction
of additional troops from <st1:place w:st="on">West Pakistan</st1:place> made
the Pakistani troops in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> more
audacious and reckless. They began to make forays across the border, resulting
in clashes with Indian para military forces manning border outposts. As these clashes
multiplied, the border posts were reinforced by the Army. This brought <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
Indian Army troops in direct confrontation with each other. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
the end of October 1971, the border clashes had escalated to proper attacks and
were often accompanied by artillery and mortar fire. On <st1:date day="21" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">21 November 1971</st1:date> Pak troops launched
an attack on a base very close to the Indian <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">village</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Boyra</st1:placename></st1:place>.
. The attack was supported by tanks, artillery and the Pakistan Air Force,
causing heavy casualties to Indian troops, which launched a local counter
attack destroying 13 Chaffee tanks and throwing back the Pak troops. Two Pak
pilots who had parachuted into <st1:place w:st="on">Indian territory</st1:place>
were captured after their Sabre jets were brought by the Indian Air Force.
After the Boyra incident, the government decided to permit Indian troops to
cross the border in self defence and carry out counter attacks against Pak
forces aggression against Indian posts.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">2</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Pak
and Indian Strategies <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When
Operation ‘‘Searchlight’ was launched on <st1:date day="25" month="3" w:st="on" year="1971">25 March 1971</st1:date>, the strength of Pak troops in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> was four infantry brigades. This was
quickly built up to four infantry divisions, approximately 25,000 irregulars,
and two regiments less a squadron of tanks. The Pak Air Force in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> comprised 20 to 25 Sabre jets and a few
helicopters. The Pak Navy had a substantial number of gunboats operating in the
coastal and inland waters. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had a total of seven infantry divisions in the East, deployed for counter
insurgency tasks and on the Indo-Tibet border. It had three regiments and two
independent squadrons of armour and a mechanised battalion. The ratio of land
forces between <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was 7:4, which was considerably less than the desired 3:1 for offensive
operations. However, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
navy and air force were much superior to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
task assigned to General Niazi was to defend <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>
against external aggression. With the troops available to him, he could not
defend the entire length of the border.
He decided that a fortress concept of defence was the best, under the
circumstances. This envisaged towns and communication centres ahead of the
major rivers being held in strength, which the Indians would have to reduce
before advancing to the interior. Accordingly, the important communication
centres of Jessore, Jhenida, Bogra, Rangpur, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet,
Bhairab Bazar, Comilla and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city>
were developed as fortresses. Being in depth, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> was left virtually undefended. The
theatre fortresses were placed under the command of the brigades and divisions
in whose area they fell. Pak 16 Division was responsible for the North-Western
Sector with its headquarters at Bogra;
9 Division was to look after the
South-Western Sector with its headquarters at Jessore; while 14 and 39 Divisions
were made responsible for the Eastern Sector with their headquarters at
Ashuganj and Chandpur respectively.
Since no threat was expected from the north, only a brigade was allotted
for the defence of Mymensigh- Jamalpur Sector, with its headquarters at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Indian strategy conceived of offensive defence in the west, defence in the
north, and a swift offensive in the east. Since <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place> was surrounded by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> on three sides, it was
planned to launch offensives from three sides with the fourth facing the sea
being blocked by the Indian Navy. The two squadrons of the Pak Air Force would
be knocked out right at the start and air superiority achieved. The ultimate
aim being the liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>, the
whole of it would have to be captured. However, initial planning was done only
up to the river line, with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
being left for the subsequent phase. Accordingly, the task given to Eastern
Command by Army HQ was to destroy Pakistani forces and occupy important areas
in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. In the event, these plans
were later modified, and orders issued to liberate the whole of East Pakistan.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">3</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The responsibility for detailed planning of
the operations rested on the Director of Military Operations, Major General
K.K. Singh (later Major General I.S. Gill), who enjoyed the trust and
confidence of the Army Chief. The plans were subjected to close scrutiny by General
Manekshaw, who went over every detail before giving his assent, after several
sittings. Though <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had an edge in numbers, the superiority was not large enough to guarantee
success in a conventional attack. To achieve quick results, it was necessary to
evolve an audacious plan that relied on manoeuvre and unconventional means. The
operations had to be quick, to preclude the chance of intervention by outside
forces.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> HQ
XXXIII Corps, located at Siliguri, was made responsible for operations in the
northwestern sector, which would be executed by 20 Mountain Division.. For the southwestern
sector, the formations earmarked were 9 Infantry Division and 4 Mountain
Division, which would be controlled by a new corps headquarters - HQ II Corps. In the eastern sector the requirement was
three divisions, one for the thrust towards Sylhet, another for Ashuganj and
the third for Chandpur-Daudkandi. The formations earmarked for this sector were
57, 23 and 8 Mountain Divisions, with control being exercised by HQ IV Corps at
Tezpur, which was moved to Agartala for the operations. The northern sector, which did not appear to
be heavily defended, was allotted to HQ 101 Communication Zone Area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
plan was ready by early July, when Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora,
GOC-in-C Eastern Command was brought into the picture. In addition to the
existing commitments against the Chinese, he was given the task of destroying
Pakistani forces and occupying the major portion of <st1:place w:st="on">East
Bengal</st1:place>, including the ports of Chittagaong, Chalna and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>. General Manekshaw
personally briefed General Aurora, covering the political background, our aims,
his forecast of the shape of things to come, the outline operational plan, and
emphasis on the vigour and determination required for its execution. Written
operational instructions were later handed over to Aurora, setting in motion
the machinery for the war for the liberation of Bangladesh.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">4</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">SIGNALS
PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals
Directorate <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wanted to undertake military operations in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> as early as April 1971, the Chief of Army
Staff prevailed on her to postpone them by at least six months, so that the
Army was fully prepared. This proved to be a boon, especially for Signals. This
was the first occasion after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city>
when the Indian Army intended to go deep into enemy territory, for which it had
neither the wherewithal nor the experience. Communications infrastructure in
the East was underdeveloped and could not cater for the large number of
formations that were to take part in the operations. After crossing the border
reliance would necessarily have to be placed on wireless, resources for which
were grossly inadequate. There was a need to build up permanent line routes
within our own territory right up to the border, for which Signals were almost
totally dependent on the P&T Department. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
SO-in-C, Lieutenant General E.G Pettengell; his deputy, Major General K.S.
Garewal; and the Deputy Director Telecommunications (DD Tels), Brigadier M.S.
Sodhi, began working on the Signals plan in April 1971. Though the tactical
plan underwent several changes before it crystallized, they were able to
anticipate the communication requirements and went ahead with the
preparations. The detailed planning and
execution of the Signals plan was the responsibility of CSO, Eastern Command.
However, the provision of resources and coordination with other departments had
to be done at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Once the requirements had been worked out by Eastern Command Signals, these
were reviewed through a series of meetings, after which steps were taken to
find the resources, in terms of manpower, equipment and transport. It was soon
realised that the requirements could not be made up by ‘milking’ other commands
or formations, and a number of new units would have to be raised. To meet the
shortages of equipment, import of some critical items such as radio sets was
resorted to. In addition, indigenous sources of production such as Bharat
Electronics had to be tapped. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since
construction and maintenance of PL routes, carrier stations and static
exchanges was the responsibility and prerogative of the P&T Department,
coordination and liaison with them had to be done at the highest level. The
Deputy SO-in-C carried out a survey of the assistance required and personally
visited each area accompanied by Brigadier Sodhi and Mr. Shenoy, a member of
the P&T Board. Wherever the P&T infrastructure was non-existent or
could not be provided in time, it was decided to provide these from Army
resources. A large number of new PL routes had to be constructed, for which
sanction of the Government was obtained.
In areas where PL could not be laid in time, the feasibility of
alternate means of communications such as microwave or radio relay was examined
and adopted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
make up the deficiency of equipment, all possible avenues were explored. The
Central Ordnance Depot at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>
held a large amount of signal equipment, including some of World War II
vintage, which was still functional. Though not authorised to units, many items
such as radio sets 76 and R 201 were issued to units, for air to ground
communications. Other equipment such as generators, batteries and even dry
cells were also collected from various sources or locally purchased. In many
cases, since financial powers for purchase of these items were not held with
Signals, they were purchased by the EME workshops, which were responsible for
the maintenance and repair of the equipment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Signals plan had to cater not only for the requirements of the Army formations
but also those of para military forces which would be operating under Army
control. There were several other organisations such as the Border Roads Task
Force and Special Intelligence Bureau whose communications had to be
coordinated with those of the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Major H.C. Malhotra, who was posted
as GSO 2 (Staff Duties) in Signals 1 Section of the Signals Directorate, recalls
that some where towards the end of March 1971 when things started building
up in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>, a number of Bengali
speaking officers were moved out from the Directorate to Eastern Command. Among
them were Major S.G. Mookerjee and Major P.K. Ghosh. A large number of new
signal units were raised to meet operational requirements. In order to ensure
that the various requirements of the new raisings were met on top priority and
things did not get held up on account of procedural delays, a daily meeting of
all concerned was held in the office of Joint Secretary (G) in the Ministry of
Defence, Mr. Lulla. Every problem, however inconsequential, was raised at this
meeting and resolved. One such problem was the of non availability of cooking
utensils in ‘Bravo’ Signal Regiment that was under raising at Tezpur.
Among Malhotra’s jobs was to draw up the proposed War Establishments (WE)
of new raisings, get them approved by the Deputy SO-in-C, SO-in-C and the
General Staff and then hold discussions with the concerned officers in the
Ministry of Defence and Defence (Finance) for issue of the government letter.
There was a refreshing change in the attitude of the bureaucracy. Instead of
delaying and being ‘difficult’ while sanctioning new units, they approved cases
without too much fuss.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">5</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 18.55pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">1 Army HQ Signal Regiment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Army
HQ Signals comprised 1 and 2 Army HQ Signal Regiments, both located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. The Commandant
Army HQ Signals was Colonel K.K.K. Seth, the staff officer being Major S.
Vaikuntam. The primary role of 1 Army HQ
Signal Regiment was operating the communications facilities ex-Army HQ, while 2
Army HQ Signal Regiment was responsible for engineering of all circuits. 1 Army
HQ Signal Regiment was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel B.P. Murgai,
with Major D.B. Khera being the second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were
Majors S.P. Dewan, Shyam Prasad, S.R.R. Aiyengar, D. Kumar, Kartar Singh and Ashok Khurana. The
Army HQ signal centre was then located in hutments opposite Sena Bhawan; the
telephone exchange was in the basement in South Block; and the tape relay
centre was in the Signals Enclave. Both units shared the living accommodation
and other administrative facilities in the Signals Enclave.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Like
other units and formations in the Indian Army, 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment began
to make preparations for the impending operations from the middle of 1971
onwards. The Deputy SO-in-C personally
initiated and supervised major changes in the rooms housing the telephone
exchange in South Block, which were modified and expanded to take on the
additional trunk positions that would be required. Similar improvements were
carried out in the signal centre and the tape relay centre. The P&T
Department worked with remarkable speed, providing new speech and telegraph
circuits as soon as they were demanded. By the time the operations started,
there were 38 speech and 23 telegraph circuits emanating from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
that time, Army HQ Signals was heavily dependent on the P&T Department for
the maintenance of speech circuits terminated at the South Block exchanges, the
telegraph circuits at the tape relay centre and the RTT circuits from the transmitters
and receivers to the Signals Enclave. Realising the importance of liaison with
P&T Department, an ad hoc defence liaison organization comprising one
officer and about 15 OR was created from within the resources of both
regiments. Overall responsibility for the functioning of this organization was
given to 2 Army HQ Signal Regiment. This proved its worth later during the
actual operations and was subsequently made a permanent feature. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the second half of 1971, there was large scale move of formations. Apart from
the increase in traffic, it created peculiar problems for Signals. According to
the procedure then in vogue, a copy of the move order was given by the Staff
Duties Directorate in Army HQ to the duty signal officer. However, there was
often considerable time lag between the actual move and the receipt of
information. Under normal circumstances this delay did not cause much trouble
but after June 1971 the number of units and formations moving became very
large, leading to problems in routing of messages. The problem was aggravated
when formations started moving without knowing their own final destinations. In a few cases the Indarmy signal centre came
to know of the destination of formations in advance and started routing signals
accordingly. However, the signal centres at the destination stations were
usually not aware of such moves. A number of telephones calls at different
levels had to be made before the signal centres started accepting such messages
for formations that were yet to arrive. In some cases, messages had to be kept
in the Indarmy signal centre for up to three days without clearance.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">6</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Lieutenant General S.R.R. Aiyengar,
who had joined the unit at the fag end of the war, narrates an interesting
incident that occurred to him:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> I was on a night shift duty at the
Signal Exchange. The Exchange was functioning from the basement of South Block.
It was humming with activity with red lights blinking incessantly indicating
some VIP call is being progressed. I guess some tempers were flying around at
the delays and disruptions of calls. I suddenly saw the Exchange supervisor on
duty storming into my cabin looking very visibly harassed. He mentioned that
the then DMO was boiling with rage and wanted me to speak to him urgently. I
made a quick enquiry about what had happened and what possibly could be the
reason for his annoyance. Some important call of his to a formation commander
was disrupted and he was keen to find out why his call was disconnected by the
Exchange. Having got my facts from our end clear, I rang up the DMO. He
was still very angry and upset and he also was not very discrete in
the language he was using. I could appreciate his anger but couldn’t stand the
language he was using to convey his annoyance. He even went to extent of
accusing our operator for monitoring his call. After he had finished his
outpourings, I thought, I should also convey how I felt about it. I had told
him to be careful about the language he used and how unbecoming of an officer
especially of his rank and stature. I also said that if he thinks he is the
only one keeping the vigil, he better find out how others also are
engaged in their work round the clock, not too far from his office This was
perhaps like a red rag to a bull and as he slammed his telephone, he warned me
that I better keep my CO informed about what all had transpired. It was bit
late in the night to inform our CO. I decided to put it down in writing after
carrying out a detailed post-mortem about the call being alleged to have been
monitored and disconnected. I enclosed it an envelope and instructed the
Exchange Staff to hand it over the CO when he comes on his daily round of
the Exchange. I also briefed my next relief about what I had written. I did not
hear anything from my CO. Later I learnt that the DMO paid a surprise visit to
the Exchange and saw for himself how we were manning our exchange and seemed to
be very appreciative of our dedication and commitment. He had also
mentioned in the passing that he wanted me to meet him later when he is free.
The meeting never took place for I guess both of us were never free!<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.5pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I also recollect my short stint as OIC Tape Relay
Centre (TRC) which was functioning from the Signals Enclave Complex those days.
Then Major D. Kumar (Dickey) was the permanent incumbent and I was asked to
officiate during his temporary absence. This I must say was a very big learning
experience especially when so much signal centre traffic was being routed
through the TRC. Timely clearance of SITREPS and compiling pending state of
traffic was indeed very demanding. The continuous chatter of the Teleprinters
was maddening and the deafening noise was still ringing in your ears when one
stepped out of the TRC. I very vividly remember the towering presence of one
Subedar Major Balan (he later became an Honorary Captain). His commitment and
dedication was something to be seen and admired. He was a great source of
inspiration to all of us at the TRC and his quiet and unassuming nature was
remarkable. I also like to add here that very often we would see our
Commandant, then Brigadier K.K.K. Seth walking into the TRC at night , probably
in his after dinner walks and enquiring as to how things are at the TRC. His
genuine and caring attitude was always very encouraging. I was a bachelor
then and I felt little more comfortable with a camp-cot in my cabin being
just adequate. With so much happening especially at night, sleep was a very
secondary affair. Also periodic service of hot tea during the night made it all
that waking hours more comfortable.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">7</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Though 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment was
physically far from the actual scene of operations, all personnel of the unit
felt that they were actively engaged in fighting the war in their own way. This
was mainly the result of the dynamic leadership of the CO, Lieutenant Colonel
B.P. Murgai. Officers who formed part of his highly motivated team recall the
tremendous enthusiasm and encouragement which they got from their CO, which
‘was bursting from his chest’, was very infectious! The performance of the unit was recognised by
a rich haul of awards, perhaps the largest by any Signals unit. Colonel Murgai
was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal; while Major S.P Dewan and Major Shyam
Prasada were ‘Mentioned-in-Despatches’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 18.55pt;">
<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2 Army HQ Signal Regiment</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">
<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The unit was under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Shanker Ambady, while the second-in-command was Major R.S.
Lobo. Other officers holding important appointments were Majors L.K. Chopra (1
Company); G. Natarajan (2 Company); and Ranjit Singh (QM). The unit had three Technical
Officers Telecommunications (TOT). They were Major Gurdial Singh (OC
Transmitters); Captain G. Ponnu (OC Receivers) and Major Kartar Singh (OC ‘M’
Section). The receiver station was located at Ridge, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. The transmitter station had
recently been moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>
from its very old location in Lodhi Estate, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. The regimental headquarters, which
was in the Signals Enclave, was to move to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city> in April 1971 but the move was held up
because of the imminent hostilities. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 2
Company was located in the wireless village on the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Upper Ridge Road</st1:address></st1:street> opposite the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Buddha</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Jayanti</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Park</st1:placetype></st1:place>. OC 2 Company was
responsible for static receiver systems (RT, RTT, and CW), radio relay and
system control. The physical and
electronic security of the wireless village - approximately 800 acres of jungle
in the heart of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
- was also part of his job. Natarajan recalls that he stayed in his office
throughout the operations and went home only for about two hours a day. They also monitored <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place> radio and were the first to receive news about Niazi’s
surrender. They rang up the Army Chief directly and informed him at about 0630 hours.
An hour later official confirmation came based on signal intelligence reports. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
maintenance of the wireless village was the responsibility of the Central
Public Works Department (CPWD). They operationalised dispersal huts in record
time. Similarly the Superintending Engineer of the Delhi Electric Supply
Undertaking personally attended meetings called by Natarajan and ensured
installation of a new generator, standby power arrangements and air
conditioning. All this was done without any paper work, sanctions or payment,
through mutual relationship and liaison. The Assistant Engineer, P&T, Mr.
Ramaswamy, kept a permanent team of linemen to take care of local lines and
remote control cables. Shortly before the operations <st1:time hour="1" minute="24" w:st="on">one midnight</st1:time> he mentioned to an irritated
Natarajan, <i>“Sir, lines may come in, lines
may go out; but man to man relation should not change.</i>” According to
Natarajan, this incident was a turning point in his life.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">8</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The communication links from the
signal centre in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
to the transmitter station in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city>
were over P&T circuits. Standby was provided over a radio
relay system established between the receiver and
transmitter stations. Since one-hop
communications was not possible a relay station was located in the Ordnance
Factory at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Moradabad</st1:place></st1:city>.
It soon became clear that operating through the relay station was not an effective way of
providing the standby, and a direct link was necessary. This was
innovatively done by building a small cabin on an intermediate platform
available in one of the heavy mast structures constructed to support the
rhombic antennas. The radio relay terminal was lifted and set
up in this cabin and one-hop radio relay link between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Meerut</st1:place></st1:city> was immediately established. A
query was later raised whether Signals work sanction had been obtained for the
cabin!</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">9</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The HF links manned by the unit
were operational throughout the war in 1971 but were not used in any
significant way because all the trunk speech and telegraph circuits
provided by the P&T remained fully functional. The only occasion when
the links were used was after the end of the war, when communications had to be
established with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>.
The link was established using <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
transmitters and receivers at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
which were taken over by the Indian Army after the surrender. The first call
between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> was
made by Major M.R. Narayanan of IV Corps Signal Regiment to Major Natarajan at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> on the A7 link at
about 0100 hours on <st1:date day="18" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">18
December 1971</st1:date>. The SO-in-C, who was waiting for the call, also
spoke to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The technical control
organisation and the fault control liaison teams had a hectic time during this
period in maintaining line communication in liaison with the P&T
staff. The fault control liaison teams
operated in shifts round the clock at the P&T coaxial and VFT centres. An
officer was detailed on each shift in view of the importance of maintaining
line communications. Captain Harbans Singh was in charge of the liaison
team with the P&T in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the operations, the Deputy SO-in-C asked the Commandant and the two <st1:place w:st="on">COs</st1:place> for citations. Colonel Ambady declined to write,
maintaining that communications were provided by the entire team and individual
citations will mar the importance of team effort. Instead of individual awards,
he preferred a trophy for Army HQ Signals. Since he declined to write citations
the Commandant asked CO 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment to write one for Major Kartar
Singh, who was physically located in their complex and was directly dealing
with the tape relay centre and exchange duty officers for termination and fault
rectification. Kartar was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Eastern
Command Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Signals plan for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ was prepared and executed by Brigadier
K.K. Tewari, CSO Eastern Command, based at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>. His SO1 (Signals) was Lieutenant
Colonel N. Ray. The two SOs2 (Signals) were Majors A.J.S. Gill and B.K.
Kataria. When he took over his new assignment in September 1970, Brigadier Tewari
noticed that communications in Eastern Command were still under developed and
there had been little change from 1962, when he was commanding 4 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment, and become a prisoner of war of the Chinese. Some modest improvements had been carried out
after the 1962 war in NEFA, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and Nagaland, but the areas surrounding <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>,
such as Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> were still under developed.
Apart from this, the P&T net work was not oriented for the requirements of
military communications from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
to the locations of subordinate military formations. This was in contrast with
Western Command where since 1947 the P&T network had been planned and
executed with a positive defence orientation. In the Eastern theatre, even
commercial or civil communications were relatively meagre. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An important geographical factor
was that all communications – P&T, road and rail - into the North- East
region of India passed through the narrow ‘corridor’ between the northern parts
of East Pakistan and Sikkim, which was highly vulnerable and could be easily
cut off. The only reliable means of communications in 1971 was the microwave
link from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
to Shillong, via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Darjeeling</st1:place></st1:city>.
General Tewari recalls that one of his biggest concerns was the protection of
microwave towers, which he brought up in his frequent meetings with the P&T
Department. A sabotage attempt to any of
the microwave towers in the ‘corridor’ or in places like <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Darjeeling</st1:place></st1:city> which could have disrupted the
entire communications network in the region. The situation was aggravated by
the extensive thefts of telephone and telegraph lines, both over head and
underground, in the region. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon
after he assumed charge, Tewari was confronted with a major communications assignment.
In early 1971 the Army was asked to assist the civil authorities in the conduct
of elections in <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place>. It was a most unusual task, where the Army
was deployed to guard the polling booths and supervise the conduct of the
elections in the whole of <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place>. Almost
1000 radio detachments - 560 HF and 440 VHF – had to be pooled from all over <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, from
both Signals and non Signals units. There were a total of 221 radio nets – 100
HF and the remainder VHF. The frequency
allocation for these nets was a major problem, but fortunately there were no
cases of mutual interference. The volume
of message traffic, particularly cipher traffic, increased manifold and had to
be controlled since resources of cipher staff were limited. For Eastern Command
Signals, this served as an unplanned rehearsal for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’,
especially in the aspects of frequency allocation and message traffic control. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
clamp down in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="25" month="3" w:st="on" year="1971">25 March 1971</st1:date>,
refugees started streaming into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
many of them crossing the border into Tripura. To improve communications to the
region, Tewari ordered a radio relay link to be established between Shillong
and Agartala. There was some reservation on the security aspect of working this
link across <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> in Sylhet area, but
it was established. This move paid dividends later during actual operations,
when a VHF link had to be established from the microwave terminal at Shillong
to Teliamura in Tripura. The P&T Department wanted to locate the terminal in
Agartala but Tewari insisted on Teliamura, which was further away from the
border and outside the range of Pakistani artillery. In the event, this proved
providential and the link proved to be the life line on which the whole of IV
Corps depended for their communications for the three divisional thrust lines.
In the words of General Tewari: <i>“We could
quote this as an example of workability, because P and T Department had refused
to consider our request for a VHF link saying that it was too long a distance and
VHF would not work. We proved it to them
that the RR was working perfectly well.
There was a particular gentleman of the P&T Department who had just
come back from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>. We had quite a task in convincing him because
he thought he knew everything until he saw this RR functioning from Shillong to
Agartala. He had no choice then but to
give it a try and it proved a success”.</i></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 10</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
July 1971 Eastern Command was warned by Army HQ to be prepared for Operation
‘Cactus Lily’, which involved advance by three corps along multiple thrust
lines. To cater for the formations that were to take part in the operation,
administrative installations were created at Dharmanagar, Teliamura, Raiganj
and Krishnagar. Communications for these
administrative installations were provided by DCSO 101 Communication Zone Area,
57 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment, CSO XXXIII Corps and DCSO Bengal Area
respectively. To cater for the deployment of the field formations it was
decided to develop Krishnagar, Tura and Teliamura as communication
centres. Out of these, Tura and
Teliamura had no telecommunication facilities, where as Krishnagar was
adequately connected to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>,
Ranaghat and Majdia. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Once
an outline plan of induction and the numbers of formations involved was finalised,
detailed studies were carried out to work out the requirement of resources, new
line construction and installation of systems. At that time, the following
units were on the order of battle of Eastern Command:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">IV and XXXIII Corps
Signal Regiments.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">L, N, S and V
Communication Zone Signal Regiments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2, 5, 8, 17, 20, 23, 27
and 57 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiments.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Eastern Command Signal
Regiment & Mobile Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2 Air Support Signal
Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bengal Area Signal
Company<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1 Radio Monitoring Company<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">312 (I) and 342 (I) Air
Defence Brigade Signal Companies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">107 TA (P & T)
Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Most
of the above units would be fully committed in case of a hot war. Whereas some
spare capacity was available with IV Corps Signal Regiment, L Communication Zone
Signal Regiment and 2 Air Support Signal Regiment, some other units like
Eastern Command Signal Regiment and Bengal Area Signal Company were not
adequately organized to meet their known tasks.
It was also known that the deployment against the Chinese had to remain
in a very high pitch of readiness, that the counter insurgency operations in
Nagaland and Mizoram would continue and that Signals would have to be prepared
to assist the P&T Department in the maintenance of essential services
during internal strikes and bandhs.
Keeping in mind the above, the requirement of additional resources was
worked out and discussed during various meetings between the CSO and the
SO-in-C. Signals Directorate indicated
that only the following additional resources are likely to be made available to
Eastern Command:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One corps signal
regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One or two independent
signal companies (mountain brigade)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air support tentacles,
based on the actual number of formations deployed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Some increments of
CSO’s branch in HQ Eastern Command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An example of the problems being
faced with regard to the shortage of manpower, and how they were overcome, is
the manner in which Tewari managed to get some staff officers for the Signals
Branch. The staff available to him was
insufficient and he had been asking for a deputy (a full colonel) and two
majors. In spite of all his pleadings he
was not getting the additional staff. The SO-in-C tried his best but was not
able to get additional staff sanctioned. On 31 October General Pettengell asked
Brigadier Tewari to come to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
to plead his case in a conference that was to be held next day in the Ministry
of Defence. The conference was held in
the office of the Joint Secretary (G), where the Additional Financial Adviser,
Mr. Joshi was also present. When Tewari
was asked to present his case, Mr. Joshi said, <i>“I have already seen this case, why is this being brought up again? I
have said no”.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Tewari got upset and said, <i>“Mr. Joshi, I have come all the way from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> and spent
Government money to come by air to present my case and you are not even
prepared to hear me. I haven’t yet told
you why I must have the staff”.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Joshi responded, <i>“Well I don’t think there is any need to
present the case again. It has been
considered before”.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Tewari got worked up and said, <i>“Mr. Joshi, in 1962 we, fought a war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> and we
lost, we were humiliated. The Indian
Army was humiliated and I was the one who suffered as a prisoner of war,
because you people in finance did not give us enough resources at that time and
we were caught unprepared. Now in the
Eastern Army we are determined to win this war and we are not going to let
these small things put us off. If you
are not prepared to give us this staff, please say so in writing and then you
will be responsible if things do not go right”.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After this outburst, Tewari
realised that he had probably said too much. But it did have the desired
effect. He did get some staff - a lieutenant colonel and one additional major. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
following new raisings were ordered by Army HQ for Eastern Command, with the
place and date of raising shown against each:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">II Corps Signal
Regiment less 3 Company Krishnagar
<st1:date day="4" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">4 October 1971</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bravo Signal Regt Tezpur
<st1:date day="7" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">7 August 1971</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l36 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1001 (I) Mountain
Brigade Signal Company Tezpur <st1:date day="7" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">7 August 1971</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l36 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1002 (I) Mountain
Brigade Signal Company Tezpur
<st1:date day="7" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">7 August 1971</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l36 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Ad Hoc Company Eastern
Command Signal Regiment <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> <st1:date day="29" month="4" w:st="on" year="1971">29 April 1971</st1:date><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l36 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1004 Ad Hoc Signal
Company Gauhati
<st1:date day="18" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">18 December 1971</st1:date> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l36 level1 lfo14; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8 Mountain Artillery
Brigade Signal Company Panagarh Not
known<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since
the newly raised units were to be used in a likely war during the winter of
1971/72, there was little time even for the raising, let alone training and
marrying up the equipment with manpower.
In fact all these units except 1002 (I) Mountain Brigade Signal Company
were immediately committed to the provisioning of operational signal
communications, because though a formal
war broke out only on 3 December 1971, border skirmishes had started much
earlier. The raisings were delayed due to rail and road communications having
been disrupted as a result of the floods.
The urgency was not felt in the rear depots and areas and despatch of
stores was not prompt and coordinated, leading to additional work to correct
the mistakes. For instance, C 41/R222 sets used for radio relay were issued to
Bravo Signal Regiment with PE 75 generators but without the transformers to
step up the voltage to 230V AC as required by the equipment. It took considerable time in procuring these
locally and subsequently progressing their issue through the Signals
Directorate. Similarly, cable was issued
without the cable laying apparatus. Due
to lack of urgency on the part of dispatching depots, units were forced to send
escorts to expedite the dispatches. At
one time Bravo Signal Regiment had more than 30% its strength out on escort
duties only<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Signals
played an important role in deciding the locations of the headquarters of the
formations taking part in the operations viz. IV Corps, II Corps and 101 Communication
Zone Area at Teliamura, Krishnanagar and
Tura respectively. Apart from the various other tactical and technical factors,
the two main factors that had a direct bearing on the above selection was the
potential for development for planned offensive operations and the flexibility
to switch axes. The requirement of a
tactical headquarters for XXXIII Corps was also considered and Raiganj was
considered a suitable location. No Army units, much less any signal
installation existed at any of the places hence communications infrastructure
had to be created from scratch. The respective formation signal units, except
in case of XXXIII Corps, were not available to be moved to these places. An early decision which proved very useful
was taken to move the regimental headquarters with some elements of N, V and S
Communication Zone Signal Regiments to Teliamura, Krishnanagar and Tura
respectively. This timely decision created a base at these places on which
communications could be developed. It also enabled close liaison with the
P&T Department and the construction of PL routes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> PL
routes under the BOPEL scheme had been projected in the early sixties and were
periodically reviewed. However, except in Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal
(NEFA), very little construction had been carried in Eastern Command in the
region bordering <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>, as no major
offensive operations were visualised before 1971. The resources then available
were too meagre to complete these routes within the time available. Neither the
P&T Department nor the Army was geared up to undertake this construction.
All available efforts were, therefore, concentrated to develop the main
arteries viz. Teliamura-Amarpur-Udaipur; Teliamura-Agartala-Champansar;
Dharmanagar-Patharkandi-Karimganj and Balurghat-Raiganj. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
availability of multi channel systems along the required arteries was
inadequate to cater for the planned requirements. A tentative requirement of
circuits that would be required was projected to the Army HQ and the P&T
authorities in Eastern Zone. A certain amount of security risk was involved in
this action but was accepted so that the desired systems could be installed in
time. Some P&T types of multi channel equipment was also made available by
the SO-in-C for use as mobile stations. The P&T Department also diverted
equipment from some existing systems in areas which were either not important
or where alternate and surplus capacity existed. The backup systems to the
microwave arteries were particularly handy in this respect. In spite of these
measures, the availability of Voice Frequency Telegraphy (VFT) equipment fell
far short of the requirement, which adversely affected the provisioning of
telegraph circuits. This was further aggravated by the fact that the 3-channel
stackable equipment with the P&T Department was not compatible with the
Army (<st1:place w:st="on">S+DX</st1:place>) 4A which was being gradually
introduced into service. The frequencies used in the (S+DX) 4A are outside the
channel bandwidth of the 3-channel stackable. The problem was solved by a simple
modification of disconnecting the audio limiting input filter of the 3-channel
stackable. The P&T Department was initially reluctant to allow such and
other ‘playing about’ with their systems. However, once things started moving
there was ample mutual cooperation and they allowed use of Army equipment over
their lines and systems without formal agreements. Some of the P&T systems
such as Agartala-Udaipur Ranaghat-Bongaon and Raiganj-Balurghat were in
unsatisfactory state of serviceability and were repaired with the help of the
Army. Similarly extensive Army assistance was provided for rehabilitation of
P&T lines and also in the form of transport to carry their equipment and
exchanges which were meant for the Army. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since it was known that operations
would be conducted deep into enemy territory, it was important to obtain
information of communications infrastructure in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>,
which could be used by the advancing troops. It was soon realised that among
the refugees who had crossed over into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> there were several personnel
who had this information. In June 1971 a team of officers was detailed for this
task. It comprised Lieutenant Colonel Surjit Singh, (Signals Branch, HQ XXXIII
Corps); Major N.T. Singh (17 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment); Major M.
Guin (S Communication Zone Signal Regiment); Major I.C. Singal (IV Corps Signal
Regiment); and Major R.B.S. Babulkar (N Communication Zone Signal Regiment).
Babulkar, who was subsequently promoted and appointed CO 3 Air Formation Signal
Regiment, headed the team, while Surjit was asked to check and assist in their
functioning. The team was tasked to obtain information about the organisation
and functions of Pakistan Army Signals and the telecommunications set up in <st1:place w:st="on">East Bengal</st1:place>.
Members of the team visited the refugee camps located at various
locations and interrogated personnel who could give the required information.
The information collected by the team was compiled and a Telecom Intelligence
Report was issued by CSO Eastern Command to all Signals units before the
operations commenced. The 33 page report provided valuable information on the
communication infrastructure in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>,
such as microwave links, VHF links, permanent lines, telephone exchanges etc.
It also gave details of the communication networks of the Army, Air Force,
Police and East Pakistan Rifles, along with the type and quantities of
equipment being used. Of special interest to Signals was the organisation and
functioning of Pakistan Army Signals, down to unit and sub-unit level.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
augment the signal intelligence in Eastern Command, it was decided that that
the Central Monitoring Organisation (CMO) resources would be placed under the
Signal Intelligence organisation. The resources available to the para military
units were also to be utilised for this purpose. This was coordinated during
meetings held with Brigadier Ajit Singh, MBE, Director CMO; Brigadier J.S. Kalra, Director Signal Intelligence; Brigadier S.R.
Khurana, Wireless Adviser, Border Security Force and Brigadier Vinayak Mehta,
who was in charge of communications for the Central Reserve Police Force.
Another important decision was to place the Signal Intelligence resources
directly under HQ Eastern Command. This was agreed only after Major General
J.F.R Jacob, the Chief of Staff in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
spoke to General Manekshaw. As a result,
Eastern Command was able to build up the complete Pakistani order of battle in
the East and read enemy intentions. During operations, it also enabled them to
respond quickly to changing situations.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">11</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">N Communication Zone
Signal Regiment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The unit was originally raised as
Nagaland Signal Regiment with only two companies in 1963. It was subsequently
re-designated as ‘N’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment and moved Jorhat in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> in May
1964. From then onwards, the unit was involved in construction and maintenance
of PL routes in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. The unit was under the technical
control of DCSO 101 Communication Zone Area located at Shillong. During
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, the unit was placed under CSO IV Corps. In 1971, the
unit was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel B.K. Bhandari, who had assumed
charge in July 1970. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
soon the Signals plan for the operation had been finalised, the construction of
new PL routes was ordered. The projected location of HQ IV Corps was at
Teliamura. The unit was required to build the communication infrastructure at
Teliamura from scratch, since none existed until then. It was also assigned the
task of constructing the new PL route Teliamura-Amarpur-Udaipur-Kakraban in
Tripura. To facilitate this task and ensure better coordination with the
P&T Department, the regimental headquarters and some elements were moved to
Teliamura from Jorhat, where the unit continued to man the static communications.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
target date given to the unit for completion of the PL route by the SO-in-C was
<st1:date day="5" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">5 October 1971</st1:date>.
The distance was 108 km and the task involved construction of two pairs of 242
lbs copper weld A4BC route, carrier transposed. The CO had some reservations
about being able to complete the task in time, but asked Major Jagmohan Khullar
and his boys to go all out and start the work. The line was constructed by 2
October, three days ahead of the target date. One pair of this route was later
extended to Sonamura, a distance of 26 km. This was duly conveyed by Brigadier
G.S. Sidhu, CSO IV Corps to Brigadier Tewari, who reported the completion of
the route to the SO-in-C, adding that the circuits were working satisfactorily.
On 6 October, General Pettengell replied: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 33.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “<i>I am
very pleased to know that the PL route from TELLIAMURA to KAKARABAN via UDAIPUR
was completed by BHANDARI’s boys on 02 Oct 71 – 3 days before the target date
indicated by me. You will remember that in the course of conversation the CO
felt the time limit given was too short. Please congratulate them for the good
work. I would like to see all their future tasks completed with the same
enthusiasm and speed without having to be pressed unnecessarily. Where there’s
a will there’s always a way”.</i></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 12</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit continued to perform creditably after the commencement of the operations,
laying several PL and PVC routes and rehabilitating existing routes in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>. It
constructed 103 km of PVC route, a carrier quad aerial route of 69 km and a
JWDI route of 29 km in Tripura and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> during the operations.
For rehabilitation of PL routes in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>, three ad-hoc line
construction companies were attached with various formations of IV Corps during
the operations. The task of these companies was to maintain the routes
constructed by the unit and extend the trunk arteries from HQ IV Corps to the
formations under command during their advance. To extend these arteries
speedily, extensive rehabilitation of existing but badly damaged PL routes was
carried out with the stores and personnel of the T&T Department of
erstwhile <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. In all 501 km of PL
routes were rehabilitated.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the operations were over,
elements of the unit were left behind till <st1:date day="10" month="5" w:st="on" year="1972">10 May 1972</st1:date> to man signal centres at Dharmanagar
and Masimpur, which they had been manning since July 1971. The good work done
by the unit was recognised by the award of the Vishisht Seva Medal to the CO,
Lieutenant Colonel B.K. Bhandari and a ‘Mention in Despatches’ to Major
Jagmohan Khullar.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">15</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OPERATION
‘CACTUS LILY’ <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preliminary
Operations<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
November 1971 Indian troops were permitted to go into <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place> up to a depth of ten miles to silence enemy guns that had
started shelling Indian border posts. These instructions were used to advantage
by Indian troops to secure specific areas which helped in improving our
offensive posture. HQ Eastern Command gave its formations the following tasks,
which were expanded as the situation developed:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">II Corps - to invest
enemy defences in area Afra and capture Mohammedpur; secure the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Khalispur</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>; and capture Uthali. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XXXIII Corps - to clear
Pachagarh and advance as far south as possible towards Thaurgaon; and capture
Hilli. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">101 Communication Zone
Area – to capture Jaintiapur; capture Kamalpur and advance to Bakshiganj; and
threaten Mymensingh, Haluaghat, Phulpur, Shyamganj and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Durgapur</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">IV Corps – to capture
Gangasagar and clear area up to Saidabad; establish a battalion block in area
Debigram; isolate Akhaura and Brahman Baria; eliminate Pakistani border posts
in Narayanpur area; capture Shamshernagar and Kalhaura; and isolate Feni. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Most
of the preliminary operations were completed before the commencement of
hostilities on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4 December
1971</st1:date>. On the Chaugacha-Jessore axis, 9 Infantry Division had reached
Arpana, about half way from the border to Jessore. A bridge had been
constructed across the Bhairab river at Bayra, linking it with the road to
Chaugacha. Meanwhile, 4 Mountain Division had captured Jibanagar, Uthali and
Darsana and advanced towards Khalispur on the Jibanagar-Kotchadnpur axis and up
to Silind on the Darsana- Kotchadnpur axis. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the North-Western Sector, parts of Hilli defences like Naoara, Monapara and
Basudebpur had been occupied but Hilli itself could not be captured, due to
stiff resistance by the enemy. In the area of Dinajpur, Khanpur and Mukundpur
had been occupied. On the Samja-Phulbari axis, both banks of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichamati</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> were secured. On the
Morgah-Dinajpur axis, 71 Mountain Brigade had captured Thakurgaon. In the
Nageshwar salient, Indian troops had cleared al the area north of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Dharla</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the South-Eastern Sector, the salient east of the line Chargam-Karimganj had
been secured. In the area of Kalaura, Ghazipur had been captured, Kalaura
invested and the Shamsernagar airfield secured. In the Akhaura area, Gangasagar
had been captured and a block established to its west. Further south, the whole
of the Belonia bulge had been cleared. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
these preliminary operations, whenever attacks were launched against well prepared
defences, the Pakistanis fought doggedly and did not give up easily. The
attacks on Hilli defences commenced on 23 November but the position was finally
captured only on 11 December, after the loss of 67 killed and 90 wounded. In
the North-Eastern Sector, the garrison at Kamalpur beat back two attacks by 95
Infantry Brigade, surrendering only after their supplies ran out. The
Teliakhalli post was captured at the cost of 23 killed and 35 wounded. In the
South-Eastern Sector the Khalai post, held initially by a Pakistani platoon that
was later built up to two companies, repulsed two consecutive attacks and was
finally cleared by a whole brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
had been planned to carry out an airdrop by a battalion at Tangail, where
‘Tiger’ Siddiqui was located with about 20,000<i> </i>Freedom Fighters. A parachute battalion was to link up with the Freedom
Fighters and 95 Infantry Brigade advancing from the north, after which the
combined force was to move towards <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
Prior to the para drop, a preliminary operation was carried out by an advance
party with a signal detachment under the command of Captain P.K. Ghosh, of 50
Independent Parachute Brigade Signal Company. Ghosh was infiltrated into <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> and contacted Siddiqui, to seek his help in
preparing the dropping zone for the air drop by the battalion. He also briefed
Siddiqui and asked for his assistance in the collection of stores that were to
be dropped as also in establishing a road block. Siddiqui was also told that in
the event of war his forces were to move with Indian troops to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. In the event, Siddiqui assisted in the
para drop but took no offensive action against withdrawing Pakistani troops. He
did however, move his force to Dacca after the cease fire.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">13</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Outbreak
of War <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Indo Pak war of 1971 began at 1740 hours on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date>, when the Pakistani Air Force
bombed several Indian airfields in <st1:place w:st="on">West India</st1:place>.
At 1800 hours General Manekshaw telephoned Major General Jacob, and told him
that war had begun and he would be issuing confirmatory orders shortly. He also
asked Jacob to notify Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who was then in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>. Jacob
immediately informed the Army Commander, General Aurora, who left for the Raj
Bhawan, where the Prime Minister was staying. Cutting short her tour, Gandhi flew back to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> the same night. The corps commanders
had already been briefed on telephone and by 2030 hours HQ Eastern Command
issued orders for commencement of the offensive. By daybreak on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4 December 1971</st1:date> the Indian
invasion of <st1:place w:st="on">East Bengal</st1:place> was underway. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Eastern
Command was given the task of destroying enemy forces and occupying the major
portion of <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. HQ Eastern Command
in turn tasked its formations as under:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the South – Western
Sector, II<b> </b>Corps comprising 4
Mountain Division, 9 Mountain Division, 50 Parachute Brigade less a battalion,
a regiment of armour (PT-76) and a squadron of T-55 tanks was to capture
Jessore and Jhenida and subsequently secure Hardinge Bridge, Goalundo Ghat and
Faridpur ferries and Khulna.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the North – Western
Sector,<b> </b>XXXIII Corps comprising 20
Mountain Division and 71 Mountain Brigade was to cut the line Hilli-Gaibanda
and to capture Bogra Rangpur.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the Central Sector,<b> </b>101 Communication Zone comprising 95
Mountain Brigade and FJ Sector was to capture Jamalpur and Mymensingh and
subsequently Tangail. A para drop by one battalion was to take place at
Tangail.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the Eastern Sector,<b> </b>IV Corps comprising 8, 57 and 23
Mountain Divisions was to capture Maulvi Bazar, Sylhet, Daudkandi-Mynamati and
Lalmai Hills (South) – Laksham and subsequently Chandpur respectively. 311
Brigade with Kilo Force was to capture <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">OPERATIONS ON THE II
CORPS FRONT<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lieutenant General T.N. Raina, MVC,
was the GOC II Corps. The divisional commanders under him were Major General Dalbir
Singh (9 Infantry Division) and Major General M.S. Barar (4 Mountain Division).
In addition, he had Major General P. Chowdry (Bengal Area) and Brigadier Mathew
Thomas (50 Parachute Brigade). Raina considered Jessore to be the key to the
defence of this Sector and planned his operations accordingly. The aim was to liberate territory west of the
river Padma. He planned to do this by containing Pakistani strongholds near the
border while fast-moving columns bypassed them and raced for the Madhumati river
to prevent the bulk of the enemy from withdrawing across the river and making
for the Meghna ferries to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
The corps plan was to spread the two divisional thrusts into several columns
making for the important communication centres at Jessore, Jhenida, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>, and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Barisal</st1:place></st1:city> and to cut the
Khulna-Jessore-Kushtia railway to prevent the lateral move of the enemy.
Subsequently <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>,
Faridpur, Goalundo Ghat and Hardinge Brigade were also to be secured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9 Infantry Division </span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The task allotted to 9 Infantry Division
was to capture Jessore by D plus 7, followed by the capture of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city> with a brigade group. Thereafter, the division was to be prepared
to capture Jhenida or Magura; and then secure the ferries in the Goaluno Ghat
and Faridpur areas. The divisional
commander planned to launch a brigade each from Bayra and Gobardanga to get
behind Jhingargacha and to use the third brigade along the main Bangaon-Jessore
axis. In this manner, he would be able
to isolate and destroy the enemy forces fighting forward and capture Jessore
easily. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In a swift night operation 42
Infantry Brigade secured Garibpur, as a preliminary operation. The enemy
launched a counter attack with infantry and armour but failed to dislodge 14 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> which had captured this position, supported by PT
76 tanks. In the process, the Pakistanis
lost a large number of tanks and personnel. Indian troops also suffered
substantial casualties, but lost only a couple of tanks. After the capture of Garibpur, the divisional
commander changed his original plan of advance to Jessore. He sent 42 and 350
Infantry Brigades on the central and northern approaches, but due to heavy
resistance these were held up at Arpara and Burinda. Though Burinda was captured by 350 Brigade on
5 December after heavy casualties, the GOC felt that the northern approach
would pay better dividends and would be less expensive in casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Bringing 32 Infantry Brigade to the
north, the divisional commander ordered 42 Brigade to secure Durgabarkati and
32 Brigade to pass through and capture Jessore.
2 Sikh Light Infantry supported by a squadron of 63 Cavalry captured
Durgabarkati on the morning of 6 December. As planned, 32 Brigade passed
through and advanced towards Jessore, clearing Afra which was vacated by the
enemy on the night of 6/7 December. On 7
December Jessore was vacated by the enemy who pulled out without a fight.
Jessore was held by an infantry brigade group supported by tanks and artillery
and it had been estimated that its reduction would involve up to a week’s
bitter fighting. Instead, it fell in a single day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the fall of Jessore, 32
Infantry Brigade continued its advance to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>.
After fighting through a number of delaying positions it was held up at
Daulatpur, north of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>. Reports indicated that the position was held
by an enemy brigade. Appreciating that its capture would need more troops, the
divisional commander decided to move the bulk of 9 Infantry Division to this
area. He planned to employ 42 Brigade to secure Syamganj ferry across the
Bhariab river, advance along the east bank and after re-crossing south of
Daulatpur, attack and capture <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>. 350 Brigade was to attack the enemy position
from the north. Syamganj was secured on
13 December but subsequent advance was slowed down due to enemy
interference. On <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="350">15 December, 350</st1:date> Brigade was launched
from the north and 1 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles secured Syamganj, after
suffering fairly heavy casualties. In
the next phase, 4 Sikh secured <st1:place w:st="on">Eastern Siramani</st1:place>
by early morning of 16 December. Subsequently, the third battalion, 13 Dogra,
captured <st1:place w:st="on">Western Siramani</st1:place> on the same day.
While the attack of 13 Dogra was in progress and 14 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
was about to cross the River Bhairab, orders were received for a cease fire at
1500 hours on 16 December. In a brief ceremony held next day at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>, almost 5000
Pakistani troops including Brigadier Hayat Khan, Commander 107 Pak Infantry
Brigade surrendered to Major General Dalbir Singh, GOC 9 Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Mountain Division</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The task given to 4 Mountain Division
was to capture Jhenida by D plus 8, followed by the securing of the ferry site
over Madhumati river by D plus 11. The
divisional commander, Major General M.S. Barar planned to advance with 41
Brigade on the Uthali-Kotchandpur axis
and with 62 Brigade on the Jibannagar-Kaliganj axis. After the capture of Kotchandpur, he planned
to employ 41 Brigade along the Kotchandpur-Sadhuhati axis and 62 Brigade along
the Kaliganj-Jhenida axis. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Uthali and Jibanagar were secured as
a preliminary operation. In order to
clear the axis of maintenance, 41 Brigade decided to capture Darsana. In the early hours of 4 December, 22 Rajput captured the railway embankment
followed by the capture of the railway station by 5/1 Gorkha Rifles. By mid day, Darsana town had been secured. On
the Kailganj axis, 62 Brigade encountered stiff resistance at Khalipur and was
ordered to advance along a minor track in the north towards Suadih, which was
found to be strongly held. After a determined
attack, 5 Maratha Light Infantry and 9 Dogra (ex-41 Brigade) captured Suadih by
early morning on 5 December. Subsequently, 9 Dogra captured Kotchandpur in the
afternoon. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The divisional commander decided to
isolate Chaudanga and attack Jhenida before the troops in the front could fall
back on this fortress. He sent 5 Guards (ex-41 Brigade) with an armoured
squadron to establish a block in Sadhuhati area, to deal with any enemy
withdrawing from Chaudanga. On 6
December, 5/1 Gorkha Rifles established a bridge head over the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Chitra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
after which 9 Dogra passed through and captured Jhenida on 7 December. Unable to fall back on the fortress at
Jhenida and thoroughly confused about the Indian plans, the enemy withdrew
towards Kushtia. As a result, 62 Brigade
was able to capture Kaliganj on 7 December and Magura on 8 December without
much resistance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The next task was the capture of
Kushtia and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hardinge</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> for which the
corps reserve (7 Brigade) was released to the division. Advancing from Jhenida,
22 Rajput were held up on the outskirts of Kushtia due to stiff resistance by
the enemy and suffered heavy casualties.
It was now clear that the remnants of Pakistani 57 Brigade had withdrawn
to Kushtia. The divisional commander concentrated
the bulk of his division for an attack on Kushtia and was also given some
additional armour and artillery. After a heavy preparatory bombardment Kushtia
was attacked on 11 December by 7 and 41 Brigades and captured easily, the enemy
having withdrawn. On the following day,
41 Brigade captured the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hardinge</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>, which had been
blown up by the Pakistanis on <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="971">11
December 971</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Information was received that an ad
hoc force of the enemy was holding the east bank of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Madhumati</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
opposite Magura, on the way to Faridpur. The divisional commander decided to employ 62 and
7 brigades from the north and the south of the enemy positions in the
Kamarkhali area and trap the enemy.
Crossing the river at Duman and Komarpur respectively, 62 and 7 Brigade
secured the area on the night of 14/15 December. Subsequently, blocks were
established near Gopaldi on 15 December.
Finding his withdrawal routes obstructed, the Pakistanis became
desperate and attacked the blocks, but could not succeed in dislodging them. In the process, they suffered heavy
casualties and broke up.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">14</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OPERATIONS
ON THE XXXIII CORPS FRONT<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lieutenant General M.L. Thapan was
the GOC XXXIII Corps. He had under his command 20 Mountain Division (Major
General Lachhman Singh, VrC) and 71 Mountain Brigade (Brigadier PN Kathpalia).
At a later stage, 6 Mountain Division (Major General P.C. Reddy) was made
responsible for the operations of 71 Mountain Brigade. The corps was also
allotted 63 Cavalry less a squadron (T 55); 69 Armoured Regiment (PT 76) and
471 Engineer Brigade for the operation. The task given to XXXIII Corps was to
cut the line Hill-Gaibanda and subsequently to capture Bogra or Rangpur,
depending on the situation. Thapan
planned to employ 20 Mountain Division for securing Hill-Gaibanda and thereafter
for the capture of Bogra. 71 Mountain
Brigade was to be utilized for the advance to Dinajpur and for the subsequent
capture of Rangpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">71 Mountain Brigade</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">71 Mountain Brigade was ordered to
advance along the Pachagarh-Thakurgaon-Dinajpur axis and capture Dinajpur. In a preliminary operation, the brigade
captured Pachagarh using 7 Maratha Light Infantry, after isolating it from the
rest of the Sector by employing 21 Rajput.
The enemy had in fact withdrawn from the position, when he found that he
was cut off. Subsequently, 21 Rajput captured
Thakurgaon, which had also been vacated after being cut off by a company of the
Marathas. Continuing their advance, the brigade captured Birganj on 5 December
and contacted the Kantanagar bridge on the Dhepa river on 6 December. The Pakistanis had blown up the bridge and
were holding the area between the Dhepa and Atrai rivers in strength. The
brigade tried to cross the river but suffered heavy casualties. On the night of
9/10 December, a battalion block was established south of the enemy position towards
Dinajpur but this proved ineffective since the lines of maintenance were from
the east. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After failing to make headway
towards Dinajpur, it was decided to change the thrust line of the brigade to
the east, towards Nilphamari.
Accordingly, it crossed the Dhepa river and advanced on the
Birganj-Khansama-Darwani-Saidpur axis until it reached Khansama, where it was
help up by the enemy. After establishing a block behind the position, 21 Rajput
attacked and captured Khansama on 13 December.
The enemy tried to counter attack on 14 December, but was frustrated by
air attacks and artillery fire.
Continuing its advance, the brigade captured Darwani on 15 December. By
the morning of <st1:date day="16" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">16 December,
71</st1:date> Brigade had reached about 8 km south-west of Nilphamari. As a
result of the relentless pressure by the brigade, the Pakistanis did not, until
the end, risk thinning out their strongholds at Saidpur, Rangpur, Parvatipur
and Dinajpur to reinforce the threatened areas further south.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">15</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">20 Mountain Division <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Major General Lachhman Singh, GOC 20
Mountain Division initially planned to secure the Hilli-Gaibanda line,
employing two brigades in the advance, keeping one brigade to hold the firm
base and the fourth brigade as a reserve. He tasked 202 Mountain Brigade to capture
Hilli and then Palasbari; 66 Mountain Brigade to advance along the axis
Samjia-Phulbari-Charkai and capture Charkai, followed by Pirganj and Gaibanda;
165 Mountain Brigade to defend the area Balurghat-Malda; and 340 Mountain
Brigade to be in the reserve.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As a preliminary operation, the area
Nopara-Morapara, on the northern flank of Hilli was secured by 8 Guards (202
Mountain Brigade) while Garhwal Rifles secured Basudeopur. However, the advance of 202 Mountain Brigade
could not proceed beyond Hilli, which had been developed into a very strong
position. Meanwhile, 20 Maratha Light Infantry of 66 Brigade captured Phulbari
while Charkai was captured by 69 Armoured Regiment on 4 December by a surprise
move. In view of the strong resistance put up by the Pakistanis at Hilli, the
divisional commander decided to move 202 Brigade back through <st1:place w:st="on">Indian
territory</st1:place> in the Balurghat bulge to the Charkai area and utilize
it for an advance to Ghoraghat via Bhaduria.
66 Brigade was to advance to Pirganj as originally planned via
Nawabganj.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Advancing on the track towards
Pirganj, 66 Brigade captured Nawabganj and Hathangi ferry on 5 December and
Kanchanda ferry on 6 December. However, due to the strong presence of the enemy
in the Hilli area, 202 Brigade could not be moved and was thus left behind. To
keep up the momentum of the advance, it was now decided that 66 Brigade would
hold the area Charkai-Nawabganj-Bridgehead while 340 Brigade would advance to
Pirganj. Commencing its advance early on 7 December from the Nawabganj area,
340 Brigade captured Pirganj the same evening. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The divisional commander now planned
his advance to Bogra. He decided to
utilize 340 Brigade to advance on the Pirganj-Gobindganj axis and to capture
Gobindganj followed by Bogra. Simultaneously, 66 Brigade was to advance on the
Nawabganj-Bhaduria-Goraghat axis and capture Goraghat. 202 Brigade was to capture Hilli and then
link up with 66 Brigade in the Goraghat area.
Subsequently, it was to advance on the Goraghat-Khetlal-Bogra axis.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Advancing rapidly, 340 Brigade
captured Palashbari on 9 December and Gaibanda and Phulchari ferry on 10
December, securing the ‘waistline’ and isolating Pakistani forces in the
Dinajpur-Rangpur belt. Pressing on further south, the brigade captured
Gobindganj on 11 December with a brilliant enveloping move. Meanwhile 66
Brigade captured Bhaduria with the support of tanks on 11 December. 202 Brigade
encountered stiff resistance at Hilli, but after capture of Maheshpur area in
the rear of Hilli on 10 December, the enemy started showing signs of weakness.
Three battalions – 22 Maratha Light Infantry, 4 Rajput and 8 Guards - closed in
on the Hilli position, while a fourth battalion - 4 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> - posed a serious threat from the
rear. After the capture of Bhaduria, the
enemy got into a panic and began to pull out. This enabled 202 Brigade to
advance to Goraghat on 11 December and to Khetlal on 12 December. However, the
advance was held up at Khetlal due to enemy resistance across a water obstacle.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Resuming its advance from Gobindgarh
towards Bogra, 340 Brigade captured a bridge over the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Karatoya</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
intact on 12 December. The defences of
Bogra were contacted on 13 December. The brigade commander sent an armoured
regiment cum infantry battalion group on an outflanking movement from the east
to cut off Bogra in the early hours of 14 December. By the end of the day, 340
Brigade had captured Bogra, along with 20 officers and 500 other ranks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 13 December, 20 Mountain Division
was ordered to capture Rangpur at the earliest.
66 Brigade advanced towards Rangpur via Mithapukur on 15 December, while
202 Brigade advanced on the western flank on 16 December. As the advance progressed, Pakistani resistance
ceased and the war ended on 16 December 1971.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">16</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">101
COMMUNICATION ZONE AREA<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Major General Gurbax Singh Gill was
the GOC 101 Communication Zone Area. The formation commanders under him were
Brigadier H.S. Kler (95 Mountain Brigade) and Brigadier Sant Singh (FJ
Sector). Apart from Brigadier Kler, the
brigade majors of both formations were also signal officers - Major G.L. Rajpal (95 Mountain Brigade) and
Major (later Lieutenant General and SO-in-C) S.G. Mookerjee (FJ Sector). At a
subsequent stage, 167 Mountain Brigade (Brigadier Irani) was also allotted to
101 Communication Zone Area. The task assigned to the General Gill was to
capture Jamalpur-Mymensingh, followed by Tangail and thereafter establish
contact with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. These tasks were in addition to its normal
commitment of providing logistic support to the formations in the region. Gill
planned to utilise 95 Mountain Brigade to capture Jamalpur by D plus 6/7 and FJ
Sector to capture Mymensingh after the capture of Jamalpur. Thereafter, he planned to capture Tangail by
D plus 8. An inland water transport task
force was to move down from Dhubri to Jamalpur down the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Brahmaputra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
to provide logistic support for the forces.
For the capture of Tangail, a para drop by a battalion group was
planned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">95 Mountain Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As a preliminary operation, 13
Guards captured Kamalpur on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4
December 1971</st1:date>. Concurrently
a force of two infantry battalions carried out a wide outflanking move and
captured Bakshiganj on 5 December, the enemy having pulled out during the
previous night. Resuming its advance on 6 December, the brigade reached the
north bank of the <st1:place w:st="on">Brahmaputra</st1:place> on the evening
of 7 December, after overcoming enemy resistance along the route. During this period, Gill was injured in a
mine accident and had to be evacuated.
Major General G.C. Nagra, GOC 2 Mountain Division assumed command of 101
Communication Zone Area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As the enemy was holding Jamalpur in
strength, it was decided that while one battalion would advance from the front
on the main axis, two battalions would carry out an outflanking move, cross the
river west of Jamalpur and establish blocks behind the enemy. Accordingly, 1 Maratha Light Infantry and 13
Guards crossed the river Shyampur after a long march on man pack basis on 6
December. Due to the delay in the arrival of their heavy weapons which were
being carried on bullock carts, the road blocks were set up only in early hours
of 9 December. At this stage Kler sent a messenger to the Pakistani garrison in
Jamalpur, asking them to surrender. Colonel Sultan, Commander Kamalpur
Fortress, sent back a sarcastic note, accompanied by a bullet, turning down the
offer, and advising Kler to fight instead of talking. He ended the note with
the words: <i>“Hoping to find you with a
sten in your hand next time, instead of the pen you seem to have so much
mastery over</i>”. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As the Jamalpur garrison continued
to hold out, Nagra decided to send one more battalion to the area south of
Jamalpur, with a view to clearing the position from the rear. On <st1:date day="8" month="12" w:st="on" year="167">8 December 167</st1:date> Brigade under
Brigadier Irani was allotted to him by Eastern Command. Nagra ordered Irani to
report to him with one battalion at the earliest. Irani reported to Nagra on 9
December, but 6 Sikh Light Infantry joined the force only on 10 December and
was placed under Kler who now controlled operations from the area South of
Jamalpur. The Indians increased pressure
on the enemy at Jamalpur by air attacks and artillery. The Pakistanis tried to break out but could
not overcome the block held by the Marathas. In the process, they suffered many
casualties. Finally, early in the morning on 11 December the garrison
surrendered, though Colonel Sultan and a number of his men managed to slip out
at night.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">17</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On the Mymensingh axis, 6 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> of FJ Sector attacked and captured Haluaght on 7
December, the enemy having withdrawn the previous night. Resuming the advance, they secured Sarchapur
on 9 December, after an earlier attempt to capture it on the night of 5/6
December failed. On 10 December the enemy vacated Mymensingh, which occupied on
the following day. Sant Singh occupied Madhupur on 12 December without a fight.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With the operations in Jamalpur and
Mymensingh going on favourably, it was decided to carry out the para drop as
planned. On the evening of 11 December, 2 Parachute Battalion (Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Pannu) was dropped in the Poongli area with a view to capturing
the bridge over the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Lohajang</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> and destroying the
retreating enemy from Jamalpur and Mymensingh.
The battalion secured the bridge by 2000 hours and soon thereafter
intercepted about 300 enemy troops withdrawing from the area. However, it was discovered that the bulk of
the enemy had already escaped earlier before the para drop. News of the success
of the para drop reached higher headquarters only on the morning on 12
December, since the battalion was out of radio contact throughout the night. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Advance Towards <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It was reported that the enemy had
split into smaller groups and withdrawn to Kaliakar and Tungi. Resuming its
advance from Tangail on 13 December, 6 Sikh Light Infantry of 95 Brigade captured
Kaliakar the same night and reached the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gurag</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
on the morning of 14 December. The
advance was held up by the Pakistanis who were holding the bridge site with
infantry supported by tanks. Attempts to
pressurize the enemy by sending a couple of companies across the river to
threaten his flanks failed as the Pakistanis used their tanks against the
infantry. At this stage, information was
received that a good road existed linking Safipur on the main road, to the
Dhamrai-Dacca road and that there were no water obstacles along this
approach. This was exploited for
subsequent operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Nagra decided to change his plans on
14 December. He ordered Kler to move down along the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Turag</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
and Sant Singh to move down towards Mirpur.
On 15 December, 6 Sikh Light Infantry managed to secure a bridge head
some distance to the south of the bridge site.
However, they were held up in the Chandna area. FJ Sector, suitably re-grouped with 13 Guards
and 6 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> and some artillery, advanced from
Kaliakar to Dharmrai area via Safipur on 14 December. After securing the
Dhamraj ferry area in the early morning of 15 December, 13 Guards, the leading
battalion, continued on to Sabhar and captured it by the evening. As 95 Brigade was held up in the Chandna
area, 167 Brigade was given the task of crossing the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Turag</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
in the Mena area, with a view to cutting off the enemy opposite 95
Brigade. Two battalions of this brigade
crossed the river and established a block in the Gachha area, in the early
hours of 16 December. The enemy then
withdrew from Chandna and was successfully intercepted at Gachha. By now
elements of IV Corps had crossed the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Meghna</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> and were
threatening <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
In order to facilitate better coordination for the battle of Dacca, the Army
Commander placed 101 Communication Zone Area under the command of IV Corps with
effect from mid-day on 15 December.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">18</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span lang="EN-GB" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span>
<br />
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigadier H.S. Kler was awarded the
MVC for this operation. His photograph and citation are given below:- <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the Indo-Pak War 1971, Brig
Kler commanded a mountain brigade on the Eastern front. His braigade was asked to lead the Indian
advance in Kamalpur-Turag river axis.
It involved clearing of strong enemy opposition at Kamalpur,
Bakshiganj, Jamalpur, Tangail, Mirzapur and river Turag and many minor
obstacles in between.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the advance Brig Kler
always moved with then leading
troops, directing the operations
in </span></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 4.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> complete disregard of his safety. His handling of the troops during the
battle of Jamalpur showed great professional skill. He provided great inspiration to his
troops, who had laid siege behind the enemy positions south of Jamalpur, by
his presence in the thick of the battle.
He directed the operations so skilfully and courageously that all aqttempts
by the enemy at breakthrough were foiled.
Enemy suffered heavy casualties and lost 379 men as prisoners of
war. He also lost a large quantity of
weapons and ammunition to the Indians.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brig Kler was awarded Mahavir
Chakra for displaying outstanding courage and leadership.</span></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OPERATIONS
ON THE IV CORPS FRONT<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lieutenant General Sagat Singh was
the GOC IV Corps, with his headquarters at Teliamura in Tripura. The formations
under his command were 8 Mountain Division (Major General K.V. Krishna Rao), 57
Mountain Division (Major General B.F Gonsalves), 23 Mountain Division (Major
General R.D. Hira, MVC) and Kilo Sector (Brigadier Anand Swarup). The corps was
given the task of securing the area up to the line of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Meghna</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>. Sagat Singh considered that if he could close
up with the Meghna in the area of Daudkandi-Chandpur, he could pose a serious
threat to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. At the same time, he had to ensure that the
Pakistani troops deployed in the Sylhet-Maulvi Bazar sector and Feni-Chittagong
sector did not interfere with the operations or fall back for the defence of
the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
bowl. In accordance with this broad
strategy, he tasked his formations as under:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8 Mountain Division was
to capture Maulvi Bazar and thereafter the Sherpur-Sadipur ferries. Depending on the situation, the division was
to capture Sylhet and secure Brahmanbaria.
Subsequently, the division was to be prepared to participate in the
operations for the capture of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">57 Mountain Division
was to capture Akhaura, followed by Daudkandi.
Later, it was also to capture <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city>.
61 Mountain Brigade of this division was to initially operate under corps
headquarters and was to isolate Comilla from the north and west and
subsequently establish a firm base for the capture of Daudkandi..<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">23 Mountain Division
was to capture the southern portion of Lalmai Hills-Laksham. Thereafter it was to capture Chandpur.
Subsequently the division was also to clear the enemy from the Lalmai Hills.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Kilo Sector was to
capture Feni and subsequently <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8 Mountain Division</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The divisional commander decided to
launch his main thrusts from the south and south-east, i.e.,
Dharmanagar-Fenchuganj-Sylhet and Kailashahar-Maulvi-Bazar-Sherpur-Sylhet. Advancing
on the Dharmanagar axis, 59 Mountain Brigade encountered stiff opposition at
Ghazipur. 6 Rajput launched an attack
but was able to capture only part of the objective, as the enemy reinforced
it. 4/5 Gorkha Rifles captured the
position on 5 December after some determined hand to hand fighting throughout
the night. Concurrently, 9 Guards
captured Kapnapahar, after some tough fighting.
The enemy counter attacked but was beaten back. Kulaura was secured without a fight on 6
December, followed by Brahman Bazar. On
7 December the advance was continued towards Fenchuganj, led by 6 Rajput.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On the Kailashahar axis, 81 Mountain
Brigade launched its attack on Shamshernagar.
After some bitter fighting 10 Mahar secured Chatlapur, while 3 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> captured Bagichara. In the next phase, 4 Kumaon after overcoming
stiff resistance captured Shamshernagar.
Subsequently, the battalion captured the Shamshernagar airfield.
Although damaged from air attacks, the airfield was quickly made serviceable by
the Border Roads Organization on 4 December.
Resuming the advance, 3 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> captured
Munshi Bazar by the evening of 6 December.
From here, 10 Mahar took over the lead and contacted the outer defences
of Maulvi Bazar the next day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At this stage, it was learned that
the Pakistani divisional commander had instructed Pak 311 Brigade to withdraw
towards Ashuganj, but the brigade commander declined to comply with these
orders, due to a road block established by 81 Mountain Brigade on the Maulvi
Bazar-Ashuganj road. Another report indicated
that Pak 202 Brigade was trying to concentrate in Sylhet and pull out of the
sector with a view to moving to the Ashuganj area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> The corps commander now saw an
opportunity to seize Sylhet, and decided to do so by a heli-borne operation.
4/5 Gorkha Rifles was selected for the purpose and the operation was launched
in the afternoon of 7 December. As only
nine MI-4 helicopters were available, essential elements of the battalion along
with two mountain guns were landed in phases.
This was the first time an 'air bridge' had been employed by the Indian
Army. Being a paratrooper, Sagat knew
the potential of a heli-borne force and could appreciate the immense advantages
that accrued from its employment at the opportune moment. The enemy was
demoralised, and made no efforts to attack 4/5 Gorkha Rifles. As he had visualised, the noise of the
helicopters misled the Pakistanis – it was later learned that they thought that
an Indian brigade had landed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Maulvi Bazar was held by Pak 313
Brigade, which was occupying a strong defended position on a prominent high
ground. From the very beginning, Hunter aircraft operating from Kumbhigram
airfield had been tasked to constantly bomb Maulvi Bazar with napalm. The
heli-borne operation near Sylhet so unnerved the Pakistani Command that the
Maulvi Bazar brigade group was moved away to Sylhet, which already had a
brigade group of four battalions. This was reported by the Indian Air Force,
which flew a tactical reconnaissance mission over Maulvi Bazar next day. On the
night of <st1:date day="8" month="12" w:st="on" year="1981">8 December, 81</st1:date>
Brigade launched its attack and captured Maulvi Bazar, the enemy having fled in
panic. In a Pakistani officers’ mess, they found lunch laid on the table,
uneaten.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the north, Echo Sector captured
Jaintiapur, but was held up at Sarighat on 7 December, as the bridge was blown
and formation had no engineer support. A company of Engineers was sent on a
roundabout route, and on 10 December, Echo Sector advanced up to Hemu, where
again a bridge was demolished. However,
the Hemu position was captured the same night. The advance was held up again at
Chandighat, which was captured on 12 December. Finally, after overcoming a
number of delaying positions Echo Sector attacked and captured the Khadim Nagar
position north of Sylhet on 16 December. From the East Bengal Brigade, 1 East
Bengal Rifles under Colonel Zia-ur-Rehman (later to become President of
Bangladesh) carried out an outflanking move and secured Chicknagul area on the
night of 11/12 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 59 Mountain Brigade commenced its advance and contacted Fenchuganj position
on 11 December. The far bank was strongly held and the railway bridge, though
intact, was swept by fire. However, a
company of 6 Rajput rushed across the bridge in a bold move and secured a small
bridge head. This action, together with
intense fire from the south bank, unnerved the Pakistanis who withdrew in
disorder. 6 Rajput continued their
advance and captured Magla Bazar early on 13 December. As the Pakistanis were on the run, the
brigade commander decided to continue the advance with the Rajputs in the lead,
but sent 9 Guards on an outflanking move behind the enemy. This resulted in utter confusion and breakup
of the withdrawing enemy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 13 December, Sagat ordered the
move of 81 Brigade less 3 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> to Agartala,
for operations in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
area. He also ordered 8 Mountain
Division less one brigade to be prepared to move to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> area after capture of Sylhet. In views of the changes, 3 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
on the Sherpur-Sylhet axis was placed under command of 59 Mountain
Brigade. This battalion continued its
advance from Sadipur ferry and captured Daadpur position, just short of Sylhet
on 13 December. On 14 December, it made
contact with the Sylhet position along the line of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Surma</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>. On its eastern flank, 9 Guards captured
Sylhet railway station and also reached the line of the Surma on 14
December. 5/5 Gorkha Rifles, Echo
Sector, as also other troops around Sylhet, were all placed under 59 Brigade to
coordinate the siege and operations for the capture of Sylhet. By now, Pak 202 and 313 Brigades were bottled
up in Sylhet. On 15 December, the enemy
sent feelers to 4/5 Gorkha Rifles for surrender. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">57 Mountain Division <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 57 Mountain was tasked to capture
Akhaura area and then build up in Maynamati by D plus 5. The enemy kept
shelling Agartala from the Akhaura area, which was also used to carry out
sabotage and subversion operations. The
divisional commander decided to mount a preliminary operation for the capture
of Akhaura. He tasked 73 Mountain Brigade to contain Gangasagar and prevent any
enemy interference from the Kasba area.
Subsequently, it was to capture Gangasagar and link up with 311 Mountain
Brigade in the north. At the same time,
311 Mountain Brigade was to capture Noapara and Lonasar. Subsequently, it was to capture Akhaura along
with 73 Mountain Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Moving cross country 14 Guards of 73
Mountain Brigade established itself just south of Gangasagar, where it was
joined by 19 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> after the capture of
Karnel Bazar. Meanwhile, 12 Kumaon also captured its objective, a
broken bridge. Subsequently, 14 Guards
attacked Gangasagar which was strongly held by the enemy and captured it after
overcoming stiff resistance and suffering heavy casualties. In this attack, the
only Param Vir Chakra of the 1971 War in the Eastern Sector was awarded to
Sepoy Albert Ekka posthumously for displaying valour and dedication to duty of
the highest order. The enemy tried to
counter attack with armour and infantry supported by his Air Force, but was repulsed. After the capture of Gangasagar, 73 Brigade
linked up with 311 Brigade in the north and established a road block on the
Kasba-Brahmanbaria road, with a view to isolating Kasba. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> 10
<st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> of 311 Brigade captured Noapara and
Lonasar, after a cross country advance. The battalion then captured Simrail in
the early hours of 5 December, after heavy fighting. Meanwhile, 4 Guards
established a block across <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Titas</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> at Kodda, west of
Akhaura. The enemy reacted strongly but the Guards held on. By now, Sierra
Force captured Rajapur and pressed forward towards Akhaura, which was attacked
by 10 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> and 18 Rajput. After some tough fighting, these battalions
captured Akhaura and the railway bridge over the Titas on the morning of 5
December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> At
this stage, information was received that the railway embankment between
Akhaura and Brahmanbaria was being used as a road, by lifting one of the rail
tracks. This track ultimately led to Ashuganj, where a railway bridge existed.
Though not decked, this was the nearest route to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, if it could be used. In the light of
this information, it was decided between to take advantage of this approach to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> and the thrust line
task of the division was changed to Brahmanbaria-Ashuganj instead of towards
Daudkandi. In order to get to Ashuganj bridge at the earliest, 73 Brigade was
ordered to advance to Brahmanbaria along the Kasba-Brahmanbaria approach, with
311 Brigade advancing along the Akhaura-Brahmanbaria approach. The Sierra Force
was to advance along Chandura-Sarail-Ajabpur and secure the ferry there, to
prevent interference from the north. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> On
<st1:date day="7" month="12" w:st="on" year="1973">7 December, 73</st1:date>
Brigade advanced and secured the eastern bank of the river west of Brahmanbaria
while 311 Brigade advanced from Akhaura after ferrying across the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Titas</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
Sierra Force, strengthened by 10 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place>, also
moved forward and positioned itself to pose a threat to Brahmanbaria from
Sarail. On the night of 7/8 December the enemy vacated Brahmanbaria and
withdrew towards Ashuganj. On 8 December, 4 Guards captured the road railway
junction to the west of Brahmanbaria. Moving cross country, 18 Rajput reached
Ashuganj, where they were subjected to heavy fire by the enemy, who even
launched a counter attack. However,
Sierra Force also approached Ashuganj from the north and other elements of 311
Brigade kept moving forward. Unnerved
by the buildup, the enemy blew up the Ashuganj bridge on 9 December, leaving the Pakistani brigade commander
and a large number of troops on the eastern bank of the Meghna river! The
troops from Ashuganj withdrew in confusion across the ferry and the town was
captured on 10 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> At this stage, the corps
commander reviewed the situation. He flew over Daudkandi, Chandpur and Ashuganj
in a helicopter on 9 December, and discussed the situation with the local
commanders. He then decided to heli-lift his troops across the Meghna, and make
for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. He
appreciated that the capture of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
would end the war, and the only way to achieve this was to contain Bhairab
Bazar and cross the Meghna further to the south, where no opposition was
expected. He had twelve MI-4 helicopters, and he reckoned that the element of
surprise would more than make up for the deficiency in numbers that he would be
able to get across. He had used helicopters in Mizo Hills for the last three
years, and knew their worth. He had planned for such a contingency, if the
opportunity presented itself, and had practised his troops and helicopter
pilots for night landings, using torches. Fortunately, the divisional commander
(Gonsalves) was also a pilot and well versed in their use in Mizo Hills where
57 Division had been deployed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> The air lift began on the afternoon of 9
December and continued for the next 36 hours. A total of 110 sorties were flown
from the Brahmanbaria stadium and crossed the Meghna, which was 4000 yards
wide, to land at helipads which had been marked by torches, with their
reflectors removed. During day the troops were landed in paddy fields, with
helicopters hovering low above the ground. The first battalion of 311 Mountain
Brigade, 4 Guards, was landed in Raipura, while 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
crossed the river using country boats. Next day, the troops were landed
directly at Narsingdi. Meanwhile, 73 Brigade had started to cross using boats,
which had been rounded up. By 11 December, both 311 and 73 Mountain Brigades
had crossed the Meghna and were ordered to advance to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, on different axes. Using all modes of
transport, including bullock carts and cycle rickshaws, both brigades advanced
rapidly, and on 14 December, the first artillery shell was fired on <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. On <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="311">15 December, 311</st1:date> Mountain
Brigade was poised to enter <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
when orders were received from HQ Eastern Command to halt further advance.
Tactical HQ 101 Communication Zone Area, 95 and 167 Mountain Brigade Groups and
2 Para were placed under command IV Corps the same day. On the night of 15/16
December, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
was subjected to shelling by artillery, and this hastened the surrender. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> General Sagat's decision to cross
the Meghna proved to be crucial to the entire operation. This was also the
first instance in military history of an 'air bridge' being used for crossing a
major water obstacle, by a brigade group. According to Major General Lachhman
Singh, <i>“It was here that Sagat Singh exhibited the genius and initiative of a
field commander. It was this decision which finally and decisively tilted the
scale in our favour and led to the early surrender of the Pakistani forces at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>…..This was a great
feat of strategic manoeuvre, and its boldness produced stunning effect on the
already demoralized enemy</i>"<i>.</i></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 19</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> After the war, B.B. Lal, who was
the Defence Secretary, told Sagat an interesting story regarding the crossing
of the Meghna. On 10 December a meeting was being held in South Block, chaired
by Sardar Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs. Attending the meeting
were the Defence, Home and Foreign Secretaries, the Director of the IB, and the
Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. The meeting had just commenced when
the message arrived that Sagat had crossed the Meghna. The Defence Minister, Babu
Jagjiwan Ram, rushed in soon afterwards, while the Prime Minister's Principal
Private Secretary ran to her office to inform her. According to Lal, very soon
afterwards, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was seen running down the corridor,
her hair and saree flying. They were all surprised to see the Prime Minister
bubbling with joy, and for him, this was the most unforgettable moment of the
1971 war.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">20</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">23 Mountain Division <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> The
divisional commander, Major General R.D. Hira, MVC, planned to secure the southern
part of the Lalmai Hills and thereafter capture Chandpur. However, after
preliminary operations the original plan was changed and it was decided to
infiltrate between Lalmai Hills and Laksham instead of launching direct attacks
on the two positions which were strongly held. Accordingly, 301 Mountain
Brigade was tasked to infiltrate along the axis
Himmatpur-Kashinagar-Bhushchi-Bhora; 181 Mountain Brigade was to follow on the
same axis and isolate Laksham from the north and west; 83 Mountain Brigade was
to advance along the Chauddagram-Laksham axis and isolate Laksham from the
south; subsequently, 181 and 83 Brigades were to capture Laksham. Finally, 301<i> </i>Brigade was to advance and
capture Chandpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> 301<i> </i></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Brigade advanced across country
with 14 Jat heading for Mian Bazar and 1/11 Gorkha Rifles heading for
Kashinagar, with tanks following. Tanks were employed in the assault on Mian
Bazar position on 4 December and the enemy broke up. As the enemy tried to
occupy the Kashinagar defences, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles who had already sneaked into
these positions opened up, surprising the Pakistanis and capturing a number of
prisoners. Shortly afterwards, 301 Brigade moved up to Bhushchi,
where 181 Brigade took the lead and advanced to Laksham on 5 December. Moving
swiftly, 301 Brigade advanced
to Mudafarganj on the night of 5 December and secured it by next morning. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> In
the south, 83 Brigade advanced towards Laksham. It established a block in the
area of Parikot and captured Chauddagram on the morning of 5 December, the
Pakistanis withdrawing from both positions in confusion. The brigade followed
up and established blocks south and south east of Laksham by the morning of 7
December. To meet the new threat, 53 Pak
Brigade moved by rail from Feni and concentrated at Laksham by the morning of 6
December. Concurrently, the enemy started concentrating his troops for the
defence of the Maynamati area and vacated the Lalmai Hills southern position.
In order to strengthen the Maynamati defences, the Pakistanis pulled out of Comilla
town also. As a result of these moves of the enemy, 181 Brigade occupied the
southern part of the Lalmai Hills; and 14 Jat of 301 Brigade occupied Comilla
town and airfield. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> After the loss of Mudafarganj, the enemy
divisional commander ordered Pak 53 Brigade to recapture the town, leaving some troops for the defence of Laksham. The
enemy attacked Mudafarganj repeatedly on the night of 7/8 December but failed
to capture the town. Pak 53 Brigade then sent a column to secure Hajiganj
further to the rear and deny it to the Indian troops. In the meantime, troops
of 301 Brigade (3 Kumaon) had already reached Hajiganj. The Pakistanis tried to
launch an attack but it was broken up. 301 Brigade continued its advance and
captured Chandpur on 9 December. When Pakistani troops started thinning out
from Laksham for attacks on Hajiganj, 181 and 83 Brigades exerted pressure on
Laksham supported by artillery and air attacks. After holding out for a while,
the enemy started withdrawing in small groups and Laksham was captured on 9
December. In the Maynamati area, 61 Brigade had captured Chandina on 7 December
and secured Elliotganj on 8 December. Continuing the advance, the brigade
captured Daudkandi by the evening of 9 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> After
Chandpur, Daudkandi and Laksham were secured, it was decided to send 301
Brigade across the Meghna to secure
Baidya Bazar, while 181 and 61 Brigades were to go across and capture
Maynamati. By <st1:date day="14" month="12" w:st="on" year="301">14 December,
301</st1:date> Brigade concentrated at Daudkandi. In the early hours of the
morning, 14 Jat crossed the river in some commandeered river craft and secured
Baidya Bazar without opposition. By the evening of 14 December, the better part
of 301 Brigade was concentrated in the Baidya Bazar area across the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Meghna</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
The same day, a ferry was secured north-east of Narayanganj and an enemy
position in Kuripara area was cleared by the evening. By the morning of 16
December, 14 Jat secured Narayanganj town after some heavy fighting. However,
in the Maynamati area, the Pakistanis had concentrated all the available forces
and were holding the position in strength. A direct attack on this well
defended position would have resulted in many casualties. It was, therefore,
decided to soften it with air attacks and artillery fire before launching the
attack which was planned for 16 December. At first light the same day, the
enemy raised a white flag and about 5000 Pakistani troops surrendered. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">THE FALL OF DACCA<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> From
the beginning of the war on 3 December 1971, when Pakistan launched a surprise
attack on Indian airfields in the west and India retaliated by commencing land
operations across the borders in the east, the situation in East Pakistan grew
from bad to worse. From 7 December
onwards, the situation really got out of control and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> could never stem the
Indian onslaught. In the South-Western
Sector, Jessore and Jhenida had been captured. In the North-Western Sector,
Pirganj was captured and Bogra was being threatened. In the Central Sector,
Indian troops reached the line of the local <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Brahmaputra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
In the Eastern Sector, a heliborne operation was mounted on Sylhet; Ashuganj
was being threatened and Mudafarganj was captured. Thereafter, the situation
rapidly deteriorated for the Pakistanis in all sectors. On 8 December, foreign
nationals were evacuated from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
under United Nations arrangements, with Indian cooperation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As the operations progressed, Pakistani
resistance broke down. The Indians bypassed all strongly held positions and the
isolated Pakistani troops, taken by surprise, began to withdraw or surrender.
American proposals to get the United Nations to effect a cease fire were
frustrated by the Soviets, who vetoed the resolutions. A major factor in fall
of Dacca was the three broadcasts made by General Manekshaw, calling on
Pakistani troops to surrender and assuring them of honourable treatment. The
first message was broadcast on All India Radio and leaflets dropped after the
fall of Jessore on 9 December. Addressed to the 'officers and jawans of the
Pakistan Army', it exhorted them to lay down their arms, before it was too
late. It went on to say: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 33.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> "Indian forces have surrounded you. Your
Air Force is destroyed. You have no hope of any help from them. <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city>, Chalna and
Mangla ports are blocked. Nobody can reach you from the sea. Your fate is
sealed. The Mukti Bahini and the people are all prepared to take revenge for
the atrocities and cruelties you have committed....... Why waste lives? Don't
you want to go home and be with your children? Do not lose time; there is no
disgrace in laying down your arms to a soldier. We will give you the treatment
befitting a soldier."<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Two other messages, on the same lines,
were broadcast on 11 and 15 December, in reply to messages from Major General
Rao Farman Ali and Lieutenant General A.K. Niazi. These messages were a severe
blow to the morale of the Pakistani troops and convinced them of the futility
of further resistance. Accounts of Pakistani officers and men captured
subsequently revealed that these messages had played a significant part in breaking
Pakistani resolve to fight and it is estimated that they had shortened the war
by at least two weeks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the early hours of 11 December, Lieutenant Iftikhar of the Pakistan Army came
up on the wireless net indicating his willingness to surrender. He came out
with a white flag near the Mirpur bridge and surrendered to Indian troops. The
same day, Farman Ali sent a message to the United Nations asking for a cease
fire. The Security Council was about to begin discussing the message when another
message was received from President
Yayha Khan countermanding Farman Ali's message, which it described as
'unauthorised'. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As early as 9 December, the Governor of
East Pakistan, Dr. A.M. Malik, had sent a message to Yahya Khan advocating a cease
fire. Yahya had replied that he was leaving the decision to Malik and had
instructed Niazi accordingly. Malik could not make up his mind and continued to
wait for instructions from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rawalpindi</st1:place></st1:city>.
On 13 December, Niazi spoke to the Army Chief, General Hamid, requesting him to
arrange a cease fire. On 14 December Yahya sent instructions to Niazi to take
action as he deemed fit to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of his men.
Before this message reached Niazi, another development had taken place. Malik
convened a meeting at mid day on 14 December at Government House in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, to discuss the
issue. The wireless message giving the time and venue of the meeting was
intercepted by an Indian Signal Intelligence unit. The Indian Air Force bombed
the Government House, causing a lot of damage. Malik was badly shaken and his
concern for the safety of his Austrian wife and daughter, who were with him,
finally pushed him towards a decision. He immediately wrote out his resignation
and accompanied by his cabinet and other civil servants, moved to the Hotel
Intercontinental, which had been occupied by the International Red Cross and
was treated as a neutral zone. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The decision to surrender was actually taken
by Niazi, who addressed a message to General Manekshaw on 15 December and
requested the United States Consul General in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, Herbert Spivack, to convey it to him.
Instead of sending the message to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, Spivack had it sent to <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Washington</st1:place></st1:state>, from where
it was relayed to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
When he received Niazi's message, Manekshaw broadcast a reply, indicating that
a cease fire would be acceptable only if the Pakistani troops surrendered to
the Indian Army by 0900 hours on <st1:date day="16" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">16 December 1971</st1:date>. He gave the radio frequencies on which
Niazi could contact <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Aurora</st1:place></st1:city>'s
headquarters. As a token of good faith, he also informed Niazi that he was
ordering cessation of air action over <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
Niazi later requested an extension of the deadline for surrender, from 0900 to
1500 hours, which Manekshaw accepted. Around <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time> on 15 December, Niazi sent a message to all his
formation commanders to contact their Indian counter parts and negotiate a
cease fire.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Indian
troops entered <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
on the morning of 16 December. By afternoon, 2 Para, 13 Guards, 6 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place>, 4 Guards and 5 (Indep) Armoured Squadron were in
the city. Early in the afternoon, General Jacob reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> with the draft surrender document.
Niazi at first insisted on a ceasefire and not a surrender. However, Jacob told
him very firmly that it was to be an unconditional surrender and nothing else.
Niazi finally accepted the terms, with tears in his eyes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
formal surrender ceremony took place at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
on 16 December. In front of a large crowd, General Niazi handed over his pistol
to Lieutenant General Aurora, the Army Commander, and signed the Instrument of
Surrender at 1655 hours. Along with
Niazi, about 93,000 Pakistani soldiers became prisoners of war. The war was
over and a new nation, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
was born.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 88%;">SIGNALS IN OPERATION ‘CACTUS LILY’<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 88%;"> </span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Eastern Command Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
CSO, Brigadier K.K. Tewari distinctly remembers the first briefing by the Army
Commander early in the morning on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4 December 1971</st1:date> after the pre-emptive Pakistani strike in
the West on the previous evening. After
everyone had assembled in the conference room, the Army Commander, Lieutenant
General J. S. Aurora entered and announced: <i>“The
war is on. Jackpot is no longer Top Secret. Hereafter, there will be no office
hours. Everybody will wear uniform at all times”.</i> This was the briefest
conference attended by Brigadier Tewari. It was quite a unique moment, which he
still remembers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
radio diagram of Eastern Command at the commencement of the operations is given
below/shown opposite:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">RADIO
DIAGRAM – EASTERN COMMAND 1971<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_1" o:spid="_x0000_i1027"
type="#_x0000_t75" alt="radiodiagECOM-J275" style='width:477.75pt;height:358.5pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image003.jpg"
o:title="radiodiagECOM-J275" croptop="6983f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="radiodiagECOM-J275" height="478" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image004.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_1" width="637" /><!--[endif]--></span><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="mso-special-character: line-break; page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tewari
and his staff had some anxious moments during the operations. One was at the
time of the drop by 2 Para of 50 Parachute Brigade on <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">11 December 1971</st1:date>. The drop took place
at about 1600 hours and all through the night there was no communications with
this force. According to Tewari, this
was one the worst periods of anxiety and negative part of Eastern Command
Signals history. They came up on the air without any explanation early morning
the next day and all was well thereafter.
On <st1:date day="12" month="12" w:st="on" year="1950">12 December, 50</st1:date>
Parachute Brigade less 2 Para left for the Western Sector<i> <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tewari
was in the habit of recording the day’s events in a diary, which gives an
insight into the conditions prevailing at that time. It will be recalled that
his diary during the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict also proved to be a valuable
historical document. Some entries during the war are given below (some abbreviations
used by him have been expanded, for clarity):<b> </b></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">21</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12
December<o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l33 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Conference
with Army Commander and Deputy SO-in-C. Question of taking resources for
Western Command - 2 Corps. We said no Corps Signal Regiment. Army Commander
said he will be in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
Taking away GR 345 for desert. We said no. </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(The
Deputy SO-in-C probably asked for radio set GR 345 for the desert due to
its longer range) <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l33 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">IAC
flights cancelled. All IAC flights to fly <st1:place w:st="on">Para</st1:place>
Brigade and two AD Brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l33 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chief
of Staff being worried by someone at night. PM’s broadcast – beautiful – told <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> off in no
uncertain terms without naming her. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l33 level1 lfo23; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Disturbing
news from intercepts of Chinese and US movements. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Message
from Mother about Victory. (</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This refers to the
Mother of Aurobindo Ashram, in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pondicherry</st1:place></st1:city><i>) <b><o:p></o:p></b></i></span></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13 December<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Tac
HQ 101 moved off from TURA – no communications. RR vehicles held up at ferry.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> News from CSO IV Corps at <st1:time hour="22" minute="30" w:st="on">10.30 pm</st1:time> -
his HQ moving to Comilla next morning. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preparing
for threat from North. Spoke to Surjit (</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CSO
IV Corps<i>) that too much sent with 2 MDSR </i>(2
Mountain Division was deployed in NEFA, facing the Chinese. The GOC, Major
General Nagra had taken over 101 Communication Zone Area after Major General
Gill was injured. Nagra moved a considerable portion of his headquarters and
signal resources to assist him in his
new appointment<i>) <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Finalized
plans for communications in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14 December – Most
hectic day<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Main
HQ IV Corps moving to Comilla – main body at night, Tac HQ in morning. Too many
restrictions. Coordination of circuits with civil requirements, CA.
Arrangements with VCK difficult </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(Brigadier V.C.
Khanna – he was later to become a lieutenant general and the SO-in-C - was
doing the course at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">National</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Defence</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
The course was shortened and the participants sent to various formations as
soon as the war started. Khanna was sent to Eastern Command to assist Tewari.
After the surrender he was appointed the Administrator of Dacca.) <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Flap
on communications to leading elements of 101 CZA (</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communication
Zone Area<i>). COS wanted direct
communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.
Protested. 2 X GR 345 flown from XXXIII Corps to be sent with Command LO <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place>
Mahipat Singh.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communications
to be established between IV Corps and 101 CZA. 101 Air support to be under IV
Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discussed
shifting of P&T Carrier station from Teliamura to Comilla – then decided on
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communications
established with Comilla – spoke to CSO.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Gill
sent to 101 CZA to sort out muddle by Don’s hasty actions. Missing for 2 days
in Mymensingh. </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(This
refers to Colonel ‘Don’ Lahiri, DCSO 101 Communication Zone Area, who had been
born in Mymensingh in undivided <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Apparently, he decided to visit his birth place, after taking permission of his
formation commander. However, since he had not informed his departmental head –
Tewari – the latter thought he was missing!). <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
15 December at about 1530 hours the CSO was asked to establish communications
with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> and
inform them to stand by for an important message from the Chief of Army Staff.
This concerned the information about the intention of the Pakistanis to
surrender which had reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
The station at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
kept calling <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
the whole evening and all through the night on the given frequency and call
sign but there was no response. Tewari had put out two additional receivers to
listen to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
in case they missed them on one receiver. Everyone was awake and on tenterhooks
through the night but the link was not through. It was only at about 0715 hours
on 16 December that <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
answered. Tewari had just come back to
the set at that time after a little bit of rest and he himself spoke to the
Pakistani operator at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
in Punjabi. When he asked him, <i>“Did you not hear us at all since yesterday”</i>,
he said ‘<i>yes’</i>. So he asked him as to what is wrong and why
he did not reply all through the night.
He said very frankly, <i>“How can we
answer unless we are given permission to answer. Just now Brigadier Bakkar is here on the set
and he will talk to you”.</i> The Chief’s message was passed and the
confirmation received, after which everyone heaved a sigh of relief. After
this, General Jacob flew by helicopter to Dacca to finalise the arrangements
for the surrender ceremony.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">22</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tewari’s
problems with the communication link to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
were far from over. The surrender ceremony was initially planned to be held in
the Town Hall at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. But seeing the unbridled enthusiasm of the
people it was decided to change the venue to the Race Course in the cantonment.
In the heat of the moment, no one thought of communications from the new
location. Even the Army Commander’s rover detachment was not taken along when
he went to the Race Course. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was scheduled to make
an announcement in Parliament at 1700 hours, once confirmation was received
from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
that the surrender ceremony was taking place on time. When no confirmation was
received by the appointed hour, the Prime Minister decided to hold the
announcement, which was made only the next morning. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
entries on the last few days of the war recorded in Brigadier Tewari’s diary
provide an authentic record of the events that occurred in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. Some of these are reproduced below:- </span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">23</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15 December<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signal
Instructions for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
finalized today.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air
Force asking for circuits to Jessore from us – responsibility.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Message
for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> at
1530 hrs – to get ready to establish communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> at 1600 hrs on CW, frequencies 3216,
6605. Monitoring and SI alerted to listen out. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Move
forward of 4 Division to Magura – proposed HQ II Corps to move forward too.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Given
message from COAS, reply to Niazi. Kept calling PAK all evening/night. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">16 December<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><st1:time hour="7" minute="15" w:st="on"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7.15 am</span></i></st1:time><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> communications
established with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
Brig Bakkar <st1:place w:st="on">COS</st1:place> on set.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9.30
– clear that surrender accepted.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11.10
– <st1:place w:st="on">COS</st1:place>, <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state>
Int, AOC left for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Army
Commander decided to leave at <st1:time hour="14" minute="0" w:st="on">2 pm</st1:time>
- take surrender at <st1:time hour="16" minute="0" w:st="on">4 pm.</st1:time>
Paper for surrender, pens, writing decided in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. Aircraft left at <st1:time hour="14" minute="0" w:st="on">2 pm</st1:time>.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Pressure
on Signals – no communications. First news from intercept.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1815
heptrs returned to Agartala. Army Commander spoke.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Army
Commander returned at 9 pm. Gathered in Mess. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">17 December<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communications
with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
established at 9.30 though Sidhu reached there last night. Rear communications
also responsibility of Signals at HQ.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chat
with Army Commander along with Gen Sircar. Spoke of also 16 December, lack of
communications.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">18 Decembe</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">r <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. Visited
all installations. Met Brig Raza (2<sup>nd</sup> course)<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Eastern Command Signal
Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Eastern
Command Signal Regiment was raised on <st1:date day="1" month="3" w:st="on" year="1963">1 March 1963</st1:date> in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.
The original Eastern Command Signal Regiment that had moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city> along with HQ
Eastern Command in 1955 was re-designated as Central Command Signal Regiment on
<st1:date day="1" month="5" w:st="on" year="1963">1 May 1963</st1:date>. The
unit functioned on a brick system of establishment up to 1965, with companies
and sections authorized on as required basis, depending on the communication
commitments. In April 1965 a new peace
establishment was issued and the unit brought on to a ‘tailored’ system. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> An interesting incident that
occurred during Operation ‘Cactus Lily was related by Brigadier A. Verma, who
was commanding the unit at that time, in the following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> <i>On
15 December at about 2000 hrs CSO Eastern Command Brigadier K. K.
Tewari asked me to come to his office immediately. On arrival he
handed over a typed sheet of paper to me and said that this was a message from
our COAS and it had to be sent to the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> Army Commander General
Niazi and the reply was required by 0730 hrs next morning. I took
the message and was about to leave when Brigadier Tewari asked me how I
would do it. I said "Sir, you have given me a task, I shall do my
best". To this he said "carry on".<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> I returned to my office and rang
up the SI detachment and Radio Monitoring Section to find out if
they had the frequencies used by the Army in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Fortunately they did and from the lists they gave I
selected four frequencies and passed them to
Captain Thapa (TOT), my officer-in-charge transmitter station at Bagjola
and told him to set up or re-align four aerials for transmission of a
message to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
This was indeed a difficult task considering the time and lack of adequate
lights in the vast aerial park of the transmitter area. I also told him to
set up four transmitters. Captain Thapa tuned a high power HP
transmitter ET4331, a SWB8X and two medium power transmitters
BC610 on the frequencies to feed the output on the realigned
aerials. At the receiver station, which was in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">Fort</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">William</st1:placename></st1:place> Complex,
we prepared teams for sending and
search operation. Radio receivers AR 88 and LTU were deployed. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> At about <st1:time hour="22" minute="0" w:st="on">10 PM</st1:time> when the transmitters were
ready we started sending the message from General Manekshaw to
General Niazi asking him to surrender, continuously on CW, RTT and voice. This
continued the whole night. At about 0725 hrs on the 16<sup>th</sup> I
picked up a signal "<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
calling <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> calling <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>" repeatedly.
To this I replied “<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
here, pass your message”. Dacca then paused a little and then started
passing a message, which was from General Niazi to General
Manekshaw. In the pause before writing out the reply I rang up the
CSO to tell him the reply was coming. Before I had written the last
sentence of the incoming message, Brigadier Tewari was in the receiver
room standing behind me. The message over, he asked me to sign it. He
then told me to check who was at the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> end and to keep
the channel open. He then took the message and left.
Since there was a major of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
Signals at the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
end I handed over the mike to a junior officer. Thereafter, a lot of
messages were passed on this link till a little before the
signing of the surrender at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
as the officer at the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
end vanished. Thus we could not get the confirmation that the surrender had
taken place.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> I was later told that the original
message was lost after being handed over to General Aurora by Brigadier K.
K. Tewari and copies had to be made from log sheets maintained in
the Receiver Station.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">24</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The radio link established between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> continued to
function for several hours on <st1:date day="16" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">16
December 1971</st1:date>. A number of messages were passed on the link,
including the request by General Niazi for extension of time for surrender.
Other messages pertained to the composition of the team that would proceed to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, the time and venue
of the surrender ceremony and other related matters. Verma recalls that
he also sent an operator with a wireless set with the
Public Relations Officer (PRO) of HQ Eastern Command in the team that went
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> to
enable the latter to send his comments regarding the surrender ceremony.
However, the PRO left the operator and the set at the airfield and proceeded
alone to the Parade Ground for the surrender ceremony. As a result, no news
about the surrender was received in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>,
even on this link. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">II
Corps Signals <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> HQ II Corps was raised at Krishnanagar in <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place> shortly before the commencement of Operation
‘Cactus Lily’. The head of the Signals Branch was Colonel B.S. Paintal, whose
designation was Deputy Chief Signal Officer (DCSO). This was later upgraded to
Chief Signal Officer (CSO). At the time of raising HQ II Corps did not have an
integral signal unit and its communication needs were met by V Communication
Zone Signal Regiment which was moved from Tezpur for this purpose. The raising
of II Corps Signal Regiment commenced at the same time and both units shared
the communication commitments at Krishnanagar during this period. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> II Corps Signal Regiment was
raised on <st1:date day="8" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">8 October 1971</st1:date>
at Krishnanagar, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.C. Chaudhuri. However, 3 Company of the unit was raised
separately at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and its raising was completed on <st1:date day="1" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">1 Dec 1971</st1:date>. The
company joined the unit only in 1972 under the command of Major R.B. Mistry. By
this time the unit had moved to Kotkapura in Western theatre. The other officers in the company were
Captain V.I.P. Mago and Lieutenant S.K. Basu. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Orders
for raising of a truncated HQ II Corps were issued on <st1:date day="4" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">4 October 1971</st1:date>. Elements of the corps headquarters and corps
troops including its signal regiment started arriving at Krishnanagar with
effect from 8 November. The proposed organization of II Corps Signal Regiment
(less 3 Company, which was being raised at Delhi to function as Army Headquarters
reserve), together with elements of V Communication Zone Signal Regiment and
other signal bricks made available ex Eastern Command, totalled about 50
percent of the manpower resources normally available to a corps. Equipment wise, the position was even
worse. Only 50 percent of the authorized
equipment was planned to be made available.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Telecommunication
facilities in the Eastern Theatre were generally under developed. PL routes were restricted to a few major
highways. Multi-cored railway electrification
cable and some PL routes were also available along main railway lines. Due to advance planning by CSO Eastern
Command, some communication assets at Krishnanagar had been developed. These
included three switchboards 50 line CBNM and two T-43 trunk boards, under
installation by the P&T authorities; one radio relay detachment linking
Krishnanagar with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>;
and one medium power radio detachment to work back to HQ Eastern Command.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Planning
for the deployment of the two divisions up to concentration phase had been
carried out and demand for provision of these circuits by P&T authorities
had been placed by CSO Eastern Command.
In addition to these circuits, the P&T Department had been asked to
construct permanent line routes Bangaon
– Heiencha – Bagda – Bayra and Heiencha – Dattapulia (two pairs each) and
Krishnanagar –Krishnaganj (one pair). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Except
for officers, JCOs and a handful of NCOs, all other postings to II Corps Signal
Regiment were on the basis of figure postings.
As a result, the dispatching units unloaded a lot of their inefficient
and undesirable tradesmen. The unit did
not get an opportunity to organize itself or even to brush up some of the very
basic detachment drills. Being fully
committed on operational duties, personnel had to be put on the job straight
away and subsequently rotated from job to job to fit them in, in accordance
with their competence. V Communication
Zone Signal Regiment was in no better condition as a large percentage of
manpower held by them had also been recently collected in bits and pieces, from
all over Eastern Command.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
with the manpower, the entire signal equipment received was also on an inter
unit transfer basis. In spite of the
most active progressing action by HQ Eastern Command, dispatching units held up
collection parties for long periods and transferred equipment that was usually
defective or incomplete. The new unit
had to put right a major portion of the equipment on their own, as the 816
Corps Troops Workshop (also under raising) had neither the tools nor the spares
to undertake this major task of equipment rehabilitation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
signal plan for the preparatory phase, visualized the use of lines as the
primary means of communications supplemented by radio relay and very high
frequency net radio. Radio silence on
high frequency net radio could be lifted for training or when in contact with
enemy on orders from the divisional commanders. The permission to lift silence
on high frequency radio for training was especially given, on account of a warning
of likely Pakistani preemptive strike on night 14/15 October 1971. When this warning was received on 12 October,
no radio or radio relay equipment was available at the corps headquarters. Radio and radio relay equipment had to be
withdrawn from the two divisions to provide essential backup to the line
communication between the corps and its divisions. Forward of the divisions, radio silence on
high frequency radio was observed till start of the offensive phase.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 38.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the offensive phase, it was visualized that the rapid speed of advance would
preclude laying of lines. Radio relay
therefore was to be used as the primary means of communications, supplemented
by net radio. Lines were to be laid
where situation stabilized. The detailed signal plan was covered in a signal
instruction issued on <st1:date day="26" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">26
November 1971</st1:date> and modified as the operations developed by issuing
brief signal engineering instructions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 38.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
and up to the concentration phase, it was intended that total reliance for line
communications would be on P&T lines/circuits. In addition P&T hired local and trunk
exchanges were installed at Krishnanagar. The performance of the P&T
circuits between the corps headquarters and the divisions was poor, especially
to 9 Infantry Division. The 3-channel
carrier system between Ranaghat and Bangaon which carried these circuits was
old and unreliable. In spite of
sustained efforts by DCSO II Corps and CSO Eastern Command, no improvements on
these circuits could be brought about by the P&T Department. As a result, even during the preparatory
phase II Corps had to rely on radio relay.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 38.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
number of permanent line routes were constructed during the preparatory
phase. The following routes were laid by
the P&T during November 1971:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo32; tab-stops: 4.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bangaon – Helencha –
Bagda and Dattapulia – Heiencha (two pairs each). Because of enemy air activity over Bayra on
19 November, the P&T had left the Bagda – Bayra portion incomplete. To bridge this gap, carrier quad was laid
between Heiencha – Bagda – Bayra and between Aranghata – Dattapulia to create
alternate routing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l10 level1 lfo32; tab-stops: 4.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Krishnanagar – Majdia
(one pair). This route proved to be
unreliable and a carrier quad between these places also had to be laid.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 38.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Once
the operations started both 4 and 9 Divisions advanced rapidly, carrying out frequent
moves. By the time the operations ended on 16 December, 9 Infantry Division had
carried out an advance of over 110 km, while 4 Mountain Division had advanced
about 160 km. During the advance, both
the divisional headquarters kept well forward so as to remain within
communication range of their brigades.
These frequent moves helped in maintaining effective forward
communications, but strained the resources of divisional signal regiments and
made communications between the corps headquarters and the divisions more
difficult. In order to avoid moving the
main divisional headquarters too often, 9 Infantry Division adopted the
practice of establishing an enlarged tactical headquarters which functioned
well ahead of their main divisional headquarters. On the other hand, 4 Mountain
Division preferred moving its main divisional headquarters, rather than setting
up a tactical headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
mainstay of signal communications during the operations was radio relay, which
proved to be most flexible and reliable.
However, lines, because of their inherent security, were frequently
demanded by the commanders and their staff.
During the operations, line communications to the divisions could only
be extended up to Khalispur (over carrier quad) in case of 4 Mountain Division,
and up to Chaugacha (over PL/carrier quad) in case of 9 Infantry Division. Beyond these points the formations were out
of carrier quad range. Line
communication was restored to 4 Mountain Division at Jhenida when PL route
Majdia – Darsana – Kotchandpur – Kaliganj – Jhenida was rehabilitated on 11
December. The line communication to 9
Infantry Division was only restored when Bangaon – Jhingergacha – Jessore axis
was cleared and PL route along this axis restored on 14 December. Unlike the divisions, the corps headquarters
was unable to move forward due to lack of equipment and transport resources to
make the headquarters mobile. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
was used extensively during the operations for communications forward of the
infantry brigades and by artillery formations/units. Between brigades and the divisions radio was
used mostly while the brigades were on move and till the setting up of radio
relay. At corps level limited radio nets
were set up. No separate rear corps
headquarters was set up and the corps maintenance area (CMA) was co-located
with the corps headquarters at Krishnanagar.
No separate radio nets were provided for the Commander Corps Artillery,
Chief Engineer, Provost or flanking formations. Even in this truncated radio layout, radio
telephony communications were not used by the staff. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
line and radio diagrams of II Corps during the operations are given below:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="_x0000_i1028" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="II Corps-line" style='width:436.5pt;
height:580.5pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image005.jpg"
o:title="II Corps-line"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="II Corps-line" height="774" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1028" width="582" /><!--[endif]--></span><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_2" o:spid="_x0000_i1029" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="2corpsradio"
style='width:477.75pt;height:358.5pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image007.jpg"
o:title="2corpsradio"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="2corpsradio" height="478" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image008.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_2" width="637" /><!--[endif]--></span><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> II
Corps Signals faced a number of problems during the operations. It did not get
sufficient time to complete raising, training and welding of the corps
headquarters and its signal elements into one responsive and cohesive team. It
had to rely totally on the P&T Department for trunk circuits within <st1:place w:st="on">Indian territory</st1:place>. It also faced a severe shortage of
equipment, especially radio relay, and lack of a system for replenishment of
field cable and carrier quad cable in the field. In spite of these handicaps,
II Corps Signals performed creditably during Operation “Cactus Lily’. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 9
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city> in <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place>
to <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place> in early 1971, along with its
brigade signal companies. While the
regimental headquarters was at Bhadreswar, the brigade signal companies of 42
and 350 Brigades were located at Chinsura and Burdwan respectively. In April
the unit moved to Barrackpore and 42 Brigade Signal Company to
Krishnanagar. In June 350 Infantry
Brigade moved from Burdwan to Ranaghat and then to Bagdaha. By October the unit
had moved to Bangaon and 350 Brigade to Bayra. The unit was then under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">K. Dhawan
with Major J. Bagchi as the second-in-command. The other field officers in the
unit were </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major M.S. Bajaj (1 Company) and </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">Major P.K. Sengupta (2 Company). </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="20" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">20 November 1971</st1:date> certain
preliminary operations had been planned in the Bayra area. To control the
battle the divisional tactical headquarters moved to Bagdaha, while HQ 350
Brigade moved Bayra. The attack for the capture of Garibpur was launched by a
battalion of 42 Infantry Brigade, followed by a fierce counter attack which
resulted in heavy casualties to both sides. Next day the divisional tactical
headquarters moved to Bayra, while those of 42 and 350 Brigades moved forward
to Azmatpur and Chotibharni respectively. Communications to the three tactical
headquarters was provided by laying WD -1 cable to the brigades ahead of
Bagdaha, which was then patched to the carrier quad that had already been laid
from Bayra to Bagdaha. In addition to
line, radio links were provided between the divisional tactical headquarters
and both brigades. It was on this day that the unit had its first war casualty.
While laying the cable to 350 Brigade at Chotibharni, Naib Subedar Lal Manral
sustained facial injuries when his line vehicle went over an anti-tank mine and
he had to be evacuated to the field hospital. Two days later, another JCO, Naib
Subedar M.S. Athley sustained a collar bone injury when a radio relay antenna
mast fell over him. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="24" month="11" w:st="on" year="350">24 November, 350</st1:date> Brigade
cleared Chaugacha and its tactical headquarters moved back to Bayra with a view
to advance on the Jhingergacha axis. One
pair carrier quad cable was laid between Bayra and Chutipur, the location of 26
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>. On 27 November the main divisional
headquarters moved to Bayra from Bangaon while HQ 350 Brigade moved to Uzripur.
Speech and telegraph circuits were provided from the new main divisional
headquarters to 42 and 350 Brigades, with the latter also having a radio relay
link. In addition two speech and one telegraph circuits were provided to 32
Infantry Brigade, which was now at Bangaon. At this time the strength of
officers was further depleted by the departure of Major P.K. Sengupta, OC 2
Company on temporary attachment to V Communication Zone Signal Regiment at Krishnanagar. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
preparation of further operations 42 Brigade moved to Chaugacha on 1 December
and the fire control centre (FCC) of 9
Artillery Brigade was established at a place about one km beyond Azmatpur. One pair of WD-1 cable was laid between
Azmatpur and Chaugacha for use as a tie line and the Bayra-Azmatpur line was
extended and terminated on the FCC exchange. A
carrier quad pair was laid between Bayra and Chaugacha thus providing
two speech circuits between main divisional headquarters and 42 Infantry Brigade. In addition, a radio relay link was
also provided to the brigade. The next day 32 Brigade also moved to a location
approximately two km short of Chaugacha on Road Bayra-Chaugacha. To cater for this move, one pair of WD-1
cable was laid between Bayra and 42 Brigade. From the existing carrier quad
between Bayra and Chaugacha, one pair was dropped at the location of 32
Brigade. This gave them a direct line to the divisional headquarters and also a
tie line between 32 and 42 Brigades. At this time, Major G.K. Singh joined the
unit on temporary attachment from V Communication Zone Signal Regiment and was
appointed OC 2 Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
advance towards Jessore commenced on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date> along multiple axes. On 4 December the
divisional tactical headquarters moved to Chaugacha. The advance of 42 Brigade in the north was
held up at Arpara and Dungarbatti while 350 Brigade encountered stiff
opposition in the centre at Burinda. The divisional commander changed his plan
and decided to swing the weight of his advance to the north along Bayra axis.
He ordered 42 Brigade to clear a passage at Dungarbatti through which 32
Brigade would advance and capture Jessore. On 6 December the divisional
tactical headquarters shifted to Khurd-Singhajuli in the morning. One WD-1 pair
was laid between Chaugacha and Khurd-Singhajuli and the existing PL pair was
rehabilitated by patching with PVC cable under arrangements of V Communication
Zone Signal Regiment to provide two speech circuits between the two
locations. The same afternoon divisional
tactical headquarters and 42 Brigade moved to Jessore after its capture. A
radio relay link was immediately established from Bayra to Jessore, providing
connectivity to HQ II Corps. On 7 December the<b> </b>main and rear headquarters of 9 Infantry Division also moved to
Jessore. 350 Brigade moved from Uzripur
via Jhingergacha to a place four km short of Jessore on the Bangaon-Jessore
road. One speech circuit was arranged immediately on the existing PL.
Subsequently, one WD-1 pair was laid to 350 Brigade and the PL pair was
released to provide line communications between Jessore, Bangaon and
Krishanagar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
8 December 32 Brigade<b> </b>resumed its
advance on the Jessore-Khulna road and reached Rupdia where line communications
was provided. The FCC of 9 Artillery Brigade moved to Singla Railway station
and was given communications on line and radio relay from the main divisional
headquarters at Jessore. On <st1:date day="9" month="12" w:st="on" year="1932">9
December, 32</st1:date> Brigade and the FCC both moved to Nawapara. One speech circuit on PL was provided from
Jessore to Nawapara and one radio relay link established for HQ 32 Brigade. In
addition, two tie lines through the brigade exchange were provided to the FCC. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
advance of 32 Brigade was held up near Phultala and it was decided to move up
the other two brigades.<b> </b>42 and 350 Brigades resumed advance on
the axis Jessore-Khulna on 11 December.
The divisional tactical headquarters moved to Phultala. Two pairs of
WD-1 cable were laid for tactical headquarters of 350 and 32 Brigades at Km 9
and 10 on Road Jessore-Khulna. These
were terminated on the divisional tactical headquarters exchange at Phultala,
where 42 Brigade was also located. Being unsuccessful in securing the Siyaganj
ferry on the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Bhairab</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> due to heavy
opposition, 42 Brigade moved further north and crossed the river near Barakpur
on the night of 13/14 December. Its move southwards to re-cross the river south
of Daulatpur was delayed. Overhead WD-1
cable was strung over the river-line to provide line communications from the
divisional tactical headquarters at Phultala to tactical headquarters of 42
Brigade at Senhati. A radio relay chain
was also established. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the absence of 42 Brigade, the divisional commander decided to continue the
operation with 350 Brigade, which attacked and captured Shyamganj on 15
December. The tactical headquarters of 350 Brigade moved to Shyamganj where it
was later joined by tactical headquarters of 32 Brigade which moved up from Km10.
Both were provided communications on line, with a radio relay being given to
350 Brigade. On 16 December it was learned that Pak troops had surrendered and
operations came to an end. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
17 December all troops of the division moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city> where a surrender ceremony was held,
in which Brigadier Hayat Khan, Commander 107
Pak Infantry Brigade with 3700 troops surrendered to Major General
Dalbir Singh, GOC 9 Infantry Division.
The unit was given the task of providing the public address system for
the ceremony, though the major portion of the unit was still at Jessore, with
the main divisional headquarters. A speech circuit was extended on WD 1 cable
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city> from
the PL available at Phultala. One radio
relay link was also provided between Jessore and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city>. The unit moved by road to Barrackpore
on 18 December. By 26 December, the unit was back in its permanent location at
Ranchi.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 4
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:place></st1:city> when it was mobilized for Operation
‘Cactus Lily’. The unit was then under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.
Sable, who had taken over from the previous incumbent, Lieutenant Colonel S.P.
Sethi on <st1:date day="18" month="7" w:st="on" year="1971">18 July 1971</st1:date>.
The other field officers in the unit at that time were Major G.L. Chadha (1
Company) and Major R.M. Onkar (2 Company). The unit moved to Panagarh in two
special trains, which left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:place></st1:city>
on 28 and <st1:date day="29" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">29 August 1971</st1:date>.
To conceal the identity of the formation, the divisional headquarters was
referred to as Rear HQ 9 Infantry Division. Except for creating confusion, this
did not achieve much. Soon after the arrival of the formation in Panagarh,
Pakistan Radio announced that ‘<i>red eagles
are hiding under shadeless pine trees</i>” (The emblem of 4 Division was a red
eagle, while that of 9 Division was a pine tree). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
obsession with security was sometimes taken to extreme limits. As soon as
communications were established at Panagarh, Major Chadha took a test call to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. When this came to
the notice of the Colonel General Staff, he treated it as serious breach of
security. Chadha was ‘marched up’ to the
GOC, Major General M.S. Barar, who smiled and let him off, remarking that
Signals are the best judges of security.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">25</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
a short stay at Panagarh, during which critical deficiencies of cable and radio
sets were made up, the unit moved to Paglachindi via Plassey on 15 October.
After a month, it moved again on 16 November to Krishnanagar, where the newly
raised HQ II Corps was located. On
interaction with II Corps Signals, the unit came to know of the impending task
and the communication plans. During the last week of November, preliminary
operations were conducted by the formation for the capture of Jibanagar, Uthali
and Darsana, to facilitate the subsequent advance on the Axis Jibanagar –
Kotchandpur – Kaliganj – Jhenida - Faridpur. For security reasons,
communications for the preliminary operations were based primarily on field
cable, with VHF radio as standby. On entering <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place>, it was found that the communications infrastructure in
the border areas was under developed. There were a few PL routes but these were
partially damaged. Roads were in a state of disrepair and the area being
marshy, laying and maintaining cable was difficult and time consuming.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
war actually started on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4
December 1971</st1:date>. However, a reconnaissance cum advance party of the
divisional headquarters and the unit under OC 1 Company entered <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> on 30 November. Finding no enemy presence
en route, the advance party moved to two different locations and established
radio and radio relay communications with the divisional tactical headquarters
which was still on own side of the border. The partially damaged PL routes were
repaired by the linemen under the supervision of Captain S.S. Dhillon, who was
performing the duties of adjutant as well as OC line section. By last light on
30 November the advance party was through with the divisional tactical and main
headquarters on line, radio and radio relay. To achieve longer ranges the radio
relay and VHF radio antennae were erected on 52 foot masts, microwave towers
and tall buildings.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
4 December the CO was injured when his jeep went over a mine. Two other
officers and two OR who were accompanying him escaped with minor injuries, but
Colonel Sable had to be evacuated. On 5 December, Major Hardayal Singh, who was
the GSO 2 (Operations) in HQ 4 Mountain Division, was asked to take over the
unit. The story has been narrated by Major General Hardayal Singh in the
following words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 40.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -4.5pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the afternoon
on 4 December, GOC’s party were going to see an objective captured by 41
Mountain Brigade when suddenly a jonga overtook the GOC’s vehicle driven by GSO
2 (Ops) from the right and got blown up on a mine just 20 yards ahead. There-upon General Barar asked me, “who is
this bloody fool?” Seeing the tactical number I told him, “Sir, your Commander
Signals.” Then he went to say,
“Hardayal, that was meant for us”. We
got out to look them up. Lieutenant
Colonel S. Sable had his collar bone fractured.
He was also bleeding from both his ears.
We arranged their evacuation and carried on. Then he asked me if I was approved for
promotion to which I replied in the affirmative. After reaching the objective he had a word
with Colonel General Staff and later spoke to General Raina, General Officer
Commanding II Corps. Thereafter, he
removed epaulettes from the shoulders of Lieutenant Colonel Bhopal Singh,
Officer Commanding 22 RAJPUT, and put these on mine and announced, “you are
hereby promoted while you will also continue to do your present job of GSO 2
(Ops)”.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB"> 26</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By 1300
hours on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1941">4 December, 41</st1:date>
Mountain Brigade had captured Darsana, which was surrounded by marshes. The
same evening, Suadih was also captured after some fierce fighting. 62 Mountain
Brigade, which had been ordered to secure Kotchandpur, found the town vacated
and occupied it on 5 December. On the same day, Kanyanagar and Khalispur were
also occupied, having been vacated by the enemy. Sahapur and Kaliganj, which
were located in marshy area, offered stiff resistance but were captured on 6 and
7 December respectively. During these operations, communications to both
brigades was mostly on VHF radio, due to the rapid rate of advance and frequent
moves of headquarters. However, lines were laid wherever possible, after the
area had been cleared of mines and enemy fire. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Jhenida
and Kaliganj were captured on 7 December and Mahura on 8 December without
resistance. For the capture of Kushtia and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hardinge</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
the division was given additional troops in the form of 7 Brigade, the corps
reserve, as well as some artillery and armour resources. The enemy initially offered stiff resistance
on the outskirts of Kushtia and the attacking troops suffered heavy casualties.
Kushtia was finally captured on 11 December, after the enemy pulled out of the
town. Communications for these operations were on radio relay down to brigade
level, and VHF radio thereafter. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hardinge</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> was captured on 12
December by a battalion of 41 Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Even
as a war was being fought, other activities continued. An interesting episode
concerned the destruction of a document.
On 10 December the unit received instructions from CSO’s Branch HQ
Eastern Command for destruction of a cipher document which had been
‘compromised’. These instructions were
passed down to brigade signal companies.
In response, Major V.K. Chatterjee, OC 41 Mountain Brigade Signal
Company, while confirming this also reported destruction of another document
which had become obsolete in November but was not yet due for destruction. The CO discussed the matter with DCSO II
Corps who agreed that there had been no breach of security but was just a
procedural lapse. It was reported back to HQ Eastern Command accordingly. Soon
afterwards, orders were received to take disciplinary action against Major
Chatterjee. Fortunately, he got off with
a Displeasure’ from the GOC. Apparently it had no adverse effect on his career
– Varun Chatterjee took premature retirement as a Major General in 1997!<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the capture of Kushtia and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hardinge</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>, 62 and 7 Brigades
crossed the Madhumati on the night of 14 December and secured the far bank.
They were advancing towards Faridpur on 16 December when orders were received
for the cease fire. A surrender ceremony was held at Kamar Khali during which
Major General Ansari, the GOC of Pakistan’s 9 Division surrendered to GOC 4
Mountain Division, General Barar. Immediately after the surrender ceremony, the
division moved to Jessore to replace 9 Infantry Division, which was moved out.
In coordination with the Pakistani T&T Department, the civil exchange and
carrier centre were made functional and linked with the Army systems. The
permanent line route from Jessore to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
on the railway alignment was rehabilitated and communications established with
HQ Easterrn Command. After a short stay at Jessore the unit moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="31" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">31 December 1971</st1:date>, en route
to its permanent location at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_3"
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="278" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image012.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_3" width="400" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 481.5pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Manpack radio set being used during the operations in Bangladesh, 1971.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XXXIII
Corps Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ
XXXIII Corps was located at Sukhna, near Siliguri in 1971. The CSO was
Brigadier Y.S. Desai. The other officers in the Signals Branch were Lieutenant
Colonel Surjit Singh and Major S.G. Rajopadhyaye. XXXIII Corps Signal Regiment
was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ranbir Mohan, with Major Sudarshan
Nayar as the second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were Majors
S.K. Rawla, S.K.S. Kirpekar, S.K. Paranjape and B.D. Sangal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the beginning of November several measures were taken by Signals in view of the
impending operations. The signal centre at Gangtok was taken over by L
Communication Zone Signal Regiment, which also sent a company to
Kalimpong. Army mechanics were
positioned at carrier and microwave stations at Siliguri, Katihar, Raiganj and
Balurghat to progress faults on army hired circuits and for security reasons to
prevent eavesdropping by P&T personnel. All <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> cipher tables were withdrawn
from brigades of 6 and 20 Mountain Divisions which were proceeding to
concentration areas for operations. These brigades were henceforth to operate
on zonal cipher tables, with the battalions ordered to use one time letter
cipher tables only. A staff message control centre was established at the corps
signal centre to control the precedence and security classification of messages
and to reduce message traffic. A direct circuit using Equipment Cipher Line
(ECL) was established between the operations rooms at HQ XXXIII Corps and HQ
Eastern Command.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
number of additional circuits were hired for formations that had started concentrating
for the operations. To reduce the load on the crypto centre, situation reports
from the divisions began to be sent by SDS after 17 November. To cater for
communications to 20 Mountain Division, a new PL route of 60 miles length
between Raiganj and Balurghat was constructed by the P&T department using
copper weld wire which was released from defence stocks. Circuits for 20
Mountain Division were derived by installing a 3 channel system on the newly
constructed line. The Balurghat - Hilli
speech circuit was provided between HQ 20 Mountain Division and HQ 202 Mountain
Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Towards
the end of November a reconnaissance was carried out by Signals for the
tactical headquarters at Raiganj. The regimental headquarters and headquarters
company of L Communication Zone Signal Regiment was moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Darjeeling</st1:place></st1:city> to Bengdubi. ‘A’ Sector moved from
Cooch Bihar to Jalpaiguri. Zonal cipher
tables were withdrawn from all brigades consequent to their move forward from
the concentration area. These formations
were now to operate only on one time cipher table with the divisional
headquarters, through which all classified signal traffic to brigades and
battalions was now canalized. On <st1:date day="28" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">28 November 71</st1:date> Mountain
Brigade moved to Pachagarh. A radio relay link was established and line
communications extended by rehabilitating the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Pak PL</st1:address></st1:street> beyond Bhajanpur with carrier quad
and PVC cable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
operations commenced on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4
December 1971</st1:date>. The radio diagram of XXXIII Corps is given below/on
the opposite page. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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o:title="" croptop="-1423f" cropbottom="-255f" cropleft="-5853f" cropright="-2740f"/>
<o:lock v:ext="edit" aspectratio="f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="422" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image014.gif" v:shapes="Object_x0020_1" width="653" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Most
of the nets functioned well. However, at night disturbance due to atmospherics
and radio stations in the HF band affected the quality of speech. It was found that
RT was not used except on one day on 14/15 December when it was the only means
of communications between HQ XXXIII Corps and HQ 20 Mountain Division. One RTT
net was established with HQ 20 Mountain Division and RP Control Centre at
Raiganj. However, it was commercial only
for about 14 to 16 hours in a day. A number of radio nets worked on CW.
Pakistani signallers who surrendered appeared to be greatly impressed by the
strength of the signals from our C-11 sets, which swamped their nets working on
ANGRC-9. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
radio relay diagram of XXXIII Corps is given below/on the opposite page showing
distances. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="_x0000_i1033" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="Slide2" style='width:477.75pt;
height:342pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image015.jpg"
o:title="Slide2" cropbottom="3025f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="Slide2" height="456" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image016.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1033" width="637" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
long ranges were feasible due to relay stations being placed at Katapahar, a
high feature in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Darjeeling</st1:place></st1:city>. Radio relay was generally appreciated by
commanders and staff. However, they tended to consider it as more secure than
radio. In the absence of lines, the
radio relay circuit was frequently overloaded since only one channel was
available. To overcome the problem, the
persons authorised to use radio relay were restricted by formation
headquarters. Teleprinters were also used over radio relay and functioned
well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
achieve longer ranges, five element antennae were fabricated under unit
arrangements. However, these were cumbersome to erect and were also more
difficult to conceal. There was one
instance of the location of a headquarters being given away by radio relay
aerials which had not been properly camouflaged. The radio relay vehicle was attacked by own
aircraft but fortunately the rocket missed.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
line communication diagram of XXXIII Corps is given below/on the opposite page.
This only shows the line communication to formations employed in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> and does not indicate line circuits to 17
and 27 Mountain which were not engaged in these operations, although they had
been moved to their operational locations to counter any Chinese reaction
through <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Generally, line circuits provided down to
divisional headquarters whilst they were located in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> were over P&T
systems. When the formations moved into <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> lines were extended by construction of
carrier quad/PVC routes and by patching up permanent line in <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-no-proof: yes;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1034" type="#_x0000_t75"
alt="Slide1" style='width:477.75pt;height:326.25pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image017.jpg"
o:title="Slide1" cropbottom="5905f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="Slide1" height="435" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image018.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1034" width="637" /><!--[endif]--></span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
P & T circuits were not of a high quality with the result that it was not
possible to work <st1:place w:st="on">S+DX</st1:place> equipment on the two
speech circuits (when HQ 20 Mountain Division was still at Patiram) without
losing the speech. At night, when the
trunk telephone circuits were not too busy, teleprinters using <st1:place w:st="on">S+DX</st1:place> equipment were used on one line. Rear HQ 20 Mountain Division was initially
next to the main divisional headquarters
at Patiram and was served by the same
circuits. On move of the main
divisional headquarters to Gobindganj, the
rear headquarters remained at Patiram
for a few days and then moved forward. During this period, the rear headquarters could not be provided with any
telegraph circuits and had only a telephone line.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Division
of responsibility between XXXIII Corps Signal Regiment and L Communication Zone
Signal Regiment was done on a geographical basis for provisioning of
communications. XXXIII Corps Sig Regt
was made responsible for all communications at HQ XXXIII Corps and south of
Sukna, while L Communication Zone Signal Regiment was responsible for all
communications north of Sukna, including maintenance of lines and manning of
locality signal centres for operations
along northern borders. A 4-set medium
static radio section from L Communication Zone Signal Regiment was attached to
XXXIII Corps Signal Regiment and a line construction section allotted from
Eastern Command was given to L Communication Zone Signal Regiment to supplement
their resources. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An
ad-hoc intercept organisation was established at HQ XXXIII Corps under a major
from the corps signal regiment. He had 16 operators who worked one search
receiver and four other receivers (R210) for interception of Pakistani HF nets,
on three shift basis. Officers and JCOs
were provided by Artillery and Engineer units to be on duty with each
shift. The whole organisation functioned
under the GOC, who took a personal interest in the work, but under the
technical direction of CSO XXXIII Corps.
This ad hoc organisation maintained close liaison with the concerned
intercept unit of the Signal Intelligence which received instructions to divert
their main effort from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
to <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. Much valuable information, including identifications,
was obtained by the ad-hoc organisation.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 55.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An
ECL line circuit was provided between operations rooms at HQ XXXIII Corps and
HQ Eastern Command. This generally worked very satisfactorily. The staff did not use the ECL circuits for
key conversations but passed logs. A
hard local copy was prepared for every log transmitted to ensure there were no
typing errors. All copies were handed
over to the staff and nothing was retained by the operator. ECL was also tried on radio relay. Both ECL machines were at the corps signal
centre and a loop on the radio relay circuit (which involved one relay station)
was given at the distant HQ 20 Mountain Division terminal. The experiment proved that ECL can in
practice be used satisfactorily on good radio relay links. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">20
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was located at Binaguri in
1971 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.C. Sharma, with Major Y.S. Rao
as the second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were Major
Nirbhay Singh, Major R.M. Shukla and Major Bhandari. In early 1971 the unit
moved to Calcutta for Operation ‘Hot Spot’, in connection with elections in
West Bengal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the last week of November 1971, the formation conducted a number of preliminary
operations to occupy lightly held or unoccupied enemy posts near the border.
The attack on Hilli on 24 November failed and resulted in heavy casualties to
own troops, especially 8 Guards.
Signalman George Kutty and Signalman Tej Singh Bains, the rover
operators of Commander 202 Mountain Brigade were injured due to enemy shelling
and had to be hospitalized. The operations continued for several days but the
position was held strongly and could not be taken in spite of being heavily
shelled and use of armour. There were
several incidents of Razakars damaging lines being apprehended by line parties.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
Operation ‘Cactus Lily, 20 Mountain Division was employed in the Bogra Sector
as part of XXXIII Corps. Apart from four mountain brigades – 66, 165, 202 and
340 – the division had two regiments of armour viz. 63 Cavalry (T 55) and 69
Armoured Regiment (PT 76). To control the armour operations, an ad hoc
organisation was created. This comprised a Brigadier Armour and a GSO2 Armour.
A separate radio net was provided for the Brigadier Armour to control the two
armoured regiments, which were also on the B1 nets of the respective brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
operations involved the advance of two brigades on widely separated axes. As
the operations progressed, there were frequent changes in the axes of advance
and tasks allotted to brigades. Communications were mostly on radio
supplemented by radio relay. However, due to shortage of terminals, radio relay
could be provided only to three brigades. Wherever possible, line communication
was provided by laying new lines or rehabilitating existing PL routes. A
carrier quad route was built up to 66 Brigade which was moving on the
divisional centre line. For 165 Brigade the existing PL was used. One VIR route
was also laid up to Balurghat to provide an additional speech circuit and for
local leads at Balurghat carrier station. For 202 Brigade, speech circuit on
line was provided on VIR up to Balurghat and on existing PL from there to
Hilli. Line communications could not be provided to 340 Brigade at its initial
location at Gajol. Later, when the brigade moved to Gangarampur, line
communications was extended on the existing PL. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
communications were stable and functioned well except for a few disruptions.
Line communications with HQ XXXIII Corps was commercial throughout the
operations except for a day when the divisional headquarters moved from Patiram
to Gobindganj on 14 December. The relay
station was then shifted to Hilli and the link was restored on 15 December.
Radio relay and the radio links to HQ XXXIII Corps functioned well. Air support
communications functioned well but the nets were frequently overloaded from the
large number of queries raised due to the grid reference or target description
not being indicated clearly by the originator. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Armour
communications within the regiments and with the brigades functioned well. The
radio link of the Brigadier Armour performed well till 12 December when the
armoured regiments went out of range. Subsequently the Brigadier Armour and 63
Cavalry were moved out of the sector and 69 Armoured Regiment functioned on the
concerned brigade net only. Artillery communications within the division were
not satisfactory due to the multiplicity of radio sets being used. The units
having AN/PRC 25 had no problems, but those using RS 62 or HM 30 did not have
satisfactory communications due to the long distances involved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the cease fire the unit remained in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> to
restore the disrupted communications. Three linemen of the unit – Lance
Havildar Bhag Singh, Naik J.P. Yadav and Naik Vasu Dev - were
‘Mentioned-in-Despatches.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">35</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 6
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was located in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bareilly</st1:place></st1:city> in 1971. On <st1:date day="12" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">12 August 1971</st1:date>, the new CO,
Lieutenant Colonel Yatindra Pratap arrived and assumed command. His
predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel P.L. Kohli had already left the unit before his
arrival. The second-in-command, </span><span lang="FR" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: FR;">Major
C.M. Sagne, was also not present, being
away on a course. The other field officers
in the unit were Major </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">K.V.
Suri (1 Company) and Major S.K. Chatterji
(2 Company). The officers
commanding the brigade signal companies were Major R.S. Singh (9 Mountain
Brigade); Major A.V. Joglekar (69 Mountain Brigade) and Major H.L. Banerji (99 Mountain
Brigade)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit received the warning order for move to Binaguri in connection with
‘Operation Cactus Lily’ on <st1:date day="10" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">10
August 1971</st1:date>, two days before the arrival of the new CO. The advance party of the unit left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bareilly</st1:place></st1:city> on 20 August and
reached Binaguri on 24 August. It started taking over signal communications
from the rear party of 20 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment that had already
moved to its concentration area. The main body of the unit arrived in two
parts. The first part under the CO reached on 31 August, while the second part
under Major K.V. Suri reached on 7 September. By this time, the rear party
under Captain J.P. Pandey had also arrived. To keep the move of 6 Mountain
Division a secret, the unit had been asked to
leave intact all radio and radio relay communications on the UP- Tibet border
and move less 69 Mountain Brigade Signal Company. On reaching Binaguri, they were renamed as 13
(Tactical No) Rear 20 Division. They
were debarred from publishing any Part 2 orders for entry into field area or
making any claims on pay authorities on this account. As a result, the officers remained without
field advance and the JCOs and OR without pay for almost two months. As it turned out these efforts at keeping the
induction of the formation a secret were in vain. Within a month of its arrival in the
operational area, Radio <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had announced its presence in <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Even
before the move was completed, the CO went to <st1:place w:st="on">Western
Bhutan</st1:place> with the divisional reconnaissance group and planned his
signal communications, in case the division was deployed there. Within a month, Lieutenant G.K. Syal, OC Radio
Relay Section had carried out trials for radio relay shoots Binaguri/Hashimara-
Cheemakoti- Thimpu/Paro- Dukhidzong. The
unit settled down in the new station, awaiting orders for move to the operational
area. However, instead of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>, 6
Mountain Division less 99 Brigade was ordered to move to Jalpaiguri for
operations in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. First to move was
9 Mountain Brigade with its two infantry battalions, to be placed under command
20 Mountain Division, which was deployed in Bhajanpur- Pachgarh. On 8 November, 9 Mountain Brigade with the
signal company moved from Jalpaiguri to Dinhata. Radio communications were established on D1
and D2 nets. In addition, a speech circuit was provided on line, for which a PL
was hired from the P&T Department from Cooch Bihar to Dinhata. Over the
next two days, 6 Mountain Artillery Brigade moved to Cooch Bihar and Tactical
HQ 9 Mountain Brigade moved to Sahibganj. One pair cable JWDI twisted was laid
between Dinhata and Sahibganj. On 13 November the divisional tactical
headquarters which was actually the GOC’s rover group moved to Dinhata. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
move of 9 Mountain Brigade to Dinhata, the CO started pressing the divisional
commander to move his headquarters to Cooch Bihar. In view of the division’s primary task in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the corps
headquarters did not permit this. The divisional commander then decided to move
his tactical headquarters or more correctly rover group plus to Dinhata. The Signals element comprised three vehicles
and 10 OR under Lieutenant A.J.S. Bakshi.
The tactical headquarters remained at Dinhata from 13 to 25
November. It was in direct
communications with the corps headquarters and 9 Mountain Brigade, when the latter
moved forward. The divisional
headquarters was in communication with 9 Mountain Brigade on line via Cooch
Bihar and tactical headquarters on D1 and D2 radio nets. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In view of the dispersed locations of various
elements of the headquarters the speech circuits Binaguri-Cooch Behar and Cooch
Behar-Dinhata became the life line of communications. In order to patrol and
maintain these lines, detachments were positioned at various locations. Captain
G.K. Syal with three men and a vehicle was placed at Falfata. A similar
detachment under Captain Kanjilal was positioned at Cooch Bihar, with HQ ‘A’
Sector. Another detachment comprising two vehicles and one JCO and seven OR under
Second- Lieutenant A.K. Batta was placed at Dinhata. This unconventional and seemingly uneconomical
method was resorted to in view of the vital need of keeping this circuit
through at all costs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
improve the quality of the speech a Repeater Field Telephone 1A was installed
between Binaguri and <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cooch Behar</st1:place></st1:state>. To further improve communications to 9
Mountain Brigade, a PL pair Dinhata – Gitaidah -Bamanhat was hired on 15
November. After the stabilisation and improvement in quality of communications
the detachment under Captain Syal was withdrawn from Falafata on 17 November.
Shortly afterwards, 6 Mountain Artillery Brigade moved to Jalpaiguri in support
of 71 Mountain Brigade. A few days later, HQ 9 Mountain Brigade moved to
Chaudhrihat. Communications were provided by extending the PL Dinhata –
Gitaidah – Bamanhat to their new location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 24
November, 12 Garhwal Rifles was placed under command of the division. The unit
could not be given a speech circuit from Binaguri, since emergency had still
not been declared. One radio detachment with RS C11/R210 was positioned with
the battalion, which was controlled directly by the divisional headquarters, to
work as an out station on the D1 net. On 25 November the GOCs rover group returned
from Dinhata. A week later, HQ 9 Mountain Brigade moved to Jaimanirhat. Shortly
afterwards, 6 Mountain Artillery
Brigade also returned to Binaguri. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was gradually involved in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ but no written order was
ever issued by the divisional headquarters.
The main divisional headquarters moved to Jalpaiguri on <st1:date day="1" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">1 December 1971</st1:date>, along with
the artillery brigade headquarters. On <st1:date day="2" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">2 December, 71</st1:date> Mountain Brigade was placed under command
and came up as an out station on D1. To
ensure quick passage of information, 71 Mountain Brigade was also in direct
communication with HQ XXXIII Corps on radio (D15), radio relay and line. To economise on equipment and man power, the
radio relay and line circuits to the brigade were routed through HQ XXXIII
Corps. However, as 71 Mountain Brigade
was functioning on D15 net, they could not come up on the D2 net, and all
traffic was cleared on D1 net.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
71 Mountain Brigade was advancing, L Communication Zone Signal Regiment was
trailing behind them laying a pair of 70 lbs. cadmium copper PVC cable. However, they could never catch up with the
brigade. In a fast moving operation like
this the tactician’s and communicator’s interests are at variance. While the tactician wants to move as fast as
possible, the communicator does not want the troops to get out of range. However, this did not apply in the case of 71
Mountain Brigade. Colonel Pratap wanted
the brigade to move as fast as possible, so that they could reach Nilphamari
and he could connect them on the Saidpur- Jalpaiguri International Trunk
route. With this in mind, he sent Lieutenant
A.K. Batta with a line detachment to keep on edging forward on this route and
put it through, as soon as 71 Brigade came on this axis. Sure enough, Major S.K. Chatterji, OC 2
Company reached Saidpur before the brigade and was handed over the keys of that
town. Once the brigade came on this axis
there was no problem in keeping them through to the divisional headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Major
General Yati Pratap recalls some interesting incidents that occurred during the
operation. Once he had gone to Saidpur via Haldibari. Returning to Jalpaiguri late at night, he
took a perfect tarmac road presuming that it led to Haldibari. Soon the road turned into a track and kept
narrowing till a point was reached from where he could not move any further. He found there were at least ten motor
vehicles including some taxis following him. He got down and went back to
nearest taxi to find the way to Haldibari.
The taxi driver’s reply floored him completely: “<i>Sahib we thought, you being fauji would know the way with your maps
etc. We are just following you.”</i> Sheepishly, he sneaked into his vehicle,
turned around and retraced his way back to Haldibari.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the operation, forward communication to brigades was mostly on radio. One fine morning the D1 control operator
heard a lot of Punjabi abuses being hurled at him. Apparently a West Pakistani radio operator
was indulging in low level electronic warfare.
On being told of the happening, Lieutenant D.V. Pantvaidya detailed a
Sikh radio operator to take over the control station. The slanging match started. Soon the two sides reached an understanding
to take a respite when either side had any urgent traffic to pass. The CO was not aware of it till one day while
standing near D1 control station; he heard his operator saying- <i>“Oye mera sparrow mere pichhe khalotta
hai. </i></span><i><span lang="SV" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: SV;">Oh nu jan de, pher men tainu
wekhanga. Khote da puttar. </span></i><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(My sparrow is standing
behind me. Let him go, and then I will see you, son of a donkey)”. </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Later,
when they went to visit the Pakistani brigade at Saidpur after the cease fire,
the operators concerned were located and a hand shake soon led to a hug and a
hearty laugh,<i> </i>and all was forgiven.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">27</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">101
Communication Zone Area Signals</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> HQ
101 Communication Zone Area was located at Shillong, under the command of Major
General G.S. Gill. The DCSO was Colonel D.B. Lahiri. The area of responsibility
of 101 Communication Zone Area included the states of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>, Arunachal,
Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya. It had under it two sub areas, with their
headquarters at Jorhat and Gauhati. There were two major units of Signals under
the Area. ‘S’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel S.N.
Barooah was manning the signal centres at Gauhati and Shillong, while ‘N’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel B.K. Bhandari had
signal centres at Jorhat, Dimapur, Mariani and Mohanbari and line construction
and maintenance duties in Arunachal, Nagaland and Mizoram.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
first commitment of 101 Communication Zone Area in Meghalaya was in connection
with Operation ‘Jackpot’. For this operation Meghalaya was divided into two
sectors viz. E1 and EJ. Operations in E1 Sector (<st1:place w:st="on">Eastern
Meghalaya</st1:place>) were directly controlled by GOC 101 Communication Zone
Area. The operations in <st1:place w:st="on">Western Meghalaya</st1:place> were controlled by the GOC through HQ
EJ Sector, which was located about 10 km away from Tura on road Tura-Dalu. HQ 1
Artillery Brigade (East Bengal Infantry Brigade) comprising 1, 3 and 8
Artillery Regiments (East Bengal Infantry Battalions) was also located in
Western Meghalaya approximately 35 km from Tura on road Tura-Mankachar.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Initially,
communications for command and control were established in both sectors. In the
E1 Sector, the training camp at Jowai was extended a telephone on civil circuit
from Shillong, while the ‘hides’ at
Muktapur, Shella, Balat and Barspra were each provided a radio set C 11/R210
with one cipher operator, being controlled from Shillong. In the EJ Sector, the
training camp at Tura was provided with speech and telegraph circuits from
Shillong. In addition, a C11/R210 was provided for communication to Shillong
and a BC 610 for communication to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.
HQ 1 Artillery Brigade was given a line from HQ EJ Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
soon as the operational role was finalized, it was decided to develop Tura, the
district headquarters town of Garo Hills (Meghalaya) as the operational
headquarters of 101 Communication Zone Area. Signals started work immediately
to establish a trunk and local CB exchange at Tura, along with a VHF radio link
to <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Cooch Behar</st1:place></st1:state>
(<st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place>) so that the formation could
enter the national grid. Resuscitation
of permanent lines to the borders all along Meghalaya was taken in hand and
Cherrapunji was developed as a relay station for radio relay communications to
the south and along the border when so required. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
was decided that once operations commenced, 101 Communication Zone Area, in
addition to its original role, will act as a divisional headquarters from
Tura. Until then, both roles were to be
performed from Shillong. The formations
placed under command were 95 Mountain Brigade, 167 Mountain Brigade, F Sector with one regular brigade and a large
force of irregulars, and 5/5 Gorkha Rifles in an independent role. While 95 and 167 Brigades were to operate on
axis Tura – Mahendraganj – Tangail – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
F Sector was to operate further east on axis Charbangla – Haluaghat and still
further east on axis Susung Durgapur – Jharia – Jhanjail, both axes leading to
Mymensingh. From Tura the distance to
the border was almost 50 km and the two axes were separated by over 80 km. This would have posed a problem for any
divisional signal regiment designed for mobile role, let alone a communication
zone signal regiment which was equipped only for static communication tasks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> One
of the major problems for Signals was finding resources, both of equipment and
manpower, to meet the additional demands. Initially two static medium power
radio sets Siemens 400W and batteries for RS C11/R 210 which were in short
supply were released and immediately dispatched to Tura. Unfortunately the vehicle carrying the
equipment met with an accident and had a watery grave in one of the
rivers. Two static Siemens 400W sets
were then removed from the Shillong transmitter station and dispatched to Tura.
Other radio equipments such as C11/R210, GR 345 and AN/PRC 25 with boosters
were arranged from within the command. Initially CSO Eastern Command released
four radio relay terminals, but subsequently agreed to one more. Radio relay sets were at a premium as the
existing network from Shillong, the communication anchor of the North East, had
to continue functioning, providing connectivity to Gauhati, Jorhat, Zakhama,
Dimapur, Aijal, Masimpur and Agartala.
As regards personnel it was decided that CO ‘S’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Barooah, would personally command the
Signals element comprising about 50 personnel at Tura with one subaltern to
assist him. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">With the induction of IV Corps, the
communication responsibility in that zone was taken over by IV Corps Signals.
However, Cherrapunji remained as anchor for their outlets and alternate
routing. N Communication Zone Signal Regiment was placed under IV Corps, which
was a great loss to 101 Communication Zone Area. To make up for this loss, 1002
Independent Signal Company (Mountain Brigade) under raising was promised.
However, three days before the actual outbreak of operations, this decision was
rescinded. Only a few detachments from the newly raised Bravo Signal Regiment
were allotted, which did not do much to boost the resources or morale of 101
Communication Zone Area Signals. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="2" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">2 December 1971</st1:date> Colonel
Lahiri had just reached Gauhati after a visit to Tura Sector, when an urgent
message was received summoning him for a conference chaired by the GOC. That same
evening at 1730 hours the headquarters commenced its move to the concentration
area. From the Signals Branch the only other officer stayed behind, as did
Major Biswas, who was commanding the company of S Communication Zone Signal
Regiment at Shillong. Lieutenant Colonel Barooah also moved to Tura, leaving
Major M. Guin, the second-in-command, to look after the unit and communications
at Gauhati. The Signals element made a dash and reached Tura in the early hours
of the morning of 3 December, while the headquarters reached at about 1400
hours. By the evening, the headquarters was fully functional and communications
to the two brigades, F Sector and rearwards to Shillong and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> were through. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
0600 hours on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1995">4 December, 95</st1:date>
Mountain Brigade commanded by Brigadier H.S. Kler crossed the international
border. Communications worked without a
break. In the evening, on his return from the front the GOC, General Gill, called Colonel Lahiri and complimented him
for the excellent communications, adding that had it not been for Signals the
operations particularly the air strikes could not have gone that well. He
stated that after the fall of Kamalpur, the enemy’s next strong hold Bakshiganj
must be captured next day i.e. on 5 December and he wanted the communications
for the battle to be perfect. He asked Lahiri to accompany him to the front in
his helicopter next morning. Lahiri pleaded that he should move the same night
and organise things so that no time was wasted and everything was ready by the
time the attack developed. Gill agreed
and Lahiri left at 2100 hours for the front to see that the communications were
planned and executed properly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
next morning, while returning from the forward localities, Lahiri met Gill who
was going forward with Kler who was driving the jeep. After Lahiri had briefed
Gill, they moved off. A few minutes later he heard a loud bang and a then saw a
vehicle from the GOC’s party rushing back. It transpired that his jeep had
struck a mine and Gill and Kler were both injured and had been evacuated to the
Kamalpur post. On reaching there Lahiri found Gill badly injured in the feet.
Kler had minor injuries but was stunned by the impact. The medical officer
treated the injuries and advised immediate evacuation of the GOC. A helicopter
still in the area was immediately called up and Gill was evacuated to Gauhati.
Before leaving, he told Lahiri that nobody should be told that he was injured
and those who knew should be told it was light. He further stated that he would
be back by the evening and the attack on Bakshiganj must be pressed on hard –
it must be taken that day. He asked Lahiri to keep him informed at the
hospital. After Gill’s departure, Kler wanted to return to the front but seeing
his condition, Lahiri persuaded him to rest a while and drove him to his main
headquarters. He promised Kler that a helicopter would pick him up at 1600
hours, by which time he should be fit enough and take him to Bakshiganj. He was
made to go to bed after medication and two stiff doses of brandy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lahiri returned to the tactical
headquarters. A telephone had been
provided in the GOC’s room in the hospital and when Lahiri rang up in the
afternoon the first thing Gill wanted to know was whether Bakshiganj had fallen.
On being answered in the negative he showered Lahiri with the choicest curses
and directed that the pressure must be kept on and he will return if not that
day, then on the next day. The OC Military Hospital on being contacted told
Lahiri that the GOC would not be fit for discharge for some time. At 1600 hours
a helicopter picked up Kler and dropped him at his tactical headquarters. On
reaching there Kler rang up Lahiri and told him that he had seen a large
concentration of enemy vehicles and troops at Jamalpur crossing and they were
the finest target for the air if a strike could be arranged immediately. Lahiri
immediately got through to the Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) of Eastern Air
Command at Shillong with the information and requested for a strike. The SASO
was doubtful if the effort required could be made available at this late hour.
However, within 15-20 minutes the troops on the ground at Tura saw the Indian
Air Force aircraft streaking overhead towards the south. Later the SASO rang up to say that the bag
was wonderful. The enemy withdrew from Bakshiganj at 1730 and the GOC was
informed. By now it was clear that Gill would not come back and Major General
G.S. Nagra, GOC 2 Mountain Division would be taking over.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">28</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
his first briefing Nagra insisted that plans should be made to go right up to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> and as fast as
possible. When Lahiri mentioned the poverty of resources, Nagra told him that
he would get whatever he needed from his own division. He also immediately sent
a signal to HQ Eastern Command for additional resources. The text of the message
is reproduced below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">personal for COS from
NAGRA (.) firstly (.) have already visited fwd elements KLERs and SANTs sector
(.) am satisfied with progress (.) secondly (.) personal assessment for scope
of ops in KLER’s sector as follows (.) alfa (.) good possibility of contacting
DACCA defs early (.) bravo (.) adm sp can be arranged for addl tps if inducted
(.) thirdly (.) recommend induction following tps (.) alfa (.) skeleton HQ 2
mtn div with div tps not op required in a div sector (.) bravo (.) inf bde gp
(.) shall prefer allotment 5 inf bde (.) echo (.) two 106 RCL for engaging
concrete bunkers (.) foxtrot (.) allotment line comn resources upto DACCA (.)
fourthly allotment armour and med arty essential mainly for early contacting DACCA
defs<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Kamalpur
surrendered on 4 December and a carrier quad cable was put through to
Bakshiganj by the evening of 5 December.
This could not be done earlier as after the mine accident in which the
GOC was injured on the road to Bakshiganj, an embargo was placed on all
vehicular movement on the road till it was declared safe. In addition to laying the carrier quad, the
line party was also detailed to repair the existing PL route which was
extensively damaged and erect a new two-km route from Mahendraganj to Kamalpur
to linkup with the existing PL for communication to Bakshiganj and beyond. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
7 December it was learnt that HQ 95 Mountain Brigade proposed to move from
Bakshiganj to Pengharchar, on the direct route to Jamalpur. A line party was
immediately sent out to lay a carrier quad cable to that location about 12 km
from Bakshiganj. The line was completed
by <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>. However, 95 Mountain Brigade instead of going
to Pengharchar, moved to Sherpur on a completely different axis, approximately
29 km from Bakshiganj. It was decided
not to lay any more carrier quad but rehabilitate the PL to Sherpur and in the
meantime communications would be only on radio relay. Simultaneously, it was considered that the
tactical headquarters should move direct to Bakshiganj from Tura instead of
moving to Mahendraganj in the first hop. Mobile signal elements of the Tura
signals complex were sent to Bakshiganj to set up communications and were ready
to receive the tactical headquarters.
However, at the last moment the plans were changed and it was decided to
set up the tactical headquarters at Sherpur. Accordingly, the communications
were shifted to Sherpur from Bakshiganj on 9 December in the morning. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> HQ
FJ Sector was to function as a static headquarters at Ghasupara. With the capture of Haluaghat and rapid
progress of 6 Bihar and the BSF unit, the sector commander decided to make his
headquarters mobile and moved to Haluaghat and thereafter it continued its move
forward till it reached Dacca on 16 December.
This movement of HQ FJ Sector was a major surprise to Signals as no
planning had been done for this contingency. However, thanks to the flexibility
of the signal plan and determination of the personnel involved, communications
to the formation were provided right up to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
Up to Mymensingh the formation was kept through on line and thereafter
on radio. Forward communications of FJ
Sector were on radio right throughout the operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="10" month="12" w:st="on" year="167">10 December 167</st1:date> Mountain
Brigade was inducted at Sherpur as reinforcement. Shortly afterwards, elements
of 2 Mountain Division also started arriving at Sherpur to augment the limited
resources of 101 Communication Zone Area. They included the <st1:place w:st="on">COs</st1:place>
of the engineer and signal regiments along with their regimental
headquarters. A large number of staff
officers including the Colonel GS and the AQMG of HQ 2 Mountain Division also
joined. The complement of 2 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment comprised seven officers, eight JCOs and 209 OR.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Jamalpur
surrendered on the morning of 11 December after which the speed of advance
became very rapid. Communication problems multiplied as the build-up of signal
resources across the river was not fast enough. On this day at 1630 hours 2
Parachute Battalion was dropped just near Tangail. Originally the battalion was
to have established communications with HQ 95 Mountain Brigade under whom they
were to operate after the drop. However, it was later decided that the
battalion would be placed under command of 95 Mountain Brigade only after the
link up had taken place. It was therefore decided to set up initial
communications only with the tactical headquarters of 101 Communication Zone
Area. The battalion was out of communication throughout the night and came up
on the net only on 12 December in the morning. After the link up with 95
Mountain Brigade in the evening, the radio link with 2 Para was closed down.
The reasons for the failure of communications with 2 Para have been covered in
detail in the account of 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 12 December, the responsibility of
provision of communications was divided between S Communication Zone Signal
Regiment and 2 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment, with the latter being made
responsible for communications forward of the tactical headquarters and the
former for communications to the rear of the tactical headquarters which was
still at Sherpur. Another commitment given to Signals was the provision of
communications for the Inland Water Transport convoy sailing down the <st1:place w:st="on">Brahmaputra</st1:place> from Dhubri with stores for the advancing
units beyond the river obstacle (<st1:place w:st="on">Brahmaputra</st1:place>)
at Jamalpur. As soon as hostilities started the convoy was ordered to sail and
communications were required between the convoy commander and the tactical
headquarters. Radio sets were made available to the unit from Gauhati and one
operator was provided from S Communication Zone Signal Regiment at Tura.
Communications were established on D2 and maintained till the convoy reached
Jagannathganj Ghat, between Jamalpur and Tangail on the River Jamuna.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
bottle neck at Jamalpur posed some problems for Signals. Initially, for
communication across the river, one pair WD1 cable was laid in the river
followed by a carrier quad cable duly water proofed and weighed down by
weights. As soon as the PL was rehabilitated to the river bank, use was made of
the main power grid cable running across the river as the PL span across the
river was destroyed due to heavy shelling. Line parties comprising Army Signals
and the East Pakistan T & T Department were sent out from Jamalpur and
Tangail towards Mymensingh and line communication was restored between the
three places by 14 December. The PL particularly at Jamalpur and between
Tangail and Madhupur was badly damaged. The line to Mymensingh from Tura via
Baluaghat was put through by the morning of 13 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
relay between Sherpur and Tangail did not get through and hence one terminal
was sent across the river to Jamalpur to be established on top of a high
building. The operational staff of the tactical headquarters had by now reached
Jamalpur and the remainder at Sherpur was ordered to up stick and move to
Tangail. Radio relay communications from Jamalpur to Tangail in a single hop
was satisfactory only for a part of the day, which was not acceptable and thus
it was decided to establish a relay station at Madhupur half way between
Jamalpur and Tangail. It was also decided to send back one terminal from
Sherpur to Tura so that direct communications could be established between Tura
– Tangail and Tangail – Jamalpur, via Tura. The relay station at Madhupur was
planned to be shifted to Tangail for forward communications beyond Mirzapur
once the Tura – Tangail link was through.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
the evening of 13 December the GOC moved up to Mirzapur instead of remaining at
Tangail. The tactical headquarters which was to be established at Tangail on 14
December had not completed its move due to the bottleneck at Jamalpur. The radio relay terminal earmarked for
Madhupur was moved up for communications forward of Tangail. The terminal to work to Tangail from Tura had
also not reached Tura. As a result, on 15 December there was no rearward radio
relay communication from Tangail. The
line from Tangail to Jamalpur via Mymensingh was rehabilitated but the speech
was of poor quality and good enough only for communication between Tangail and
Jamalpur. Hence, radio was the main mode
of communications on 15 December. On 16 December the GOC entered <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> at 1040 hours and
the headquarters was ordered to up stick from Tangail and move into <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. The tactical headquarters moved out leaving
behind the radio relay detachment at Tangail which had got through to Tura by
the afternoon of 16 December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
14 December Lahiri had been told by Eastern Command Signals that 101 Communication
Zone Area was being placed under HQ IV Corps with effect from <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time> on 15 December and he should
establish direct communications with them. However, this could not be done as
no signal instruction had been received either from HQ Eastern Command from HQ
IV Corps. Ultimately frequencies and call signs were obtained on phone on 15
December. However, when the radio operator of 101 Communication Zone Area tried
to join the net he was challenged by the control at IV Corps. Since the relevant docs were not held the
challenge could not be answered. This
was brought to the notice of IV Corps Signals. A liaison officer was
immediately dispatched from IV Corps with the necessary documents. However, these could not be delivered to 101
Area Signals even on 16 December. As a result, 101 Communication Zone Area
continued to function independent of IV Corps as before. <b>39<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At 1630
hours on 16 December the surrender ceremony took place at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. Colonel Lahiri was present along with
the GOC’s rover detachment. In <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
Colonel Lahiri visited the East Pakistan Command Signal Centre. He found that
the cipher equipment and documents had been systematically destroyed. The
exchange was functional and so was the link to <st1:place w:st="on">West
Pakistan</st1:place>. Lahiri asked for the CSO, Pak Eastern Command. He was
pleasantly surprised to meet Brigadier Raza, who had been his course mate at
the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indian</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place>. Brigadier G.S. Sidhu, CSO IV Corps was in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> and had taken
control of the communications. The civil
communications at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
were non functional as the civilian staff on communication duty with the Pak
Army were missing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Colonel
Lahiri collected a pair of brass emblems of the Pakistan Army Signals from the
door of the Pak Eastern Command Signals Mess and after obtaining permission
from HQ Eastern Command to retain them as war trophies, brought them to
Shillong. At the request of General Nagra, one was given to 2 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment. The other ‘Jimmy’ was presented to the SO-in-C when
he visited Shillong after the war. It is kept in the Headquarters Mess at Mhow.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 36.0pt 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit had been raised in November 1962 in the wake of the Chinese attack in NEFA
as an infantry divisional signal regiment. It was subsequently re-designated as
2 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment and moved to Dinjan in early 1966. The
unit was looking after communications of 2 Mountain Division which was
responsible for the defence of the present day Arunachal Pradesh, then known as
NEFA (North East Frontier Agency). The divisional commander in 1971 was Major
General G.S. Nagra, while the signal regiment was under the command of Major
S.S. Dhillon. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 36.0pt 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 36.0pt 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since
the formation was deployed on the Chinese border, it had not been planned to be
used during the invasion of <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>.
However, soon after the commencement of the operations on <st1:date day="4" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">4 December 1971</st1:date>, General Nagra had to
take over command of 101 Communication Zone Area whose GOC was injured in a
mine accident. Finding the signal resources at Tura woefully inadequate, Nagra
decided to supplement them from those from his own formation viz. 2 Mountain
Division. The unit arrived at the tactical headquarters at Sherpur on <st1:date day="10" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">10 December 1971</st1:date> and
established communication with the forward brigades viz. 95 and 167 Mountain
Brigades and FJ Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 12 December, linemen
of the unit repaired the PL route running along the railway line from Jamalpur
to Mymensingh with the help of local P&T personnel. A railway motor trolley
was requisitioned for speedy movement along the route. On 13 December the
Jamalpur-Tangail VHF link was tested. The specialist radio vehicles carrying
the control stations for D1 and D2 step-up crossed over for setting up the
advance headquarters at Jamalpur. On the next day, the PL route Jamalpur-Mymensingh
was also put through. Soon after wards,
the officiating CO, Major Dhillon, proceeded to the new location of the
advanced tactical headquarters at Tangail with two radio and three radio relay
detachments. The unit established a 12-line exchange at Tangail for the
advanced tactical headquarters, from which a line was extended to the forward
air supply officer at the airfield. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 16 December a liaison officer arrived from
HQ Eastern Command with new signal instructions. Direct contact was established
with HQ Eastern Command from the rover group. The divisional tactical
headquarters and main body of the unit arrived at Tangail. The PL route
Tangail-Mymensingh was through and now available for communications from
Tangail. Elements of 2 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment arrived in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> in the evening on
16 December. Major Dhillon accompanied by the cipher officer reached the Pak
Eastern Command HQ signal centre at about 1930 hours. They confiscated the Pak
cipher equipment such as the Typex machine and drums. The unit also captured
three vehicles, in addition to a large quantity of arms, ammunition and signal
equipment. Subedar Major Baldev Singh
Perhar was ‘Mentioned in Despatches’ for his performance during the operations.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">95
Mountain Brigade Signal Company <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Before
its deployment in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, 95 Mountain Brigade Signal Company
was located in Paphima in Nagaland, as part of 8 Mountain Divisional Signal
Regiment. The company commander was
Lieutenant Vinod Aggarwal. The company subsequently moved to Tura in Meghalaya,
where Major Pratap Singh took over from Aggarwal. The brigade was placed under
101 Communication Zone Area. Shortly afterwards, Major G.R. Singh from ‘S’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment was posted as the new OC. The brigade
commander was Brigadier H.S. Kler, from Signals. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Colonel
Aggarwal relates some interesting anecdotes of the period. In the preparatory phase, the brigade was
located opposite Kamalpur, which was to be captured as a preliminary operation.
It was noticed that Pakistani company located at Kamalpur employed a simple
substitution method to encode messages to the battalion headquarters. Using the
security classification of the messages and initial substitution indicators,
the Indian signallers were able to fill in the blanks by the sequential
substitution being followed by the enemy. Thus after any action, they were able
to get the enemy’s version even before the Pakistani battalion and brigade
commanders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the fall of Kamaplur the next
objective for the brigade was Jamalpur. Before the attack, when the brigade was
deployed on the banks of River Brahmaputra, the signal company was asked to
provide line communications to one of the forward battalions which was located about 40 km away. Coming to know from the locals that the power
supply from Jamalpur had been available till the previous day, the signallers
resorted to an innovation. They located a Pakistani lineman and with his help
cut the power line U-link towards Jamalpur. Using WD 1 cable at both ends of
the power line, they were able to get line through to the battalion in about 90
minutes, with strength 5 speech.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
crossing the River Brahmaputra, a line had to be slung across. However, a large number of boats that were
crossing the river posed a danger to the line. The problem was solved by
slinging the cable across the river at a distance from the crossing point and
weighing it down with bricks so that it sank below the surface, ensuring that
it was not cut by boats passing over it. Subsequently, a radio relay link was
provided by 2 Mountain Division. The brigade subsequently reached Tangail,
where it linked up with 2 Para that had been dropped earlier.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When the brigade was at Kalaikar,
about 40 km from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
Signals intercepted a wireless message addressed to all Pakistani commanders.
The message was encoded but one of the stations could not receive it properly
so the transmitting station decided to send it in clear. This message revealed
that the enemy intended to surrender. It also talked about destruction of
certain documents, ciphers and some equipment before surrendering. Since the
bridge opposite Kalaikar had been destroyed, the troops were told to take a
detour and hit the Mirpur bridge as soon as possible, bulldozing their way
through. Next morning Major General Nagra and Brigadier Kler took off in a
helicopter and landed at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Mirpur</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>, where the ground
troops linked up with them. Thus, troops of 95 Mountain Brigade were the first
to enter <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
The brigade headquarters was set up in the Presidential Palace on the first
night and moved to the cantonment on the next day.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">29</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">50
Parachute Brigade Signal Company <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 50
Parachute Brigade Signal Company had moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
in February 1971 for Operation ‘Hot Spot’, in connection with elections being
held in <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place>. After it became known that
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ was likely to be conducted in the later part of
the year, all specialist vehicles and
medium power radio sets were called up from Agra to Barrackpore near Calcutta
where 50 Parachute Brigade was located.
The company commander, Major Manmohan Bhatia, joined the company in early
November 1971. The three other officers in the company were Captain P.K. Ghosh,
Lieutenant A.S Bhagat and Lieutenant I.P. Singh. The brigade commander, Brigadier
Mathew Thomas had also assumed command a few days earlier. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
Barrackpore local telephones were provided from the automatic exchange already existing.
Due to the non availability of underground and overhead permanent pairs for
extensions, these were provided on cable laid by linemen of the company. The
scale of telephones was also reduced to two for each major unit. Towards the
end of November 1971 Major Bhatia was informed by Brigadier Thomas that Captain
P.K. Ghosh was to go on a special mission. Apparently it was a toss-up between
two Bengali officers and finally Ghosh was selected. On 28 November Ghosh moved
by air along with Lieutenant Colonel K.S. Pannu to Shillong for an operational
conference from where they proceeded to HQ 95 Mountain Brigade. Pannu returned
on 1 December whereas Ghosh was sent on the special mission, details of which
have been described elsewhere. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Another
important action in which the company was involved was the para drop that was planned
near Tangail. The battalion earmarked for the drop was 2 Para, communications
for which were planned as shown below: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB">LEGEND<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB">G = GU 734<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB">F =
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB">P = PRC 25<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB">K = SIEMENS 400 W<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-GB">R = R 2009<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<v:oval id="_x0000_s1037" style='position:absolute;left:3855;top:7573;width:720;
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height:720'/>
<v:oval id="_x0000_s1039" style='position:absolute;left:6174;top:12385;
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<v:line id="_x0000_s1043" style='position:absolute' from="5333,8274" to="6413,12414"/>
<v:line id="_x0000_s1044" style='position:absolute' from="5115,10330" to="6252,12509"/>
<v:line id="_x0000_s1045" style='position:absolute;flip:x' from="6593,10330"
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<v:line id="_x0000_s1046" style='position:absolute;flip:x' from="6735,10330"
to="7815,12433"/>
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<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1047'>
<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>Bn NET<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<![if !mso]></td>
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</table>
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</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1048" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
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<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1048'>
<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>PATH FINDER / AIRCRAFT<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
<![endif]></v:textbox>
</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1049" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
left:4158;top:4371;width:540;height:360' stroked="f">
<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1049'>
<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>P<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
<![endif]></v:textbox>
</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1050" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
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<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1050'>
<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>G<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
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</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1051" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
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<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1051'>
<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>G<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
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</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1052" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
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<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>P<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
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</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1053" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
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<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1053'>
<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>F<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
<![endif]></v:textbox>
</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1054" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
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<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
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<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>R<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
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<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
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<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>F<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
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<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
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</tr>
</table>
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<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
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<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
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</table>
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<v:textbox style='mso-next-textbox:#_x0000_s1058'>
<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
<tr>
<td><![endif]>
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<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>F<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
<![if !mso]></td>
</tr>
</table>
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</v:shape><v:shape id="_x0000_s1059" type="#_x0000_t202" style='position:absolute;
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<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
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<p class=MsoNormal align=right style='text-align:right'>
<span lang=EN-GB>ROVER<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<![if !mso]>
<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width="100%">
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<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>B-1<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<span lang=EN-GB>Bn<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<![if !mso]></td>
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<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>
<span
lang=EN-GB>Bn<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
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<p class=MsoNormal>
<span lang=EN-GB>Bn<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span lang=EN-GB>HQ 95 BDE<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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<b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span
lang=EN-GB>JOC IV CORPS<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'><v:shape id="_x0000_i1025"
type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:7in;height:666pt'>
<v:imagedata croptop="-65520f" cropbottom="65520f"/>
</v:shape><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span></b><![endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> The personnel and equipment that
were earmarked to be dropped were as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Pathfinder - One radio operator with RS 734 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air support tentacle
comprising eight personnel, including a driver, with a jeep and trailer. They
were to carry one RS GU 734, one RS GR 345, one RS AN/PRC-25 and one receiver R
209. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">A radio detachment to
work as out station on B1 link, comprising three operators and two RS GR
345. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 3 December a one to one link was
established between 2 Para and HQ 95 Mountain Brigade at Gauhati to check the
radio sets and confirm suitability of frequencies. The detachment earmarked for
the para drop was attached to 2 Para next day and preparations began to prepare
the jeep and trailer for heavy drop.
Line detachments were moved to Kalaikunda and Dum Dum air fields for
establishing line communications to the mounting bases. On 5 December information was received that 2
Para was to operate under 101 Communication Zone. Since signal instructions of
this formation were not held, an officer was sent by air to Shillong to collect
them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Being
Army HQ reserve, 50 Parachute Brigade had not been assigned any specific role
before the commencement of hostilities. It was only on 5 December that the brigade
commander was called by the Chief of Staff, HQ Eastern Command and briefed
about his mission to capture Jessore from the rear. They were to form part of 9
Infantry Division, under II Corps. Major Bhatia immediately left for the CSO’s
Branch in HQ Eastern Command to get the signal instructions for the operation.
However, his visit was fruitless. The CSO, Brigadier Tewari told Bhatia that he was not
aware of this operation and advised him to contact the concerned
formations. After informing the brigade commander
and the BM, Bhatia left by road for HQ 9 Infantry Division on 6 December. He reached their location in the night and
since the shelling was intense, decided to stay the night there. On his return
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
next afternoon he found the brigade all packed up and ready to move into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
However, by this time Jessore had been occupied. GOC 9 Infantry Division
decided to divert the 50 Parachute Brigade thrust to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Khulna</st1:place></st1:city> and ordered it to advance to Magura. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
7 December the brigade less 2 Para moved along axis Dum Dum – Basirhut –
Bangaon – Jessore and concentrated at Abdulpur 5 km short of Jessore. On 8
December the brigade was placed under 4 Mountain Division and commenced its
advance with 7 Para leading on Axis Pakhuria-Kajura-Simkhali, maintaining
communications on D1 and D2 nets. Bhatia was at the start point when Lieutenant
Colonel R.P. Singh, CO 7 <st1:place w:st="on">Para</st1:place> got into the
first tank. At about 1130 hours they came under intense fire from Pakistani
troops occupying a defensive position at Khajura. Taking them to be Razakars,
and being unaware of the strength of the enemy, CO 7 Para decided to launch an
attack. In the ensuing skirmish, three officers including Colonel R.P. Singh
and three OR were killed and one officer and three OR were wounded. Bhatia was
at the B-1 control and fully in the picture.
The ill fated action came to an abrupt halt. The brigade commander was
also in the B-1 vehicle trying to fathom what happened. He spoke on the D-1 for
immediate award of a Param Vir Chakra for CO 7 Para. Bhatia was asked to rush
to HQ 9 Infantry Division to arrange a helicopter for evacuating the
casualties. Fortunately, the officer commanding the helicopter squadron was
Bhatia’s course mate and the helicopter was promptly made available. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Resuming
the advance that evening, they entered the domain of 4 Infantry Division which
was also advancing towards Magura.
Though the company had their frequencies, the operator at the D-1
control of 4 Division refused to let them join the net, since he did not have
any instructions. On Bhatia’s insistence, the operator agreed to get an officer
on the set. The officer turned out to be Major G.L. Chadha who was well known
to Bhatia. They decided on a code sign extract for seven days and thus we were
able to join the net. However, next morning 50 Parachute Brigade reverted to 9
Infantry Division and was ordered to return to its old location near Jessore. Lines were laid in the harbour and
communications again established with 9 Infantry Division on D1 and D2. On 10
December the brigade moved to concentrate at Barrackpore from where it was to
be air lifted to the Western Theatre. At a conference held the same evening it
was informed that the brigade less 2 Para that was to carry out the para drop
on 11 December would be air lifted to Palam, sorties for which would commence
at <st1:time hour="6" minute="0" w:st="on">6 am</st1:time> next morning. Next
morning the company was airlifted to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
with all its equipment. The jeep carrying the brigade commander’s rover and one
line jeep were also airlifted.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">42</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
drop by 2 Para took place on 11 December, while the company was in Bararckpore.
As has been mentioned elsewhere, the battalion was not in communication
throughout the night and came up on the radio only at about 0715 hours on 12
December. While the Adjutant of 2 Para attributed the failure in communication
to a mix up in the frequency being used, Major Bhatia has this to say:-<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “Regarding communications after the para drop, one has to
view all the facts in totality. The communications were not a failure as they
were not opened!!! I had talked to the operators after they got back to the
Company. The night of the para drop was pretty chaotic and on landing, they
were immediately on the move. They were not given time to stop and erect the
aerial for the comn link up. Knowing the force commander very well, I can fully
appreciate his priority in getting on to the objective by first light. This was
the reason why there was no news from them that night. In fact we too were on
listening watch that whole night at Barrackpore. I did not expect much as the
directions were totally different. I was hoping for some stray radiation or the
remote possibility that the detachment may try to contact us in case of any
emergency. This did not happen on ground and the force just pushed ahead to get
to the objective. (By then it was clear that the objective was to get to Dacca
first and claim the “first to enter tag”).</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">30</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
response to a query whether the cause for the link not getting through could be
use of an incorrect frequency and the reason for not using alternate means such
as the air support net, Bhatia has
clarified :-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 44.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“We had tried out our
communications with 95 Brigade prior to the operations as also the tentacle
frequencies were tried out. So it stands to reason that had our detachment been
given time to establish communications, we would have been through. The fact
that they ‘mysteriously’ came up the next morning proves my point. How come
just over the night when they were running like hell towards their target all
the confusion got sorted out?? Elementary - they did not stop for anything
since they had it going so good and did not want to waste time on
communications - they had to get there first! The members of the communications
detachment were handpicked, very capable persons who could be trusted to take
all possible actions to ensure communications come what may - using alternate
frequencies, other nets etc. and I don't doubt their competence, capability or
integrity even for a second.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
Tewari confesses that he could never really get to the bottom of the story as
to why it happened, he feels that the reason may be similar to that given above
by OC 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company. He writes:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 5.0pt; margin-left: 44.0pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 5.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">“There was a bit of a
muddle because soon after the drop, they were rushed off to the West without or
before any investigation into the so called lapse could be carried out. There
was such a rush by different operational thrusts to reach <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">DACCA</st1:place></st1:city> first that certain obligations of
informing the higher authorities were given a go-bye. With the “success” of
operations in the air, there were lapses in passage of information and I was a
worried man in the final stages even though I had the full backing of my Army
Commander”. </span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">31</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Saga of Captain P.K. Ghosh, VrC<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The exploits of Captain Prashanta
Kumar Ghosh form an important part of the history of the Corps of Signals
during the operations for the liberation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Strangely enough, the
story has never been told, partly because of the innate modesty of the person
involved. For this lapse, the Corps also must share a part of the blame. Had he
been from any other arm or service, there is little doubt that he would have
been made much of. The task entrusted to
him required the highest standards of courage, initiative and resourcefulness.
He not only completed the mission but exceeded the expectations of those who
had planned it. The fact that he was
selected for the assignment, which involved the highest degree of risk – he had
to go behind enemy lines, alone – is itself a tribute not only to him but to
all signallers. His feat was recognised by the well deserved award of a Vir
Chakra, which he almost missed, thanks to some misunderstanding about his
parent formation. Mercifully, the confusion was sorted out in the nick of time
and Ghosh got the coveted decoration. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Contrary
to popular belief, Ghosh was not para-dropped with a signal detachment into <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. He crossed the border on foot, all by
himself, with only a local lad of 14 years to help him with local dialects He
infiltrated in mid November 1971 with the help of FJ Sector, then commanded by Brigadier Sant
Singh MVC**. The brigade major of the FJ Sector was a signaller - Major S.G.
Mookerjee, who later became a lieutenant general and the SO-in-C. Ghosh soon established contact with ‘Tiger’
Siddiqui near Madhupur, north of Tangail and set about carrying out his tasks. Briefly, he selected the main and alternate
dropping zones and with Siddiqui’s boys was able to secure them, and make sure
that the drop by 2 Para was organized safely. He had to ensure that the battalion was guided to Poongli Bridge
without loss of time and all the ‘heavy drop’, meaning light vehicles, guns,
ammunition and sundry logistics were recovered from water and deployed/hauled
to appropriate locations. He established road blocks on Road Madhupur-Tangail,
north and south of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Poongli</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> to prevent
pressure building up on 2 Para before they were fully deployed and guns were in
place. The drop took place on 11 December and everything went off well, thanks
to the preparatory work done by Ghosh. Siddiqui disappeared on the evening of
the air drop as he had no intention of taking orders from the Indian Army or
anyone else. With his immediate entourage he moved quickly towards <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, on the night of 11
December, to exploit the situation to his best advantage. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
saga of Captain P.K. Ghosh is best described in his own words:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“By May 1971, the
General Elections were over and the situation in <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place> was boiling over. Refugees had begun to pour into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and
voices frequently heard in the media and elsewhere that war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> could
no longer be avoided. As the excitement was building up I was detailed for the
Combined Course at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Joint</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Air</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Warfare</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">School</st1:placetype></st1:place> in Secunderabad.
By the time I returned to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
(50 Para Brigade had been moved there in January 1971 in view of the Naxal
threat to disrupt the Elections), Brigadier Mathew Thomas had taken over from
Brigadier T.S. Oberoi. In October the Commander summoned me and said that I was
to report to HQ Eastern Command and meet General Jacob, the Chief of Staff. I
did so and was congratulated by the Chief of Staff for ‘volunteering’ for the ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mission</st1:place></st1:city>’. Seeing the look
of utter bewilderment on my face, General Jacob smiled and proceeded to put me
at ease in the most avuncular fashion. I still recall his words, “Look young
man, you’re a paratrooper, a signaller, a commando, a Bengali and your Commander
says that you topped the last course at JAWS. I can’t think of a better lad for
this job”. The ‘job’ as it turned out was to get into enemy territory as soon
as possible in the event of a war breaking out, establish a good working
relationship with </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">‘<i>Tiger’ Siddiqui, locate a couple of good DZs for a possible airborne
assault and, when the time came, to ensure the assaulting unit was led to the objective
area and that all heavy drops were secured without loss. The Chief of Staff
waved me off with a big reassuring smile and said orders would follow in due
course. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 504.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the middle of November I was
ordered to report to HQ 101 Communication Zone Area in Shillong along with CO 2
<st1:place w:st="on">PARA</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place> KS Pannu and to come back to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> thereafter.
Travelling ‘hush hush’ in civvies we were met at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Guwahati</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Airport</st1:placetype></st1:place>
by a shady looking character who took charge of our luggage and whisked us off
to Shillong in his Amby. Depositing us at the Area Officers’ Mess he
disappeared. Major Bammi the GSO2 (Ops) met us after dinner and asked us to be
ready to meet the GOC next morning at 0400 hrs! When Pannu protested he was
told that the Old Man liked to get an early start. We were ushered into General
Gurbux Gill’s bedroom next morning at four. The General lay on his bed while we
took up military postures. The bedroom looked more like a macho Command Post
than a place for carefree slumber. Taking hold of a long pointer staff he
briefed us with the help of the ‘ceiling to floor maps’ at the foot of his bed.
He then asked us to immediately proceed to Garo Bhada in the Tura Hills
District to be further briefed at HO 95 Mountain Brigade. When Pannu asked him
for further orders he was told that he should collect as much info as he could
and go back to Calcutta and wait for the ‘balloon to go up’. As for me, I was
to be launched into <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> without
further delay! Pannu looked at me with a ‘better you than me, boy’ smirk on his
face.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.5pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Landing up at HQ
95 Mountain Brigade, we realized that heavy and serious skirmishing was even
then going on in border areas with <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>.
Brigadier H.S. Kler, the Commander (a former OC of 50 Para Brigade Signal
Company) briefed us and for the first time it became clear to me that, of all
the planned thrusts being aimed at Dhaka, the Northern thrust under 101
Communication Zone had a good chance of succeeding since there were no major
water obstacles impeding its projected path. The role of the planned airborne
assault in preventing a possible long drawn out ‘delaying battle’ at Tangail
also became clear. Brigadier Kler, who knew me from my days in 19 Division at
Baramulla/ Haji Pir, where he was the GSO1 (Ops) during 1965 War, then discussed with me how I planned to get on
with my job. Remarking that other than the fact that there wasn’t enough time
for me to get circumcised, I did not have the foggiest notion of how to proceed
in the matter. Brigadier Kler told me not to worry as he had had a chat with
Brigadier Sant Singh of F-J Sector and that I was to immediately report to
Major Mookerjee, the BM of F-J Sector for further briefing. Major Mookerjee
turned out to be none other than S.G. Mookerjee of Signals who I knew from my
days at Mhow while attending SODE Course. Now I came to grips with my ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mission</st1:place></st1:city>’. I was given
codename ‘Peter’, dressed up in a ‘lungi, a half torn shirt with a ‘jhola’ and
a sheet to cover myself. I was also given Rs.10,000/- in Pak currency and an
unmarked Sten Machine Carbine with two magazines of unmarked ammunition.
Captain T.I. Donald, the Sparrow of F-J Sector then handed over a small little
radio transreceiver which he called Radio Set HX. Working on battery cells, the
crystal tuned set could be used to send and receive messages using Morse code.
Two wire antennae came with the set, a normal end fed wire and another Y shaped
centre fed. I was told that I could expect a range of about 10 to 15 Kms with
the former and about 30 Kms with the latter. In the event I was able to get as
much as 65 to 70 Kms on good days. Of course I took the precaution of
discreetly passing it on to Donald’s boys that my Morse was a bit ‘rusty’. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.5pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I do not the
recall the exact date on which I set course from Tura to cross the border; it
was mid Nov or thereabouts. At a personal level I do recall being a bit uneasy.
I was young but not so young as not to realize that my wife was in the family
way with our second child. She was due in December and it would be hard on her
if something were to happen to me. I had taken the precaution of writing out
about seven odd letters and sent them back to the Company with Pannu, with
instructions to ‘Bags’ (late General Andy Bhagat) to post them at regular
intervals to my wife. (As it turned out, this ploy failed miserably since my
letters were impossibly out of ‘sync’ with her letters, not to mention the well
known ‘women’s intuition’ factor). At a professional level I realized that my <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mission</st1:place></st1:city> was important and
that I ought to feel excited. I also realized that what I was doing was
‘clandestine’. General Gurbux had made it quite clear that once I crossed over,
the Indian Army would disclaim all knowledge of my existence. Nonetheless, all
in all, once I had spent 24 hours inside enemy territory, the urgency of ‘here
and now’ completely took over my consciousness and thereafter it was more a
question of thinking on my feet and getting on with the job.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.5pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I had with me
‘Badshah’, a 14 year old boy who I had picked out from the batch of trainees in
F-J Sector. He came in handy as a local guide and as an interpreter, when
required. I was after all a ‘Bong’, born and brought up in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kanpur</st1:place></st1:city> but so far as local dialects of rural <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> were concerned, I may as well have been of
Greek parentage. I soon established contact with Siddiqui, the boss of the
area. For the next 8 to 10 days we operated between Mymensingh and Tangail
passing back all information, military and otherwise, to HQ F-J Sector. During
this time I had recced two suitable locations for the para drop and had passed
this information back to F-J Sector. Needless to add, operating mainly at
night, we regularly ambushed Pakistani military convoys moving up and down the
Kamalpur/Mymensingh – Madhupur – Tangail Axis creating as much confusion and
insecurity in the Rear Areas, as we could. I have to say that the local boys
were in high spirits and fairly charged up.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.5pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I had earlier
indicated to HQ Eastern Command via F-J Sector that, given the local situation,
paucity of Pak troops in Tangail and road blocks that I had planned to
establish, a morning drop would be feasible and advisable. The para drop,
however, eventually took place after last light on 11 December. A dozen of our
Signal Company boys (later called the Dirty Dozen) with a jeep based Tentacle
formed part of the ‘2 PARA Battalion Group’. On looking back one does feel that
with about 200 excited local boys under my control on the DZ, we did contribute
substantially to the success of the operations in terms of getting the
battalion to Poongli Bridge, north of Tangail, without delay and recovering all
the heavy drop including arty guns, ammunition, light vehicles and other stores
to respective earmarked areas, with dispatch. By mid day on 12 December advance
elements of 1 MARATHA of 95 Mountain Brigade commanded by General ‘Bulbul’ Brar
with General Satish Nambiar as 2IC had linked up with 2 PARA. I would have to
add that had the drop taken place in the morning we would have been able to cut
off a major portion of the Pakistanis falling back from Mymensingh and Kamalpur
and inflict far more casualties than we actually did.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By the evening
of 12 December we had occupied Tangail and advance to <st1:place w:st="on">Dhaka</st1:place>
resumed without further delay. Brigadier Kler, speaking to all officers on 13<sup>th</sup>
morning made it very clear that given the progress of XXXIII, IV and II Corps
he was convinced that 101 Communication Zone with 95 Mountain Brigade leading,
had the best chance of being the first to enter Dhaka and he expected nothing
less from us. The ‘Race’ for <st1:place w:st="on">Dhaka</st1:place> was now
well and truly on! In the event we were the first to enter <st1:place w:st="on">Dhaka</st1:place>
on 16<sup>th</sup> morning. Since 2 PARA was leading the advance at that point
of time, it was again the Red Berets who marched triumphantly into <st1:place w:st="on">Dhaka</st1:place> on 16<sup>th</sup> morning to a tumultuous welcome
by the populace.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This story would
have turned out even better had it not been for a slight miscalculation on my
part. It was the evening of the 16<sup>th</sup> Dec and the stage was set for
the Surrender Ceremony at the Ramna Race Course. A contingent each of Indian
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
Army had been constituted. The Indian Contingent was taken entirely from 2 PARA
with self included. After General Niazi handed over his pistol to General
Aurora and the latter reviewed the contingents, both Generals repaired to the
table set up for the actual signing. The contingents broke off and surged
forward to get a ringside view of the historic event. It was difficult to say
who was the more excited, our boys for having trumped the enemy, or the Pakis,
relieved that the whole sordid affair was over and they could now go back home!<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Seeing that the
crowd was too dense to penetrate, Nirbhay Sharma (Adjutant 2 PARA and an ex
Signals officer) and I stepped aside and stood next to Niazi’s staff car. I
casually stole a glance to my left to admire the shiny black Mercedes with
Niazi’s flag still hoisted atop the bonnet. Suddenly it dawned on me that the
flag was no longer ‘authorised’ and it was now a ‘finders –keepers – losers –
weepers’ situation. This was my big chance! I saw a vision of this flag
adorning the HQ Mess at Mhow (with my name in the small caption below!). As I
was mustering courage and looking for a chance to swipe the thing there was a
sudden swelling of the crowd with much shoving and elbowing. I soon regained
proximity to the Staff Car again just in time to see a Naval officer
disappearing with the flag. I believe that the darned thing is displayed prominently
in the Eastern Naval Command Mess. Whenever I reminisce over the <st1:place w:st="on">Dhaka</st1:place> days this incident still rankles. Who says life is
fair?”</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
already mentioned, Ghosh was awarded the Vir Chakra for his exploits. The
citation reads as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“During
the operations against Pakistan in December 1971, Captain Prashanta Kumar
Ghosh was assigned a difficult task in the Eastern Sector which he completed
successfully. He established road blocks, intercepted several enemy convoys
and inflicted casualties on enemy men and equipment, thereby disrupting the
smooth movement of the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Throughout
Captain Prashant Kumar Ghosh displayed gallantry, leadership and devotion to
duty of a high order.”</span></i></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</td>
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<br /></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Ironically,
Ghosh almost missed the award. When his name did not come up in initial lists of
awardees, Brigadier Mathew Thomas took great umbrage and dashed off a DO
(demi-official) letter to General Jacob, who immediately took up this issue with 101 Communication
Zone Area. It transpired that the confusion arose since General Gurbux Gill was
injured in early December and General
Gandharv Nagra was brought in overnight from 2 Mountain Division to take over.
As result, no one was clear whether Ghosh had fought the war under 95 Mountain
Brigade or F-J Sector, each assuming that the other formation was doing the
needful. Fortunately, HQ Eastern Command intervened and ruled that Ghosh had
fought the war under F-J Sector! Thereafter Brigadier Sant Singh had no
hesitation in dashing off the citation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
will be noticed that citation is resoundingly silent on the para drop and
dropping zone aspects of the tasks carried out by Ghosh, who gives a simple
explanation for this. In normal airborne operations the dropping zone is
selected off maps and suitability corroborated by other intelligence sources.
It is then secured on the day of the drop by ‘Pathfinders’. However this was
not a World War II ‘Operation Market Garden’ scenario and there was hardly any
ground intelligence. Moreover, Major General Inder Gill, the Director of
Military Operations was also the Colonel of the Parachute Regiment. This was
going to be the first airborne assault of independent <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and he
wanted to make sure that it was a resounding success. If it took a lot of stage
management on the ground then so be it. General Jacob in his initial briefing
to Ghosh had said as much. His exact words were: <i>“Inder
wants to make sure that nothing goes wrong for his boys”.</i> Ghosh feels that
any mention, publicly, of the dropping zone being fully or partly secure, in
Gill’s view, would somehow detract from
the achievement of the airborne assault as a whole. It should be remembered
that during late 60’s there was a periodic clamour for disbanding or reducing
drastically the strength of ‘airborne’ element of the Indian army, for various
nebulous reasons. A successful airborne operation would silence the detractors
once and for all. Ghosh confesses that this is entirely his own view as gleaned
in subsequent years of service and numerous para get-togethers.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">32</span></sup><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">IV
Corps Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 44.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After
its raising in 1962, HQ IV Corps was located at Tezpur. The CSO was Brigadier
G.S Sidhu, while his SO 2 (Signals) was Major M.K. Ghosh, who subsequently rose
to the rank of lieutenant general and became the SO-in-C. By the middle of 1971 it was known that an
offensive would be launched during the winter months for the liberation of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>, in
which IV Corps was to play a prominent part. Tezpur being located at a distance
from the area of operations, it was decided to move to a suitable concentration
area in Tripura. Agartala being too
close to the border with <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>, the
choice fell on Teliamura, about 45 km to the East.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 44.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
June 1971 Brigadier Sidhu and Major Ghosh accompanied by some other staff
officers proceeded to Agartala to reconnoitre a suitable location for the corps
headquarters. It was only after reaching Teliamura that Ghosh learned about the
purpose of the visit. The CSO returned to Tezpur, leaving Ghosh at Teliamura,
with instructions to liaise with the P&T Department and set up the
infrastructure that would be needed for the corps headquarters when it arrived.
This included engineering the speech and telegraph circuits, construction of a
VHF tower, several new PL routes and the installation of a 200 line exchange. For reasons of security, Ghosh and his men
wore civil clothes, ate at roadside eateries and lived at a nondescript address
about 15 km away. The only support he had was a jeep loaned by the brigade
signal company at Agartala. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> IV
Corps Signal Regiment was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Har
Krishan. The other field officers in the
unit were Major I.C. Singal and Major M.R. Narayanan. Along with the corps
headquarters, the unit moved to Teliamura in August 1971. The commitments of
the unit at Tezpur were to be taken over by Bravo Signal Regiment which was
under raising, but due to the slow progress in the raising of the latter unit,
IV Corps Signal Regiment continued to provide signal communications at Tezpur
during the operations. The strength of the unit was further depleted by some
elements being moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
for employment under orders of CSO Eastern Command. Also, the manpower already
attached to 57 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment and on internal security
duties in <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place> was not available. As a
result, the total present strength of personnel was about 65%, which had to be
split between the permanent and operational locations. The state of equipment
was also not healthy – the unit had only four sets of crystals for radio relay
working.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
main body of the corps headquarters and signal regiment comprising over 250
vehicles left Tezpur on <st1:date day="28" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">28
August 1971</st1:date> under Major Narayanan, OC Engineering Company. The 1200-km
journey took four days, during which there was a mishap at Badarpur. While
crossing the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Barak</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> the vehicle
carrying the 200 line exchange overshot the ferry and fell into the river. The
exchange could be not be retrieved and had to be written off. The advance party
of Main HQ IV Corps was initially located in a vacant refugee camp. Ad hoc
arrangements had to be made for provision of signal communications as no
P&T systems or circuits were available. The corps headquarters moved into
its proper location on 25 September. A 50 line CBNM board and three Ericsson magneto
exchanges as trunk boards were initially installed. The replacement for the 200
line CB exchange that had fallen into the river was arranged from Agartala and
was finally commissioned on <st1:date day="3" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">3
November 1971</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
corps plan involved an advance right up to the River Meghna and communications
had to be planned for move of formations along the Badarpur –Sylhet axis in the
north and Feni-Chittagong axis in the south. During his move Narayanan had seen
a police wireless detachment working on VHF from Badarpur to Aijal, over a line
of sight distance of 120 km. Being
located at a height of approximately 4000 ft, Aijal afforded an advantage which
could be exploited. Narayanan suggested that a radio relay node be located at
Aijal, from which both axes of advance of the corps could be covered. It
involved the move of six to eight radio relay detachments over a distance of
350 km along treacherous hill roads, and would take three days to reach. Once
there, the radio relay detachments would be on their own until the end of the
operations. However, Brigadier Sidhu immediately saw the advantages of the plan
and put it to the corps commander who accepted it. Narayanan accompanied the
corps commander to Aijal on one of his trips to site the node, which was
established by the middle of September 1971. It was on a mound inside the military
hospital in Aijal, an ideal site with a clear line of sight all around. For the
next three months, till the corps headquarters moved forward to Comilla, this
radio relay node proved to be most reliable means of communications to all the
formations under IV Corps.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">33</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
early October communications from Teliamura had been established and fully
stabilized. During the preparatory phase radio silence had been imposed which was
lifted at 1100 hours on 14 October. By 0300 hours next day six medium power
radio links with their triple folded dipole aerials and had been activated and
test calls taken through the remote control lines. It was felt that the radio
relay communication from Aijal would become marginal once the formations
crossed the International Border, and another node was planned to be located at
Sonamura. However, this could be established only in early November, when eight
radio relay terminals were obtained from Bravo Signal Regiment which was under
raising at Tezpur. Apart from establishing the node at Sonamura, an additional
terminal each was given to 23 and 57 Divisions, to enable them to work on radio
relay from their main as well as tactical headquarters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
corps offensive was launched on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3
December 1971</st1:date>. By 5 December the leading elements had reached three
key points on the Meghna, i.e. Ashuganj, Daudkandi and Chandpur. By 9/10 December the leading formations of 23
and 57 Divisions had secured the east bank of the river and captured Akhaura,
Brahmanbaria, Bhairab Bazar, Comilla and Laksham, opening up the approaches to
Dacca. In view of the speed of the advance, the corps commander decided to move
his headquarters to Comilla. Thanks to the advance planning of Signals, the
move was carried out without a hitch and full scale communications were set up
at the new location which was still under the fire of Pak artillery even before
the arrival of the corps headquarters. This was an impressive achievement by
Signals, which was later publicly acknowledged by General Sagat Singh himself.
The story is best told by two of the officers who played an active part in the
move, Major Malay Ghosh and Major Nararyanan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
6 December a worried Brigadier Sidhu asked Ghosh to go forward to the location
of 23 Mountain Division, which had been out of communication on radio relay
after commencing their advance. On reaching Buschi village near Kakraban where
the divisional headquarters was located at about, Ghosh met the CO, Lieutenant
Colonel P.S. Talwar, who told him that they had not opened the rear radio relay
link on the divisional commander’s orders. Ghosh conveyed the instructions from
the CSO that the radio link should be put through immediately. Ghosh then
retired to the officers’ mess and tried to sleep on a tabletop. But an enemy
artillery battery located nearby began firing at our own gun area and the wagon
lines putting paid to his hopes of sleep. The ammunition dump in the wagon
lines was hit, starting a fire, resulting in the death of the CO of the artillery
unit while trying to supervise rescue operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
early next morning the radio relay link had been put through. When Ghosh spoke
to Sidhu he asked him to return to Teliamura by way of Comilla, which was
reported to have been occupied by own troops. Ghosh started back taking the
Chittagong–Dacca road and reached Comilla around <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">noon</st1:time>. Proceeding to the civil telephone exchange he met
Mr. Shaukat Usman, the divisional engineer telephones who told him that his was
the first Indian military vehicle that he had encountered. The platoon of the
Pak Army that had been guarding the exchange had left only that morning. He
took Ghosh around the Siemens 100 line auto exchange that was functioning and
manned. He then accompanied Ghosh to the circuit house, a large building which
had an extensive underground cable layout on which a large number of telephones
could be connected. Collecting a number of blueprints showing the cable layout
extended around the town, Ghosh returned to Teliamura via Belonia. En route, he
visited the police communication centre which was still communicating with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city> and other places. Ghosh promptly
confiscated the crystals from the VHF/UHF radio sets that were being used, much
to the chagrin of the Punjabi Muslim policemen who were manning the station. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Arriving
at the corps headquarters at about 2100 hours on 7 December, Ghosh went
straight to the CSO and briefed him about the communication infrastructure at
Comilla. The next day Sidhu himself went to Comilla accompanied by Major Gill
of Eastern Command Signals who had brought the much-needed radio relay
crystals. They met Mr. Usman and did their own reconnaissance. That night Sidhu
informed Ghosh that the corps commander had told him during dinner at the A
mess that the corps headquarters must be established on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> soil
by the evening of 11 December. Ghosh told Sidhu that they could move to Comilla
where the corps headquarters could be located at the circuit house premises. He
offered to accompany Narayanan who would have to set up the communications at
the new location, to work out the details with the divisional engineer
telephones. This was discussed with the COs of IV Corps Signal Regiment and N
Communication Zone Signal Regiment (Colonels Har Krishan and Bhandari) and the
move plan finalized.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
9 December Major Narayanan was briefed by Brigadier Sidhu and Major Ghosh. He
was asked to proceed to Comilla and examine the feasibility of extending
rearward communications from Comilla to Shillong, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> through the corps carrier centre
already functioning at Teliamura. Narayanan left for Comilla around 1000 hours
reaching there at about 1500 hours. He
met Mr. Shaukat Usman who offered him the use of the complete exchange both
trunk and local along with the operators and other essential staff. As directed
by the CSO, the construction/rehabilitation of the PL route from Comilla to
Sonamura was in progress and likely to be completed by <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time> on 11 December. Mr Usman gave an assurance
that he would also arrange link up with the route on the Indian side, which had
been completed by N Communication Zone Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Satisfied
with the communication facilities at Comilla, Narayanan started back at about
1700 hours. After driving for about 20 minutes they crossed a few fully armed
Pakistani soldiers walking in the same direction. Then they saw a road barrier
manned by Military Police. Narayanan realised that they had taken the wrong
road - instead of east, they were heading west towards Mynamati Cantonment!
Turning around the jeep, he made a quick getaway, reaching Teliamura at about
2100 hours. He briefed Ghosh and then Colonel Har Krishan in the officers’
mess, conveying to them his assessment that we would be able to provide
communications from Comilla if the corps headquarters moved there.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
10 December morning, Har Krishan and Narayanan were summoned by Sidhu for an
urgent meeting in his office. Sidhu told them about the corps commander’s wish
that the corps headquarters should move forward and establish on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>
soil. He wanted to be absolutely sure of our ability to build up the signal
communication from Comilla. The safer option was to move to Agartala, where
communications were assured, but forward communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> would be stretched. Har Krishan briefed
Sidhu about Narayanan’s visit to Comilla the previous day, the offer by Mr.
Shaukat Usman and the PL route build up from Sonamura to Comilla. When asked, Narayanan confirmed the state of
readiness of our system vehicle which had already been positioned at Sonamura
ready to move to Comilla.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Sidhu
asked them to accompany him to the operations room that was close by. Asking
them to wait in the next room, Sidhu entered the room where the corps commander
was having a meeting with his staff, the main agenda being the move of the
corps headquarters. The CSO briefed all
present about the visits made by various officers to Comilla on the previous
three days and the communications infrastructure available. He concluded by
saying: <i>“Sir, the CO of the corps signal
regiment is waiting outside along with his company commander. They are also
confident of providing the communications from Comilla.”</i> General Sagat did
not waste any time. He said, <i>“Gentlemen,
so we move to Comilla. We close our headquarters here at <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">noon</st1:time> today, and reopen at Comilla in 48 hours.”
</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Early
in the morning on 11 December, Ghosh and Narayanan left Teliamura with a small
convoy of Signals and some elements of corps headquarters. They were followed
at 1000 hours by the advance party of the corps headquarters and the unit under
Major I.C. Singal, OC Operating Company.
Picking up the systems vehicle en route at Sonamura, Narayanan’s party
reached Comilla at about 1100 hours. To their pleasant surprise, the PL route
from Sonamura to Comilla had already been patched by Major J.M. Khullar of N
Communication Zone Signal Regiment and the staff of the divisional engineer
telephones. By <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">noon</st1:time>, the
communications had been fully established.
Telephones had been connected in all the rooms at the circuit house
along with a directory and instructions for users with each instrument. The
corps headquarters elements arrived in the afternoon and started functioning by
the evening. The corps commander arrived in the evening and asked to be put through
to his family at Jaipur. The call was connected immediately and everyone felt
happy that Signals have again risen to the occasion.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">34</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
is worth mentioning that when HQ IV Corps moved to Comilla, there was an entire
Pakistani brigade located at Mynamati.
The corps headquarters at the circuit house in Comilla was within mortar
range of the enemy. In fact 117 Pak
Brigade at Mynamati under Brigadier Atif did not surrender till 16 December.
The bulk of the HQ IV Corps remained at Comilla from 12 to 20 December when it
moved to Mynamati, though some essential elements moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> after the fall of the city and
surrender of the Pakistani forces. During the stay at Comilla signal
communications remained stable. An added bonus for telephone users was the auto
dialling facility, a welcome change from operator assisted manual exchange at
Teliamura. A notable achievement was the provision of a radio relay link to the
advance headquarters established by 23 Division for control of the operations
by 83 Brigade and K Force on the Feni-Chittagong axis on 13/14 December. This
vital communication link was provided through the Aijal radio relay node. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
civil exchange taken over by IV Corps in Comilla was a Siemens automatic
exchange of 5000 lines with a number of trunk boards. The lady operators
operating the trunk/junction lines and assistance positions were all given
leave so that Signals operators and other Army personnel could function
effectively without endangering security, Because of the extensive UG cable
network emanating from this exchange at the circuit house, telephone
connections to the corps staff could be provided almost immediately after
arrival of the advance party. This was perhaps an unique example of a
city's civil exchange being taken over and used for providing military
communications including trunk speech circuits. Incidentally, the junction
lines to the exchange of 117 Pak Brigade at Mynamati continued to function and
there were some interesting conversations between Indian and Pak operators. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
IV Corps was poised to capture <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
the honour went to 101 Communication Zone Area whose troops were the first to
enter the city. However, the responsibility of providing essential
communications from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
during the first few days after the surrender fell on IV Corps Signals, more by
accident than design. Apparently, no communication plans had been made by
Eastern Command in the event of the capture of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, which had not been part of the
operational plans. It appears strange that this contingency had been
overlooked, especially after the rapid progress made by Indian forces in the
first few days of the operations<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
16 December everyone in Comilla was
expectantly waiting for news from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>.
At about 0800 hours, Sidhu called Narayanan and told him that he would be
flying with the corps commander to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
and he wanted a mobile radio set with an operator to accompany him. A man-pack
radio set GR 345 with an improvised antenna for use inside the GOC’s helicopter
was immediately sent to the helipad, from where they took off at about 0900
hours. A set was kept open at Comilla but there was no contact with Sidhu for
the next 24 hours. Late at night, news about the formal surrender was broadcast
by All India Radio.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 1100 hours on 17 December
Sidhu came up on the radio set. Telling Narayanan that everything in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> was topsy-turvy, he
ordered him to come to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
immediately with a small communication detachment. A helicopter would be coming
to Comilla to pick them at 1500 hours. He indicated that there were no
communication links from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
to any other place, and IV Corps would have to establish its own radio relay
links from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
to Shillong via Teliamura. Narayanan immediately informed his CO and held an
urgent meeting with Captain Nirmal Dhillon, OC radio relay section; Lieutenant
Tarun Mahendra, OC radio section, Subedar Natu, OC system and Captain Tushar
Tamhane, attached from Bravo Signal Regiment with his radio relay detachments.
After a quick appraisal of the requirement, it was decided that a radio relay
repeater would be established at Daudkandi on the east bank of River Meghna by
Captain Tamhane, who was instructed to keep his terminal for the forward link
on 24 hour listening watch and await signals from Dacca, where two radio relay
terminals were likely to reach by the evening.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Collecting
the matching frequency crystals for use at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, Narayanan and his detachment
comprising nine men took off at about 1515 hours. They landed at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> airport and began
looking for suitable transport. An
elderly gentleman loaned them his van which took them to the cantonment about
12 km away. The road was jam packed and it took them 45 minutes to reach HQ Pakistan
Eastern Command They made their way to the signal centre and exchange building
where they were met by Brigadier Sidhu, who took Narayanan along to a meeting
being held by Brigadier K.K. Tewari, CSO Eastern Command, who had arrived in
Dacca along with his staff. Present in the conference were signal officers from
several formations. Seeing Narayanan
with Sidhu, Brigadier Tewari perhaps assumed that essential elements of IV
Corps Signal Regiment had already arrived at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. Telling Narayanan to take control of
the transmitter station of the Pakistan Eastern Army Command, he asked him to
establish the radio and radio relay links to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> with assistance from Pak Signals
personnel.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Narayanan
found that the receiver station located in the signal centre building was
manned by eight Pakistani signallers under Havildar Guldast. Leaving
instructions with them to stay put and not leave for the prisoner of war camp,
Narayanan commandeered a jeep and left for the transmitter station at 2100
hours with a Pak soldier as a guide. When he arrived at the transmitter
building he found an Indian Signals JCO who had been sent there earlier by
Major Gill of Eastern Command Signals. The Pakistani JCO in charge was Subedar
Riaz, who showed him round the station, which had over a dozen medium and high power
transmitters mostly British SWAB8 (Marconi) and Siemens 1 KW. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Working
feverishly through the night, the Indian and Pakistani signallers were able to
establish the radio links to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> as
ordered. At about 0100 hours on 18 December Narayanan got through on the A7
link to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
He spoke to Major G. Natarajan who connected him to the SO-in-C, who was
waiting for the call from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. This was probably the first call connected
between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
during the operations. By this time the radio relay link to Comilla had also
been established through the relay station at Daudakhandi. The E5 radio link to
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> got
through at 0630 hours. Shortly afterwards Major Sudarshan Nayar of Eastern
Command Signals arrived to take over the radio links. By <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time>
on 18 December, IV Corps Signals was relieved of the responsibility of
communications at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
ending their role in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
performance of IV Corps Signals during the entire operation was truly
commendable. This was highlighted by the corps commander, Lieutenant General
Sagat Singh. While attending the Corps Anniversary function on <st1:date day="15" month="2" w:st="on" year="1972">15 February 1972</st1:date>, he gave a
speech, which is reproduced below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> “<i>Ladies and Gentlemen,<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 38.5pt; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Today is the Corps of Signals Day. I have conveyed my
felicitations to all members of the Corps of Signals serving in IV Corps. But,
this celebration tonight soon after our victory in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> is of special
significance. On this occasion, I feel obligated to acknowledge gratefully all
that the Corps of Signals led by Brigadier Sidhu did for IV Corps during the
operations. I may sound emotional but I may confess and claim, I was not so in
the operations. I was a harsh man, I didn’t spare myself, I didn’t expect
anybody to be spared, whether a rifleman, signalman or a gunner; or whether he
was an EME man, or ASC for that matter. The fact, ladies and gentlemen, is
this, that IV Corps did a historic advance of 110 miles, over five water
obstacles, of which, Meghna was the widest water obstacle. Military history
books record the crossing of the <st1:place w:st="on">Rhine</st1:place>. May I
submit to you, <st1:place w:st="on">Rhine</st1:place> is one third of the water
obstacle of the Meghna. Meghna is two and half times wider than the <st1:place w:st="on">Brahmaputra</st1:place> that you know here in Tezpur. However, that’s
a matter apart; a matter of topography. The Corps responsibility, lay from north
of Sylhet down to Cox’s bazaar, and the whole of Mizo hills, all of which I
think is a great geographical mass. I couldn’t possibly have exercised my
operational command, had it not been for Brigadier Sidhu and his resources. He
never failed me. He was entirely in my confidence. I would tell him, Gurdial,
this is what I have in mind, and he wouldn’t ask me any questions at all. He
rose to every occasion, every demand, and communications never, never failed. I
don’t think there is any parallel in history, where a corps headquarters moved
within enemy gun shells as we moved into Comilla. And we couldn’t have possibly
moved there, unless Brigadier Sidhu and the Corps of Signals had ensured our
communications. Now this is something, ladies and gentlemen, a fact of history
and undeniable. The whole corps headquarters moved on the night of 11/12 and we
couldn’t have functioned there, if he had not gone ahead and established the
communications within enemy gun range. May I gratefully, on behalf of the
entire Corps, the fighting Corps, submit that we couldn’t have achieved the
success that we did, had it not been for Brigadier Sidhu, IV Corps Signal
Regiment, Bravo and V Communication Zone Signals elements. Frankly I couldn’t
have achieved the success had it not been for their support and for their
efficiency. I am most grateful. Thank you Brigadier Sidhu”.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">35</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 8
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was located at Zakhama in Nagaland in 1971
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kalyan Singh. The second-in-command was
Major S.C. Ahuja (he subsequently became a lieutenant general and the SO-in-C)
while the adjutant was Captain Bharat Parkash. The other field officers in the
unit were Majors G.R. Bhardwaj, J.L. Puri and MS Dhillon. <b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As soon as the unit came to know of
its role in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, it started making preparations. The unit conducted feasibility
trials from several locations such Dharmanagar, Rattabari and Kailashahar to
the projected locations of brigades. Some PL and cable routes were constructed
in the area of operations. These included a 70 lbs cadmium copper spaced PVC
route from Dharmanagar to Kalashahar and a field cable route from Dharmanagar
to Amtila. A G1 system of the P&T Department was mounted in a vehicle to
derive circuits by integration with their circuits at Dharmanagar. This proved very useful during the
operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The move of 8 Mountain Division to
its concentration areas was carried out in strict secrecy. To conceal its
identity, the divisional headquarters was referred to as Rear HQ 57 Mountain
Division, which was also functioning in the area. This created a lot of
confusion and it was later decided to revert to its original name. The
operational commitments of the unit in Operation ‘Orchid’, including the signal
centre at Zakhama were taken over by 1001 Independent Signal Company (Mountain
Brigade) which had been raised for this purpose. Major Mukandan and Captain S.
S. Badal who had been with the company through its raising took charge of the
communication duties. Lieutenant A.K Choudhary of the unit remained at Zakhama
to assist Mukandan and his team. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
15 October the special train arrived at Baraigram railway station. By 17
October, the signal centre was fully functional, and trunk speech circuits had
been provided to Main HQ IV Corps, to Rear HQ 8 Mountain Division and to 59 and 81
Mountain Brigades. On 18 October the remainder of the unit arrived by road,
completing the concentration of the unit at Sherpur. Radio relay links were
established with both brigades and direct channels given between the operations
rooms at both ends. Radio links were
also put through with corps, both brigades as well as with Zakhama. The rear divisional headquarters came up at
Ratbari, where the signal centre became functional on 25 October and a 40 line
Ericsson exchange was installed. Initially, traffic was cleared to corps on C2
but the link was closed down on 30 October after a telegraph circuit was
engineered by mounting ACT 1+1 on the PL
between Dharmanagar and Sherpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
addition to its own brigades, 8 Mountain Division also had a brigade of East
Bengal Regiment (EBR) located at Kadamtila. Communication to the EBR brigade
was provided by sending a HF/VHF radio detachment to their location on 5
November. Subsequently another radio detachment was sent to Kamalpur to provide
communications to the EBR brigade at that location. By this time the
teleprinter was working on the radio link to 81 Brigade. For 59 Brigade, a VFT
circuit was provided on the radio relay link. Shortly afterwards, a party of
the P&T Department arrived to install the G1 carrier system between
Sherpur-Silchar and Sherpur-Dharmanagar, which was commissioned on 15 November.
Circuits were engineered from Sherpur to Dharmanagar as well as to Teliamura
and Sonamura by dropping the audio at Patherkandi. The audio channel of
Sherpur-Silchar GI System was dropped at Karimganj and extended to Tactical HQ
2 Artillery Brigade at Fakirbazar, about
15 km away. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
17 November the rear divisional element of Signals moved to Rattabari under
Captain K.G. Tewari. During this period
a divisional tactical headquarters was established for Operation ‘Spring Time’,
the code name for the capture of Atgram and Zakiganj, in order to remove the enemy
threat to Karimnagar and the Badarpur Ferry.
A radio relay detachment under Second-Lieutenant Virendra Kumar was
deployed for providing communications at the divisional tactical headquarters.
A monitoring detachment under Captain John Cherian was also sent along. Radio
communications were provided on D5 and D5A nets, for which detachments were
sent from 2 Mountain Artillery Brigade Signal Company. These detachments were
all withdrawn on 21 November after the capture of Atgram and Zakiganj by 59
Mountain Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Even
after the capture of Atgram and Zakiganj, Pak troops continued to fire at
Indian positions and carry out acts of sabotage in the area across the border.
To eliminate this threat, Operation ‘Winter Flower’ was launched for the
capture of area up to Kulaura by 59 Brigade and Operation ‘Black Jack’ was
undertaken by 81 Brigade for the capture of Shamshernagar. For these operations, communications were
provided on the same lines as for Operation ‘Spring Time’ to the divisional
tactical headquarters at Bhagban Nagar. On 27 November orders were received for
the move of the main divisional headquarters to Missiontila. On 29 November the
main body of the unit moved to Missiontilla and established communications on
line, radio and radio relay with forward elements as well as rearwards. A line construction section of N
Communication Zone Signal Regiment under Captain V.K. Girdhar attached to the
unit was asked to extend the PVC route from Chandipur to Chatlapur the new
location of 81 Mountain Brigade and complete the task by midnight 3/4 December.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operation
‘Cactus Lily’ commenced on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3
December 1971</st1:date>. The M1 Group moved to the new location in general
area Kailashahar at 1100 hours. Captain S.V. Jagannath, OC 81 Mountain Brigade
Signal Company visited Shamshernagar which had already been liberated and gave
information regarding the communication infrastructure available. Apart from a
40 line magneto exchange, a huge quantity of PL stores was found. There were a
number of partially damaged PL routes existing towards Kulaura, Kamalganj,
Maulvi Bazar and Chatlapur, and also some carrier quad. On 4 December the rear divisional
headquarters moved from Ratabari to Bhagban Nagar. The PVC route was extended
from Chandipur to Chatlapur, the new location of 81 Brigade. The same day a
line party of 59 Mountain Brigade Signal Company apprehended two Razakars
cutting the line running to 9 Guards. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
5 December line communications to rear divisional headquarters had been
provided by dropping the audio at that location by use of a BBFU on the circuit
derived by mounting ACT 1+1 between main and tactical divisional headquarters.
A 10 line magneto exchange was installed at the tactical headquarters at
Shamshernagar. On 7 December
line communications were provided between tactical headquarters at
Shamshernagar and 81 Brigade at Munshi Bazar. A radio relay link was also
established and channels dropped at Shamshernagar and connected to the tactical
headquarters exchange. On the same day the famous heliborne operation took
place for the capture of Sylhet. A radio detachment of 59 Mountain Brigade
Signal Company accompanied 4/5 Gorkha Rifles, the battalion that carried out
the heliborne operation and landed at a point north of Sylhet. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
10 December the M1 Group moved from Missiontila to the new location at
Shamshernagar. The detachment of N Communication Zone Signal Regiment laid an
additional pair of 150 lbs GI (galvanised iron) wire between Shamshernagar and
Munshi Bazar on the existing PL alignment. A team of the P&T Department had
been positioned with the G1 system at Shamshernagar. A radio relay link was established from the
new location to HQ IV Corps through the relay station at Aijal. These
communications were through before the move of the main divisional headquarters
from Missiontilla to Shamshernagar on 11 December.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
links from the main divisional headquarters were established to 59 Brigade at
Sagarnal and 81 Brigade at Maulvi Bazar. The G1 system between Dharmanagar and
Shamshernagar was commissioned. This provided two speech and one telegraph
channels to Teliamura. The third channel was patched to 59 Brigade at Kulaura,
with the audio channel dropped at rear division at Bhagban Nagar. Next day a
direct line was provided to 59 Brigade at Kulaura by rehabilitating the
existing PL route along the railway alignment under supervision of Major M.S.
Dhillon. The third channel of the GI system was terminated at Dharmanagar
exchange. Two pairs of PL route Maulvi Bazar – Sylhet were rehabilitated by 81
Brigade Signal Company to provide line communications to 3 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
from the brigade exchange.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tactical
HQ 59 Mountain Brigade moved to Fenchuganj after it was cleared on 12 December.
A radio relay link was immediately established to the new location on 13
December. Next morning a monitoring detachment under Captain John Cherian
accompanied the divisional commander to Fenchuganj. On <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1959">15 December 59</st1:date> Mountain Brigade moved
to area Magla Bazar. Communications on
radio relay and radio were established with main divisional headquarters at
Shamsher Nagar over distance of 60 km. By this time the corps headquarters had
moved to Comilla. To cater for this, Channel 1 of the GI system Shamshernagar –
Dharmanagar – Teliamura was patched at Teliamura for Comilla. The operations ended on 16 December.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">49</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">57
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was raised on <st1:date day="10" month="12" w:st="on" year="1969">10
December 1969</st1:date> at Masimpur, the first CO being Lieutenant Colonel
B.S. Chadha. The role of the unit was to provide communications for counter
insurgency operations over a wide area, comprising difficult and mountainous
terrain. The division at that time had 19 battalions including para-military
forces, resulting in heavy work load for the unit. After the worsening of the
political situation in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> in March
1971, large numbers of refugees started pouring in across the international
border. This led to an increase in subversive activities by the Pak Army in the
area of operational responsibility of the division. Delta and Echo Sectors were
created at Agartala and Masimpur respectively under the command of 57 Mountain
Division. The co-ordination of their communications became the responsibility
57 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. To counter the border violations by the
Pak Army, 61 Mountain Brigade was moved from Mizo Hills to Cachar District with
its headquarters at Badarpur. After this, 73 Mountain Brigade at Aijal became
responsible for the whole of Mizo Hills.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, 57 Mountain Division operated in the Akhaura-Bhairab
Bazar Sector as part of IV Corps. The
divisional headquarters moved from Masimpur to Jerania in Tripura on <st1:date day="28" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">28 August 1971</st1:date>.
Communications on radio, radio relay and line were established soon after
arrival. The D1 net was established on
HF as well as VHF. The VHF D1 control
using ANPRC 25 with remote control facility was set up on top of a water tank
at a height of 50 feet from the ground, as the distances were beyond the
effective range of the set. In addition, a one to one radio link using GR 345
was established for the divisional commander’s rover, so that it could get
through from any place in the area of responsibility. Radio relay links were
established to all brigades and to Main HQ IV Corps as a standby to speech
circuits.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
derive speech channels with brigades a three channel composite system of the
P&T Department was installed on the PL between Jirania and Agartala. A VFT
system was mounted to derive the teleprinter circuit to the corps. A carrier quad route on bamboo poles was laid
between Jirania and Agartala Carrier, on which a (1+4) carrier system was
mounted to provide standby speech lines to brigades. Field cables routes were
laid on bamboo poles, for the line to Champaknagar from Jirania, and for speech
and telegraph tails to three brigades at Jirania and Agartala. Three phase
power supply was taken from the civil mains and utilised for battery charging,
as also for power supply to radio relay detachments and other signal
installations. This obviated the need to run charging engines and generators, which
were conserved for the actual operations.
An underground signal centre was constructed by 15 Engineer Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the last week of October 1971 an operation was conducted for the capture of
Dhalai across the international border. The divisional tactical headquarters
moved to Kamalpur on 30 October. A
signal detachment with HF and VHF radio sets, a 10 line exchange, telephones
and cable accompanied the tactical headquarters. The radio relay link between
Jirania and Ambasa was extended to Kamalpur to provide standby line
communications between Teliamura -Kamalpur and Jirania -Kamalpur. During the
attack, line communication was provided to the advancing troops on manpack
basis. Signal detachments from the unit did an excellent job in providing communication
for this action, which brought the first major victory for the division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Shortly
before the commencement of open hostilities with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>, Main HQ 57 Mountain
Division moved to Agartala on 29 November and was deployed tactically in
underground bunkers. 61 Mountain Brigade was placed under direct control of IV
Corps and ‘S’ Force came under command of 57 Mountain Division. The operation for the capture of Ganga Sagar
and Akhaura commenced on 2 December and was completed on 5 December. Field cable
routes followed the advancing troops and line communication was established
immediately. During this operation one lineman of 73 Mountain Brigade Signal
Company was killed and one wounded. A lineman of 311 Mountain Brigade Signal
Company was wounded in the operation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Immediately after the capture of
Akhaura, line communications were extended to 311 Mountain Brigade and later to
73 Mountain Brigade even before the road axis was opened for vehicular
traffic. The existing PL routes were
badly damaged by the retreating enemy and due to heavy artillery shelling from
both sides. Because of the urgency of
getting across guns and artillery ammunition at bottle necks, very low priority
was given to Signals for crossing at Akhaura ferry. All stores, cables and equipment had to be
manhandled and carried on manpack basis. Even the radio relay detachments
including generators and petrol were manhandled across the river and radio
relay communications provided to 73 Mountain Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The divisional tactical headquarters
moved to Brahmanbaria on 8 December after it was vacated by the enemy. The 73
Brigade radio relay terminal located at Brahmanbaria ferry site was converted
hurriedly to establish communications with Main HQ IV Corps, until the corps
detachment reached Brahmanbaria. <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Crystals</st1:place></st1:city> for this link
were sent up by a special DR and a long
local lead was laid across the river.
Thus rearward communication on radio relay was made available to the
skeleton divisional headquarters. D1 control (VHF) with remote control facility
was installed on top of a four storey building at a height of about 50 feet
from the ground, to ensure radio communications with formations under
command located beyond the effective
range of radio set ANPRC-25. Standby to
VHF D1 net was provided by RS GR-345. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Agartala -<st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Teliamura PL</st1:address></st1:street> route was later extended to Brahmanbaria
exchange by N Communication Zone Signal Regiment. Field cable lines on man pack
basis were laid to the air landing ground, helipad, 73, 311 and Artillery
Brigades. The existing PL routes were
used wherever possible. Signal traffic was mostly cleared to Teliamura through
the corps radio relay link, on which teleprinter circuit worked successfully.
The teleprinter circuit on line to Teliamura did not work properly due to
unsteady lines and the P & T carrier system. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With
the fall of various strong holds of the enemy, his morale was shattered and he
was on the run. To cut off enemy troops and prevent them from reaching <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>, 311 Mountain
Brigade was landed at Narsingdi, while 73 Mountain Brigade built up pressure to
capture Bhairab Bazar which the enemy was still holding in strength. The
tactical headquarters of 57 Mountain Division was flown to Narsingdi on 11
December. Due to urgency of the impending operation, the move of personnel and
stores was carried out in great haste.
Initially the second-in-command of the unit with one operator and one RS
AN/PRC-25 left on 11 December with the advance element of the tactical
headquarters in one helicopter. In another helicopter which was made available
in the afternoon, the Foreman of Signals could take only one radio relay
detachment, one generator, one barrel of 73 NL petrol and 10 km of cable with
two linemen. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
the following day i.e. 12 December, two more helicopters were allotted. These
carried the CO and adjutant, along with the remainder of the radio relay
detachment stores, 20 km of cable with four linemen, and three RS C11/R210 with operators.
Another party of 15 men under Subedar K.S. Patial left Brahmanbaria by boat for
Narsingdi with one radio relay detachment, one RS C11/R210 station, batteries,
rations and 30 km of cable. This party
took about 40 hours to reach Narsingdi jetty. Another party of four OR under a
Yeoman of Signals left Brahmanbaria on 13 December with an exchange, 10
telephones, two more barrels of 73 NL petrol and rations. This party took 36 hours to reach
Narsingdi. The same day another party of
four officers, 25 operators, eight linemen, the corps radio relay detachment,
20 km of WD-1 cable, two type-X machines and a 5.5 KVA generator left by
steamer which reached Narsingdi after 10 hours.
The last party of two officers with 30 OR left Brahmanbaria on 16
December by steamer, reaching Narsingdi after eight hours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> From the helipad at Narsingdi,
equipment had to be manhandled to the tactical headquarters location, which was
about 7 km away. Stores coming by boat had to be manhandled from Narsingdi
jetty, over a distance of 2 km. The
Signals element at Narsingdi had to go without rations for two days as priority
was given to important equipment and stores. Communications from Narsingdi were
mainly based on radio and radio relay. Tactical headquarters of 73 and 311
Brigades and 4 Guards were placed on D1 HF net using GR 345, others being on D1
VHF. Radio relay links were established to 311 Brigade and Brahmanbaria.
However, a direct link to Tactical HQ IV Corps at Comilla could not be
established even after erecting the aerial on top of the United Jute Mill water
tank at a height of 80 feet. Calls to IV Corps had to be routed through
Brahmanbaria radio relay link which remained steady. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In addition to local lines, cable
routes were laid on man pack basis to 73 Mountain Brigade, 57 Artillery Brigade
and Narsingdi jetty. One operator of 73 Mountain Brigade Signal Company
battalion detachment was killed due to enemy action during their crossing of
the Meghna. On the morning of 14 December, 301 Mountain Brigade ex 8 Mountain
Division and 95 Mountain Brigade ex 2 Mountain Division which were closing in
on Dacca were placed under command 57
Mountain Division. These were added to
the D1 and D2 net, though lack of road communications posed problems in
coordinating communication arrangements with these formations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
afternoon <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">15 December 1971</st1:date>,
our advancing troops were within 7 km of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
and it became apparent that East Pakistan Army was ready for surrender. At
about 1100 hours on 16 December the Pak Army offered to surrender. By 0900
hours on 17 December the advance elements of the division reached the old
location of Pak HQ 14 Infantry Division. By the same evening skeleton Advance
HQ 57 Mountain Division became functional at Peelkhana, the erstwhile
headquarters of the Pakistan CAF. The major part of the unit that was spread
all over from Brahmanbaria to Narsingdi, moved by road and boats to reach <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. Due to lack of road and rail
communication, the unit was able to concentrate at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> only by the end of December 1971.<b>50</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">23
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> According
Lieutenant Colonel M. Sathesan who served in the unit in the early sixties, 23
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was originally known as GOC Assam Signal
Company located in the <st1:place w:st="on">Naga Hills</st1:place>. It was subsequently renamed as 23 Infantry
Divisional Signal Company, functioning under DCSO HQ 23 Infantry Division, the
last officer to hold the appointment being Lieutenant Colonel Kulwant Singh
Deol. The brigade signal companies were independent. Soon afterwards, the
DCSO’s branch, divisional signal company
and the brigade signal companies were all grouped and reorganized into 23
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. The division had a large area of
responsibility, comprising five brigades and two Assam Rifles sectors. Road and
line communications were poor and communication was maintained primarily by
radio. Maintenance of lines was difficult and hazardous and line parties had at
all times to move with escorts, provided by Infantry or from unit resources. A
radio relay link to Shillong functioned using vintage AN/TRC sets. In addition
to its normal commitments, the unit manned the signal centres at Dimapur and
Jorhat. Subsequently this responsibility was taken over by N Communication Zone
Signal Regiment in 1966. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1971 the unit was located at Rangiya under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
P.S. Talwar. When the unit received orders for move to the concentration area
for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, it was facing shortage of manpower particularly in
the operator category. There were also shortages of radio and radio relay sets,
secondary batteries, charging engines and cable. To complicate matters, B1 net of one brigade
viz. 83 Mountain Brigade was on the HF, whereas the other two brigades were on
VHF. The shortage of radio equipment of non-signal units, particularly VHF sets
in the battalions was very pronounced.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With a view to ensure equitable
distribution of signal equipment in the division, measures were undertaken to
rationalize the holdings of all units.
The Technical Officer Telecom (TOT) of the unit visited all units in the
division including non-signal units in order to make maximum equipment
serviceable, by carrying out repairs by cannibalization of components of
unserviceable radio sets. This resulted in considerable improvement in the
availability of serviceable radio sets before the commencement of operation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The commitments of the unit during
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ can be broadly divided into two major operations viz.
‘Harvest’ and ‘Sledge Hammer’. Operation ‘Harvest’ (19 to 29 November 1971)
dealt with operations in the Belonia Bulge and Operation ‘Sledge Hammer’ (3 to
15 December 1971) with the operations in the Comilla – Chandpur – Mynamati
sector.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
about the second week of November, 83 Mountain Brigade took over the
operational responsibilities from 73 Mountain Brigade in the general area
Santir Bazar – Sabrum with the brigade headquarters at Bugafa. During the
relief of 73 Brigade 83 Brigade there was heavy enemy interference resulting in
considerable casualties to own troops. The divisional commander decided to put in
a two battalion attack in the area around Belonia – Parsuram from where the
enemy interference was reported. Due to stiff enemy resistance from area
Bulgazi, this operation was held up and it was decided to put in a two brigade
attack with 83 and 181 Mountain Brigades to clear the enemy from the Belonia
Bulge. Since the main divisional headquarters was located at Kakraban which was
over 40 km from Belonia, it was decided to move up the divisional tactical
headquarters to a suitable location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
17 November the CO, accompanied by OC 1 Company and GSO 2 (Operations) carried out a
reconnaissance and selected an area for the tactical headquarters on a high
ground about 6 km from Santir Bazar along the Belonia road. The brigades
commenced their moves on the night of 17/18 November and completed
concentration by first light. The
initial location of HQ 83 Mountain Brigade was Raj Nagar and that of HQ 181
Mountain Brigade was Amjad Nagar. HQ 301 Mountain Brigade remained at
Nirbhaypur looking after the Sonamura sector. The divisional signal centre was
established and started functioning by 1400 hours on <st1:date day="18" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">18 November 1971</st1:date>. Radio, radio relay
and line communications were established to 83 and 181 Brigades. The corps
radio relay detachment was also moved to the tactical headquarters location.
Radio relay was established to Main HQ IV Corps at Teliamura and the main
divisional headquarters at Kakraban. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operation ‘Harvest’ commenced at first light on 19
November with infiltrations by 83 and 181 Brigades along the western and
eastern sides of the Belonia Bulge respectively. One radio relay and one line
detachment each were attached to the brigade headquarters. The tactical
headquarters of the brigades moved up and established radio communications with
the divisional headquarters followed by the establishment of line
communications. After this the radio
relay detachment moved up with the main brigade headquarters and established
radio relay communications. This was the drill followed throughout the
operations by which continuous and reliable communications were maintained with
the brigades as they advanced. In addition to exchange lines to the brigades
lateral lines were also provided whenever possible. The brigades advanced
rapidly along their respective axes and the final distances of HQs Artillery
Brigade, 83 Mountain Brigade and 181 Mountain Brigade from the divisional
headquarters were 28, 35 and 42 km respectively. The operation ended on <st1:date day="28" month="11" w:st="on" year="1971">28 November 1971</st1:date> and the
divisional tactical headquarters returned to Kakraban after handing over the
trunk lines laid on the ground to HQ ‘K Sector’ which was made responsible for
the Belonia Bulge.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
Operation ‘Harvest’ there was rethinking regarding the advisability of attack
on Lalmai Hills from the divisional headquarters location at Shobapur with
brigades located around Nirbhaypur-Dhanpur. On 29 November it was decided to move the divisional
tactical headquarters further south. After a reconnaissance by OC 1 Company and
the GSO 2 (Operations), Nidhiya was selected as the initial location of the divisional
tactical headquarters. The brigades began concentrating in their new locations
on the same night. By last light on 2
December, communications to brigades were established. The divisional tactical headquarters became
functional on the same day, while the main headquarters reached the location
two days later. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="5" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">5 December 1971</st1:date>, the
divisional tactical headquarters moved to area Bahadurpur. By last light that day radio and radio relay
had been established from the new location. On 7 December, main divisional
headquarters moved up to join the tactical headquarters. Communications were provided on radio and
line to HQ 23 Mountain Artillery Brigade (Bhatora); HQ 83 Mountain Brigade
(Chaudagram); HQ 181 Mountain Brigade (Harischar); and HQ 301 Mountain Brigade
(Bhatora). Radio relay was provided to 83 and 181 Brigades and rearwards to HQ
IV Corps (Teliamura).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In view of the rapid advance of 301
Mountain Brigade along Chandpur – Narayanaganj axis it was decided to move the
divisional tactical headquarters to Chandpur after it fell. With the fall of Hajiganj on 8 December
and Chandpur on 9 December, a reconnaissance party with OC 1 Company and
essential radio and line detachments proceeded to Chandpur to establish the tactical
headquarters. By the last light on 9
December, radio and radio relay to corps were established. On 10 December, the main divisional
headquarters moved up to Chandpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With the fall of Comilla on 12
December it was anticipated that the enemy at Mynamati would surrender. However, the garrison held on, in spite of
heavy battering of Lalmai and Mynamati by air.
It was then decided to clear Mynamati using 61 and 181 Brigades, 83
Brigade being still under HQ IV Corps. The divisional tactical headquarters
moved from Chandpur to Aileshwar.
According to the drill, radio nets D1, D2 and C1 and radio relay link to
corps were established at Aileshwar, followed by the other communication links
which subsequently moved up from Chandpur. On <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">15 December 1971</st1:date> the surrender of Pakistani
troops in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> was announced by a
signal from HQ IV Corps. The Mynamati
garrison surrendered at 1000 hours on <st1:date day="16" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">16 December 1971</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 18 December, the divisional
headquarters moved to Mynamati. With the
move of Eastern Command to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>,
which was earlier planned to be the location of HQ IV Corps, the latter moved
to Mynamati on 24 December. As a result, Main HQ 23 Mountain Division had to move out to Feni on 25 December. Communications were established on line and
radio with HQ 23 Mountain Artillery Brigade (Kakraban); HQ 83 Mountain Brigade
(<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city>);
HQ 181 Mountain Brigade (Comilla); HQ 301 Mountain Brigade (Naokhali) and HQ IV
Corps (Mynamati).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During Operation ‘Sledge Hammer’,
the advance of the brigades was very fast and usually beyond normal field cable
range. The divisional headquarters moved no less than five times during the
operation. In all these moves it was
split into tactical and main headquarters. The usual practice of a
reconnaissance by Signals before move of the tactical headquarters could not be
followed. Invariably full scale
communications on radio, line and radio relay had to be provided at both
tactical and main divisional headquarters till the latter joined the former,
which could be after 12 to 36 hours. The
frequent changes in the order of battle posed problems regarding allotment of
frequencies, code signs, authentication sheets, radio relay crystals and cipher
documents.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">51</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2 Air Support Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1971, the unit was located in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>,
with a company each affiliated to the IV and XXXIII Corps. The unit was under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Dhamija. OC 1 Company, located at
located at Phulbari near Tezpur, was Major M. A. Siddiqui. The other officers in 1 Company were Captain
S.B. Mishra and Second Lieutenant S.S. Grewal. When the company was ordered to
move with HQ IV Corps for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, it was asked to leave behind
a skeleton joint operations centre (JOC) staff and the divisional section
allocated to 17 Mountain Division. The two divisional sections which were with
8 and 57 Mountain Divisions were to join the company on arrival at the
destination, thus completing the full complement for the three divisions that
were to be part of IV Corps. While the section
that was with 57 Mountain Division was in reasonable shape as far as equipment,
vehicles and manpower was concerned, the state of the section with 8 Mountain
Division was not very healthy. The operators of this section had been attached
permanently with the divisional signal regiment and were not conversant with
air support procedures. Their equipment was also in bad shape, with major
deficiencies of secondary batteries radio sets and tyres for the tentacle
vehicles. For the four 1-Ton tentacle vehicles, only 14 tyres were held instead
of 20. As a result, they had to leap frog during their move from Zakhama in
Nagaland. Two tentacles would cover 50 km distance at a time and then halt
while the tyre of one vehicle was removed and taken back so that the remaining
two vehicles could join them. The section took a week to join the company at
its new location in Agartala. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
make up the shortage of about 100 odd secondary batteries, the Deputy Director
Ordnance, HQ IV 4 Corps suggested that these be purchased from the local
market. However, the local dealers, being unfamiliar Army procedures refused to
supply the batteries on credit. Besides, some modification had to be done to
the battery terminals, to permit them to be used on radio sets. Fortunately, Major
Siddiqui learned that 57 Mountain Division Signal Regiment was planning to back
load a large number of new batteries which were not even given the initial
charge. Siddiqui promptly got orders issued transferring the batteries to his
unit. That still left the problem of initial charge, which is the
responsibility of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME). Since the
affiliated EME workshop refused to carry out this job, Siddiqui decided to do
it within his own resources. He asked his unit in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> to buy the acid and send it over.
The only hurdle left was transportation. Through the good offices of Major R.S.
Chhikara, the GSO 2 Operations (Air) at HQ Eastern Command, the acid was
airlifted and delivered to the company, solving the problem of batteries. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
arrival at the new location, the process of training in air support procedures
was taken in hand. The detachments were reorganised so that each tentacle had
at least one trained operator. Intensive training of operators was conducted
for the next two months, at the end of which all detachments had achieved a
high degree proficiency and were ready for the operations. By the time the
orders came to deploy the air support tentacle detachments with their
respective formations, their confidence and morale was high. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Initially,
the radio set that was held for ground to air communications for the air
observation post was BE 201, which used secondary batteries. The set was
vehicle bound and not suitable for carriage in man pack mode. Before operations
started, the company received the new portable GU 734 sets, which used portable
Nickel Cadmium batteries. Out of four frequencies allotted to the company, one
was an international frequency and another open for civil use. This left the
company with only two reliable operational frequencies. Subsequently, HQ
Eastern Command agreed to allot additional frequencies, the crystals for which
were issued to the EME workshop, which was to fit them in the sets. The story
of how this was done has been described by Colonel Siddiqui thus:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By mid November
1971, all the tentacles were deployed with their respective formations. One
day, the SO1 (Signals) Corps Headquarters called me and said that orders for
the new frequencies have come and are to be implemented. For this new crystal
sets had to be installed in our GU 734 radio sets. I told the SO1 that it was
impossible as the sets were already deployed with the formations. The SO1 then
suggested a novel method of getting the crystals replaced. I was told to
withdraw sets from one formation, get the replacement incorporated and then do
the same with the second formation and finally the third one. In his estimate,
we could do this in a few days time. When I firmly told him that I cannot carry
out the task as suggested by him as it was impractical, he told me that it was
an order and I simply had to implement it. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I then went to
the 5 TAC Commander, Group Captain Gopalan and told him about the orders that I
had received, stating that I can promise no ground to air communications, in
the event of hostilities breaking out, as we will have our formations on
different frequencies, not compatible with those fitted in the aircraft. His
reply was, “ Look Siddiqui, it has already been confirmed by your Command
Headquarters to Headquarters Eastern Air Command that they are ready with new
frequencies to operate and based on this all our aircraft have already been
fitted with new frequencies. What do you expect me to do at this stage?” My
reply was “Sir, your aircraft are at their bases but my sets are deployed with
the forward formations in the field, where technical support for replacement of
the crystals is not available. Therefore, I am unable to implement the orders
that have been given by our Signals Branch”. Unluckily, the CSO was also away
at that time and I could not seek his help. The TAC Commander understood my
problem and spoke to the CSO Eastern Air Command, who was simply told that we
are not ready yet for the new frequencies. Their order to the bases was thus
reversed and all the aircraft were asked to switch back to old frequencies. We
were thus able to avoid a major disaster, as air support to the ground troops,
played a very significant role in the entire Bangladesh operations and our
communications never failed.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB">36</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
part of the offensive of IV Corps, 23 Mountain Division was to launch an attack
on Akhaura on 4 December. An air strike was demanded but as the ETOT (expected
time over target) was being repeatedly postponed by IAF, the corps commander
decided that the attack should go in without waiting any further. Finally, two
Hunters took off from Bagdogra for the mission. However, instead of going
towards Akhaura the aircraft headed for Sylhet which was on the front of 8
Mountain Division. Since the aircraft
were way off the planned target, there was no contact with the ground troops
and the pilot decided to go back to base. Since their return path was from the
direction of the enemy, the Air Force radar station at Shillong declared the
Hunters as hostile aircraft. This created a panic at the JOC of IV Corps, where
it was assumed that the warning coming from the radar station at Shillong
implied that Pakistani Sabres were coming to neutralise our Hunters. The TAC
Commander asked Siddiqui do something to warn the Hunter pilots of the presence
of the hostile aircraft. Siddiqui told him that all that he had was a GU 734
set. Since they were located in a depression it was highly unlikely that the
pilots would hear his transmission. Just then, they saw the Hunters fly past. It
was only then that they realised that what the radar had thought to be hostile
aircraft were our own Hunters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
this time the aircraft carrier I.N.S. <i>Vikrant</i>
was in the <st1:place w:st="on">Bay of Bengal</st1:place> and joined the air
support net on the fourth day of the operations. An immediate air strike demand
was raised by HQ IV Corps with I.N.S. <i>Vikrant.
</i>Due to some reason, the ship suddenly went off the net and the message
could not be passed. When Siddiqui informed the GSO1 (Operations) at the corps
headquarters he said that how he passed the message was his problem and refused
to hear any excuses. Siddiqui then called the signal officer at the Naval
Establishment in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>
to find out if he had any communication with the ship. After he confirmed that
he was through, the message was dictated to him on the telephone. The message was passed and the air strike
materialized at the specified time. Later, when the ship joined the net, they
were asked the reason for their being off the air. It was learned that a fire
accident had damaged their equipment and this led to the break in
communications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon
afterwards, 8 Mountain Division planned a heliborne operation of 59 Mountain
Brigade, about which Siddiqui was not informed. The tentacle detachment with 59
Brigade carried the bulky C11/R210 radio set with two secondary batteries and a
generator. They were in the first wave which came under heavy enemy fire, could
not land and came back. One soldier was hit by a bullet and died. This had
visibly shaken Naik Raju, the tentacle detachment commander and it took a lot
of persuasion and pep talk from Major J.L. Puri, OC 1 Company in 8 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment to build up his morale when the detachment was sent
again in the next wave. Siddiqui came to know of this the next day, when he
found this tentacle going off the air frequently. He then called Puri who
informed him of what had happened. Siddiqui regretted that he was not informed
about the heliborne operations. Had he known, he could have requested the CSO
to loan him the portable HM 30 sets, a few of which were held by the corps
signal regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> However,
the tentacle detachment performed very creditably. The C11/R210 radio set of
the air support tentacle was the only means of communication of 59 Brigade with
outside world, as the HF set that was being used as an out station on the D1
net of 8 Mountain Division had a battery
problem and could not get through. In order to conserve batteries, Naik Raju
was told to open the set only when he had a message to pass. They could not start
the generator to charge the batteries as the noise immediately drew enemy fire.
He was able to remain on the D1 net and provide crucial communications to the
brigade, switching back to his own net to pass air support demand messages. As
many as six immediate air support demands were initiated by the heliborne
forces and all of them materialized, thanks to the air support
communications. Naik Raju was later
‘Mentioned in Despatches’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the last few days of the operations, everyone was racing for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> and rearward communications were given
a go by. There were times when the air support tentacle was the only means of
communications with the formations. The CSO told Siddiqui to keep his
communications going and not to switch off the sets. There was also an instance
of the tentacle set being commandeered by a brigade signal officer when his own
set became faulty. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Siddiqui’s
experience during the war had an element of adventure as well, when he
inadvertently was made officer in charge of an escort mission to take a
Pakistani general (by the name of Qazi Abdul Majeed), the GOC of 4 Pakistan
Infantry Division, from Bhairab Bazar to Dacca on 15 December 1971 in a MI 4
helicopter. This was a day before the formal surrender of the Pakistani
Army. The company performed creditably
during the operations and Siddiqui got a 'Mention -in- Despatches'. In
addition, one JCO and two OR got COAS commendation cards<b>.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">L Communication Zone
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was raised on <st1:date day="15" month="4" w:st="on" year="1964">15 April
1964</st1:date> in Siliguri. The role of the unit was to carry out
communication tasks in the rear areas of formations deployed in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st="on">West Bengal</st1:place> under XXXIII Corps. It also carried out line
construction and maintenance in far flung areas such as <st1:place w:st="on">North
Sikkim</st1:place>. In 1971 the unit was located at Lebong, near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Darjeeling</st1:place></st1:city> under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel S.C. Roy, with Major P.K.S. Bisen as his second-in-command.
Other officers holding important appointments were Major V.K. Bajaj (adjutant);
Major A.S. Molni (2 Company); Major V.K. Gupta (3 Company); Captain S.C. Sharma
(1 Company); and Captain K.S. Nair (HQ Company). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since
the unit was looking after communications along the L of C, it was not actively
involved in the invasion <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>.
However, it was given the responsibility of relieving units that were to take
part in the operations of their static communication responsibilities in XXXIII
Corps sector. This involved maintenance of line routes, as well as manning of
radio links, exchanges and locality signal centres. The major commitment of the
unit was maintenance of PL routes in XXXIII Corps sector. It was also asked to man locality signal
centres at Gangtok, Kalimpong and Hashimara; and locality exchanges at
Bengdubi, University Area, <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Sevoke
Road</st1:address></st1:street> and Binaguri. In order to carry out these
tasks, the unit was reorganised. 1
Company was given the responsibility for communications in the sectors of
XXXIII Corps, 20 Mountain Division and North Bengal Sub Area, including P&T
carrier centres. 2 Company was made
responsible for communications in the 17 and 27 Mountain Divisional sectors.
These deployments were completed by <st1:date day="20" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">20 October 1971</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In mid October, 42 Light Radio
Section (8 set- mobile) was sent to IV Corps Signal Regiment on temporary
attachment. On 3 November, 2 Company of the unit moved to Kalimpong. Towards
the end of November, the regimental headquarters along with HQ Company moved to
Bengdubi near Siliguri, where 1 Company was already located. The PL route along
axis Jalpaiguri – Chandra Banda – Patgram – Baora – Bara Khata was resuscitated
to provide a direct line between HQ XXXIII Corps and Garhwal Rifles, the total
distance being 67 km. On 2 December, the unit was given the responsibility of
maintaining all PL routes north and east of Bengdubi including the PL routes in
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
the unit had not been given any role in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ at the planning
stage, once the operations started it was called upon to perform various
communication tasks. On <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1977">3 December, 77</st1:date> Line
Construction Section ex Bravo Signal Regiment was placed under command of the
unit. On 4 December, one officer, one JCO and 22 OR of this section were
deployed at Pachagarh. The detachment was given the responsibility to provide
line communication up to HQ 71 Mountain Brigade which was advancing on axis
Pachagarh – Birganj – Saidpur. On 7 December the line detachment was moved from
Pachagarh to Thakurgaon. A
line party of seven OR was positioned at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Sevoke Road</st1:address></st1:street> for strengthening and
maintaining the line route between Sukna and Terulia.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Consequent
to the move of HQ 71 Mountain Brigade to Birganj, the existing PL route was
resuscitated upto Birganj on 9 December. 77 Line Construction Section, which
had joined the unit on 3 December, was detached on 12 December and allotted to
XXXIII Corps Signal Regiment. On 12 December, HQ 71 Mountain Brigade moved to
Khansama – Darwani and finally to Saidpur. Line communication was provided on
field cable. As a PL route was existing on axis Haldibari – Chilahati – Domar –
Nilphamari – Saidpur, a reconnaissance was carried out on 13 December to
undertake the resuscitation of the route. A line party of one officer, one JCO
and 21 OR was placed at Jalpaiguri for this purpose. The line from Jalpaiguri
to Haldibari was put through on 14 December. On 15 December, one JCO and eight linemen
were positioned at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Sevoke Road</st1:address></st1:street>
to maintain the line route Sukna – Pachagarh.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the surrender of Pakistani troops on <st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">17 December 1971</st1:date>, the unit was given the responsibility of
rehabilitating several PL routes in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
These were Jalpaiguri – Domar – Saidpur; Sukna – Thakurgaon – Birganj –
Saidpur; Saidpur – <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rampur</st1:place></st1:city>
and Saidpur –Diaper. L Communication
Zone Signal Regiment remained in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> for a month after the
termination of Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, carrying out various line maintenance
and rehabilitation tasks. Though the entire unit was not committed during the
operations, its detachments provided valuable assistance to other signal units
in carrying out their communication tasks. The unit returned to Lebong on 20 January
1972. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">V Communication Zone
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> V
Communication Zone Signal Regiment was located at Tezpur in mid 1971 when
preparations started for Operation ‘Cactus Lily.’ The CO was Lieutenant Colonel
M.L. Khanna, who was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Baldev Aurora shortly
before the commencement of the operations.
The unit was given the responsibility of looking after the
communications needs of the newly raised HQ II Corps till the raising of II
Corps Signal Regiment was completed. To
carry out this task, the unit was split in two parts. While the main body moved
to Krishnanagar where HQ II Corps was being raised, the rear elements remained
at Tezpur to look after the communications responsibilities of the unit before
it was split. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
main body comprising six officers, five JCOs and 176 OR left Tezpur for
Krishnanagar on <st1:date day="19" month="9" w:st="on" year="1971">19 September
1971</st1:date>. On arrival at the new location the unit established the
signal centre and began looking after the communication requirements of II
Corps. A 150 line CB exchange with two
T-43 trunk boards was commissioned on 15 October by the P&T Department.
Radio silence was imposed during the concentration of units and
formations. As a result, communications
had to be on line. Due to the large distances cable could not be used except
for local communication and many permanent and semi-permanent line routes had
to be constructed at short notice. In addition, some already existing routes
were rehabilitated. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
major problem faced by the unit was lack of resources. The unit was asked to
move at short notice with very little time to make up its deficiencies in
equipment, transport and personnel. Moreover the commitments of the unit at
Tezpur remained unaltered. When the unit moved in September a large number of
personnel were away on courses and leave. Although these personnel were
recalled yet during the initial stages there was a considerable drain on the
manpower resources of the unit. The
situation was aggravated owing to the necessity of sending escort parties to
various ordnance depots for collection of stores released to the unit at that
time. The problem of manpower was alleviated through the efforts of DCSO II
Corps by attachment of personnel from other units. A line construction section was attached from
S Communication Signal Regiment, while a skeleton line construction section was
attached from Bravo Signal Regiment which was itself under raising at Tezpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since
the unit was mainly responsible for construction and maintenance of permanent
line routes priority was given only to line stores. When the unit was asked to
establish a signal centre and man circuits to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>, it faced great difficulty as it had
only two teleprinters. The problem was solved by the transfer of some
teleprinters from 9 Infantry Division. With
the gradual equipping of II Corps Signal Regiment and by resorting to local
purchase the shortage of equipment was gradually reduced. Another problem was
the shortage of secondary batteries. A large number of new batteries could not
be used due to shortage of acid and lack of initial charging. The problem was solved to some extent by
draining acid from unserviceable batteries and purchasing some from local
resources.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was heavily dependent on the P&T Department, whose reaction to
maintenance of equipment and lines was slow. To speed up things, additional
manpower was provided by the unit at the P&T carrier centre. The unit
personnel were not trained for such tasks and it took some time before they
became familiar with P&T equipment. The 150 line CB exchange functioned
well but the T-43 trunk boards gave a lot of trouble and developed frequent
faults. Consequently, the trunk lines
were transferred to two Ericsson exchanges and the T-43 boards were handed over
to P&T Department for maintenance. A link panel was procured from Indian
Telephone Industries, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>
to provide engineering facilities. The
P&T Department after considerable efforts managed to repair the trunk
boards and the trunk circuits were transferred back to the T-43 boards. There was an acute shortage of UG cable for
the local leads from Krishnanagar repeater station and this was provided with
great difficulty through personal
liaison with P&T authorities at Calcutta.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">55</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">107 Communication Zone
Signal Company (Territorial Army)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
company was embodied for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ on <st1:date day="5" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">5 December 1971</st1:date>. Immediately after embodiment orders were
received to deploy the company under various formations. Subsequently two officers, one JCO and 27 OR were
dispatched to HQ II 2 Corps on <st1:date day="8" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">8
December 1971</st1:date>. Out of the
above personnel one officer and three OR were sent to Jessore to repair the
carrier equipment which was damaged due to enemy action. They were able to
repair the damaged equipment and put through the line to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.
Other personnel were deployed at Krishnanagar by II Corps Signal
Regiment and V Communication Zone Signal Regiment. A detachment of two Officers, one JCO and 26 OR
was sent to HQ XXXIII Corps on 8 December and they were deployed in different
places in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region>
to maintain communications. Another
detachment of 13 OR was sent to Eastern Command Signal Regiment for maintaining
the signal centre. Two OR were sent to
Bengal Area Signal Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the cease fire, all personnel reported back at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city> by 25 December. On 27 December, the company was asked to move
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> as
Army HQ reserve. On reaching <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> the company was
asked to be ready to move to Kotkapura to be deployed in Western Sector. On 2 February orders were received to move to
Kotkapura and an advance party was sent on the same day. On 4 February the orders for move were
cancelled and the company was asked to return to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Calcutta</st1:place></st1:city>.
On 10 February the company returned to Calcutta and was subsequently
disembodied on 5 March 1972. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Bravo Signal Regiment
(Corps)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In anticipation of its role in Operation
‘Cactus Lily’, HQ IV Corps was split into two parts - main and rear. Main HQ IV
Corps moved to Teliamura in Mizoram under Lieutenant General Sagat Singh for
undertaking operations in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>. Rear
HQ IV Corps under Major General O. P. Malhotra (who later became the COAS)
stayed behind at Tezpur to command the troops which remained deployed along
northern & eastern borders in Arunachal Pradesh and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Since IV Corps Signal Regiment did not have
adequate resources to provide communications for operations in <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place> as well as to meet the communication needs
of Rear HQ IV 4 Corps, it became necessary to augment its resources. For this
purpose, Bravo Signal Regt (Corps) was ordered to be raised post haste at
Tezpur in August 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
authorized strength of the unit was 40 officers, an equal number of JCOs and
over 1350 OR. The first CO was Lieutenant Colonel Col B.G. Chakraborty who assumed
command on <st1:date day="28" month="8" w:st="on" year="1971">28 August 1971</st1:date>.
The first second-in command was Major Charan Singh. The other officers in the
unit during the initial years were Majors Jaswal, V.K. Sidhwani, R.K. Kak,
Mehta, and Tiwari; Captains D.M.
Tripathy, S.R. Raju, Tamhane, V.J. Gomes, Devrajan, G.C. Nair , M.K.Das,
Shanbhag, Ramachandran, Ramaswamy, V.K. Chamela, V.K. Kutty; and Lieutenants
Bhardwaj and Pritam Singh. The first OC
Light Repair Workshop was Captain Manubhai of the Electrical and Mechanical
Engineers (EME).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was issued new generation communication equipment and vehicles from the
Central Ordnance Depot (COD), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>.
As the operations to liberate <st1:place w:st="on">East Pakistan</st1:place>
were imminent, the time available to complete the raising of the unit was at a
premium. To save time collection parties were sent to various depots to collect
equipment and vehicles. On receipt the
equipment such as radio relay etc. were fitted in vehicles using the resources
of civilian workshops in Tezpur town. To train the unit personnel in operation
and maintenance of the new equipment training classes were held even at night.
With sustained efforts and hard work put in by all ranks the unit became fit
for war in a short span of just three months. When war broke out on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1971">3 December 1971</st1:date> the unit
was ready to fulfil its role. All mobile
communication elements were attached to IV Corps Signal Regiment and they
provided crucial communications to Main HQ IV Corps during its advance to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>. Some sections of
the unit were also attached to Eastern Command Signal Regiment. The remainder handled all communications
required by Rear HQ IV Corps at Tezpur.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the termination of the war the
unit was ordered to move from Tezpur to Nagrota near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> to provide communications from scratch for HQ XVI Corps which was then under
raising there, along with HQ Northern Command at Udhampur. Moving by rail and
road, the unit was able to concentrate at its new location by mid June
1972. On reaching Nagrota the unit was
redesignated as XVI Corps Signal Regiment.37<b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Indo- Pak War of 1971 is a milestone in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s history and has a place in
the annals of famous battles of modern times. After the two inconclusive wars
of 1947-48 and 1965 and the decisive defeat in 1962, it resulted in a clear
victory, redeeming the Indian Army’s reputation as one of the finest fighting
forces of the World. In terms of prisoners captured and territory occupied, it
has few equals in modern warfare. It was unique in another sense – it gave
birth to a new nation. Most important of all, it established <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> as an
Asian power. The confidence and self assurance acquired by the country in 1971
has only increased with the passage of time and enabled <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> to stake
her claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Corps of Signals played a stellar role in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. Unlike the
previous wars, communication failures were almost negligible. The primary
reason for this splendid performance was the time available and the improvement
in the quality of signal equipment. This was perhaps the first time when Signals
plans were made six months before the commencement of the operations. Thanks to
the free hand and support given to the Corps by Army HQ and the Government of
India, various measures such as improvement of communication infrastructure,
import and indigenous production of critical signal equipment and raising of
new units were implemented well before the actual operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Perhaps the most significant factor
was the availability of radio relay, which became the backbone of
communications. The rapid rate of advance of formations precluded laying of
lines. Though radio functioned well, it could obviously not replicate lines,
especially for telephone conversations. This is where radio relay proved its
worth; making converts of commanders and staff who had hitherto been allergic
to the presence of radio relay aerials near their headquarters, on
considerations of camouflage and concealment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As in the 1965 war, leadership at
all levels was crucial to the success of the Corps. The SO-in-C, Major General E.G Pettengell and
his deputy, Brigadier K.S. Garewal, played a proactive role, going down to
formations to get first hand information about their problems. Their excellent
rapport with the P&T Department, the Ministry of Defence, Finance,
Ordnance, production agencies etc. was instrumental in making up deficiencies
and building up infrastructure. There was excellent rapport between the
commanders, Signals and staff. The exemplary leadership and organizational role
played by Brigadier K.K. Tewari, CSO Eastern Command, in getting the
communication infrastructure established, synergizing the capabilities of so
many signal units and making available human and equipment resources as per
requirement, stands out in this campaign. The CSO and his staff at Eastern
Command did a magnificent job, fine tuning the Signals plan for the campaign.
There were many glitches, but they overcame them, ensuring that communications
did not fail. Perhaps the only blame that can be laid at their door is not
planning communications from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
after it fell. Since the capture of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city>
was not planned, this lack of foresight can be condoned. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> There
were a few cases of instances of communication failure, which could have been
avoided by better planning and attention to detail. As recorded in the diary of
Brigadier Tewari, when HQ 101 Communication Zone Area moved from Tura on 13
December, the radio relay vehicles were held up at the ferry, leading to
disruption in communications. The radio relay link between HQ XXXIII Corps and
the HQ 20 Mountain Division also did not function for two days on 14 and 15
December, when the latter moved from Patiram to Gobindganj. The link became functional after the relay
station was shifted to Hilli on 15 December. Considering that radio relay
communications in the plains can be planned with a fair degree of certainty
with the help of path profiles and power balance calculations, the incorrect
siting of the relay station was an inexcusable lapse. As had happened in
Operation ‘Vijay’ in 1961, the breakdown of rearward communications from a
divisional headquarters was probably overlooked in the euphoria of victory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
reason for the breakdown of radio communications between HQ 95 Brigade and 2
Para after it was dropped near Tangail on 11 December appears to be due to the
failure of the battalion to switch on the radio sets. In this particular
instance, perhaps the lapse can be forgiven. As is well known, 2 Para was
tasked to capture the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Poongli</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> and intercept
enemy troops withdrawing from Kamalpur and Mymensingh. Immediately after
landing, the battalion rushed off to carry out its assigned task, without
waiting for the set piece drills that are done after a para drop. Due to the
drop having taken place in the afternoon instead of the morning, the battalion could
capture only 300 of the withdrawing enemy.
Had they stopped to erect the aerial and communicate on radio with 95
Brigade, perhaps the number of captured prisoners would have been even less. It
was the prerogative of CO 2 Para to decide which of the two was more important
– reaching the objective or passing a message to the rear. One can hardly fault
a commander for giving priority to his operational tasks in such a
situation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: 18.55pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operations in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangladesh</st1:place></st1:country-region> were characterized by
speedy advance across wide rivers, bypassing enemy opposition, use of heliborne
forces and exploitation of tactical opportunities as they arose. Corps of
Signals officers and personnel rose to the occasion and using bold and at times
unorthodox measures, ensured essential communications. As in previous
operations, it was the ‘Signalman’ who did us proud. Irrespective of his trade,
he did a magnificent job, ensuring that communications – line, radio, radio
relay, SDS – was always through. The dedication, professionalism and commitment
of signallers won accolades from commanders and staff at all levels. Without
being presumptuous, one can say that Signals deserve as much credit, if not
more, than any other arm or service, for the Indian Army’s splendid feat of
arms during the Indo- Pak War of 1971. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 18.55pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">End Notes – Chapter 6<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
chapter is largely based on Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao’s <i>Prepare or Perish</i>, (New Delhi, 1991); Lt Gen J.F.R. Jacob’s <i>Surrender in Dacca – Birth of a Nation,</i> (New Delhi, 1997);
Brigadier M.R. Narayanan’s <i>When</i> <i>Sparrows Flew Like Eagles – Memoirs of a
Signal Officer; </i>a tape recorded interview of Maj. Gen. K.K. Tewari;<i> </i>and personal accounts. Specific
references are given below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo37; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Maj. Gen. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Sukhwant Singh</st1:city>, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><i>India</i></st1:country-region></st1:place><i>’s Wars Since <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> - Volume 1, The Liberation of
Bangla Desh,</i> Lancer Publishers. <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1980, pp.54-56<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo37; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Maj Gen D.K. Palit, <i>The Lightning Campaign,</i> Thomson Press, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1972, p. 74<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -12.95pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo37; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Gen K.V. Krishna Rao, <i>Prepare or Perish</i>, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, pp.170-71<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l9 level1 lfo37; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">4.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Sukhwant Singh, pp.
71-73<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">5.
Personal account, Brigadier H.C.
Malhotra.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">6.
Personal account, Colonel M.
Sathesan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">7.
Personal account, Lt. Gen. S.R.R.
Aiyengar<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -18.0pt; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">8.
Personal account, Brigadier G.
Natarajan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -18.0pt; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">9.
Personal account, Lt. Col S.
Ambady<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">10. Major General K.K. Tewari, tape recorded interview. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -4.5pt 0.0001pt 36pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">11. Lt
Gen J.F.R. Jacob, <i>Surrender in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dacca</st1:place></st1:city> – Birth of a
Nation,</i> Manohar Publishers, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1997, p. 47<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -4.5pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: -18.0pt; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">12.
DO Letter No 00576/EGP/SO in C of <st1:date day="6" month="10" w:st="on" year="1971">6 October 1971</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">13.
Jacob, pp.71-77.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">14. <st1:place w:st="on">Krishna</st1:place> Rao, p. 176<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">15.
Jacob, p. 113<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">16.
<st1:place w:st="on">Krishna</st1:place>
Rao, pp. 177-180<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">17.
Maj. Gen. Lachhman Singh, <i>Victory in Bangla Desh</i>, Natraj
Publishers, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Dehra Dun</st1:place></st1:city>,
1981, pp. 157-8<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">18.
<st1:place w:st="on">Krishna</st1:place>
Rao, pp. 182-183<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">19.
Lachhman Singh, pp.207-208<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">20.
Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, <i>Leadership
in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers,</i> Sage Publications, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
2005, p. 323.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">21.
Personal Diary, Maj Gen. K.K. Tewari <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">22.
Tewari, tape recorded interview <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">23.
Personal Diary, Maj Gen. K.K. Tewari<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">24.
Personal account, Brigadier A.
Verma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">25.
Personal account, Maj. Gen. G.L.
Chadha. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">26.
Personal account, Maj. Gen. Hardayal
Singh<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">27. Personal
account, Maj. Gen. Yati Pratap.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">28.
Personal account, Brigadier D.B.
Lahiri.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">29.
Personal account, Lieutenant Colonel
Vinod Aggarwal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">30.
Personal account, Maj. Gen. Manmohan
Bhatia<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">31.
Personal account, Maj Gen. K.K.
Tewari<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">32.
Personal account, Brigadier P.K.
Ghosh <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: -4.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">33.
Brigadier M.R. Narayanan, <i>When</i> <i>Sparrows
Flew Like Eagles – Memoirs of a Signal Officer. </i>pp.<i> </i>23-24<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">34.
Narayanan, pp. 45-46<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">35.
Narayanan, p. 118<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">36. Personal account, Colonel M. A. Siddiqui<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm -4.5pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">37. Personal Account, Brigadier Charan Singh<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -4.5pt;">
<br /></div>
<br />
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<br /></div>
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veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-28652858243247465042016-01-16T07:09:00.001-08:002016-01-16T07:09:05.457-08:00Chapter 5 - THE INDO-PAK WAR (1965)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chapter
5 </span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE
INDO-PAK WAR (1965)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview – State of the Corps in 1965</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">.<b> </b></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OPERATIONS IN
KUTCH : <i>Op ‘Kabadi’ – Loss of Biar Bet –
Cease Fire & Op ‘Ablaze’</i>. SIGNALS IN THE KUTCH<b> </b>OPERATIONS : <i>Sigs Dte &
Southern Comd – ‘K’ Sector Sig Coy – 50 (I) Para Bde Sig Coy.</i> PAKISTAN’S
OPERATION ‘GIBRALTAR’ : <i>Activities of
Gibraltar Force – Capture of Hajipir Pass – Ops in Tithwal Sector</i>. SIGNALS
IN OPERATION GIBRALTAR : <i>19 Inf Div Sig
Regt – 68 (I) Inf Bde Sig Coy – 25 Inf Div Sig Regt – 163 Inf Bde Sig Sec – 191
(I) Inf Bde Sig Coy</i>. PAK OPERATION ‘GRAND SLAM’ & RESPONSE BY XV CORPS :
<i>Pak Offensive in Chhamb – The Battle of
OP Hill – The Kishanganga Bulge</i>. SIGNALS
IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’ - XV CORPS SECTOR : <i>Western Comd Sigs – Western Comd Sig Regt –
Western Comd Mob Sig Coy – XV Corps
Sigs – XV Corps Sig Regt – ‘Y’ Comn Z Sig Regt – ‘T’ Comn Z Sig Regt – ‘J’ Comn
Z Sig Regt – 19 Inf Div Sig Regt – 191 (I) Inf Bde Sig Coy - 10 Inf Div Sig
Regt – 41 (I) Inf Bde Sig Coy – 25 Inf
Div Sig Regt.</i> OPERATIONS IN XI CORPS SECTOR : <i>Planning and Preparatory Moves – 15 Inf Div – 7 Inf Div – 4 Mtn
Div – Battle of Asal Utar – 67
Inf Bde
– 23 Mtn Div</i>. SIGNALS
IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’- XI CORPS SECTOR : <i>XI Corps Sigs </i><i>– XI Corps
Sig Regt -‘Z’ Comn Z Sig Regt –15 Inf Div Sig Regt – 50 (I) Para Bde Sig
Coy – 7 Inf Div Sig Regt – 4 Mtn Div Sig Regt – 2 (I) Armd Bde Sig Coy</i>. I
CORPS OPERATIONS IN SIALKOT SECTOR : <i>Planning
and Build up for Op ‘Nepal’ – 1 Armd Div – 6
Mtn Div – 26 Inf Div – The
Cease-Fire.</i> SIGNALS IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’-
I CORPS SECTOR. : <i>I</i><i> Corps Sigs – I Corps
Sig Regt – 6 Mtn Div Sig Regt – 26 Inf Div Sig Regt – 1 Armd Div Sig Regt – 14
Inf Div Sig Regt – 1 Air Sp Sig Regt – Air Fmn Sigs</i>. OPERATIONS IN
RAJASTHAN SECTOR : <i>11 Inf Div</i>. SIGNALS IN RAJASTHAN SECTOR<b> : </b><i>11 Inf Div Sig Regt</i>. CONCLUSION<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
genesis of the Indo-Pak War of 1965 lay in Pakistan’s desire to fulfill her
ambition to annex Jammu & Kashmir and complete the task that remained
unfinished in 1947 when hordes of tribal raiders had entered the State and
reached the outskirts of Srinagar. The military aid received by Pakistan from
USA; India’s defeat at the hands of China in 1962 and her subsequent
pre-occupation with her northern borders; the completion of the Ichhogil Canal
astride the road axis to Lahore; and<b> </b>American
military aid to Pakistan changed the military balance between India and
Pakistan, giving the latter an impression that the time was ripe for inflicting
a crushing defeat on her bigger but militarily ‘weaker’ neighbour. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
a prelude to the main offensive, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> carried out an incursion
in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> in April 1965 with the intention of
testing her newly acquired American weaponry, especially the Patton tank, and
to gauge <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
reaction. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
mobilized her troops and moved them to concentration areas near the border in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>, as part of Operation ‘Ablaze’. After some skirmishes and the loss of a few
posts like Biar Bet the hostilities in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>
ended and a cease-fire was accepted by both sides, largely due to the efforts
of the British Prime Minister. After a meeting between Prime Minster Lal
Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">London</st1:place></st1:city> in June 1965 both sides agreed to
withdraw their troops from the border and the tension ended. With rare
prescience, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
allowed her main strike force, 1 Armoured Division, to remain in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> instead of withdrawing it to its base in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon afterwards <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> launched Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>’, sending thousands of infiltrators into Jammu
& Kashmir in the first week of August 1965 to carry out sabotage,
subversion and indoctrination of the local population, encouraging them to
overthrow Indian rule. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
launched counter-infiltration operations and liquidated most of the raiders,
with a large number going back or being captured. Some important military
offensive operations were conducted by Indian forces in Kargil, Tithwal and
Punch sectors to seal the infiltration routes. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> also captured the
strategically important <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hajipir</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> in August 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the failure of Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>’, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> went ahead with the second
phase of her offensive, code named Operation ‘Grand Slam’. This was a bold
armoured thrust aimed at the capture of Akhnur, near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>, in order to effectively isolate
Naushara, Rajauri and Punch and threaten the Indian line of communications to
the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The Pak offensive was launched
on 1September 1965 and Chhamb fell to the enemy on the first day itself.
However, Pakistani forces could not maintain the momentum of the offensive which
came to an abrupt halt on 6 September when <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> launched her own offensive in
the Lahore Sector by XI Corps followed a day later by the I Corps offensive in
the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:place></st1:city>
sector, as part of Operation ‘Riddle’. This forced <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> to pull out the bulk of
her armour and artillery as well as some infantry, virtually stalling her
offensive in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The offensive by XI Corps started
on <st1:date day="6" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">6 September 1965</st1:date>
and that of I Corps a day later. The three divisions of XI Corps – 15, 7 and 4
– commenced their advance concurrently on different axes achieving complete
surprise on the enemy. A brigade of 15
Division crossed the Icchogil canal and reached the outskirts of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>. However, the division
did exploit its initial success due to a defeatist attitude in the higher leadership,
resulting in the replacement of the divisional commander. The only major
success was the capture of Dograi by 3 Jat on <st1:date day="22" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">22 September 1965</st1:date>, in which the unit suffered
heavy casualties. Advancing on the Khalra-Lahore axis, 7 Division had some
initial successes, including the capture of Barki on 11 September after a stiff
fight. 4 Infantry Division ran into the enemy’s 1 Armoured Division which had
concentrated at Kasur for a major offensive into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This inadvertent spoiling
attack by 4 Division delayed the Pak offensive by 24 hours. This enabled 4
Infantry Division and 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade to take up defences in
area Asal Uttar behind Khemkaran, where in an important action fought on 10
September, almost four tank regiments of the enemy were destroyed, rendering
the Pak Armoured Division virtually ineffective for the rest of the war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The main Indian offensive by the
newly raised I Corps, comprising 1 Armoured Division and three
infantry/mountain divisions – 6, 14 and 26 -
to cut off <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:place></st1:city>
from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city> was
launched on 8 September. Both 6 and 26
Divisions secured their initial objectives but the progress of 1 Armoured
Division was slow, mainly due to lack of bold higher leadership and
coordination between the brigades. After a major tank engagement on 11
September, 1 Armoured Division captured Phillora. Two days later, 6 Mountain
Division captured Pagowal. The next major armour engagement occurred at
Chawinda where a series of actions was fought between 14 and 17 September. The cease fire was announced two days later,
ending operations in this sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the Rajasthan sector which had
been placed under Southern Command just before the commencement of the 1965 war,
some minor operations were conducted by 11 Infantry Division, which did not
result in any significant gains. While Indian troops captured <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
Pak forces were able to capture Munabao on our side.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The cease fire was declared on <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23 September 1965</st1:date>, after a UN
resolution that was accepted by both sides. Subsequently, the <st1:place w:st="on">Soviet
Union</st1:place> offered to mediate. Prime Minister Shastri and President
Ayub met at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tashkent</st1:place></st1:city>
on <st1:date day="4" month="1" w:st="on" year="1966">4 January 1966</st1:date>
and signed an agreement, giving up all territory captured or occupied during
the war. The crucial Hajipir pass was returned to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> for the second time, while
Pak forces vacated all area captured by them in Chhamb. Unfortunately, the
Prime Minister died in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tashkent</st1:place></st1:city>
a day after signing the agreement. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Corps of Signals played a
prominent role in the Indo-Pak War of 1965. The performance of signals units is
all sectors was, by and large, excellent and was commended by the formation
commanders. However, there were a few instances of communication failure,
mostly at brigade and battalion level. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For ease of understanding, the
operations have been covered sector wise, with the operational details being
covered first, followed by the activities of Signals in the particular sector
or corps zone. Before dealing with the actual history of the war, the state of
the Corps in 1965 has been described briefly. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">State of the Corps in 1965<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lines,
wireless/radio, very limited radio relay and signal despatch service (SDS) were
the means of communications in use during the 1965 War. Field signal units were authorised line,
wireless (mostly high frequency) and SDS resources in their establishments.
Radio relay as a means of communication was not authorised to field signal
units, except mountain divisional signal regiments. A few radio relay sections
had been raised, but these were mostly for line of communication functions. In the mountain divisions, signal units were
equipped with better radio equipment, cables and above all radio relay. The
brigade signal sections were upgraded to brigade signal companies. However,
reduced transport affected their capability when deployed in the plains. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lines
were usually the primary means of communication in all operations of war except
in mobile battle. These included permanent lines (PL) hired from Department of
Posts & Telegraphs (P&T) or Army owned; and field cables (field/carrier
quad, D3/D8 as also assault cables). Cable WD1 with sleeves jointing and a
proportion on dispenser packs began to be received as part of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> military
aid, after the 1962 war and later manufactured in the country. The field cables
were laid from vehicles and on man pack/ animal pack, depending on the terrain.
In snow bound areas yaks and in the desert camels/camel carts were also used at
times. PVC cable was used for multi air line (MAL) routes on poles. Carrier
equipment could be mounted on such routes. In forward areas, at places, earth
return circuits and magneto exchanges were still in use.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Carrier
equipment such as apparatus carrier telephony
(ACT) 1+4, ACT 1+1 and voice
frequency telegraphy (VFT) equipment such as S+DX, transistorised versions, manufactured by
Indian Telephone Industries (ITI) Bangalore started to replace old valve based
similar equipment of World War II vintage. The new versions were much lighter
and easier to align. A very useful but old piece of equipment was balance and
bypass filter unit (BBFU), with which the audio channel could be dropped at
intermediate locations while the carrier channel was strapped through. Vintage
equipment like superposing units was also in use. Carrier and VFT equipment
were mounted in specialist vehicles called TEVs (terminal equipment vehicles).
TEV Type ‘C’ was used at corps level and TEV Type ‘D’ at division. Though
teleprinters were in use at division and upwards, the fullerphone was still in
service mostly in brigades and installations having less signal traffic, for
clearing messages using Morse code.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio,
more widely known as wireless, was an important means of signal communications
for the field force, as alternate to lines. At corps, division and brigade,
high frequency wireless were in use. Forward of battalion, both high frequency
(HF) and very high frequency (VHF) sets were authorised. The wireless sets in
the HF range were medium power sets SCR 399 and RS 53, both of World War II
vintage. Wireless sets C11/R210 and 62 were the low power sets in use, with a
few radio sets 19 and 52, work horses of World War II. After the Sino-Indian
conflict of 1962, some mountain divisions were equipped with the AN/GRC 9,
received as part of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region>
military aid, which could also be powered with hand generators. VHF sets AN/PRC
25 and AN/PRC 10 were also inducted in mountain divisions. The VHF set C42 was
in use in some armoured formations having Vijayanta tanks. Radio sets 31 and 88
were authorized to infantry battalions. Generally, the wireless equipment was
bulky and heavy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Radio relay had been used by the US
Army Signal Corps during World War II to a limited extent. A few AN/TRC radio
relay sets were available to the Corps in late 1950s. These sets were difficult
to align and not stable. Trials with new radio relay equipment were undertaken
in early 1960s after which C41/R222 started being received. Radio set FM 200
was also under trial. A radio relay section was authorized in the establishment
of a mountain division signal regiment. In1965, radio relay resources were
limited and were mostly kept centralised. R’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> had a
few radio relay sections, which were held centrally as Army HQ reserve.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> According to the prevailing law, the
Department of Posts & Telegraphs (P&T) had a monopoly over all
communications in the country and no other organisation could set up any static
communication network. Telecommunication equipment such as switchboards was
manufactured in P&T workshops. Public sector companies such Indian
Telephone Industries and Bharat Electronics, manufactured carrier and radio
equipment. The Corps of Signals was heavily dependent on the P&T and its
infrastructure for back bone/static communications. Similar was the case with
exchanges, telephones and local lines. There was structured and formalised
liaison between Corps of Signals and P&T officers at various levels, from
Army HQ downwards. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Being a commercial organisation,
the P&T Department was not keen to develop line and other communications in
border areas. The Army was therefore
permitted to construct permanent line routes for its use in such areas. There
was a spurt in construction of permanent line routes by the by Corps after the
1962 War, as new roads were constructed and troops deployed along the northern
borders. The scheme was termed BOPEL (Border Permanent Lines). Similar action
was also taken in remote areas in Jammu &Kashmir, <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>,
Rajasthan, <st1:place w:st="on">Gujarat</st1:place> and the North-East. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
1965, P&T long distance communications in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> were derived on coaxial
cables, permanent line routes and a few microwave links. However, in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>, Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir, where most of
the fighting took place, there was hardly any microwave link till then.
Circuits were extended from P&T carrier stations to Signals installations
mostly on underground copper cables. A
few Signals personnel were located at P&T carrier stations for liaison, to
expedite rectification of faults and reorientation of communications. Signals
personnel also ensured that Army’s channels were not unauthorisedly monitored.
In field areas, at places, P&T carrier and VFT stations were housed inside
Army premises.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Corps of Signals had set up its own strategic radio network as standby/
complementary to P&T based backbone communications. In addition to linking
stations/formations in the chain of command, certain important stations from
internal security point of view were also linked on STRAN as also locations
where major Army training establishments were located. Circuits derived on
STRAN were extended to signal centres over underground cables/ permanent line
and remote controlled from there. Most of the radio links worked on schedule
but were periodically fully loaded with traffic. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Medium
and high power radio sets like SWAB 8, SWAB 11, HS 31, 53 (all British) and SCR
399 were in use offering radio telephony, radio telegraphy and Morse facilities.
Separate transmitter and receiver stations existed at important military
locations, well away from inhabited areas, spread over scores of acres, to
accommodate equipment, personnel and large HF aerials like rhombic and folded
dipoles. Overhead protection was catered for a portion of transmitters/
receivers as a safety against air attacks. Defence Security Corps personnel
were authorised to guard such installations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Corps of Signals operated a countrywide train despatch service (TDS) to most
military stations in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
connected by rail and carried official mail. Private mail was handled by the
Army Postal Service. Compartments were reserved in trains and mailbags were
exchanged at railway stations enroute, with personnel of local signal units.
Where train services were not available, Army vehicles were used to carry mail
and the service was called MDS (motor despatch service). In cases, mail was
also carried in aircraft, which was termed ADS (air despatch service). When signal
message traffic was excessive, messages of lower precedence were also sent
through SDS and termed ‘live traffic’. It reduced load on signal centre staff
including cipher staff. Within formations, SDS was run using vehicles. While
SDS runs were on schedule basis, normally once or twice a day, special despatch
riders (SDRs) mounted on motorcycles/ jeeps cleared important mail including
operational orders/instructions, as and when need arose. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There were no secrecy devices in
use over P&T and Army’s systems and radio equipment in 1965. The only
instrument available was the archaic Ultaphone, which provided very low-grade
privacy over telephones. The scales of issue of even this equipment were
meagre. The enemy could therefore pick up a great deal of intelligence by
monitoring our radio and radio relay links and at times by tapping lines in
forward areas. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> World
War II vintage book cipher and Type ‘X’ machines were still in use. The
encryption and decryption process was slow and time consuming. As tension along
the borders built up, the cipher traffic increased considerably and the limited
cipher staff could not cope up with the load. To obviate this, security
classification of telegraph circuits derived on lines using VFT equipment was
upgraded, taking into account the security in the areas through which the lines
passed. Also restrictions were placed on officers authorised to originate
messages<b>.</b></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">1</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 108.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <b><u>OPERATIONS
IN <st1:place w:st="on">KUTCH</st1:place> <o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operation
‘Kabadi’<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
launched the operations in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> with the two
fold aim of gauging <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
reaction and testing equipment received from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>, especially the much
vaunted Patton tanks. The <st1:place w:st="on">Rann of Kutch</st1:place> was
selected because it offered several advantages. A desolate wasteland along the
undemarcated border between <st1:place w:st="on">Gujarat</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Sind</st1:place>, it was the scene of a dormant territorial dispute
that provided an alibi for the venture. The area was sparsely populated with
very little military presence on the Indian side due to absence of roads and
administrative problems. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
had better communications and logistics, with the major cantonment of Badin
with an airfield located close to the border. The timing was carefully chosen
in summer, since the onset of the monsoons made the area impassable for several
months, ruling out the movement of reinforcements by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In January 1965 a company of the
Indus Rangers of Pakistan occupied Kanjarkot, a ruined fort about a mile south
of the border on the north-western fringes of the Rann. A meeting of the
commanders of the border posts held on 15 February failed to resolve the issue.
It was then decided to evict the Pakistani intrusion from Kanjarkot and 31
Infantry Brigade was ordered to move from Ahmedabad to Bhuj. On 21 February
Major General P.C. Gupta, GOC Maharashtra & Gujarat Area issued Operational
Instruction No 1 (Operation ‘Kabadi’) to Brigadier S.S.M. Pahalajani, Commander
31 Infantry Brigade, to evict the Pakistanis from Kanjarkot. An infantry
battalion (17 Rajputana Rifles less a company) was already in Bhuj. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
retaliated by moving 8 Frontier Force of 51 Pak Infantry Brigade Group to Kadan
on 6 March and reinforcing Kanjarkot and Rahim-ki-Bazar. The Indus Rangers were placed under the
operational command of Major General Tikka Khan, GOC Pak 8 Division, who was
tasked to take retaliatory measures against the Indians. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lieutenant Colonel (later General
and Chief of Army Staff) K. Sundarji, commanding 1 Mahar and the officiating
brigade commander, recommended the immediate capture of Kanjarkot but this was
not approved by the government. Instead, it was decided to set up the Sardar post,
manned by the State Reserve Police about 500 yards to the south-west of
Kanjarkot, to block the Pakistani route of ingress. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> retaliated by establishing
a platoon post at Ding, to the north-east of Sardar post. On 9 April <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
launched an attack on Sardar post, which was beaten back with heavy casualties.
The Pakistani casualties were 34 killed including four officers, while the Indians
lost four policemen killed and five wounded. Though the attack was repulsed,
the police personnel withdrew to Vigokot and Sardar post was occupied by 1
Mahar from Khavda on <st1:date day="12" month="4" w:st="on" year="1965">12
April 1965</st1:date>. Shortly afterwards Brigadier Pahalajani, who had
returned and assumed command of 31 Brigade, ordered 1 Mahar to vacate Sardar post.
At this stage there was a reorganisation of the Indian forces in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>. Kilo Sector
under Major General P.O. Dunn was set up to command the Indian forces in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>. 50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade was moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> and placed under command Kilo Sector<b>.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Loss of Biar Bet<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -13.5pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -13.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the
unsuccessful attempt to capture Sardar post, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> reinforced the sector with
an infantry brigade and two regiments of armour. On the night of 23 April, Pakistani forces
launched an attack supported by armour on Sera Bet held by B Company of 3 Para,
which had to withdraw in the face of assault by tanks. The Pakistanis suffered
almost 100 casualties, killed and wounded, while the Indian casualties were
relatively minor – one killed, two wounded and nine missing. On the night of 26
April Pakistani forces attacked Biar Bet, which was held by A Company of 3
Para. The attack was launched by armour in the assault role accompanied by
infantry mounted in armoured personnel carriers. Again the Indians fought
valiantly but could not withstand the weight of the armour and were forced to
withdraw. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A unique feature of the operations in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>
was that neither side used its air force. It is reported that the Pak Air
Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan rang up his Indian counterpart, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh on 14 April 1965 and
suggested that aircraft of both countries should not fly over the ‘disputed’
area of Kanjarkot as this might escalate the conflict. This was agreed to by
Arjan Singh with the proviso that transport aircraft and helicopters would
continue to be used for supply and casualty evacuation. As a result, none of
the two sides used aircraft in an offensive role during the conflict.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -13.5pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cease Fire & Operation ‘Ablaze’<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The occupation of Biar Bet by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> alarmed Indian political
leaders and the public, who recalled the defeat suffered by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> at the
hands of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
less than three years earlier. There was considerable pressure on Prime
Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to evict the Pakistani aggression from Indian
soil. The Army Chief, General J.N. Chaudhury, advised the government not to
undertake military operations in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> as this
would result in pulling out troops from the <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
and the North East, which were strategically more important. The <st1:place w:st="on">Rann of Kutch</st1:place> had no strategic or tactical significance
and after a month the area would become impassable due to the monsoons. He
recommended that if necessary, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
should react by launching an offensive against <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>,
which would result in more profitable gains and force <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> to
vacate the incursion in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>. Having seen the
result of disregarding military advice in 1962, Shastri accepted the advice of
the Chief. Shortly after wards, Operation ‘Ablaze’ was put into effect, under
which Indian formations moved to their battle locations in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>.
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
reacted by a reciprocal deployment of troops on her side of the border. During
this otherwise peaceful confrontation, Brigadier Vijay Ghai captured three
Pakistani posts in the Kargil sector on <st1:date day="17" month="5" w:st="on" year="1965">17 May 1965</st1:date>. These posts were later vacated after the
cease fire came into effect<b>.</b></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">2</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The deployment of troops by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> along
their borders was viewed with alarm by the Western powers. Due to the efforts
of Prime Minister Harold Wilson of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>, both countries agreed to a
cease fire which came into effect on <st1:date day="29" month="4" w:st="on" year="1965">29 April 1965</st1:date>. In June 1965 Prime Minister Shastri and President
Ayub met during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">London</st1:place></st1:city> and signed a
general agreement on the demarcation of the boundary in the <st1:place w:st="on">Rann
of Kutch</st1:place>. By July 1965 both sides had withdrawn their troops to
their permanent locations. However, as a mark of prudence, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> allowed 1
Armoured Division, its main strike formation, to remain in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
instead of returning to its base at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>,
which was located at a considerable distance from the border. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
suffered more casualties in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> (34 killed
and 150 wounded) than <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
(15 killed and 40 wounded), it regarded itself as the victor. More important,
it had been able to gauge the strength and resolve of the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
political leadership and her armed forces. The lack of criticism from the USA
on the use of American equipment such as the Patton tanks in spite of an
undertaking not to use them against India gratified Pakistan, who was now
convinced that she could do so again if the need arose. The lack of a military
response from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was seen as a sign of weakness of the political and military leadership. Most important,
the Pakistani soldier felt that he had got the better of the Indian <i>jawan</i>, confirming the impression formed
after the performance of the latter in 1962 in the conflict with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The
stage was set for the Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>’,
the ambitious plan to annex the <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<h4 align="center" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">SIGNALS IN THE <st1:place w:st="on">KUTCH</st1:place> OPERATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></u></h4>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals
Directorate &</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<u>Southern Command</u> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Major General R.N. Batra, O.B.E. was
the SO-in-C and Brigadier I.D. Verma was the Deputy Director Signals. Colonel
K.S. Garewal, subsequently replaced by Colonel Harchand Singh, was the Deputy
Director Telecommunications, responsible for all communications and equipment
in the Army. From February 1965, when the trouble in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>
started, all out efforts were made under by them to provide signal resources in
terms of manpower and equipment to Southern Command. Urgent action was taken to
raise new signal units viz. I Corps Signal Regiment, 10 and 11 Divisional
Signal Regiments. To meet any war situation that might arise, steps were also
taken to procure additional equipment and make up deficiencies of men and
equipment in units. Meetings were held with P&T Department officials to
arrange additional circuits, exchanges and additional permanent line stores and
spares for P&T equipment. General Batra and his staff visited formations
and signal units to ascertain their operational requirements and ensure maximum
operational readiness. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier
Prem Singh was CSO Southern Command, located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. He did not have many field signal
units in the command, as the operational role was limited. Once the trouble in <st1:place w:st="on">Rann of Kutch</st1:place> started, he had to gather resources from
all over including from other commands and Army HQ to meet the sudden
requirement. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">‘<b><u>K’ Sector Signal Company<o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When
the operations in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> commenced in early
1965, there was no field formation to control them. As mentioned earlier, the
first operational instruction was issued by HQ Maharashtra & Gujarat Area
on <st1:date day="21" month="2" w:st="on" year="1965">21 February 1965</st1:date>.
Even after the establishment of ‘K’ Sector under Major General P.O. Dunn, there
was no dedicated signal unit allotted to the force. The responsibility for planning
communications for the operations fell on Lieutenant Colonel H.C. Heffernan,
Deputy Chief Signal Officer (DCSO) Maharashtra & Gujarat Area. Subsequently
Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Unni was appointed DCSO ‘K’ Sector. Based on a signal
appreciation prepared by Colonel Heffernan, the ‘K’ Sector Signal Company was
organised on an ad-hoc basis. In
addition, the resources of 31 Brigade Signal Company, commanded by Major
Ganapathy and later of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company
commanded by Major Y.S. Awasthy, were also pooled for communication tasks in
this Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 18.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 18.0pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major R.K. Verma was commanding
‘K’ Sector Signal Company. Captain Bhupal, the SO 3 (Signals) in HQ Southern
Command was posted as the company officer. He was replaced by Captain S.K.
Paranjape in May 1965. <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Captain</st1:city>
<st1:state w:st="on">S.C.</st1:state></st1:place> Ahuja was also posted to the
company as officer-in-charge signal centre, Khavda. Lieutenant Harbans Singh, Technical
Officer Telecom (TOT) was based at Bhuj and was responsible for engineering
extension of circuits from the P&T hub at Bhuj to Khavda. The company also
had two subalterns, Lieutenants S.S. Shina and S. Rao. These two dynamic and diligent young officers
were the backbone of all the field work including line construction and
maintenance, radio relay engineering, routine administration etc. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 18.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 18.0pt; mso-add-space: auto;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 18.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 18.0pt; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">K Sector Signal Company
was an ad-hoc mix of personnel, equipment and vehicles milked from about two
dozen units mostly in Southern Command.
These resources were either on loan or attachment for various periods
during the period February to July 1965, and lacked cohesiveness and
commitment. The state of morale was also low, the administration of personnel
being in a pathetic state. The men were
dispersed at various detachments in an area 150 X 30 kilometres with hardly any
communication amongst themselves. Captain
S.K. Paranjape recalls spending a whole day carrying cash in the morning from
Khavda on the pay day and distributing pay to about a dozen detachments located
at different places along a route of 150 kilometres and returning late in the
evening with some of the cash back from them to send their money orders. The procedure was repeated every month. Officers spent endless hours in making
parade states of personnel and equipment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Due
to sparse population in the region, the P&T Department had not developed
communications in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> and Barmer. The first requirement was to provide reliable
line communications from Bhuj to Vigakot, the likely battle location of HQ 31
Infantry Brigade. Fortunately, a P&T permanent line (PL) route existed
between Bhuj and Khavda. To bridge the remaining distance of 65 kilometres between
Khavda and Vigakot, a poled PVC route was ordered to be constructed within a
week. Captain V.A. Balasubramanyam, who was made responsible for the task,
recalls that the construction of the route was not an easy task. The personnel
were drawn from several units in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. Movement beyond Khavda was restricted and could only
be carried out at night. Since troops and military vehicles were not permitted beyond
Khavda, the personnel had to wear civil clothes and use civilian transport. There was no vegetation anywhere and direction
had to be maintained with the help of a compass. Being close to the border, there was a risk
of straying across if they lost their way. Within a week the route was completed
and put through. The line was laid initially on ground and subsequently built
up into a poled PVC route. Carrier and VFT equipment were mounted at both ends
to derive additional channels. The channel from Vigakot was directly extended
to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. Subsequently this line served as the main
artery for operations in this sector.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">3</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-size: 18.0pt;">A line route being constructed in the Kutch Sector,
1965</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
a visit by the SO-in-C to Bhuj on 12 April, some readjustments were made to
improve the communication support being provided to ‘K’ sector. A command net
with control at Khavda where HQ ‘K’ Sector was located was established with 31
Infantry Brigade and 50 Parachute Brigade as out stations. In addition a direct
radio link was established with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and a radio net linking Khavda, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> and
Bhuj, all using radio set SCR 399. Forward radio links used radio sets 19/19HP
and 62. A radio relay chain linking Bhuj with Vigokot via Khavda was
established after the arrival of radio relay sets from the Trial and
Demonstration Unit at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
under Captain (later Lieutenant General and SO-in-C) S.C. Ahuja. SDS was provided between Poona, Bombay,
Ahmedabad, Bhuj and thence onwards to
Khavda, using a mix of rail and air despatch services, mechanical
transport being used forward of Bhuj. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the cease fire in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>,
between 9 May and <st1:date day="5" month="6" w:st="on" year="1965">5 June 1965</st1:date>,
Major Bhupal Singh and his men constructed an AB/BC copper route between Khavda
and Dharamsala. Due to the swampy ground, 120 swamp sockets were used in a
short distance of eight kilometres. Another 48- kilometre long route using 70
lb. cadmium copper was constructed between Bela and Shanthalpur in 14 days,
starting <st1:date day="16" month="6" w:st="on" year="1965">16 June 1965</st1:date>. About 20 kilometres of the route was laid
over marshy ground, using 5½ foot long angle iron pickets, with the rest of the
route being constructed on multi air line (MAL) poles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This
company was commanded by Major Y.S. Awasthy with Captain M.S. Ahluwalia as the second-in-command.
The other officers in the company were Captain D.K. Uberoy, Lieutenant M.
Bhatia and Second-Lieutenants C.J. Appachu and Krishan. The company was in Pauri in the Garhwal
Himalayas attending Exercise ‘Pratigya’ along with the brigade headquarters in
early April 1965 when it received orders to move to Ahmedabad for the <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> operations. Returning post haste to its base at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> on 10 April, the
advance party under Captain M.S. Ahluwalia was despatched next morning, the
rest of the company moving by rail two days later along with HQ 50 (Independent)
Parachute Brigade. On 18 April the
vehicle column under Lieutenant M. Bhatia and Second-Lieutenant C.J. Appachu
left Ahmedabad and concentrated at Khavda by 19 April. The company had to lay
lines between the brigade headquarters and battalions as well as between
battalion headquarters and the 10-12 companies deployed 5-6 miles away. On 23
April Second Lieutenant Appachu, Naik Surjit Singh and Naik Surat Singh were
laying the lines from Dharamsala (3 Para) to Pt. 84 and Biar Bet (C and D
Companies of 3 Para). On reaching Pt. 84, Appachu noticed some men in Khaki and
realised that they were Pak personnel, Indian troops having vacated the area
under pressure during the night. He was ordered to fall back and had a narrow
escape. Describing the incident, Major General M. Bhatia writes: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 27.9pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“The line laying
commenced in the evening of <st1:date day="23" month="4" w:st="on" year="1965">23
April 1965</st1:date>. It should have finished well before mid night, but
there was no news of Appachu. I then moved out for a search and found Appachu
and the line party around Point 84 searching for someone to hand over the line
to. The gunners arrived next morning and all hell broke loose. A Pak helicopter
arrived on the scene and people panicked, the gunners left their guns and ran
back, spreading alarms of an attack. Utter chaos ensued. Meanwhile Appachu and
the line party retrieved what they could to safer distances. This included a
gun of the 17 Para Field Regiment</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">”.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In view of the changed operational
situation, on <st1:date day="24" month="4" w:st="on" year="1965">24 April 1965</st1:date>
Captain Ahluwalia moved to Dharamsala and line parties under Naib Subedar Sohan
Singh and Naik Balaram laid lines to 2 Para and 4 Para. In the evening, 11
wireless detachments and one battery charging detachment were also moved to
Dharamsala. By 0800 hours on 25 April the advance signal centre and all radio
and line communications were established at Dharamsala. The next few days were
spent in burying the lines, constructing over head shelters for weapon pits,
signal centre and the wireless pit. On 11 May Brigadier Prem Singh, CSO Southern
Command, visited the company and gave a pat on the back to the linemen and
operators for their splendid performance. On 19 May Major Vinod Kumar, the OC-
designate, arrived at Khavda. He took
over command of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company on 23 May
1965, relieving Major Y.S. Awasthy who
proceeded to take over command of 10 Mountain Division Signal Regiment on
promotion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An
interesting incident pertaining to that period has been narrated Major General
Vinod Kumar in these words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .9pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At Dharmsala, all the
units deployed themselves along a nullah and its branches parking most of their
stores and heavy/bulky stuff on the nullah bed. Just as we were all
congratulating each other and patting ourselves on the back for excellent camouflage and concealment
effect, that night there was a sudden ‘cloud burst’, and in no time the nullah
was all over with torrential floods and current speed of tens of knots.
Everything was washed away – ammunition boxes, vehicles, rations, POL barrels,
and lots more (some of these items were recovered two days later several
kilometres downstream). <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .9pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Brigade
Command Post, the Brigade Officers Mess and the Brigade Commander’s caravan had
been sited on a small island inside the nullah. They were the first to get cut
off. There was constant danger of the Brigade Commander and many others getting
washed away too in the swirling waters constantly on the rise.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .9pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Fortunately, the
field cables laid for local lines held on and the exchange was functional all
this while. The rescue parties were organised hurriedly, who moved holding the
cable, braving the fury of the flood and brought back all the beleaguered personnel
to safety. This incident remained a hot topic of casual conversation (and brag
too) with several variations even at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>
till we all got engrossed with Operation ‘Riddle’. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: center;">
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">PAKISTAN</span></u></b></st1:place></st1:country-region><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">’S OPERATION ‘<st1:place w:st="on">GIBRALTAR</st1:place>’ <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 3.75pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Activities of <st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>
Force <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>’
was the code name given to the audacious Pakistani plan to seize Jammu & Kashmir
by force. According to the plan, several small groups of armed infiltrators
were to cross the Cease Fire Line and enter the Valley between 1 and <st1:date day="5" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">5 August 1965</st1:date>.
Simultaneously, Pakistani attacks would be launched in the Jammu Sector, tying
up Indian forces in Chhamb and isolating Rajauri and Punch. The Jammu-Srinagar
and Srinagar-Kargil roads would be cut, isolating <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>, which would be captured with the
help of the local population. The Gibraltar Force comprised almost 9,000 men,
drawn from the Azad Kashmir battalions, Special Service Group and Mujahids.
They were divided into a number of columns or forces, named after well known
Islamic heroes such as Tariq, Qasim, Khalid, Salahuddin, Nusrat, Ghaznavi,
Murtaza and Babar. The operation was under the command of Major General Akhtar
Husain Malik, GOC Pakistani Forces in Pak Occupied Kashmir.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">4</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>’ was daring and brilliantly conceived. However,
it had an inauspicious beginning. On <st1:date day="5" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">5 August 1965</st1:date> two armed
strangers wearing green <i>salwar kameez</i>
uniforms accosted a Kashmiri lad named Mohammed Din who was grazing his cattle
near Gulmarg and offered him 400 rupees in exchange for some information. The
young man agreed, and returning ostensibly to do the needful, rushed to the
police station at Tangmarg. The information soon reached the Army which
promptly sent a patrol that neutralized the infiltrators. In a similar incident
in the Mendhar Sector, some suspicious looking armed men offered a bribe to a
local named Wazir Mohammed, who agreed to get the information but made his way
instead to HQ 120 Infantry Brigade which sent a patrol of platoon strength
under Captain C.N. Singh to investigate. In the ensuing encounter with the
infiltrators the officer and three Indian soldiers were killed, the raiders
escaping after leaving a large amount of ammunition and personal equipment.
Three days later two Pakistani officers, Captains Ghulam Hussain and Mohammad
Sajjad were captured near Narian. Their interrogation revealed that they were
the leading elements of the ambitious plan to capture Jammu & Kashmir –
Operation ‘Gibraltar’ – that had been planned several months earlier and forces for which were trained at various
locations in Pak Occupied Kashmir from May 1965 onwards.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">5</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though surprise was lost on <st1:date day="5" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">5 August 1965</st1:date>, the infiltrating columns
succeeded in entering <st1:place w:st="on">Indian territory</st1:place> at
several points and became active from 6 August onwards. The Tariq Force damaged several bridges on
the Kargil - <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
highway, raided the Border Roads camp at Doras and damaged the Ganderbal
powerhouse and waterworks near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>.
The Qasim Force entered the Gurais Sector and raided HQ 268 Infantry Brigade
and a gun position. In the Tithwal Sector the Khalid Force attacked the base
camp of 8 Kumaon at Naugam and killed the CO, Lieutenant Colonel M.V. Gore. It
also raided an ammunition dump at Chowkibal and a vehicle convoy. Entering the Valley through Gulmarg, the
Salahuddin Force raided a police station in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> and an ammunition depot at Khundru,
in addition to fomenting incidents in Pahalgam, Anantnag, Shupian and Badgam.
Some infiltrators fired on the airfield, airport road and Tattoo ground at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>, creating panic
among the civilian population. The Nusrat, Ghaznavi and Babar forces operated
in Punch, Rajauri and Chhamb areas and succeeded in establishing sanctuaries in
Budil, Mandi and Riasi.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">6</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Overcoming
the initial shock, Indian troops reacted swiftly. Some battalions of the Punjab
Armed Police were flown into <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
on 7 August followed by others by road. On <st1:date day="11" month="8" w:st="on" year="163">11 August, 163</st1:date> Infantry Brigade arrived in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> from Leh. In
addition, two additional battalions – 4 Sikh Light Infantry and 2/9 Gorkha
Rifles were moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>.
41 Infantry Brigade from Palampur was moved to Tangmarg and 52 Infantry Brigade
was moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
to carry out anti-infiltration operations under 25 Infantry Division in Rajauri
Sector. Even as the Army was grappling with the situation, the State Government
panicked and sent an urgent request to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
that the Army should take over the State and declare martial law. After
consulting the Army and Corps Commanders, Lieutenant Generals Harbaksh Singh and
K.S. Katoch, the Army Chief advised the Government that this was not necessary
and adequate measures were being taken to restore the situation in the State.
To relieve 19 Infantry Division from security duties and permit it to undertake
counter-infiltration tasks in the Valley, HQ SRI Force was established in
Srinagar on 14 August under the command of Major General Umrao Singh, the
tactical headquarters of 19 Infantry
Division moving back to Baramula. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 3.75pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 15 August
there was a major incident in the Chhamb sector that witnessed the clash of
regular troops from both sides. In an attempt to perk up the spirits of the
disheartened infiltrators <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
launched a limited offensive supported by heavy artillery, which shelled the
Indian post at Dewa, where an Indian artillery dump was located. A stray shell
killed Brigadier B.F. Masters, Commander 191 Infantry Brigade, along with
several other officers of the brigade orders group. Four officers, one JCO and four
OR were killed, while two officers and 38 OR were wounded. Most of the
casualties were from 14 Field Regiment, whose six guns were put out of action.
Brigadier Manmohan Singh, Commander 162 Infantry Brigade was immediately moved
to Jaurian to take over 191 Infantry Brigade, which was reinforced with another
battalion, 2 Sikh, from 26 Infantry Division.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">7</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 3.75pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The loss of surprise in the initial
stages of Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>’, lack of local
support to the infiltrators and the response of the Indian troops resulted in
the operation losing steam by the middle of September 1965. It was decided to
carry out counter-infiltration operations to evict the infiltrators, seal the
routes used by them and destroy their bases in Pak Occupied Kashmir. Towards
this end several offensive operations were undertaken in August 1965. Two of
the most important were the capture of the Hajipir pass and eviction of the
Pakistani forces west of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kishanganga</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> in the Tithwal
Sector.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Capture of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hajipir</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The road connecting Uri and Punch passed
through the strategically important Hajipir pass, at a height of 8,650 feet,
which was the main route of ingress into the <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>
valley. It was being used for
replenishment of the infiltrating columns and a number of logistical dumps with
stocks of arms, ammunition and supplies had come up in the vicinity. It was
decided to capture the pass, in order to block this major route of infiltration
and destroy the administrative installations in the Hajipir bulge. A pincer
attack from two directions was planned, with one brigade ex-19 Infantry
Division launching an attack from the north along the road from Uri, and
another brigade ex-25 Infantry Division from the south, along the road coming
from Punch. The task of capturing the feature from the north was assigned to 68
Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Z.C. ‘Zoru’ Bakshi, who had
had proved his worth as a commander, winning decorations in Burma during World
War II, in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, and in Congo in 1962. To indicate
the confidence he enjoyed of the higher command in the Army, the operation for
the capture of Hajipir was code named Operation ‘Bakshi.'<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 68 Infantry Brigade was allotted five
infantry battalions viz. 1 Para, 19 Punjab, 4 Rajput, 6 Jammu & Kashmir
Rifles and 4 Sikh Light Infantry for the operation. For artillery support it had 164 Field
Regiment, equipped with 25 pounder field guns, 144 Mountain Battery, and a
troop of medium guns ex-39 Medium Regiment. Bakshi's plan for the operation
envisaged a two-pronged attack, from the north, to be conducted in three
phases, which was to commence on <st1:date day="24" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">24 August 1965</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Due to heavy rain on 23 August, all the <i>nullahs</i> (streams) along the right axis
were flooded. Consequently, the attack was postponed by a day and was launched
on the night of 25 August. By 0130 hours on 26 August, 19 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
had captured Pathra. However, it could not proceed further to Bedori due to the
rugged and precipitous terrain and stiff resistance by the enemy, and fell back
to Pathra by first light. On the right axis, 1 Para launched their attack on
Sank as planned but were held up by intense enemy fire and suffered about 30
casualties. Bakshi decided to attack Sank again, using 1 Para, and requested divisional
headquarters to assign the task of capturing Bedori to 161 Infantry Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The attack by 1 Para on Sank went in at 2230
hours after a heavy artillery barrage. By first light on 27 August, Sank had
been captured. The enemy vacated the feature, leaving 15 dead. 1 Para did not
lose the momentum, and continued to press on. By <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time>, they had secured Sar and Ledwali Gali. Bakshi now
decided to exploit the success he had achieved on the Sank approach, and ignore
the Bedori approach till the situation became clearer. Hajipir pass, being in
depth, was not expected to be occupied by the enemy, ab initio. However, the
enemy had by now been alerted, and would have started moving additional troops
to reinforce the feature. Once it was reinforced, it would no longer be within
the capability of a brigade to capture the pass. He decided to go for the pass
directly, without waiting for Bedori to be cleared. This meant a frontal
assault from the north under enemy observation and fire and could result in
heavy casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Bakshi spoke to Lieutenant Colonel
Prabhjinder Singh, CO 1 <st1:place w:st="on">Para</st1:place>, and told him
that he was looking for a suitable officer to capture Hajipir pass. Prabhjinder
suggested the name of his second-in-command, Major Ranjit Singh Dayal. Bakshi
personally briefed Dayal on the mission, advising him to avoid the direct
approach and capture the knolls on either side of the pass from an unexpected
direction. He was given an infantry company, with an additional platoon. An
artillery officer would accompany him, as the forward observation officer
(FOO). Another company of 1 Para was earmarked to reinforce the company after
it had captured the pass. At the end of his briefing, Bakshi told Dayal, <b><i>"If
you succeed, the credit will go to you. If you don't, I will accept
responsibility for the failure."</i></b>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Dayal left with his column at last
light on 27 August. He was accompanied by Captain Vaswani, as his
second-in-command, and Second-Lieutenant J.S. Talwar of 164 Field Regiment as
the forward observation officer (FOO). Descending from Ledwali Gali, the
company crossed the Haidarabad nullah, and, began to climb, avoiding the track.
Soon, it started to rain and the valley was covered with low clouds and mist. At
about 2000 hours they reached a house, which was found to be occupied by ten
Pak soldiers, who had fallen back from Bedori and were resting for the night.
After they were disarmed, they were pressed into service for carrying loads.
Soaked to the skin and utterly exhausted, the men kept on moving throughout the
night, weighed down by heavy loads.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At about 0430 hours on 28 August,
the company hit the old Uri - Punch road, where Dayal decided to give the men a
much-needed break. Resuming the advance at 0700 hours, the company moved
towards the objective. After about an
hour, the leading platoon came under intense machine gun fire from the western
shoulder of the pass. Leaving the leading platoon and the FOO to keep the enemy
engaged from the front, Dayal took the balance of the company to the right, and
began climbing up the western shoulder of the pass. Having reached the top,
they rolled down, completely surprising the Pak soldiers, who took to their
heels without offering any resistance. By 1100 hours on 28 August, Hajipir pass
had been captured. Twelve Pakistanis, including one officer, were taken
prisoner. There was not a single Indian casualty. The capture of Hajipir was an important
victory for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and a big blow to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The credit for the success went to Dayal, who had led his men resolutely, and
to Bakshi, who had not only conceived the bold plan but had executed it
brilliantly. Both were awarded the Maha
Vir Chakra for the daring operation.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">8</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 3.75pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operations in Tithwal Sector<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.55pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 41.25pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-language: HE; mso-font-width: 114%;">The limited offensive in the Tithwal sector involved the
capture of a number of tactically important features, in order to dominate the
area. On <st1:date day="23" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">23 August 1965</st1:date>, a combined patrol composed of 2
Rajput and 3/8 Gorkha Rifles secured the Ring Contour across the cease-fire
line. This was the first position in enemy territory captured during the 1965
operations. Although no opposition was encountered on the objective, the enemy
shelled the position throughout the night, but the Rajputs and Gorkhas held
their ground. During the following night 1 Sikh less two companies, supported
by 138 Mountain Battery and 17 Field Battery from 7 Field Regiment, attacked and
captured the Pak post on Richhmar Ridge, held by a platoon plus of the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 21.3pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 42.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-language: HE; mso-font-width: 114%;">On night 25/26 August, 1 Sikh attacked and captured the
formidable Pir Sahiba feature, which was held by an enemy company. A subsequent
task given to the battalion was the destruction of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Nauseri</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
</span><em><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-style: normal;">Fortuitously</span></em><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-language: HE; mso-font-width: 114%;">,</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-language: HE; mso-font-width: 114%;"> the bridge prepared for demolition
by the enemy was struck by lightning and blew up, rendering the operation
unnecessary. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the night of 3 September, 3/8 Gorkha Rifles,
supported by field, mountain and light artillery, attacked the massive Sunjoi
feature, and captured it using Khukris The enemy launched two furious
counter-attacks on night 4/5 September and 6/7 September, which were both
repulsed. Enemy casualties were one officer and seven OR killed, with own
losses being one officer and one OR. The battalion next attacked the enemy post
at the Ring Contour overlooking the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Mirpur</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The attack was
launched on the 10 September and the feature was captured after fierce
hand-to-hand fighting. The withdrawing enemy destroyed the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Mirpur</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the night of 20 September, 4 Kumaon captured Pt.
9013, after three hours of heavy fighting during which the enemy lost 55
killed, including one officer. The capture of Pt. 9013 gave Indian troops
complete domination of the Mirpur area up to Jura Bridge on the River
Kishanganga.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">9</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">SIGNALS IN OPERATION <st1:place w:st="on">GIBRALTAR</st1:place></span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
brunt of enemy armed infiltration and activity along the Cease Fire Line was
faced by 19 Infantry Division, which was guarding approaches to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The division launched major
offensives in the Kishanganga and Hajipir bulges, as also to capture some
important features and areas in Tangdhar and Kupwara Sectors. The
responsibility of providing communications during the counter infiltration
operations in August 1965 primarily devolved on 19 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment, which was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Juneja. Fortunately, he had a good rapport with the divisional
commander, Major General S.S. Kalaan, as well as the staff, which included a
signal officer, Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Kler, the GSO1 (Operations).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
first report of sighting armed infiltrators in Gulmarg area was received on <st1:date day="5" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">5 August 1965</st1:date>. Second
Lieutenant O.P. Mehta was immediately dispatched from Baramula with the GOC’s
rover to Tangmarg, where the GOC was then located. It was decided to send out
two columns, one from 7 Field Regiment and the other from 6 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place>,
to search and destroy the infiltrators. Since the column from 7 Field Regt did
not have a radio set, the manpack set detachment from the GOC’s rover,
comprising Lance Havildar J.P. Vaid and Signalman Babu Kamble</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">was sent with the column, with a radio
set AN/GRC-694. On 6 August, the
detachment at Tangmarg was reinforced with a terminal equipment vehicle (TEV),
a line detachment and one RS C11/R210 under Major R.S. Chimni and Second
Lieutenant P.K. Ghosh, who established a signal centre at the Dark Bungalow.
Second Lieutenant P.S. Parmar was ordered to move from 268 Infantry Brigade to
Tangmarg with additional line detachments which extended line communications to
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>,
Baramula and Gulmarg. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
about 1130 hours the 7 Field Regiment column encountered the infiltrators.
Using his manpack set Havildar Vaid was able to call for artillery fire from
the battery of which had already moved to Tangmarg. The artillery fire wounded
many of the infiltrators, who scattered leaving behind their arms, ammunition,
rations and clothing. A line party under Havildar Jagjit Singh laid field cable
till mid night in spite of coming under fire twice. A column of 13 Jammu &
Kashmir Rifles was sent to general area Toshamaidan with a wireless detachment
comprising Naik Raj Kumar, Lance Naik R.S. Saini and Lance Naik Gurmith Singh
with a radio set AN/GRC- 694. They remained at a height of 8500 ft. for five
continuous days and provided good wireless communication. New lines were laid
by parties led by Lieutenants Ghosh and Parmar. The CO himself stayed at
Tangmarg for three days to oversee the communications. On 10 August, the
Signals personnel at Tangmarg moved back to Baramula, after handing over to 68
Brigade Signal Company, which was placed under command. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1027" type="#_x0000_t75"
style='width:257.25pt;height:162pt'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image003.png"
o:title="PictureB" croptop="4578f" cropbottom="12558f" cropleft="8928f"
cropright="5886f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="216" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image004.gif" v:shapes="_x0000_i1027" width="343" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A line party at work in the Uri Sector, 1965</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Monitoring
of enemy radio links by all brigade signal companies and the ‘I’ Section of the
unit was started from 12 August and interception reports passed to all
formations and 3 Wireless Experimental Centre at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>. On 15 August lateral radio
communications were established to 93 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span>
<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigade at Punch, Sri Force and 68
Brigade. A civilian tampering with local lines at Pattan was apprehended by the
CO. On the same day a signal detachment was sent with the column of 4 Sikh
Light Infantry tasked to search the Naugam area, where the raiders had attacked
the 8 Kumaon base and killed the CO two days earlier. On 16 August a tank column was also sent to
Naugam to evacuate the casualties of 8 Kumaon. The signal centre at Tangmarg
was taken over by 41 Brigade Signal Company which came under command, 68
Brigade Signal Company moving back to Khrew. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
19 August a wireless and a line detachment was fired at by infiltrators, two of
whom were apprehended and handed over to the Intelligence Branch. A Pak soldier
with RS AN/GRC-9 was captured at Chor Panjal and brought to the divisional
headquarters for interrogation. On the same day 68 Brigade Signal Company was
ordered to move to Pattan for Operation ‘Bakshi’ (capture of Hajipir pass). Planning and arranging communications for
this highly critical operation became the foremost pre-occupation of the unit.
A bid was made for radio relay detachments, quad cable and dispenser packs.
Cable WD-1 was wound on reels No. 2 for use in mountainous terrain. Colonel Juneja visited all battalions
earmarked for the operation and checked their signal equipment and stores. To
ensure foolproof communications, a wireless detachment and a line detachment
was attached to each unit. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Colonel Juneja conceived an
innovative signal communication plan for the capture of Hajipir pass and
subsequent link-up between Uri and Punch.
A switching centre was established just south of Uri, which proved extremely
effective and useful. It catered for a
small signal centre, ten line exchange, despatch riders, battery charging, line
and radio detachments. To offset the
shortage of charging engines, central battery charging was organized at the
switching centre. This catered for the needs of the battalions in the forward
areas who could get their fresh batteries from the switching centre in exchange
for their rundown ones. These were
collected on a clean exchange basis when their supply columns passed through. The switching centre was connected to Baramula
by two permanent line pairs, one of which was taken over from the P&T Department
for this operation. Two other pairs
belonging to the Electricity Department between Baramula and Mahura were
extended to the switching centre by quad cable.
This arrangement allowed for provision of hot lines from the divisional
operations room to the brigades taking part in the operations as also for HQ
Artillery Brigade.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
communications to the five brigades under command 19 Infantry Division and 93
Infantry Brigade of 25 Infantry Division were provided in an unorthodox manner
by splitting both command (D1) and
traffic clearing (D2) nets into two separate nets. Thus, 68, 93 and 161 Brigades
came up on D1A and D2A nets, while 41, 104 and 268 Infantry Brigades were
outstations on D1 and D2 nets. Two RS 19
were deployed in 161 Infantry Brigade area to simulate induction of an
additional infantry battalion in Uri sector.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">10</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_6" o:spid="_x0000_i1028" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:225pt;
height:167.25pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image005.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="223" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_6" width="300" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Telephone exchange of 19 Inf Div Sig Regt, 1965</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Signal
Instruction No3/65 for Operation ‘Bakshi’ was issued on <st1:date day="23" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">23 August 1965</st1:date>. By 24 August the signal centre for 68 Brigade
had been established, charging and wireless sets humped up and jamming of enemy
wireless nets commenced. On night of 24/25 August laying of lines beyond our
posts on the Cease Fire Line commenced by ‘C’ Section of the unit and line
detachments of the brigades. Lines were
laid towards Pir Sahiba (104 Brigade), Sank and Ledwali Gali (68 Brigade). In
addition hot lines were laid between the divisional operations room and those
of 68 and 161 Brigades. Wireless
communications was established and kept on listening watch, to be opened in
case of disruption of lines. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 25 August the
Pir Sahiba post in Tithwal Sector was captured by 1 Sikh of 104 Brigade. A Pak signal
instruction recovered during the battle was extensively used by own signal
units in Operation ‘Bakshi’ and subsequent operations, for interception of
enemy links. On 26 August lines were
extended to Sank and Ledwali Gali immediately after their capture by 1 Para.
The same day Signalman Babu Ram of 268 Infantry Brigade Signal Section was
killed in action at Kupwara. On 29 August after the capture of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hajipir</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place>, a lane was cleared of mines and a
cable detachment under Naib Subedar Siv Raman Nair started to lay the line,
accompanied by the CO. At 0200 hours on 30 August Lieutenant Parmar left with a
line party for Hajipir pass accompanied by the Quartermaster, Captain Pandey.
The unit sent cooked food by helicopter to 1 Para, which had captured the pass.
By 31 August communications had been extended to Hajipir pass. A Pakistani
officer, Captain Masood, who had been captured during the operation was kept in
the unit quarter guard that night. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There were two
stalwarts of the Corps of Signals in 19 Infantry Division on command/general
staff appointments, whose deserve mention. Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Kler, a
paratrooper, was the GSO 1 (Operations) in the divisional headquarters. A
dynamic signaller, Kler was of tremendous help to the unit. Brigadier S.N.
Antia was commanding 268 Infantry Brigade which undertook successful operations
against the infiltrators at a number of places. He was shortly thereafter
promoted to major general and given command of a division.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_7"
o:spid="_x0000_i1029" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:284.25pt;height:191.25pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image007.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="255" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image008.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_7" width="379" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Signal Centre flag atop Hajipir
Pass, 1965</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">68
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal Company </span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Captain
Shamsher Singh was the brigade signal officer of 68 (Independent) Infantry
Brigade, known as the ‘Bakarwal Brigade’, as it was always on the move, on
training and exercises in the mountains, like the <i>Bakarwals </i>(shepherds<i>)</i>. For Operation ’Bakshi’, 68 Brigade had been
allotted five infantry battalions and an artillery regiment, which entailed
considerable additional communication responsibility. A few weeks before the
operations, American equipment, particularly radio sets AN/GRC-9, which could
be easily man packed, were withdrawn and replaced with the heavier C11/R210. As
a result, the old but tried radio set 62 was the mainstay of wireless
communication during the operation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Once
the operation was launched on <st1:date day="26" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">26
August 1965</st1:date>, the brigade commander, Brigadier Bakshi, mostly
remained well up and ahead in the brigade tactical headquarters, which included
a Signals element comprising radio detachments, a small exchange, line detachment
and battery charging facility, all on man/mule pack basis. This enabled
Shamsher, who was part of this setup, to know the latest tactical picture and
the thinking of the brigade commander. In addition to the standard radio
communications i.e. D1 and B1 nets to division and battalions, an extra radio
set 31 was kept open to listen in on the assaulting battalion’s forward net, so
that the brigade commander could gain first hand knowledge and ‘feel’ of the
battle. A radio set was also used to listen in on the net of Pak battalion
being attacked, to gain information about the actions being taken or
contemplated by the enemy. Some Pak radio sets AN/PRC 10 collected on capture
of Hajipir pass came very handy for this purpose during subsequent operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Line
communication was extended to all battalion headquarters even while they were
attacking. Field cables were laid along mountain tracks and cross-country at
great heights. Personnel of 68 Infantry Brigade Signal Company worked tirelessly,
faced dangers alongside the infantry battalions and showed tremendous spirit
and devotion to duty even when under shelling and small arms fire. An incident
described below is indicative of the spirit and devotion to duty of the signal
company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Late
one night in when the battle for a feature called Gittian was in progress,
Brigadier Bakshi had bedded down in a Bakarwal hut. During naps, he heard
whispers around him. On enquiry, Shamsher told him that he was organizing a
line party to go out to repair a line, which was not through. Bakshi instructed
Shamsher not to move about in the dark as enemy troops were in the area and
instead send out a line party at first light. Soon he dozed off to be woken
after some time by the telephone ringing and was surprised when Shamsher told
him that the line was through. Bakshi
asked him if he if he had taken out a line party. The officer answered in the
affirmative. Bakshi asked him why he had gone out at night to repair the line
against his instructions. Shamsher answered, <b><i>“Sir, if I had not done so, you
could not have collected information from your HQ or the battalions. How could
you then give orders? We all know that you need not be in the frontline facing
shells and bullets. You are doing your
duty and I have done mine”.</i></b></span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">11</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Describing the incident many
years later, General Bakshi wrote to Shamsher:<b><i> “I can still remember vividly
the night at Hajipir when we were trying to snatch some sleep in that stinking
cow-shed and you were trying to sneak out of the shed to repair a telephone
line. You exposed yourself to grave danger to give me communications with my
units. I was lucky to have you with me in that war.</i>”</b> Coming from a
person of Zoru Bakshi’s well known reputation and stature in the Indian Army,
this is high praise indeed and an accolade that would make any signaller proud.
Sadly, Shamsher’s performance remained largely unknown and unrecognized – let
alone a gallantry award, which he deserved, he did not receive even a ‘Mention-in-Dispatches’
or a lesser award. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="Picture_x0020_8" o:spid="_x0000_i1030" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:347.25pt;
height:240.75pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image009.jpg"
o:title="Brig Shamsher Singh Photo" blacklevel="-3277f"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="321" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image010.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_8" width="463" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt;">Tac HQ 68 (I) Inf Bde atop Hajipir Pass, 28 Aug
1965. Brig ZC Bakshi, MVC in <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10.0pt;">the foreground.
Capt Shamsher Singh in the far
distance wearing a Balaclava</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
was an intense and prolonged operation lasting nearly three weeks, on which the
eyes of the whole Nation were fixed. Providing signal communications for such a
large, difficult and important operation in high mountains was not an easy
task. However, Captain Shamsher Singh, though having hardly three years
service, functioned like a veteran of many wars and his performance can be
rated as outstanding. All ranks of the signal company also worked admirably in
face of danger, bringing credit to the Corps.
Like Shamsher, the excellent performance of his men also remained
unrecognised, and they have remained unsung heroes of the 1965 War.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">25
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lieutenant
Colonel Surjit Singh was Commander Signals, 25 Division deployed in Rajauri
Sector in 1965. Major C.S. Joshi was the second-in-command and Captain P.K.
Handa was the adjutant. The field
officers in the unit were Major C.R. Ahuja; Major V.P. Singh and Major S.G.
Rajopadhye. The officers in the brigade signal sections were Captain S.S. Kale
(80 Infantry Brigade); Captain S.C. Anand (93 Infantry Brigade) and Captain
H.S. Grewal (120 Infantry Brigade). The division was looking after a large
area, extending from Sunderbani to Punch. HQ 80 Infantry Brigade was located at
Naushera; 120 Brigade at Galuthi on road Rajauri-Bhimber Gali-Punch and 93
Brigade at Punch, along with respective signal sections. The primary means of
signal communications was PL down to battalions and in some cases to companies
and picquets as well. Radio was stand by and opened on schedule. SDS runs were
undertaken daily. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The linemen had the most difficult
task and had to repair the lines frequently, at times even without escort. Some
acts of bravery and devotion to duty deserve mention. On 21 August, one of the convoys was
ambushed between Bhimber Gali and Surankot. The signal detachment vehicle
providing communications to the convoy was hit by small arms fire and grenades.
The wireless operator, Signalman Basro Ram, was killed and two OR severely
wounded. Havildar Hazura Singh, the NCO in charge of the signal detachment at
Bhimber Gali, immediately rushed to the spot, passed information to higher
headquarters and also repaired the line, which had been damaged by the
infiltrators. He displayed commendable initiative and high sense of duty by
himself going out to repair lines in areas infested by the enemy, not caring
for his personal safety. His personal example was a great source of inspiration
to his men. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
the 93 Brigade area, Signals personnel were deployed at all vital installations
where there was any likelihood of damage. The security of the operations room was
strengthened and signal cover was extended to all convoys, bridges and
sensitive installations up to general area of Bafliaz, Krishna Ghati and
Surankot. Due to shortage of equipment,
some was readjusted through brigade resources and some more was released
through staff channels on priority basis. The intelligence set up was activated
and two protective patrols along with radio detachment personnel were sent to
apprehend the infiltrators towards Mandi and interior of Bafliaz. The patrols were self contained and Signals
were provided mules for carriage of the radio set, batteries and charging
engine. Relay stations were established
at Surankot and strict radio security and discipline was imposed to conceal the
task of these two special patrols.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
radio transmitter which was operating clandestinely in this sector was
intercepted by 93 Brigade Signal Section. A close watch was kept on this link,
and though the signal section did not have any sophisticated direction finding
equipment, it was successful in locating this transmitter in one of the
villages in area Krishna Ghati and apprehending the personnel operating the
set. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In mid August 1965, CSO XV Corps
sent a radio relay detachment (RS C41/R222) comprising two JCOs and 19 OR from
XV Corps Signal Regiment, to establish a radio relay chain from Rajauri to
Punch, as the road between the two locations and lines along it were being
disrupted frequently and radio links jammed. The chain was successfully
established with a relay at Bhimber Gali, which ensured reliable communications
to 93 Brigade. A one to one channel was provided between the operations rooms
at both ends. Power supply was a problem and the link was therefore opened on
schedule to conserve generators. On 17 August, an enemy shell nearly knocked
out the terminal at Punch. It was then shifted to the brigade tactical
headquarters location and a power line laid from the civil power house in just
four hours.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
radio relay terminals were equipped with ACT (1+4), manufactured by Indian
Telephone Industries. An old valve version ACT (1+1) was modified for four-wire
working and at Bhimber Gali, a channel each was patched through on line to 120
Brigade and 52 Brigade. These were early days of use of radio relay and such
innovations were quite an achievement.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> SDS
runs were disrupted at times due to roads being cut and enemy action. Through
the efforts of CSO Western Command an air despatch service (ADS) was organized
to Rajauri and Punch, which ensured prompt delivery of official mail. This
service was discontinued after the aircraft was damaged at Punch airfield due
to enemy shelling on <st1:date day="19" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">19
August 1965</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
major offensive operation was undertaken by 93 Brigade to link up with 68
Brigade attacking from Hajipir side. Major C.R. Ahuja, OC 3 Company, assisted
by Captain S.C. Anand, OC 93 Brigade Signal Section planned the communications
for the operation. For the capture of Raja and Chand Tekri, lines were laid via
Kasba. Raja was captured on the night of 5/6 September after a bloody fight and
line was extended immediately. The lines were duplicated the next day.
Signalmen Kanda Swamy Gounder Kesawan, Ajit Singh and Pritam Singh laid and
repaired the lines under heavy fire and personal risk. For attacks by 3/11
Gorkha Rifles and 7 Sikh on the night of 21/22 September, lines were laid and
maintained under Havildar Shamsher Singh. The NCO showed great qualities of
leadership under fire and inspired his detachment. On capture of Kahuta, a
carrier quad route was laid under command of Naik Uttam Chand along a route
under observation of the enemy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">163
Infantry Brigade Signal Section</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">163 Infantry Brigade was located at
Leh. As soon as the information about armed infiltration into the Valley was
confirmed, the brigade was moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
and concentrated there by <st1:date day="11" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">11
August 1965</st1:date>. Captain K.K. Ohri was commanding 163 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section. The task assigned to the brigade was the destruction of
infiltrators south of road Srinagar-Gulmarg, excluding <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> city and protection of the airfield
and other installations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operations were immediately
launched to seek and destroy the infiltrators and ensure protection of the
airfield as also the Ordnance installations at Khunmuh and Khundru.
Subsequently, combing operations were launched to flush out the infiltrators
from the area and nab them by holding passes on the Pir Panjal range. A large
number of infiltrators were killed and captured by the brigade. These
operations required mobile radio communications and Captain Ohri organised his
resources admirably. He ensured that good communications were provided even on
man pack basis and at high altitude. With the help of DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh,
line communications were ensured to troops deployed for the security of
Ordnance installations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">191
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal Company <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -54.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This company was raised as 191 Brigade Signal Section at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="5" month="9" w:st="on" year="1949">5 September 1949</st1:date> and later
moved to Akhnur. In 1955, personnel of this company and those of 93 Brigade
Signal Company at Punch were interchanged en block, to enable Punch Brigade
personnel to serve in the plains. They had been in Punch since 1947-48, as
Punch Brigade was the old Jammu & Kashmir State Forces Brigade and the
personnel belonging to erstwhile Jammu & Kashmir State Forces had remained
posted to the same Section! <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1965, the company
was located at Akhnur under the command of Major B.K. Mathur with Second
Lieutenant M.S. Bakshi as his second officer. During Operation ‘Ablaze’ the
brigade had moved to Troti, returning to Akhnur in late July 1965. The company had 90 percent of its authorized
manpower and adequate signal equipment for its communication commitments.
However, a large percentage of the personnel were raw soldiers having joined
recently from the STCs. On 9 August the affiliated artillery unit, 14 Field
Regiment arrived at Akhnur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 15 August,
Pak artillery shelled Dewa near the Cease Fire Line where Tactical HQ 191 Brigade
was located. To provide communications for the attack that had been planned for
15 August, four radio detachments (for 6/5 Gorkha Rifles, 3 Mahar, 15 Kumaon
and commander’s rover) and one line party under Second Lieutenant M.S. Bakshi
had been concentrated at Dewa. During the shelling the exchange bunker, commander’s
rover and the line party truck received direct hits and were completely
destroyed. The permanent route around Dewa and Chhamb broke like dry
twigs. Second Lieutenant Bakshi and one
OR were killed and four OR wounded. Almost all the signal equipment and
vehicles held by the company were destroyed. Lance Naik Damodar Singh, though
himself seriously wounded, picked up four wounded soldiers and drove them to
the advance dressing station at Aknur, 30 miles away. On reaching Akhnur he
himself collapsed due to heavy bleeding. He was later awarded the COAS
Commendation Card for his devotion to duty. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier Vinayak Mehta, CSO XV Corps, quickly
augmented the resources of the company, moving radio and line resources from
Corps units. One line party was attached to repair the damaged PL routes, while
three line parties were provided for laying cable routes. One SCR 399 radio
detachment was sent as an outstation on the C1 link, along with an air support
tentacle. One line party and one radio detachment were also given for artillery
communications. Two officers, Captain M.G. Kapoor from 26 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment and Second Lieutenant Curion Joseph from Y Communication Zone
Signal Regiment were attached for two weeks. These timely reinforcements were
of great help in getting the company back on its feet in a short time. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
company commander, Major B.K. Mathur was a bold and fearless officer, who set
extremely high standards and led from the front. Two incidents that occurred during this
period deserve mention. On 20 August when 2 Sikh lost wireless contact during
their attack on Post 710, Mathur led a small line party under heavy enemy fire
and provided line communication to the post even before it was secured. This
personal example inspired the men under his command to carry out their tasks
even under enemy fire. On 30 August Naib Subedar Ram Chand, Havildar Krishan
Lal and Lance Havildar Bhattacharjee volunteered to repair the 28 kilometre long
cable route from Dewa to Kalidhar without any protection or rations. The area
was hilly and infested with active infiltrators. Before they could complete
their task, Pakistan launched a massive attack on 1 September 1965 and the
party returned to Akhnur. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; tab-stops: 468.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">PAK
OPERATION ‘GRAND SLAM’ & RESPONSE BY XV CORPS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Pak Offensive in Chhamb
<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Stung by the failure of Operation ‘Gibraltar’ and
the successful counter infiltration operations undertaken by the Indian Army in
Hajipir and Tithwal, Pakistan decided to launch an offensive by regular forces.
Code named Operation ‘Grand Slam’, the massive offensive was launched with a
powerful armoured-cum-infantry force in the Chhamb-Jaurian region with the aim
of capturing the strategic town of Akhnur and the bridge, with a view to
cutting the Jammu-Srinagar highway. If successful, this would result in
complete isolation of the Kashmir Valley as well as bottling up the Indian
forces Naushara, Rajauri and Punch. The
defence of the Chhamb sector was the responsibility of 191 (Independent) Infantry
Brigade Group which was directly under HQ XV Corps. Brigadier Manmohan Singh
had taken over the command of the formation on 15 August 1965, following the
death of Brigadier Masters in enemy shelling a few days earlier. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In the early hours of 1 September 1965 Pakistan
launched a three-pronged attack with a force estimated to be a division of
infantry and two regiments of armour. The attack was preceded by an intense
artillery and mortar bombardment on Mandiala and Chhamb which continued up to 0630
hours. Simultaneously, the enemy mounted an offensive in area Pir Maungawali,
overwhelming the forward companies of 15 Kumaon and reaching within 500 yards
of the brigade headquarters. By nightfall the Pakistanis had succeeded in
driving a wedge between Mandiala and Chhamb. Considering the grave danger to HQ
191 Infantry Brigade, orders for its withdrawal were issued at 2100 hours. The brigade headquarters, 6 Sikh Light Infantry, 15 Kumaon, 14 Field
Regiment and the surviving elements of C Squadron 20 Lancers withdrew to
Jaurian, leaving behind 3 Mahar, 6/5
Gorkha Rifles and remnants of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia to hold their
defences in area Kalidhar. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In view of the depleted strength of
191 Brigade, 41 Mountain Brigade had also been ordered to occupy Jaurian, with
both brigades being placed under 10 Infantry Division, which was made
responsible for the defence of Akhnur.
Acting with commendable speed, 41 Mountain Brigade was reasonably dug in
on Troti Heights, west of Jaurian and prepared to face the enemy by the morning
of 3 September. Meanwhile, the
Pakistanis had consolidated their positions along river Manawar Tawi and by 1930
hours on 2 September, they had crossed the river unopposed and established a
bridgehead. Next evening, at about 1900 hours the enemy mounted a major attack
on Jaurian with approximately 30 tanks, supported by infantry and
artillery. To tide over the critical
situation, 28 Infantry Brigade consisting of 2 Grenadiers and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles was rushed
in and ordered to hold a delaying position on the general line of Fatwal Ridge,
approximately 10 kilometres west of Akhnur and east of Jaurian by first light on
4 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the failure of his attack on 3
September, the enemy launched another attack on Jaurian position at about 2300
hours on 4 September with one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions.
After heavy fighting during which three forward company positions of 41 Brigade
were overrun, the situation was stabilised through counter-attacks. The Army
Commander, who was present in Akhnur during the critical stage of the Jaurian,
approved the withdrawal of 41 Mountain Brigade during the night to Akhnur. Passing through Fatwal Ridge position which
had been occupied by 28 Infantry Brigade on the previous night, 41 Mountain
Brigade withdrew during the night of 4/5 September. A regrettable episode was
the abandonment of their guns by 161<span style="color: red;"> </span>Field Regiment
during their withdrawal. Though orders were issued for their retrieval, this
did not come about due to intensive Pak shelling.<i> <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It was appreciated that the only way to relieve
Pakistan's pressure in this sector was to mount a full-fledged offensive in the
more sensitive Lahore and Sialkot sectors, from where Pakistan had thinned out
forces, especially heavy armour and artillery, for the Chhamb offensive. The
Army Chief discussed this option with Prime Minster Lal Bahadur Shastri, who
gave him carte blanche in the matter. Soon afterwards, Indian troops crossed
the border and launched offensives in the Lahore and Sialkot Sectors in
Pakistan on 6 September 1965. As expected, Pakistan reacted immediately,
pulling out troops from Chhamb. This put
paid to her ambitious plans for the capture of Akhnur and isolation of Indian
forces in Jammu and the Kashmir.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Along with the offensives of I and XI Corps in
Sialkot and Lahore Sectors, XV Corps also launched counter-offensives in the
Chhamb Sector. However, these did not make much headway and both 28 Infantry
Brigade and 191 Infantry Brigade Group were halted by intense artillery and
tank fire. After stabilization of the position a fresh offensive was launched
on 9 September with 2 Grenadiers of 28 Infantry Brigade attacking Chak Karpal and a company of 15 Kumaon and two troops of
armour under 191 Infantry Brigade
threatening the objective from the rear. However, both attacks failed. The
Grenadiers disintegrated under the weight of intense artillery and medium
machine gun fire even as there were forming up for the assault, suffering heavy
casualties – 14 killed, 46 wounded and 12 missing. The 15 Kumaon company ran
into a column of Pak Shermans supported by infantry and recoilless guns and returned
to base, after losing three AMX tanks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 10 September 1965, 41 Mountain
Brigade was moved to the XI Corps Zone of operations. This took away the strike
potential of 10 Infantry Division and the battle shifted towards the north of
Chhamb. Pakistan made repeated attempts
to dislodge the Indian troops from the Kalidhar Ridge. On 14 September, Indian
patrols reported that the enemy had infiltrated a sizeable force of regular
troops and Mujahids in general area Manani-Gulaba Chappar. For clearing this
intrusion, two battalions, 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 3 Kumaon were employed. On 20
September, 28 Infantry Brigade was warned for a likely offensive task in Dagger
area. This task was later changed for an offensive task along the road
Akhnur-Jaurian on the night of 22 September. However, before the operation
could be launched the Cease Fire came into effect.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">12</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Battle of OP Hill<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The battle of OP Hill took place after the
cease-fire had come into effect on 23 September 1965. Located on the south-west
of the road Mendhar-Balnoi, the feature comprised a complex of hills that was
mentioned in official correspondence as 'OP Hill' since it dominated the road
and gave a clear view of the Indian defences.
In early August 1965 Pakistan had occupied the feature and gradually
developed it into a battalion defended area, while the Indian troops were busy
dealing with the infiltrators. After the
cease fire Pak troops continued to occupy the feature and resorted to shelling
of 2 Dogra base at Balnoi and Picket 636. They also interfered with the
movement of vehicle convoys and large bodies of troops by day on road
Mendhar-Balnoi. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After parleys with the United Nations observers had
failed to produce any result, GOC 25 Infantry Division decided to evict the
enemy from OP Hill and gave this task to Brigadier B.S. Ahluwalia, Commander
120 Infantry Brigade,. A brigade attack was launched on 2 November 1965 by 2
Dogra, 5 Sikh Light Infantry and 7 Sikh attacking in three phases. After two days of heavy fighting, OP Hill was
finally captured, though at heavy cost. Three Maha Vir Chakras were awarded during
the operation, including Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh, CO 5 Sikh Light
Infantry. Two Vir Chakras were also
awarded. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Kishanganga Bulge <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When cease-fire was declared, Indians troops were in
complete control of the area east of River Kishanganga, but the enemy had still
to be cleared from the area between Pt. 9013 and Bugina to straighten the
Kishanganga Bulge. This task was given to 4 Kumaon and 3 Sikh. 3 Sikh was·
tasked to destroy the Shahkot bridge. By 0330 hours on 26 September, a company
of the battalion had occupied the area which dominated the road across the
Kishanganga river and the Shahkot bridge, which was made of concrete and steel
rope suspension and was heavily guarded by Pakistani troops, entrenched in
concrete bunkers. Initial attempts to destroy the bridge by medium artillery
did not succeed even after firing the whole day on 26 September. Another
attempt made by 3 Sikh to raid the bridge on 5 October was foiled by the enemy,
who subjected the raiding party to heavy mortar and automatic fire. After
several attempts the bridge was finally destroyed at 1800 hours on 12 October
by D Company of 3 Sikh. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The task allotted to 4 Kumaon was to destroy the
Jura Bridge. After an arduous 40 kilometre march the assault force reached the
4780 metre high Bimla Pass on 5 October. During the next three days, the
battalion captured a series of features that dominated the bridge. The attack on the Jura bridge was planned on
the night of 10/11 October. Before the attack could be launched the enemy, who had
stealthily infiltrated three companies the Jura bridge, assaulted the
Indian positions. The fighting continued
till mid day, the Kumaonis beating back all the attacks. Realising that a
direct assault on the Jura bridge was unlikely to succeed, it was decided to
destroy the bridge by recoilless guns, which reached only in evening on 14
October. The recoilless guns began firing at the target and in the 7<sup>th</sup>
round the bridge was destroyed on 15 October 1965. With this, the Mirpur-Bugina
Bulge had been cleared of the enemy, and the Cease Fire Line realigned to
follow the course of the Kishanganga. Indian troops were now in complete
control of the Muzaffarabad-Kel Road, and the infiltration routes into Kargil
and Gurais had been effectively sealed.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">13</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 88%;">SIGNALS IN
OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’ - XV CORPS SECTOR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Western Command Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The 1965 War was primarily fought
in Western Command. During peacetime, HQ Western Command was located at Simla.
The territorial jurisdiction of the command extended from Himachal to Ladakh in
the north, whole of Jammu & Kashmir, <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
and to western part of Rajasthan in the west. While XV Corps was deployed in
Jammu & Kashmir, with its headquarters at Udhampur, XI Corps was
responsible for the defence of <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and
western part of Rajasthan. Brigadier Ajit Singh was CSO Western Command; Lieutenant
Colonel D.A.J. Beeby the SO 1 (Signals); Major Shanti Swarup the SO 2(Communications);
and Major Bains the SO2 (SD).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CSO Western Command was responsible
for all signal communications in the vast territorial jurisdiction of the command.
Based on the operational planning and priorities, additional resources were
allocated to various formations. Brigadier Ajit Singh ensured that additional
resources were made available where ever needed, by moving these from one
formation to the other, as the operations progressed. A major effort was
required to provide communications to I Corps, which was under raising in
Central Command and was to be inducted in Samba-Jammu sector for offensive
operations. Blessed with a calm and composed nature, Brigadier Ajit Singh had
the ability to get the best out of his team. He also enjoyed good rapport with
the Army Commander, various formation commanders and senior staff. As a result,
he was able to ensure high quality communications during the War. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Western
Command Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit was located at Simla under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel S. Tandon with Major P.S. Randhawa as the
second-in-command. Other officers in the unit holding important appointments
were Major R. S. Kardam (OC 1 Company); Major Balbir Singh (OC 2 Company) and
Captain (later Lieutenant General and SO-in-C) A.J.S. Bhalla being the adjutant.
The regimental headquarters was at Jutogh, but the signal centre and the
exchange were at Simla. The regiment had to provide signal communications to HQ
Western Command and from there to HQ XI and XV Corps, as well as static
formations, logistics installations and certain important locations. These were
spread over a very large area and at considerable distance, especially those in
Jammu & Kashmir. While the signal centre staff comprised combatants, quite
a few civilian switchboard operators, a number of whom were ladies, manned the
exchange. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For Operation ‘Ablaze’, the unit
was moved to its wartime location Ambala along with the command headquarters on
12 April 1965, returning to Simla on 12 July 1965. For Operation ‘Riddle’ the
regiment again moved to Ambala between 2 and 4 September. A few days later,
five operators of 87 Switch Board Operating Section from Southern Command
reported on attachment. A number of additional speech and telegraph circuits to
Fazilka, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>,
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>,
Pathankot, Doraha, Kohara etc. were taken over. The exchange, signal centre and
cipher load increased considerably. Some additional operators were also made
available from Central Command and ‘R’ Communication Zone Signal
Regiments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
lady exchange operators did a commendable job even when Pak planes dropped
bombs on Ambala Cantt. Miss Marak, hailing from Meghalaya, was the senior lady
exchange supervisor and did excellent work, for which she was awarded the Army
Commander’s Commendation Card. The unit moved back to Simla between 24 February
and <st1:date day="1" month="3" w:st="on" year="1965">1 March 1965</st1:date>
after Operation ‘Riddle’ was over. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Western
Command Mobile Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
need was felt as a result of experience gained in Operation ‘Ablaze’ to provide
CSO Western Command with some mobile resources. To meet this requirement, 4
Company ‘S’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment located at Gauhati was allocated
to Western Command. It moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
(Anand Parbat) on <st1:date day="10" month="6" w:st="on" year="1965">10 June
1965</st1:date> and was re-designated as Western Command Mobile Signal
Company. In July, 85 Medium Radio Section (4 Set) <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mobile</st1:place></st1:city> and 8 Medium Radio Relay Section from ‘R’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
joined the unit. A month later, 22 Radio Teletype (RTT) Section from Eastern
Command Signal Regiment also joined the unit. The company was under the command
of Major S.K. Walia .<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
2 September, 8 Medium Radio Relay Section was attached to I Corps Signal
Regiment for Operation ‘<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nepal</st1:place></st1:country-region>’.
In May 1966, Western Command Mobile Signal Company moved to Ambala Cantt., its
permanent location. In June 1966, 24 Medium Radio Section (4 Set) <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mobile</st1:place></st1:city> and 6 Medium Radio
Relay Section ex Western Command Signal Regiment became part of the unit. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XV
Corps Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier Vinayak Mehta was the CSO,
responsible for planning and providing signal communications to XV Corps. The
area of jurisdiction covered whole of Jammu & Kashmir, from Ladakh to
Pathankot. Operation ‘Ablaze’ between May and July 1965, proved to be a big
boon. All communications for operational locations were tested. Construction of
a number of additional PL routes was taken in hand and existing communications
improved. During Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on">Gibraltar</st1:place>’ XV
Corps had to deal with large armed infiltration and was involved in very heavy
fighting. It also faced the situation posed by the Pak offensive in Chhamb and
induction of formations such as 10 Infantry Division. Providing communication
infrastructure for I Corps for its offensive operations was a big challenge for
XV Corps Signals. Great credit is due to the CSO and his team for providing
high-grade communications for operations involving intense fighting all over
the corps zone. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> From
August 1965 onwards, CSO XV Corps had the following signal units under him for
communication tasks:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XV Corps Signal
Regiment at Udhampur (Lieutenant Colonel B.S.
Paintal).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DCSO Kashmir &
Ladakh at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
(Colonel R.S. Tiwana).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">‘T’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
(Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Vishwanath).
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">‘J’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment at Kargil (Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Nanda).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Y’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
(Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Batra)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">3 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Leh (Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Tawatia).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Baramula (Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Juneja)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 54.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo28; tab-stops: list 54.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">25 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Rajauri (Lieutenant Colonel Surjit Singh)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">26 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
(Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Mukherji).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">121 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Signal Company at Kargil (Major Dhani Ram)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">68 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Signal Company, near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
(Captain Shamsher Singh)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">163 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section (Captain K.K. Ohri). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">191 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Signal Company at Akhnur (Major B.K. Mathur) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
In addition to the above, the following units were inducted as the
operations progressed, coming under the jurisdiction of CSO XV Corps:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Y.S. Awasthy) was inducted and located at
Akhnur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">28 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major S.C. Roy) was inducted in 10 Divisional Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">36 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major A.J.S. Bhalla) was raised at Rajauri in August 1965.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">41 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major V.K. Khanna)
located at Palampur, first moved to Jammu, next to the Valley, then to
Chhamb Sector and later to XI Corps, as part of 41 Infantry Brigade.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">52 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major K.S. Maini) was inducted in 25 Infantry Division Sector.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XV
Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Till
mid 1965, ‘Y’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was providing signal
communications to HQ XV Corps at Udhampur. The regiment was split in two and XV
Corps Signal Regiment was raised at Udhampur, taking over the responsibility of
providing communications at the corps headquarters, while ‘Y’ Communication
Zone Signal Regiment was moved to Jammu. Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Paintal took
over command of the unit on <st1:date day="3" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">3
August 1965</st1:date> from Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Dhaliwal. The other
officers holding key appointments were Major R.S. Wadhwa (second-in-command);
Major O.P. Kapoor (1 Company); Major A.J.S. Kahlon (2 Company); Major R.N.
Lambah (3 Company); Captain S.K. Jandial (Adjutant); and Captain Bhagat Singh
(Quarter Master). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
primary means of trunk communications in Jammu & Kashmir was lines. Most of
the circuits were hired from the P&T Department and some were also derived
on BOPEL routes, using Army’s own carrier and VFT equipment. At Udhampur, the
civil carrier station was located in the Army signal centre, which helped in
maintaining very close coordination. P&T personnel rose to the occasion and
met demands placed on them expeditiously. Shri R.P. Saini, RSA, deserves
special mention. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
spite of long distances and mountainous terrain, line circuits to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>, Baramula,
Rajauri, Pathankot, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
and Akhnur were quite stable. During winter, the PL route across Banihal was
disrupted at times. The communications to Kargil and Leh were adversely
affected due to long distance, very rugged terrain, heavy snow and avalanches.
Radio and radio relay therefore played an important role, beyond Udhampur. The
concept of ‘hot line’ teleprinter circuits was tried out between the corps and
command headquarters. Essential elements of the signal centre and radio links
were moved to underground facilities, to safeguard against any air attacks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 4
Medium Radio Relay Section was deployed to provide the radio relay chain
between Udhampur and Srinagar via Patnitop and Banihal as also between Srinagar
and Kargil via Gulmarg and Dras. Once the operations started, these radio relay
chains were wound up and the resources re-deployed to meet urgent operational
requirements of 25 Infantry Division and I Corps. On 21 August, a radio relay
detachment consisting of two JCOs and 19 OR was sent to 25 Infantry Division
for providing radio relay communications in the Rajauri-Punch sector. Two days
later another detachment consisting of one officer and seven OR was sent to
Pathankot for carrying out trials between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
and that location. On 6 September, a day before the commencement of the
offensive by I Corps, two radio relay detachments consisting of one officer and
15 OR were sent to I Corps Signal Regiment for providing radio relay
communications between Pathankot and HQ I Corps. Major Amarjit Singh Kahlon,
who had been trained in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
was sent to I and XI Corps to advise them on stabilising their radio relay
communications.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit provided additional resources to 191 Infantry Brigade Signal Company on 17
August, to make up losses suffered on 15 August as a result of shelling by the
enemy in area Dewa. Resources were also provided to ‘T’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment for providing communications to HQ SRI Sector on its raising. A
radio detachment of the unit led by Lance/Naik Pratap Singh Rialch provided
first-rate communications across very rugged terrain to <i>Pran</i> Force, which flushed out infiltrators from area Riasi-Budil.
On 15 September, Havildar Shiv Singh of the regiment while on a SDS run on road
Jammu-Pathankot was killed during strafing by enemy aircraft. A line party led
by Second-Lieutenant Man Prasad laid a
carrier quad route on 13 September in
one night, along the northern bank of Ranbir Canal between Jammu and Akhnur, as
an alternate to the permanent line route, which had been damaged due to enemy
shelling. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">‘Y’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was located at Udhampur until mid 1965, when it moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> on raising of XV Corps Signal Regiment.
The CO was Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Batra. Its role was to provide signal
communications at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
and along the L of C to Banihal, rearwards to Pathankot, along roads
Dhar-Udhampur, Udhampur-Riasi-Sunderbani-Siot as also to Akhnur-Naushera-
Rajauri. As a sequel to Pak infiltration in Chhamb Sector and damage suffered
in Dewa, an officer was attached to 191 Brigade Signal Company for a short
period. A SCR 399 medium power wireless detachment was also provided to the brigade
for communications to HQ XV Corps. The wireless vehicle was subsequently
destroyed as a result of enemy
shelling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When the enemy launched an
offensive in Chhamb on 1 September,
Major J.C. Sarin with some signal resources was placed at Akhnur from 2 to 7
September to provide communications to Tactical/Advance HQ 10 Infantry
Division, until the arrival of 10 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. Two line
parties were also deputed to maintain the PL between Akhnur and Jaurian.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
cater for communications for I Corps, which was to be inducted in the Jammu-
Samba area for offensive operations, a number of steps were taken. A large
number of channels were arranged from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
carrier station and the signal centre at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
was geared up to handle I Corps traffic till the corps signal regiment was
established. Some circuits were re-engineered on PL along road Pathankot-Dhar-
Udhampur, which was less vulnerable than the route along the road
Pathankot-Jammu, which was close to the border.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
was considered necessary to augment the signal resources of I Corps for its
offensive. ‘Y’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was therefore placed under
operational control of I Corps from <st1:date day="9" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">9 September 1965</st1:date>. The unit constructed a number of poled
carrier quad and 70 and 200 lb. cadmium copper spaced cable routes in I Corps
Zone, which were used to provide carrier and VFT circuits between HQ I Corps
and its formations. A nine-mile long two pair copper PL route was built between
Bishnah and Pindi. Two line construction sections were attached to the unit
from XV Corps Signal Regiment and ‘J’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment
respectively during the period August-October 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">‘T’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Vishwanath was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>. Its role was to provide signal communications
at Srinagar to HQ 31 Communication Zone Sub Area and HQ SRI Force, which was
raised on 14 August 1965. It was also responsible for communications forward to 19 Infantry Division, up to Zojila
on the route to Leh, rearwards to
Banihal and to formations, units and training establishments as also logistics
installations located in the area. The regiment prided itself by associating
its identity ‘T’ with ‘THROUGH’, the Corps motto. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Once
the Pak infiltration came to light on 5 August, the unit had to provide
communications to a number of mobile columns sent to flush out infiltrators.
Radio communications were established for troops deployed for the defence of
key installations like the airfields at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
and Awantipur and Ordnance depots near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>.
Radio communications were arranged for the two infantry battalions earmarked
for the protection of the L of C Banihal-Srinagar-Leh. In addition, the
regiment had to ensure local defence of a large sector against threat from
armed infiltrators. A dedicated radio net was also established for anti-para
operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 48
Line Construction Section was deployed for the maintenance of PL between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city> and Zojila
(Gumri). Just before the operations started, the section was tasked to
construct an additional PL pair between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
and Zojila, to be extended to Leh by ‘J’ Communication Zone Signal
Regiment. The section was divided into
self-contained detachments located at Ganderbal, Kangan, Gund, Gagengeer,
Sonamarg and Baltal. From 5 August onwards the line parties were frequently fired
upon by the infiltrators. On 9 August the infiltrators attacked the bridge at
Woyle and the line was damaged due to enemy mortar fire. Personnel of 48 Line
Construction Section put through the line under mortar and small arms fire.
Again on 6 September the infiltrators laid an ambush near Gund for a convoy
after cutting the telephone line. The line party nearby constructing the third
pair repaired the line in the face of enemy fire. Whenever communication duties
allowed, the personnel of this section also joined in anti infiltration
operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 49
Line Construction Section was allotted to I Corps in the first week of
September 1965. It constructed a number of PL and PVC routes in the thick of
operations of I Corps. 58 Line Construction Section was attached to 19 Infantry
Division and did commendable work in ensuring line communications to places
like Pattan, Kupwara, Chowkibal, and Bandipur. It also worked on constructing
the line route to Hajipir and Kahuta, at times under fire. 69 Line Construction
Section was deployed between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>
and Banihal. 16 Line Section looked after the local communications at and
around Srinagar, including vital installations, formations and units in the
vicinity of the city.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">‘J’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The unit was located at Kargil under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Nanda. It was responsible for
communications between Zojila and Leh and line routes in Ladakh. The regiment
also operated signal centres at Kargil and some locations along the L of C to
Leh. It also provided wireless communications and SDS. During Operation
‘Ablaze’, the regiment provided cable, line and a wireless detachments to 121
Brigade located at Kargil. The unit also assisted the brigade by carrying badly
needed mortar ammunition to two high features close to Kargil, which facilitated
the capture of Pak picquets. In one case, four Jeeps of the unit were used to
carry the ammunition on a very narrow and tricky mountain track at night and
without headlights. On the return journey the Jeeps brought down battle
casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyTextIndent2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="9" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">9 August 1965</st1:date>, the
detachment of the unit located at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Shamsha</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> along with Punjab
Armed Police Personnel was fired upon. A warning had
been received by the detachment a few
minutes earlier that another
bridge at Pashkyum had been attacked. The detachment was therefore ready. In
the exchange of fire, a JCO of Punjab Armed Police was killed and a head
constable was injured. Though none of the personnel of the detachment were
wounded, there were bullet holes in their vehicle and tents. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
part played by the unit in Operation ‘Bakshi’ for the capture of the Hajipir
pass has already been described earlier. After the commencement of the Pak
offensive code named Operation ‘Grand Slam’, the focus shifted to the Chhamb –
Jaurian sector, and the Valley was relatively quiet. However, the unit remained
busy in building up communications to threatened sectors. On 3 September
carrier quad cable was laid up to Silikot, where HQ 68 Infantry Brigade had
moved after the capture of Hajipir. The same day line communication was
extended to Sanjoi, which was captured by 3/8 Gorkha Rifles after a hand to
hand fight. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 4 September Second Lieutenant
O.P. Mehta proceeded to Sank with direction finding equipment, a second set
being sent to Rustom on main pack basis.
Signalman K.N. Bhat was wounded and evacuated to the military hospital
in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>.
During the next few days carrier quad was laid to Khojabandi signal centre
established by 68 Infantry Brigade Signal Company and from there to the
battalions - 1 Para, 6 Dogra and 19 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. By
20 September the PVC route to Hajipir had been completed. After the linkup
between 68 and 93 Infantry Brigades, communications were established with
Kahuta on line and wireless, the radio sets being lifted by helicopter. On <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23 September 1965</st1:date>, the day the cease fire was announced,
Signalman Kulbhadur Thapa was wounded while laying cable beyond Demari
Gali. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A number of congratulatory messages
were received from GOC 19 Division during the course of and after the War. The
one received on 1 October read, <b>“<i>Communications at all times given to the
forward most troops have been very good. Good show, keep it up</i>”</b>. The
good work of the unit was recognised by several awards, including ‘Mention in Despatches’
to Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Juneja;
Lieutenant Pritam Singh Parmar; Subedar Harbans Lal Ratra; Naik Chandrasekhar
Pillai and Signalman K.B. Thapa. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">191
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal Company <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The brunt of the Pak offensive in
the Chhamb sector on 1 September 1965 was faced by 191 (Independent) Infantry
Brigade which pulled back from Mandiala during the night through 41 Brigade at
Troti and took up defences at Akhnur. During the day, line communications
forward of brigade headquarters suffered heavy damage due to shelling and tank
movement. By the afternoon, only the lines to 15 Kumaon and Akhnur- Udhampur
were still working. These two lines were also cut later but repaired
expeditiously. Major B.K. Mathur ensured that radio communications functioned
efficiently during this critical period when the whole brigade was bearing the
impact of the Pak offensive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
6 September, XI Corps launched its offensive in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city> sector and the enemy pulled out some
armour and artillery from Chhamb to meet this threat. This information was
picked up by Signal Intelligence units and XV Corps ordered 28, 41 and 191
Brigades to launch a counter offensive towards Jaurian. The attack started on 7
September but due to stiff resistance by the enemy, hardly any progress could
be made. 191 Brigade was again pulled back to Akhnur on 13 September. It was
moved to Tanda towards Sunderbani and tasked to look after the hilly Kalidhar
Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -9.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
this period, Naib Subedar Ram Chand, the senior JCO of 191 Brigade Signal
Company personally led line parties through enemy infested areas several times.
He was ‘Mentioned in Despatches’ for his acts of daring. Another incident worth
recounting took place on 20 September, when the bridge on the Tawi on the road
from Sunderbani to the two battalions deployed on Kalidhar was damaged due to
shelling and along with it the lines also got cut. Lance/Havildar S.S.
Bhattacharjee tied the cable to his body, swam across the fast flowing Tawi
three times while the area was under shelling and restored line communication
to the forward battalions. This act of daring at grave risk of life was
recognised by the award of the Chief of Army Staff’s commendation card. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 115%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
the cease fire came in effect on <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23 September 1965</st1:date>, operations did not stop and some
battalion size attacks were put in to evict Pak encroachments in the Kalidhar sub
sector. During one such attack on a feature called Malla, Major Mathur
accompanied 6 Sikh Light Infantry with a line party and radio detachment and
was able to pass minute to minute information to the brigade commander. The H
hour had to be changed twice at very short notice and Major Mathur ensured that
the information was speedily passed to the artillery and others, thus
contributing to the success of the operation. As a follow up of the Tashkent
Agreement, Pak and Indian Troops withdrew to positions held before the War.
Accordingly, on <st1:date day="26" month="2" w:st="on" year="1966">26 February
1966</st1:date>, the brigade reoccupied its original sector in Chhamb,
including the area that had been overrun during the Pak offensive. This
entailed laying large number of cable routes, installing exchanges and
providing radio communications over long distances. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Major
B.K. Mathur showed great qualities of leadership and courage during the
operations. He was always cheerful and exhibited a bold spirit, which was
infectious. His motto was to ensure that communications were always through, in
keeping with the Corps ethos. For his several acts of bravery and providing
reliable communications under trying and dangerous conditions for operations
lasting over two months, he was awarded the Sena Medal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was raised at Yol in February 1965 under XI Corps, as 11 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment. From 2 May to <st1:date day="2" month="7" w:st="on" year="965">2 July 965</st1:date>, it was deployed in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
during Operation ‘Ablaze’, after which it joined its parent formation at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>. The CO was
Lieutenant Colonel Y.S. Awasthy who had assumed command of the unit in end May
1965. The other officers holding key appointments were Major A. Sen
(second-in-command); Captain S.K. Vij (HQ Company); Major S.K. Sikka (1 Company);
Lieutenant K.B. Vohra (RR Section); Second- Lieutenant K.S. Grewal (adjutant); and
T.R Mehta (quartermaster). The officers in the brigade signal companies which
joined the unit during the operation were Majors B.N. Mathur (191 Brigade);
S.C. Roy (28 Brigade); K.S. Maini (52 Brigade) and Second- Lieutenant Harmohan
Singh (Artillery Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
Operation ‘Riddle’, the unit left for Pathankot on 25 August along with HQ 10 Infantry
Division and arrived there on 6 September 1965. It moved to Akhnur the same
day. Though the unit at this time was part of 10 Infantry Division, its
official designation remained as 11 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. The divisional
commander had arrived earlier to carry out reconnaissance and was without his
headquarters. On 1 September, after Pak launched the offensive in Chhamb and
the situation became critical, he was ordered to take over command of all
troops in Chhamb-Akhnur Sector. He had to function without the signal regiment
for six days, while intense fighting was going on in Area Troti-Jaurian. During
this period, Major J.C. Sarin ex-Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment located at
Akhnur provided communications to the divisional commander and his truncated
staff. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
situation improved somewhat on arrival of 10 Divisional Signal Regiment on 6
September evening. However, the unit was short of equipment and did not have its
full complement of manpower. A central battery exchange located at Akhnur was
used for providing telephones to important subscribers of HQ 10 Infantry
Division. The trunk lines to Udhampur, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>,
the brigades and Sunderbani were terminated on this exchange. The unit was in the thick of battle as soon as
it reached Akhnur and events moved quickly. While radio communications worked
throughout, the lines got damaged frequently due to shelling and move of tanks.
The line section was kept busy repairing lines and re-orienting them as the
brigades changed locations. After the Tashkent Accord, the unit moved out to
area Pathankot. It was subsequently reorganized on 28 February 1967 and its
designation officially changed from 11 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment to
10 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">41
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal
Company</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 41
Infantry Brigade was an independent brigade located at Palampur. Major V.K.
Khanna was in command of the signal company with Lieutenant Bhutkar as his
second-in-command. Once the extent of armed infiltration into Jammu &
Kashmir was known, the brigade concentrated at Phalora near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="9" month="8" w:st="on" year="1965">9 August 1965</st1:date> and was nominated as the corps
reserve. Subsequently the brigade was moved to Tangmarg and took over the existing
communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Srinagar</st1:place></st1:city>,
Baramula and Gulmarg. It also established radio communications to picquets
along the Cease Fire Line. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 31
August the brigade moved to Udhampur. Next morning it was ordered to move to
Akhnur with all speed after alarming reports were received regarding a major
offensive by Pak in Chhamb and enemy armour breaking out towards Mandiala. The brigade
arrived at Akhnur at 1130 hours on 1 September and was immediately placed under
10 Infantry Division. It was ordered to occupy a defended sector in area Troti,
astride road Akhnur-Chhamb, west of Jaurian. 41 Brigade Signal Company arrived at
Troti at 1900 hours the same day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The PL pair, which was being used
by 3 Punjab Armed Police located at Jaurian Rest House for rearward
communications was taken over and extended to Troti, establishing direct speech
communication with Akhnur. A radio set was opened on C24 net and radio
communications established with the HQ XV Corps. Lines were also laid to the
infantry battalions and gun areas, though it was extremely difficult to locate
them, since the unit guides being new in the area themselves were not sure of
the locations. 191 Brigade withdrew through Troti during the same night. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
2 September, Pak Sabre jets strafed Jaurian and fired rockets. As a result,
nearly two miles of PL was completely destroyed. Rearward communications were
disrupted and field cable was laid to patch up the line. Radio communications
to Akhnur and Udhampur remained commercial and lines were built up on poles,
where possible, since the cable was being cut frequently due to move of own tanks.
A tentacle for close air support communications arrived the same day, but the
detachment did not have frequencies and code signs. Demands for close air
support were therefore passed on C 24 link. However, when the aircraft came
over target, these could not be contacted on the ‘ground to air link’. A
general bomb line was therefore given to the aircraft beyond which they could
take on targets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
3 September at about 1500 hours brigade patrols contacted enemy tanks. There
after the enemy repeatedly attacked the brigade defences at Troti, the attacks
extending into the night. Enemy shelling around the brigade headquarters and
gun areas was accurate and lines suffered extensive damage. At 0400 hours on 4
September, orders were received that the brigade could pull back at the
discretion of the brigade commander. However, since daylight was approaching,
it was decided to stay put and pull out during the next night. Enemy infantry
and tanks supported by heavy artillery fire launched a number of attacks during
the day and some positions of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and 9 Mahar were overrun but
were recaptured by counter attacks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
communications in the brigade and rearwards functioned throughout. However, the
lines got damaged time and again due to shelling and move of tanks. The brigade
started withdrawing at 2000 hours on 4 September, passed through 28 Brigade at
Fatwal Ridge behind Jaurian and concentrated at Akhnur. The company retrieved
all its technical equipment, while pulling out from Troti. The next two days were spent in planning for
a counter offensive. On 9 September orders were received that 41 Brigade was to
take part in the divisional attack on Jaurian. Major Khanna along with the brigade
operations group went to 28 Brigade to study the Signals aspects so that he
could and plan for the offensive. However, at 0900 hours the orders were
changed and the brigade was ordered to join 26 Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
brigade arrived at Miran Sahib at 1515 hours and to everyone’s surprise
received fresh orders to move to Amritsar, where it reached next morning and was placed under 15 Infantry Division. It
was ordered to relieve 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade occupying defences in
area Khasa along the Grand Trunk Road. Communications were taken over and changes
effected where required. On 12 September, the brigade was placed directly under
HQ XI Corps. Orders were received on 16 September for the company to reorganize
as an independent brigade signal company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 18 September, the brigade was placed under
command 4 Mountain Division deployed in Asal Uttar Sector. 41 and 29 Brigades
were given the task of capturing Khem Karan. Major Khanna met Commander Signals
4 Mountain Division (Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Rawat) and discussed the signal
plan for the new task of the brigade. Commander 41 Brigade issued his orders
for the attack on Khem Karan at 1000 hours on 21 September. The signal detachments
left for the assembly area at 1430 hours and established communications to the
battalions. Rearward communications included speech circuits to HQ 4 Mountain
Division and HQ 29 Brigade; and a radio relay and a wireless link to the divisional
headquarters. The attack on Khem Karan was launched in the evening and
continued at night. A radio and line detachment was attached to each assaulting
battalion. Lines were laid as the two battalions advanced. The lines worked up
to the forming up place but thereafter these were badly damaged due to
shelling. Radio communications on B1 Link, however, functioned throughout. The attack
only had limited success and Khem Karan could not be captured.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commenting
on the<b> </b>frequent changes in the
location and designation of the company, Major General Khanna, who was then
commanding the company, writes:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 31.5pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At
Palampur and Akhnur it was a mountain brigade signal company since there was no
concept of an independent mountain brigade signal company. Later on we became
an infantry brigade signal company as our brigade also became an infantry
brigade. Subsequently 41 Brigade again became a mountain brigade but fresh
orders came changing our WE and re-named us as independent infantry brigade
signal company. We had the unique distinction of a mountain brigade being
supported by an infantry brigade signal company. Another feature was that
though 41 Brigade had become integral to 4 Division we were not part of 4
Divisional Signal Regiment as per AHQ orders. This was more so since Signals
Directorate could not keep pace with the fast changing scenario of 41 Brigade.
As OC of signal company, I was directly under the CSO. We however had the best
of relations with the divisional signal regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">25
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
role of the unit during counter infiltration operations has already been
described. The Pak offensive on 1 September was launched in Chhamb, to the
south of the sector occupied by 25 Infantry Division. The Indian counter
offensive also took place at a distance from the division’s area of
responsibility. Consequently, the unit did not play a major part in Operation
‘Riddle’. However, the personnel were kept busy carrying out maintenance of
lines, which were prone to frequent interruptions. Ironically, some of the
major operations in this sector took place after the Cease Fire had been
declared. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="9" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">9 September 1965</st1:date>, Naik
Tushar Kanti Sen located at HQ 120 Brigade at Galuthi, was ordered to repair
lines to two infantry battalions and Rajauri, which had suddenly developed
faults. He and his two colleagues were given an escort of a CRP (Central
Reserve Police) Section. After travelling a few miles, Naik Tushar noticed that
the road had been breached and telephone wires deliberately cut. He ordered the
CRP Section to deploy and along with two other linemen went to repair the
lines. As they moved forward they were fired upon from the nearby high ground.
Naik Tushar told the CRP Section to return the fire, crawled forward to the
nearest pole with the other linemen, quickly raised the ladder and tapped the
line. Getting through to the brigade headquarters, the NCO briefed them about
the situation and enemy location. Artillery fire was quickly brought down and
Naik Tushar gave corrections to the guns to adjust the fire. He remained
steadfast and faced the enemy till an infantry platoon and an artillery officer
arrived, who engaged the enemy and killed nearly 40 of them. It was later
revealed that there were approximately 200 infiltrators in the area and the
bold action by Naik Tushar thwarted the designs of the enemy to lay a major
ambush for convoys coming from Punch.
Naik Tushar Kanti Sen was awarded the Sena Medal for his act of bravery
in the face of the enemy and danger to his life. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another important operation was the
capture of OP Hill in Mendhar Sector on the night of 2/3 November 1965, to
evict the enemy. Three battalions - 5 Sikh Light Infantry, 2 Dogra and 7 Sikh
took part in the brigade size attack launched under Commander 120 Brigade. 5 Sikh Light Infantry commanded by the legendary
Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh (he was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for this
battle and won the same award again in 1971), played a leading role in the
success of the operation. He explained that he was through on radio all the
time during the bloody battle with the companies directly and the brigade headquarters.
Naik Uttam Chand and Lance/Naik Joga Singh provided line communications to the
battalion during the attack. Signal communications for this operation were
planned and executed under Major C.S Joshi the second-in-command of the unit.
Major S.G. Rajopadhye (1 Company) and Captain H.S. Garewal (120 Brigade Signal
Company) were responsible for the communications during the operation, which
was commended by the brigade commander. An important task was the interception
and jamming of enemy nets. Throughout
the war, arrangements were made for intercepting enemy radio links and
important intelligence passed to the Staff. For the OP Hill operation, enemy
frequencies were identified after monitoring and these were jammed during the
attack, using SCR 399. A deception plan was also put in effect in area
Jhangar. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
a result of the Agreement at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tashkent</st1:place></st1:city>,
both sides agreed to withdraw from areas captured. Indian and Pakistan Signals
laid lines in affected sectors between commanders of both sides to coordinate
the withdrawal. At Naushera, the line was laid under Captain S.S. Kale up to
North Check Post near Jhangar. The line was joined with the cable laid by Pak
Signals. Major Harbhajan Singh (later Lieutenant General and Signal
Officer-in-Chief) was the brigade major of 80 Infantry Brigade and used this
line to interact with his Pak counter- part. A line was also laid in Punch
sector to the Pak side. These lines were wound up after all actions on Tashkent
Agreement had been implemented. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">OPERATIONS IN XI CORPS SECTOR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Planning and Preparatory Moves <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">According
to the plan made by Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, GOC-in-C Western
Command, simultaneous offensives were to be launched by I and XI Corps I order
to divide the enemy reaction and reduce the possibility of a counter attack. In
the event, the offensives had to be staggered due to the delay in move of
formations of I Corps that were located at a distance from the area of
operations. This gave Pakistan the margin of time to launch her offensive
first, which was brilliantly repulsed by XI Corps. <u> <o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Lieutenant
General J.S Dhillon was the GOC XI Corps. The divisional commanders under him
were Major General Gurbakhsh Singh, M.V.C. (4 Mountain Division); Major General
H.K Sibal, M.V.C. (7 Infantry Division) and Major General Niranjan Prasad (15
Infantry Division). In addition, he had Brigadier T.K. Theograj (2 Independent
Armoured Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The
tasks assigned to XI Corps by HQ Western Command were to secure the line of the
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>, establish certain bridge heads
across the canal and pose a threat to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>.
After their withdrawal from concentration areas occupied during Operation ‘Ablaze’,
formations of XI Corps had returned to their permanent locations in the <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. HQ XI Corps was in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>, while the divisions - 4, 7 and 15
- were located in Ambala, Ferozepore and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
respectively. The units of 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade were in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Patiala</st1:place></st1:city>, Nabha and
Sangrur, while 67 Infantry Brigade was in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The
go-ahead for commencement of the operations was received from Army HQ on <st1:date day="3" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">3 September 1965</st1:date> and the
move of the formations from their interim locations commenced at first light
next morning. In the interest of security no vehicles were permitted to cross
the <st1:place w:st="on">Beas</st1:place> before last light on 5 September,
leaving them with just nine hours of darkness to get into their assembly areas
for the attack that was scheduled to go in at 0400 hours on 6 September. In
order maintain secrecy, the move of the operational headquarters of Western
Command from Simla to Ambala was held back till the last minute. To further deceive
the enemy, the Army Commander and several senior officers of HQ Western Command
agreed to attend a large civilian lunch party in Simla in the afternoon of 5
September.</span><sup><span lang="EN-US">14</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">15 Infantry Division<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The
task allotted to 15 Infantry Division was to secure Pakistan territory up to
east bank of Ichhogil Canal and capture the important bridges on the GT Road,
Ichhogil Uttar and Jallo. The advance
commenced at 0400 hours on 6 September as scheduled and achieved complete
surprise. The advance was led by 3 Jat of 54 Infantry Brigade, under Lieutenant
Colonel D.E. Hayde, who had taken over only the previous evening. Advancing rapidly the battalion assaulted and
captured the enemy post at Gosal by 0630 hours, clearing the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">village</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Dial</st1:placename></st1:place>
within the next 30 minutes. At the same time the Dogra company accompanying the
battalion surprised the Pakistani Rangers at Wagah and captured the post. At 0800
hours 15 Dogra with C Squadron 14 Horse set off towards the bridge over the
Ichhogil at Dograi. The Pak Air Force was quick to react and carried out
intensive air strikes with rockets, machine guns and bombs on 3 Jat and 15
Dogra, causing heavy casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 109%;">Due to a breakdown in the wireless link, HQ 54 Infantry
Brigade was not aware of the success achieved by 3 Jat, which linked up with 15
Dogra at about 0930 hours. The brigade commander, Brigadier M.S. Rikh, who went
forward to contact 3 Jat, met CO 15 Dogra, Lieutenant Colonel Inderjit Singh,
who informed him that his battalion had suffered very heavy casualties at Wagah
and he was not in a position to carry out his task. It was later found that
this account was exaggerated. However, based on the information given by Colonel
Inderjit, Brigadier Rikh modified his plan and ordered 3 Jat to capture the
bridge near Dograi, asking 15 Dogra to firm in at Dial. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 109%;">Led by the intrepid Desmond Hayde, 3 Jat raced forward and
captured the east bank of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place> about 200 yards north
of Dograi. The Jats then swung southwards and captured the GT Road Bridge at 1130
hours. The leading elements of the battalion crossed the canal and reached the
Bata shoe factory on the outskirts of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>,
which was to be the limit of the bridgehead. By this time enemy air attacks had
taken a considerable toll of the advancing troops. Almost the complete F
Echelon of 3 Jat had been destroyed and the battalion was short of ammunition
and essential supplies. Even the brigade headquarters was attacked, the brigade
major’s jeep and office 3 Ton vehicle both being blown up. Rattled by the enemy
air strikes and unaware of the momentous success achieved by 3 Jat – the
wireless link was still not through – Rikh ordered the battalion to withdraw to
Gosal Dial. In the bargain, the gains achieved by a brilliant feat of arms at
Dograi by 3 Jat were frittered away. Colonel Hayde, who was wounded during the
attack, was awarded the MVC and Subedar Khazan Singh received the VrC. The
casualties suffered by 3 Jat were 25 killed, including one officer and one JCO;
and 78 wounded, including three officers and three JCOs.</span><sup><span lang="EN-US">15</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 109%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-font-width: 109%;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_9"
o:spid="_x0000_i1031" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:192.75pt;height:129pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image011.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="172" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image012.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_9" width="257" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Indian troops on the outskirts of Lahore, 1965</span><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 109%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At
this stage, the corps commander gave a fresh set of orders according to which
54 Infantry Brigade was to capture Dograi and 38 Infantry Brigade was capture
Bhasin, sending a battalion to capture Bhaini-Malakapur. The divisional
commander vehemently protested against this, both verbally and in writing,
arguing that the diversion of 38 Brigade to secure Bhasin and Bhaini-Malakapur
would hamper his advance. He also reported that the situation in his sector was
desperate due to heavy casualties, and that no further offensive action was
possible. Alarmed at this report, the army and corps commanders rushed forward
and met the divisional commander at near Attari at 1400 hours on 6 September. A
quick on the spot assessment revealed that the situation had been grossly
exaggerated by Major General Niranjan Prasad, who appeared to have been
demoralized by the recent events. He was asked to pull himself together and
carry out the assigned tasks with vigour.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On the GT Road axis, 38 Infantry
Brigade was to capture Dograich-Bhasin and secure the East bank of Ichhogil
Canal, in Phase II of the operation on the night of 6/7 September. In view of
the set-backs already encountered, the task of the brigade was modified and it was
ordered to secure the east bank of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place> in general area of
the aqueduct. The brigade moved after last light on 6 September on man-pack
basis via Wagah-Singhpura along road Pul Kanjri, but could not make much
progress, in spite of lack of opposition. The formation advanced some distance
and firmed in there. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
Not knowing the whereabouts of 38 Brigade due to disruption of the
wireless link, the divisional commander along with a small party set off to
locate them at night. Unfortunately, they ran into an ambush and were captured
by the enemy, though General Prasad managed to escape in a jeep. However, 12
men and four jeeps fell into enemy hands. One of the vehicles had Prasad’s memo
pad and a personal file containing references to his representations against
his removal from the command of 4 Mountain Division in 1962. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> radio
gleefully announced the incident and broadcast extracts from his personal file,
causing embarrassment to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Soon afterwards, Prasad was relieved and Major General Mohinder Singh assumed
command of 15 Infantry Division. On 7 September Brigadier Rikh, Commander 54
Brigade was wounded and evacuated, being replaced by Brigadier S.S. Kalha, the
Commander Corps Artillery of XI Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 7 September, fresh orders were issued to 38
and 54 Infantry Brigades to complete their allotted tasks by first light of 8
September. Commander 38 Brigade ordered 1/3 Gorkha Rifles to advance north of
the road and attack the bridge on 8 September. But the enemy reacted fiercely and
the attack failed. From this date till the cease-fire, 38 Infantry Brigade
remained in the same area, but was unable to secure the east bank of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>. Brigadier Pathak was subsequently
punished and demoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. On the 54 Infantry
Brigade front, the attack was planned for the night of 7/8 September on the
canal bridge and rail bridge with 13 Punjab on the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC)
axis and 3 Jat forming a firm base while 15 Dogra were to exploit from west of
Gosal Dial village on the main GT road with the assistance of A Squadron 14
Horse after first light on 8 September. A and B Companies of 13 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> reached the objective and completed digging of
fire trenches by first light. The enemy withdrew from the canal road bridge but
reinforced the railway bridge. When D Company advanced to the railway bridge,
it came under heavy army shelling. By first light, Pak armour also arrived, and
13 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> withdrew without orders. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
8, 9 and 10 September, Pakistan maintained pressure on all the Indian positions
by raids, artillery shelling and armour attacks, which were repulsed with heavy
losses to the enemy, except on the Ranian axis. On 10 September, in face of
enemy pressure the remnants of 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon withdrew to Lopoke; and
Ranian and Kakkar fell into enemy hands. The same day, 96 Infantry Brigade was
relieved by 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade (Brigadier A.M.M. Nambiar) and placed under command 15 Infantry
Division for securing the right flank of the divisional sector and preventing
any ingress of Pak armour from the Syphon area. It was then moved to area
Kohali to restore the situation on that axis and be prepared to advance up to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place> bridge at the earliest. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After its arrival at Hudiara Drain
on 10 September, 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade was first given the task of
capturing Bhasin by first light 14 September. However, after being relieved by
41 Mountain Brigade on 13 September, the brigade was given new tasks of
securing Pak territory up to Ichhogil Canal, and capturing the Jallo bridge
intact by last light 16 September, which was later extended to last light 17 September, at the
request of the brigade commander. Moving
along the drain on both sides of the UBDC, 2 Para reached the junction of
Khaire distributary and the canal and advanced towards the objective, suffering
heavy casualties from enemy fire. Undeterred by the stiff opposition, 2 Para
assault elements reached the Jallo bridge, to discover that it had already been
destroyed by the enemy. The demolition party detailed for the bridge also came
under heavy fire and two sappers were killed and six wounded. At the same time
6 Para attacked the rail bridge at about 0030 hours on 17 September and
occupied it. Though both battalions captured their objectives they were
subsequently withdrawn to the area Bhamma-Bhatha to occupy a defensive
position, due to ambiguity in orders issued by the brigade commander. In the
bargain, valuable territory captured at great cost was vacated. For withdrawing
his troops without orders, the brigade commander was replaced.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 21/22 September, 15 Infantry
Division made a fresh attempt to get to the Ichhogil Canal. According to the
plan, 54 Brigade was to recapture the Dograi area; 38 Brigade was to advance to
the canal in its area and 96 Brigade was to secure the Syphon area to the
north. While 38 and 96 Brigades could not secure their objectives, 54 Brigade
succeeded, despite heavy odds. Once again 3 Jat under the inspiring leadership
of Colonel Hayde recaptured Dograi on 22 September and held it against repeated
counter attacks by the enemy. Both the Jats and the Pakistanis suffered heavy
casualties in this battle. For its gallant performance, 3 Jat received three
Maha Vir Chakras and a number of other gallantry awards.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">16</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">7 Infantry Division<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 43.9pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US;">The advance of 7 Infantry Division commenced at 0530 hours
on <st1:date day="6" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">6 September 1965</st1:date>.
The leading elements of 48 Infantry Brigade Group (Brigadier K.J.S. Shahaney)
contacted enemy defences at Hudiara at about 0700 hours coming under heavy,
long-range automatic fire from enemy positions in Hudiara, Nurpur and Hudiara
Drain. By this time, 17 Rajput had captured the enemy border post east of
Bedian, achieving complete surprise. By
1030 hours 6/8 Gorkha had secured Hudiara village. A frontal attack on Hudiara
Drain being ruled out due to accurate artillery and small arms fire from the
enemy, it decided to launch an attack from the left, eliminating enemy
resistance at Nurpur and up to a distance of 1000 yards from the west bank of
Hudiara Drain. The task was entrusted to 5 Guards, which launched its attack on
Nurpur at 1330 hours on 6 September. The enemy put up stiff resistance but the
Guards persisted. Early next morning, the enemy withdrew, after blowing up the
bridge over the Hudiara Drain. 48 Infantry Brigade then firmed in while 7
Divisional Engineers started constructing a bailey bridge on the Hudiara Drain.
Brigadier Shahaney, himself a Sapper, prevailed on the young Engineer officer
at the bridge site to construct a causeway on priority for the jeeps carrying
recoilless guns. This delayed the work on construction of the bridge.</span><sup><span lang="EN-US">17</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 89%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 43.9pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US;">Placing under his command the Central India Horse
(CIH) equipped with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sherman</st1:place></st1:city>
tanks, General Sibal ordered Brigadier Lerb Ferris, Commander 65 Infantry
Brigade, to resume advance at 0700 hours on 7 September. However, the causeway
and a bailey bridge were ready only by 1545 hours, after which 9 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> with B Squadron
CIH advanced and secured Barka Kalan. The enemy put in an immediate counter-attack,
but it was beaten back. After reports being received that <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">village</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Barka Khurd</st1:placename></st1:place>
was also held by the enemy, 16 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> attacked
and captured the village on 9 September. Continuing its pressure on the enemy,
65 Infantry Brigade advanced further for the capture of Barki and east bank of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 43.9pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 43.9pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US;">The attack on village Barki was launched at 2000 hours
on 10 September by 4 Sikh, after an intense preparatory bombardment by Indian
artillery. When the assaulting troops were very close to the objective, CIH
less two squadrons moved forward to provide fire support after the artillery
fire had lifted. Due to the continuous
Indian armour fire at night, the Pakistanis thought that India had brought in
new tanks with night-firing capability and abandoned Barki at 2100 hours after
suffering a large number of casualties. When permission was given to the Pak
troops to collect the dead bodies of their comrades from the battle-field, they
took away four truck-loads of corpses, including the dead body of Major Aziz
Bhatti, who was posthumously awarded Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan's highest
gallantry award.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 43.9pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: EN-US;">Supported by the divisional artillery, 16 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> now advanced to complete Phase 2 of the plan. It
passed through Barki at and secured the east bank of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>
by 2340 hours. The enemy ran in panic and demolished the bridge at Barki before
withdrawing. In this battle, Lieutenant Colonel S. C. Joshi, VrC, commanding
the Central India Horse, who had dismounted from his tank and was trying to
guide it forward, was killed in a mine blast. During the night of 10/11
September, a medium battery was moved up to counter-bombard enemy guns, some
shells falling on <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>
also. This not only silenced enemy guns effectively, but was also a
contributory factor for the exodus from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">4 Mountain Division<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 89%;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">4 Mountain Division under Major
General Gurbaksh Singh had been reorganised and specially trained for mountain
warfare after the 1962 operations against the Chinese in NEFA. It was located
in Ambala and the Simla Hills when it was ordered to move for the operations in
the Khem Karan sector. The tasks allotted to the Division were to secure Pak
territory east of the Ichhogil Canal south of Bedian right up to the Sutlej;
destroy the bridge over the Canal on the Kasur Khem Karan Road; and to occupy a
divisional defended sector to contain a likely offensive by Pak 1 Armoured
Division and an infantry division astride the Kasur-Khem Karan and
Gandasinghwala-Khem Karan axes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
operations commenced at 0500 hours on 6 September. 9 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles
of 62 Mountain Brigade captured Rohi Nala on the main axis at about 0915 hours while
13 Dogra secured area Rohiwal by 1030 hours. Two battalions of 7 Mountain
Brigade, 7 Grenadiers and 4 Grenadiers, also advanced towards Ballanwala and
Theh Pannun respectively. By 1130 hours 4 Grenadiers secured the line of Rohi
Kala and east bank of Ichhogil Canal from Theh Pannun southwards. However, 7
Grenadiers could not capture Ballanwala, which was heavily defended. The
battalion made another attempt at 0200 hours but failed. The enemy reacted quickly. At 1530 hours 13 Dogra was subjected to
heavy artillery fire prior to a counter-attack by the enemy. The battalion
abandoned the position and disintegrated as a unit. Throughout the night all
defended localities and gun areas were subjected to very heavy, accurate and
sustained artillery fire. By first light on 7 September, it was discovered that
7 Grenadiers and two companies of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles had also abandoned their
positions. At about 0700 hours, 9 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles was encircled by
enemy armour and strafed by the enemy aircraft. The CO and one company
withdrew, leaving the rest of the battalion to its fate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The situation in 4 Mountain Division
appeared to be desperate. Not only had the division failed to carry out any of
its tasks, two and a half battalions had disintegrated, leaving about three and
half battalions that were still holding their positions. The corps commander recommended
that the division be replaced by another formation, but this was ruled out by
the Army Commander after a personal visit to the division to assess the
situation. The divisional commander was
confident that he would be able to pull his troops together and re-establish
command and control. He was as good as his word, and the division performed
creditably in the crucial actions that took place during the next few days.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">18</span></sup><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Battle of Asal Utar<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By the morning of 8 September, 4
Mountain Division had hastily occupied a defended sector at Asal Utar with the
three and a half battalions that were still functional and the armoured
regiment that was available. At 0930 hours approximately two squadrons of
Chaffees approached the divisional defended sector through Ballanwala on a
reconnaissance-cum-probing mission.
Approaching on a broad front, they surrounded the Indian defended
localities, and from their right flank attempted to infiltrate to the gun
areas. In the action which followed, the enemy lost two Chaffees and withdrew.
Again at 1445 hours, they carried out a reconnaissance in force with a regiment
of Pattons and over-ran the position of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles. 9 Horse now played
an important role in stopping the enemy in front of the Indian defended sector.
A diversionary attack by Pattons fell on 4 Grenadiers and the gun area, but it
was halted in area Rattoke. The enemy tried to by-pass the defended sector on
the north, but a squadron of 3 Cavalry in the area Bhikhiwind had anticipated
this move and was ready to receive them. It moved down immediately and attacked
the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing him to withdraw. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After this reconnaissance in force by the enemy, it
became evident that a major armoured thrust was likely to take place next day.
Immediately, 2 (Independent) Armoured
Brigade was ordered to concentrate 3 Cavalry
less a squadron from the area Chabal Kalan and Rajatal and 8 Cavalry
less a squadron from the Amritsar by-pass area to the 4 Mountain Division
sector. All moves were completed smoothly on the night of 8/9 September, and
the defences were strengthened by laying more mines. At 0200 hours on 9
September the enemy combat group of two Patton regiments, making use of
moonlight and infra-red equipment, attacked 18 Rajputana Rifles. The Indian
artillery brought down heavy fire and the infantry engaged the attacking enemy
with recoilless guns. Though the enemy tanks had a free run, they failed to
dislodge the Indian defences and the attack was beaten back. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 9 September, 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was
placed under command 4 Mountain Division. Orders were issued that the Indian
armour would function at night, and 9 Horse would stay in forward defended
localities and gun area in an anti-tank role. The enemy made another attempt
during the night to over-run 18 Rajputana Rifles’ positions. However, the
battalion held fast and the enemy was engaged by medium artillery and tanks,
located in forward defended localities. At 0330 hours the enemy infantry,
brought up in armoured personnel carriers, probed forward, but, on hitting the
mine-field, withdrew, and a lull followed. Pakistan carried out reconnaissance
in force with tanks throughout the latter part of night of 9/10 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The final enemy attack came at 0700 hours on 10
September. A strong enemy combat group attacked the position held by 4
Grenadiers, but the attack was foiled by Indian artillery and a squadron of 3
Cavalry that was patiently waiting for an opportune moment, and opened up once
the enemy Pattons came out of a sugar cane field, exposing their broadsides. After
the failure of the attack on 4 Grenadiers, the enemy made another outflanking
movement towards Mahmudpur-Dibbipura, aiming for the gun area. The enemy column
was shadowed by 3 Cavalry and was attacked from three sides. Trying to
extricate themselves from the trap the Pattons got bogged down in the mud and
were shot like sitting ducks by Indian tanks and recoilless guns. This broke
the back of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division which was forced to pull back in
complete disarray. The infantry played its part and Havildar Abdul Hamid
knocked out three Patton tanks with his recoilless gun before losing his life.
He was awarded a posthumous Param Vir Chakra.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The battle of Asal Utar turned the tide of the war
in 1965. Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division was decimated, with it evaporating her
hope of a decisive victory over India. In three days of fighting at Asal Utar,
Pakistan lost 97 tanks, including 72 Pattons. This included the entire tank
fleet of 4 Cavalry, whose CO, 12 officers and several soldiers surrendered en
masse on the morning on 11 September.
The casualties suffered by 4 Mountain Division were 60 killed, 206
wounded and 93 missing, in addition to 10 tanks. The losses of 2 (Independent)
Armoured Brigade were one OR killed with two tanks destroyed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">After the withdrawal
of the bulk of the Pakistani armour, 4 Mountain Division was ordered to re-take
Khemkaran. Gurbakash gave the task to 7 Brigade, which was given two battalions,
4 Sikh and 2 Mahar, for the operation that was launched on 12 September. The Sikhs
were used on an outflanking movement, while the Mahars put in a frontal attack
on the Khemkaran Distributary position. Unfortunately, about two companies of
Sikhs were captured by the enemy; while the Mahars supported by Deccan Horse,
could not overcome the position, despite some initial success and suffering
heavy casualties. The brigade put in a second attack, which also failed.
Subsequently, 4 Division was given two new brigades, viz. 29 Brigade and 41
Brigade, but lost 7 Brigade. The division launched yet another attack on
Khemkaran on 21 September, but even this could not make any headway, the enemy
determinedly holding the position with a strong brigade group with armour. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 89%;">67 Infantry
Brigade <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">GOC XI Corps tasked
Brigadier Bant Singh, Commander 67 Infantry Brigade Group, to defend the area
from Harike headworks to Anupgarh in Rajasthan. On 6 September, the enemy
shelled Indian defences in the Sulaimanke sector followed by three attacks on
night of 7/8 September on 14 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> which were
all repulsed. On 8 September, Pak F-86 jets bombed 2 Maratha positions, which
were also subjected to artillery fire. During the night of 9/10 September, the
enemy attacked 14 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> defensive position in
Fazilka and captured a platoon locality, which was recaptured after a counter-attack.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">During the period
12-18 September, there was intermittent shelling by both sides. On the night of
19/20 September, 2 Maratha at Hussainiwala was attacked by an enemy infantry
battalion supported by tanks. The Pakistanis also attacked the Bhagat Singh
Samadhi area at Hussainiwala and destroyed the memorial. However, the main
attack was repulsed and the Indian garrison at Hussainiwala was reinforced with
two infantry companies and two troops of armour from Fazilka. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 89%;">23 Mountain Division<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">23 Mountain Division,
commanded by Major General D.K. Palit, VrC, was located in Rangia in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> in early
September 1965. After the Pak attack on Khem Karan, the division minus 30
Brigade moved by train and detrained at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ludhiana</st1:place></st1:city>.
In lieu of 30 Brigade, the division was allotted another brigade, but one
battalion was taken away to Hudiara for operations. Although earmarked as Army
HQ Reserve, this division was located within the Western Command Theatre.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> During 15-18 September1965, the division was
asked to be prepared for launching an offensive in the Kasur area with a view
to drawing out Pak I Corps from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>.
However, this was subsequently cancelled as it was planned to launch 23
Mountain Division across the <st1:place w:st="on">Ravi</st1:place> in Dera Baba
Nanak sector to hit the Pak forces from the south. This was considered necessary to stimulate the
progress of the Indian offensive in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:place></st1:city>
sector and also to open a line of communication along the same axis to
supplement the replenishment of I Corps from the east. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">On 20 September,
orders were issued to the division to concentrate in Dera Baba Nanak area by 26
September. As the Division did not have any armour, one squadron of PT-76 tanks
was provided. Since the task required the crossing of the river <st1:place w:st="on">Ravi</st1:place>, and as the formation had no river-crossing
experience, it was asked to practice the same on the <st1:place w:st="on">Sutlej</st1:place>.
However, all these preparations proved futile, as the cease-fire took place on
23 September 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 88%;">SIGNALS IN
OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’: XI CORPS SECTOR</span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XI
Corps Signals <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier K.S. Garewal (later
Lieutenant General and SO-in-C) took over as CSO XI Corps in the first week of
August 1965. He had, however, to return to Signals Directorate soon afterwards
to finish certain important actions dealing with Plan AREN. Before returning to
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
Brigadier Garewal discussed the operational requirements with the corps
commander, his staff and senior signal officers, and revalidated the existing
signal plan for the Corps. The lines and wireless diagrams of XI Corps are
given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 2 September, the Signals branch
was asked to prepare a signal instruction to be issued along with the corps
operational instruction. Since details of the operational deployment and tasks
were not known, it was decided to issue the signal instruction in two parts.
Part I contained what could be foreseen and was not location specific i.e.
general policy, wireless diagram, frequency assignment, authentication sheets,
codes and ciphers, scale of line communications and SDS plan. Part II covered
detailed line communication plan, routing and engineering diagrams and SDS time
table. Part I was issued on 3 September and Part II on <st1:date day="4" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">4 September 1965</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lines
were to be the primary means of signal communications supplemented by radio
relay. On 2 September orders were received for attachment of 9 Medium Radio
Relay Signal Section ex ‘R’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment with XI Corps
Signal Regiment. Patti was developed as
a switching centre and a civil as well as military carrier centre. Radio relay
equipment (Radio Set C41/R222) was new to the unit and only limited training
had been carried out. A link was established between Main HQ XI Corps and Patti
and from Patti to 4 and 7 Divisions. A radio relay chain was also established
to 15 Division. Radio relay proved highly stable and at places became the
mainstay of communications.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">XI
Corps Signal Regiment</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lieutenant
Colonel D.B. Lahiri was commanding XI Corps Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. The other field officers in the
unit were Major N.T.C. Nambiar (second-in-command); Major R.S. Arora (1
Company); Major Sarjit Singh (2 Company); and Major Gurdev Singh (3
Company). Based on the visit of the SO-in-C
during Operation ‘Ablaze’, some new radio sets, line equipment and radio relay
stations were issued to the unit in the first week of August 1965. The unit was
also given orders to reorganise based on three companies as opposed to four
companies till then. During the month of August, the regiment was busy
reorganising and training on new equipment including radio relay. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
2 September evening, the CO was summoned by the corps commander, Lieutenant
General J.S. Dhillon and informed that hostilities with Pakistan were imminent
and that the corps headquarters would move out to its operational location on 5
September. Signals could send small
parties to make preliminary arrangements but all work was to be done during
hours of darkness. General Dhillon mentioned that formations will not be moving
to any concentration areas but directly to operational locations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
return to the unit, the CO gave orders for a crash exercise. On 3 September
Major Sarjit Singh, OC 2 Company and the GSO 1 (Operations) proceeded on a
reconnaissance of the new site of the corps headquarters at Rayya. The GSO 1(Operations) decided to locate both
the main and rear headquarters in <st1:place w:st="on">Beas</st1:place>.
However, Sarjit did not agree to this due to technical and tactical reasons and
informed the CO, who immediately apprised the corps commander of the
implications of the selected area. A fresh reconnaissance was ordered and this
time Colonel Lahiri himself accompanied the GSO 1. By the evening of 3
September, a new location about one kilometre from the carrier station near
Rayya, already established for the Army, was agreed upon.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
CSO, Brigadier Garewal, arrived from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
on 3 September in the afternoon and was briefed by Colonel Lahiri on his return
from the reconnaissance. Garewal was of the view that it would be better if the
corps headquarters stayed put at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
and moved only once the battle had stabilised. Meanwhile some mechanics and
linemen of the unit had started working to engineer circuits from the new
location. At 0400 hours next morning Second Lieutenant R.K .Gill, the TOT
(Technical Officer Telecom) gave a completion report to the CO that all
circuits were ready for activation from the new location. However, at 0900 hours Colonel Lahiri was
informed that the corps commander had accepted the recommendation of the CSO to
delay the move of the headquarters till the battle stabilised. He was directed
to bring back all the circuits from Rayya to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Working
throughout the night, the personnel of the unit completed the task of
re-engineering the circuits. At 0600 hours on 5 September, the CO gave a
completion report to the corps headquarters that all line communications had
been re-routed to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. After checking the communications Colonel
Lahiri had just gone home for breakfast when he was again summoned to the corps
headquarters. When he reached there he was told by the corps commander that
there was yet another change and he had finally decided to move his headquarters
to Rayya. He told Colonel Lahiri that road space had been specially allotted
for his unit so that he could move at the earliest. He wanted direct
communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
Simla, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
and Ambala by 1600 hours, when he would arrive at the new location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
CO, dumb founded at the sudden change in the move plan, rang up his unit from
the nearest telephone before rushing back to issue fresh orders. By 1030 hours Major Sarjit Singh had left
with the advance elements and the rest of the unit vehicles were lined up and
ready to move. Fortunately detailed reconnaissance and engineering of circuits
from the new location had already been carried out a day earlier, and the
communications were re-established from the operational location in record
time. General Dhillon arrived at 1600
hours and asked to be connected to the Army Commander. The call was put through
immediately. Shortly afterwards the GOC left for a visit to the forward areas
accompanied by his rover. During the night the rover vehicle met with an
accident near Tarn Taran, in which the rover operator Havildar Bhagat Singh was
injured and evacuated to hospital. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Officers were placed on all axes
along with line parties to extend lines to formations as these arrived. By
about 0030 hours on 6 September, the line parties waiting on different axes for
formations moving in contacted the advance parties. By 0200 hours all lines and
radio relay links were through. Wireless links had been established and kept on
listening watch. Wireless detachments from formations under command had been
called earlier at the corps headquarters for tuning and netting as also
marrying up. At 0400 hours when the shooting war started, radio silence was
broken and wireless and radio relay communications established in addition to
lines. A deliberate decision was taken not to activate rearward wireless links
till 8 September. It had been planned to
move the rear corps headquarters close to the main headquarters on 6 September.
However, on request from the CO, its move was deferred by three days. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> XI Corps
was heavily dependent on the P&T for trunk communications. Mr. Harkrishan
Singh, the Divisional Officer, Telegraph at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> was appointed the Department’s
liaison officer to XI Corps. He and his staff provided excellent support in
engineering and re-engineering trunk communications. These remained stable
except the ones to 4 Mountain Division, which were disrupted quite often due to
intense fighting, shelling and move of tanks. As a result, radio relay and
wireless had to be relied upon for communications to 4 Mountain Division. At
one stage, in response to an urgent request from their CO, XI Corps Signal
Regiment gave them four radio relay sets on loan for three days. The CSO, who
had not been informed, was ‘livid’, but decided to overlook it. His annoyance
was justified – the sets were returned only after the cease fire. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lahiri
recalls an interesting incident to prove that luck favoured his unit during the
war. The corps commander was concerned about the location of Pak 1 Armoured
Division, which could launch a potent offensive into the corps zone. The war
was two days old and Lahiri was standing near the signal centre when he saw
Brigadier P.S. Grewal, the Brigadier General Staff almost running towards the CSO.
The two met and then the CSO also almost ran towards the signal centre. On
seeing this, Lahiri ran towards him. Brigadier Garewal gave him a signal and
said, <b><i>“Clear it to 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade immediately- it’s Flash”.</i>
<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lahiri did not look at the message.
He knew that the line to 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was under repair and
so he made a dash to the C 2 link about 150 yards away and told the operator to
clear the message immediately. The operator said that he had just then agreed
to the request of the operator on the other end to close down for 30 minutes
for change of batteries and adjusting the aerial. Lahiri told the operator to
call 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade all the same. Luckily the other end
operator had not yet switched off his set. The ‘Flash’ message, just two lines,
was cleared immediately in clear. Its contents were: <b><i>“Enemy Armoured Division thrust
had begun. Position own forces in pre determined locations as already decided,
in shortest possible time to thwart the enemy Armoured Division thrust”.</i> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An
important drill started by Colonel Lahiri was the ‘Technical Stand To’. As is
well known, all units in operations carry out ‘Stand To’ early in the morning
and in the evenings, when all personnel man their trenches/weapon pits and are
in a state of readiness to face any attack. In case of Signals, it was
considered necessary that they in addition have a ‘Technical Stand To’. With
experience, it was concluded that between 0100 and 0330 hours signal traffic
was minimal. It was therefore decided to start the Signals ‘Technical Stand To’
at 0200 hours. During this Stand To, equipment was checked, batteries changed
and all circuits lined up, so that when the commanders and staff got active
early in the morning and desired to make telephone/radio calls to obtain latest
situation reports, all the communications were working at optimal efficiency.
Another reason was that enemy and own troops usually launched attacks in the
early hours and it was necessary that communications should be optimised before
such happenings. However, care was taken to ensure that all the circuits to
each formation were not disturbed at the same time due to testing/aligning. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
was a challenging task to provide communications to XI Corps, which was
involved in very intense fighting. XI Corps Signal Regiment under the command
of Colonel Lahiri acquitted itself creditably, earning praise from commanders
as well as staff. Lieutenant K. Veluswamy and Subedar Major Pritam Singh were ‘Mentioned
in Despatches’. In addition, a number of Chief of Army Staff Commendation Cards
was awarded. The corps commander visited the unit after the hostilities were
over and at a grand ‘Sainik Sammelan’ presented an impressive trophy. While
addressing all ranks he said, <b><i>“Your performance during the Indo-Pak War
was so superb that it has never been equaled by any signal regiment in any war,
at any place and time”.<o:p></o:p></i></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Z
Communication Zone Signal Regiment</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
under Lieutenant Colonel C.P. Katarya. It was responsible for operating the
signal centre at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>
and providing communications to administrative installations of XI Corps. 2 Company of the regiment was located at
Pathankot. In August 1965, 3 Medium Radio Relay Section ex Central Command
Mobile Signal Company was moved to the unit. On 2 September, the unit was
placed under the technical control of CSO XI Corps. 11 Line Section which was
constructing a PL route in Jammu & Kashmir returned on 9 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="_x0000_i1034" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:239.25pt;height:220.5pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image017.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="294" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image018.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1034" width="319" /><!--[endif]--></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A radio relay
terminal in the open, 1965.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;">
</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Before
the 1965 War, there were two line arteries towards the border from Jullundur
viz. Jullundur- Beas- Amritsar and Jullundur-Hoshiarpur-Dasuya-Pathankot. In
July 1965, it was decided to build another PL route between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> and Gurdaspur via
Dasuya-Mukerian-Naushera. There was no bridge on the <st1:place w:st="on">Beas</st1:place>
at Naushera and this posed a big problem as the river was swollen due to the
monsoon rains. Brave linemen of the regiment under Lieutenant M.S. Toor
succeeded in putting across four wires after a few unsuccessful attempts and
the route was completed with the help of the P&T Department by the end of
August 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Orders
for establishing AMAs (Army Maintenance Areas) at Moga and <st1:place w:st="on">Beas</st1:place>
were received on 1 September. A 40-line F&F (Field & Fortress)
exchange, signal centre and radio detachments were put in place by the evening.
On 2 September, CSO XI Corps ordered laying of a carrier quad cable between
Patti and Valtoha, the projected location of HQ 4 Mountain Division. The task
was completed by 4 September. The unit was also tasked to establish a number of
additional speech and telegraph circuits from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>, primarily for logistic entities.
On 5 September, speech and telegraph circuits for field formations were
re-engineered from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. However, soon thereafter it was decided to
move the corps headquarters to its operational location at Rayya. By the
evening, most of the speech and telegraph circuits were transferred to the new
location. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Pak
Air Force bombed Adampur airfield and communications were disrupted. The unit
had to send line and radio detachments to restore the communications with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>. On 12
September a radio relay link was established between the airfield and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> signal centre.
Two terminals ex 6 Medium Radio Relay Section were sent from Western Command
Signal Regiment for this purpose. In addition a 40 lb. 40 pair underground
cable was laid to the carrier room at Adampur, from the main road Jullundur-Hoshiarpur.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
15 September two untoward incidents occurred. The daily motor despatch service
(MDS) vehicle carrying official mail between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ludhiana</st1:place></st1:city> and Fazilka was ambushed near
Jalabad at night. Craftsman Amarjit Singh Sikri and the driver Signalman B.C.
Roy were taken prisoner. The bullet ridden jeep and the mail bag were recovered
by a guard of the Punjab Armed Police, when he challenged the vehicle being
driven under the control of Pak infiltrators, who disappeared with the Indian
prisoners. On the same day, a Pak plane strafed the MDS vehicle plying between <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> and Pathankot. The
courier and the driver were wounded.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
the commencement of hostilities, the technical control of 2 Company of the unit
located at Pathankot, which was earlier with CSO XV Corps was transferred to DCSO
Punjab & Himachal Pradesh Area. After the induction of I Corps,
communication load at Pathankot increased considerably. This company also
became a reporting and staging centre for signal detachments and personnel
moving in. A large number of messages and official mail packets accumulated due
to lack of information about change of locations of units and formations.
Considerable signal equipment meant for other units also remained uncollected.
CSO Western Command arranged an additional officer from Army HQ Signal Regiment
to take care of this load. On <st1:date day="12" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">12
September 1965</st1:date>, DCSO Andhra Pradesh Independent Sub Area was moved
from Secunderabad to Pathankot to coordinate signal communications in that area
and 2 Company was placed under him.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Once
the cease fire came in to effect on 23 September, the unit was ordered to
assist the P&T Department in constructing a number of PL routes in area
Dera Baba Nanak-Gurdaspur, Dasuya and Mukerian. 4 and 11 Line Construction
Sections of the unit along with 51 Line Construction Section ex ‘T
Communication Zone Signal Regiment (XV Corps) completed the task by <st1:date day="1" month="1" w:st="on" year="1966">1 January 1966</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
11 October, CSO Western Command ordered laying of submarine cable across major
rivers and nullahs in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> at seven places.
This step was taken to cater for any damage to PL existing across various
rail/road bridges due to enemy air bombardment. 645 Army Troops Engineers were
detailed to carry out the task along with Signals and the P&T Department. Each cable drum weighed 21 tons and it took
several days to lay the cable, depending on the width of the river and state of
approaches. Getting the cable from Ordnance depots, unloading from wagons,
transporting them to the laying sites and the actual laying along the riverbeds
and burying were some of the challenges that were met with ingenuity. Four
crossings were completed by 5 November and the remaining by <st1:date day="7" month="2" w:st="on" year="1966">7 February 1966</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Headquarters
United Nations <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and Pakistan Observer Group (UNIPOM) was established at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> to supervise the cease fire. The
unit was made responsible for providing static signal communications to HQ
UNIPOM. Their messages to Desert Force UNIPOM at Jaisalmer and Barmer were
cleared via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit performed creditably
during the 1965 war, particularly since it was spread out throughout the corps
zone. In recognition of the services rendered, Lieutenant Colonel C.P. Katarya
was ‘Mentioned in Despatches’.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">15 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was under raising at Dehradun when it was ordered to move to <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> for Operation ‘Ablaze’ in April 1965. The CO was
Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Norton, the other field officers being Majors B.N.
Satyamurti, K.S. Bindra and M.S. Saharan. After termination of Operation
‘Ablaze’ the unit was located in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
in July 1965, along with 54 Infantry Brigade Signal Section. The other two
brigade signal sections, affiliated to 38 and 96 Infantry Brigades, were at
Dalhousie and Yol respectively. Shortly before the commencement of the
operations, 38 Infantry Brigade moved to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
along with the signal section.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The operational location of Main HQ
15 Infantry Division was a few miles ahead of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> along the Grand Trunk Road. Lines
were provided to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
military exchange, the two infantry brigades, Rania, artillery brigade and rear
divisional headquarters. The battalion
in Rania was brought on D1 net. Wireless silence was broken as soon as the
troops crossed the border at 0400 hours on <st1:date day="6" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">6 September 1965</st1:date>. Wireless was the primary
means of communications for the advance up to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Unfortunately, there was a critical
failure of wireless communication in one of the brigade nets on the first day
itself. Leading the advance of 54 Infantry
Brigade on the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">GT Road</st1:address></st1:street>,
3 Jat captured Gosal Dial and Dograi, crossed the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>
and reached the out skirts of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lahore</st1:place></st1:city>.
However, the battalion’s wireless link with the brigade headquarters broke down
as soon as it commenced its advance. By a strange co-incidence, the artillery
forward observation officers with 3 Jat were also not in communication with
their guns. The brigade commander, being unaware of the spectacular success
achieved by 3 Jat, ordered the battalion to withdraw to Gosal Dial. This
unfortunate decision that had far reaching implications would perhaps not have
been taken if the wireless communications had not failed. This has been
commented on by several authors, including the CO of the battalion. According the Army Commander, the brigade commander’s
being out of touch with the leading battalion was ‘an inexcusable lapse’ and by
asking 3 Jat to fall back ‘a cheap victory had been thrown to the winds.’</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">19</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit had its share of
casualties during the operations. On 8 September
Lance Havildar Budhiballabh Gahrola was killed in enemy action. On 15 September
Havildar Lekh Raj was killed by an enemy shell while repairing a disrupted line
in a forward location. The unit was plagued by casualties even after the cease
fire. On 10 October Lance Naik C. Rajamanickam died in an accident while on
duty. On 13 October Signalman Mirendra Mohan Banerjee while on escort duty
accidentally fell down from the running train near Sanahwal and died. On 22
October Naik Mukhtiar Singh of 81 Field Regiment Signal Section died.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> However,
the unit had the distinction of winning for the Corps the only Vir Chakra
during the Indo- Pak War of 1965. Lance
Havildar K.G. George had been working diligently for several days, repairing
lines damaged by enemy action. On the night of 8/9 September, he went beyond
the call of duty and at the risk to his life established line communications to
a forward battalion during the enemy’s counter attack. For displaying conspicuous courage and
dedication to duty in leading his line party under constant heavy shelling and
strafing from the air and restoring disrupted line communications for a number
of days, he was given the
immediate award of a Vir Chakra. The citation for the award is
reproduced below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">NO
6263784 L/HAV KG GEORGE, VrC<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">CITATION<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></b></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <b>During the period from the 6<sup>th</sup>
till the 10<sup>th</sup> September 1965, under persistent enemy shelling
and air strafing, L/Hav (Lmn Fd) K.G. George continued to lead his Section
to restore disrupted communications in the Wagah Sector in Pakistan. On the night of the 8<sup>th</sup>/9<sup>th</sup>
September 1965, notwithstanding risk to his life, he established a line of
communication from Brigade Headquarters to the forward battalions during an
enemy attack. In doing so L/Hav K.G.
George displayed courage and devotion to duty of a high order and was
awarded “Vir Chakra”. <o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company
</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
taking part in the Kutch operations, 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal
Company returned to Agra. It was only after the commencement of operations that
it was ordered to move to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
on 7 September. On arrival at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
next morning, it was located near the parade ground in Delhi Cantt. The same
evening orders were received for the brigade to move to Tarn Taran for
Operation ‘Riddle’. Moving by road as well as rail, the brigade concentrated at
Khasa on <st1:date day="10" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">10 September 1965</st1:date>.
The signal company was under the command of Major Vinod Kumar, with Captain
D.K. Uberoy as the second-in-command. The other officers in the company were Captain
M. Bhatia, Lieutenant C.J. Appachu and Lieutenant Krishan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 50 (Independent)
Parachute Brigade was initially deployed in Area Hudiara as the corps reserve
and later placed under 15 Infantry
Division. On the night of 11/12 September the brigade was moved to Pulkanjiri
with the task of capturing Bhasin. On 13 September, the task was changed to
that of securing the road bridge at Dograi. It was also asked to capture intact
the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Jallo</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> and the rail bridge over the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>. The attack was launched on night
16 September and the bridges were captured by first light on 17 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lieutenants
Bhatia and Krishan were in charge of communications with 2 Para and 6 Para
during their attacks on their respective objectives. The lines to the forming
up place were through even before the assaulting battalions reached there! The
line parties extended the lines beyond the forming up place as the battalions
moved forward and kept on passing information to the brigade headquarters. The
B1 net with the battalions also worked throughout using wireless set 62.
Lieutenant Appachu was the rover officer and accompanied the brigade commander,
Brigadier A.M.M. Nambiar. A dedicated speech line was also provided to the commander’s
rover in addition to wireless communications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Narrating the story of the capture
of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Jallo</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>, Major General M. Bhatia writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Jallo
Bridge was about 5-7 kms from our HQ on the Ichhogil Canal.</span></i></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>The communication plan was real great ….we were to establish a
communication centre mid way from where we were to lay lines to the battalion
going in for the attack. The lines would be to the FUP initially and thereafter
extended wherever the battalion was. I was in charge of this forward
communication centre ….we were to give a running commentary of the attack and
its progress to the Brigade HQ. Three line parties under the three lieutenants
started laying lines once darkness set in. The situation was extraordinary –
here were the Signals personnel moving about in ‘no man’s land’. At one point
two line parties crossed each other and I had a miraculous escape…Krish heard
sounds coming from a direction, he thought it was an enemy patrol and took
position to fire. As I turned the corner of the building, I don’t know why but
I just whispered Krish’s name… fortunately he heard me and when I met him I found him cold!!!. He told
me that if I had not spoken he would have shot me; range was 2-3 yards, his sten
was on automatic. <o:p></o:p></i></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -4.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The brigade signal company suffered a few
casualties. On 17 September Signalman S.S. Mane manning the radio detachment
with 6 Para sustained major injuries. On 21 September Naik Edward who was part
of the radio detachment with 411 Para Field Company was killed due to shell
wounds. Signalman Hukam Singh was killed on 22 September while laying lines.<b> </b><u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was raised at Ferozepore Cantt on <st1:date day="1" month="7" w:st="on" year="1963">1 July 1963</st1:date> as a mountain divisional signal regiment and
subsequently reorganized as an infantry divisional signal regiment on <st1:date day="1" month="5" w:st="on" year="1964">1 May 1964</st1:date>. It was
originally tasked to provide signal communications from Madhopur to Ganganagar,
the area of operational responsibility of its parent formation. On arrival of
15 Infantry Division in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city>
in April 1965, the unit’s area of responsibility was reduced. Originally the division
had 48, 54 and 65 Infantry Brigades on its Order of Battle. Subsequently, 54
Brigade moved out and for some time the division had only two brigades. In July
1964, the newly raised 29 Brigade was allotted to the division. During 1965,
the regiment had 29, 48 and 65 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies. The unit was
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Barooah, with Major Sucha Singh being the second-in-command.
The other field officers in the unit were Majors A. Basu (1 Company) and J.S.
Duggal (2 Company). The brigade signal companies were being commanded by
Captain J.S. Cheema (29 Brigade); Maj J.S. Ahluwalia (48 Brigade) and Major
Kashmira Singh (65 Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During Operation ‘Ablaze’, the division
was deployed in Bhikiwind-Patti sector and the unit was able to rehearse its
operational role and communication lay out. For Operation ‘Riddle’, the unit
moved from Ferozepore to its operational location on <st1:date day="5" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">5 September 1965</st1:date>. By 1100 hours the step up
divisional signal centre was opened at a place called Narla about three miles
short of the international border. Line communications were established with
the brigades, rear division headquarters at Patti and with the base at
Ferozepore. With the increase in movements of tanks and B vehicles the lines
started snapping very frequently and the line parties remained on their lines
to carry out repairs as faults occurred, instead of coming back to the unit.
Strict wireless silence was observed with control sets kept on listening watch.
Most of the outstations had netted before leaving the base; those grouped later
were quickly netted in harbour without radiating. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Wireless
silence was lifted at 0400 hours on 6 September and all stations were through.
The battle for Hudiara started. There
was some confusion about 17 Rajput that was detailed for flank protection.
Since it was located away from 65 Brigade, its parent formation, it was not
clear whether the battalion was to come up on the brigade or the divisional
net. The brigade did not want to lose control over the battalion though it did
not give it any resources for rearward communications. The regiment sent a locally modified 1 Ton
Wireless Truck fitted with radio set C11/R210 to enable 17 Rajput to come up on
the D-1 link. However, the truck could not proceed beyond Wan police post where
the battalion rear was located as the whole area was subjected to very heavy
shelling. The divisional commander was
very keen to speak to battalion commander, who was in position near Bedian
bridge about two miles ahead. A remote control unit which was made out of an H1
unit to work with C-11 Sets (no unit J’s were available with the unit) was
quickly installed on the line between the battalion’s main and rear positions
to solve the problem. This line was
duplicated at the first opportunity. Soon the enemy shelling started
playing havoc on all lines. Lines were often disrupted but an efficient fault
control organization and the unbounded zeal of the linemen kept the
communication going. The artillery
brigade lines were the worst affected, but the divisional line detachment and
the ‘H’ Section linemen and kept the regimental and fire order lines
operational. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 9 September the unit had its
first battle casualties, when enemy aircraft launched attacks on the divisional
headquarters as well as the forward brigades. Signalman Driver Jasudan Khosla
of 29 Infantry Brigade Signal Section and Lance Naik Driver Rajagopal of 65
Infantry Brigade Signal Section were killed in action. Major A. Basu recounts his experience during
the air attack:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Pakistani
Star fighters, flown by young Bangladeshi pilots (many of them were brought
down by ack ack Bofors located at Dograi and pilots bailing out) almost
regularly flew sorties over our area. One morning (after 3/4 days of battle) I
was returning from the Div HQ when the air–raid alert sounded and I was caught
in an area where there were no trenches or shelter nearby. I hugged the ground
quickly as per our training, lying prone absolutely motionless. Soon a fighter
flew over me strafing. I heard the noise and I saw a line of dust progressing
with the bullet noise just about a metre or less near my side. Soon the
aircraft was gone and the all clear was sounded. I got up and went to my
company without any reaction. Much later I realized about the consequences, in
case the line of dust that went by my side during strafing was a metre closer.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An
important event on 10 September was the occupation of Barki up to the east bank
of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place> by 65 Infantry Brigade. The line was extended to the brigade headquarters
forward position at Barka Kalan by the evening under difficult conditions. Next
day, a new direct line to Barka Kalan was put through. This line was laid away from the road with
the intention of making it overhead at the earliest opportunity. Working through heavy shelling and bombing,
the line detachment made the line overhead in about three days. At many place new poles had to be erected but
for 5 miles on the Pak side of the border the poles of the PL route were
used. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 12 September lateral lines
between the infantry brigades and artillery brigade were completed. On the same night a special task force
created from 48 Infantry Brigade was sent to capture Jhaman. In the evening Second Lieutenant Bhupinder
Singh, OC Line Section took the line from Khalra exchange to the brigade
tactical headquarters. This was a
difficult task as all movement had to be done stealthily at night and the
tracks were very close to enemy territory.
The Punjab Armed Police guides panicked and pushed off at the first
sound of firing. Moreover when the line
was taken to the point ordered by the divisional headquarters, there was nobody
there. Bhupinder left the line detachment at the place indicated and began to
hunt for the brigade tactical headquarters in pitch darkness. However, the line was through before the
commencement of the operation. The enemy
had come to know about the move and at <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>
pounded Khalra with heavy artillery.
This shelling cut the line at places but it was soon repaired, Bhupinder
remaining on this line throughout the night.
A radio set C-11/R210 was also provided on D1 net for the task force but
it was not permitted to go up to the tactical headquarters as the station was
mounted on a one-ton vehicle and had to remain a mile behind. The attack was not successful and the
wireless truck was brought back in the morning keeping the line in position for
any future use.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
18 September orders for a special task force operation were issued. The task
was to clear the area between Hudiara and Bedian and then to occupy Rajoke and
Dholan to assist 4 Mountain Division’s operation against Khemkaran. An exchange was placed at Wan and 17 Rajput,
82 Light Regiment, and several logistic elements were put on the exchange. The old 17 Rajput line was used to connect
this exchange with the main divisional exchange. Also from this exchange a line kept on
trailing behind the task force commander as he moved forward. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Wireless communications experienced
considerable static and atmospheric interference. There was serious
interference between Indian and Pak command radio nets. However, a policy of
live and let live was followed by Signals of both sides and each side normally
waited for the other to finish its transmission before initiating own calls!
Surprisingly, after the cease fire, Signals of both sides got more aggressive
and often interfered with other’s wireless communications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
advance made by 7 Infantry Division was limited and the divisional headquarters
did not move during the operations. This reduced the communication challenges
for 7 Infantry Division Signal Regiment to some extent. Second-Lieutenant
Bhupinder Singh, Naik P. Kalan and Lance/Naik Rajagopal were ‘Mentioned in
Despatches’, the last one posthumously.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The unit was located at Ambala under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Rawat, with Major H. Subramanian as the
second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were Majors R.B.
Babulkar and J.S. Dhillon. The officers
in the brigade signal companies were Major Yatindra Pratap (62 Brigade) and
Major N.K. Rastogi (7 Brigade). The third brigade of the Division - 33 Mountain
Brigade – did not take part in the operations. Being a mountain division,
equipped and trained to fight in the mountains, 4 Division lacked anti-tank
resources and had comparatively lighter artillery guns. However, just before
the war, infantry battalions were issued 106 mm recoilless guns. In terms of
signal resources, it was equipped with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> origin equipment like radio sets
AN/GRC 9, with hand pedal generators, better telephone exchanges, cable WD1,
VHF radios like AN/PRC 25 and AN/PRC 10 and above all it had radio relay
equipment. The division had the luxury of having a radio relay link to both
brigades. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Mountain Division
concentrated in Khem Karan sector during the night of 5/6 September, after an
approach march of nearly 200 miles. The main divisional headquarters was
located at Warnala and rear headquarters at Tung. The line section and skeleton
signal centre had arrived the previous night and laid lines to the projected
locations of brigades and other entities and these were through by 1800 hours on
5 September. The brigade signal
companies and rest of the regiment arrived around <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>. Line
communications were available to commanders and staff on arrival.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 7 and 62 Mountain Brigades launched
the offensive on 6 September and initial surprise was achieved. 62 Mountain
Brigade attacked astride Kasur axis and 7 Mountain Brigade was further north.
Wireless silence had been imposed and was lifted at 0430 hours. Though C1, C2
and D5 wireless links were through, the D1 link to 7 and 62 Mountain Brigades
and 9 Horse got through only at 0830 hours due to non receipt of the signal
operation order and late arrival of wireless detachments. Radio relay terminals
of the unit had been deployed in area north of Simla and reached only on 6
September. The radio relay link with 62 Brigade was established soon thereafter
but the one to 7 Mountain Brigade did not get through due to a technical
problem. The link became functional only at 2300 hours after the CO visited the
brigade and a new terminal was sent to them on his orders. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By mid day on 6 September, most of
the initial objectives had been captured.
After being initially surprised, Pak troops regained balance and in the
afternoon counter attacked with infantry and armour and resorted to heavy
artillery shelling. Lines extended to forward battalions were damaged due to
enemy shelling and move of vehicles. On the
night of 6/7 September, there was further shelling and attacks by Pak infantry
and armour to throw back the Indians as also to establish a bridgehead across
Rohi Nala. During the night, two battalions of the division – 13 Dogra and 7
Grenadiers - left the line and withdrew, closing down their wireless links to
the brigade headquarters. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The main divisional headquarters
moved near village Boparai by 0200 hours on 8 September and line communications
were re engineered to new locations of brigades and 9 Horse. Rear divisional
headquarters stayed put at the original location. To minimise damage from
shelling, wherever possible lines were laid on the enemy side of water
channels. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The decisive battle of Asal Utar
took place on 10 September. Major Naresh Rastogi, OC 7 Brigade Signal Company,
has described the events of 9 and 10 September in the following words:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">09
Sep. Next morning the enemy came close to probe our defences, but 4 Grenadiers
were ready. Especially, CQMH Abdul Hamid had destroyed three tanks, for which
on the recommendation of the Bn Cdr, Brig Sidhu asked me to send an ‘Emergency’
Signal, recommending him for Maha Vir Chakra. In the mean time some tanks
outflanked us from the West but were stuck up in the flooded fields where the
drains had been ruptured by the Artillery fire. They surrendered to the
Infantry Pl of 4 Grenadiers sent to round them up. <o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10
Sep. Early morning, plenty of smoke and dust, but the enemy was halted at a
distance only. Later we learnt that their commanders expecting the road to
Delhi to be clear were advancing in jeeps protected by armour, to reach Harike.
CQMH Abdul Hamid again destroyed one tank, but was killed on the spot. Cdr
asked me to send a ‘Flash’ message to read ‘Param Vir Chakra, posthumous’ in
place of ‘Maha Vir Chakra’. Luckily the same evening AIR announced his
decoration and Pakistan Radio, the decoration, Hallal- e –Zurrat, for their
GOC. Brig Shami, their C Arty was killed and his jeep with his body was
captured along with their Op Order and fully marked Arty map. The body of
another Cdr, perhaps the Armd Bde Cdr had been taken away.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In
the afternoon, one Pakistani tank had reached behind our location but was
abandoned when bogged down on a bund near the water tank along the road. We had
a shower of machine gun fire from behind. Everyone lying doggo thinking the end
of our stories, since surrounded by enemy tanks. Somehow I heard some shouting
and thinking it to be our own troops, I crawled forward along the grove to meet
them with a soiled so-called white kerchief. Maj Vohra (?) of 3 CAV had been
told that our position had been overrun so they came to liberate us. Luckily we
escaped again, this time from our own fire.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
relay and wireless were the backbone of signal communications down to brigade
level during intense fighting on 8, 9 and 10 September. Due to milling around
of nearly 300 Indian and Pak tanks, other vehicles and intense shelling, lines
got damaged frequently. Though a great
deal of effort was put in to repair the damaged lines these could not be kept
through for long periods. Since radio relay was only available at divisional
and brigade headquarters, wireless was the main stay at regiment/battalion
level. However, at times jamming was experienced from the enemy and in the
evenings and at night there was considerable atmospheric interference also.
Duplicate command nets were established using VHF radio sets (AN/PRC 25 and
AN/PRC 10) and proved invaluable. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After being placed under 4 Mountain
Division on 8 September, 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade came up on D1
wireless link and a radio relay link was also established. The brigade
headquarters was through on line as well. However, the brigade commander
functioned mostly from his tactical headquarters using his rover set. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Having blunted the Pak offensive, 4
Mountain Division planned to recapture Khem Karan and all ground up to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Ichhogil</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Canal</st1:placetype></st1:place>. 7 Mountain Brigade with 9 Horse
was ordered to mount the attack on 12 September. Though initially some success
was achieved, due to inadequate resources and stiff resistance, the attack was
called off. 4 Sikh was handpicked and hurriedly brought in from 7 Infantry
Division to infiltrate behind enemy lines during the night, as part of this
operation. The battalion succeeded in infiltrating unnoticed but as dawn broke,
it bumped straight into an enemy tank harbour. Considerable numbers of
personnel were taken prisoner. Second Lieutenant Darshan Singh of 4 Mountain
Division Signal Regiment was detailed to accompany 4 Sikh in this audacious
operation and was made in charge of signal communications to the battalion. He
was initially reported missing but was able to rejoin the unit on 13
September. On 18 September, Lance
Havildar Narinder Singh of 62 Mountain Brigade Signal Company was killed due to
shelling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The final attack to recapture Khem
Karan was launched on 21 September. 41 Mountain Brigade from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> sector and 29 Infantry Brigade
earlier deployed at Dera Baba Nanak were made available to 4 Division for the
operation. However, the attack had very limited success. Line, radio relay and
wireless were provided and functioned well. Lines were extended up to the
assembly areas and communications for artillery support ensured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="_x0000_i1035"
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</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="299" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image022.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1035" width="325" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An EFS repairs a charging set in the field, 1965<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 4 Mountain Division Signal Regiment
acquitted itself well in face of intense enemy shelling and infantry and tank
assault. Communications were always available to commanders and staff and
proved to be a battle-winning factor. The divisional commander, Major General
Gurbaksh Singh, presented a trophy to the unit after the War. During the
presentation he said, <b><i>“Pak Army launched their major offensive
during the War in Khem Karan Sector using its US equipped 1 Armoured Division
and 11 Infantry Division. 4 Mountain Division was inferior in equipment and had
less strength. That the Division was able to blunt this offensive and decimate
Pak Armour with excellent command and control, is a glowing tribute to the
Divisional Signals.”</i></b><i> </i>The unit
was awarded four ‘Mentioned in Despatches’, including one to Major R.B.
Babulkar, who commanded 1 Company. The casualties suffered by the unit were
three OR killed and six wounded. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major (later Major General) Yatindra
Pratap was commanding 62 Mountain Brigade Signal Company during the operations.
He has described his experiences in the following words:-<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Before
moving from Kasauli, I had married up the radio detachments for rear links with
the respective infantry battalions.
Similarly I had sent the line party commanders with the battalion commanders
to see their assembly areas on 5 Sep 1965.
This resulted in lines being laid to these places before troops moved
in. Of course it is a different story
that the troops in their rush to cross the start line, totally bypassed the
assembly areas. To my horror, the
control station for battalion radio net, and rear links to division did not
catch up with brigade headquarters by H hour.
We had to take attacking battalion on my brigade commander’s rover
set. We came up on all radio nets later
in the morning and remained functional, till my rear link with 9 JAK went off
air due to injury to the radio operator and his brief separation from the
adjutant. The line were finally put
through to attacking battalions as soon they firmed in their limited objectives
and remained through till the last light, when these were disrupted by heavy
artillery fire. Soon after last light
the battalion commanders ordered radio sets to be switched off.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Our
withdrawal from Khem Karan to Asal Utar was so fast, with enemy following us
that we could not reel any lines laid for attack. Once we occupied defences around Asal Utar,
our communications remained through. To
save our lines from enemy shelling, we laid them in irrigation drains, on enemy
side. In no time, there were plenty of
WD 1 line laid by Signals, Gunners and Infantry on either side of road and
tracks. Nobody had time to label
these. In case of faults, linemen always
preferred to lay fresh lines instead of finding and repairing faults in the
existing ones. In these operations, the
Company lost three men killed, one taken prisoner of war and any number
injured. We lost three trucks to enemy
air strafing.</span></i></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2
(Independent) Armoured Brigade Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 2 (Independent)
Armoured Brigade was directly under HQ XI Corps and played a crucial role
during operations in Khem Karan sector. Brigadier T.K. Theograj was the brigade
commander and Major Gurdial Singh was commanding the signal company.The brigade
moved to its operational location on 5 September 1965, from Patiala, Nabha and
Sangrur. Line communications were established to all units as these arrived.
The XI Corps offensive started at 0430 hours on 6 September. However, the
brigade was not actively involved at this stage of the operations. The brigade headquarters was split into
tactical and main headquarters. The brigade commander had a rover detachment
and the GSO3 had a duplicate rover set with him in the tactical headquarters
near village Cheema. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
enemy’s 1 Armoured Division launched fierce attacks from 7-10 September. On 8 September wireless communications
between tactical and main headquarters was broken due to heavy interference. A
step up detachment was sent to act as a relay station between the two headquarters. The area between village Dialpura and
Bhikiwind proved to be dead ground for wireless communications, which was
maintained by setting up a relay station. On 9 September communications between
HQ XI Corps and Tactical HQ 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was disrupted due
to heavy jamming and interference.
Another step up wireless detachment was sent to main headquarters to act
as a relay station. The wireless vehicle
was strafed at Bhikiwind crossing but no damage was done to the men and
equipment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier
Theograj exercised command and control using his rover wireless set in an
unorthodox manner. The <st1:place w:st="on">COs</st1:place> of armoured
regiments and the artillery regiment mostly remained with him at the brigade
tactical headquarters, along with the signal company commander. The presence of
the <st1:place w:st="on">COs</st1:place> of units enabled the brigade commander
to get first hand information about the progress of the battle from them. He
was able to pass orders to them directly, saving a lot of time. This also
ensured that there were no clashes between tanks of own formation and everyone
knew and understood the overall battle situation and brigade commander’s
mind. Of course, the absence of the <st1:place w:st="on">COs</st1:place> from their units during battle was undesirable, from
the point of command and control and morale. In the event, this unorthodox procedure
seemed to work and did not evoke any criticism. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 11 September, the major portion
of the brigade was ordered to move to 15 Infantry Division as a precautionary
measure against armour threat that was believed to be developing in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Amritsar</st1:place></st1:city> sector. The
brigade returned to its original location near Dibipura on 13 September. An
ad-hoc armoured force called Bharat Force was created under Colonel Bharat
Singh, the deputy brigade commander. Communications were arranged for this
force. Some of the brigade units took part in 4 Division attacks to recapture
Khem Karan on 12 and later on 22 September.
However, no major armour action took place after 11 September 1965.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 21 September one company of 19
Maratha Light Infantry supported by one troop of 7 Cavalry attacked from
Rattoke. The wireless vehicle of 7
Cavalry got stuck in one of the canal distributaries. As a result the regiment
remained without communications for two hours.
The communications were restored by sending a standby wireless vehicle from
the signal company.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Naib
Subedar Karnail Singh, the Foreman of Signals, was an outstanding
technician. He repaired a number of
radio sets not only at brigade headquarter but in the armoured regiments even
while the battle was in progress. The repairs were undertaken a number of times
in forward positions as quite a few radio sets developed faults during the Asal
Uttar battle due to rough terrain and enemy action and there was no time to
bring the sets back. He was awarded the Sena Medal for his services. Major
Gurdial Singh was ‘Mentioned in
Despatches’, along with two other personnel. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: center; text-indent: -.95pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I CORPS OPERATIONS IN <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">SIALKOT</st1:place></st1:city> SECTOR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.95pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Planning and Build up for Operation ‘<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nepal</st1:place></st1:country-region>’<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 88%;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
decision to launch the Indian counter-offensive was taken on <st1:date day="3" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">3 September 1965</st1:date>, soon after the Pak
offensive in the Chhamb Sector. The original plan to launch I and XI Corps
simultaneously had to be amended due to the wide dispersion of the formations
of I Corps, which had been raised only few months earlier in May 1965. In the
event, XI Corps operations were launched on 6 September while those of I Corps
commenced on the next night. In hindsight, this proved to a blessing, as it
resulted in the crippling of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
1 Armoured Division, which could have turned the tide of the war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 88%;"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I
Corps was a newly raised formation, under the command of Lieutenant General
P.O. Dunn. The divisions under I Corps were 1 Armoured Division (Major General
Rajinder Singh, MVC); 6 Mountain
Division (Major General S. K. Korla, DSO, MC); 14 Infantry Division (Major General R.K. Ranjeet Singh);
and 26 Infantry Division (Major General
M.L. Thapan). Having been raised only in
mid May 1965, the Corps was plagued with all the teething troubles common to a
new raising. Of its four divisions, two were new and truncated. 6 Mountain
Division had been raised in 1963 and had been deployed on the Himalayan border
ever since. It was neither equipped nor trained for plains warfare. 14 Infantry
Division was still in the process of raising and when called up for action, had
to make frantic efforts to assemble the formation headquarters and units from
outstations. Only 1 Armoured Division and 26 Infantry Division were suitably
located and trained for the type of operation that had been envisaged. The corps
had no third line transport; civil vehicles had to be commandeered to fill in
this gap in the administrative chain. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
task assigned to I Corps was to isolate Sialkot from Lahore, by driving a wedge
into the area of Daska, north of Gujranwala. The operation was given the
code-word ‘<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nepal</st1:place></st1:country-region>’.
According to the corps plan, 26, 6 and
14 Infantry Divisions were to secure Anula and Bajragarhi; Maharajke and
Charwa; and Zaffarwal respectively by first light 8 September. 1 Armoured Division
was to advance and capture Phillora and Pagowal by last light the same day.
Subsequently, the Armoured Division was to advance to Chawinda, and thereafter
on relief by 14 Infantry Division, was to advance further south, for which
detailed planning was to be done later.</span><sup><span lang="EN-GB">20</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By
last light 7 September 1965, I Corps was ready to cross the international
border on a frontage extending from west of Basantar River to Suchetgarh. The
formations were deployed according to plan except for 14 Infantry Division, which could not be concentrated to
participate in the establishment of the bridgehead as its 58 Infantry Brigade
employed for the security of Madhopur road bridge and the headworks
could not be relieved from Pathankot for this role. Also, 28 Infantry Brigade,
which had been promised to the division, could not be made available, as it was
involved in the Chhamb sector. Still, promptly at 2300 hours on 7 September, 6
Mountain Division and 26 Infantry Division crossed the international border
into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
to mark the commencement of Operation ‘<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nepal</st1:place></st1:country-region>'. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
carry out its assigned task, 6 Mountain Division assigned Charwa to 99 Mountain
Brigade and Maharajke to 69 Mountain Brigade Group in Phase I of the operation.
Two battalions of 99 Mountain Brigade launched attacks on enemy positions on
the flanks of the village Charwa, clearing them by 0300 hours next morning. Exploiting
their success, the assaulting battalions pushed forward beyond their objectives
to cover the roads coming into Charwa from Maharajke, Chobara and Ikhnal. Commencing their attack on Maharajke at the
same time, 3 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>
and 9 Kumaon of 69 Mountain Brigade secured the right half of the objective by 0300
hours. In the second phase of the
attack, 4 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>
was temporarily held up by heavy enemy fire. The CO, Lieutenant Colonel H.L
Mehta, rushed forward to lead the assault and the objective was secured by 0530
hours. However, the gallant CO fell to
an enemy bullet. He was awarded the MVC posthumously. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 26
Infantry Division, tasked to capture Anula and Bajragarhi, launched an attack
with two brigades on the night of 7/8 September. By 0200 hours on <st1:date day="8" month="9" w:st="on" year="162">8 September, 162</st1:date> Infantry
Brigade had captured Point 857 and Wains, astride the main Suchetgarh-Sialkot
road. In a simultaneous attack, 168 Infantry Brigade captured Anula and
Bajragarhi by 0530 hours without much fighting. Thus, both 6 and 26 Divisions
succeeded in taking their initial objectives on schedule. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 3.55pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.2pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3.55pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 88%;">1 Armoured Division <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1
Armoured Division (Major General Rajinder Singh ‘Sparrow’) was located in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city> before it
reached Ramgarh area for operations on <st1:date day="5" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">5 September 1965</st1:date>. The task allotted to the division was to
capture Phillora-Pagowal by last light <st1:date day="8" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">8 September 1965</st1:date>. According to the outline plan 1 Armoured
Brigade (Brigadier K.K. Singh) was to advance on axis
Ramgarh-Kangre-Sabzkot-Chobara-Phillora while 43 Lorried Brigade (Brigadier
H.S. Dhillon) was on axis Salehriyah-Sabzipur-Cross Roads-Mastpur-Pagowal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 2.15pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 33.85pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At 0600
hourson on 8 September, 1 Armoured
Division crossed the border in
two columns, 43 Lorried Brigade on the
right and 1 Armoured Brigade on the left. The left column of 1 Armoured Brigade
advanced rapidly until 0930 hours when the leading armour (16 Cavalry)
encountered some enemy tanks, recoilless guns and dug-in infantry in area
Gadgor. About the same time, 17 Horse encountered a similar opposition in area
Tharoh, south-east of Phillora. A serious tank-to-tank battle ensued, in which
the enemy air force also took a hand. However, in the melee both regiments
failed to determine the strength of the opposing armour and could not
out-manoeuvre the enemy. The brigade commander ordered 17 Horse to withdraw
from Tharoh to counter what he thought was a serious tank threat on the left
flank to area Pindi Bhago. 16 Cavalry was also disengaged and deployed along
Hasri Nala. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
advance of 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade came to a halt after some tanks of 2
Lancers got bogged in the quagmire created by a heavy shower of rain the
previous night, and had to be diverted to an alternative route via Ramgarh. The
brigade cleared Salarian and captured Cross Roads. Subsequently, it was ordered
to advance via Maharajke-Kaloi and capture Pagowal. Advancing on the morning of
9 September, the brigade secured Kaloi but could not get to Pagowal. Heavy
enemy shelling and air attacks throughout 10 September followed by heavy rain
made all tracks unfit. This coupled with the indifferent state of
communications in enemy territory, caused a virtual breakdown in administrative
support. The division decided that it could not continue its advance, and spent
9 and 10 September reorganising and replenishing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
an extensive reconnaissance on 9 and 10 September, the divisional commander located
an opening in area Rurki-Kalan to the north. He decided to abandon the earlier plan
of advancing to Phillora via Gadgor. Instead, 1 Armoured Brigade would switch
from the left to the right, regroup and advance to Phillora via Maharajke –
Rurki Khurd. The ground in this area was full of paddy fields and sugarcane
plantations and there was the risk of tanks being bogged down. However, General
Rajinder Singh chose to mount the attack from this unexpected direction in
order to achieve surprise. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
assault on Phillora commenced at 0600 hours on 11 September after a brief but
intense pre-H hour bombardment. As 1 Armoured Brigade reached the line Libbe -
Nathupur-Saboke, there was a serious clash with the enemy armour. Carrying out
an outflanking movement, 4 Horse compelled the enemy to withdraw from the eastern
side. 43 Lorried Brigade then tried to launch an attack on the Phillora
position, but due to enemy's heavy artillery fire and strafing, could not press
on. The brigade then cleared the villages Khananwali and Wachuke. By 1530 hours
on 11 September, Phillora Cross Roads was secured. Operating on the right of 4 Horse, 17 Horse took
part in the battle, displaying great gallantry and aggressiveness. In a classic
tank engagement with the enemy at a range of only 100 yards that lasted for
about 45 minutes, 17 Horse destroyed 28 tanks of the enemy, losing only one of
its own. After the capture of Phillora, the enemy tried to dislodge the brigade
but could not succeed. It also transpired that GOC 15 Infantry Division, who
was trying to land in the Phillora area by helicopter was shot up by 17 Horse
and killed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Attempts
to capture Pagowal with 62 Cavalry on 11 September did not succeed and the task
was given to 6 Mountain Division. On <st1:date day="13" month="9" w:st="on" year="1969">13 September, 69</st1:date> Brigade of this division under Brigadier E.A.
Vas, supported by 62 Cavalry, captured Pagowal against heavy opposition. The
enemy reacted by raining approximately 1000 shells into the brigade sector
within two hours, but the troops held their ground. A Pakistani attempt to
launch a counterattack from the south-west with approximately two squadrons of
Patton tanks supported by infantry was foiled by own artillery and tank fire.
With the repulse of this counter-attack, 69 Mountain Brigade had consolidated
the defended sector around Pagowal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.05pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 11.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.95pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Plans were now made
for the capture of Chawinda. Briefly, the plan was that 4 Horse was to advance
from Chahar and cut the Badiana-Pasrur and Chawinda-Pasrur roads in the area of
the railway line Sialkot-Narowal. Thereafter, 17 Horse was to advance to Alhar
from Gil and then swing towards Kalewali-Chawinda. 16 Cavalry and 2 Lancers
were to provide flank protection from the west and the east. Once the armour
had created a favourable situation, 43 Lorried Brigade was to attack Chawinda.
The operation was to take place on 14 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.05pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Chawinda was held by
about two regiments of armour and infantry. The operation commenced on 14 September
but due to stiff opposition, 1 Armoured
Brigade could only secure some of the objectives, viz. Wazirwali and Alhar railway
station. Kalewali was secured by 5 Jat but was taken back by enemy armour.
However, in the early hours of 15 September, the Jats recaptured Kalewali. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.05pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Owing to the heavy
opposition encountered at Chawinda, the corps commander appreciated that unless
a strong force was established behind Chawinda and the position cut off, it
would not be possible to capture the town. Accordingly, 17 Horse and 8 Garhwal
Rifles group was ordered to establish itself in the area Jassoran-Butur
Dograndi area on 16 September. On the
morning of 16 September, 17 Horse with a company of 9 Dogra captured Jassoran,
after suffering heavy losses. The Garhwalis managed to reach Butur Dograndi
after suffering heavy casualties, including the loss of their CO, Lieutenant
Colonel J.E. Jhirad. However, Butur Dograndi changed hands several times, with
the enemy ultimately retaking part of the position. 43 Lorried Brigade was then
ordered to launch their attack on Chawinda on 17 September. However, as the
troops were far back and could not fetch up in time, the attack was called off.
During the heavy tank battles, Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Tarapore of 17 Horse was
killed. He led his regiment with great distinction and gallantry and inflicted
considerable tank losses on the enemy. He was posthumously awarded the Param
Vir Chakra.</span><sup><span lang="EN-US">21</span></sup><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 2.15pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -2.15pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">6 Mountain Division</span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The Chawinda position
proved to be a tough nut to crack. The corps commander decided to put in an
attack with 6 Mountain Division, with armour in support. For this purpose, 6
Division received two brigades of 14 Division, viz. 35 Brigade and 58 Brigade.
The attack was to go in the early hours of 18 September, but had to be
postponed, to facilitate adequate reconnaissance. Meanwhile, Jassoran and Butur
Dograndi were lost, despite determined resistance and heavy losses among the
Garhwalis. However, 20 Rajput from the Lorried Brigade recaptured the position on
the night of 18/19 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">6 Mountain Division
mounted the attack as planned on the night of 18/19 September. Surprise had
been lost and the enemy started shelling the forming-up places, dislocating the
attack from the very beginning. However, 35 Infantry Brigade did achieve
partial success in its assault; 6 Maratha were able to capture their objective
while 5 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles encountered heavy enemy resistance. At first
light, enemy tanks opened up from Chawinda. It was found that enemy was using
tanks as pill boxes from inside the town and the defences were well dug in and
organised in depth. Heavy casualties were sustained and the troops were
compelled to fall back on Jassoran. Two companies of 6 Maratha which had fought
their way to Chawinda railway station had to be extricated with the assistance
of 4 Horse. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The situation on the 58
Infantry Brigade front was even worse. Enemy shelling was so heavy that it
unnerved the troops, causing confusion and loss of control. The leading troops
lost direction, and 14 Rajput barged into a neighbouring position in Wazirwali
held by a company of 5 Jat and a squadron of 2 Lancers of 43 Lorried Brigade.
Stunned by the unexpected opposition en route to their objective the Rajputs
dispersed in confusion. Two companies of 4 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles (the
other assaulting battalion) which had managed to reach Chawinda were thrown
back by the enemy. By this stage, all control at battalion and brigade level
was lost and the formation ceased to be a cohesive force. Commander 58 Infantry
Brigade ordered 3/1 Gorkha Rifles, the reserve battalion, to restore the
situation, but it did not succeed in the face of intense artillery and tank
fire. The failure at Chawinda
automatically ruled out further operations for the capture of Badiana and
Zararwal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">In his scathing comments
on the reasons for the debacle at Chawinda, the Army Commander, General Harbaksh
Singh, writes: <i>“This battle is a classic
study in command failure and poor execution. Lack of control at Corps level
paved the way to defeat - an indifferent leadership at lower levels made
disaster inevitable. The depressing combination decided the fate of the battle
and foredoomed the outcome of the entire campaign".</i></span><sup><span lang="EN-US">22</span></sup><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 7.65pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.2pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3.15pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 89%;">26 Infantry Division <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">On the far right
flank, 52 Mountain Brigade was nominated to capture Tilakpur and Muhadipur on
the Chaprar-Sialkot road on the night of 17/18 September 1965. The D Day was,
however, postponed by a day to conform to operations at Chawinda. In a well
executed outflanking manoeuvre, 52 Mountain Brigade launched the assault from
the right rear at 2230 hours on 18 September. The enemy, though taken by
surprise, quickly rallied round to offer stiff resistance. By 0300 hours on 19
September, areas Mile 8 Road Sialkot-Chaprar, Tilakpur and Muhadipur had been
captured. The enemy reacted sharply to the loss of these villages by bringing
down heavy artillery and launching a number of determined counter-attacks with
infantry and armour groups. But Indian troops stuck on doggedly to their
positions and repulsed the assaults with heavy loss to the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The most serious of
these counter-attacks was launched on the night of 22/23 September. The enemy
demonstrated against 1 Madras at Tilakpur, but carried out the actual assault
against 10 Mahar from the area west of the road. A penetration was effected
into the left hand forward company, posing a direct threat to the battalion
headquarters at Muhadipur. After a brief but bitter fight, the enemy withdrew
in confusion. Indian artillery took full advantage of the inviting targets
offered by the disorganised, retreating enemy and inflicted heavy casualties,
which included 150 killed and seven tanks destroyed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 4.05pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 7.65pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 89%;">The
Cease-Fire <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">On 22 September, a
message was received from Army HQ s ordering a cease fire with effect from 0330
hours on <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23 September 1965</st1:date>.
The orders were communicated to the troops who were, however, cautioned to
remain vigilant. It was apprehended that enemy forces might put in a series of
strong offensive actions in a last-minute bid to save face and strengthen their
subsequent bargaining capacity. In the event, this proved to be a correct
surmise. The Pak Army made frantic efforts to recapture lost areas in the
intervening period up to the deadline for the cease-fire. The most desperate of
these attempts was the assault on village and railway station of Alhar, which
was repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy. Pak artillery continued
shelling in the entire area of operation until the very last. Indian guns
retaliated suitably. At 0330 hours on <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23 September 1965</st1:date>, the last of the shells was fired and
all became quiet. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.2pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 6.45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 34.8pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">When the cease-fire
came into effect, I Corps had approximately 500 square kilo-metres (about 200
square miles) of Pak territory under its control. It had also taken a heavy
toll of enemy armour. The number of enemy tanks destroyed was estimated to
total 144, of which 31 lay scattered in enemy territory firmly held by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The
captured equipment included 11 tanks and a large quantity of arms and
ammunition. The number of enemy troops killed was placed at 693, while the
prisoners with the corps numbered 448, including 310 civilians. I Corps' losses
in armour were 29 tanks destroyed and 41 damaged. Casualties in personnel were
heavy: 38 officers killed, 116 wounded, nine missing; 29 JCOs killed, 76
wounded, eight missing; 508 OR killed, 1688 wounded and 410 missing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 10.8pt; text-align: center; text-indent: -.95pt;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">SIGNALS IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’ - I
CORPS SECTOR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I
Corps Signals Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I Corps Signal Regiment was a newly raised
unit, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel C.S. Randhawa, who was due to
retire at the end of October 1965. During Operation ‘Ablaze’, the unit had
moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Varanasi</st1:place></st1:city>
to Pathankot, from where it was sent to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>
towards the end of July 1965. Due to these moves, elements of the unit and
stores were strewn over a number of places. Ordnance depots had sent stores to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Varanasi</st1:place></st1:city> and Pathankot
and these were being redirected to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Even after the regiment moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>
to its concentration area for Operation ‘Riddle’, quite a few stores continued
to reach <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>.
<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
CO-designate, Major B.C. Banerjee, arrived in the unit on 28 August. Three days
later, Colonel Randhawa left on leave pending retirement, as there was no
indication of the impending all out war. The move orders for Operation ‘Riddle’
were issued at a conference the very next day i.e. <st1:date day="1" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">1 September 1965</st1:date>. Most of the elements were to
move by rail and a few by road. The first train left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city> at 1300 hours on 2 September. The main
headquarters elements detrained at Pathankot during the night of 4/5 September
and drove to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>.
Reconnaissance for selecting the location for main corps headquarters was
carried out and site selected on 5 September. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit had very little equipment
fitted in vehicles except wireless sets. Items like exchanges, carrier and VFT
equipment and teleprinters for the signal centre had to be unpacked and placed
in vehicles/dug outs. The rear headquarters was located at Mirthal, a distance
of over 75 miles. The offensive was due to be launched on night 6/7 September,
leaving very little time for the unit to get organised. The road party, which
left <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city> on
2 September, fetched up in the operational location on 10 September, three days
after the offensive was launched! <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> CSO
I Corps (Brigadier H.S. Bains, VrC) issued the first signal instruction on 5
September 1965. With effect from 9 September, ‘Y’ Communication Zone Signal
Regiment located at Jammu was placed under CSO I Corps, considerably
augmenting his resources,
particularly of lines.
49 Line Construction Section ex
‘T’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment
(XV Corps) constructed a permanent line pair
from Tawi bridge in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
to Kaluchak as also a number of PVC and other routes in I Corps area of
operations, once the offensive got under way.
1 Company, 1 Air Support Signal Regiment reported arrival on 6
September. On the same day, orders were issued for the move of two radio relay
terminals ex 6 Medium Radio Relay Section (Western Command Signal Regiment) to
I Corps. Later, on 20 September, 8 Medium Radio Relay Section ex ‘R’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment, which was attached with XI Corps Signal
Regiment was also moved to I Corps.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I Corps Signal Regiment was not
fully geared for operations initially. However, within a few days the situation
improved as line arteries started to be built, technical equipment stabilised
and personnel returned from leave. HQ 26 Division, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> and Pathankot were connected on PL.
Initially only field cable was laid to HQ 1 Armoured Division and 6 Mountain
Division. Wireless silence was in force, which was lifted as 6 Mountain
Division and 26 Infantry Division crossed the border in the evening on 7
September. Wireless worked well thereafter and remained the main stay of
communications under fluid battle conditions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
operations progressed, it became clear that a carrier/ switching centre would
be required at Charwa. Two carrier quad cables were laid between Kaluchak and
Pindi. Subsequently, spaced PVC cable routes were constructed between
Kaluchak-Vishnoi, Charwa-Sabzpir and Vishnoi-Charwa. ‘Y’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment constructed a multi air line route between Charwa and Maharajke
and a PL pair was also extended from Vishnoi and Pindi. Line routes were thus
extended to headquarters of divisions as these moved forward and laterals were
also provided between formations. SDS was used extensively to clear important
despatches, documents and also low precedence signal traffic. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Initially,
a radio relay link was established only to Pathankot with a relay at Samba. As
more resources became available, radio relay links were established with all divisions.
These proved to be very reliable, except for initial technical hiccups, due to
the equipment being newly introduced. Fullerphones were used for clearing
signal traffic between corps and divisions. Teleprinters worked to HQ Western
Command and Army HQ. <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 6
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bareilly</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="20" month="4" w:st="on" year="1963">20 April 1963</st1:date>, out of assets of the Indian
contingent that had served with the UN Peace Keeping Force in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Congo</st1:place></st1:country-region>. During
Operation ‘Ablaze’, the unit was deployed in <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
from 8 May to <st1:date day="8" month="7" w:st="on" year="1965">8 July 1965</st1:date>,
and returned to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bareilly</st1:place></st1:city>
thereafter. The CO was Lieutenant
Colonel P.K. Unni with Major H.M. Goyal as the second-in-command. The other
field officers in the unit were Majors Iqbal Singh, T.D. Radhakrishanan, S.N.
Bhardwaj and V.B. Sarin. The officers in the brigade signal companies were
Major K.K. Puri and Major Joginder Singh. A signal officer, Lieutenant Colonel
G.S. Sidhu, was the GSO 2 (Operations) in HQ 6 Mountain Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
mid August 1965, the unit was staged forward to Ambala along with the parent
formation. Towards the end of August, on receipt of the operational instruction
for Operation ‘<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nepal</st1:place></st1:country-region>’,
the divisional commander, Major General S.K. Korla with senior commanders and
staff carried out reconnaissance of the area of operations. The advance parties
left for Pathankot by road on 2 September, followed by the main body next
morning. On arrival at Pathankot the unit was moved to Jasmirgarh where the
main divisional headquarters was located, the rear headquarters being at Kathua.
Next afternoon the main divisional headquarters moved to Hiranagar, in view of
the task given to 6 Mountain Division to ensure the safety of road
Pathankot-Jammu which was to be used for the induction of I Corps. On 5 September the main divisional headquarters
was moved further ahead near village Pindorian.
HQ I Corps had not yet arrived. The PL pairs running along the main Pathankot-Jammu
highway were utilised to link up with Jammu, Pathankot and lines extended to 6
Artillery Brigade, 69 Mountain Brigade and 99 Mountain Brigade. By 6 September
lines were extended to all brigades in their concentration areas. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 6
Mountain Division was given the task of capturing villages Maharajke and Charwa
and establish a bridgehead for the break out by 1 Armoured Division on 8
September. The task of capturing the two villages was assigned to 69 and 99
Brigades respectively. The brigade signal companies were briefed about their
operational tasks by the CO and a signal instruction was issued. The attack was
to be launched after last light on 7 September. However, in the morning of the
same day Pak aircraft strafed the main and rear divisional headquarters and the
divisional troops. Seven OR of the unit were wounded during the attack which
also damaged three unit vehicles and one wireless set 19. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
attack was launched at 2300 hours on 7 September as planned. The enemy was
taken completely by surprise, thanks to the security precautions taken by the
formation. By 0330 hours next morning 99
Brigade had captured Charwa after a grim battle. By 0530 hours 69 Brigade had
also captured Maharajke. Wireless communications functioned throughout and
lines were extended behind advancing battalions as also brigades and were
always through. Elaborate arrangements had been made to ensure speedy fault
rectification. According to the Army Commander, the battles of Charwa and
Maharajke are classic examples of meticulous preparations and flawless
execution of a deliberate night attack. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the capture of Maharajke and Charwa, 35 Infantry Brigade was ordered to move
forward and clear the cross roads near Sabzipur, which was to act as a firm
base for the assault by 1 Armoured Division.
On 8 September one OR was wounded due to strafing near Sibbu Chak. One line vehicle with all its equipment was
burnt completely. On 9 September the main divisional headquarters moved to
village Naria. On 11 September after the
battle of Phillora, certain regroupings were carried out and new tasks assigned
to formations. 99 Brigade was placed under 1 Armoured Division and ordered to
move to Phillora; 69 Brigade was tasked capture Pagowal; and 35 Brigade was to
continue to occupy Sabzipr. Commencing its advance at first light on <st1:date day="13" month="9" w:st="on" year="1969">13 September, 69</st1:date> Brigade
secured the intersection of roads Maharajke-Pagowal-Badia and Phillora-Sialkot
by 0700 hours. During the day the enemy
launched several counter-attacks which were beaten back. Finally Pagowal was
captured at last light on <st1:date day="13" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">13
September 1965</st1:date>. Communications during these operations were
excellent and there were no disruptions. However, there were a few casualties
in 99 Brigade Signal Company on 12 September, when one OR was killed and three
were wounded.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
16 September the corps commander reviewed the situation and assigned new tasks
to the divisions. According to the revised plans, 6 Mountain Division was to
capture Chawinda on the night of 17/18 September. For this operation, 35 and 58
Brigades of 14 Division were placed under command and 99 Brigade reverted to 6
Mountain Division, though it remained committed for holding Phillora. The main
divisional headquarters moved to Sabzpir.
The attack had to be postponed by a day due to the move of 35 Brigade
from Gangore to Phillora ordered by 1 Armoured Division due a misunderstanding.
Further confusion was created by the withdrawal of its troops from Jassoran and
other pivots by 1 Armoured Brigade on 18 September, resulting in 35 Brigade
ordered to secure it at the last moment. The attack on Chawinda was launched on
night 18/19 September but failed, due to loss of surprise, lack of coordination
and strong reaction by the enemy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Before
operation, the resources of 35 and 58 Brigade Signal Sections ex 14 Division
had to be augmented as they did not have adequate wireless and equipment. There
were difficulties of coordination as the regrouping happened at very short
notice. However, there were no major breakdowns in communications. After the
unsuccessful attacks on Chawinda, 6 Mountain Division took over the defence of
areas captured and extensive line laying was undertaken to have reliable
communications. On 21 September Subedar Hari Singh of 69 Mountain Brigade
Signal Company and two OR of 99 Mountain Brigade Signal Company were killed due
to enemy action. In addition six OR of 69 Mountain Brigade Signal Company were
wounded. On <st1:date day="22" month="9" w:st="on" year="1935">22 September 35</st1:date> Infantry Brigade Signal
Section was established in area Monga after its capture. The main divisional headquarters was strafed
by enemy air craft at midday and one OR was wounded. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
id="_x0000_i1036" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:307.5pt;height:221.25pt;
visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image023.png"
o:title=""/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img height="295" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image024.jpg" v:shapes="_x0000_i1036" width="410" /><!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A DR is offered
refreshments by village damsels in Punjab, 1965</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 6
Mountain Division Signal Regiment suffered rather high casualties during the
operations: six killed and 20 wounded. However, the unit’s contribution did not
go unrecognized – it received no less than eight ‘Mentioned in Despatches’. The
recipients were Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Unni; Major Joginder Singh; Subedar
Major M.C. Nelson; Naib Subedar K. Apukuttan Nair; Havildar M. John; Havildar
K.R.P. Shinde; and Lance Naiks Keshar Singh and Amar Singh.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">26
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 26 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was located
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Mukherji, with Major Har Krishan as the
second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were Majors M.
Sathesan, Y.G. Gore (later killed in action), K.C. Sud and Surpet Singh, the
last two joining after the commencement of the operations. The officers in the
brigade signal sections were Captain D.K. Dubey (162 Brigade); and Major
Harbhajan Singh (168 Brigade). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
task allotted to 26 Infantry Division was to contain the enemy forces in area <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sialkot</st1:place></st1:city> and protect the
right flank of the main thrust by 1 Armoured Division towards
Phillora-Chawinda. It was planned to launch the attack on the night of 7/8
September, with two brigades up (162 and 168), to coincide with the attack of 6
Mountain Division on Maharjke and Charwa. The formations moved to their
concentration areas on 3 September. The main divisional headquarters was
deployed at Kharian, near Ranbir Singh Pura, where 19 Brigade was located. The
other two brigades, 162 and 168, were located at Suchetgarh and Chakroi
respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">162 Brigade crossed the border at 2300
hours on 7 September and launched an attack on its objectives, Point 857, Unche
Wains and Niwe Wains. By first light the objectives had been captured.
Communications functioned well except for the second phase of the attack, when
the communications with 1 Sikh Light Infantry failed, leading to a change in
orders by the brigade commander. 168 Brigade also launched its attack at the
same time and captured Anjula and Bajragarhi by first light, the opposition
being light. Lines were extended to both brigades but were frequently disrupted
due to heavy shelling that continued after the objectives had been captured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line parties sent out to restore
communications had to work under enemy fire, sometimes sustaining casualties.
On 9 September Signalman Inder Singh Manhas was killed by enemy shelling while
working on a line. On the same day, Second-Lieutenant Sharma, the
second-in-command of 162 Brigade Signal Section was sent out to repair the line
to 1 Sikh Light Infantry. He reported that due to heavy shelling it was not
possible to proceed further and asked for further instructions. He was told to finish his task allotted to
him, which he did. Next day, the CO personally went forward to check on the
lines to the brigades, and ordered additional line detachments to maintain the
forward lines.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Subsequently local actions took
place in the divisional sector. On <st1:date day="12" month="9" w:st="on" year="1952">12 September, 52</st1:date> Brigade was moved from 25 Division and
placed under command 26 Division. It was
tasked to capture areas Tilakpur-Muhadipur in conjunction with the attack on
Chawinda. The brigade made good progress and the enemy reacted strongly. By the
time the cease fire took place on 23 September, 26 Division had secured its
objectives, in spite of strong enemy reaction.
Since the division advanced only a few miles and was located close to
operational area, the communication support was relatively easy. The brigade
signal sections provided sound communications for various battalion and brigade
attacks, though there were a few breakdowns. Communication support for the
advance of 52 Brigade from the north was also well planned and executed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit had its share of casualties during the operations. On 13 September enemy
aircraft bombarded the rear location of the unit. Three OR came under the
debris caused by the bomb explosion and suffered injuries. On14 September, Major Y.G. Gore was shot by
infiltrators near Ranbir Singh Pura. He was evacuated to the hospital, where he
succumbed to his injuries. The officer had joined the unit just eight days
earlier on 6 September, on promotion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1
Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On termination of Operation ‘Ablaze’
in July 1965, 1 Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment did not return to its
permanent location at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jhansi</st1:place></st1:city>
but remained at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jullundur</st1:place></st1:city>.
The unit was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel K. Balaram, with Major
K.F. D’Lima as the second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were
Majors P.R. Vishvanathan (1 Company); I.S. Wadva (2 Company); and R.C. Patra
(HQ Company). The officers in the brigades were Majors Sudarshan Nayar (1
Armoured Brigade) and D.R. Dev (43 Lorried Brigade). Captain Raman Gambhir was
the adjutant and Captain M. Sudhakaran was the quartermaster.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On <st1:date day="5" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">5 September 1965</st1:date> the unit moved to its
concentration area south of Mile 113 on Road Samba- Jammu. The next day the divisional
commander issued verbal orders for Operation ‘<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nepal</st1:place></st1:country-region>’, which envisaged 1 Armoured
Division to advance and capture Phillora and Pagowal by last light on 8
September. On 7 September the CO issued his orders for the operation. The unit
also issued Operation Order No. 1, giving out details of the communications to
be provided. In addition to the HF (high frequency) D1 net a VHF (very high
frequency) D1A net using wireless set C-42 was also established, perhaps for
the first time. The GOC’s command tank and 4 Horse group (unit rear link) were
also included on D1. Two radio
detachments with wireless sets C-42 and C11/R210 respectively were provided by
the unit to 4 Horse as rear link on D1 A and D1 nets respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless silence was lifted at 2330
hours on 7 September and communications on wireless were established. The advance commenced at 0600 hours <st1:date day="8" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">8 September 1965</st1:date>. D1 (HF)
and D1A (VHF) nets worked satisfactorily.
For the first time two command RT nets were provided for the general
staff. The divisional headquarters
operations room however found it difficult to man both the nets
simultaneously. The same difficulty was
experienced by the staff at brigades.
However this difficulty was overcome by getting the staff to communicate
on the D1 (HF) net only and use the D1A (VHF) net as standby.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As the distance between brigades
and the main divisional headquarters increased, by 1100 hours the
communications on D1 (HF) became weak but command and control was effectively
maintained through the GOC’s rover set which was located in the forward battle
area. On D1A (VHF) net also the signals
began to get weaker as ranges increased beyond line-of-sight. The aerials being
used were the manufacturer’s eight feet rod aerials with the antenna tuning
unit. The problem was overcome to some
extent by using an innovation known as the ‘Balaram aerial”. These dipole rod
aerials had been designed by Lieutenant Colonel K. Balaram and manufactured
locally when the regiment was located in Punjab during Operation ‘Ablaze’ and
comprised a rod dipole aerial mounted on
a 36 feet tall mast. The VHF signals
immediately improved to strength five by using the new aerial. Communications on the D1A net remained stable
during both day and night over longer ranges than was otherwise possible with
the eight feet rod aerials of the wireless set C-42.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Other than D1 and D1A, problems
were also encountered on other radio nets.
The D2 net worked well. However
on D4 net, 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade could not get through due to a faulty
wireless set. D3 links with 6
Mountain Division and 14 Infantry Division were not established. Similarly, C-1
was working but C-2 was not through.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By 1000 hours the advance of 43
Lorried Infantry Brigade had been stalled, while that of 1 Armoured Brigade
axis proceeded according to plan. The situation in the evening was a bit worse,
with 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade being not through on D4 as well as D1A. However, D2 net continued to function well.
Next morning three wireless sets 19 Mk 2 were collected from the Ordnance Field
Park and handed over to 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade Signal Section. By last
light on 9 September, the divisional headquarters had moved forward in
preparation for the advance to Phillora.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="10" month="9" w:st="on" year="116">10 September 116</st1:date> Infantry
Brigade was placed under command 1 Armoured Division. Frequencies and link signs were issued to the
brigade signal section. The advance for the
capture of Phillora was resumed at first light on 11 September. During the
battle of Phillora communications functioned well and there were no major
failures. Enemy aircraft carried out several attacks on the divisional main and
rear headquarters, but there was no damage to Signals elements. On 11 September
Signalman Ram Nandan Singh of 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade Signal Section was
killed by enemy shelling. On 12 September Naik Nadarapu Venkanna, of 1 Armoured
Brigade Signal Company was killed in action.
The same night Naib Subedar Ayyadurai and Havildar Raghbir Singh with an
escort party were sent area to Charwa to deliver link signs and frequencies to
the Divisional Commander’s command tank and repair the wireless set 19 that had
become faulty. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape
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height:209.25pt;visibility:visible'>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Nk NK Singh and Sigmn Ram Singh, Ram Bilas and MV
Peter of 1
Armd Div Sig Regt laying cable near Phillora.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 13 September the unit commenced
its move to Charwa, located about a mile across the border in Pak
territory. The road was very dusty and
movement was slow, since most of the time vehicles had to move in first gear. Military requisitioned civil trucks moving in
the opposite direction as well as some overtaking the convoy split the unit
convoy in parts. As a result some
vehicles diverted from the actual route and ultimately fetched up at the
harbour at 0630 hours, nearly four hours after the rest of the main body. On arrival in harbour at 0230 hours communications
on D1 HF and D1A VHF had been
established. Shortly afterwards, D4 to rear divisional headquarters and C1 and
C2 to I Corps were also through. However, D3 was not through with 6 Mountain
Division.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Line communications with HQ I Corps
could not be provided due to shortage of carrier quad cable. The CO suggested a circuit utilization plan
to the CSO. The proposal was to derive a
circuit between main corps and main divisional headquarters by using a balance
bypass filter unit (BBFU) at Rear HQ 1 Armoured Division and ACT 1+1 at either
end. The following circuits could then be provided:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo33; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Main I Corps to Main 1
Armoured Division – One speech on
carrier and one telegraph on fullperphone through <st1:place w:st="on">S+DX</st1:place>
No 2.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Main I Corps to Rear 1
Armoured Division – One speech on audio and one telegraph on phantom
fullerphone<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l17 level1 lfo33; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Rear 1 Armoured
Division to Main 1 Armoured Division – One speech circuit on audio and one telegraph circuit on
phantom fullerphone.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.5pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Shortly
before the attack on Chawinda on 14 September a radio relay terminal was
provided by CSO I Corps for communication from Main HQ 1 Armoured Division to
HQ I Corps. A speech circuit was put through
at 0800 hours on 14 September. However, the incoming speech at I Corps end was
poor, which improved with the intervention of the CSO. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the failure of the attack on Chawinda the divisional headquarters continued to
be located at Charwa, 43 Lorried Brigade at
Phillora and 1 Armoured Brigade north of Phillora. The state of
communications on 16 September was not very good, with some of the links not
functioning due to extended ranges or lack of equipment. Line had been laid to
58 Infantry Brigade, 1 Artillery Brigade and rear divisional headquarters. However, there was no line communication with
1 Armoured Brigade and 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade. Brigadier Ajit Singh, CSO Western
Command and Brigadier H.S. Bains, CSO I Corps visited the unit during the day
to discuss its communication problems. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
second attack on Chawinda by 6 Mountain Division also failed and the attack on
Badiana by 1 Armoured Division could not be mounted due to a series of
misunderstandings. From 19 September onwards there were no major actions,
though measures to improve communications continued. On 21 September the CO went
to Tactical HQ I Corps with the intention of setting up a fullerphone circuit
between Main 1 Armoured Division and Main HQ I Corps, by engineering a bypass
through two superposing units at the tactical headquarters location. The fullerphone circuit was tested on one
pair of quad cable between Main HQ 1 Armoured Division and Tactical HQ I
Corps. However, the signal centre at
Main HQ I Corps was not ready for the test.
After briefing Lieutenant Prasad at Tactical HQ I Corps regarding the
connections required to the fullerphone circuit going, Colonel Balaram returned
to the unit. Next day, Major K.F. D’Lima proceeded to the corps forward
exchange at Pindri to arrange establishment of a fullerphone circuit between
Main HQ 1 Corps and Main HQ 1 Armoured Division. By the evening the fullerphone
working between the unit and the corps forward exchange had been tested.
However, it could not be extended to Main HQ I Corps due to the carrier quad
pair that was being used between the two locations being faulty. The circuit
was transferred to a PVC pair and started working. Unfortunately, the PVC pair developed a fault
and the circuit could not be established.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
cease fire came into effect on <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23
September 1965</st1:date>. On 7 October the unit suffered a misfortune when the
SDS jeep met with an accident on road Samba- Jammu. Lance Naik V.P. Appukuttan
Nair and Signalman B. Narayanan died on the spot, while Signalman Kamta Prasad
was injured. Colonel Balaram, who had ably commanded the unit during the war
left on 9 November 1965, handing over to Major K.F. D’Lima, who was promoted
and appointed the new CO.<u><o:p></o:p></u></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was under raising at Saugor when it received orders to proceed to the
concentration area to take part in Operation ‘Riddle’. The CO was Lieutenant
Colonel R.A. Mousinho, with Major B.B. Sarin as the second-in-command and Major
N.B. Phansalkar commanding 1 Company. Second Lieutenants D.C. Dutta and A.S.
Shaikh were commanding 58 and 116 Infantry Brigade Signal Sections respectively.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit received orders to move on <st1:date day="2" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">2
September 1965</st1:date>. On 4 September the layout group comprising Major
N.B. Phansalkar, Second Lieutenant S.K. Sanan, Subedar R. Rangachari and 20 OR entrained
for Pathankot along with HQ 35 Infantry Brigade and 20 Rajput. Loading of the unit’s vehicles in flats and
stores in covered wagons continued throughout the day and was completed a
little after <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>. The
main body of the unit entrained at 1430 hours on 5 September, along with the
divisional headquarters. The unit was still under raising and had less than
half its complement of men and equipment. The strength of the unit that moved
with the main body was seven officers, five JCOs and 261 OR. The situation was
aggravated by the departure of the second-in-command, Major B.B. Sarin on
posting to Police Wireless in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
even as the rest of the unit was moving for operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
layout group reached Pathankot on 6 September and was directed to its location
on the Basoli track. The flats carrying the vehicles arrived soon afterwards
and were unloaded. A little after <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>
the train carrying the main body arrived at Pathankot. However, the Movement Control did not allow
the personnel to detrain, since air strikes were expected from first light
onwards. Finally at about 0600 hours on 7 September the train reached Sarna
railway station and unloading commenced. By 1400 hours the unit had moved to
its allotted area near Janglote. Telephone communications were established to
116 Infantry Brigade at Basoli track, which was connected to Rear HQ 14
Infantry Division located nearby; and also to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city> via the civil exchange at Kathua. 35 Infantry Brigade was located at Noria,
under 6 Mountain Division while 58 Infantry Brigade had still to arrive.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
8 September wireless communication was established with HQ I Corps on C-1 and
C-2 links. At this stage 35 and 116
Brigades were placed under command 1 Armoured Division for the operations for
the capture of Phillora. On 9 September the unit moved to Samba where it
remained until 11 September when it was ordered to move to Ramgarh. The main
body left Samba at 1930 hours but reached Ramgarh only at 2200 hours, since
most of the drivers were not proficient in convoy drills and driving at night without
lights. After reaching Ramgarh the unit laid local lines to the divisional
headquarters. At 0200 hours a line party
was sent out to 116 Brigade under the command of Second Lieutenant S.K. Sanan.
A line party was also sent to 58 Brigade at 0500 hours. These lines did not get
through until the evening and at 2030 hours the CO together with Second
Lieutenant G.D. Diwana and a line party left to check the lines to 58 and 116
Brigades and to provide lateral communications between these two formations.
The line to 116 Brigade was through at <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time>
on 13 September while telephone communication to 58 Brigade and lateral lines
between the two brigades got through only by 1930 hours after the CO reached
the location of 58 Brigade at Charwa. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
14 September the CO came under fire twice from enemy aircraft. At 1330 hours while
visiting the location of 58 Brigade he came under an air attack by two enemy
Sabre jets in the area cross roads 800 yards north of Sabzpir. No casualties were sustained by the unit
personnel. However, one jeep of the brigade signal section was slightly
damaged. At 1700 hours while returning from Sabzipur the CO was again fired
upon ineffectively from Charwa.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the night of 14 September the
unit moved to Dundial in Pak territory, arriving there at 2230 hours. For the
first time the unit was able to get through to HQ I Corps on radio relay. The
link could not be established earlier because of lack of aerial leads and
connectors. The same night the unit strength was augmented by the arrival of
three officers. The second-in-command, Major B.B. Sarin, who had left on
posting to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
returned as the officer whom he was to relieve was granted an extension up to <st1:date day="31" month="12" w:st="on" year="1965">31 December 1965</st1:date>. Second Lieutenant R. Mehrotra joined the unit
on posting from 2 STC and Second Lieutenant N.V. Chalapathy returned from
annual leave.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For the battle of Chawinda that
took place on 18 and <st1:date day="19" month="9" w:st="on" year="1935">19
September, 35</st1:date> and 58 Brigades were allotted to 6 Mountain
Division. During the attack,
Lance/Havildar Ram Singh Mehar and Signalman Surjit Singh Puri of 58 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company were killed in action from enemy shelling, while manning
the B1 link. On 21 September the unit moved back to Sabzipur. Telephone
communications were established with Tactical HQ I Corps and 116 Brigade. At
this stage 58 Brigade reverted from 6 Mountain Division was located at Gadgor.
The line party went out at 2100 hours on foot because of bad road conditions.
The line did not get through until next morning and at 0600 hours another line
party under Second Lieutenant Diwana was sent out. At 1400 hours Colonel R.A.
Mousinho himself left for Godgar and was subjected to shelling from enemy
medium guns enroute. The CSO and the CO visited 58 Brigade Signal Section in
the evening at their new location at Chobara. Telephone communications were
established to HQ 58 Infantry Brigade at 2000 hours on 22 September. Simultaneously wireless communication on D1
and D2 links were also established. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit remained at Sabzipur after
the cease fire came into effect on 23 September. Though 14 Infantry Division
did not play a major role in the operations of I Corps, its brigades were
grouped with the other divisions for various actions. The unit was still under
raising and handicapped by shortage of manpower, transport and equipment, which
continued to trickle in even during while the operations were going on. There
were very few experienced officers in the unit, and the brigade signal
companies were commanded by subalterns. In spite of these limitations, the unit
performed creditably.<b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1 Air Support Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Close air support to ground troops
commenced in the evening on <st1:date day="1" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">1
September 1965</st1:date>, when enemy advancing columns in Chhamb were
attacked by Vampires. The Indian Air Force flew a total of about 800 sorties
during the war in support of the Army. However, as it took a long time for the
aircraft to arrive over the target, it was often difficult for the pilots to
recognise the targets and the effect of the attacks was not appreciable. Air
photographs took inordinately long to be received at tactical headquarters as
control of sorties and interpretation was exercised at army/command
headquarters.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBlockText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Signal communications between the
JOCs at corps headquarters and supporting wings/airfields did not function
efficiently, which adversely affected planning of pre-planned demands. RT
communications between the air control teams and fighter bomber aircraft also
did not work in a number of cases. Some of the reasons were that the supporting
aircraft flew too low, radio equipment had limited range and the air control
teams could not locate themselves at vantage points or move cross-country with
speed. Remedial measures, both technical and organisational were taken after
the war and additional training conducted with the Air Force. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 1 Air Support Signal Regiment was
responsible for providing signal communications for immediate close air support
to all formations in Western Command. The unit was under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel S.P.S. Bedi. Before the war the regimental headquarters and
1 Company were located at Delhi Cantt.,
while 2 and 3 Companies were at Udhampur (under XV Corps) and Jullundur (under
XI Corps) respectively. Orders were received on 1 September 1965 for the
regimental headquarters to move to Ambala and 1Company to move to Kaluchak for
impending operations of I Corps. On the same day orders were issued for
detachment 4 Air Support Signal Company ex Central Command (six tentacles, one
airfield detachment and one control detachment) to move to Ambala to supplement
resources of 1 Air Support Signal Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> While
the company headquarters were located with respective corps headquarters, the
tentacles moved and married up with formation headquarters/ units concerned by
5/6 September. During the operations, 1 Company with I Corps received 64
demands for immediate close air support but very few sorties materialised. In
most cases, reason for refusal given was ‘Priorities Prevent’! The tentacle
allotted to 1 Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division was ambushed on night of
8/9 September near Charva along with administrative vehicles and one OR was
missing for 15 days. Signalman Gurbachan Singh Jandu, the wireless operator
with the tentacle allotted to 162 Brigade of 26 Infantry Division, was
seriously wounded due to shelling while he was adjusting the length of the
aerial. He died in the hospital on 15 September. Signalmen Lal Singh, Ram Lal
Sheresta and Rattan Lal Sharma were injured in area Phillora due to shelling
while working with 43 Lorried Brigade. The tentacle allotted to 58 Brigade of
14 Infantry Division was destroyed due to shelling near Alhar Railway Station
while the brigade was advancing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
2 Company (XV Corps), the tentacle with 191 Brigade in Chhamb Sector was
destroyed at Mandiala Crossing on 1 September during the Pak offensive. The
operators were able to save the documents and worked from an ad-hoc tentacle.
On 12 September, Signalman Ram Singh with 41 Mountain Brigade tentacle suffered
facial injuries due to shelling. He maintained communications till the evening
and refused to be evacuated. An ad-hoc JOC was established at 6 TAC for 3
Infantry Division for which the required communications were established by 2
Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 3
Company with XI Corps established wireless communications with all the formations
by 0800 hours on 6 September, wireless silence having been lifted at 0400
hours. The company handled 117 demands for close air support but very few were
executed. The main reason for refusal was ‘Priorities Prevent”! Naik Dharam
Vir, the detachment commander with 54 Brigade tentacle suffered injuries as a
result of enemy shelling. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air
Formation Signals</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Chief Air Formation Signal Officer (CAFSO) was Colonel J.V. Pinto. 1 Air
Formation Signal Regiment located at Delhi Cantt was responsible for providing
signal communications at the airfields in Western Command. The unit was
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel K.T. Bopaya. Companies of the regiment
activated line and other communications at all operational airfields during
Operation ‘Ablaze’ and later in August when the situation on the western border
became tense. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Communications
at some airfields like Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara were affected by air
strikes by the Pakistan Air Force. CSO Western Command helped a great deal in
improving communications at and to Adampur and other airfields. Though there
was hardly any ground action on the border with <st1:place w:st="on">East
Pakistan</st1:place>, Pak aircraft carried out a number of air strikes on
Indian airfields such as Kalaikunda, Bagdogra, and Barrackpore. The IAF also struck
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Chittagong</st1:place></st1:city>
airfield. Air Formation Signals maintained communications on affected and other
airfields in the East in spite of enemy air attacks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">OPERATIONS
IN </span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <b>RAJASTHAN SECTOR </b><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">11
Infantry Division</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 89%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Till August 1965, the Rajasthan Sector (less Ganganagar
Sector) was part of the operational responsibility of HQ Delhi and Rajasthan
Area under Western Command. In September
1965, when the fighting in Jammu & Kashmir Sector intensified and Western
Command found it difficult to deal with such a vast theatre, Barmer Sector was
handed over to the Southern Command. Lieutenant General Moti Sagar, GOC-in-C,
Southern Command, entrusted the task of tying down Pak Forces in Sind to 11
Infantry Division commanded by Major General N.C. Rawlley. When the war started
11 Infantry Division was at Ahmedabad, with 31 Infantry Brigade at Bhuj, 30
Infantry Brigade at Dhrangadhara and 85 Mountain Brigade at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>.
30 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier J. Guha was given the operational
responsibility of Barmer Sector. The troops available to 30 Infantry Brigade
were 5 Maratha Light Infantry, 1 Garhwal Rifles, 3 Guards and D Squadron 13
Grenadiers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 4
September GOC 11 Infantry Division issued orders to 30 Infantry Brigade to
capture Gadra City and establish a firm base in area Nayachor with a view to
exploiting towards Mirpur Khas. The
attack to capture Gadra City, which was planned for the night of 6/7 September,
had to be postponed by 24 hours due to want of information about the enemy and
lack of armour and artillery support. The attack on <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place>
was launched by 1 Garhwal Rifles, which captured the town by 1300 hours on 8
September. The town was held by a weak
battalion of Indus Rangers which did not offer much resistance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Another
task assigned to the Brigade was to raid Dali on the road Gadra – Chhapar
-Chachro. One company of 1 Garhwal Rifles with one section of camels (13
Grenadiers) and a detachment of medium machine guns and 3-inch mortars left <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place>
for Dali on 11 September after last light.
As the company neared Dali it came under enemy mortar and machine gun
fire. The company returned to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place> in the evening and
intimated that the sand dunes south and south-west of Dali were occupied by
approximately one company of Indus Rangers.
One company of 1 Garhwal Rifles occupied area Jessa-Ka-Par without any
opposition on 15 September. The advance towards Dali commenced on the morning
of 18 September, by a column consisting of two companies of 5 Maratha Light
Infantry and one company of 1 Garhwal Rifles. The force reached Dali at about
1100 hours and captured it without any opposition. The enemy, as was later
learned from an intercepted message, had anticipated this move and withdrawn to
Khinsar. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
newly raised HQ 85 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier H.N. Summanwar) arrived at
Barmer from Ahmedabad on 18 September. After regrouping of the forces, 5
Maratha Light Infantry and 17 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>
came under the command of 85 Infantry Brigade while 30 Infantry Brigade had 3
Guards and 1 Garhwal Rifles. HQ 30 Infantry Brigade changed its location to
area north-west of Lilma railway station and HQ 85 Infantry Brigade moved into
Gadra area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 21 September, a combined force
of two companies of 5 Maratha Light Infantry and two companies of 17 Madras
under their respective COs and a troop of tanks ex 3 (Independent) Armoured
Squadron concentrated at Dali for further advance to Khinsar- Chhapar-Chachro.
The enemy was holding defences in area Naupatia, Dhole-Ki-Beri and Khutkari
with two companies of 18 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and one
company of Indus Rangers. The combined Indian force
attacked the enemy positions at first light, capturing them by 1130 hours after
overcoming minor opposition. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Unfortunately,
wireless communication between this force and HQ 85 lnfantry Brigade and its
firm base had broken down. At 1630 hours the enemy commenced shelling Dali and
this was followed by strafing after an hour. The counter-attack came at 1930
hours and Dali fell at 2030 hours on 21 September. The Indian position astride
Naupatia was cut off and surrounded, and had to be abandoned. Due to the
breakdown of the wireless link, HQ 85 lnfantry Brigade was not aware of the
fall of Dali till some stragglers reported there. A patrol under Major C.K.
Karumbaya was sent to Dali on 22 September. The patrol returned to base at <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time> and reported that Dali was in
enemy hands. The COs of 17 Madras and 5 Maratha Light Infantry fell back and
occupied Jessa-Ka-Par<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Meanwhile,
the divisional commander issued orders to 30 Infantry Brigade to capture
Munabao by the first light on 23 September. However, before the attack could be launched,
the cease fire came into effect. Immediately after the cease-fire, Pak troops violated
the cease-fire agreement and resorted to large-scale infiltration into <st1:place w:st="on">Indian territory</st1:place>, occupying Miajlar, Sato, Chohtan,
Udisyar, Dedusar, Kelnor, etc. The Sodhi Column, Hammer Force and Bull Force,
formed to clear the Pak infiltrators from the Indian villages, succeeded in
their mission to a great extent. 1 Garhwal Rifles and 4 Maratha Light Infantry with
attached troops attacked Miajlar on 16 November and captured it, despite tough
resistance by the enemy. In the
Rajasthan Sector, the battle of Miajlar was the first well-planned,
well-executed and gallantly contested action in which Pak troops had to yield
after much loss of men and material. The Pak forces, especially the Indus
Rangers, fought boldly in this operation that took place after the cease-fire. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Apparently,
Pakistan's intention was to capture as much Indian territory as possible in the
Rajasthan Sector and to create panic and disorder in the area. At the time of
cease-fire, India held about 390 square kilometres of Pak territory across the
Barmer border, whereas Pakistan had occupied only a small Indian outpost at
Munabao. Besides, a large number of police out-posts, which were occupied after
the cease-fire by the Pak infiltrators, were ultimately vacated after the
Tashkent Agreement. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 88%;">SIGNALS IN
RAJASTHAN SECTOR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was raised as 10 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="30" month="6" w:st="on" year="1964">30 June 1964</st1:date>, with 71 and 83 Mountain Brigade
Signal Companies forming part of it. On <st1:date day="9" month="12" w:st="on" year="1964">9<sup> </sup>December 1964</st1:date>, the regiment moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Ranchi</st1:place></st1:city> to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bangalore</st1:place></st1:city>. While at the
new location, both the brigade signal companies were re-designated as 36 and 85
Mountain Brigade Signal Companies respectively. 195 Mountain Composite Brigade
Signal Section was raised at Bangalore and also became an integral part of this
unit. On 19<sup> </sup>June, the unit less the brigade signal companies moved
to Khavda in <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>, under command of 11
Infantry Division. Subsequently, the unit moved to Ahmedabad, which became its
permanent location thereafter. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
the commencement of the operations in September, the unit was located at
Ahmedabad, while the brigade signal sections of 30 and 31 Brigades were at
Dharangdhra and Bhuj respectively. The third brigade signal section (85
Brigade) located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
joined the unit only on <st1:date day="7" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">7
September 1965</st1:date>, after the commencement of the operations. The CO was
Lieutenant Colonel C. Soni, with Major A.G. Desai as the second-in-command. The
other field officers in the unit were Majors Shiv Raj Kumar (1 Company),
S.S.Das (2 Company) and S.K. Rawla (HQ Company). The adjutant was Second
Lieutenant P.Y. Poulose while the quartermaster was Major S. Ayaswamy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The task given to 11 Infantry
Division was to seal the <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> border and
conduct operations that would pin down Pak forces in <st1:place w:st="on">Sind</st1:place>.
The sector assigned to the division was vast, extending from Khavda to Barmer
and north of Munabao. In order to accomplish the task, an offensive defensive
posture was adopted. P&T Department communications in the area were not
well developed. However, some improvements/additions carried out during the <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place> operations and Operation ‘Ablaze’ proved very useful.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 2 September, 30 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section moved from Dharangadra and 57 Engineer Regiment Signal Section
from Ahmedabad to their concentration areas at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Gadra Road</st1:address></st1:street> and Barmer respectively. By 4
September a speech channel between Ahmedabad and Barmer had been taken over
from the P&T Department. A few days later, Tactical HQ 11 Infantry Division
was established at Barmer. A detachment of one officer and 19 OR was sent to
Barmer to provide signal communications for this headquarters. On 7 September
an advance signal centre was established at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Gadra Road</st1:address></st1:street> in preparation for the attack
by 30 Infantry Brigade on <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
attack on Gadra was launched on 8 September and was successful. The same day a
detachment of the mobile signal company from Southern Command that had been
placed under 11 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was dispatched to
Barmer. To derive additional channels,
Major V. Mehta proceeded to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jodhpur</st1:place></st1:city>
with one ACT (1+1) and one <st1:place w:st="on">S+DX</st1:place>. On 9
September the train carrying the special courier was rocketed by enemy air
craft near Gagaria railway station.
Signalman Anand was seriously wounded and died later in the hospital on
the same day. Naik Mange Ram was injured,
but carried the mail on his person since the train service was discontinued
immediately. He delivered the mail at 30 Infantry Brigade Signal Centre after
walking a distance of about 17 kilometres without regard to his personal
safety.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 10 September buried PVC cable was
laid to patch up the disrupted PL route between Barmer and <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Gadra Road</st1:address></st1:street>. To boost up the strength at
Barmer, the unit sent 13 OR under an officer from Ahmedabad. Since movement by
road in the desert was difficult and the PL route ran along the railway line,
it was decided to establish a ‘Lineman Post’ at Gagaria railway station. Second Lieutenant Jagir Singh with eight
linemen and two from the P&T Department were sent to man the post on 15
September. The party was provided with one powered rail trolley to facilitate
their task. Shortly afterwards the CO visited Barmer. It was decided that
communications at Barmer and forward would be taken over by the unit, relieving
the mobile signal company. On 19
September Major Shiv Raj Kumar left for Barmer with one officer, one JCO and 41
OR. The same day, the unit took over the communications at Barmer, relieving
personnel of the Southern Command Mobile Signal Company. Shortly afterwards,
Major V. Mehta was appointed officiating Duty Signal Officer at the Ahmedabad signal
centre under operational control of 11 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 20 September, troops of 85
Brigade were inducted to relieve 30 Brigade for capture of Munabao. 85 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company, which had moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> via Ahmedabad, concentrated at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place>
along with the brigade headquarters. On <st1:date day="21" month="9" w:st="on" year="1985">21 September, 85</st1:date> Brigade
took over operations in Dali sub sector, 30 Brigade moving to new positions in
area Munabao. After the capture of Dali, it was held by two companies of 17 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>. During the Pak counter attack, these
companies vacated the position and fell back to Jessa-ka-Par. However, the loss
of Dali was not known to HQ 85 Infantry Brigade till early hours of 22
September due to failure of the wireless link.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The cease fire was declared on <st1:date day="23" month="9" w:st="on" year="1965">23 September 1965</st1:date> but was
not followed in Rajasthan, where the enemy continued his attempts to capture
Indian positions employing regular troops, rangers, Mujahids and even
dacoits. Large scale infiltration by
Pak-Indus Rangers also took place just before the cease fire. Orders were given
to 11 Infantry Division to throw out all infiltrators covering an area of 300 kilometres. Operational tasks for the formation were
spelt out as holding the Rann of Kutch sector and the enemy territory captured
up to 40 kilometres deep as also to carry out long range attacks by troops up
to brigade level to evict enemy infiltration that had taken place on night
22/23 September. One brigade was to hold <st1:place w:st="on">Kutch</st1:place>
sector, another to hold Gadra city while the third brigade less a battalion was
made responsible for the Jaisalmer sector.
Hammer Force, Bull Force, Sangram Force and Sodhi Column were organized
for these anti-infiltration operations. Three additional Rajasthan Army
Constabulary (RAC) battalions were placed under command.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 23 September, two signal detachments under
Second Lieutenant K.M. John were provided to the Sodhi column, consisting of
one company of 3 Guards and one company of 1 Garhwal, operating directly under
HQ 11 Infantry Division. The column was
required to clear out Pak infiltrators from area Shobaia, Dedusa, Nawatala and
Bijliap. In view of the extended ranges,
a mobile wireless detachment with radio set C 11/R210 was sent to Chotan to
establish a step up station for the column.
To provide signal cover to the Bull Force, 11 Artillery Brigade Signal
Section comprising one JCO and 28 OR was moved to Kalron Kataia on 6 October.
Apart from wireless, extensive line communications was catered for the Bull
Force by laying approximately 80 miles of field cable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 11 November, a signal detachment
under Second Lieutenant John comprising two mobile wireless detachments and a
cipher detachment proceeded to 1 Garhwal Rifles which was to form the Sangram
Force. The task given to Sangram Force was to capture Miajlar post occupied by
PAK infiltrators. The operation was
carried out successfully. Due to the
distances involved, wireless was the only means of communications with the
force, which continued to operate for several weeks, its resources being
supplemented from time to time. On 20
November another mobile wireless detachment with cipher cover was sent to a
guerilla company operating under the Sangram Force in the Khavdala area. On 30
November 11 Artillery Brigade Signal Section moved with HQ 11 Artillery Brigade
from Bull Force to Sangram Force, the former being sustained on wireless and
daily runs of scheduled despatch service. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Apart from wireless, considerable
amount of cable had to be laid for the anti-infiltration forces. By the end of
1965, about 80 kilometres of cable had been laid for the Sangram Force, all of
it buried. Similarly, about 150 kilometres of field cable was laid to 4 Maratha
Light Infantry, which formed the Bull Force. In addition, extensive cable had
been laid in the divisional and brigade sectors. 30 Infantry Brigade Signal Section
had laid 85 kilometres, all buried one foot deep; 85 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company had laid 45 kilometres, 30 kilometres of which was buried; while 120 kilometres
of PVC cable had been laid at the divisional headquarters and locality signal
centres at Gadra Road and Girab.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the operations in Rajasthan, 11 Divisional Signal Regiment had taken steps to
mount medium and low power radio sets in
1- Ton vehicles and studied laying lines in desert terrain. In spite of this,
sand dunes and desert tracks beyond <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Gadra</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">City</st1:placetype></st1:place> inhibited smooth
movement of radio vehicles. It was not an easy task to erect high aerials in
such terrain. Lines had to be laid on the ground and were often cut to shreds
by tanks and vehicles. The despatch
riders found it difficult to drive through such terrain and were vulnerable to
capture by enemy troops. These conditions adversely affected line and other
communications. Notwithstanding these problems, some innovative methods were
used. Wireless was the main stay due to a frontage of about 500 km and wide
gaps between formations. These were organised on geographical basis. A number
of mobile detachments were created and allotted to even company groups, at
times. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This
was the first major operation carried out in the desert and everything did not
go as visualized. However, valuable lessons were learnt as regards
communications. An assessment was also carried out of signal resources required
in Barmer Sector, keeping in view the large distances. These helped in planning
and creating sound communications infrastructure for the future.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
unit was known as 10 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment though it was part of
11 Infantry Division during the War. To rationalise designations, the regiment
was re-designated 11 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment on <st1:date day="1" month="11" w:st="on" year="1965">1 November 1965</st1:date>. Similarly, 11
Mountain Division Signal Regiment, which was part of 10 Infantry Division, was
re-designated as 10 Infantry Division Signal Regiment.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Indo- Pak War of 1965 is an important landmark not only in the history of the
Indian Army but also that of the country. This was the first time after <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> when Indian
troops were involved in intense operations in such large numbers over such a
vast area. Though the results of the War were inconclusive, the Indian Army
redeemed its honour and prestige that had been dented during the Sino-Indian
Conflict in 1962. It restored the faith of the public in the ability of the
Army to defend the nation from external aggression. Most important, it refurbished
the self assurance and confidence of the soldier in himself. As in 1947-48, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s designs to annex <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place> were foiled, this time more emphatically. The Pak
Army suffered a serious setback, the much flaunted superiority of its weaponry
and the fighting quality of its troops being disproved convincingly. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> For
the Corps of Signals, the 1965 War is of special significance. In all previous
operations, the equipment available to the Corps was similar to what had been
used during World War II. After 1962,
there was a concerted effort to improve the quality of signal equipment.
However, the new acquisitions were small in number, while indigenous
development efforts were yet to fructify. As a result, in 1965 the situation
had improved only marginally, and the Corps still depended on orthodox line
communications, single channel HF radio and despatch riders. Some
transistorised equipment had arrived in the previous years but these were given
to formations deployed on the border with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>, it being a condition of
military aid from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region>
that the equipment will not be used on the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> front. Radio relay had
been introduced but this too had been authorized only to mountain divisions,
with a small reserve kept for deployment on vulnerable lines of communication. As a result of the large scale expansion of
the Army after 1962, a number of units were under raising or had just been
raised. These had shortages of men and equipment and had not done any
collective training. The silver lining, however, was Operation ‘Ablaze’, during
which troops were deployed in their operational areas between May-July 1965.
This gave signal units a chance to practice their likely operational role and
identify shortcomings, which were rectified before the actual operations commenced
in September 1965. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Due
to constraints of technology and availability of equipment, the scales of
communications that could be provided in 1965 were limited. It was not possible to provide one-to-one
circuits between operations rooms, hot lines or dedicated direct communications
between commanders, due to lack of channel capacity. VHF sets were at a premium and communications
for mobile operations depended primarily on HF wireless. In spite of these
technological and organisational constraints, the communications functioned
well. However, there were a few cases of failure of communications between
brigade headquarters and infantry battalions, some leading to changes of
fortune in battle. Units often resorted to innovative and unorthodox methods to
provide communications and tasks were completed with grit and determination,
often in face of danger and risk to life. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The linemen of the Corps once again
wrote a glorious chapter of devotion to duty in the face of enemy fire and
vagaries of terrain and weather. Time and again, they repaired lines damaged by
infiltrators, shelling, tanks, vehicles and landslides, swam across swollen
rivers and laid or repaired lines in areas infested by the enemy. Another
dedicated breed that had to remain outdoors were the desptach riders, who went
about their task delivering, messages in all weather conditions and round the
clock, searching out units and formations even under shell fire and often in
darkness. Some came under air attacks and one was captured by enemy infiltrators.
The wireless operators, particularly those with brigades and battalions and
armoured regiments, manned their sets while under attack and shelling. A number
of linemen, operators, despatch riders, and drivers made the supreme sacrifice.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Cipher
and exchange operators had their own critical tasks cut out and did a
commendable job. The traffic load increased many fold but the operators worked
almost round the clock for weeks to clear the calls and messages speedily. The
mechanics worked long hours and at times repaired equipment while tanks were
actually engaged in battle or their locations being strafed or shelled. The
brave deeds of the signallers were duly acknowledged, though understandably not
all. One Vir Chakra. five Sena Medals, a considerable number of Mentioned in
Despatches and a large number of Commendation Cards were awarded to the Corps
personnel during the War. The casualties suffered by the Corps were
substantial. Two officers, one JCO and 37 OR were killed, while 87 personnel
were wounded. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An important factor in the
marvelous performance of the Corps was leadership, at all levels. The SO-in-C,
Major General R.N. Batra, had been at the helm for over four years. Having
experienced the problems faced by the Corps during the <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
operations in 1961 and the war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1962, he ensured that
these were not repeated in 1965. His excellent rapport with the Army Chief,
General Chaudhuri and the staff at Army HQ ensured that the Corps got whatever
it asked for, and in quick time. His energy and dedication trickled downwards
and inspired CSOs at command and corps, as well as unit commanders to give out
their best. Credit must also go to the young officers of the Corps, who
compensated for their lack of experience with courage, grit and boundless
energy. They led line parties, manned rover detachments, supervised signal
centres and exchanges and often accompanied infantry battalions and special
task groups. All of them, without exception, performed magnificently, infusing
their men to rise to the occasion and ensure that communications are always
through, in keeping with the ethos of the Corps. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .1pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.0cm; margin-right: 28.8pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
chapter is largely based on Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh’s <i>War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 </i>(New Delhi,1991); Gen K.V. Krishna Rao’s <i>Prepare or Perish</i>, (New Delhi, 1991 and Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh’s C<i>orps of Signals History - 1965 Indo-Pak War </i>(unpublished),
2004. Specific references are given below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo38; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Lt. Gen. Harbhajan
Singh, C<i>orps of Signals History - 1965
Indo-Pak War </i>(unpublished), 2004.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo38; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Maj Gen Lachhman Singh
Lehl, <i>Missed Opportunities: Indo-Pak War
1965</i>, Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun, 1997, p 119. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l15 level1 lfo38; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Colonel V.A.
Subramanyam, <i>A History of the Corps of
Signals</i>, Macmillan, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
1986, pp.152-3<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">4. Lehl, p. 122<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">5. Lt. Gen. Harbakhsh Singh, <i>War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 </i>(New
Delhi,1991); p. 26<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">6. Lehl, p. 123<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">7. Harbakhsh Singh, pp. 27-36 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: 0.1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">8. Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, <i>Leadership in
the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, </i><st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, Sage, 2005, pp. 338-345<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">9. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 53-5<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">10. Subramanyam, p.156<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">11. Lehl, p. 145<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">12. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 66<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">13. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 67<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">14. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 87<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">15. Brigadier Desmond E. Hayde, <i>The Battle of Dograi</i>, p.152 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">16. Gen K.V. Krishna Rao, <i>Prepare or Perish</i>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1991, p. 132<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">17. Lehl, p. 200<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">18. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 103<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .1pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">19. Harbakhsh Singh, p.91; Hayde, pp. 89-90;
Lehl, pp. 192-195<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">20. <st1:place w:st="on">Krishna</st1:place>
Rao, p. 138<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">21. <st1:place w:st="on">Krishna</st1:place>
Rao, p. 139<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">22. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 157<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .1pt;">
<br /></div>
</div>
veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-60767740386293559372016-01-16T07:05:00.003-08:002016-01-16T07:05:23.468-08:00Chapter 4 - THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT (1962)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chapter
4<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: -27.0pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE
SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT (1962)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 36.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview
– Background. EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION -
Operation ‘Onkar’ – Operation ‘Leghorn’ - The Clash at Tsenge-jong -
Namka Chu and Tsangle - 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment & 7 Infantry
Brigade Signal Section (Before the Invasion).
THE INVASION OF NEFA – KAMENG DIVISION – The <st1:city w:st="on">Battle</st1:city>
of Namka Chu – Signals in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Battle</st1:city></st1:place> of Namka Chu - Fall
of Tawang. THE CHINESE ADVANCE TO THE
FOOTHILLS – Withdrawal from Se La –
Dirang Dzong is Abandoned – The Battle of
Bomdi La – The Aftermath. THE INVASION OF NEFA –WALONG SECTOR - Fall of
Kibithoo- <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Battle</st1:city></st1:place>
of Walong - 11 Infantry Brigade Signal Section in Walong. SIGNALS IN NEFA – 1V
Corps Signals- 1V Corps Signal Regiment - 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
- Signal Task Force (Project Tusker). LADAKH - Daulet Beg Oldi - Changchenmo
and Galwan - Chushul - The Indus Valley - The Lull : 28 October to 18 November
- Battles of Rezangla and Gurung Hill
-114 Infantry Brigade Signal Company in Ladakh - Air Support Signals in Ladakh. CONCLUSION<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Preview <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese invasion of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1962
took the country by surprise. It was the sequel of the failure of both
countries to resolve the problems concerning the border between them. The political
leadership, led by Nehru, believed that the Chinese would never attack <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This
view was responsible for the ‘Forward Policy’, which envisaged the
establishment of several posts along the border, which had never been
delineated, to prevent Chinese incursions into <st1:place w:st="on">Indian Territory</st1:place>.
There were several minor incidents that should have given an indication of
Chinese intentions, but these were ignored, due the prevailing belief that the <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region> was not in a position to enter into a
serious confrontation with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The McMahon Line, which formed the basis of Indian claims, had never been
accepted by the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
After the departure of Thimayya and Thorat, the military was virtually
sidelined, and their advice disregarded. VK Krishnamenon, B.N. Mullik and B.M
Kaul became the Prime Minister’s trusted advisers on all matters concerning the
nations’ security. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese invaded <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> according
to a well prepared plan, with simultaneous attacks in NEFA and Ladakh. The
first assault occurred on 10 October 1962 when the Chinese attacked and overran
the Indian post at Tsenge Jong, which had been established on the north bank of
the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Namka</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Chu</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>.
Ten days later, they launched a massive attack in the Namka Chu sector as well
as the Galwan valley in Ladakh. After virtually destroying 7 Infantry Brigade
that was holding the Namka Chu defences, they continued their onslaught,
capturing Tawang. Further east the
Chinese captured Kibithoo while in Ladakh they occupied Daulat Beg Oldi. There
was a lull in the operations for about three weeks, during which both sides
consolidated their positions and carried out preparations for further
operations. Starting in mid November 1962, the second phase in NEFA saw the
fall of Walong, followed by Se la, Dirang Dzong and Bomdila in quick
succession, most of the positions being vacated even before they were attacked.
In Chushul in the north, Rezangla and Gurung Hill fell after fierce fighting.
On 21 November, the Chinese announced a ceasefire, ending hostilities on all
fronts.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In NEFA, the major operations took
place in the Kameng Frontier Division, where 4 Infantry Division was deployed.
In the Lohit Frontier Division, an important battle was fought at Walong. The
operations in these two divisions have been covered in detail. Some incidents
also took place in the Subansiri and Siang divisions of NEFA, but these were
minor in nature and have been omitted. Similarly, incidents on the Indo-Tibet
border areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh have been ignored, as there
was little or no fighting. There were several chief actions in Ladakh, where
the Indian troops fought gallantly, vacating there positions only after
suffering heavy casualties or on orders from higher headquarters. These significant
actions in Ladakh have been covered in fair amount of detail, the minor ones
being omitted. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Background</span></u></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> British and Chinese interests in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region> came into
conflict for the first time after Younghusband’s expedition in 1903-4. Alarmed
by the British Force, the Dalai Lama fled to <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>
and the Regent <i>Tri Rimpoche</i> signed
the Anglo-Tibetan convention, giving <st1:country-region w:st="on">Britain</st1:country-region>
trading and communication rights, alongwith the stationing of a British
representative and military escorts in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>. During the subsequent
Anglo-Chinese ratification of the convention in 1906, although the British gave
an assurance that they would not annex or interfere in the administration of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Tibet</st1:country-region>, the Manchu imperial government began to
perceive <st1:country-region w:st="on">Britain</st1:country-region> as a threat
to its own suzerainty over <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
In 1910 a Chinese military force occupied <st1:city w:st="on">Lhasa</st1:city>,
forcing the Dalai Lama to flee again, this time to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Recognising the growth of <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>’s military power, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region> began
to explore the extent of tribal territories in the region, in an attempt to
establish control and forestall further Chinese excursions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In 1911 the Manchu empire collapsed and the Dalai
Lama returned to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lhasa</st1:place></st1:city>.
During a conference held at Simla in 1914, Sir Henry McMahon, the Foreign
Secretary to the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
prevailed on the Chinese and Tibetan representatives to accept the line drawn
on a map indicating the limits of Inner and Outer Tibet. Though the Chinese
representative reluctantly initialled the map, the government in <st1:place w:st="on">Peking</st1:place> subsequently refused to ratify the agreement.
Significantly, the Chinese objected to the alignment of the eastern boundaries
of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Tibet</st1:country-region>, not the alignment
of the Indo-Tibet border, which ran along the crest line from the <st1:country-region w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:country-region> border to the border of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Burma</st1:country-region> with <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>’s
<st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Yunnan</st1:place></st1:state>
province. To make the line straight and avoid a common border between <st1:country-region w:st="on">Assam</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on">Tibet</st1:country-region>,
McMahon prevailed on the Tibetans to concede the Tawang salient to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. However,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>
continued to administer Tawang and Dir<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="readtill">an</a>g. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The proceedings of the Simla conference were never
published, and the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> remained unaware of the
existence of the McMahon Line until 1935, when it was first marked on the maps
of the Survey of India. In 1938 the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> government sent a British
officer with an escort which occupied Tawang and evicted the Tibetan officials.
After vehement protests from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lhasa</st1:place></st1:city>,
the force was recalled and the Tibetan officials returned. However, Assam
Rifles posts were established in Dirang and Walong. After <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> became independent in 1947, the situation
remained unchanged for a few years, until <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>
occupied <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The Nehru government, without initiating
negotiations with the Chinese, decided to extend its administration right up to
the McMahon Line. In 1951 a political officer with a strong escort of Assam
Rifles was sent to Tawang, evicting the Tibetan officials. The Chinese did not protest, leading the
government in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
to assume their tacit acceptance of the McMahon Line. The next few years were
the period of ‘<i>Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’,</i>
with Nehru and Chou En-lai professing everlasting friendship between the two
Asian giants.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The reason for the Chinese silence became clear only
later. Unknown to <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>, the
Chinese had begun construction of a road across Aksai Chin in eastern Ladakh in
1951, soon after they occupied <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The Chinese considered the road strategically important as it gave them easier
access to western <st1:country-region w:st="on">Tibet</st1:country-region> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lhasa</st1:place></st1:city> from Sinkiang via
Aksai Chin, than over the Khampa dominated mountains of the east. <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> came to know of the road only in 1958 from
a report by the Indian embassy in <st1:place w:st="on">Peking</st1:place>. An
army patrol sent to the region was captured by the Chinese and released only
after two months. Indian protests were summarily rejected by the Chinese, who
blamed <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
for intruding into their territory. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Between August and October 1959 there were three
serious border incidents which made the Indian public aware, for the first
time, of the serious differences between China and India on the border issue.
In August a party of 200 Chinese violated the border at Khinzemane in the
Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA and pushed back the Indian patrol that met
them. However, there was no clash and the Chinese later withdrew. Shortly
afterwards another intrusion took place at Longju in the Subansiri Frontier
Division, where the Chinese fired on an Indian post and apprehended the
occupants. The Prime Minister informed Parliament about these incidents on 28
August 1959, adding that the government had decided to place the border areas
in NEFA directly under the military authorities. Until then, the border posts
were manned by the Assam Rifles, which functioned under the Ministry of
External Affairs.<b>1</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In September 1959 the Chinese laid formal claim to
about 50,000 square miles of <st1:place w:st="on">Indian Territory</st1:place>
in Ladakh and NEFA. The third major incident took place in October 1959, when
the Chinese ambushed a police patrol party under Havildar Karam Singh in the
Changchenmo valley, south of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Kongka</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass.</st1:placetype></st1:place> Even as these
border incidents were taking place, <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>
had stepped up her repressive measures in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lhasa</st1:place></st1:city>,
culminating in the bombardment of the Norbu Lingka summer palace in March 1959.
Alarmed by this development, the Dalai Lama fled to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> where he was given an
enthusiastic welcome by the Indian people. The Chinese government accused the
Nehru government of meddling in its internal affairs. This was the beginning of
the cold war between <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The mask had fallen and the dispute between
the two great powers of <st1:place w:st="on">Asia</st1:place> was now out in
the open.<b>2<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Unfortunately, Nehru did not take
these incidents seriously, taking the Chinese at their word that they would not
resort to military force to resolve the border disputes. This was the view held
by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, BN Mullik, whose opinion Nehru
trusted in these matters. The Army did not share this view, and General K.S.
Thimayya, the Army Chief, as well as Lieutenant General S.P.P Thorat, the
GOC-in-C Eastern Command, had informed the government in early 1959 of the
Chinese threat and the men and material required to contain it. Both were
dubbed ‘alarmist’ by the bureaucrats as well as the Defence Minister, V.K.
Krishna Menon. The difference of opinion between them was one of the reasons
for Thimayya’s resignation on 31 August 1959, alongwith Thorat not being
appointed the Army Chief after Thimayya’s retirement in 1961. As was later
learned, Krishna Menon did not inform Nehru about the paper prepared by Thorat
and submitted to him by Thimayya in October 1959, which clearly brought out the
serious shortcomings in the defence of NEFA in the event of a Chinese attack. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: center; text-autospace: none;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operation ‘Onkar’<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The decision of the government to
entrust the responsibility for guarding the northern border to the Army was
taken in August 1959. However, due to logistical problems, it was only in
November 1959 that 4 Infantry Division was ordered to move to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> with its
three brigades - 5, 7 and 11. The responsibility of 11 Infantry Brigade was to
look after the 225-km long Sikkim-Tibet border.
The other two brigades were to defend the 1075-km long NEFA-Tibet border
i.e. the McMahon Line. The task of 7 Infantry Brigade was to guard the Kameng
Frontier Division, while 11 Infantry Brigade was made responsible for the rest
of NEFA. To improve the lines of
communication in the border area, the General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF),
also known as the Border Roads Organisation, was set up January 1960. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In 1960 Operation ‘Onkar’ was
launched in NEFA. This envisaged the establishment of a large number of posts
along the frontier, manned by Assam Rifles personnel under Army supervision. Strangely
enough, the exact location was decided not by the Army but the Intelligence
Bureau! In the Central Sector i.e the
UP-Tibet border, due to administrative difficulties the Police Forces continued
to be responsible for the defence of the border, though the Army commands were
instructed to complete all preparations to enable regular troops to take over
border security duties at short notice in an emergency. At this time, the
UP-Tibet border was being guarded by six companies of Special Police Force
(SPF). By July 1961 the strength of SPF had gone up to nine companies, seven of
which manned 17 summer posts on the border, the rest being deployed in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state>. . <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The decision to hand over the border
in Ladakh was implemented in April 1960 with the induction of HQ 114 Infantry
Brigade comprising 7 and 14 <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and
Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state> Militia battalions. In April 1961 the brigade
was strengthened with the addition of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and some ancillary
troops. In spite of difficulties imposed
by lack of road communications, shortage of aircraft, severe cold conditions
and other logistical problems, the three battalions of the brigade were not
only deployed in forward areas but a few additional posts were also
established, bringing their number to 27 by the end of 1961. Of these, 11 were in the Nubra Valley Sector,
six in the Chang Chenmo and Chushul Sector and ten in the Indus Valley Sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
2 November 1961 an important meeting was held in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, during which the Prime Minister
directed that Indian troops forces should occupy the whole frontier from NEFA
to Ladakh and cover all gaps by setting up posts or by means of effective
patrolling. However, he ordered that our
troops should not fire except in self-defence. On 5 December 1961, Army HQ
instructed Western Command to patrol as far forward as possible in Ladakh
sector, with a view to establishing additional posts to prevent the Chinese
from advancing further and also to dominate existing Chinese posts. The order also specified that the ‘forward
policy’ shall be carried out without getting involved in a clash with the
Chinese unless it becomes necessary in self-defence. Regarding UP and other
Northern areas similar instructions were issued, Eastern Command being told to
go forward and occupy the whole frontier, covering the gaps by patrolling or by
posts. As will be obvious, the orders from Army HQ went a step further than the
instructions issued by the Prime Minister. The ‘forward policy’ was the genesis
of the deterioration in the situation on the border, culminating in the Chinese
attack and the final debacle. Though it has
not been conclusively established who was responsible for the forward
policy, it is generally believed that Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul, the Chief
of General Staff and B.N. Mullik, the Director Intelligence Bureau, played an
important role. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In spite of the difficult terrain,
adverse weather conditions and lack of adequate maintenance facilities, a
number of new posts were established near the McMahon Line and the strength of
already existing posts was increased.
Although those posts were being manned by Assam Rifles, they were
physically established under supervision of the Army. In most cases, the posts were in most cases of
platoon strength and almost entirely dependent on air-dropped supplies. In February 1962 the Assam Rifles detachments
had been posted at Chutangmu, Chuna, Khinzemane and Bum La in the Kameng
Frontier Division. In Ladakh, by the time the implications of the new policy
had been worked out, the winter of 1961-62 had far advanced. Hence it was only from April 1962 that the
induction of troops commenced and a battalion was concentrated at Leh by
mid-May 1962. Army units from Daulet Beg Oldi started moving eastwards and set
up posts along the Chip Chap river valley, within a couple of kilometers of the Chinese
posts. Although there were now four
battalions posted in Ladakh, the force was inadequate to defend the 480 km front
from Daulet Beg Oldi in the north to Demchok in the south. As a result, they had to be dispersed into
small, isolated posts each barely 10 to 20 strong. This pattern of deployment was based on the
known Chinese tactics, which was to creep into <st1:place w:st="on">Indian Territory</st1:place>
whenever it was unguarded, but not to launch an offensive against the Indian
posts. By the end of September, 36 Indian posts had been established in Ladakh
against 47 posts set-up by the Chinese in the region. Around Chushul the Indian
and Chinese posts confronted each other at close range and in the south around
Rezangla and Demchok the Indian posts reached almost up to the international
border. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By May 1962 the Chinese had
reinforced all their posts all along the Indo-Tibetan border. A report on the
Frontier Security Situation prepared by the Intelligence Bureau was discussed on 17 May 1962 at a meeting
presided over by the Defence Minister, who ordered that all the gaps left still
unoccupied in the border areas should be filled up. Even if sizeable forces could not be spared,
there should be at least a platoon of the Army or police or the Assam Rifles at
each of those places. By 20 July 1962, 34 posts – 8 in Kameng, 8 in Subansiri, 7
in Siang and 11 in Lohit Frontier Divisions – had been established in NEFA. Among
these posts was the one at Dhola, established a little south of the Namkha Chu
on 4 June 1962 under the guidance of Captain Mahabir Prasad of 1 Sikh who
accompanied the Assam Rifles party. In
June 1962 HQ 4 Infantry Division designated Tawang as the Divisional Vital
Ground. Consequently 7 Infantry Brigade was moved to Tawang to strengthen the
defences of the town. The force level in NEFA at this time was two infantry
brigades and 74 platoons of Assam Rifles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Even as diplomatic efforts to
resolve the dispute continued, the tension on the border increased as the
Chinese inducted more troops in the region. By the beginning of September 1962
it was estimated that the total deployment of Chinese troops along the northern
frontier had gone up by six battalions since the beginning of the summer of
1962. Of the total strength of Chinese troops in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>, which was of the order of
eight divisions, almost seven divisions were dispersed in the south and
south-western border areas. In addition two regiments (six battalions) were
deployed opposite <st1:place w:st="on">North Ladakh</st1:place>, almost double
the force of three battalions that had been there in spring of 1962. In the area in front of <st1:place w:st="on">South
Ladakh</st1:place> and the central sector, the strength of Chinese troops had
been increased from five to seven battalions. Against <st1:country-region w:st="on">Sikkim</st1:country-region>, three regiments were deployed of which
two were in the Chumbi valley and one opposite <st1:place w:st="on">North
Sikkim</st1:place>. Across NEFA, the estimated Chinese deployment was of the
order of 19 battalions. In addition to the troops deployed on the border, three
to four Chinese divisions were held as reserves in places like <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lhasa</st1:place></st1:city>, Gyantse, Shigatse, Chamdo and Nagchuka.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The above military preparations were
followed by a spurt in provocative activities by Chinese troops and intrusions
in <st1:place w:st="on">Indian Territory</st1:place>. On 10 July 1962, about 300 surrounded the Indian
post at Galwan manned by about 40 Gorkhas.
The post was ordered to stand fast and did not withdraw, though the
Chinese deliberately left a withdrawal route open. The Chinese did not permit
the relief of the post and threatened to open fire on a party that was sent for
the purpose in August. Consequently, the post had to be supplied by air. The
post was subsequently overrun in October 1962 when the Chinese attack was
launched.<b>3</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon after the Galwan Valley incident,
on 21 July 1962 a Chinese party opened fire with LMGs, mortars and rifles on a routine
Indian patrol of 14 Jammu and Kashmir Militia, about eight km south-east of Daulet Beg Oldi. The patrol returned the fire in
self-defence. In this action, one naik
and one sepoy were seriously wounded. On the same day the Chinese fired on a patrol
of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, wounding two Indian soldiers. On 4 August 1962, the Chinese fired a shot
near <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Karakoram</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> close to the Indian post at Daulet
Beg Oldi. On 26 August at 12 pm, a party
of the Chinese troops tried to ambush an Indian patrol on routine duty about 53
km south-east of Daulet Beg Oldi, but the attempt was detected and foiled. There
was another incident of firing by the Chinese on Indian patrol party in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Galwan</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>
area on 2 September 1962. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the Eastern sector, during the
period June/July, the Chinese had intensified their border patrolling opposite
the Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions.
They had intruded about 140 meters inside <st1:place w:st="on">Indian Territory</st1:place>
at Lhola in the western part of Siang Frontier Division. Several senior Chinese officers were noticed
carrying out reconnaissance in Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions. A Chinese VIP also visited the Thagla Ridge
in July 1962. By that time, the Chinese
had constructed a road up to Le village, approximately 10 km short of the
McMahon Line. During the last few months, all Chinese border posts had moved
forward and had been considerably reinforced. They had constructed defence
works in all the forward posts and the troops had been issued modern machine-guns
in place of the old weapons. Telephone
lines had also been laid right up to the Frontier. The Chinese had deployed two
companies opposite the Khinzemane Indian post and a company at Shao opposite
Bumla. The biggest threat was posed by
the Chinese in the Eastern sector in August when they moved troops to the Thagla
Ridge in the Kameng Frontier Division and occupied it. By the end of August 1962, they had
concentrated about 400 troops in the area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Operation ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Leghorn</st1:place></st1:city>’ <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At this time HQ 7 Infantry Brigade
under Brigadier J.P. Dalvi was located at Tawang, along with two battalions, 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and 1 Sikh. On 23 August 1962, after a conference
held at HQ 7 Infantry Brigade, 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> under
Lieutenant Colonel R.N. Misra was ordered to move forward and occupy certain
posts close to the border. Due to non-availablity of adequate local ponies and porters,
the move commenced only on 27 August and was in small parties. By 8 September
1962, one company had reached Shakti; one was at Lumpu, with the remainder still
at Tawang. At about 3 pm the company at Shakti received a message that about
300-400 Chinese had crossed the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Thagla</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place>, demolished two
bridges over the Namka Chu at 8 am and surrounded the Assam Rifles post at
Dhola. By 4 pm the message had been passed on battalion wireless net to the
Battalion HQ which immediately conveyed it to Brigade HQ on telephone.<b>4</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Dhola post had been established
a month earlier as part of Operation ‘Onkar’. It comprised 32 Assam Rifles
personnel under a Junior Commissioned Officer. While setting up the post, the
officer detailed for this task, Captain Mahabir Prasad of 1 Sikh, noticed that the
traditional boundary was in variance
with the boundary shown on the map. According
to the map, Dhola post, which was situated near the tri-junction of
Indo-Bhutan-Tibetan territory, fell north of the McMahon line, whereas
traditionally the boundary ran along Thagla ridge which was to the north of the
post. This had been confirmed from the
local Political Officer and the Divisional Headquarters was informed on 5 September
1962. In facts, the name ‘Dhola’ post was a misnomer, as the actual name of the
area, a small pasture on the south bank of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Namka</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Chu</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>, was Tsedong. It came to be known as Dhola post after the Dhola
pass located about two miles to the south.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The post had been surrounded by the Chinese at 8 am
but the information reached the Brigade Headquarters eight hours later at 4 pm.
The inordinate delay in passage of such vital information needs scrutiny. The
battalion apparently had only four 62 sets. One was with the Battalion HQ and
one with the company at Shakti. The third set for the company at Lumpu was
still on its way, while the fourth was with a platoon at Lumla. There was no
direct communication with the Assam Rifles posts. As an adhoc arrangement, the
62 set at Shakti tuned in to the Assam Rifles net twice a day at 9 am and 3 pm,
and information obtained on this net was then passed on to the Battalion HQ on
the battalion net. Communication between Battalion HQ and the company at Lumpu
was through the Assam Rifles post at Lumpu, using the relay system. The system
was unsatisfactory and caused a considerable amount of delay. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Commenting on the communications arrangements,
Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) K.K. Tewari, who was then commanding 4
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, quoting an entry in his diary dated 3 September 1962, writes:
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“God Almighty’s flap
all day in Headquarters. Army Commander arrived. Calls from COAS. GOC asked
about no news from 7 Brigade. Told him communication are OK. Staff is not
sending messages. No flaw in communication.”
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 3.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Actually the
problem was that Assam Rifles were to be passing the information. After all,
all the border outposts were manned by the Assam Rifles. They would not give
the information to the Army in the forward areas. They would pass the
information to their own headquarters IGAR (Inspector General Assam Rifles) through
their regimental headquarters. In the case of 5 Assam Rifles, which was manning
the Kameng Division out post, their headquarters was at Lokra. The information
took the route from Lokra to Shillong (HQ IGAR) and from there back to us (4
Divisional HQ).” Write up of Tape recorded version of Talk by Maj Gen KK Tewari
on Ops in NEFA-1962.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Information of the Chinese move was conveyed to
Divisional HQ and to Commander 7 Infantry Brigade, who had proceeded on leave,
but was still at Tezpur. Orders were issued to the post commander at Dhola to
hold out at all costs and reinforcements were on their way. Next morning the
Brigade Commander arrived at Tawang by helicopter and conferred with Commanding
Officers of 9 Punjab and 1 Sikh. He ordered 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
to move forward to Lumpu and 1 Sikh to send a company to Milaktongla. A strong patrol of 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
comprising 40 Other Ranks under Second Lieutenant N.C Kohli was dispatched to
the Namka Chu valley to find out the enemy strength and the extent of damage to
the bridges. One Assam Rifles platoon ex Lumla was ordered to move forward and
reinforce the Dhola post. Leave parties enroute to Misamari were stopped and
were ordered to rejoin their units. By the evening of 9 September the Chinese strength
around Dhola was reported to be about 600. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the next three days, several more patrols
were sent out. After Kohli returned on 10 September and reported that there was
no enemy at Bridge I, a patrol under a Junior Commissioned Officer was sent out
to establish a firm base at that location. Two other patrols were sent to
contact Dhola post, one along the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Namka</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Chu</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
and the other via Karpola. None of these patrols had any means of
communication. Leading a strong column of about three companies and two 3-inch
mortars, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.N. Misra, also reached
Bridge I on the night of 14 September. Moving towards Bridge II next morning,
he found the north bank occupied by Chinese, who began shouting at the Indians
and asked them to go back as the area belonged to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Leaving two companies at
Bridge II Colonel Misra decided to make for Dhola. Since the north bank was
occupied by the Chinese, his column moved south of the Namka Chu, reaching
Dhola at 2 pm on 15 September. All this time there was no communication between
the column and the base at Lumpu. It was only after reaching Dhola that Colonel
Misra could convey the information to his Adjutant at Lumla, who in turn
conveyed it to the Brigade Headquarters at Tawang. Instructions were received
that the Indian Political Officer would be meeting his Chinese counterpart on
18 September, and nothing should be done to jeopardize the talks. After leaving a company at Dhola, Colonel
Misra returned to Bridge II where the bulk of his unit was located. <b>5<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Tewari, in his talk on Ops
in 1962, describes the above incident in the following words: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
14 September, we were all in the mess and this God Almighty’s flap was on when
the IGAR came out with the dramatic news for the information of the Chief or
the Corps Commander who was with us that day. …..I was talking about the IGAR breaking
the news dramatically to steal the thunder so to say, in the mess when he came
and announced about the link up of the Army troops with Assam Rifles. The
regular Army battalion, 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>, linked up
with Assam Rifles at Dhola Post. This information had not been given to the
Army in the forward areas. On this point I made a note in my diary and quote
again, “Signals getting blamed for 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
mistakes. Told GOC communications are OK, but perhaps Assam Rifles and 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> are not on talking terms and Assam Rifles are
deliberately withholding inf.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Along with the rapidly changing situation in the
forward areas, considerable activity was taking place at higher echelons of the
Army as well as the political leadership. On 9 September 1962, a high level meeting
was held in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
chaired by Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon. It was attended by Chief of
Army Staff, General P.N. Thapar; GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, Lieutenant General
L.P. Sen; the Cabinet Secretary, S.S. Khera; the Director, Intelligence Bureau,
BN Mullik; and a few others. At the meeting it was decided that the Chinese
must be evicted from south of the Thagla Ridge immediately. The Army Chief accepted
the decision, and orders were passed to Eastern Command accordingly. To carry
out this task, orders were issued for the immediate move of 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
to Namka Chu, with the rest of 7 Brigade to be ready to follow within 48 hours.
The eviction operation was code-named ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Leghorn</st1:place></st1:city>’.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Two days later at another meeting held in Defence
Minister’s office, General Sen reported that there were some 600 Chinese in
Dhola and he had ordered 7 Brigade to deal with them. The estimate of Chinese
troops was based on the wireless message received from the Junior Commissioned
Officer at Dhola. Based on the advice of the Eastern Army Commander, the
Defence Minister approved the decision to mount an attack on the Thagla ridge.
On 12 September 1962, General Sen conveyed the decision of the government to
expel the Chinese from Thagla to the Corps and Divisional Commanders during a
conference at Tezpur. The Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Umrao Singh, who
had already consulted General Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi on the issue, clearly
told the Army Commander that the task was beyond the capability of the troops
available to him. He also questioned the wisdom of moving the only brigade
available for the defence of Tawang, the vital ground, to Thagla. However,
General Sen was not convinced, reiterating that the decision had been taken by
the government, and they had to follow it. Immediately afterwards, General
Umrao Singh sent a formal letter to HQ Eastern Command, giving a realistic
appraisal of the military situation, based on an appreciation carried out
earlier.<b>6 </b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 13 September, the Divisional
Commander spoke to Commander 7 Infantry Brigade on wireless and ordered him to
move to Lumpu forthwith. At the same time, 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
was ordered to move to Namka Chu. Brigadier Dalvi left Tawang next morning,
accompanied by a staff officer and his rover group, reaching Lumla the same
evening. After marching continuously for
three days, he reached Lumpu on 16 September 1962. All this time, he was out of
communication with his battalions as well as his staff. It was only after 16
September that HQ 7 Infantry Brigade became functional. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 18 September, a Government
spokesman announced at a press conference that the Army had been instructed to
drive the Chinese out of the Dhola area. On 20 September, Eastern Command issued
instructions that all patrols and posts were to engage Chinese patrols that
came within range of their weapons. At this time, Brigadier Dalvi accompanied
by Colonel Misra was carrying out reconnaissance of the area occupied by 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. At 10.30 pm while they were at Bridge II
discussing the points to be included in his appreciation that had been asked
for by Divisional HQ, the Chinese sentry threw a grenade into the Indian sentry
post. Firing started from both sides of the Namka Chu and resulted in two
Chinese being killed and two wounded. Indian casualties were five wounded. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The outbreak of firing on the Namka
Chu and the build-up by the Chinese made their intentions clear. At a meeting
in Defence Ministry on 22 September 1962, General Thapar asked the government
to reconsider the decision to evict the Chinese from Thagla. Since Nehru and
Krishna Menon were out of the country, the meeting was chaired by K.
Raghuramaiah, the Deputy Defence Minister. The Foreign Secretary then explained
the Prime Minister’s instructions that no infringement of the border in NEFA
was to be accepted. It was decided that the Army would have to carry out the
instructions of the government and evict the Chinese from the Dhola area. General Thapar requested for a written order
of the government on the subject. Soon afterwards, he received a note signed by
H.C. Sarin, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence, which stated: “The decision
throughout has been as discussed at previous meetings, that the Army should
prepare and throw the Chinese out as soon as possible. The COAS was accordingly
directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese in the KAMENG Frontier
Division of NEFA as soon as he is ready.”<b>7</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> General Thapar repeated the
Government’s orders to Lieutenant General Sen. He also warned Lieutenant General Daulet
Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command of the possibility of Chinese reaction in
Ladakh and advised that Indian posts there should be strengthened. On 24 September the Corps Commander, Lieutenant
General Umrao Singh personally conveyed these orders to Major General Niranjan
Prasad, GOC 4 Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By this time, serious differences
between commanders at various levels in the military hierarchy had surfaced. On
14 September, General Sen had ordered General Umrao Singh to carry out an
appreciation and formulate an outline plan for the operation. After passing
through the Corps and Divisional Commanders, the order reached Commander 7
Infantry Brigade. Other than the Army Commander, all three – Umrao, Prasad and
Dalvi – were convinced that the capture of Thagla was not feasible with the
resources then available. However, Dalvi agreed to produce an appreciation highlighting
the maintenance and administrative problems, hoping that this would convince
the higher authorities of the unsoundness of the plan. His appreciation
resulted in a plan with the modest aim of capturing Tseng-jong, a small feature
on Thagla slopes, and then rolling down west to east to the Chinese positions
on the Namka Chu. It was to be attempted with an out-flanking move from Bridge
V near Tsangle. While working out the logistics for the plan, Brig Dalvi made
it clear that unless the proper administrative base was ready within a
fortnight there would be no scope for operations during that winter. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Divisional Commander approved
the plan after some alterations and then submitted it to the Corps Commander who
had reached Lumpu on 26 September. General Umrao Singh also suggested some
modifications in the appreciation and advised on a more modest tactical aim. The
draft plan was revised accordingly and the Corps Commander personally took it to
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city> on 29
September. However, General Sen refused to accept the requirements stipulated
for the operation; it would have been impossible to meet them before the winter
set in. Being unable to convince the Army Commander, General Umrao Singh
submitted his views and assessment of the situation in writing on 30
September. There were other differences
between Generals Sen and Umrao, which came out in the open during a meeting on
2 October 1962, presided over by the Defence Minister. General Umrao protested
at the interference in his command and orders sent to him by General Sen to
send a company patrol to Tsangle to establish a post there. He felt that
Tsangle had no tactical significance and would give away Indian intentions to
the Chinese. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Defence Minister returned from <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New York</st1:place></st1:state> on 30
September. Two days later, Prime Minister Nehru returned from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Nigeria</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Sen
had been insisting on the removal of Umrao and the appointment of a more
pliable Corps Commander to carry out the orders of the government. The problem
was solved by divesting General Umrao Singh of the responsibility for NEFA. It
was taken away from XXXIII Corps and handed over to a newly raised IV Corps. Lieutenant
General B.M. Kaul, the Chief of General Staff, was given command of the new
Corps, with the specific task of evicting the Chinese from the Dhola-Thagla
area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Immediately after his appointment as
Corps Commander, on 4 October 1962 General Kaul flew to Tezpur where in an
unprecedented reversal of protocol, he was received by the Army Commander
himself. After spending the day in conference with Generals Sen and Umrao, he
flew to Lumpu next day where he was received by the Brigade Major, the
Commander having been sent forward the previous day by the Divisional
Commander. Kaul promptly ordered HQ 7 Infantry Brigade to pack up and move to
Tsangdhar immediately. Being out of touch with Brigadier Dalvi, the Brigade
staff and Signal Company had little choice except complying with the order.
Kaul then moved forward to Ziminthaung and Serkhim, where a helipad was
constructed during the night on his orders. Accompanied by the Divisional
Commander, he walked to Dhola on 7 October, where he was received by the
Brigade Commander. Realising the enormous problems that the troops were facing,
he sent a message to higher headquarters, informing them of these difficulties.
Still he was all prepared to carry out the task assigned to him. In the plan
that formed part of his appreciation, Brigadier Dalvi had specified 10 October as
the date by which Op ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Leghorn</st1:place></st1:city>’
would have to commence if the required administrative and fire support was made
available to him. Kaul decided to treat this date as a deadline, regardless of the
rider about logistics. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 7, 8 and 9 October General Kaul visited
the posts and held discussions with their commanders. He took a number
measures, such as ordering 2 Rajput and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles to move from Tsangdhar
to Namka Chu to join the other troops along the river line. Earlier, 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> had already been ordered to occupy Tsangle with
one company. According to the plan which he disclosed to the subordinate
commanders, in view of the difficulties of mounting a direct assault on Thagla he
decided to make a “positional warfare” manoeuvre. Indian troops would occupy
Yumtsola, to the west of Thagla peak which the Chinese had still not occupied. He hoped that this action would satisfy the
government that ‘the Army had done its best to carry out its orders.’<b>8</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Prasad and Dalvi tried to explain to
Kaul that the troops in cotton uniforms would either freeze at Yumtsola or
starve to death if their line of communication was cut off by the Chinese. Kaul
brushed aside their objections. However, he agreed to Dalvi’s suggestion to
send a patrol from 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> before the whole battalion
(2 Rajput) was committed. The patrol would find the best place to cross the
river and take up a position at Tseng-jong so as to cover the move of 2 Rajput
to Yumtsola on 10 October. A platoon of 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
under Major M.S. Choudhary left for Tseng-jong and established a bridgehead on
the north bank of Namka Chu on 8 October. One section of this platoon occupied
the Karpola II next morning. Another platoon of <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>,
under Subedar Chhail Singh left for Tseng-jong on 9 October to reinforce the
platoon under Major Chaudhary. The Chinese did not react to these moves
instantly. However, our observation posts observed heavy reinforcement of
Chinese positions. The Chinese strength south of Thagla was estimated to be a brigade plus with
artillery support. About 300 artillery guns and mortars had been concentrated
at Le. Wheeled guns could also be seen
south of Thagla through binoculars.<b>9<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">It would not be out of
place to mention the primitive Signals set up that then existed in the
formation. During the three days that he spent at Dhola, General Kaul sent long
messages addressed not only to his immediate superiors but the highest
political authorities in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
The clearance of these messages was a nightmare for Signals. Every night, the
Corps Commander would dictate the messages which were taken down in longhand by
Brigadier Dalvi or Lieutenant Colonel Sanjiva Rao, the staff officer from Army
HQ who had accompanied General Kaul. The
next day, a sturdy Sikh from the Punjabis would run with the message to Lumpu,
where the second-in-command of the battalion would pass it on telephone to
Ziminthaung, where it would be enciphered and transmitted to Tezpur, <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>.
The first message reached Delhi after three days, infuriating the Defence
Minister who demanded the dismissal of the Chief Signal Officer of Eastern
Command!<b>10<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Some of the<b> </b>entries in the diary of Lieutenant
Colonel K.K. Tewari make interesting reading, as given below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">16<sup>th</sup>
Sep.</span></u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>Thinking of problems of OP <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">LEGHORN</st1:place></st1:city>.
Through no fault of ours, we’ve had a bad name in this operation because
9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> did not open their set. Amazing state
of affairs. Army Cdr left for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. GOC and rover group with Ramu (Maj Ram Singh)
to Towang. Corps Cdr with 2 Sig Offrs
arr today. Orders gone out permitting
own tps to fire at Chinese who come into our area. Also evict the Chinese from opposite
Namkachu. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">17<sup>th</sup> Sep</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. Corps Cdr annoyed
over interruption on his call. He was
actually annoyed over late arrival of his ac.
Heptr made available for ferrying of eqpt to Towang which had been made
available earlier also but eqpt was not then available. The eqpts were held up. Maj Sodhi arr from Shillong with the adv tac
HQ of 33 Corps. 4 medium powers set also
arr. Another set opened up on C1 link
while 4 Div set on C11 continued to work.
Had to allot a new area for their medium power sets. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19 Sep.</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 62 Bde arr today. Sent one RS 52 to Towang for our own
GOC. Later on this moved to Lumpu. Conf held to discuss the proposal by IGAR for
comn. Greasy proposal. I promised to speak to CSO, IGAR. Afternoon meeting at Div HQ. I spoke about high precedence tfc, high
security graded tfc, SDS and use of telephones.
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">28 Sep. </span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Long discussion with OC
5 TAC and G staff regarding comn for offensive air sp. All these high floating ideas of standard air
sp unit had to be discarded. Finalised
the SDS comn for the L of C upto Towang.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“30 Sep.</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I was asked to go to Towang. I felt upset.
I should be left alone to decide where I should be. The trip got cancelled immediately after when
the news of COAS (Chief of Air Staff) came.
Actually later changed to Army Cdr and Corps Cdr.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4<sup>th</sup> Oct.</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Big changes afloat.
4 Corps took over by 4 PM when GOC 4 Corps Lt Gen Kaul arr. Gill came as CSO. Plans to move the Regt out of air fd
area. I argued that 4 Div is providing all the comns at the
moment not only for 4 Div HQ but for 4 Corps HQ also and least possible
disturbances should be caused to the Sig Regt.
This had to be argued like mad.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 3.0pt;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">5<sup>th</sup>
Oct</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.
Brig PS Gill, CSO for the first time started appreciating some of our
difficulties which he never did before as CSO 33 Corps. Agreed to get 10 more cipher staff. By evening, he agreed not to disturb my Sig Regt. Gen Kaul left by heptr with one cipher op at
9 AM to go to Lumpu. Very unsatisfactory
for a senior cdr to go and sit alone. It
is very remote place with only one WS 62 comn.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">6<sup>th</sup> Oct.</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Delay in flash tfc last night worrying me. Recce by Gill who saw the logic today of not
building around the existing sig centre the corps installations as it would be
too congested. …..Flash message from
Kaul to COAS asking for air sp against Chinese build up. He talked in terms of national disaster. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">7<sup>th</sup> Oct</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Stupid message from G1
at Lumpu asking for M Sec and 2 Offrs move to Lunghtu without any other sig
staff. This
G1 was really a crazy person and less said about it, the better. Let us not to talk about it. I’ve talked about this same G1 earlier. Then
he ordered the move of RS 399 set from 5 Bde at <st1:place w:st="on">North
Lakhimpur</st1:place> to Dirang Dzong to work on D6. ….Decided to open D-3
link at Dirangdzone and Gauhati with det in 62 Bde Sig Sec. So many flash msgs from Kaul to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and Eastern
Command. All TOP SECRET. I can see the strain on cipher and sig centre
staff. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">8<sup>th</sup> Oct.</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 7 Bde no comn from 9 PM
to 6 AM. Tfc held up. It is a very
unsatisfactory state for the Corps Cdr so far forward and moving so fast. 62 Bde Sig Sec completely disorganized. C42 air lifted from Towang to Lumpu. Long chat with CSO Gill. …..Gen Kaul and NP in Dhola post last night”.</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Clash at Tsenge-jong</span></u></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At about 6.45 am on 10 October 1962 a patrol ex Tseng-jong
reported a large concentration of Chinese troops on the north and east of their
post. The patrol was fired upon. The patrol returned the fire and returned to
base without any casualties. The Chinese
came closer and thereafter intermittent fire continued. At about 8 am approximately 600 Chinese
attacked the Indian position at Tseng-jong, which had a total strength of 56
men. Out of this, one platoon had moved in only the previous evening and had
not yet dug in. The men had only pouch ammunition. After heavy exchange of fire
for about 45 minutes the attack was repulsed with heavy casualties to both
sides. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As soon as the attack started Major Chaudhary asked
for medium machine gun and mortar fire on the attacking troops but this was
turned down. After the first assault the Chinese again formed up for a second assault
at 9.30 am. Chaudhary again asked for medium machine gun and mortar fire from
Bridge IV but it was again turned down. In the meantime the section which had
gone to Karpola II moved to a position about 300 yards away on the flank of the
forming up Chinese and brought down very heavy small arms fire inflicting heavy
casualties. This unexpected fire disorganized the second Chinese attempt to
assault. However, the Chinese brought down heavy mortar fire on both positions causing
casualties to Indian troops. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese were again seen forming
up for the assault. Major Chaudhary spoke to his Commanding Officer on wireless
and informed him that his men had almost finished their ammunition, and that he
would not be able to hold on to the position unless support was provided by
medium machine gun and mortars. The Commanding Officer agreed but this was
again turned down by the Brigade Commander, who informed him that
reinforcements from 2 Rajput were on the way. The Chinese launched the third assault from
three sides - north, east and west – supported by mortar fire. At 12.30 pm the
post was given orders to withdraw. By
this time the assaulting troops were on the position and hand to hand fighting
developed. Major Chaudhary displayed
remarkable leadership and courage in extricating whatever was left of the platoons.
He was himself wounded and later succumbed to his injuries. The Chinese had
suffered heavy casualties, which were later announced by Peking Radio and Press
as 77 dead and 100 wounded. Indian casualties
were six dead, eleven wounded and five missing.<b>11</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It is interesting to reflect on the
reasons for denying the Tseng-jong post the support of medium machine gun and
mortars that could have broken up the Chinese assault and reduced casualties to
own troops. The war diary of HQ 7 Infantry Brigade lists five reasons for fire
support not being given. Only two 3 inch mortars were in range and only 56 rounds
of ammunition were available; the medium machine guns had a limited amount of
ammunition; 2 Rajput was moving into Bridge IV to relieve 9 Punjab; the Chinese
had vastly superior artillery and would have subjected the whole front to
intense bombardment; the presence of the Corps Commander and his party. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General Kaul had watched the action and left Dhola post
at 10 am after telling Brigadier Dalvi “this is your battle.” He sent a message
to Eastern Command and Army Headquarters informing them of the grave situation that
had developed at Tseng-jong and sought permission to fly to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> to personally acquaint them with the
facts and seek further orders. This was agreed to immediately. Before leaving
the Namka Chu area, Kaul told the Divisional Commander that the instructions to
drive the enemy back were to be held in abeyance till he returned from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. In the meantime, he was to hold his present
position. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Namka Chu and Tsangle <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 11 October 1962, a meeting was
held in the Prime Minister’s house late at night. It was attended by the Prime Minister, Defence
Minister, the Army and Air Chiefs, the Cabinet, Foreign and Defence Secretaries,
the Director, Intelligence Bureau, the officiating Chief of General Staff,
Major General J.S Dhillon and GOC IV Corps, Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul. General Kaul presented the tactical picture
of the Dhola Sector at the meeting and then suggested three alternatives viz.
to continue building up this sector and launch an attack on the Chinese despite
their superiority and a possibility of a reverse; or to cancel the orders of an
attack but hold our present positions; or to hold a more advantageous position
elsewhere. <b>12<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Prime Minister asked the Army
officers present for their views. The GOC-in-C Eastern Command was not in agreement
with Kaul about the inability of Indian troops to hold the Namka Chu position
and therefore recommended the second course, i.e. to hold the present
positions. The Army Chief, General Thapar, concurred with the Army Commander.
The Prime Minister then decided that the Namka Chu position would be held but
no offensive action would be taken to oust the Chinese from the northern bank.
Nehru left for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Colombo</st1:place></st1:city>
next morning. At the airport a press
reporter asked him as to what orders had been given to the troops in NEFA. “Our instructions are to free our country”,
he said. When asked how soon this would happen, he replied “I cannot fix a
date. That is entirely for the Army”. Several
newspapers reported the statement, some stating that the Prime Minister had
ordered the Army ‘to throw the Chinese out’. It is believed that the
exaggerated version of Prime Minister’s statement infuriated the Chinese
leadership and was partly responsible for the attack on 20 October 1962.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 13 October, HQ IV Corps sent a
signal to HQ 4 Infantry Division confirming the Corps Commander’s verbal orders
issued on 10 October that positions along the southern side of the river were
to be held at all costs; line of communications via Lumpu would be protected; Hathung
La would be held and positions at Tsangle, Tseng-jong and Karpola would he held
at the discretion of the Divisional Commander. The next day, IV Corps amended
the order, specifying that the Tsangle position would also be held at all costs.
On 16 October, Army Headquarters issued orders to Eastern Command to reinforce
Tsangle if possible up to a battalion and carry out aggressive patrolling in
the area. They were also asked to forward their recommendations at the earliest
regarding commencement of Operation ‘<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Leghorn</st1:city></st1:place>’,
including their requirements of additional troops, administrative cover and air
lift. Apparently, Army HQ had decided
Operation ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Leghorn</st1:place></st1:city>’
had not been shelved – it was held up temporarily until deployment and
logistical position improved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> This was a
severe blow to the Brigade and the Divisional Commanders, who had been pleading
for withdrawal, in view of the reports of further reinforcements by the Chinese
and the condition of the forward defences. By this time General Kaul’s physical
condition had deteriorated – he was suffering from pulmonary oedema and had to
be evacuated shortly afterwards. He sent another message to the Eastern Command
and Army HQ arguing that the Namka Chu position was untenable and pleaded pulling
back the isolated company from Tsangle. To resolve the issue another conference was
held at Tezpur on 17 October. It was
attended by V.K. Krishna Menon, B.M. Mullik, H.C. Sarin, Major General A.S. Guraya (Inspector General Assam
Rifles), and Generals Thapar, Sen and Kaul. General Guraya was in favour of
withdrawal. Kaul also forcefully argued for
an immediate withdrawal. However, the
Defence Minister insisted that we should not yield any more territory,
emphasizing that it was politically necessary to hold Tsangle. According to Mullik,
at this stage he suggested that the civilians withdraw from the meeting to
allow the Generals to take a military decision without civilian
interference. After a closed door
discussion lasting two hours, General Thapar informed the Defence Minister that
it had been decided to hold the Namka Chu front and the Tsangle Sector. The Corps Commander immediately passed these instructions
to GOC 4 Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Defence Minister and his entourage
flew back <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
However, by the evening General Kaul’s condition had taken a turn for the
worse. Next morning a medical officer flown to Tezpur from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> in a special aircraft examined him and
decided to bring him back with him. However, no officer was appointed as his
relief, it being decided that Kaul would continue to command IV Corps from his
sick bed at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
On 18 October he ordered two more companies to strengthen Tsangle. Brigadier Dalvi protested that this would
stretch the supply effort of 7 Brigade to breaking point. However, Major
General Niranjan Prasad told him that he was helpless, since the move had been
ordered at the ‘highest level’. When Dalvi protested more vehemently, he was
told that he and his commanding officers would be court martialled if they raised
any more objections or arguments against Tsangle!<b>13<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">While these high level
discussions were taking place at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and Tezpur, the Chinese continued their preparations. Changes were carried out
in the deployment of troops holding the forward positions on our own side also.
By 16 October 1962, HQ 7 Infantry Brigade had been established at Rongla, close
to Dhola Post. The deployment of the Brigade was as under:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Grenadiers less two
companies was at Bridge I; one company was at Serkhim with a platoon at
Hathungla; one company was at Drokung Samba under HQ Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> less one coy was holding Bridge II; the
fourth company was deployed at Bridge V/ Tsangle. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2 Rajput less three
companies was at Bridge IV; the remaining three companies were at Bridge
III, <st1:placename w:st="on">Temporary</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype> and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Log</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place>
respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1/9 Gorkha Rifles
less a company was located in the area Chauri Hut above Dhola; one company
was covering the gap between Bridge III and Bridge II ahead of Rongla,
with a platoon located at Tsangdhar. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A battery of 34
Heavy Mortar Regiment and a troop of 77 Para Field Regiment were at as
Tsangdhar<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A platoon each of
C Company of 6 Mahar (Machine Gun) was located with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles and
2 Rajput, the third platoon still at Tawang. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l25 level1 lfo3; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">100 Field Company
less a platoon was at Rongla, the third platoon being at Tawang. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Although the weapons of the supporting
arms were in position the ammunition held was woefully inadequate. Only two
guns of the troop of Para Field Regiment were able to fire, the other two
having been damaged in the air drop. The total artillery of the Brigade consisted
of four 4.2 inch mortars and two para-field guns. The ammunition available at the dump at Tsangdhar
was approximately 500 rounds of field ammunition and 450 rounds of 4.2 inch
mortar ammunition. The gun ammunition had
been placed at the gun positions but the mortar ammunition had still not
reached the mortar positions. Due to
short range the mortars had to be sited about 1.5 miles north of the Tsangdhar
Dropping Zone. All personnel were employed in preparing mortar positions and no
additional manpower was available to shift the mortar ammunition. One subsidiary small arms ammunition dump was established along side 1/9 Gorkha
Rifles to facilitate ferry forward of ammunition, but this dump had still to be
stocked. <b>14<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">While these preparations were going on, the
casualties due to extreme cold conditions increased. There were several cases
of pneumonia, frostbite and pulmonary oedema, some resulting in deaths. The
evacuation of casualties was a major problem, especially from Tsangle. It took
about four days for a casualty to reach the Advanced Dressing Station at
Tsangdhar, with no staging facility enroute over altitude of 16000 ft. The sick
rate was abnormally high (50%) among the Pioneers of the General Reserve
Engineering Force (GREF), which was responsible for the construction and
improvement of roads and tracks. Due to the high casualty rate at Bridge
V/Tsangle, it was decided that snow clothing would be issued on priority to
personnel at these locations, the next priority being Tsangdhar. Since there was no snow clothing held in
stock, the troops deployed in Namka Chu from Bridge I to Bridge IV were
stripped of their snow clothing to meet this requirement. As no porters were available, troop labour had
to be used. A party of 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> was dispatched
on 18 October with ammunition and snow clothing for Tsangle. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 18 October a Chinese patrol
attempting to cross the Namka Chu at Bridge II area was fired upon by own troops,
one of them killed. Another Chinese patrol found probing the Bridge V position withdrew
after a short exchange of fire. As a result of orders received from the Corps
Commander from his sick bed at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
a company of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles was ordered to move to Tsangle, further denuding
the defences at Namka Chu. By this time,
regular reports were coming in of concentration of Chinese troops and stores south
of Thagla. Senior Chinese officers were seen holding conferences and pointing
to Indian positions. They were also seen taking bearings of all our positions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 19 October 1962, a patrol sent out from Tsangle encountered
a Chinese patrol on the track to Bridge IV.
After a brief exchange of fire the Chinese patrol withdrew. Soon
afterwards all observation posts reported unusually heavy concentration of
Chinese troops. Hordes of mules were seen carrying various stores including
mortars and ammunition. About 1200 – 1500 Chinese crossed the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Thagla</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place>
enroute to the north bank of the Namka Chu. They were seen moving towards 2 Rajput
positions and further westward toward Tsangle. It was obvious that the Chinese
were preparing to launch an attack and the Brigade Commander requested
permission to withdraw the Tsangle Company which was on a limb, out of range of
supporting artillery. However, the Corps Commander being absent, the permission
was denied. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment & 7 Infantry Brigade Signal Section (Before the Invasion) <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After moving from Ambala to Tezpur in November 1959,
4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was faced with two major challenges. The
first was the responsibility for communications over a frontage over 1800 km in
mountainous terrain, against the 30-40 km that an infantry division usually
occupies in the plains. The second was the additional responsibility of
constructing accommodation for troops under Project ‘Amar 2’, the brain child
of General B.M. Kaul, which was inaugurated in the unit area next to Tezpur
airfield by the Prime Minister in April 1960. After the Dalai Lama’s flight to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> via the
Tawang route in 1959, the defence of this sector assumed importance, and 7
Infantry Brigade was moved from Misamari to Bomdila and then to Tawang as the
road was constructed. Line communications, hitherto non-existent, were also
extended up to Tawang, a distance of almost 200 miles. <b>15</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In September 1962, the unit was
catering to the communication requirements not only of 4 Infantry Division but
also Tactical HQ of Eastern Command as well as 33 Corps, which had been setup
at Tezpur. The unit was then under the command of Lieutenant Colonel K.K.
Tewari, with Major Ram Singh as the second-in-command and Captain A.K. Bhowmik
as the Adjutant. The other officers in the unit were Major K.G. Gangadharan (1
Company); Major S.S. Gupta (2 Company); Major R.G. Singh (3 Company); Captain
Lakshman Singh (7 Brigade Signal Section - Tawang); Captain A.S. Bawa (5
Brigade Signal Section – <st1:place w:st="on">North Lakhimpur</st1:place>); and
Second Lieutenant Lal Singh (11 Brigade Signal Section --deployed in Nagaland
under the operational control of 23 Infantry Division). The Chief Signal
Officers of 33 Corps and Eastern Command were Brigadiers M.B.K. Nair and E.G.
Pettengel respectively. Other Signal officers located in the area were
Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Panwar, Officer Commanding, Tusker Signals; Brigadier
P.S. Gill, Chief Signal officer, 4 Corps (after 4 October 1962); and Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Mehta, Officer Commanding 4 Corps Signal Regiment (after 10
October 1962).<b>16</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <span style="color: red;">The problems
faced by 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment are best described by Major
General K.K. Tewari, who was then commanding the unit. In a memo dated 10 March
2009, he writes:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Div Sig
Regt had no previous training or experience in mountain or jungle area and was
not even equipped for it. Troops did not even have clothing issued for the hill
areas. In any case, the so called famous Red Eagle Division had not been able
even to do its normal operational training for months, being deeply involved in
construction work under a strictly controlled schedule and regime. Even the
normal maintenance of technical equipment was neglected in the process. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The other
aspect was the frontage of area for defence allotted to the div from Sikkim to
the extreme north east in a completely undeveloped area with hardly any roads,
electric supply or poorly developed P & T or other communication
facilities. On top of all this was the directive for the troops to build their
own accommodation on a schedule planned by the authorities who were keen to
continue with the apparently popular project of accommodation construction for
the troops, to please certain political bosses. There was little time or
consideration for acclimatising troops in the new area and to study effects of
screening due to hills on VHF radio and to develop land line facilities in an
undeveloped area with frequent landslides in heavy rains. All this was further
complicated with the shortage of equipment and its neglected maintenance. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">To add to the
other communication problems was the authority exercised on the deployment of
the army and para military forces by different ministries of Defence, Home and
External Affairs with a lack of coordination and spirit of trying to outdo the
others and show off to please vested rival interests and personalities of
different bosses. To any serious minded commander with a dedicated sense of
commitment to the effective defence aspects of this completely new and
undeveloped area, the usual response was “why are you flapping? The Chinese are
not going to attack.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Shortly after the incident at Dhola
on 8 September 1962, HQ 7 Infantry Brigade had been ordered to move from Tawang
to Lumpu. The Brigade Commander accompanied by the GSO 3 (Intelligence) and the
rover group left Tawang on 14 September, with the move of remainder of the
headquarters and the signal section being spread over the next one week, due to
the paucity of ponies and porters. Due to political considerations, there was a
ban on using ponies beyond Bomdila, as these were owned by <i>Khampas,</i> who hailed from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This ban was relaxed later and
ponies were allowed upto Lumla. The trans-shipment of stores and the mismatch
between the carrying capacity of ponies and porters created a major bottleneck
at Lumla, where a large quantity of stores piled up. The carriage of heavy
signal equipment posed a peculiar problem, since it had to be dismantled,
broken into porter loads, loaded on ponies or porters and then re-assembled on
arrival at the other end. For instance, the Radio Set 19 and 550 watt charging
engine needed five porters each, while the Radio Set 62 could be carried by
two. Of course, no load tables had been prepared for such a contingency, it
being left entirely to the ingenuity of the Officer Commanding 7 Infantry
Brigade Signal Section to dismantle the equipment, pack it and improvise
carriers for ponies and porters.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The move of 7 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section commenced on 14 September and was completed only on 20 September,
when it closed down its signal centre at Tawang, handing over communications to
the signal detachment under the second-in-command, Major Ram Singh, who had
arrived two days earlier with the task of providing communications to the adhoc
brigade headquarters being set up at Tawang under the Commander Artillery,
Brigadier Kalyan Singh and the Tactical HQ, 4 Infantry Division. Since Major
Ram Singh had arrived with no manpower or equipment, 7 Brigade Signal Section
had to give him some from their own meagre resources. This included two Radio
Stations 499, one of which had been brought to Tawang a few days earlier by
Naib Subedar Dharam Singh who had reported to the Section on 15 September,
having been despatched posthaste from Tezpur, where he was the pigeon training
officer of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment.<b> 17</b> <b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Describing his journey from Tezpur to Tawang and
onwards to Lumla, Naib Subedar Dharam Singh writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“I left Tezpur at 1400
Hours. We were four of us - two linemen,
the driver and myself. It was dark by
the time we reached Bomdila. I made enquires
about the road condition and proceeded ahead.
It so happened that there was a landslide about 12 Kms from Bomdila and
our vehicle got stuck and could not move any further.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I happened to see a
light some distance away and went over there.
It was a detachment of GREF, Project ‘Tusker.’ I explained to him my plight and problem. The Commander of the detachment was helpful
and came along with his Jawans to where the vehicle was truck. They pushed and pulled and with hard labour
were not only able to move the vehicle out of the dangerous position but also
on to the road. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By 11 AM the next day I
was able to reach Darang Dong and got the 499 station loaded and fitted
properly in the one ton Nissan.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the 11<sup>th</sup>
of October we started for Senge about 22 km’s away. It is a place where the sun is seen only
occasionally and it rains for 24 hours at times. The road surface was full of mud, difficult
and dangerous to drive, the convoy was accompanied by a bulldozer. There were a number of spots where it was
used to push the stalled vehicles.
Somehow we managed to reach Senge by the evening. However, by now both my vehicles were without
petrol and we could not move forward.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At night I tuned the BC
610 transmitter on the D1 Frequency and spoke to the Commander Signals Lt Col
KK Tewari and told him about my difficulties and non-availability of fuel. He spoke to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place>
Panwar, OC Tusker Signals and after that advised me to contact the Convoy
Commander. I was relieved but it was
short lived as the Convoy Commander flatly refused to give us any fuel.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I was wondering as what
to do. I had to move forward at any cost
but my vehicles were without petrol. The
only source that appeared to me was the Petrol Store of Project ‘Tusker.’ I had been given four bottles of Rum with
instructions from Commander Signals to make good use of them and that is what I
decided to do. I invited the POL NCO of
Tusker for drinking with us. But then I
had a problem as how to go about it being a total non-drinker myself. Anyway I told my men 4 join in drinking and
make him fully drunk and when he is unable to do anything put him on bed and
start filling the vehicles with petrol.”
This is what they did and tanked up the vehicles from the store and also
filled four Jerry Cans and carried them as reserve. I know it was wrong but for a good cause and
my move was an operational necessity.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I got up early next
morning and went to Maj Reddy, OC Tusker, well known to me, and requested him
to push up first. He did so and we were
on the road. We reached Towang the same
day by 1400 Hrs along with the 499 Set and I reported to Capt Lakshman Singh,
OC Brigade Signal Section <b>16A<o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">He appeared quite
surprised to see the set, wondering as how to employ the same as he already had
one at Towang. I in any case was unable
to throw any light on that.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I have no idea about
Towang as I was ordered by the OC to move the next morning with the Brigade
advance party with a skeleton Signal Centre.
I was totally new to the Brigade and did not know the officers. However, I became quite familiar with them en
route to Lumpu, the next location of the HQ, via Shakti, We established
communication from Lumpu on D1, D2, as also the Signal Centre.<b>18<o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though his signal section had left, Captain Lakshman
Singh was not permitted to leave until 23 September, on the grounds that his
services were still required at Tawang for the newly created headquarters<b>.</b>
He reached Lumla next morning after spending the night at Khillan, a
small village enroute. He was happy to find that Naib Subedar Dharam Singh had established
communications on wireless with Lumpu and the battalions. After rearranging the
radio nets working from Lumla, he pushed the remainder forward with the
available porters before starting himself after a day’s halt at Lumla. Though
he was not familiar with the track beyond Lumla, he found no problem in
following the correct route – it was marked with an unbroken line of empty Gold
Flake cigarette packets, which formed part of the troops’ rations at that time!
After a back breaking march he reached Shakti where he halted for the night. On
the evening of 27 September, he reached Lumpu where he met the Brigade
Commander and the rest of the brigade staff, after a gap of two weeks, during
which they had been virtually out of communications with higher headquarters as
well as the battalions. There were no telephones, and they were using a
primitive system based on whistles and flags to communicate with the units,
which were located within visual range of the Brigade Major’s tent. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Captain Lakshman Singh set about
developing communications for the Brigade HQ at Lumpu, hoping it would be the
location from where future operations would be controlled. He felt it strange that he was never
consulted or informed about operational plans by the Commander or the staff. No
one ever asked for his advice on matters concerning Signals and he was not
given any orders, verbal or written, throughout Operation ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Leghorn</st1:place></st1:city>’. He was only told to move to the
next location without warning and that too forthwith. Though he was non-plussed
by the adhoc manner in which the brigade was functioning, he could never
imagine that not only his own Brigade Commander but also the Divisional
Commander were unaware of the future operational plans. As he was to learn
later, the situation at higher headquarters was not very different. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As soon as communications had been
established from Lumpu, the Chinese began to intrude in the radio telephony
nets, telling whoever was listening to vacate the area as it belonged to them.
The intimidating tone in which the message was delivered only added to the
discomfiture of the users, brought about by the uncertain and hostile
atmosphere in desolate surroundings. To make matters worse, most of the signal
equipment that began to arrive from Tawang was found to be damaged due to
mishandling and needed major repairs, which had to be carried out by the
handful of mechanics available. Maintenance was entirely by air, but since a
large percentage of the airdropped stores were lost due to faulty parachutes or
landing in inaccessible ravines, there was an acute shortage of essential items
such as petrol, oil and lubricants. Due to a shortage of jerricanes, petrol was
dropped in 42 gallon barrels, which were difficult to handle over steep slopes.
Telephone cable was dropped on heavy No. 7 drums which were designed for line-laying
in the field, instead of the lighter dispenser packs. Though a headache for the
Signallers, the No. 7 drum was much in demand by others as it could be easily used
as a table. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By 1 October the communications at
Lumpu had stabilized. Telephone lines had been laid to the battalions, which
were all at the same location. Rearward communication on line was available to
the Divisional Tactical HQ at Khinzemane. The rearward links D1 and D2 had been
established using 19 HP and 76/R209 sets respectively. Another net using 62
sets was working with the rear elements of the Brigade at Tawang and Misamari,
as well as the airfield at Gauhati. The signals detachment with 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> was still at Lumpu, providing a link with the
battalion at Bridge I. As regards the performance of the sets, the old
workhorse 62 set worked well during the day with a wire aerial. However, at
night the performance deteriorated due to poor signal to noise ratio. The
76/R209, a crystal controlled trans-receiver for Morse code, performed
creditably on the traffic clearing D2 link, though it was noticed that its
rotary transformer developed faults after prolonged use. <b>19<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Tewari, had already done his forward planning for
communications in the area. He assigned the task of extending the existing line
from Shakti to Lumpu to Major Ram Singh by 9 October, while Captain Lakshman
Singh was told to lay the cable from Lumpu to Tsangdhar by 8 October. An
important document that gives out salient details of the communication planned
by the unit is the demi-official letter dated 3 October 1962 from the
Commanding Officer to Major Ram Singh and Captain Lakshman Singh, with a copy
endorsed to Major K.G. Gangadharan, Officer Commanding 1 Company as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="margin: 0cm 36pt 6pt 18pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> OP
IMMEDIATE<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="margin: 0cm 36pt 6pt 18pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Do
No 001/SIGS<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="margin: 0cm 36pt 6pt 18pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> INF
DIV REGT <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="margin: 0cm 36pt 6pt 18pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> C/o
56 <st1:place w:st="on">APO</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText3" style="margin: 0cm 36pt 6pt 18pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> 3
Oct 62<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">My Dear Lakshman <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> I am writing this to keep ourselves on one net for comns and
priority for ops in the future.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">First and foremost is
to get line comn going between TOWANG and HQ 7 Inf Bde. We already have double cable from TOWANG via
LUMLA to SHAKTI. Line beyond SHAKTI has
still to be laid. This line (for through
working from TOWANG to LUMPU)has to be laid by 9 Oct 62, without fail.
It will mean a lot of effort and all that with a thousand and one
difficulties. As discussed with you,
RAMU, we should conc first on laying PVC (double) between SHAKTI and
LUMPU. Then we should lay a single line
of PVC between TOWANG and SHAKTI and use (for the second leg of metallic return
cct), the existing double cable bunched
into one. Only later should we think
about laying the second leg of PVC between TOWANG and SHAKTI. We should lay the PVC on the ground to start
with and then lift it to “Tree Slung” gradually at a later stage. CSO has advised that we should string the PVC
up with spunyarn without insulators to start with. I have asked for insulators but they may take
time to come. Sleeves jointing are
coming up by air to TOWANG on 4 Oct with Lt KV RAMDAS. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> But whatever happens, this line has to be put between TOWANG
and LUMPU by 9 Oct, as discussed with you verbally, RAMU. I know I am asking a lot but I am certain we
shall rise to the occasion. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Now Lakshman, you have to conc. on the cable line from LUMPU
to TSANGDHAR. Your mention to me on the
RT about move fwd was confirmed by me with the GOC before he left for
TOWANG. You must try and get this line
working by 8th also. Again very tough
assignment but you may consider laying just on earth return single line, if you
feel like it. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> GOC has confirmed that cable routes in 4 Arty Bde sector will
take second priority. I was extremely
pleased to note that the TOWANG PENKENGTAG line has been extended up to
MILAKTONGLA and beyond already. This is
good show and I feel that the main requirement will be met by this line in the
sector. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Both of you must consider working of F/Phones on TOWANG LUMPU
and TOWANG MILAKTONGLA (1 Sikh) line. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> MANN is at present in GAUHATI chasing the airdrop of PVC and
fd cable. I have managed to get 50 coils
of PVC also which should be easier to tpt on the ground than drum No. 7. I
shall have all future fd cable dropped on drum No. 5. There has been a big hold up on air dropping
of cable in the absence of cluster paras and rig. MANN is sorting things out. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 18.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">PVC/cable is now being
dropped as follows (in miles):- <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 81.0pt; margin-right: 54.0pt; margin-top: 0cm;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">PVC Fd
Cables<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> __________ Drums Coils<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">TOWANG 35 40 30 (W 110 on No.7)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> 45
(D3 on No. 5) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">LUMLA 20 - <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">LUMPU 45 10 45 (W 110 on No.7)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Air Force will not drop at SHAKTI.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">For pers, we have sent
8 lmn from here, who reached TOWANG on 1 Oct and TUSKERS are making another 8
to 10 available forthwith at TOWANG.
They should suffice (as lmn) providing extra man power for porterage can
some how be grabbed. I was pleased to
note, RAMU that you have fixed that up. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> TUSKERS are speeding up the PL route to Jang and then
TOWANG. They expect to be in Jang by 12
Oct, with cable upto Jang in existence, we may be able to talk to DIRANG from
TOWANG. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> We are installing our exch AT DIRANG at Reg HQ and PL both
sides will be terminated on this exch.
We shall give 2 junctions to 624 exch in DIRANG. What I am hoping to do
by 5/6 Oct is to install ACT 1+1 between TEZPUR and DIRANG with BBFU at
MISAMARI. All tappings on this line will
be removed by this evening. Once the PL
is through upto Jang, we shall remove all taps between DIRANG and JUNG also,
similarly but that will be later. All
this is for your info. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Coming to wrls, as I told you RAMU, the GOC is thinking in terms
of moving fwd to LUMPU. I have advised
him against it in clearest terms. To
LUMPU, our comns are NOT satisfactory.
Even with C52 set there, it will NOT be a great help. In any case, it will mean opening D1 and D2
links as well as a Signal/Cipher Office at LUMPU once LAKSHMAN leaves. As requested verbally RAMU, kindly let me
know by tomorrow what the final decision is so that we may plan more pers being
sent up. I shall also try for another 76
for D2 (for TAC HQ).<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> I want to open D4 link (RT) to TOWANG for reasons discussed
with you, RAMU on RT. Lakshman could
come up on this also when necessary.
This link will be opened in the Regt lines at Air Fd and will be free
from interference of other links and other interference at the Signal
Centre. We shall remote control it on PL
and should it prove successful, we could possibly open it as the working RT op
link (with existing D1 becoming standby RT/CW link). As soon as you both can, I would like you to test this link out.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> I
am not keen that you should open on D6 from TOWANG. With the tele line to JUNG, we should get
that officer in charge of TCP there to keep TOWANG info of all moves on the L
of C.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Question of wrls sets with bns is what worries me a lot. The inf bns have left their sets behind. I had personally talked to the OC, Adjt and
QM of the 2 Rajput the day before they left that they must collect 62 sets from
DIRANG en route from GREN store. This
was NOT done. Even 1/9 GR could not
carry their sets fwd. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> I hope, Lakshman, your 3 bns are now getting their sets moved
up at top speed. RAMU, you may have
noted that we have ordered DIRANG Grn Comdr to shift to TOWANG forthwith, 3/4
62 sets left behind by GRENADIERS as Grn stores. I hope no sets of bns are now left on the L
of C. If so, kindly let me know by
signal, I shall move them up. From 7 Inf Bde there be only 2 Sets, One each
at MISAMARI and GAUHATI and no units sets/left behind with rear parties or on L
of C. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Can you both examine this holding by units (at your own secs)
of 62 Sets, 31 sets and 88 sets and let
me have the data by an ‘O’ sig by return?
Check on 19 sets of 7 Bde Sig Sec and H Sec also. I am moving the following sets at top speed
to TOWANG/LUMPU:-<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">(a) 62
Sets -6 (2 left by heptr
3 Oct with GOC. (Complete
Stas) <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Two leaving by heptr 4 Oct. Two will
follow by 5/6 Oct. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">(b) SCR
694 -2 (leaving by rd with 2/Lt
ANAND on 4 Oct.) <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">(c) 62
Sects -3
(Ex Grn at DIRANG ordered for move on 30 Sep.)<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">This is to suffice; I
hope till I hear from you but please give details of holding/loc/serviceability
by units so that I can justify my demand for more sets. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Out of the above, RAMU, you can retain any two sets for rear
links of bns under 4 Arty Bde. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> All your requirements of teles, adm stores line stores have
already been dispatched, RAMU. Anything
else you may need please let us know. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Both of you have been carrying a big load single handed. So I am sending following offrs up to be used,
I suggest as follows;-<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">(a) Lt RAMDAS - Leaving by heptr on 4 Oct with
one Hav OWK and 2X62 sets and 4X300 Watt engines plus batteries. He should take over as OC H Sec with Jem
CHANAN SINGH as his 2IC.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">(b) 2/Lt ANAND - Leaving by rd on 4 with a ‘red’ priority
for move along with 4x OWL and certain other and other stores. He will act as RAMU’s asst for GOC’s Gp. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Jem DHARA SINGH will stay with Lakshman and as soon he
returns, I shall send CHOPRA as 2IC to Lakshman. I shall try and fly him out (we are recalling
ARUN and DK from Courses.) <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> For man power, I hope
Lakshman is OK. At TOWANG, we want to
keep GOC’s Rover Gp separate from 4 Arty Bde, if possible. Details of pers requirements should be sent
by you by tomorrow, RAMU. We shall meet
your bids somehow. Work them out
carefully and give me details. I am
sending 6 X OWLs (4 with ANAND and 2 later). One Hav OWK (SREEDHARAN with
RAMDAS) and one OSL (with ANAND). These
OWLs should be given to H Sec for their rear with two bns.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> RAMU, I have studied
your DOs to RG dated 2 and 3 Oct.
Condiments, canteen items, two rain coats (Jungle Boots/Snow clothing
are both NA with Ord but I shall keep chasing) and other stores as also signal
centre stationery, have all either left or will leave tomorrow morning. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Both of you must have seen my ‘Y’ signal last night about
SITREPS. Please keep a special watch on
this. There have been avoidable and
excessive delays on SITREPS
as well as METREPS lately. From TOWANG
as from 7 Inf Bde metrep should go direct on 7 Inf Bde B net to GAUHATI within
½ hrs at the most. Give precedence ‘Y’
to sitreps also and warn the DSO about NR Nos of these crypto for special
attention Sitreps from you LAKSHMAN have been badly delayed in the past. G method MUST (rpt) MUST be used.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> We are all frightfully busy but not as much as you both and I
want you to know that uptil now, a difficult job has been handled by you, very
creditably. We have some more difficult
job/responsibilities ahead of us still and I have no doubt, we shall discharge
them well. Do not hesitate to ask for
any help, and I can assure you, our answer will be ‘yes’ invariably inspite of
all our commitments here. I shall try
and visit you as soon as I can. I have
delayed my departure a bit because of all the “brass” arriving in TEZPUR
today. CSO is arriving tomorrow morning
and I may leave the following day by rd.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> I hope both of you have studied the AR wrls layout. With the spare sets now being positioned as
required by us, their situation is very healthy.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> I am insisting that Air Force est their own wrls set at
TOWANG. I hope this will be done
soon. They can work a link to DARANGA
(route of heptrs via <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">BHUTAN</st1:place></st1:country-region>)
and TEZPUR. We can not help them on
this. TUSKER link to DARANGA is now
being worked continuously from 0600 hrs to 1700 hrs daily.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Keep an eye on security
also. There have been serious breaches
lately. Our duty in this respect should
be clear in our minds we are to advise the staff in this respect.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Do keep your VHF sets BE 201 also tested. Requirement may arise at short notice.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> With the very best of wishes, and best
of luck. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Yours
<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> Sd/- x x x<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> KK
Tewari<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Maj Ram Singh<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">OIC Sig Gp with GOC Rover Party<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Capt Lakshman Singh<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">OC 7 Inf Bde Sig Sec<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Copy to :- <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Maj KG GANGADHARAN, <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 75%; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">OC 1 Coy <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lakshman and his men had hardly
settled down when the new Corps Commander, General Kaul, arrived at Lumpu on 5
October 1962. With immediate effect, 4 Infantry Division came under command the
newly created 4 Corps, which became responsible for the operations in NEFA. One
of his first acts was to order the Brigade HQ and Signal Section to get out of
Lumpu and move to Tsangdhar immediately. Though the Brigade Commander was not
present, they had no choice and many of them left the same night, halting for
the night after travelling a short distance in the direction of Tsangdhar. Captain
Lakshman Singh could not leave with the rest, due to the unavailability of
porters to carry his equipment and was instructed by his Commanding Officer to
stay put until further orders. On 7
October 1962 Major Ram Singh landed at Lumpu in a helicopter and took over the
radio detachments of D1, D2 and B21 which were then functional. He left Lumpu
in the afternoon accompanied by Naib Subedar Dharam Singh and 32 Other Ranks,
minus most of his equipment. After spending the night in a<i> chauri</i> hut (shelter made of stones used by graziers) they reached
the base of the 16,000 feet high <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Karpola</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass</st1:placetype></st1:place> next evening. After
a gruelling climb up to the pass they spent another night in a <i>chauri </i>hut before arriving at Tsangdhar
on 9 October 1962. By this time Dharam Singh had already reached and
established rudimentary communications, in spite of the acute shortage of
electrolyte for the secondary batteries and fuel for the charging sets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The clash at Tsenge-jong took place
on the next day, watched from a vantage point by the top brass from the Corps
Commander downwards. Though the enemy got a bloody nose, thanks to the grit and
determination of Major Chaudhary and his boys of 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>,
it brought home to everyone the hard fact that the Chinese meant business. Even
as the operation was going on, Lakshman Singh was asked by the Brigade Major to
lay a line urgently from Tsangdhar to a
place where the Commander was located, near 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, and from there
to 2 Rajput and 9 Punjab. Undaunted by the fact that he had no dispenser packs,
hardly any cable and very few linemen, Lakshman set about his task at once. All
available personnel, including the cook, barber and washerman, were pressed
into service to collect the few drums of cable from the dropping zone and make
coils for laying by hand. Realising that it was almost impossible to lay the
entire length with the cable and manpower available, an unconventional solution
was found. There was a line running between 9 Punjab and 2 Rajput, which had
been laid by the regimental signallers of 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
for their company which was earlier at Bridge IV. It was decided to lay a pair
of cable from the exchange at Tsangdhar to the location of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles
where it was terminated on a 10 line exchange next to the Commander and the
Brigade Major. Two pairs of cable were then run from this exchange to the Namka
Chu, where the cable between the two battalions was split, and connected to the
newly laid cable pairs. The Brigade Commander was now through to both
battalions. Of course, the battalions no longer had the direct line between
themselves, their calls being routed through the exchange set up near the
Brigade Commander. The battalions were not too happy with the hijacking of
their line by Brigade Signals, but Lakshman can be forgiven for the lapse. If
he had not resorted to this unusual step, it is unlikely that the line would
have been completed the same day. In case the Chinese had reacted during the
night, as was feared, Signals would never have been forgiven for the fiasco
that would have resulted. <b>20<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After laying the line to 1/9 Gorkha
Rifles, Lakshman spent the night sharing the sleeping bag of the Brigade Major,
Major Kharbanda. Fortunately, both were quite slim but still, they did not get
much sleep. The Commander felt that the Chinese would react during the night to
the clash at Tsenge-jong in which they had suffered heavy casualties, and asked
for information every half hour or so. The exchange operator sitting next to
the two officers would crank the handle every time to raise the battalions turn
by turn, and get the latest information, which would be passed on to the
Commander. Fortunately, nothing happened that night and Lakshman returned to
Tsangdhar next morning, after meeting Major Ram Singh who had been sent to
Dhola Post to contact the Corps Commander, but had missed him. By this time
communications had stabilized, and the telephone lines as well as the radio
nets were working. The line and wireless diagram of 7 Infantry Brigade on 12
October 1962 is given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though the full complement of communications for the
Brigade HQ had been set up by Signals at Tsangdhar, there was no staff officer
to use it. The Commander and Brigade Major were both located with 1/9 Gorkha
Rifles location, from where they talked on D1 net on remote. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As
regards the performance of the link, Lakshman writes:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 27.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“Just as a
matter of interest, while speaking on D1 one morning, with the CO, the signal
strength was so good that he refused to believe that I was operating a 62 set.
The planning range of radio set 62 was just 25 km, where the aerial distance
between the two of us at that time was approximately 200 kms, he being at
Tezpur. Of course, I had the advantage of height. This was good news.”</span></i><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">21</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On arrival at Tsangdhar, it had been
discovered that most of the secondary batteries did not have any electrolyte,
the porters having drained them enroute to reduce the weight. As a result, two
or three batteries had to be emptied to top up one battery. Again, an
unconventional solution was found by Dharam Singh and his team of mechanics.
The 300 watt charging engine was connected to the battery in use, which then
worked on float charge, one feeding two sets simultaneously. Another problem
was the non availability of poles for erecting wire aerials. Tsangdhar was
devoid of vegetation except rhododendron bushes, and logs had to be cut from
trees about 5 to 6 miles away and lugged up the steep slopes. In the absence of
tents, parachutes had to be used as shelters for the signal centre and the
radio detachments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
problem of electrolyte for the batteries was to have serious consequences for Colonel
Tewari, the Commanding Officer of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment – it
was while delivering electrolyte to the forward troops that he was later
captured by the Chinese. Describing the episode, he writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“</span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">But we were all in for
a still bigger shock when it was discovered that almost all the secondary
batteries had arrived without any electrolyte. What must have happened (perhaps
done deliberately) was that a porter dropped a battery accidentally when its
electrolyte leaked out. When he picked it up again he would have found it to be
surprisingly light. Word must have spread among the other porters and they may
have all decided to lighten their loads the same way by emptying out the
electrolyte from all the remaining batteries. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">How could communications
be established on the radio when the batteries were dead and could not be recharged
even after petrol had been air-dropped! Such a calamity was beyond anyone’s
imagination and I had to get the Brigade Signal officer to check and recheck that
this was what actually happened. One just could not believe it! How to get the
electrolyte up? This time our persuasive powers did not work because the Air
Force helicopter boys refused to carry the electrolyte inspite of our good
relations with them. And there was no question of dropping sulphuric acid by
air. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">What was I to
do? Fate was also pushing me to my inevitable destiny. We filled up a jar of
electrolyte (broken sulphuric acid), marked it prominently as ‘Rum for Troops’
to hide the contents. In another kit bag the regimental Subedar Major packed a
roasted pig (we had a piggery in the Regiment) to take to our jawans in the
forward area. They had not received any fresh supplies for many days. The irony
of it all was that in high altitude areas, all the troops were entitled to get
special scales of rations and they were not even getting the basics. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 18<sup>th</sup>
October, I flew from Tezpur in an Otter aircraft to Dirranga on the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region> border.
There I changed into an MI4 helicopter for the hop to Ziminthang. My second in
command, Major Ram Singh was already at Ziminthang with the GOC, Maj Gen
Niranjan Prasad at the divisional Tactical HQ. After meeting the GOC for his
orders and giving instructions to Maj Ram Singh there, I flew in a two-seater <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bell</st1:place></st1:city> helicopter with just
one pilot, with a ‘Rum’ jar strapped onto my lap. We landed on the dropping
zone at Tsangdhar in the late afternoon and I marched down to the bottom of the
hill on the bank of the river Namka Chu to Brig Dalvi’s brigade HQ.”</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<b>22<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lakshman Singh’s elation at the performance of his
radio links was shortlived. On 13 October, he was asked to move to Rongla, the
new location of the Brigade HQ. On reaching the new location, he set up the B1
and B21 nets, but could not get through on the D2 net and the daily situation
report was not cleared in time. Rongla was located in a valley, surrounded by
thick jungle, as was Ziminthang, the location of the Divisional Tactical HQ. It
took some time for the equipment to reach Rongla. Even after it arrived, most
of the radios sets could not be used due to the batteries being without
electrolyte, which had been drained enroute again by the porters. After the
receipt of a 19 HP set it was expected that the communications would improve,
but this did not happen. Transmissions from the BC 610 set at Tezpur and the C
52 at Ziminthang could be heard clearly at Rongla, but the transmissions from
the 62 set located there were inaudible at the former locations. With great
effort, Major Ram Singh and Captain Lakshman Singh were able to pass a few
messages at night, but the Commander and staff were unable to talk on the nets.
The problem was aggravated by the mismatch between the different types of sets
being used at each headquarters and the turmoil of frequent moves. As a result,
messages began to pile up in the signal centre and many high precedence signals
were delayed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The breakdown in radio communications almost
resulted in the sacking of the Officer Commanding 7 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section. After the delay in clearance of an important message, a signal was
received from Divisional Tactical HQ that read: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 45.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“Op Leghorn
(.) from tiger to tiger (.) information
not reaching in time (.) suggest change signal officer</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 150%;">.”
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lakshman naturally thought that he would soon be
sent packing, but this did not happen. Though the Commander was too pre-occupied
to bother about the message, Major Pereira, the DAA&QMG (Deputy Assistant
Adjutant & Quarter Master General), prevailed on the Commander not to act
on the message, in the interest of the morale of the Signal Section and
the feelings of the Officer Commanding. Brigadier
Dalvi promptly sent signal to the Divisional Tactical HQ that he would prefer
to be sacked himself. It later transpired that the signal from Ziminthang had
been sent by the GSO1 (General Staff Officer Grade 1) without the approval of
the Divisional Commander.<b>23 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 18 October Captain Lakshman Singh and Naib
Subedar Dharam Singh walked half way up to Tsangdhar to receive the Commanding
Officer, Colonel Tewari, who arrived from Ziminthang in a helicopter. He met the Brigade Commander and gave him the
welcome news that it was planned to withdraw the Brigade shortly to Lumpu,
leaving only a battalion at Namka Chu, with a company at Tsangle. He gave a
similar input to the Signal Section, asking Lakshman to plan leave parties for
the winter. After spending the night at Rongla, he planned to visit the
battalions next day to check on their communications and state of signal
equipment. Before he left for 1/9 Gorkha Rifles next day, he spent some time
with Brigadier Dalvi when the latter was talking to the Divisional Commander on
telephone, pleading for permission to withdraw to a tactically sound defensive
position. Dalvi felt that the existing position along the river where he had
been ordered to deploy by the Corps Commander was a ‘death trap’. However,
General Prasad told him not to flap but obey orders and stay put. At this,
Brigadier Dalvi was visibly annoyed and passed the telephone to Colonel Tewari,
saying, “You won’t believe me Sir, but talk to your ‘bloody’ Commander Signals
and he will tell you what all he can see with his naked eyes.” Colonel Tewari
then spoke to General Prasad equally strongly and informed him that he could
see the Chinese moving down the Thagla Ridge like ants and could also see at
least half a dozen mortars which were not even camouflaged, adding that the
Chinese could not be there for a picnic and that their attack was imminent on a
massive scale. But the Divisional Commander was not impressed. He asked Tewari
not to worry and concentrate on his work. <b>24</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Captain Lakshman Singh accompanied his Commanding
Officer to 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, on 19 October 1962. En route, they were amazed to
see the movement of the Chinese on the Thagla Ridge across the Namka Chu. After
having lunch with the Gorkhas, Colonel Tewari was keen to move to the location
of 2 Rajput, but was dissuaded by Lakshman, who pleaded with him to either
return to the Brigade HQ or spend the night with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, the Rajputs
not so well dug in having moved to their location only recently. Tewari agreed
to stay with Gorkhas, Lakshman rushing back to the Brigade HQ. In the evening
there was a request from Major Balraj Nijjar, Officer Commanding 24 Heavy
Mortar Battery for a radio set to establish communications with Tsangdhar.
Lakshman provided the set and the link got through. In the evening he was a
mute listener to the telephone
conversation between Brigadier Dalvi and Major General Prasad, when the
latter ordered him to send the remainder of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles to Tsangle, and
the harsh words exchanged between the two. <b>25<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The communications set up in 7 Infantry Brigade had
undergone several changes since it had moved to the area. On 19 October 1962
line communications existed from the Brigade HQ at Rongla to the infantry
battalions and the dropping zone at Tsangdhar, in addition to the Divisional
Tactical HQ. The B1 net had all the battalions and 24 Heavy Mortar Battery. The
B 21 net was through to Tsangdhar, Lumla, Lumpu, Misamari and Gauhati. The
troop of 17 Para Field had also been put on B 21 to reduce the number of
stations on B 1. Rearward communications on D 1 and D 2 existed to the
Divisional HQ. The line and radio
diagrams of 7 Infantry Brigade (on 19 October 1962) are given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:
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During the crucial ten days before
the Chinese invasion, Colonel Tewari made several important entries in his
diary, some of which are given below, along with his comments:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">10<sup>th</sup> Oct.</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Flew with CSO Gill to Zimithang by heptr. Changed the heptr at Dirangdzone. Things very disorganized. Maj Ram Singh there at Zimithang while G1 on
top at Lumpu, 200 ft higher. Persuaded
G1 to shift down next day. …..7 Bde Sig
Sec arr Tsangdar in battered condition, after 3 days of march on 5<sup>th</sup>
Oct. Bde Tac HQ at Dhola. Maj Ram Singh sent to Tsangdar at 2 PM. He saw 7 Bde Sig Sec and asked them to push
on to bridge 2 to join the GOC – both the GOCs.
But they had left.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11<sup>th</sup> Oct</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. Gen Kaul soon flew out in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bell</st1:place></st1:city> heptr.
Left from Nellie for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
same day. Gen NP arr Zimithang at 1030
by <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bell</st1:place></st1:city> heptr. GOC briefed me on the action of 10<sup>th</sup>
Oct. Frantic msg to 7 Bde to get
info. GOC talked to Brig Dalvi at 730
PM. Long message from Corps Cdr to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. Decided to lay a line from Lumpu to bridge 1
at top speed. (This was PVC line. Cable
was air dropped and Lt Chaman Anand laid this.
This was a fantastic piece. I was
extremely pleased to see this.) <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13 Oct</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. I flew back to Tezpur. GOC Gen Kaul arr back from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Confirmed own hunch. Further Op
on. Gen Kaul not well.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14 Oct</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. Using full persuasive powers to stop move of
Div HQ from Tezpur to Charduar. (I was
insisting that the HQ if it has to move, as 4 Corps had come in, should move
only to the airfield). Meeting with GOC 33 Corps, Commissioner NEFA, IGAR and
DGBR”.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">18<sup>th</sup>Oct</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I flew in the early
morning by MI4 heptr to Dirang, Zimithang.
From Zimithang I was taken by Sqn Ldr Williams in a <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bell</st1:place></st1:city> heptr to Tsangdhar. I reached Bde HQ that night and had a long
chat with Brig Dalvi. I could even talk
on the telephone to GOC and I had a long chat with him. I remember the Bde Cdr was telling the GOC
that Chinese were not there for nothing.
They meant business. He was
pleading with him to be allowed to move up, to a more tactically Sound position. Where he was and where he had been ordered to
be – he was a sitting target. He then
passed the telephone to me while saying, “you will not believe me sir. Talk to your cdr sigs”. So I remember talking
to the GOC and pointing out that from where we were we could see the Chinese
quite clearly. I could count 10 mortars
easily and they were not even camouflaged.
I remember even using the term ‘like fly buttons all open’. Everything was visible. Gen NP’s typical answer was that “you stay bloody
well where you are. These are the govt’s
orders.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">19<sup>th</sup> Oct</span></u></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">. My intention next day was to move upto 1/9
Gurkhas and Rajputs and see their positions.
That was after I visited the Bde HQ
and checked the bde sig sec pers all of whom had done a remarkable march
forward. They were pushed like mad in
their move forward. …..On 19<sup>th</sup>
evening I came upto 1/9 Gorkhas. The
darkness comes fairly early in those areas.
I decided to stay on and early next morning visit Rajputs and then march
back to Lumpu. Early morning at 5 am,
the Chinese attacked. I was fast asleep
when the shelling started. It was very
intense shelling. Then, the whole show
started.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE INVASION OF NEFA –
KAMENG DIVISION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Battle</st1:place></st1:city> of Namka Chu<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At 5 a.m. on 20 October 1962, the Chinese opposite
Bridge III fired two Verey lights. This was the signal for commencement of the
heavy bombardment by 76 mm guns and 120 mm mortars on the Indian positions at
Bridge III and IV; log and temporary Bridges; Tsangdhar and Rongla. The Punjabis
and Grenadiers at Bridge I and II were not subjected to the hour-long bombardment
after which massive infantry assaults were launched on Bridge III, Dhola and
Tsangdhar between 6 and 7 a.m. In the
very first few minutes of the shelling, telephone lines linking the Brigade HQ
with the battalions had been cut. At about 7 a.m., two wounded Assam Rifles
soldiers came running to the Brigade HQ and informed that Dhola Post had been
completely over run. Fifteen minutes later
Captain Ravi Eipe of 2 Rajput reached the Brigade HQ to report that his company
had been wiped out. He informed that the
Chinese attacked his position from the rear through the Dhola area. At about 7.30 am, the Brigade Commander had a
radio telephony conversation with Commander Signals 4 Infantry Division, who
was at that time with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles. At about 7.45 a.m. Colonel Tewari spoke
again with Brigadier Dalvi and informed that the extreme left company of 1/9
Gorkha Rifles had been overrun, the company commander and two other officers reported
killed. At about 8 am, a few stragglers
from 1/9 Gorkha Rifles arrived and stated that the battalion’s positions had
been overrun.<b>26</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigadier Dalvi spoke to Major General Prasad and
obtained his permission to withdraw the troops to Tsangdhar, so as to be able
to give the Chinese a fight there. Since direct communications with the
battalions had broken down, the message could not be passed to them. Brigadier
Dalvi appreciated that since the Commanding Officers of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles and 2
Rajput knew his mind, they would automatically fall back on Tsangdhar. He requested the Divisional Commander to pass
these instructions to 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and 4 Grenadiers
who were still through on line with the Divisional Tactical HQ. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Indian
troops were completely taken by surprise when they were assaulted from the
rear. The Rajputs and the Gorkhas
deployed at Bridges IV and III and the area between Bridges III and II fought
gallantly but were soon over-powered.
There was hand to hand fighting and many casualties on both sides. After having annihilated the Indian positions
along the Namka Chu on Bridges II to IV and the surrounding areas, the Chinese
directed heavy fire on Indian positions at Tsangle and Bridge V. The artillery link between Brigade HQ and Tsangdhar
that had been established only the previous evening also failed. The Battery Commander, Major Nijjar had been trying
since 6 am to contact his mortar positions and the gun positions at Tsangdhar, but
he could not get through, as the Chinese had jammed the radio frequency used by
the gunners. As a result the guns did
not fire a single round. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Of the units deployed on the Namka Chu, the Rajputs
suffered the most. They were preparing
for the morning ‘stand to’ (routine practice in adopting defensive positions at
sunrise and sunset, when most attacks take place) when they were caught between
the frontal fire of the Chinese guns and the main attack from the rear. Their companies were widely dispersed and
each fought its own battle, taking on wave after wave of the enemy as long as
men remained standing. In some cases,
entire platoons were wiped out. The high casualty figures – 282 killed- are
ample proof of their valour. Among the dead were many officers, including
almost all the company commanders. The second-in-command, Major Gurdial Singh
displayed exceptional gallantry. After most of the posts had been over-run by
the enemy, he rallied the remnants and led them in a final charge. Most of these men died fighting or fell
wounded, while Gurdial Singh was over-powered and captured. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra while in
captivity. After the battalion had been
almost annihilated, the only bunker still holding out was that of the
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel N.S. Rikh, who had with him his
Adjutant, Lieutenant Bhup Singh, and Intelligence Officer, Captain Bhatia. They
were surrounded by the Chinese and asked to surrender, but Rikh refused. The
Chinese threw a grenade, killing Bhatia and wounding Rikh. Finally, they
destroyed the bunker with a pole charge. The severely wounded Rikh and Bhup
Singh were both captured. <b>27<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Gorkhas, who were holding
positions on the northern slopes of Tsangdhar, between Bridges III and II, were
surprised when they were attacked suddenly from the flanks and later from the
rear. They fought gallantly but could
not withstand the Chinese assault. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel B.S.
Ahluwalia, ordered his men to abandon their positions and move to
Tsangdhar. He was wounded in the battle
and later on in the afternoon, he was taken prisoner along with a few of his
men. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After giving orders to the Brigade Major to destroy
documents and follow him with the rest of the Brigade HQ, the Brigade Commander
left Rongla for Tsangdhar at about 8.10 am, with a protection party and a few
staff officers. Moving on the track along the nullah to Tsangdhar, they came
under heavy shelling. They left the main track and started climbing the ridge
on the left. By this time, the Chinese
had occupied Tsangdhar. When Brigadier Dalvi and his party came to know of this,
they headed for Serkhim area through Dhola pass. Enroute, he was separated from
most of the others and was finally left with only Captain Talwar of 17 Para Field
Regiment and a few Other Ranks. On 22
October 1962 they ran straight into a Chinese company near Serkhim and were captured.
<b>28 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By the afternoon of 20 October, the
Chinese had driven back all the Indian troops from Bridges I to V along the
Namka Chu, Tsangle, Khinzemane and Tsangdhar. The brunt of the fighting had
been borne by the Rajputs, Gorkhas and Assam Rifles. However, 4 Grenadiers and
9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> had not been attacked. Deciding to
pull back the available troops to the line Hathungla -Chutangmu just after mid day, GOC 4 Infantry Division personally spoke to the Commanding
Officers of 4 Grenadiers (Lieutenant Colonel Harihar Singh) and 9 Punjab
(Lieutenant Colonel R.N. Misra) ordering
them to withdraw to Hathungla. In the event, the battalions commenced their
withdrawals but could not reach Hathungla, which was attacked and occupied by
the Chinese early in the morning on 21 October.
Realising that the Divisional Tactical HQ at Ziminthang would soon be
attacked, General Prasad ordered its withdrawal to Tawang. After destroying the
cipher documents and radio sets, General
Prasad left Ziminthang on foot, accompanied by Brigadier Kalyan Singh,
Lieutenant Colonel Manohar Singh and the Signals rover detachment. <b>29</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After covering a distance of
approximately 35 km on foot, the Divisional Commander and his party reached
Lumla at 2 am on 22 October, where he came to know that the Army Commander was
then at Tawang. He could not talk to him personally but was told that he should
stay on in Lumla. However, these orders were changed next morning and he was
allowed to proceed to Tawang, reaching there at 6 pm on 22 October. However, he
found that the Army Commander was not at Tawang but at the helipad about 3 km
away, waiting for a helicopter to take him to Tezpur. Meanwhile, the Chinese
occupied Zimithang on night 22/23 October and Lumpu at 9.30 am on 23
October. With the occupation of Lumpu by
the Chinese, Indian troops lost all physical contact with Dhola-Thag La area. This
marked the end of the battle of Namka Chu. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Signals in the <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Battle</st1:place></st1:city> of Namka Chu<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 20 October 1962, at about 5 am, Captain Lakshman
Singh was sleeping in his one man arctic tent fully clothed as was his
practice, when he was woken by a mortar bomb that landed in the Brigade HQ. Hurriedly pulling on his boots, he rushed to
the signal centre only to find the telephone lines to the battalions cut. On
switching on the B-1 net, 2 Rajput came up on the air to inform that they were
under attack. Soon after this, the battalion set went off the air. (It was
later learned that the bunker housing the Signals detachment had been
demolished by enemy fire, killing all the operators). The Battalion Signals
Officer of 2 Rajput, Captain Mangat was also killed on the spot. The set was
through to 1/9 Gorkha Rifles and Divisional Tactical HQ. The telephone lines
from the Brigade HQ to the battalions had been cut, but a portion of the lines
from Divisional Tactical HQ that passed through 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
and 4 Grenadiers was intact. Both battalions had tapped the lines to eavesdrop
on the conversation between Division and Brigade. This enabled Brigade HQ to
keep in touch with them after the direct lines were cut. Surprisingly, the
battalions were also able to remain in touch with each other on radio, possibly
due to incorrect tuning and netting. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lakshman was soon talking to his Commanding Officer,
Colonel Tewari who was giving a running commentary on the shelling going on in
the location of 1/9 Gorkhas, where he
had spent the night. After 8 am, he went off the air. His linemen were ready to
move out to repair the lines, but seeing the intensity of the shelling, Lakshman
held them back. Soon afterwards, he saw Lieutenant Ravi Eipe of 2 Rajput
stagger in, the worse for wear and almost incoherent. He was followed by a
shaken Major Pawar of 1/9 Gorkhas, whose company was holding the forward left
flank of the Brigade HQ. He walked in a dazed condition, informing the
Commander that the Chinese were just 200 yards away.<b>30 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Soon after this, Lakshman received orders to
organize his Signal Section in 10 minutes and move to Tsangdhar. He asked Naib
Subedars Dharam Singh and Arumgam to destroy the signal centre, the ciphers
already having been sent with the Brigade Commander’s party. The Signals
contingent, numbering 40 personnel, set off with two 62 sets, two small 22
Ampere Hour batteries, one pedal generator, one ten line exchange and three
field telephones J. With this, Lakshman hoped that he would be able to set up
‘hard scale’ communications at the new location. Before leaving, Rongla, he
called up the Divisional Tactical HQ on radio. He spoke to Major Ummat, the
General Staff Officer Grade 2 (Staff Duties) and informed him that he was moving
to Tsangdhar. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Signals were the last to leave Rongla, along
with the Brigade Administrative Officer, Lieutenant Didar Singh. Naib Subedar
Dharam Singh, who was among the last to leave, writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 40.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 3.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“The Chinese had
cut all the lines and I did not hear anything from <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state> Tewari.
I went to my OC and requested him to move towards Lumpu. I said it was our duty towards our country to
put all the Wireless equipment on fire.
He was in no mood to go without me, on my repeated requests he agreed
and left Dhola Post.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I got all the wireless
equipment and all the things in one place.
I broke all the sets and put them on fire except the slidex. All the secret papers were also put on fire. I was alone with nobody there. I had even sent my orderly away. Heavy smoke was emitting from the HQ location
due to this burning of documents, which helped the Chinese to concentrate
mortar fire there. However, I was lucky
to survive. It is a reality that the
Chinese were just 50 yards away from me”.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">31</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Lakshman and his band made their way
to Lumla via Lumpu and Shakti, all of which they found occupied by the Chinese.
Learning that Tawang had also been abandoned, they decided to head for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. After
an arduous journey, during which they had many narrow escapes and there were
several instances of men getting separated and then rejoining, the party
crossed into <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>
and reached Tashignag Dzong Gompa on 27 October. Two days later they reached
Border Roads camp of Project ‘Dantak’ (Tusker) at Beefoo, which was the one ton
road head. It was here that Lakshman performed his last act as Sparrow (the
appointment code for Signal officers when talking on radio) of 7 Infantry
Brigade during Operation ‘<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Leghorn</st1:place></st1:city>’.
Locating a working radio set, he persuaded the Dantak operator to let him use
it to pass a message. Flicking to the D-1 frequency, he was able to get through
to the Divisional HQ which had in the meantime moved from Tezpur to Darrang.
The operator at the other end was an old hand who immediately recognized his
voice. Lakshman gave him the latest information about the Signal Section and
the names of the survivors. He told the operator to pass on the information to
Major Gangadharan, Officer Commanding 1 Company, along with the advice to
change the code signs and ciphers which had probably fallen into Chinese hands.
As soon as Gangadharan was informed about the call, he rushed to the radio set,
but could not talk to Lakshman, who had left, handing over the set back to the
Dantak operator. <b>32</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As mentioned earlier, Colonel
Tewari, had stayed on with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles on the night of 19 October 1962.
Early on the morning of 20 October he was woken up by the noise of intense
bombardment. There was a lot of shouting and yelling and he could hear men
running around. It was dark and he was not familiar with the area, so he
lingered, expecting that someone would come call him. After waiting for some
time, he came out of his bunker and made his way to the Signals bunker where
two signalmen of his unit were manning the rear link radio set. He found that the telephone lines had been
cut but the radio was working. He was able to talk to <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigade
and well as Divisional HQ and inform them of the Chinese bombardment. After
some time the shelling stopped and there was an ominous silence, followed by
short bursts of small arms fire. Peeping out of the bunker, he saws khaki clad
soldiers advancing towards them. He then realised that all the battalion HQ
personnel had withdrawn, leaving him and the two operators. He later found that
the medical officer had also been left behind while he was attending to the
wounded in the regimental aid post. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Colonel Tewari immediately withdrew
into the bunker and decided to lie low for a while, asking the two operators to
do likewise. The first wave of attackers passed them. Then they heard the
second wave, firing as they moved along, lobbing grenades into each bunker.
When the first couple of Chinese soldiers entered their bunker, Colonel Tewari fired his 9 mm Browning
pistol, emptying the whole clip. The first Chinese was hit above the eye and
fell back wards, being killed. The second was also hit on the shoulder and
fell, wounded. Suddenly several more Chinese entered, yelling and firing. Both the
operators were hit, one probably being killed immediately. Colonel Tewari threw
down his empty pistol. A Chinese soldier hit him with the butt of his rifle and
kicked him out of the bunker. He became a prisoner of war and was finally
repatriated to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in May 1963, after spending over six months in captivity.<b>33 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At about 10 am on<b> </b>20 October 1962, a <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Bell</st1:city></st1:place> helicopter piloted by Flight Lieutenant
Vinod Sehgal flys to Tsangdhar which had
already been occupied by the Chinese. The only passenger was Major Ram Singh,
the second-in-command of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. The helicopter
was shot down and both officers were killed. During their conversation on the
previous day, Major General Prasad had promised Brigadier Dalvi that he would
visit him the next day, to stay and share the fate of his brigade. The news of
the Chinese attack on 20 October reached the Divisional Tactical HQ just before
General Prasad was to take off. Finding the communications severed, Major Ram
Singh prevailed on the Divisional Commander not to fly to Tsangdhar till the
tactical situation was clearer. However, Prasad was adamant and wanted to keep
his promise to Dalvi. Major Ram Singh then volunteered to first go himself and
find out what had happened, to which Prasad agreed. In the bargain, both
officers lost their lives, probably saving the Divisional Commander. <b>34</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The circumstances under which Major
Ram Singh flew to Tsangdhar have been explained by Major General Niranjan
Prasad, GOC 4 Infantry Division. The radio set of HQ 7 Infantry Brigade being
closed, it was found that the link to Tsangdhar was also not working. Thinking
that the set at that location may have gone out of order, Major Ram Singh
suggested sending a replacement set, offering to fly it in himself. General
Prasad agreed, deciding to go with him, to keep an eye on the battle and
supervise the withdrawal from Tsangle. However, the pilot, Flight Lieutenant
Vinod Sehgal objected to the load of two passengers along with the heavy
wireless set and its batteries. The choice was either to go himself or send the
radio set with the signal officer. Ram Singh argued that establishing the radio
set at Tsangdhar was more important, otherwise the GOC would be without
communications once he landed there. In any case, it would take the helicopter
only 20-25 minutes to drop the set and return.
Seeing the logic, General Prasad allowed Ram Singh to go with the set,
deciding to go on the second trip. <b>35</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The death of Major Ram Singh and the
capture of Lieutenant Colonel Tewari at almost the same time were a severe blow
to the beleaguered 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. With the Commanding
Officer away from his post, the decision of the second-in-command to leave also appears questionable. However, in
the prevailing circumstances, the importance of establishing communications
with Tsangdhar where 7 Infantry Brigade was to redeploy perhaps justified the
unusual step taken by Major Ram Singh. There can be no two opinions about his
personal courage and commitment to his profession, which resulted in the loss
of his life. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Fall of Tawang<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Tawang is a small town located on
the bank of the Tawang Chu at a height of about 10,000 feet. Its importance lay
in the existence of the famous <i>gompa </i>(monastery)
and the junction of three important tracks that led to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Tibet</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Though tactically
not as defensible as Bomdila or Se la, Tawang had been nominated as the
Divisional Vital Ground, which implied that its loss would render the defences
of the Kameng sector untenable. The responsibility of defending Tawang, earlier
with 7 Infantry Brigade, had been given
to 4 Artillery Brigade after the former moved to the Namka Chu sector. The
troops available for this task were two infantry battalions and six platoons of
Assam Rifles. The deployment of these troops on 21 October 1962 was as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l35 level1 lfo7; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1 Sikh was
deployed on the Bum La axis with the Battalion HQ, A and C companies in area Milaktong La; B Company
at Pamdir with a platoon at Sumatso; and D Company at Tongpeng La with a
platoon at IB Ridge, two km south of Bum La. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l35 level1 lfo7; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Garhwal Rifles
was looking after the defence of Tawang, with A Company located at Tawang,
overlooking the track to Bum La; C
Company at Landa Village on the
track; and D Company at Pankentang, with a platoon at Gyshie La for
patrolling. The fourth company (B) was at Ziminthang, looking after the
defence of Divisional Tactical HQ. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l35 level1 lfo7; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In addition, one
company of 13 Dogra was available, having arrived at Tawang on 21 October.
Commander 62 Infantry Brigade with his headquarters also reached Tawang by
22 October 1962. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l35 level1 lfo7; tab-stops: list 36.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ ‘A’ wing 5
Assam Rifles with two platoons was at Tawang; with one platoon at Bum La
and one platoon at Sumatsu. Two other platoons were in area Chuna and
Dhola. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By the evening of 22 October, the enemy
had reached Shakti and blown in up the bridge at that location. They reached
Lumla in the early hours of 23 October and their next objective appeared to be
Tawang. With the troops at his disposal,
the Divisional Commander concluded that Tawang was not really defensible
against a determined Chinese attack. He
appreciated that the Chinese would by pass the Sikhs on Bum La-Tawang track and
make for Se La by the Chaksang track. If
the Chinese blew up the bridge at Jang on the Chaksang track, they would trap
the Indian troops on the Tawang side of the river. He decided to withdraw all troops from Tawang
to Se La and fight the main battle from there. General Prasad met General Sen
at Tawang on 23 October and sought his approval for the withdrawal of troops to
Jang on way to Se La. Reportedly, the Army Commander told Prasad to do whatever
he wished, since he was the Divisional as well as the Corps Commander. <b>36<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Before
leaving for Tezpur on 23 October, the Army Commander ordered Brigadier Kalyan
Singh, who was responsible for the defence of Tawang, to abandon it forthwith. Orders confirming this decision were received
at about 10.30 am from HQ IV Corps. The
order, however, enjoined the troops to withdraw not to Se La but all the way to
Bomdila. Another signal from the IV Corps to 4 Infantry Division confirmed it
by ordering the induction of fresh troops for the build up to hold Bomdila. In
the evening of 23 October, the order was amended by Corps HQ, and the troops
were now instructed to hold <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street>
This was the result of a meeting held in the office of the Prime Minister at 10
am that morning. When apprised of the inadvisability of holding Tawang with the
troops available, Nehru had left the decision to the military. <b>37</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> According to the withdrawal plan
prepared by Brigadier Kalyan Singh, all non-essential personnel at Tawang were to
withdraw to Jang forthwith, with HQ 4 Artillery Brigade withdrawing at 4.30 pm
on 23 October. The withdrawal route from Tawang to Jang would be covered by 4
Garhwal Rifles less two companies and one company of 13 Dogra, while 1 Sikh
with one company of 4 Garhwal Rifles would remain at Milaktong La till last
light on 23 October. The task of protecting the bridge on the Tawang Chu at
Jang and preparing it for demolition was assigned to 18 Field Company of
Engineers. However, the withdrawal could not be carried out according to the
plan, as the Chinese had already started pushing down the Indian troops
deployed on Bum La-Tawang approach even as the withdrawal plan was being worked
out. However, HQ 4 Artillery Brigade was able to withdraw as per plan and reached
Jang at about 11 pm on 23 October. It located itself in the Officers Mess of Project Tusker at Jang, as a
telecommunication link with the Divisional HQ at Dirang-Dzong was available. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Chinese advanced towards Tawang on three axes. A
column of about a regiment moved from Lumpu via Zimithang, Shakti and Loongla.
It reached the western outskirts of Tawang in the evening on 23 October. Another
column of about the same size after overcoming the company of 4 Grenadiers at
the bridge below Khinzemane, climbed to the Soktsen monastery from where it
took the Sumatsu route, reaching Tawang in the evening of 23 October. The third
column of about two battalions followed the Bum La route. This column faced
heavy opposition from 1 Sikh, resulting in the award of the only Param Vir
Chakra during the 1962 operations to Subedar Joginder Singh. The battle of Bum
La merits recounting, being one of the high points of the operations in which
Indian troops gave an excellent account of themselves. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 1 Sikh was deployed to defend the
Bum La approach, its most forward company (D) located at Tongpeng La, whose No.
11 Platoon was located at IB Ridge, about
550 metres south of Bum La. On the morning of 20 October, Jemadar Roy of
the Assam Rifles at the Bum La Post noticed that more than 1000 Chinese or
Tibetan labourers with digging implements and protected by Chinese soldiers arrived
on the Raider’s Ridge and started digging.
After watching the Chinese closely for sometime, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Roy</st1:place></st1:city> informed Subedar Joginder Singh, the
commander of No. 11 Platoon of 1 Sikh. Joginder Singh detailed a section under
Havildar Sucha Singh to reinforce the Assam Rifles post. Simultaneously, he asked for ammunition from
his Company HQ at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Tongpeng La.</st1:address></st1:street> Nothing happened till 4.30 am on 23 October
when suddenly the Chinese started firing with mortars and anti-tank guns. As soon as the firing ceased, about 600
Chinese attacked the Assam Rifles post.
The men fought bravely but the post was soon over-run. After inflicting heavy casualties on the
enemy, Havildar Sucha Singh was able to withdraw his section to the platoon
position at IB Ridge. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After over-running the Assam Rifles
post at Bum La, about 200 of the enemy attacked the platoon position at IB
Ridge at about 5.30 am. As the Chinese
negotiated the steep climb, they were subjected to intense small arms fire and
were forced to retire after suffering heavy casualties. Subedar Joginder Singh
asked for more ammunition from the Company HQ. By this time the Chinese had cut
the telephone line from the platoon to the company and had contacted <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Tongpeng La.</st1:address></st1:street> Even
then, Subedar Joginder Singh sent a havildar and three men to fetch ammunition
from the company. The party managed to reach Tongpeng La and returned with the
ammunition. The Chinese launched another attack on the platoon at 7 am from
another flank, causing many casualties. The Company Commander Lieutenant
Haripal Kaushik, asked Subedar Joginder Singh
to withdraw, but the latter refused, saying that the enemy would not be allowed
to get through the IB Ridge to the ‘Twin Peaks’ as long as he was alive. The
platoon repulsed the attack but Subedar Joginder Singh was wounded and made
prisoner. The wound became septic and he died while in the enemy’s custody. He
was awarded the Param Vir Chakra (posthumous) for his gallant action.<b>38</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Meanwhile, the enemy prepared to attack <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Tongpeng La.</st1:address></st1:street> At about 6 am, Captain Gosel, the artillery
observer, accurately directed artillery fire on the steep rock where the enemy
had massed for the attack. The Chinese
suffered heavy casualties and dispersed.
The enemy then made an encircling movement and launched a second attack
from a different direction, using snipers to silence the artillery observer. Once
again the enemy was subjected to heavy and accurate artillery fire and beaten
back with heavy casualties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the meantime, orders had been
received from 4 Artillery Brigade for withdrawal from the Tawang area to Jang.
According to the withdrawal plan, 1 Sikh with 1 Company of Garhwal Rifles was
to deny Milaktong position to the enemy till last light of 23 October; D Company
was to hold its position at Tongpeng La till 3 pm and then to withdraw to
Milaktong La; after D Company’s arrival at Milaktong La, the Battalion HQ was
to start its withdrawal to Jang, leaving D Company to hold Milaktong La against
the enemy till 11 pm. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese launched their third attack
on Tongpeng La at about 11.30 am but were again repulsed. Throughout this day,
the artillery observation post officer kept bringing down accurate and heavy
fire on the enemy enabling the infantry to hold the position till about 3.30
pm. The Chinese suffered heavy casualties and could not penetrate the defences
of <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Tongpeng La.</st1:address></st1:street> The
enemy tried to bypass the position and attack Milaktong La directly from the
east but failed. Finally, D Company withdrew to Milaktong La at the appointed
time. During the withdrawal, the artillery
officer climbed up the hill and directed the artillery fire on the enemy with
telling effect. The battery fired about
600 rounds during the day. B Company of the battalion also arrived at 4 pm and
the Sikhs left Milaktong La at last light, leaving D Company to cover the
withdrawal. Except for a few casualties in D Company, 1 Sikh reached Jang
intact on the night of 23/24 October. By 11 am on 24 October, the entire unit had
concentrated at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street>
<b>39 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In accordance with the orders issued
on 23 October, 4 Garhwal Rifles had withdrawn to Jang by 4 am next morning. In
the evening of 24 October the sentry on the bridge noticed some movement on the
Tawang track. The information was conveyed to Major Rai, Officer Commanding C
Company, who was responsible for the defence of the bridge. The sentry on the north of the bridge was
withdrawn and the Company took up firing positions. The enemy started shelling from three different
locations, north of Jang. Indian Artillery engaged the Chinese in the area
opposite <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Jang</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> and the Chinese retaliated with
mortar bombs and rifle grenades. Major
Rai crawled up to the sentry on the south bank and saw about 30 Chinese on the
opposite side, standing in single file. With the approval of the Commander 4
Artillery Brigade, the bridge was blown up at approximately 6 pm on 24 October
by the engineers of 18 Filed Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the bridge had been demolished,
the intensity of enemy shelling decreased and small enemy parties were seen
probing forward at Lao and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Rho</st1:city></st1:place>
crossing areas. After this, Commander 4 Artillery Brigade left for Nuranang to
join his tactical HQ at Km 106 and ordered 4 Garhwal Rifles to occupy the next
delaying position in the area of Bridge 3. The Battalion started thinning out
at Jang shortly after midnight and was able to concentrate at Bridge 3 by 7 am
on 25 October. Tawang was occupied by
the Chinese unopposed on 25 October, all the Indian troops having withdrawn.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE CHINESE ADVANCE TO
THE FOOTHILLS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After occupying Tawang, the Chinese did
not pursue the Indians and stopped their push north of Tawang Chu. There was a lull in the fighting in Kameng
which lasted a little over three weeks.
This was necessitated by the need to replenish their supplies and
ammunition and induct fresh troops before undertaking a further thrust into <st1:place w:st="on">Indian Territory</st1:place>. The Chinese had suffered heavy
casualties and already extended their lines of communications. They needed time
to construct a road up to Tawang to bring up their guns and heavy equipment.
The bridge over Tawang Chu at Jang had been blown up by the Indian army and had
to be re-constructed. To gain time for
making preparations before commencing fresh attacks, China issued a statement suggesting a ‘friendly
settlement’ of the boundary question, a copy of which was sent by Premier Chou
En-Lai to Prime Minister Nehru, through the Chinese <i>Charge d’Affairs</i> in Delhi on the evening of 24 October 1962. The conditions stipulated by <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region> were such that the offer was bound to be
rejected by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Apart from its propaganda value, the statement
was a ploy to gain time for the Chinese to complete their preparations for a further
offensive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Together with the decision to vacate Tawang, changes
in the deployment of forces were ordered by HQ IV Corps. The responsibility for
defence of Se La was assigned to 62 Infantry Brigade while Bomdila was to be
held by 65 Infantry Brigade. There were important changes in the command
structure of IV Corps. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh was appointed the new
GOC IV Corps, replacing General who was at that time lying sick in Delhi. Major General A.S. Pathania, MVC, MC, replaced
General Prasad as GOC 4 Infantry Division on 25 October 1962. Major General M.S. Pathania was appointed the
GOC of the newly created 2 Infantry Division which was to look after the
operations in all the NEFA other than Kameng Frontier Division. Along with the Corps and Divisional Commanders,
most of the brigade commanders were also changed. Brigadier G.S. Gill replaced
Brigadier Kalyan Singh as Commander 4 Artillery Brigade; Brigadier Hoshiar
Singh replaced Brigadier N.K. Lal as Commander 62 Infantry Brigade and Brigadier
A.S. Cheema succeeded Brigadier G.M. Sayeed as Commander 65 Infantry Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The new Divisional Commander, Major General A.S.
Pathania arrived at Tezpur, along with the newly appointed Corps Commander,
Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh on 24 October 1962. The Army Commander briefed
them about the impending task of defending area Se La- Dirang- Bomdila, code
named Operation ‘Olympus’, which was to come into effect from 10 November 1962. With its four battalions - 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>, 2 Rajput, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles 4 Grenadiers - having
completely disintegrated, 7 Infantry Brigade had virtually ceased to exist. The
only troops available to 4 Infantry Division were scattered elements of three
battalions - 1 Sikh, 4 Garhwal Rifles and 13 Dogra. While new troops were being inducted, the new
Divisional Commander established his Rover Group at Shukla Camp between Senge
and Se La and shifted his Main Divisional HQ from Tezpur to Dirang. After handing over its additional
responsibility of commanding infantry elements to 62 Infantry Brigade, HQ 4
Artillery Brigade joined the Main Divisional HQ at Dirang. Exactly five days
after his appointment as Corps Commander, General Harbakhsh Singh was replaced
by General Kaul, who returned from Delhi on 29 October 1962. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the lull in the battle, extensive
patrolling by Indian troops along with aerial photography revealed considerable
vehicular traffic from Shao to Tawang through <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Bum La.</st1:address></st1:street>
The rapid rate of road construction by the Chinese made clear their
intention to complete the stocking before snowfall. They had also improved the road from Tawang
to Jang, constructed a large bridge over Tawang Chu and also repaired Bridge
4. By the middle of November 1962, they
had concentrated two divisions in the Tawang area. An estimated one complete Chinese division
crossed the Tawang Chu for operations against Indian positions in Kameng
Frontier Division in the second phase.
Of this force, approximately one regiment (equivalent to an Indian
brigade) was pushed through <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Mukto</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> by the evening of
15 November. Elements of this force moved
down to Senge Dzong and Dirang Dzong to cut the line of communication of 4 Infantry
Division at various places from south west of the main road. Simultaneously, two Chinese brigades crossed
the Tawang Chu near Bridge 4 and Mago for operations from the north and east of
the main road axis. Of these, one
battalion was assigned the task of attacking Indian covering troops (4 Garwal
Rifles) and the other two battalions crossed the Se La Ridge via Kya La to
bypass Indian defensive positions at Se La and to harass the Indian troops in
the area. Elements from this Chinese
column infiltrated into the Dirang valley in the east of Nyukmadong Ridge and
took up positions on a dominating feature north of the village,
Nyukmadong. Of the other brigade, two
battalions reached the vicinity of Poshung La through the track via Tse La
(27). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After a detailed reconnaissance, Major
General A.S. Pathania felt that a force of nearly 17 battalions was necessary
to ensure a coordinated defence of the area allotted to 4 Infantry Division. However,
the troops made available were 12 Infantry battalions. In the event, only ten
battalions could be inducted before the operations commenced. Of these, five
were deployed at at Se La as part of 62 Brigade; two at Dirang Dzong under 48
Brigade and three at Bomdila under 65 Infantry Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Of the three brigade defended sectors, Se La was the
strongest, being a natural fortress which was difficult to storm even by a
stronger attacking force. The new Commander, Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, had taken
over on 29 October 1962. By
mid-november, all the five battalions earmarked for the defence of Se La had
occupied their defences. A few
anti-personnel mines had been laid around the covering defensive positions of
the battalions and the Brigade HQ. The
Brigade was being maintained almost completely by air. It had about two first–line scales of small
arms ammunition and ten days rations stocked with the units. However, only one and a half scale of first
line artillery ammunition was held. The battalions allotted to the Brigade were
4 Garhwal Rrifles, 2 Sikh Light Infantry (ex 65 Infantry Brigade), 4 Sikh Light
Infantry (ex 48 Infantry Brigade), 1 Sikh, and 13 Dogra (ex 11 Infantry
Brigade). Of these, 4 Garhwal Rifles was deployed as covering troops between
Nuranang and Jang. For fire support, the Brigade had 5 Field Regiment, a
battery of 22 Mountain Regiment and a troop of heavy mortars of 36 (Maratha) Light
Regiment (Towed). It also had a platoon of medium machine guns of 7 Mahar (MG)
and a section of 6 Mahar (MG). Engineer support was to be provided by 19 Field
Company. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Dirang Dzong Sector was held by 65 Infantry
Brigade comprising 19 Maratha Light Infantry (Dirang) and 4 Rajput (Sappers’
Camp). HQ 4 Infantry Division and HQ 4 Artillery Brigade were also located in
Dirang. One company of 1 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Madras</st1:city></st1:place> from Bomdila and
two companies of 13 Dogra from Senge Dzong were moved to Dirang for the defence
of Divisional HQ. For fire support, it had 6 Field Regiment, a troop of 22
Mountain Regiment and a platoon of medium machine guns of 7 Mahar (MG). The
Brigade was also allotted a squadron less one troop of armour, from 7 Cavalry. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Bomdila Sector was held by 48 Infantry Group,
comprising 1 Sikh Light Infantry, 5 Guards and 1 <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Madras</st1:city></st1:place>.
For fire support, it had been allotted a battery each of 22 Mountain
Regiment and 6 Field Regiment, battery less a troop of heavy mortars and a
platoon of medium machine guns. It also
had a troop (three tanks) of 7 Cavalry. Engineer support was to be given by 15
Field Company.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Withdrawal from Se La <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Reports of the Chinese infiltration
on both flanks of their defences had reached HQ 62 Infantry Brigade. On 16
November, troops of 4 Sikh Light Infantry positioned in Two-Lake area had reported
the movement of more than 1,000 Chinese troops along the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region> border
towards the south-east. A strong patrol
under the second in command of 2 Sikh Light Infantry had been attacked on the
morning of 16 November which clearly confirmed the concentration of Chinese
troops in the Luguthang area, on the right flank of the Brigade defences. On 17
November, the enemy had secured a foot-hold on the main road axis by hammering
the covering position occupied by 4 Garhwal Rifles, which was ordered to fall
back to the main defences at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se
La.</st1:address></st1:street> There
was a possibility that the brigade defended sector would soon be attacked from
three sides and that the line of communication of the brigade might be cut. In spite
of this, the Brigade Commander stuck to his decision to stay put and fight the
Chinese at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street> He ordered D Company of 4 Sikh Light Infantry
to take up a screen position in the area forward of Nuranang to cover the
withdrawal of 4 Garhwal Rifles and ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies of its own battalion
from Two-Lake area. Commencing their
withdrawal at 9.30 pm on 17 November, both A and C Companies of 4 Sikh Light
Infantry reached Se La at 4.50 am. 4
Garhwal Rifles had arrived at Se La earlier, at 3 a.m. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese had reportedly pushed
more than a division through Kye La and Poshingla axis and were using the
numerous tracks to bypass the defended localities on the main road axis. On 15
November they captured Poshingla, overwhelming the two Assam Rifles platoons
and the platoon of 5 Guards that had been sent to reinforce them. Orders were
immediately issued to 48 Infantry Brigade to send a battalion to Thembang to stop
the Chinese and if possible recapture Poshingla. 5 Guards left Bomdila on 16
November and reached Thembang the same evening. Meanwhile, the company at Lagam
was attacked by the Chinese and the company second-in-command killed. On 17
November the Chinese attacked Thembang and overwhelmed 5 Guards, which
retreated in disorder, some element being able to reach Bomdila, with the rest breaking
up into small parties that headed for the plains. By the evening of 17
November, the Chinese had cut the road Bomdila – Dirang. <b>40</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Divisional Commander talked on
telephone with Commander 62 Brigade, who felt that he would be able to hold out
for 5 to 6 days. General Pathania told Brigadier Hoshiar Singh to formulate his
plans for withdrawal to Bomdila on night 19/20 November, but not to communicate
it below the level of battalion commander. During the conversation, the Brigade
Commander informed the GOC about his earlier orders to 4 Garhwal Rifles and two
companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry deployed in Two-Lake area to withdraw to the
main defences at <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street>
The GOC gave his approval to these moves, also authorizing Commander 62 Infantry
Brigade to demolish Bridges 2 and 1 in the event of withdrawal from <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street> It was also agreed that 4 Rajput, located at Bridge 1 and east of Nyukmadong
Ridge, would come under command of 62
Infantry Brigade so as to cover its withdrawal to Bomdila. On the orders of the GOC, two companies of 13
Dogra were sent to Dirang on night 17/18 November for the defence of the Divisional
HQ. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon after the telephone conversation
with GOC 4 Infantry Division, Commander 62 Infantry Brigade chalked out the
plan of withdrawal as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 72.35pt; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo15; tab-stops: list 72.35pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Garhwal Rifles was to
withdraw from Nuranang and occupy a delaying position at Senge and cover
withdrawal of the Brigade. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 72.35pt; mso-list: l23 level1 lfo15; tab-stops: list 72.35pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13 Dogra<u> </u>less
two companies with 4 Garhwal Rifles was to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the Brigade from <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 72.0pt; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo10; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2 Sikh Light Infantry
would abandon Kye La at 4.30 pm on 18 November and take up a delaying position
at Nyukmadong to cover the withdrawal of rest of the Brigade.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 72.0pt; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo10; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Sikh Light Infantry
would abandon its defences at 9 pm and concentrate at Bridge 1. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 72.0pt; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo10; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1 Sikh would abandon
its defences at 11 pm on 18 November. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 72.0pt; mso-list: l14 level1 lfo10; tab-stops: list 72.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Brigade HQ would
move in two parts. The non-essentials would leave at 9.30 pm with 4 Sikh Light
Infantry and the rest would withdraw at 11 pm with 1 Sikh Light Infantry. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Later, at about 10 pm, the Brigade Commander
advanced moving out of 2 Sikh Light Infantry from Kye La from 4.30 pm on 18
November to 10.30 pm on 17 November. The Battalion less one company was asked
to take up covering position at Nyukmadong, with one company being left to
cover the Nuranang road. The Commander informed the GOC and the battalion
commanders about this change on telephone.
Though there was no change in the withdrawal timings of 1 Sikh, the Commanding
Officer, Lieutenant Colonel B.N. Mehta, ordered his battalion to withdraw on the
night of 17 November itself, a day earlier than planned. This decision was taken
by the Commanding Officer on his own, i.e. without any orders from the Brigade
Commander. It is likely that information about the withdrawal of 2 Sikh Light
Infantry having been advanced was probably not passed on to the troops of 1
Sikh. Consequently, when the troops of 2
Sikh Light Infantry were passing through 1 Sikh defences at night, the latter
got jittery and began leaving their posts. This triggered a panic and lead to
the premature abandonment of <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se
La.</st1:address></st1:street> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 4 am on 18 November, when the
Brigade Commander went to Se La to watch the progress of the withdrawal, he saw
that troops of 2 Sikh Light Infantry and 1 Sikh had got mixed up and were completely
disorganized. All communications from Brigade
HQ to the battalions had broken down or were cut off. Rearward communications on line and wireless
was disrupted after 5 am and progress of the withdrawal could not be
communicated to Divisional HQ. Realizing that the right side of Se La was
completely devoid of troops, at about 5.45 am the Brigade Commander ordered
that all troops should withdraw immediately, and concentrate at Senge. These
orders could not be communicated to 4 Sikh Light Infantry, there being no communication
and the route to the battalion being blocked by the Chinese. The Brigade Commander
left Se La and reached at the location of 13 Dogra at Senge at about 6.30 am. At 8 am, the Brigade Major of 62 Brigade informed
the GSO 1 of IV Corps from Shukla Camp that the Brigade was on its way to
Dirang. He also informed the Brigade Major of 48 Brigade that they expected to
reach Bomdila on 19 November after clearing the enemy on Dirang - Bomdila road.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When the withdrawing troops reached
Senge, the Brigade Commander divided them into three columns. The vehicle
column was asked to move immediately to Dirang Dzong. Of the two marching columns, one consisting
of two companies of 4 Garhwal Rifles under their Commanding Officer was ordered
to reach Dirang Dzong by the old mule track Nyukmadong – Dirang along the
heights and not by the main road, with a view to protect the left flank of the
Brigade Column, which consisted of all the other troops, i.e. the Brigade HQ, 2
Sikh Light Infantry, 1 Sikh, 4 Garhwal Rifles two companies and the remaining
two companies of 4 Garhwal Rifles. 4 Sikh Light Infantry and section of 7 Mahar
(MMG) were still at Se La as they had not been conveyed the withdrawal orders. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Chinese began occupying the defences of Se La
even as they were being vacated. Soon
afterwards, 4 Sikh Light Infantry positions came under fire from localities
held earlier by 2 Sikh Light Infantry. After repeated attacks on their
positions including the Battalion HQ, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel R.B. Nanda, ordered his troops to withdraw. The troops divided
themselves into small parties and started marching south of <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street>
These parties were repeatedly ambushed by the enemy and a large number
were killed or wounded, the others escaping to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Among the six officers
killed were the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.B. Nanda and the
Second-in-Command, Major S.R. Tandon. The section of 7 Mahar that had been left
in Se La continued to occupy its location until it was attacked, suffering
heavy casualties before being overwhelmed.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The vehicle column of 62 Brigade
left Senge at 8.30 am on 18 November for Dirang. At about 10.30 am, when it was
2 km short of Bridge 1, it was ambushed by the enemy. More than 30 all ranks were killed and many
were made prisoner. Only a few could
escape. The 4 Garhwal Rifles column
under the Commanding Officer cleared enemy delaying positions of about one platoon
strength in the area of Nyukmadong and a series of enemy stops, suffering many casualties. Just after midnight on 18/19 November when the
column reached Dirang Dzong, it ran into an ambush, most of them being killed
or captured. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bhattcharjea and Lieutenant
S.N. Tandon were captured in the early hours on 19 November. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Brigade column came under fire when they
were a little ahead of Bridge 2. The
leading battalion, 2 Sikh Light Infantry tried to clear the enemy located on
high features on both sides but failed. In the meantime, 13 Dogra which was in
the rear was attacked twice and could not be brought forward to assist 2 Sikh Light
Infantry or 4 Garhwal Rifles. The lack
of wireless communication between Brigade HQ and the units led to loss of
command and control and the column was disorganized. The column was pinned down with enemy medium
machine guns sweeping the road. When darkness
fell, command and control broke down completely and men began dispersing in ones
and twos. Some of these parties were again ambushed that night while trying to
escape. Brigadier Hoshiar Singh’s party was reportedly ambushed near Phudung on
27 November 1962 and he was killed, four days after the ceasefire announced by
the Chinese government with effect from 23 November. Some idea of the confusion and disorder that
prevailed can be gauged from the fact that on 1 December 1962, i.e. after 14 days of withdrawal, 2291
personnel of 62 Infantry Brigade were still missing. This included two officers, one Junior
Commissioned Officer and 54 Other Ranks of the Signal Section. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dirang Dzong is
Abandoned <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chief of Army Staff, General
P.N. Thapar, accompanied by Major General D.K. Palit, arrived in Tezpur on the
evening of 17 November 1962. Earlier in the day, they had briefed Prime Minister
Nehru about the situation in the NEFA, where the Chinese had launched another
attack in the Walong sector a few days earlier. Lieutenant General L.P. Sen,
the Army Commander, was already in Tezpur. However, General Kaul, the Corps
Commander had still not returned from the Walong sector, where he had gone
after the situation there had worsened, prompting him to send an urgent signal
to Delhi to request for foreign intervention. It was only after reaching Tezpur
that the Army Chief was informed about the Chinese attack in the Kameng sector
and the plans for withdrawal from <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se
La.</st1:address></st1:street> He cancelled his plans to fly to Jhabua and
had a signal sent to recall the Corps Commander to Tezpur. <b>41<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During the day, information was
received that the enemy had established a road block between Se La and Dirang
and another road block north of Bomdila. The strength of the enemy road blocks
was not known. After his return to Tezpur in the evening, the Corps Commander
spoke to the Divisional Commander. The latter was apprehensive of his ability
to hold out in view of the interruption of his communication to 62 Infantry
Brigade (Se La) as well as to 48 Infantry Brigade (Bomdila). He expected strong
attacks next day and sought permission to withdraw his troops from Se La as
well as Dirang Dzong to Bomdila. The Corps Commander told him to hold his
present positions, though he could plan for the withdrawal if the position
became untenable. He was also told that
based on the tactical and operational situation, the final orders would be
issued next morning. Instructions were also issued to Commander 48 Infantry
Brigade to clear the road blocks north of Bomdila. A signal confirming these
instructions was issued by IV Corps shortly afterwards.<b>42</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> For some reason, the Divisional
Commander was convinced that by withdrawing the troops from Se La and Dirang
Dzong, he would be able to fight a defensive battle at Bomdila
successfully. Consequently, he had
ordered the withdrawal of 4 Garhwal Rifles from Nuranang to Se La and that of 4
Sikh Light Infantry from Two-Lake area earlier. At a conference held at Divisional
HQ at 7.30 pm on 17 November, immediately after his telephone conversation with
the Corps Commander, he ordered 62 Infantry Brigade to withdraw to Dirang Dzong during the
night 17/18 November and advance to Bomdila with 65 Infantry Brigade and Divisional
HQ during the night 18/19 November. The entire Division was to concentrate at Bomdila.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 5.30 am on 18 November the Divisional
Commander again spoke to the Corps Commander and sought permission to fall back
to Bomdila. The Corps Commander left the
decision of withdrawal at the discretion of the Divisional Commander, as the
necessary authority had already been delegated to him. Immediately after his telephone conversation
with the Corps Commander, GOC 4 Infantry Division called a conference at his HQ
at which Commander 65 Infantry Brigade and the Commanding Officer of 6 Field
Regiment were present. While the situation resulting from the happenings of Se
La and the cutting off of the lines of communication with Bomdila was being
discussed, reports came in at about 7 am
that enemy was advancing on Dirang Dzong from the direction of Bomdila while
another enemy force was coming down from the hills in the north. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The news of Chinese advance from
Munna Camp towards Dirang came as a complete surprise. With no troops at the Divisional HQ to stop
the enemy and the certainty of the Dirang– Manda La track also being cut by the
enemy any moment, in order “to save the garrison and troops”, the GOC ordered withdrawal of Dirang Dzong
Garrison to Bomdila. The GOC, along with his Rover Group, left Divisional HQ
about 8 am on 17 Novemeber. At 8.25 am, Lieutenant G.S. Sodhi, the Commanding
Officer of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, informed Brigadier P.S. Gill,
the Chief Signal Officer, IV Corps, that he would be moving out towards Bomdila
and <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Tenga</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place> and that he would contact him
some time late in the afternoon. A few
minutes later, he again spoke to Chief Signal Officer IV Corps, and told him that
he would be destroying his cipher documents.
Brigadier Gill passed on this information to Brigadier K.K. Singh, the
Brigadier General Staff at HQ IV Corps. When Brigadier K.K. Singh wished to speak
to some Staff Officer at HQ 4 Infantry Division, he was informed by the
Commander Signals that no Staff Officer was available and that he was going to
close down at Dirang Dzong. Until this
time, the Corps HQ was not aware that HQ 4 Infantry Division had withdrawn from
Dirang Dzong. They were also unaware that Se La had been abandoned, coming to
know of this only at about 9 am on 18 November when the Brigade Major of 62
Brigade telephoned GSO 1 (Operations) at HQ IV Corps from Shukla camp, giving
him this information.<b>43 </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the GOC had left Dirang Dzong,
some officers of the rank of Major and below made attempts to rally the troops
into a scratch force to fight their way to Bomdila. But in the face of Chinese pressure, these
efforts did not succeed. The men divided themselves into small parties and made
for the plains. Like his GOC, Commander
65 Infantry Brigade also left the place immediately without giving any
withdrawal plan to his troops. Later,
General Prasad and a few officers of HQ 4 Infantry Division were picked up by
the Corps Commander on 22 November 1962 in his helicopter near Bhairabkund. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> ‘B’ Squadron of 7 Cavalry under Major
S.D.S. Jamwal had only four serviceable Stuart tanks at Dirang. On the morning
of 18 November, the GOC ordered the Squadron to break through to Bomdila. In case they failed, they were to abandon their
tanks and withdraw on foot. Starting at
8 am, the column encountered a road block in the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">village</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">Dirang Dzong</st1:placename></st1:place>
covered by heavy automatic fire by the Chinese at about 8.30 am. Brushing aside
the minor opposition, the troop reached a wooden bridge which had been damaged
by the enemy, making it impossible for the tanks to advance any further. The halted column, particularly the ‘soft’
vehicles, came under heavy automatic and mortar fire. In a few minutes, several vehicles were
destroyed and one Artillery officer and five Other Ranks were killed. At 9.30 am the Squadron Commander ordered the
men to abandon their soft vehicles and re-deployed his tanks as well as rifle
troops, engaging the enemy who was forced to withdraw to the hills in the north. In the afternoon, the enemy attacked Dirang
village supported by automatic weapons and mortars. The Cavalrymen held the ground and brought
down heavy fire, halting the rushing enemy.
A similar attempt by the enemy was made further to the north-west, in
the area vacated by Divisional HQ, where Squadron HQ was in position with a rifle
company and two tanks. The action
continued till last light. Having been
badly mauled in their earlier attempts, the Chinese did not come down from the
hills again during the day. After last
light on 18 November, the Squadron personnel were assembled, personal weapons
and ammunition collected, and the men moved out abandoning the tanks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The two infantry battalions at
Dirang also withdrew at the same time. 19 Maratha Light Infantry left at 8.15 am
after setting fire to their bunkers and tents.
They were joined by a company of 4 Rajput enroute and halted near Manda
La at night. The unit reached Phudung at 2 pm on 20 November. The other battalion, 4 Rajput could not
withdraw as one body as its companies were widely dispersed. D Company, ordered to withdraw to Foot Hills
after destroying its heavy stores, reached Bhairabkund on 24 November. The rest of the battalion was to withdraw
after troops of 62 Infantry Brigade had passed through their location on their
move downward. After waiting the whole
day on 18 November but getting no news about them, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel B.N. Avasthi, decided to withdraw to Dirang Dzong next morning. However, during the day one company was
ordered to withdraw. It left at 4 pm and came under heavy enemy fire near
kilometer stone 33. The Commanding
Officer and the rest of the battalion left on 19 November, taking the Dirang
Dizong – Manda La route. The column of
300 men crossed Rupa Chu on 22 November and climbed the hill which skirts
Shergaon. The next morning, on 23
November, the column was heavily engaged by medium machine guns and mortars,
even though the enemy had declared a unilateral ceasefire. Being caught unawares, the column tried to
extricate itself and in the process killed more than a hundred Chinese, suffering
heavy casualties itself. Among those
killed was the Commanding Officer. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Battle</st1:place></st1:city> of Bomdila</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With the disintegration of 5 Guards
after their defeat at Thembang on 17 November, the Chinese were in a position
to cross the river at any moment and also occupy the Mandala Ridge. In fact, the same evening they cut the Line of
Communication and established a road-block on the road Bomdila-Dirang
Dzong. When the Corps Commander was
apprised of this situation, he ordered Brigadier Gurbax Singh, Commander 48 Infantry
Brigade to send a mobile column of two companies and two tanks to open the road
to Dirang Dzong. But the Brigade Commander
protested that he had no extra force and was not in a position to undertake the
task and the order was cancelled later the same night. The Divisional Commander again discussed the
issue with the Brigade Commander and it was decided that the latter would make
an attempt to clear road Bomdila – Dirang on arrival of reinforcements on 18
November 1962. On the night 17/18 November, 48 Infantry Brigade had only six rifle
companies, three of 1 Madras (the fourth had been sent to Dirang Dzong earlier)
and three of 1 Sikh Light Infantry (the fourth was at Phudung). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 10.40 am on 18 November, the
Corps Commander directed 48 Infantry Brigade to send a mobile column to Dirang
to link up with HQ 4 Infantry Division. The
column, comprising two companies of 1 Sikh Light Infantry, two tanks and a
section of mountain guns, moved at about 11.15 am, leaving the Battalion Defended
Area held by only one company and Battalion HQ personnel. At about 12.30 pm the Chinese launched an
attack from the direction of Old Bomdila Pass.
At that time, only one platoon of A Company and one section of medium
machine guns were in the defences. After
severe fighting, the attack was beaten back and the enemy withdrew. In the meantime, a patrol of C Company
returned and was rushed to their locality, which had been completely
vacant. At about 1.30 pm the enemy launched
another attack, which was also repulsed with the help of artillery, 3-inch
mortars and medium machine guns. After
this there was a lull in the battle for about half an hour, during which all
the casualties were evacuated. Some
personnel of 3 <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state>
Rifles and 377 Field Company had arrived by then, and they were ordered to
occupy the vacant position of B Company defended locality. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The mobile column started its
advance at midday on 18 November to clear the road-block. The column had hardly advanced about 4 km
when the enemy opened automatic fire from the ridge on the left of the
road. The Infantry troops returned fire,
but the tanks could not open fire, as the enemy was not visible. The mobile
column was ordered back, as it appeared held up by enemy fire. The mobile column returned without suffering
any casualty. At about 2.45 pm when they were trying to get back into their
defences, the enemy put in a massive attack with approximately 600 to 700 men. At
this stage a thick fog set in. Taking advantage of the poor visibility, the
enemy surrounded the battalion defences from three sides. By about 3.15 pm, A
and C Companies and the Battalion HQ were completely over-run. The Battalion
pulled back to lower heights and took up a new defensive position. The Commanding
Officer went to the Brigade Commander and apprised him of the latest position. By
this time, the enemy had gained control of all the dominating heights and was
firing at the Brigade HQ and gun positions.
All attempts to restore the situation failed and 1 Sikh Light Infantry fell
back to the school building at Bomdila, where it remained there till 3 am on 19
November 1962. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The two tanks which returned to
Bomdila along with the mobile column were ordered to position themselves in the
Circuit House area to guard all approaches from the west. As the two tanks got in position, heavy enemy
fire came from the ridge. The tanks
opened up on the enemy positions and prevented any further advance of the
enemy. The tank commander of the
off-road tank put two light machine guns under his tank, one each guarding the
front and the rear. The Chinese, who had
thought Bomdila as virtually captured were taken by surprise when subjected to
firing from the machine guns of the tank and withdrew into the hills, leaving
behind several dead. This action gave
the troops some time to organize the defences.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Having failed to advance towards
Bomdila town because of the tanks on that side, the enemy assaulted the 1 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> position at 4.45 pm
and dislodged the extreme left platoon. At about 5 am, a patrol was sent to the
Brigade HQ since communications had broken down. The patrol reported that there
was no one in the Brigade HQ. At about 5.30
pm the Commanding Officer gave orders for withdrawal. The battalion started thinning out at 9 pm and
the defences were finally abandoned at 2 am on 19 November 1962. By this time, the enemy had already occupied
the position and was exchanging fire with rear parties. When the battalion was near <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Tenga</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>
on 21 November, it was surrounded by the Chinese. About 125 personnel were made
prisoners while about 120 were reported missing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Along with the attack on the left
and right flanks of 48 Infantry Brigade, the Chinese put launched a massive
attack on Bomdila at 3 pm on 18 November.
After the fall of 1 Sikh Light Infantry location, the Brigade Commander
found it difficult to hold on to Bomdila any longer. The two battalions - 6/8 Gorkha Rifles and 3 <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state> Rifles,
promised by the Corps Commander as replacement for 5 Guards and the mobile
column, had not reached Bomdila by 4 pm on 18 November. At about 4.30 pm, Brigadier Gurbax Singh
decided to pull back to Rupa, reaching there at 7 pm. When the Commanding Officer
of 22 Mountain Regiment arrived at the Brigade HQ Command post at about 4.30 pm
he found it deserted. Neither the Brigade
Commander nor his staff was there. He
heard the telephone ring and on picking up the instrument, found himself
connected to Brigadier K.K. Singh, the Brigadier General Staff of HQ IV Corps,
who asked him of the whereabouts of the Brigade Commander. Shortly after this,
Major General D.K. Palit, the Director Military Operations at Army HQ who was
then at HQ IV Corps came on the line. On being told that Brigadier Gurbax Singh
was not present, Palit ordered the Commanding Officer of 22 Mountain Regiment
to take over command of 48 Brigade in the Commander’s absence and organize
resistance in Bomdila or in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Tenga</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place> to the best of his
ability. <b>44</b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 9 pm, the Brigade Commander
returned to Bomdila. He met the
Commanding Officers of the 3 <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu
and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state> Rifles and 22 Mountain Regiment at 2.30 pm
on 19 November. It was felt that unless
the new troops had reconnoitered the area, an immediate attack on the enemy was
inadvisable. The Brigade Commander again
ordered all troops to withdraw from Bomdila. He left for Rupa, reaching there
at dawn on 19 November. The troops
finally left Bomdila at 5.15 am on 19 November.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When the Corps Commander came to
know of the withdrawal of troops from Bomdila, he sent a special message
through Major Nahar Singh, Signal Officer of Tusker Force for the Commander 48
Infantry Brigade, ordering him to occupy the defences at Rupa. The Brigade
Commander ordered 1 Sikh Light Infantry to occupy a high ground near Rupa. At about 8 am, when the battalion was getting
ready to move, the Chinese opened up with automatics from all the features
around the Rupa defile. By that time,
troops of 6/8 Gorkha Rifles, which had returned to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Tenga</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>
in the early morning in vehicles, were on their way back to Rupa. They were caught in the enemy fire in the
Rupa gap and became disorganized. At this
stage, Brigadier Gurbax Singh again ordered withdrawal along the high ground on
either side of the Rupa valley. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Commanding Officer of 6/8 Gorkha
Rifles was ordered to position his troops in a narrow defile, approximately 2
km south of Rupa gap, until all units of the Brigade had passed through. The battalion held the gap until midday on 19
November, when the Brigade Commander ordered that the troops should withdraw
from Rupa to Chako to foil a possible Chinese attempt to cutoff the entire
force there. However, the enemy
continued following the withdrawing troops. 3 <st1:state w:st="on">Jammu and
Kashmir</st1:state> Rifles, which had withdrawn from Bomdila directly to <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Tenga</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
came under heavy enemy fire from the opposite ridge at about 9 am. The
battalion suffered heavy casualties and broke up, some elements withdrawing to
Chako, while the rest moved directly to Tezpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When 48 Infantry Brigade reached
Chako at last light on 19 November, it was already growing dark. Brigadier
Gurbax Singh sent for ammunition, digging tools and rations which started
arriving. The troops were still busy preparing their
trenches when at about 2.45 am on 20 November, they came under heavy enemy fire
from the surrounding heights. Soon afterwards, the position was attacked at
different places along the perimeter. Meanwhile,
the stores continued to arrive. Unfortunately, at 3.15 a.m. a vehicle carrying
ammunition overturned and blocked the road. The Sikh Light Infantry troops, who
were on the high ground astride the Chako Check post, had to pull back as their
ammunition got exhausted. After this the
Chinese surrounded the 6/8 Gorkha Rifles positions. By 3.30 am, two attempts by the enemy to
break into their defences had been thwarted.
But the Battalion HQ was overrun by the enemy at about 3.45 am. Although
they continued to suffer casualties, the Gorkhas held on to their respective
positions tenaciously till 5.30 am, when the Commanding Officer ordered them to
withdraw to Foot Hills. Till 1 December 1962, more than 150 all ranks were
still missing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Aftermath<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The withdrawal from Se La marks an ignominious
chapter in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
military history, and has given rise to considerable debate. The
Henderson-Brookes Enquiry questioned a large number of personnel who played a
part in the decision to vacate Se La, but its report has still not been de-classified.
There is considerable variation in the versions of officers who wrote books
after the event, as well as the war diaries of various formations and units.
However, it is possible arrive at certain conclusions regarding the circumstances
that led to the withdrawal even though the Brigade Commander was strongly
against it. Significantly, Signals played a part in the story.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">According to General. Pathania, GOC 4 Infantry
Division, his decision to withdraw from Se La was based on an input from
Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, Commander 62 Infantry Brigade that the on the evening
of 17 November the brigade defences had become untenable. However, the decision
had already been taken by the GOC before the conversation took place and everyone
in the Divisional HQ knew that they were to move back to Tenga valley, south of
Bomdila. At 3 pm on 17 November Lieutenant Colonel G.S. Sodhi, Commander
Signals 4 Infantry Division spoke to Brigadier P.S. Gill, Chief Signal Officer
of IV Corps and informed him that at 4.30 pm he would be moving out with the
layout group for the purpose of establishing the Divisional HQ at the new
location. In fact, a staff officer from the Divisional HQ had already been sent
to Tenga, where HQ 4 Infantry Division was initially planned to relocate.
However, after the fall of Thembang and the establishment of a road block
between Bomdila and Dirang Dzong in the afternoon, the plan to move to Tenga
was shelved and the officer was called back.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During his conversation with
Brigadier Gill, Lieutenant Colonel Sodhi told him that his GOC wanted to speak
to the Corps Commander. When he was told that the Corps Commander was not
present – he had gone to Walong – he spoke to Brigadier K.K. Singh, the
Brigadier General Staff and requested for permission to withdraw from <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Se La.</st1:address></st1:street> In the absence of the Corps Commander,
Brigadier K.K. Singh expressed his inability to give permission for withdrawal
and advised him to hold on. Later, when the Chief of Army Staff, the Army
Commander and the Director Military Operations arrived at the Corps HQ,
Brigadier K.K. Singh informed them about his conversation with GOC 4 Infantry
Division and the latter’s request for withdrawal. While Brigadier K.K. Singh
was briefing the Army Chief and the Army Commander, GOC 4 Infantry Division
again telephoned with an urgent request for permission to withdraw, which was
again denied. Subsequently, Major General Pathania spoke to Brigadier Hoshiar
Singh and suggested that he should withdraw from Se La on the same night. Brigadier Hoshiar Singh protested, since he
was confident that his defences were strong enough to repel an attack by the
enemy. Finally, he agreed to withdraw the next night, i.e. the night of 18/19
November. It was after this conversation
that Brigadier Hoshiar Singh informed his Battalion Commanders about the
withdrawal from Se La during night 18/19 November. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At
about 7 pm, the Corps Commander returned to Tezpur from his trip to Walong.
After talking to the Divisional Commander and discussing the situation with the
Chief and the Army Commander, he ordered a signal to be sent to 4 Infantry
Division to withdraw to Bomdila. Brigadier Gill recalls that the signal was
given at about 7 pm. Since the signal was classified, it had to be enciphered
before transmission and deciphered at the other end. To save time, Brigadier
K.K. Singh telephoned Commander 48 Infantry Brigade at Bomdila and asked him to
pass the message to GOC 4 Infantry Division on telephone. After encryption, the
signal was transmitted to Bomdila for onward transmission to the Divisional HQ.
Apparently, after a discussion with the Chief, the Corps Commander General Kaul
changed his mind, and ordered that the signal should be cancelled. Brigadier
K.K. Singh again telephoned Brigadier Gurbax Singh at Bomdila and asked him not
to pass the message that he had given to him earlier, regarding the withdrawal
of 4 Infantry Division. Brigadier Gurbax Singh confirmed that the message had
not been passed since the telephone line between Bomdila and Dirang was out of
order. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; tab-stops: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the cancellation of the above signal, General Kaul gave another handwritten
signal to Brigadier K.K. Singh to be passed on to GOC 4 Infantry Division,
directing him to hold on to his present positions to the best of his
ability. However, if any position became
untenable, the Divisional Commander was delegated the authority to withdraw to
any alternate position he could hold.
The message was cleared to HQ 4 Infantry Division at about 2.30 am on 18
November 1962.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At about 10.30 pm on 17 November,
Commander 62 Infantry Brigade telephoned the GOC to inform him about the latest
situation in his Brigade. General
Pathania told Brigadier Hoshiar Singh that he could make his withdrawal plan
but final orders would be given in the morning.
But the situation changed during the night, when 2 Sikh Light Infantry
was pulled out of Kye La at about 10.30 pm that night, triggering the premature
withdrawal of 1 Sikh without orders. 2
Sikh Light Infantry was withdrawn according to plan and not because of enemy
pressure. The GOC was informed by the
Brigade Commander regarding this step. If 1 Sikh had not withdrawn on their
own, it is unlikely that Se la would have been abandoned on the night of 17/18
November, setting off the alarm that resulted in the panic stricken flight of
the troops of 62 Infantry Brigade from Se La. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the fall of Chako, all semblance of any defence
ended. The famous Red Eagle Division, which had won universal acclaim for its
victories in World War II had been virtually destroyed. After the fall of Se La and Bomdila, all
command and control was lost. Proud battalions
had crumbled into small parties, some heading for the foothills and others to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This
caused panic and bewilderment in the rear areas also. Because of lack of communications with HQ 4
Infantry Division or any of its subordinate formations or units, there was no
precise information about either the casualties or missing men. Even on 30 November, ten days after the fall
of Bomdila, the number of personnel listed as missing was 119 officers, 143 Junior
Commissioned Officers and 5431 Other Ranks.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Alarmed by the debacles at Se la and
Bomdila, and the developing threat to Tezpur, Army HQ ordered 5 Infantry
Division to be airlifted from <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>, for the
defence of Tezpur. The advance party of HQ 5 Infantry Division along with one
Brigade HQ and one Infantry battalion landed at Tezpur on 19 November and began
to dig in for the defence of Tezpur airfield. On 20 November, the situation at Tezpur was completely
out of control after a part of HQ IV Corps left for Gauhati. Rumour started that the Army was vacating <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region>, leaving
the civilians at the mercy of the Chinese who were expected to reach the plains
in a matter of days. With the anticipated departure of the military, the
civilian administration panicked and the District Magistrate left for
Gauhati. Law and order collapsed and the
jail was thrown open, releasing all prisoners. The district treasury office was ordered to burn
currency to prevent it from falling into Chinese hands. All government offices
started burning documents, creating a thick pall of smoke over the city. By nightfall, Tezpur became a ghost city. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 21 November 1962, the Chinese declared a
cease-fire. Soon afterwards, General Thapar retired on health grounds though he
had offered to resign. General J.N. Chaudhury, the GOC-in-C <st1:place w:st="on">Southern
Comamnd</st1:place>, was appointed the new Chief of Army Staff. Lieutenant
General B.M. Kaul resigned, succeeded by Lieutenant General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw,
who moved on promotion from his appointment as Commandant of the <st1:placename w:st="on">Defence</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Services</st1:placename>
<st1:placename w:st="on">Staff</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype>
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Wellington</st1:place></st1:city>.
The Defence Minister, V.K Krishna Menon also lost his job. Though Nehru was
reluctant to remove him, he bowed to vociferous demands for his removal in
Parliament and the Press. The debacle affected Nehru also. He was a broken man,
his unquestioned authority eroded after 1962. He did not live long, breathing
his last in May 1964, a year and a half after the Chinese invasion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE INVASION OF NEFA
–WALONG SECTOR.<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Other than Kameng, the only part of NEFA invaded by
the Chinese was Walong in the Lohit Frontier Division. Incursions did take
place in Subansiri and Siang divisions of NEFA and along the Indo-Tibet border
areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, but these were minor and did not
involve significant fighting. Even in Walong, the number of troops involved was
small, in comparison to those that took part in the operations in Kameng.
However, the heavy casualties incurred by both sides bear testimony to the
intensity of the conflict and merit recounting. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Before the responsibility for the
defence of NEFA was handed over to the Army in 1959, only 2 Assam Rifles was
deployed in the Lohit Division, with a wing each at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Dibang</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
Hayuliang and Walong. A regular battalion – 2 Rajput – was moved to Walong only
in July 1961. In April 1962, 6 Kumaon took over the responsibility for the
defence of the area. With the launching of Operation ‘Onkar’ which envisaged
setting up of additional posts by Assam Rifles under the operational control of
the Army, eleven new posts were set up
in Lohit Frontier Division. In September 1962, two battalions of 62 Infantry
Brigade – 4 Sikh and 2/8 Gorkha Rifles - were moved from Ramgarh to Jorhat and
placed under 5 Infantry Brigade. 4 Sikh, which was earmarked for the Lohit
Frontier Division, arrived at Walong on 8 October 1962. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 18 October 1962, the deployment
of Indian troops in the three subsectors was as under:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<ul style="margin-top: 0cm;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify;"><st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dibang</span></st1:placename><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></span></st1:place><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
sub-sector - 2 Assam Rifles <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Kibithoo
sub-sector - 6 Kumaon. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l19 level1 lfo21; text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Walong
sub sector – 4 Sikh less two companies.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By this time the Chinese strength
on NEFA-Tibet border had gone up to nineteen battalions, of which six were
positioned opposite the Lohit Frontier Division. In September 1962, Chinese
troops had moved closer to the border and had been observed digging and
preparing defensive positions opposite Indian posts. According to intelligence
estimates of HQ IV Corps, the Chinese had deployed one infantry division in
area Shugden – Drowa Gonpa – Tithang. Shugden was on the main Lhasa-Chamdo
highway, from where Rima could be approached via two routes, Shugden – Drowa
Gonpa – Rima and Shugden – Tithang – Rima.
The Chinese were known to have improved the Drowa Gonpa – Rima road that
led to Kibithoo and onwards to Walong on the Indian side of the border.<b>45 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Fall of Kibithoo <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Located on the western bank of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Lohit</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>,
Kibithoo was held by 6 Kumaon with the Battalion HQ at Walong and tactical HQ
at Kibithoo. A reconnaissance patrol sent on 18 October 1962 to a feature known
as Hundred Hill observed the presence of some enemy soldiers on the feature. Next
morning, an Assam Rifles patrol was sent to the feature to check the Chinese
advance to Kibithoo along that approach.
A platoon of ‘A’ Company of 6 Kumaon was also sent to take up position
on the McMahon Ridge followed by the entire Company on 21 October. A platoon was also sent up along Di Chu
Nullah to prevent any enemy advance from <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Taluk</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass.</st1:placetype></st1:place>
On the same night, after a preparatory
bombardment by medium machine guns and artillery, the enemy attacked the
McMahon Ridge with approximately a battalion group. The first attack was
repulsed with accurate firing by the battalion’s 3-inch mortars, which were
positioned south-west of Kibithoo Ridge. After some time, the Chinese launched
another violent attack. The Kumaonis stuck
to their position and held the enemy at bay, with accurate fire from small arms
and mortars. About 60 Chinese were killed in this action, the Indian losses
being four killed. However, in view of the considerable numerical superiority
of the enemy and lack of reinforcements, it was decided to withdraw A Company
from the McMahon Ridge and Di Chu and concentrate at Kibithoo. The troops started withdrawing at 7 am on 22
October.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Brigade Commander arrived at
Walong at 9 am to personally review the situation. After talking to the Commanding Officer of 6
Kumaon on telephone, he gave orders to cut all the twine rope-ways across the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Lohit</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
at Kibithoo. The enemy continued his
shelling using smoke bombs, causing dense smoke in the whole area. At 10 am on 22 October 1962, HQ 5 Infantry Brigade
received orders placing it directly under IV Corps. In view of the loss of the
Dichu Ridge and enemy build up against Kibithoo, IV Corps ordered the
withdrawal of 6 Kumaon from Kibithoo, and occupation of a new defensive
position at Walong, along with 4 Sikh. At the same time, all Assam Rifles posts
on the western side were to be withdrawn to Hayuliang for protection of the
left flank of Walong Garrison. In response to the order, 6 Kumaon abandoned Kibithoo
at 9 pm on 22 October 1962 and concentrated at Walong by 5 pm on 23 October
1962. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Shortly afterwards, 2 Infantry
Division was raised to take over operational responsibility in Subansiri, Siang
and Lohit Frontier Divisions of NEFA. The first Divisional Commander, Major
General M.S. Pathania, arrived at Walong on 26 October. In order to control the
two battalions located at Walong, 181 Infantry Brigade was raised. This was
replaced by 11 Infantry Brigade, then in Nagaland, which was placed under 2 Infantry
Division. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier N.C. Rawlley, MC, along with his
Rover Group arrived at Walong on 31 October.
On 31 October 1962, the Brigade comprised 6 Kumaon, 4 Sikh, two
companies of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles and one company of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. Supporting
troops were a platoon 6 Mahar MG, a troop of 62 Para Field Battery and 71 Heavy
Mortar <st1:place w:st="on">Battery</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the withdrawal of Indian
troops from Kibithoo, the Chinese had occupied positions behind Ashi Hill. Since then it had become a daily routine for
the Chinese troops to fire at the Mithun and Ladders positions and also to
carry out probing attacks on Indian defences.
This exchange of fire was so regular that Indian troops from the other
post used to visit the Mithun-Ladders area daily to witness the ‘fire works’,
to amuse themselves. The Indian firing taxed the Chinese so heavily that on 2
November the local commander sent a message to the rear for permission to
withdraw, which was refused, since the Chinese did not like to lose face<b>. </b>Chinese
fire on the Mithun and Ladder’s positions was, in fact, a ruse to cover their
activities somewhere else. Behind the
screen of their firing, the Chinese constructed a track from Ashi Hill to the
Green Pimple post and started their build-up unchecked.<b> 46<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Battle</span></u></b></st1:place></st1:city><b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> of Walong<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To check the enemy incursion,
Commander 11 Infantry Brigade decided to occupy the area Tri-junction – Yellow
Pimple – Green Pimple which was crucial to the defence of Walong. Additional troops allotted to the Brigade for
the offensive were 3/3 Gorkha Rifles and 4 Dogra. By 13 November Tri-junction had
been occupied by 6 Kumaon, while 4 Sikh was on the forward slopes of West Ridge
and Ladders. The newly arrived 3/3 Gorkha was deployed on Dakota Hill and the
Dong Plateau, while 4 Dogra was still in the process of being inducted, most of
its elements at Walong. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The attack on Yellow Pimple was
launched by 6 Kumaon on 14 November. The enemy reacted violently and by
nightfall the Kumaonis had been able to capture only a part of the feature.
Next morning, the Chinese counter attacked with a battalion supported by
artillery. After fierce hand to hand fighting the Kumaonis were forced to fall
back to Tri-Junction, after losing 110 men out of the 200 who had taken part in
the assault the previous day. Not pausing on the recaptured objective, the
Chinese attacked Tri-Junction, where the troops had withdrawn from Yellow
Pimple. After a bitter fight lasting over two hours the attack was
repulsed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese launched a massive
attack on Tri-Junction at 7.30 am on 16 November, which was beaten back.
However, the position was completely surrounded, and the enemy had cut-off the
routes of replenishment and reinforcement and the number of casualties was
mounting, with no hope of evacuation.
Realising that further resistance was useless, the Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Madiah decided to disengage and withdraw his troops.
Tri-Junction was occupied by the enemy at 9 am on 16 November. As they
withdrew, the Kumaonis were repeatedly ambushed by the enemy on their downward
march.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The West ridge was held by A Company
of 6 Kumaon, which was attacked by the Chinese after they had overcome the
Indian defences at Tri-Junction. The first assault mounted frontally failed. The
next attack was made with larger numbers from three directions, supported by medium
machine guns and heavy artillery. After
holding out for several hours, the Company found itself encircled and asked for
permission to withdraw. One Junior Commissioned Officer and 17 Other Ranks were
able to break through the Chinese ring, but the rest died fighting including
the Company Commander, Lieutenant Bikram Singh.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Similar attacks were launched by the
Chinese on other posts. They attacked Patrol Base which was held by A Company
of 4 Sikh at 9 pm on 15 November. With the help of artillery fire, the attack
was repulsed. The Chinese attacked the position several times during the night,
being beaten back on each occasion. After fighting resolutely throughout the night,
the company asked for and was given permission to withdraw to the Maha Plateau.
During the withdrawal, the Company Commander was killed. The casualties
suffered by the Sikhs during the operation were one officer, one Junior
Commissioned Officer and 20 Other Ranks killed, while two Junior Commissioned
Officers and 40 Other Ranks were wounded. Among those killed were four Olympic
sportsmen.<b> 47</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> One of the fiercest battles was
fought at Ladders which was being held by C Company of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles under
command of 4 Sikh. At about 3 am on 16 November, the Chinese attacked Ladders
after destroying the bunkers occupied by the Gorkhas. The Company Commander,
Major N.B. Chand ordered his men to come out into the crawl trenches to fight
the enemy. The situation became critical when small groups of enemy started
infiltrating to the Indian gun positions under small arms fire. The Company Commander
requested 4 Sikh for reinforcements and ammunition, which could not be sent.
Finally the position was abandoned. After
his bunker was destroyed, the Company Commander found himself alone and was
later captured by the Chinese. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Maha Plateau, Lachhman Ridge and the
Mithun track were held by C Company of 4 Sikh and D Company of 3/3 Gorkha
Rifles, under command 4 Sikh. After over-running the Patrol Base on 16
November, the Chinese advanced and launched an attack on these positions, which
were overrun and the troops dispersed, both company commanders being
captured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The High Plateau on the right
extremity of the Walong Front was held by D Company of 4 Sikh under the
operational command of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. At 11.30 pm on 15 November a strong
enemy force attacked the position but was beaten back. The second attack was at
about 1.30 am on 16 November during which the Company Commander, Lieutenant Yog
Raj Palta was killed. After his death, Havildar
Gurmukh Singh took over command, when only 18 men were left in the company. At
4.45 am the Chinese launched the third attack overwhelming the position. The
Sikhs lost 36 men including the Company Commander. During the early hours of the day, efforts
were made to re-inforce the Sikhs, but the Gorkhas could not go beyond the
southern edge of High Plateau. At about 8 am the artillery observation post
officer, Second Lieutenant P.S. Bhandari reached the post and assumed command
of the few non-combatant Sikhs who were still alive. For some time he directed
artillery fire on the Chinese but was soon killed. When the Chinese captured
the position there was not a single Indian soldier left alive. <b>48</b>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The battle for the capture of Yellow
Pimple was witnessed by the Brigade Commander, Brigadier N.C. Rawlley on 14
November. The Corps Commander and the Divisional Commander were at Walong with
the Brigade Commander from the afternoon of 15 November till they left Walong
for Hayuliang by an Otter aircraft at 11 am on 16 November. While leaving
Walong, General Kaul instructed the Brigade Commander to hold the Defended
Sector to the best of his ability. However, if the position became untenable, he
was to fall back to an alternative position. These orders were confirmed by a
signal from HQ IV Corps to 11 Infantry Brigade in the evening. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After launching attacks on Indian
positions all along the front the enemy had secured a foothold both on the western
and eastern side of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Lohit</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> and was in a
position to shell the Walong landing ground. Out of the four battalions with 11
Infantry Brigade, only four companies (two of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles at Dong Plateau
and two 4 Dogra at Brigade HQ) were left. With his fighting strength severely
depleted, the Brigade Commander, at 11 am on 16 November, gave orders for
withdrawal of troops from the forward areas and for holding of Yapak feature. The troops at Tri-Junction and Mortar Post
had already disintegrated before they received the orders for withdrawal at
about 12 pm. They could not carry out an organized withdrawal due to the
pressure from the enemy. They moved in small parties and the troops kept on
trickling down to Tezu, till 4 December 1962. The casualties suffered by 6
Kumaon in the operations in this Sector were 118 killed and 113 wounded, with
172 being captured. The casualties suffered by 4 Dogra were 110, while 4 Sikh
had 180 casualties. The total casualties sustained by 11 Infantry Brigade during
the battle of Walong were 340 killed 260 wounded and 332 captured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section in Walong <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">11 Infantry Brigade was on its way from
Kangpokpi in Naga Hills to Darranga near Bhutan when it was diverted to Chabua
from where it was airlifted to Walong. The Section was then under the command
of Captain Lal Singh. The Brigade Commander and his rover detachment which had
already reached Darranga were flown to Chabua and then to Walong on 31 October
1962. The Brigade Headquarters and Signal Section reached Chabua by train and
road on 1 November. Two wireless detachments were immediately sent to Walong to
work on D1 and B1 links, while the rest of the personnel and equipment moved by
air over the next two days, when airlift became available. The vehicles and
heavy equipment were left behind at Chabua. Since the battalions already had
their wireless detachments with them, the Signal Section was asked to leave an
equivalent number of personnel and equipment behind. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On arrival at
Walong the Signal Section got down to the establishing the essential
communications on line and radio with the battalions and rearwards. The lines
to 4 Sikh and 3/3 Gorkha Rifles which were both located nearby were completed
the same day, while the line to 6 Kumaon at Tri-Junction took more than two
days. After the direct lines had been completed, lateral lines were laid
between battalions. Multiple strands of
cable were laid along steel twines across the Lohit River to ensure
reliability. To improve survivability of local lines, these were laid through
communication trenches on the side walls. Lines to the operations room and the
Brigade Commander were duplicated, using different routes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The line to Tri-Junction
required considerable effort. The distance involved was about 15 miles from Walong
(height 5000 feet) to Tri-Junction (height 13000 feet). The cable used was D 8(T), all on man pack. Speed being of the utmost importance, the route was divided into three sections. The cable was air dropped on drums No 5 Mk I,
which were collected and placed at intervals of about half a mile with the help
of porters and pioneers. Each section
was laid by a different line party, working simultaneously. The route was completed
in a very short time and worked well thereafter. Lance/Naik K. C. Singh, who
was in charge of the line party working on the farthest section did a
creditable job but was taken prisoner. The
laying of the line was supervised by Jemadar Risal Singh, the Jemadar GD (general
duties) of the Section. Though he was an operator by trade, he guided the linemen
well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> All line laying was
done on manpack basis. There were only six
linemen, so each line party comprised
just two linemen. One lineman was on duty on local lines and one was engaged on
repair of faulty trunk lines. At times linemen were helped by operators for
specific short durations. The lateral lines proved to be extremely
useful and there was never a chance when at least one of the alternate lines to
a battalion was not through. The
Divisional Commander, General Pathania, who was in Walong on Night 15/16 November,
remarked that he could speak to any platoon on telephone. The line to Tri Junction served another
useful purpose – it served as a track guide to the troops being inducted into
the area. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The wireless links
to HQ 2 Infantry Division at Dinjan, D1 and D2, were based on 19 HP sets, using
end fed wire aerials. For the B1 net to battalions, 62 sets were used, with rod
aerials. The B21 net worked with the rear headquarters of the brigade at Chabua
and the airfield at at Tezu, using WS 19. The B1 net to battalions was not used
except during attack for a short time and during withdrawal. The wireless links functioned well, though
the speech was not clear during night on D1 when key conversation had to be
resorted to. There was no interference
experienced from the Chinese stations, though the detachment of the wireless
experimental unit in Walong did monitor some messages of the Chinese. Captain
Lal Singh recalls that he was once given a report about “a Chinese lady”
passing a message on channel 8 of WS 31.
He immediately opened the set and tried to monitor the channel but found
nothing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A
major problem was man packing of WS No 62 with the 300 watt charging engine on
the hills. The 80 watt engine did not
function due to the low temperatures at heights. During the withdrawal two detachments with WS No 62 and charging
set 300 watt engine were brought till the first halt. The charging set had to be abandoned
thereafter. The rest of the equipment consisting
of WS No 19/19 HP and 1260 watt engines had to be left since it could not be
carried on man pack on the 110 mile long route, along with other essential
stores. However, two wireless sets 31 were brought back by the Signal Section. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless communication during withdrawal
was not very satisfactory for several reasons. The entire route followed the
valley, the track being hardly 1-2 ft wide. Halts were dictated by the enemy at
awkward places on narrow tracks on sheer rocks where there was hardly any place
for correct direction and height of aerials.
The halts were mostly during night between 11 pm and 4 am. The
maintenance of the column had been planned but could not be carried out as one
of the helicopters which came to deliver food to the battalion in a delaying
position was shot down by the Chinese.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The SDS (scheduled despatch service)
proved very useful. An ADS (air despatch service) was maintained between Chabua
and Tezu using IAF Dakotas. At Chabua, a detachment of divisional signals was
stationed to handle the SDS mail. At Tezu the Brigade Transport Officer, who
was part of the B Echelon, was responsible for dispatch and receipt both
ways. From Tezu an ADS was organised
with IAF Otters for the maintenance of Walong garrison. At Walong airfield, a runner from the Brigade
Signal Section collected the incoming mail and handed over the outgoing mail to
the pilot. The battalions collected their mail by sending their runners to the
signal centre every 3-4 hours. However, important messages with precedence ‘Op
Immediate’ or above were cleared by a runner from the brigade. When the runner was not available, the battalion
was informed on telephone to send their messenger. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="color: red; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 11 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section worked under trying conditions at Walong. The communications
functioned well throughout, for which credit is due to the officer commanding,
Captain Lal Singh. Though all ranks worked with dedication, the performance of
Lance Naik Sat Parkash deserves special mention. He was the operator manning
the wireless link with division. For his devotion to duty in maintaining communications
on D2 net on 16 November 1962 under
enemy shelling he was recommended for the award of VSM. In fact, four personnel (linemen and
operators) were recommended for awards. Unfortunately,
none of these came through. In the battle of Walong, 11 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section had one officer, to JCOs and 62 OR.
Out of these four OR were killed and six were taken prisoner. All these belonged to battalion wireless
detachments, rover and line detachment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">SIGNALS IN NEFA<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">IV Corps Signals<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> IV Corps was created on 4 October 1962 and
Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul appointed its first Commander. This was a unique
case of a military formation being created for a commander, instead of a
commander being found for a formation. One of the first officers to join the
newly formed headquarters was the Chief Signal Officer, Brigadier P.S. Gill. Since
he had recently moved from Shillong to Delhi after handing over charge of Chief
Signal Officer of XXXIII Corps to Brigadier M.B.K. Nair, he was familiar with
the area and its problems. The story of his appointment and subsequent events
are best described in his own words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>“</i></span><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Biji
Kaul’s IV Corps was born at midnight of 3<sup>rd</sup> Oct 62. I was awakened and summoned to Kaul’s
residence around 1 AM that night to be told by him personally, I had been
selected to be his CSO, Lack of seniority, the basis of moving me from Shillong
in May to Sigs Dte as DD Tels (the very job I had held as GSO1 Tels from 1953
to 1957) was given the go-by. Some 10
hours later (4<sup>th</sup> October) I accompanied him to Tezpur, in a Viscount
of the Presidential flight. En route,
quite naturally, I quizzed him regarding the role, area of responsibility of IV
Corps and the troops allocation. He had
no satisfactory answer but kept on repeating “ap nahin samjhen ge” I was left
with the impression that he was going to Tezpur more to instill some urgency
into the Dhola affair/action.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I
had never worked with Kaul. I was picked
because I had known the NEFA region as CSO XXXIII Corps, since handed over to
MBK Nair. Kaul left for LUMPU etc on
fifth. I was to organize and set up the
new Corps HQ. Kaul had asked me to send
the BGS and the CE to join him at the front on arrival. My good friend “Bhaiya” Rajwade who had been
CE XXXIII Corps along with me and was shunted to the CME, also for lack of
seniority, was brought in on 6<sup>th</sup> October as the CE. KK Singh of the Armoured Corps another good
friend joined on the seventh as BGS.
Both were sent on to join Kaul.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I
soon realized what a clout Kaul wielded.
DG P&T Nanjappa of the ICS, would call me twice a day to ascertain
what he could do for IV Corps and so also other worthies at Army HQ. In no time there were direct telephone and
tele-printer lines connecting Tezpur to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. Nanjappa also gave me (on attachment) a
P&T Dept LO IK Gupta, a very capable and efficient officer As for SDS,
Indian Airlines instituted a daily Viscount flight Delhi-Tezpur- Delhi a sort
of daily Air Courier. <st1:city w:st="on">Delhi</st1:city>
planners in their keenness to fulfil Kaul’s bidding failed to instruct the
Courier aircraft to make a stop at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>
ie Eastcom HQ which nominally was controlling IV Corps. I put this right in time.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">In
the fortnight prior to the Chinese attack of Twentieth October there was very
little that IV Corps could do for 7 Bde.
I visited Zimithang (TAC HQ 4 Div) and met Ram Singh who despite the
various odds had the situation under control.
I was certainly appalled by the difficult terrain conditions and the
extremely precarious porter-based supply line forward to Namka Chu. Recovery of air dropped supplies was as low
as 30 percent-most of it falling into deep ravines. Two-seater <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bell</st1:place></st1:city> helicopter, which could carry very
little, was the only efficient means of getting around.” <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">IV Corps Signal
Regiment</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <u><o:p></o:p></u></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though the skeleton Corps HQ had been created, it
took some time before it got its integral signal regiment. Formal orders for
the raising of IV Corps Signal Regiment at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> were issued by Army HQ on 10 October
1962. The first Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Mehta and the
Second-in-Command, Major P.S. Gill reported on 24 October. Two days later, three more officers – Captain
H.S. Goel and Lieutenants N.T. Singh and I.S. Jaswal - joined the unit, along
with 36 Junior Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks. Within the next few days,
several more personnel joined the unit. Among the officers were Major Channan
Singh (Officer Commanding 1 Company); Major Ranjit Singh (Quartermaster); Major
H.V. Dixit (Technical Officer Telecom); Captain Y.P. Mittoo (Adjutant) and Captain
S.R. Sharma (Cipher Officer).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 10 November 1962, the advance
party of the unit comprising of one Junior Commissioned Oficer and 39 Other
Ranks left by rail for Tezpur under Lieutenant N.T. Singh. A day later a
smaller party of ten men under Major H.V. Dixit left for Tezpur by air. The Commanding Officer left by air on 14
November, via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
where he was called for discussons by Army HQ. On 19 November a large quantity
of essential equipment was moved by air from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> to Tezpur, along with the personnel
required to man the signal centre, exchange and cipher office. However, even
before the detachment could start functioning at the new location, on 20
November HQ IV Corps was asked to move from Tezpur to Gauhati. All personnel of
the detachment at Tezpur left for Guwahati by road, leaving a small party of 15
men under Captain H.S. Goel to man the signal centre at Tezpur. These orders
were cancelled the very next day, and on 21 November HQ IV Corps was asked to
move back to Tezpur. The personnel of the detachment also returned to Tezpur<b>. 49<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Meanwhile a party of four officers, two Junior
Commissioned Officers and 40 Other Ranks had moved by train from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> 20 November 1962
with section stores. On 21 November when they were passing through <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city> the Movement
Control Officer informed them that their destination had been changed from
Gauhati to Tezpur. Soon afterwards the Chinese declared a cease fire and the
operations came to an end. However, the induction of the unit at Tezpur
continued. On 30 November the complement
at Tezpur changed its name from Detachment IV Corps Signal Regiment to IV Corps
Signal Regiment, while the portion of the unit at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> became Rear HQ IV Corps Signal Regiment.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 1 December the orderly room staff arrived and the
Regimental HQ became functional. Two days later, all the personnel of 4
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment who had been assisting the unit since 28
October were relieved and personnel of IV Corps Signal Regiment began manning
the signal centre and exchange on their own. <b>50<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As mentioned earlier, 4 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment virtually disintegrated right at the beginning of
the Chinese invasion on 20 October 1962, with the commanding officer becoming a
prisoner and the second-in-command being killed. With the defences being
overrun or vacated in quick succession and the Chinese systematically cutting
the telephone lines, the only means of communication left with the brigades and
battalions was wireless. The rapid rate
of withdrawal often resulted in loss of signal equipment that could not be
replaced, with consequent adverse effect
on communications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
survivors of 7 Infantry Brigade Signal Company withdrew from Namka Chu and
initially headed for Ziminthang, little knowing that the Divisional HQ was
already on its way to Tawang. Eventually
most of them made their way to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bhutan</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
with a few being killed or captured by the enemy. By 24 October 1962 the
Divisional HQ was established at Dirang Dzong. After the capture of Tawang by
the Chinese on 25 October and their advance upto Walong in the Infantry Brigade
Sector there was a long pause in the fighting. On 26 October 1962 Lieutenant Colonel
G.S. Sodhi assumed command of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. The task given to 4 Infantry Division now was
the defence of the Se La – Dirang - Bomdi La area. By 9 November 1962 the Divisional
Headquarters and Signal Regiment were deployed at Dirang Dzong, with 62, 65 and
48 Infantry Brigades being located Se La, Tawang and Bomdila respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 45.0pt 58.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; tab-stops: 45.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the second phase of the Chinese
operations, the Walong front crumbled on the morning of 16 November and 11
Infantry Brigade was forced to withdraw. On 17 November the enemy isolated the
Divisional HQ and the Signal Regiment by establishing a road block about a
kilometer North of Bomdi La on the Bomdi-La-Dirang Dzong road after bypassing
Sela. 62 Infantry Brigade was ordered to
move back to Dirang Dzong. During the
withdrawal one officer and 32 Other Ranks of 62 Brigade Signal Company went missing. On reaching Dirang Dzong the
survivors of the Brigade, found it under enemy occupation as the Divisional HQ
had left for Bomdi La on hearing the news of Chinese occupation of Munna
Camp. On their way to Bomdi La, the
Divisional HQ learnt about the fall of Bomdi La through a radio message. The Divisional HQ and elements of the
Divsional Signal Regiment dispersed and made their way to the plains. 65 Infantry Brigade also suffered a similar
fate. 48 Infantry Brigade had been
withdrawn to Rupa from where the Chinese evicted them on November 19 and they
reached Chakku foothills on the subsequent morning.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 45.0pt 58.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; tab-stops: 36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Stragglers
of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment continued to arrive at Misamari, Charduar, Bhairakund and Tezpur
for many days. The bulk of the unit
equipment and vehicles were destroyed or lost. The casualties suffered by the
unit were three officers and 21 Others Ranks killed, while one officer and 29
Others Ranks had become prisoners of war.
On 7 February, 1963, the unit was converted to 4 Mountain Divisional
Signal Regiment and moved back to Ambala shortly afterwards.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 63.0pt 67.5pt 76.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; tab-stops: 36.0pt 67.5pt 76.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A conspicuous feature of the
operations was the apparent breakdown of command and control and lack of
coordination between various formation headquarters. There were many instances
of information not reaching higher headquarters in time or orders not being
passed down the chain of command. This led to doubts on the reliability of
communications provided by Signals. While it is true that communications did
breakdown at certain periods, a detailed analysis reveals that most of the
criticism is unfounded. Apart from the obvious constraints of lack of equipment
and terrain, the systematic disruption of lines by the Chinese ensured that the
only means of communications available once the operations commenced was
wireless. The shortage of equipment, especially batteries and the electrolyte
needed to keep them charged has been well documented. Another factor that needs
to be kept in mind is that this was the first time Indian troops were operating
in such terrain with almost total dependence on air supply for replenishment of
essential spares and supplies including fuel, oil and lubricants. The fact that
the Commander Signals of the Division had to personally carry a jar of
sulphuric acid needed to charge the batteries of 7 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company in Namka Chu shows the peculiar constraints under which the unit was
working.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 63.0pt 67.5pt 76.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; tab-stops: 36.0pt 67.5pt 76.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> An important point that needs to be
brought out is that most of the criticism about failure of communications
originates from lack of authentic information and is based more on surmise than
actual facts. Significantly, the formation commanders themselves have generally
been appreciative of the quality of communication support provided to them by
their signal units. In some cases, communications functioned until the last
moment and ceased only when the headquarters itself closed down or withdrew,
sometimes without informing the higher headquarters. There are several entries
in war diaries of the formations and units that mention their inability to pass
an important message or obtain the latest information because of lack of
response from the other end. This naturally led to the conclusion that
communications had broken down, not an uncommon occurrence in those days, given
the type of equipment then in use. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; tab-stops: 63.0pt 67.5pt 76.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-add-space: auto; tab-stops: 36.0pt 67.5pt 76.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Two signal officers who were
primarly responsible for the communications during the critical phases of the
operation were Lieutenant Colonel K.K.
Tewari, commanding 4 Infantry </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Divisional Signal
Regiment and Captain Lakshman Singh, commanding 7 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company. Both have dwelt on this aspect
in their books as well as in inputs sought from them subsequently. In his book published in 1995, Major General Tewari
writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“It has been said
earlier that when something went wrong in operations there was a tendency to
put the blame on Signals for the lack of communications. I had personal experience of this on many
occasions before and after the 1962 operations.
But in this particular case, although the staff did indulge in the same
tactic, I am happy to note that the two commanders most intimately concerned
with the battles in October have given a very balanced and correct picture
about the signal communications in the books they wrote afterwards.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Reference can be made
to the books written by the GOC 4 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad
and the Commander, 7 Infantry Brigade, the late Brig John Dalvi. I am grateful to them for having put the
record right for the sake of posterity and it would not be out of place in this
narrative to quote from their books.”</span></i><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 51</span></b><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> General Tewari goes on to quote the
following excerpt from <i>The Fall of Towang</i>
written by Major General Prasad:-<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “In order to ensure that I could influence the matters
after battle has been engaged, it was imperative that I had good communications
to all the sectors and posts concerned.
In this, I had been served very well, both by my Chief Signals officer
(Lt Col Tewari, even now on a visit to the Namka Chu area) and by his No 2, Maj
Ram Singh, who was with me in Zimithang.
My communication state, briefly, was as follows:-<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To the Rear – both line and wireless link with Corps HQ
and my Rear HQ at Tezpur.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To 7 Brigade Sector - line and wireless to all posts –
but I could listen into all the wireless sets with units forward of Brigade –
Tsangle, Tsang Dhar, Bridge 3 & 4 and 1/9 Gorkhas.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To Centre Sector – line and wireless to all posts –
Bridge 1 & 2, Lumpu, Hathungla, Khinzemani, Chutangmu and Brokenthang.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 63.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To Towang Sector – line and wireless.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 40.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “My signals officers and personnel had ensured that the
wireless sets and telephones worked well and I had no trouble in keeping touch
with all the sectors and outposts. I was
therefore confident of being able to help and guide my command once the attack
had started …. The signallers manned their sets or telephones and coolly
handled incoming and outgoing signals traffic”.</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> General Tewari also quotes from the
book <i>The Himalayan Blunder </i>written<i> </i>by Brigadier John Dalvi:-<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>“On
11 September, I was constantly prodded to give the ‘exact’ location of the <st1:country-region w:st="on">Assam</st1:country-region> Rifles and <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
patrols which were moving post – haste to Dhola. My staff maintained round-the-clock vigil by
the wireless set but could not establish contact. There were cynical and sarcastic remarks
about the standard of 7 Brigade’s wireless proficiency, as if the brigade
signallers could redress the inadequacies of our antiquated equipment.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “On the evening of the 18<sup>th</sup> (October), <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Lt</st1:city> <st1:state w:st="on">Col</st1:state></st1:place>
K.K. Tewari, Commander Signals of 4 Division arrived at my HQ …. He was able to
brief me on what was going on at the Divisional HQ … <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Col</st1:place></st1:state> Tewari was a gentle God-fearing man in
addition to being a firstrate signaller.
He had worked against tremendous odds throughout the operations and had
overcome difficulties which would have taxed an Army Signals Regiment. He is due much credit for providing
communications with obsolete equipment and the distances involved. Instead of praise they came in for criticism
for not being able to work miracles with outdated sets and distances which were
beyond the range of divisional signals. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “I was once asked to sack my Brigade Signals Officer but
I refused and said I would prefer to be sacked myself. I was responsible for giving him tasks which
were beyond his capability. Tewari was
grateful for my intervention on behalf of an innocent young officer. I hope that young Lachman Singh reads this
small tribute from a grateful commander, for his untiring efforts to keep me in
touch.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “There was a sad sequel to Tewari’s visit. He asked my permission to visit 1/9 Gorkhas
and I readily agreed. When the Gorkhas
were attacked, Tewari found himself in the midst of any infantry battle. He was taken prisoner after the Chinese had
overrun the position. Who has ever heard
of a Commander Signals being sent to an infantry battalion on the night before
a massive attack. He would have been at
Divisional HQ attending to Division’s requirements”.</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Many years later, Major General K.K. Tewari was
interviewed and his impressions recorded on tape. He was also given a
questionnaire dealing with various events of that momentous period. In response
to a specific question regarding failure of communications, he said:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“Lot of incorrect
statements have appeared in books and other articles written on 1962 Ops,
regarding failure of signal communications. Major Ohri in his book “Chinese
Invasion of NEFA” talks of only an Artillery
set providing the only communications
from 7 Infantry Brigade to the outside world on 20 October. This is absolutely false. There was no rear link of Artillery from Namkachu
area. Upto the time when the Chinese
attack came on 20 October morning, both line and radio communications at HQ 7
Infantry Brigade forward as well as rearward were fully operational and working
entirely satisfactorily. Lines were
systematically cut by the Chinese early that morning. This included the line to the DZ at Tsangdhar
prior to the commencement of attack which was preceded by a heavy barrage of artillery and mortar
fire. I spent the night of 19/20 October
with 1/9 GR and was sitting on the rear link (B1) radio set talking to Brigadier
Dalvi when the assault on the battalion HQ came and gave him a sort of running
commentary on the battle. I later
flicked the frequency to talk to Divisional HQ at Zimithang and spoke to my
2IC, the late Major Ram Singh. Rear link
radio set of 2 Rajput was destroyed when it received a direct hit on the bunker,
killing its occupants including the Mortar officer Captain Mangat and wounding
the CO, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Rikh seriously. As far as I know, 9 Punjab rear link radio
set was working upto the time perhaps when the control set at brigade HQ packed
up to withdraw. I am not sure of 4 Grenadiers
rear link set.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On my return from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> in May 1963.
I was questioned by the SO-in-C Lieutenant General R.N. Batra about the communications and he
wanted to know why the communications had broken down. I had to correct him with a firm remark which
I remember distinctly: “Communications were provided as long as the commanders and
users were there to use them”. This is a
factual and true statement because I was left in the bunker with the rear link
radio detachment talking as given above when the battalion HQ elements of 1/9
GR had withdrawn.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">In fact the only people
left behind were myself with two Signalmen (radio operators) and the RMO
(Regimental Medical Officer), Captain Sud with his wounded in the RAP
(Regimental Aid Post) and we were both taken prisoners of war in the battalion HQ
area. Rest of the personnel of battalion
HQ of 1/9 GR were captured later at other places while retreating and NOT in
the battalion HQ area. It is interesting
to note on Page 357 of Neville Maxwell’s book ‘<st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>’s
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>
War’ where he writes: “Dalvi, whose HQ was in the valley with his troops, asked
Prasad for permission to withdraw, he remained in contact with 4 Division”.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Communications were
disrupted only when the Chinese attacked the rear link radio bunker in which I
was sitting on the set with two of my signal operators. I fired with my 9mm Browning pistol and
killed one Chinese and wounded another before the Chinese assaulted the
bunker. The radio set was riddled with
bullets, one of the radio operator killed outright and the other badly wounded.”</span></i><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">52<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Captain
(later Brigadier) Lakshman Singh has also quoted the remarks of Major General
Niranjan Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi mentioned above. In addition, he writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“Many commanders and
staff officers have blamed communications for their failures in Training
Exercises and in Operations. Brigadier
PS Gill, the then CSO 4 Corps had written in a letter to me dated 30<sup>th</sup>
January 2002, about his own experience.
I quote: “It is also my (1962) experience that often good signal
communications, for some, was an unmitigated nuisance since the user commander
could be asked for a decision or such like.
So he was always ‘gone forward’ without the rover set. I once even asked one such commander as to
where was his Rover WS. He replied he
did not need one”. Possibly this was
also the reason that Lt Col Mishra CO 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>
had left the Signals detachment on the Brigade net, as recorded earlier, behind
at Lumla. I have already narrated the
incident of my sacking. …….. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lakshman Singh writes that his own commander, Brigadier
Dalvi had his own views of Signals and quotes the following excerpts from his
book:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 3.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When the GOC
ordered me to leave at once, I decided that someone had taken leave of his
senses, so I pretended that I could not hear him and could not follow his
orders due to heavy atmospherics. I
asked the operator to tell the GOC to call me again when reception conditions
improved …..” <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">When Lakshman was informed by the operator
of D1 of this and not being aware of the reason behind the instructions to the
operator, he was most upset. With the 400 watt Transmitter at his disposal, he was
confident and proud of providing communications round the clock. He was also
aware of the quality of the wireless link at that time. He does not remember as
to how he reacted, and whether he spoke to the BM or the Commander. He goes on
to give another excerpt from Dalvi’s book:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 40.5pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> “Again ….. 4 Division’s Signals Regiment
managed to get a telephone line through from Division to 7 Brigade over the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Hatungla</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Pass.</st1:placetype></st1:place>
The line ran parallel to the Chinese forward defended positions for over
seven miles, in violation of every principle of laying a line in the battle
zone. The line was useful for conducting
all the futile conversations that preceded the Chinese attack, but served no
purpose whatsoever after the assault, as it was inevitably cut. This was one more feverish military activity
under Chinese observation to give the illusion of feverish military
preparations ……”<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">……..On 16 October I was
able to set up my HQ at Rongla about 1000 yards from Dhola post. The location was not ideal but only one
possible in the circumstances, unless I went to Tsangdhar.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 4.5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lakshman wonders what would have
happened if the headquarters had been set up at Tsangdhar. Perhaps all of them would have been killed or taken
prisoners, on 20 October when the Chinese attacked. But this new location was the beginning of
all his troubles in so far as communications go. It was totally unsuitable for wireless
communications, heavy screening by thick vegetation and over head cover of
thick jungle trees, it was also sited deep in the valley of the River Namka
Chu, with massive mountain features between the Brigade HQ and the Division TAC
HQ at Ziminthaung. In one stroke he had
lost the advantage of the heights provided by Tsangdhar. All the signal officers of the battalions had
been called to the Brigade HQ on 18<sup> </sup>October for tying up the
communications as he was having difficulty in contacting 9 Punjab and 4
Grenadiers, mainly due to siting of the sets and the terrain. The Signals detachments of these two
battalions were still on move, since they had been inexplicably left behind at
Lumpu and they had opened their own sets on B1.<b>53 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Brigadier P.S. Gill, the Chief Signal Officer IV
Corps, also refutes the charge of communication failure. In his letter of 30
January 2002 to Lakshman Singh, he writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“<i>Those days I personally (from Tezpur) closed
down the VHF (AN/TRC) link at Sela, as everyone of any consequence had
vanished. The same happened at Darrang (4 Div HQ) and Bomdila (48 Bde HQ).
Sodhi (who had taken KK’s place) contacted me to know what he should do now
that Anant Pathania and his GSO1 Manohar were nowhere to be seen. I authorised
him to make his own way as best as practical. Lakhanpal, the 48 Bde Signals
Officer, contacted me and presented a similar situation and I had to authorise
the ‘pull-out’ and a move back by certain ‘bounds’. He was intercepted by the
Chinese at the second bound and was olliged to hide till nightfall in a nearby
stream. A week later he turned up looking famished and under weight, but in
good heart. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 40.5pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At the HB Committte
later on, of course Signals were the favourite whipping boy. I however had
taken good care, to provide convincing proof to the contrary in every case.
Even our DD Sigs (Chakerburti) had turned up at Tezpur ‘to know what went
wrong. I directed him to the BGS who directed him back to me, saying ‘nothing
went wrong, and, to remember PS Gill gave us signal comns while we were
retreating.”</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <b>54<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Signal Task Force (Project Tusker</span></u></b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">)</span></u><b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Two Signal Task Forces were raised
at the General Reserve Engineering Forces (GREF) Centre at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:place></st1:city> in 1961. One Task Force was later sent to provide
communications support to Project Beacon in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state>, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Atal. The second
Task Force was raised by Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Panwar for Project Tusker in NEFA.
After raising the Force, Colonel Panwar took the Force to foothills at
Misamari. Prior to raising this Task
Force, he had carried out extensive reconnaissance of the area that the Force
was to operate in. The Task Force consisted of three companies. One company comprised personnel from the
Corps of Signals. The other two companies
comprised personnel from GREF. The Task
Force reached Tezpur on the 51<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the Corps i.e, on 15
February 1962. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The priority task assigned to the Force
after arriving in NEFA was to construct two permanent line routes viz. <st1:place w:st="on">North Lakhimpur</st1:place> – Lakhabali – Along and Tezpur – Misamari
(Foothills) – Dirang Dzong – Bomdila – Tawang. Both routes were to be built up
on 300 lbs copper wire. To start with
only one pair was to be built on each of the two routes. In September 1962, One of the routes had
reached just short of Bomdila when the Chinese started infiltrating across the
border. After the infiltration commenced,
Colonel Panwar ensured that only regular Army personnel were used for the
construction ahead of Bomdila whereas GREF personnel were used for construction
work in the rear, well away from the border.
The Task Force was under the command of 4 Infantry Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When the induction of troops into
the Namka Chu Area started, the Task Force provided assistance by making
available all its transport for the move.
The transport fleet with the Task Force -Nissan vehicles - was better
than that with the Division which largely held the Second - World War vintage
15 cwt trucks. When it became clear that the Chinese meant business, Colonel
Panwar speeded up the construction of the route Bomdila – Dirang Dzong – Sela –
Tawang. Colonel Panwar managed to obtain
some radio sets AN/TRC with which he established a radio relay link from
Bomdila to Sela to provide a duplex speech circuit. After the initial attack on
20 October 1962, there was a lull in the battle that lasted almost a month.
When the next major action took place on 17 November, Colonel Panwar was watching
a film in the Officers’ Mess. His
Adjutant, Captain S.V.S. Chaudhary, quietly walked up to him and told him that
both Bomdila and Dirang Dzong were cutoff.
Colonel Panwar immediately spoke to the Brigadier General Staff at HQ IV
Corps and came to know that the Chinese had once again infiltrated and cutoff
the lines. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Next day, on 18 November, Bomdila
fell. Colonel Panwar spoke to Lieutenant
Colonel G.S. Sodhi, who had taken command of
4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment after the capture of Lieutenant
Colonel K.K. Tewari. Colonel Sodhi informed him that they were abandoning
Bomdila within the next hour. Six
personnel of the Corps of Signals who were part of the Task Force and were
involved in the maintenance of the lines ahead of Bomdila were killed. On 20 November the Chinese declared a
unilateral ceasefire. Later it was
discovered that almost the entire route built up by the Task Force had been
stripped of the copper wire. The Chinese
had probably taken away all the copper.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">LADAKH<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Daulet Beg Oldi<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Daulat Beg Oldi abbreviated as DBO,
was an important post in Ladakh on the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Old Silk Route</st1:address></st1:street>, which led to Yarkand in
Sinkiang. The position was held by 14 Jammu & Kashmir Militia and a company
of 5 Jat. Following the pattern of the deployment dictated by the ‘Forward
Policy’, only the Battalion HQ and a company were located in DBO, the rest
distributed in 21 small posts covering various approaches. Ten posts were located in the Chip Chap river
valley, while four were guarding the approach from another river to the south.
In addition, there were a few troops’ staging posts on the line of
communication from Leh. The principal
means of replenishment was by airdrops and a few available MI 4 helicopters.
All the posts were equipped with small arms only with the exception of one which
had a section of 3-inch mortars. The distance between the posts ranged from 2 to
12 kms, and none were mutually supporting. Their capability to defend
themselves against Chinese incursions movement was inadequate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese had been building up
their strength in the sector from July 1962 onwards, unhindered due to own lack
of resources and also the policy of not provoking the Chinese. Shortly before the invasion, on 19 October
1962 the Chinese had surrounded or dominated all the Indian posts in Chip Chap
valley. The Chinese started their offensive on 19 October 1962 with simultaneous
attacks on two Indian posts, one held by a section of 14 J&K Militia and
the other by a few men of 5 Jat. The Chinese used more than a company supported
by mortars and medium machine guns against each post, whose defences consisted
of open trenches and <i>sangars </i>(stones
placed in a heap above ground level). The posts fought back and withstood the
Chinese onslaught until next morning when they went out of communications with
the Headquarters, this being the first indication that they had been overrun. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the early hours of the morning on
20 October, the Chinese launched attacks on two other posts on the northern
bank of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Chip</st1:placename> <st1:placename w:st="on">Chap</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
held by 5 Jat, whose personnel were asked to fall back to another post. This
resulted in the isolation of another post called Chandni held by a platoon of
14 J&K Militia, located on high ground.
After one hour of shelling, at 6 am on 20 October the Chinese attacked
the post, which could not be reinforced since the route had been blocked by the
enemy. After beating back three attacks the post fell. Similar attacks were
launched on other posts during the day, but by the end of 20 October, the
Chinese had succeeded in capturing four posts, the other still holding out.
Information regarding these events was conveyed on wireless by DBO Headquarters
to HQ 114 Brigade at Leh and through them to HQ XV Corps at Udhampur. Appreciating
that the Chinese would soon cut the line of communication, HQ 114 Brigade
recommended to HQ XV Corps that isolated posts should be asked to pull back and
concentrate at DBO. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During the night of 21 October, the remaining
isolated posts were ordered to fall back on DBO, which was soon surrounded by
the Chinese. On 22 October, the battalion commander sought the brigade
commander’s permission to withdraw the troops to a more defensible position.
The Corps HQ was fully in picture and as early as 20 October itself had ordered
114 Brigade to withdraw the isolated posts. However, DBO, Post 14 (Jyotish), Track
Junction, Sultan Chushku, and Galwan Shyok river junction which were tactically
sound were to be strengthened and held. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At 6 p.m. on 22 October 1962, HQ 114
Brigade asked 14 J&K Militia to commence withdrawal, which started at 9 pm.
To deceive the enemy who had been known to be intercepting our wireless nets,
the Battalion Commander passed a false
message to HQ 114 Brigade indicating that he had decided to hold on to DBO and
Track Junction. The withdrawing troops destroyed all heavy stores, including 3
inch mortars, recoilless guns and most wireless sets. The platoon of 1 Mahar refused
to destroy their Vickers machine guns and carried them along. The seven
available vehicles - mostly jeeps and a few 1 tons - were loaded with the sick
and wounded and driven on the frozen river surface. However, about 24 km from
DBO, the frozen surface gave way under the weight of the vehicles which had to
be abandoned. It was an organized withdrawal, with the advance party led by Major
Randhawa, who was familiar with the route and the main body under Lieutenant Colonel
Nihal Singh. A rear party consisting of a platoon of J&K Militia under Captain
S.P. Rigzin occupied the dominating features of Pt 18763, withdrawing only on
23 October to a half way point. This
marked the end of the fighting in Daulet Beg Oldi during the 1962 operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Changchenmo and Galwan </span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Galwan post was held by a
company of 5 Jat, with the rest of the battalion at Phobrang. The posts at Hot Spring, Nala Junction and Patrol
Base were held by a platoon each, in addition to a post opposite the Chinese
position at Tsogtsalu. In the first week
of October, 5 Jat relieved 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, which had been holding the post
earlier when it had been in the news in September for not budging when
surrounded by the Chinese. Coinciding with their attack elsewhere in the Ladakh,
the Chinese launched an attack on Galwan post in the early hours of 20 October
1962. Communications with the post also
ceased but sound of light machine gun and 2 inch mortar firing could be heard
from the direction of the post. On 21
October Indian helicopters sent to fly over the area were fired at by the
Chinese and no contact could be established with Galwan post. On his return the pilot reported that he saw
no signs of life on the post. Details of
the fighting at the Galwan post were known only after the return of Indian prisoners
of war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese attack on the post had started
at 5.30 am on 20 October with heavy artillery and mortar bombardment, which
destroyed most of the temporary shelters and tents. After an hour of shelling the Chinese attacked
the forward sections with nearly about a battalion. The defending troops moved
to open trenches and fought a last ditch battle with small arms, there being no
artillery or mortars. After the forward
positions had been overrun the rear positions continued to fight and it was
only in the evening that the Chinese succeeded in capturing the post after
launching their third attack. Out of 68 Indian personnel in Galwan, 36 were killed.
The exact number of Chinese casualties is not known, but they were no doubt
heavy, as can be deduced from the caution they displayed when tackling other posts
such as Patrol Base, Nala Junction and Hot Spring. The Galwan post battle also demolished
the assumption that was the foundation of the ‘Forward Policy’ viz. the Chinese
back down if the defender stands his ground. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After eliminating the Indian posts in
the Galwan valley, the Chinese turned their attention to Changchenmo valley in
the south, which had platoon-sized posts
at patrol Base, Nala Junction and Hot
Spring, with the Company HQ at Hot
Spring. On 21 October, the Chinese
shelled all the three Indian posts. Since
the utility of Patrol Base as a link between the Nala Junction and Galwan posts
had come to an end with the fall of the latter, it was ordered to withdraw to
Nala Junction. As darkness fell, the
platoon broke contact and withdrew, leaving a behind section to cover their
move. Next morning, on 22 October, the Chinese launched an assault on this
section. The men fought with great
bravery and inflicted many casualties on the Chinese before being overwhelmed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At 2 pm on 22 October 1962, the Chinese
launched an attack on Kongma post on the southern flank which was held by a
platoon 5 Jat, fighting for four hours before being overrun. Out of 33 men at
Kongma only seven survived and withdrew to the Battalion base at Phobrang under
the cover of darkness. The Chinese also
attacked the platoon post at Anne La on the same day. The post fell by last light on 22 October
after a stiff fight. With the fall of
these two posts the Chinese were now in a position to pose a threat to the rear
of the Indians deployed in Changchenmo valley.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The situation became critical, as
from Kongma the Chinese could cutoff the Jats deployed at Hot Spring, Nala
Junction and Tsogatsalu. On 23 October HQ XV Corps issued orders to withdraw
all troops and prepare positions at Tsogatsalu,
Shortly afterwards, HQ 114 Brigade ordered even Tsogatsalu area to be
abandoned and the troops to withdraw to Phobrang. Due to the extreme cold, nearly every one
suffered from frostbite or chilblains during the withdrawal by a difficult
route to Phobrang. The situation soon
stabilized, and on 24 October a platoon under Major Ajit Singh of 5 Jat reoccupied
Nala Junction. By 28 October, 5 Jat had
consolidated their positions from Shyok to Phobrang. The forward positions at Tsogatsalu continued
to be held and Indian patrols could still dominate the area. The Chinese did not attempt any further
advances in this sector and the situation remained unchanged right up to the
ceasefire. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chushul </span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The defences at Chushul were held by
two companies of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, After being relieved by 5 Jat in second
week of October 1962, a company less platoon strength was deployed in Siri Jap
complex north of Pangong lake. This post was supplied by boats across the
lake and had no land link with the battalion.
South of Pangong lake was the Yula complex comprising three posts manned
by another company of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles.
Nearly two companies defended the Spangur gap, holding the hill on the
northern shoulder named Gurung hill and to the south named Nagar hill, in
addition to a post in the gap itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since early September the Chinese
had surrounded the Sirijap post. The enemy
strength opposite Chushul sector was estimated to be approx a regiment. At about 6 am on 21 October 1962 the Chinese commenced
their assault on Sirijap after heavy shelling, using light tanks against which
the defenders had no weapons. Soon after the shelling started communication
with Sirijap was disrupted. A patrol from another post reached within 1000
yards of Sirijap-1 but could not see
any signs of life on the post. On its return it reported that the entire post
including the company commander Major Dhan Singh Thapa had been killed. After
capturing Sirijap-1 the Chinese attacked and captured Sirijap-2 after heavy
fighting. The few who escaped reported that after collecting the wounded the
Chinese lined them up and shot them dead.
By 22 October the Chinese were in complete control of the Northern bank
of <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Pangong</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Lake</st1:placetype></st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 21 October, a two mile long
column of Chinese vehicles had been seen proceeding towards Spangur gap by
Indian transport aircraft flying in the area.
The move of Chinese vehicles was confirmed by troops in the area,
causing alarm regarding imminent threat to Chushul. Since there was only a weak
battalion covering the entire front of nearly 60 km from Changchenno to Dungti,
13 Kumaon was ordered to move from Leh to Chushul. A platoon of 1 Mahar with
medium machine guns and a field battery equipped with 25-pounders was also ordered to Chushul. However, the Chinese attack came only after
the lull period was over. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indus</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The <st1:place w:st="on">Indus</st1:place>
valley sector to the south of Chushul was held by 7 J&K Militia. The
Battalion HQ with one company was in Koyul, a company was in Dungti and the
rest of the troops were deployed along the passes on the International Border. The Chinese were estimated to have a battalion
located in Tashigong. The Chinese
attacks in this sector started on 27 October, with simultaneous assaults on Changla,
Jarala, New Demchok and High Ground (northwest of Demchok). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Changla was a well dug-in post held
by 17 men of 7 J&K Militia under a Junior Commissioned Officer. Early on the morning of 27 October, the
Chinese opened fire on the Indian post with machine guns mounted on vehicles. The
Indians returned the fire with 2-inch mortars, setting fire to the leading
Chinese vehicles. As the enemy came closer, he was engaged with rifles and
machine guns. After fighting resolutely for three hours, when he found himself
surrounded by about 300 Chinese, the post commander decided to withdraw.
Dividing his men in two parties, he ordered half of them to move while the
other remained to give covering fire, he himself manned the light machine
gun. Most of the men were able to withdraw
to Fukche but the post commander was killed. . <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Jarala, which was held by 17 men
under a Havildar, was attacked at the same time as Changla. About 200 Chinese surrounded
the post from all sides and began firing with machine guns, the Indians replying
with 2-inch mortars and light machine guns. After fighting through the day, at
last light the post commander decided to break-out and rejoin the battalion
main defences at Koyul. Using fire and
move, the men successfully withdrew during the night.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In the south at New Demchok and High
Ground the situation was different. High
Ground was a well dug position held by five platoons, which had two sections of
3-inch mortars and two medium machine guns. About 200 to 300 Chinese attacked the position
in the early hours of 27 October. However, in the face of defensive fire of
mortars and machine guns they had to beat a hasty retreat, after suffering
heavy casualties. For the rest of the day, the Chinese were pinned down and
could not move, since the ground was open. Unfortunately, the fall of Changla, Jarala and New Demchok cut
the route of withdrawal maintenance for the post, forcing it to pull out. Reluctantly, Battalion HQ ordered the post to
withdraw at 7.30 pm on 27 October and the men were redeployed at Fukche. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> New Demchok post across the <st1:place w:st="on">Indus</st1:place> was a ‘Forward Policy’ post on the International
border, not tactically sited. It was
held by two platoons who were deployed in the historic Zorawar fort area. About 400 Chinese attacked the post on the
morning of 27 October and suffered heavy casualties due to the heavy fire from
Zorawar fort. Some Chinese crossed the <st1:place w:st="on">Indus</st1:place> and positioned themselves in the area of old
Demchok on the western bank between High Ground and New Demchok, threatening
the southern positions of 7 J&K Militia. The troops were ordered to
withdraw in conjunction with those at High Ground during the night 27/28
October. The withdrawal was successfully
completed and the men reached Koyul by 11.30 pm after evading a Chinese
road-block under cover of darkness. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The newly established 3 Himalayan
Division as well as HQ XV Corps considered a withdrawal from Koyul as well, but
left the decision to the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.M.
Banon. He preferred to stay put and
strengthen the defences rather than withdraw.
As a result, the Indians continued to occupy these positions. There was some confusion regarding outposts
at Hanle, Zarser and Chumar which were held by CRP/ITBP and were not in
communication after 27 October. These posts
were also presumed to have fallen to the Chinese but it was learnt on 31 that
they all were intact. When the fighting in this sector ended on 28 October, the
Chinese had established control of the eastern hills flanking the <st1:place w:st="on">Indus</st1:place> valley. They
dominated the road that passed through the valley, denying its use to the
Indians. The Chinese had apparently achieved
their aim and there was no further fighting in this sector. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Lull: 28 October to
18 November<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> With a well co-coordinated Chinese
attack in Ladakh and NEFA on 20 October 1962, the basic hypothesis of the
‘Forward policy’ stood disproved. HQ Western Command, which had been pleading for deployment based
on military logic considerations rather than guess work, felt itself vindicated
and now put into action its own plan for
the defence of Ladakh. The earlier
operating injunction about not withdrawing resources and troops facing <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region> was
revoked and between 20 October and 30 October, nearly a division worth of
troops was inducted into Ladakh. To achieve this task, adhoc measures were
taken on a war footing. To offset the severe shortage of transport, first line
transport from units and formations was withdrawn to form adhoc transport companies
to help the induction process. Battalions
were taken from divisions facing <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pakistan</st1:place></st1:country-region>, after evaluation of the
threat in each sector. The transport
fleet of the Indian Air Force was utilized beyond its normal capacity. Most of
the inducted troops were earmarked for the defence of Leh, the troops in the
forward most posts being augmented only marginally.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Many new formations and units were
raised to control the large number of troops deployed in the sector. On 26 October 1962, Major General Budh Singh,
MC raised 3 Himalayan Division at Leh. HQ 114 Brigade was moved to Chushul and made
responsible for Chushul and Phobrang sectors.
Brigadier R.S. Grewal, MC, arrived in Leh with HQ 70 Infantry Brigade on
25 October and took over responsibility of the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indus</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>
sector. By 3 November it was established
at Dungti and later at Assle in the rear.
On 24 October Delta sector was raised out of existing troops to look
after the Northern sector, with its Headquarters at Thoise. HQ 163 Infantry
Brigade arrived in Leh to look after the close defence of the town itself. Since 114 Brigade, which was directly under HQ
XV Corps, was bearing the brunt of the fighting, the existing structures were
left intact and HQ 3 Division interfered very little in its functioning. Additional
infantry battalions were also inducted. These included 9 Dogra, 3/4 Gorkha
Rifles, 3 Sikh Light Infantry and 1 Jat.
The troops were airlifted in small groups and deployed to plug the gaps
in the defences. In view of the
likelihood that the road to Chushul would get cut off, the Corps of Engineers
were asked to construct an alternative route via Karu, Changla, Tangtse and
Tartar Camp. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To enhance the
fire power of troops in Ladakh, 13 Field Regiment equipped with 25-pounder
field guns was inducted. One battery of
this unit was already in Chushul. By 3
November another battery reached Dungti.
The third battery was located in Leh along with the Regimental Headquarters.
114 Heavy Mortar <st1:place w:st="on">Battery</st1:place>
equipped with 4.2 inch mortars was inducted in Chushul between 26 October and
31 October. One troop was sent to Lukung
to support 5 Jat and the rest of the battery was sent to Dungti. The Indian Air Force achieved a major feat
when the AN-12 aircraft airlifted a troop of AMX-13 tanks of 20 Lancers to
Chushul on 25 October 1962. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 30 October, HQ XV Corps informed the Army
Commander, Western Command that 3 Himalayan Division was not being asked to make
any plan for withdrawal from Chushul, as it was felt that this would have an adverse
effect on the morale of the troops who had given a good account of themselves
in the recent battles with the Chinese. Orders were issue that Chushul and
Dungti were to be defended to the last man.
A bid was also made for close air support for the defensive battle. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> All possible routes to Leh were held
in strength. In the north, D Sector with
strength of nearly two battalions held Saserla, Sultan Chushku, Shyok, and Galwan-Shyok
river junction. The route passing over
Changla was defended at the pass itself, as well as at Dorbuk. To give depth to the Changla defences, troops
were deployed at Phobrang and Chushul with some artillery support. In the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Indus</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Valley</st1:placetype></st1:place>
sector, a whole brigade blocked the axis at Dungti, Chumathang and areas
further back. In Leh proper there was
nearly a battalion worth of troops to defend the surrounding hills. The newly inducted troops were well placed to
defend Leh. Only one battalion, 1 Jat,
was deployed in Chushul area. Commander,
114 Brigade made a bid for additional troops for the defence of Chushul, but
this was turned down by the Corps Commander, who had decided that priority must
be given to the defence of Leh. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Battles of Rezangla and
Gurung Hill </span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese utilized the lull period
to build up their strength in the Spangur area.
This was not hidden from Indian troops occupying Gurung hill and Yula
III, who duly reported these activities.
In the absence of long range weapons and the decision to not use the Air
Force, the Indians did not have the capability to interfere with the Chinese
build up, which continued unabated. The Indian build up was proceeding apace
but it had been decided to not send the newly inducted troops to threatened
areas like Chushul. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After the raising of 3 Himalayan
Division, 114 Brigade moved to Chushul on 27 October and assumed sole responsibility
for the defence of this sector. Out of the three battalions that were part of
the Brigade, 1 Jat had a company each at Tokung, Yula III and Lukung with the
rest of the battalion at Gompa Hill. 1/8
GR was deployed to cover the northern flank of Spangur gap, with two companies
on Gurung hill and a company to the north of Pt 5167. The fourth company was located in the Spangur
gap itself, while the battalion headquarters was located at the airfield with
an adhoc company as reserve. 13 Kumaon was
looking after the southern flank with two companies on Muggar Hill, a company
with a section of 3 inch mortars at Rezangla and battalion headquarters with
one company at Track Junction. Tsakala
also had a company of 5 Jat. The total
frontage held by the brigade was nearly 40 km.
Most of the troops were committed to a ground - holding role and the
only reserves available at the brigade level were two troops of tanks and an
adhoc company located at the airfield.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese had concentrated nearly
a regiment plus a battalion in the vicinity of the Spangur gap. The two major concentrations were in area north
of Gurung hill and in Spangur gap itself.
They had deployed their heavy mortars in the gap in full view of the
Indians deployed on Gurung hill. On 29
October the Chinese opened mortar fire on Gurung hill. Once the Indian guns opened up and engaged
the Chinese Observation Post located at Black Top that overlooked Gurung hill,
the Chinese promptly stopped their fire.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The real Chinese attack in this
sector started on 18 November, coinciding with their attack on Se La in NEFA. In
a coordinated attack on Chushul defences the Chinese used nearly two battalions
in south against Rezangla and about a regiment in the north. Rezangla is an isolated 18,000 ft high
feature, about 11 km south of Spangur gap.
The importance of Rezangla was that it dominated the road link with Leh via
Dungti, which was the life line of the Chushul garrison. The nearest Indian position to the south was a
5 Jat company at Tsakla. The Rezangla
position, though forming part of the main defences, was thus in reality an
isolated company post. The battery of 13
Field Regiment located in Spangur gap could not support Rezangla, which only
had a section of 3-inch mortars located within the company position as fire
support. In view of its isolated
location, the company was sited for all round defence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Early in the morning on 18 November,
the forward observation post to the south of company defences detected nearly
400 Chinese approaching the defences. The company immediately went to their trenches
but held their fire, waiting for the Chinese to come within range. Soon,
nearly a battalion of the enemy assaulted Rezangla from the south and the east.
At about 5 am, when the enemy had climbed up the slopes and was within range,
the Kumaonis opened fire. Caught in the deep nullahs, the Chinese suffered heavy
casualties from 3-inch mortars and grenades.
After nearly half an hour of intense fighting the attack lost momentum,
the assaulting Chinese taking shelter behind boulders. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Once the Chinese failed to capture
the position by a silent attack, they opened artillery and mortar fire. Though
the fire was not very effective and did not cause much damage to the defences,
the telephone lines to the Battalion HQ were cut and the radio set
destroyed. C Company of 13 Kumaon was
now out of touch with the rest of the battalion. The post at Tsakala could see the firing and
reported the news of fight to the Battalion HQ. Under the cover of artillery fire, two companies of Chinese
troops attacked the rear platoon. The
Indians jumped out of their trenches and tackled the enemy with bayonets and
even bare bands. All the men of the platoon died fighting, and there was not a
single survivor. However, the 3-inch
mortars were continuously firing at the advancing enemy at point blank range
and the ground was littered with dead Chinese soldiers. The Company Commander, Major Shaitan Singh,
moved from trench to trench, encouraging his men and redeploying the light
machine guns. He was ably assisted by his Havildar Major, who was always at his
side and with his fixed bayonet he warded off attacks on the Company Commander,
sending many Chinese soldiers to their graves. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Rezangla was a hard fought battle. The
Indian machine gun fell silent only at about 10 pm. The ferocity of the fighting can be gauged
from the fact that out of 112 all ranks at Rezangla, only 14 survived and no prisoners
were taken by the Chinese. In November
1963, nearly a year after the battle, the dead bodies were recovered by the
Indian Red Cross. The parties that
visited Rezangla saw the place littered with field dressings and blood marks,
giving some idea of the heavy losses suffered by the Chinese. The Company
Commander, Major Shaitan Singh, was awarded the Param Vir Chakra for the battle
of Rezangla.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese attacked Gurung hill
complex simultaneously with their attack on Rezangla. At 5.30 am on 18
November, the Chinese began intense bombardment of Gurung hill as well as the
Indian posts located in the Spangur gap and Muggar Hill. Two companies of 1/8
Gorkha Rifles were defending the East area of Gurung Hill. The first wave of
the attackers made contact with the northern company on Gurung hill at 6.30 am. When still outside small arms range, they
were engaged by accurate fire from the troop of 13 Field Regiment. The enemy launched a series of attacks and
after two hours succeeded in occupying some portions of Gurung hill. The Gorkha came out of their trenches and
fell on them with their <i>khukris</i> (a
small curved knife). Unable to face this fierce onslaught, the Chinese fell
back. By 10 am the situation became stable and Gurung hill remained firmly in
Indian hands. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Chinese soon launched another
attack, which was preceded by intense shelling.
The brave Gorkhas were finally overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers
and the forward platoon fell. Out of 17
men in this platoon, not even one survived. The Chinese then turned their
attention to the lower company. At this
stage, they came under accurate fire from the tank troop of 20 Lancers. With no answer to the tanks, the Chinese
suffered heavily and fell back. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Gorkhas had suffered heavy
casualties, with nearly 50 killed and several wounded. With the shelling of the airfield and
village, reinforcements as well as ammunition supply was difficult. At this
crucial juncture the line and radio communications link between Gurung hill and
Battalion HQ as well as Brigade HQ was disrupted due to heavy shelling. Keeping
in mind the overall picture, HQ 114 Brigade decided to withdraw the troops from
Gurung hill, Muggar hill, Spangur post and Tokung and to redeploy them on mountains
West of Chushul. This was in conformity
with instructions of HQ XV Corps, and the new positions had been already decided.
The closing down of Chushul airfield and the threat to Dungti track after the fall
of Rezangla meant that the brigade was now dependent on the long and difficult
mule track from Leh that passed over Changla and reached Chushul via Tangtse
and Tartar camp. It was clear that while
the defenders might be able to hold on for some more time, the sacrifice in men
and material would not be justified. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier T.N.
Raina, ordered a withdrawal on the night of 19/20 November. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The withdrawal was conducted in an
orderly manner and most of the major equipment was retrieved. A major share of the credit for the successful
withdrawal is due to the battery of 13 Field Regiment, which carried out accurate
shelling on the Chinese positions during this period. On 19 November the
Chinese launched another determined attack around mid-day on Gurung hill. But the artillery and tank fire was so accurate
that the enemy had to fall back and made no further attempt. After the Indian troops had withdrawn, the
Chinese occupied Gurung hill. The
Chinese did not follow the withdrawing Indians.
They also made no attempts to secure the Chusul airfield for their own
use, as that would have meant tackling the Indian defences west of
Chushul. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Chushul was the only organized defensive battle
fought by the Indian Army in 1962. Though
the Chinese outnumbered the Indians and had more fire support, the contest was close,
and honours even. If 114 Brigade had an
extra battalion and an artillery regiment, which is the normal fire support
complement of a brigade, it is quite likely that they would have been able to
repel the attacks on Gurung hill and Rezangla and win the battle of Chushul. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">114 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company in Ladakh <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 114 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
was in Leh at the beginning of the year 1962.
The company was then under the command of Major P.K. Mukherji with <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Captain P.C Route</st1:address></st1:street>
as his second-in-command. As part of the ‘Forward Policy,’ a large number of
posts were established in Chushul and the Indus valley region by 1/8 Gorkha
Rifles and 7 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
& Kashmir Militia. In the absence of Major Mukherji who was on leave, <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Captain Route</st1:address></st1:street> the
officiating Company Commander was given the responsibility of coordinating the
communication arrangements of the newly established posts. Setting out for Adampur
from Leh on 2 January by air, Route was able to land at Fukche airfield only six
days later on 8 January. Between 9 and 18 January, he visited the signal
detachments of 7 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu</st1:place></st1:city>
& Kashmir Militia at Koyul, Fukche, New Demchok, High Ground, Dumchele,
Dungti and Sakala. After visiting Rezangla on 19 January he proceeded to 1/8
Gorkha Rifles at Chushul and Phobrang. Soon after his return to Leh, it was
learned that Major P.K. Mukherji had been admitted to the <st1:placename w:st="on">Military</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Hospital</st1:placetype> in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Allahabad</st1:place></st1:city> and was unlikely to return. He was
struck off strength on 30 January and <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Captain
Route</st1:address></st1:street> was appointed Officer Commanding, with
Lieutenant S.S. Sahney as the second-in-command.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Since 114 Brigade was directly under
HQ XV Corps, technical control over the Signal Company was exercised by Chief
Signal Officer XV Corps, Colonel Ajit Singh. To cater for the increased
commitments of the Signal Company, it was given some additional equipment. In
February 1962 it received one medium power radio set SCR 399 and two PE 95
generators from Chief Signal Officer XV Corps. A month later, trials were
carried out of radio set SCR 694 with hand generators GN 58 on Road Leh –
Sheora at a distance of about 50 miles, climbing to a height of approximately
17,000 ft. The communication on the link was found to be quite good. It was
therefore decided to use the set with the Brigade Commander’s Rover. In April
1962 Brigadier S.N. Gairola, who had taken over as the Chief Signal Officer XV
Corps, visited Leh and discussed the communications problems with the Officer
Commanding. Shortly after this, four miles of additional cable electric W110B
(Single) was sent to Daulet Beg Oldi by helicopter along with two wireless sets
48 for providing wireless communications
for patrols in the area. In May, trials were carried out with radio set 76 and
R209 on Road Leh – Rangbir Pura – Kaura at a distance of 15 miles. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By this time, another officer Lieutenant P.B. Vartak
had also joined. In the middle of the year Major R.M. Rajan was posted in and
assumed the appointment of Company Commander, <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Captain Route</st1:address></st1:street> reverting to his original post
of second-in-command. In view of the increase in commitments of 114 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company, in September 1962 some changes were carried out in the
existing communications setup. It was decided that T Communication Zone Signal
Regiment would be responsible for the communications in Leh and rearwards, with
114 Infantry Brigade Signal Company being responsible only for communications
forward of Leh. For this purpose, 2 Company of T Communication Zone Signal
Regiment was asked to send 50 personnel to Leh, who would take over the signal
centre and line communications at Leh. They would also operate and maintain the
wireless links working back from Leh. However, overall responsibility for
communications in Ladakh would remain with Officer Commanding 114 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company, who would also provide additional manpower and
equipment, if required, to augment the resources of T Communication Zone Signal
Regiment deployed at Leh.<b>55 </b> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By 10 October 1962, the 50 men from
T Communication Zone Signal Regiment had arrived at Leh and taken over the
signal centre, local lines and rear wireless links. After the Chinese attacks on 20 October 1962
on Daulat Beg Oldi, Galwan and Changchenmo valley, things moved rapidly. It was
decided to move HQ 11 Infantry Brigade to Chushul, with the newly raised 3
Himalayan Division being located at Leh. On 25 October Major Rajan was sent to
carry out reconnaissance for a new location for the Brigade HQ on Axis Leh –
Dungti. The Tactical Group of HQ 11 Infantry Brigade left Leh next morning at 4
am. It was accompanied by the advance party of the Signal Company under Captain
Harbhajan Singh, who had reported arrival only two days earlier to relieve <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Captain Route</st1:address></st1:street>, who went
along with the party. They arrived at Chushul at 4 pm on 27 October after
losing a lineman who died in a vehicle accident en route. By 28 October the
advance party had set up skeleton communications at Chushul. The rest of the
Signal Company under Major Rajan joined them on 30 October.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier S.N. Gairola, Chief Signal
Officer XV Corps, visited Chushul on 7 November. He was accompanied by
Lieutenant Colonel Harjit Singh, Commander Signals 3 Himalayan Division. By 10 November full scale line and wireless
communications had been established with all posts and battalion headquarters
and to Leh. The detachment of 2 Company, T Communication Zone Signal Regiment in
Chushul was relieved and de-inducted. Line communication between Chushul and
Leh was provided by extending the existing permanent line at Shera to Chushul by
ground PVC cable. This was done with the assistance of 11 Signal Company, Project
Beacon.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On 16 November the Brigade
Commander, Brigadier T.N. Raina, sent Major Rajan to Leh to bring up the remnants
of the Brigade HQ and some additional signal equipment. Shortly afterwards, the
Chinese attacked Rezangla and Gurung Hill.
However, the communications remained stable and was commended by the
Brigade Commander. Immediately after
this it was decided to move the Brigade HQ to Tariar Camp. On 19 November a
line was laid to the new location. On 27 November the advance party of the
Brigade HQ and Signal Company moved to Thangse, with the main body arriving two
days later. Communications at Chushul were handed over to a detachment of 2
Company, T Communication Zone Signal Regiment. On 10 December, the Brigade HQ and Signal
Company moved again, to Darbuk. By 12 December lines had been laid to all units
of the Brigade in Darbuk. Rearward communication to Leh was established by a poled
PVC route between Leh and Darbuk via Changla.<b>56 <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: 36.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Air
Support Signals in Ladakh<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> The
Air Support Signal Unit (ASSU) was </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">located in Palam
(Delhi Cantt). Its tentacles were spread
all over Ladakh. Each tentacle consisted of three men, a WS 62 and a 300 W
charging engine and a 40 1b tent. Brigadier T. Barreto, the Chief Signal
Officer Western Command has this to say about air support during the operations
in Ladakh:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> I visited
some of these tentacles when I was CSO Western Command, and was distressed to
see the condition of these small detachments attached to infantry
battalions. I particularly remember the
one at THOISE and their little 40 1b tent, completely uncared for. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I tried, unsuccessfully, to impress on Sigs Dte and
the Air Force that I could not guarantee communication with WS 62 from these
tentacles in Ladakh to Palam. These
tentacles were designed to call for support from air-fields in North Africa
which were within 40 miles of the front.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">I had on my office
table in Simla the wireless diagram of the ASSU layout. When the Chinese attacked, I read the SITREP
every morning. One by one these infantry
battalions were over run and with them the ASSU detachment. I crossed out relevant circle in my diagram. Eventually there were hardly any left. In any case, as Air Force was not used, air
support was never called for.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">I tried to plan a control station at SRINAGAR which
would relay calls for air support by SCR-399 to Palam but the Air Force did not
agree.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Sino – Indian Conflict of 1962 is an important
landmark in the history of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
as well as of the Indian Army. It was the first and only occasion when <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> took on a
major power after gaining independence from British rule. The contest was
uneven and the results could have been foreseen. That they were not is a sad
commentary on the quality of political and military leadership at that time –
the former deciding to go to war with a stronger foe, and the latter accepting
to fight a war that it knew it could not win. Indian troops suffered an
ignominious defeat in the north-east, where the Chinese almost reached the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Assam</st1:place></st1:country-region> plains.
In Ladakh, the clash was of shorter duration and the gains made by the enemy
relatively smaller. The conflict ended when the Chinese declared a unilateral
cease fire and withdrew from the areas they had captured or intruded into.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For the Indian Army, the war with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region> proved to
be a blessing in disguise. A decision to cut down the size of the armed forces
that was imminent was shelved, and the political leadership learned the lesson
that development and security deserved equal attention. It also ended, at least
temporarily, the domination of the civil bureaucracy over the armed forces and
the political interference in military matters, especially promotions and
appointments. However, it also tarnished
the reputation of the Indian Army, built over several generations. Though the
Indian soldier fought with courage and determination, he was handicapped by
lack of weapons, equipment and many other items that form the sinews of war. He
was also let down by his leaders at the senior level. Inevitably, many of those
responsible for the blunders paid with their reputations and careers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">Perhaps the saddest part of the 1962 war is the fact that the real
story has still not been revealed to the public. An official enquiry was
ordered by Army HQ to go into the reasons for the debacle. It was headed by
Lieutenant General Henderson-Brooks, with Brigadier P.S. Bhagat, VC, as the
only other member. The Enquiry Report was submitted to the Chief of Army Staff
on 12 May 1963, and he in turn forwarded it to the Defence Minister on 2 July
1963. Though it had been ordered by the Army Chief, the Ministry of Defence
decided that its contents should not be made public, and it was graded as Top
Secret. This was probably because it showed certain failings on the part of the
political leadership, including Nehru, Krishna Menon and a few others in the
Government. It also brought out the failures in the military leadership. Though the Report was not made public, the
Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, made a statement in Parliament on 2 September
1963, in which he referred to certain portions of the Report, and its
recommendations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> The four specific terms of
reference which the Enquiry had been asked to examine were shortcomings in
training and equipment; system of command; physical fitness of troops; and
capacity of commanders at all levels to influence the men under them. The
Enquiry decided to include three other points, pertaining to operational
aspects, in order to give a comprehensive picture. It thus also covered
intelligence; staff work and procedures; and the higher direction of
operations. Though the report was never made public, Neville Maxwell was
somehow able to read it, and he has written about it in his book 'India's China
War'<b>. 57</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">It is generally agreed that the 1962 conflict should not be taken as
a yardstick for assessing the performance of the Indian Army, which was
severely handicapped by factors such as political interference, inferior leadership in the higher echelons of
the Army, lack of training, shortages of weapons, equipment and clothing and so
on. In a sense the Army fought with one hand tied behind its back and it was no
surprise that it was bested by the adversary. Though every arm and service
faced difficulties, the ones confronting Signals were unusual. The demands placed on 4 Divisional Signal Regiment
were truly extraordinary. It was saddled
with the responsibility of providing communications not only for its own division
but also the corps headquarters, before the latter could raise its own signal
regiment. In addition, it had to look after the tactical headquarters of
Eastern Command and XXXIII Corps, as well as that of the Inspector General
Assam Rifles (IGAR) in Tezpur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US">Apart from being overburdened by the task of catering for so many
headquarters, the unit had to meet the exceptional demands of clearing messages
not just to the next higher or lower formations but direct to command headquarters
and Delhi with the highest precedence and security classification. To add to this unusual load were the numerous
para military forces like the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB), Assam
Rifles, Project ‘Tusker’ (Border Roads) with their peculiar needs and demands.
All this has to be viewed in the light of the psychological impact of the Chinese attack on
minds conditioned by intelligence inputs that asserted that only one in three
Chinese was armed and that too with old Japanese rifles with defective ammunition!
If commanders raised doubts or sounded the alarm they were told all too often
not to complain and flap as the Chinese are not going to attack, quoting the
highest authority in the defence set up, the Defence Minister. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US"> The
most difficult problem faced by Signals was the lack of experience and peculiar
traits of certain senior commanders, such as General Kaul. According to General
Tewari:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 5.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 5.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-US">For a three star general to give a 2/3 page message at a forward
post on 5 Oct (even before the troops had time to settle down and establish
communications on obsolete radio equipment which had been man packed up there)
not only marked as FLASH and TOPSECRET but addressed to the highest in Delhi
political authorities with copies to intermediate army formations like Command
and Corps HQ – just shows complete disregard and even basic knowledge of
available communication facilities in the new field area. There were no machine
cipher facilities for enciphering but only the book ciphers of low
classification and morse code key transmission of enciphered version. Number of
available cipher staff was another major factor – only meant to cater for
normal divisional traffic and not be flooded with traffic imposed big higher
commanders. Should not the worthy Corps Commander have known this? All this was
at to be at the expense of establishing minimum communication channels and
coping with their primary responsibilities of handling Signals traffic at
brigade, divisional level for normal functioning while still in the process of
settling down. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 5.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 31.5pt; margin-top: 5.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 9.75pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US">Literally, it was an
impossible situation and it is being described by one who was involved
personally as the Comdr Sigs of the Div at the time - by one, who had gone
through Burma operations in World War 2 with air supply and other facilities.
And now in Oct 1962, to be faced with denial of even basic clothing and
equipment and on top of that to be imposed with impossible demands while being
threatened with consequences, in case of failure. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Like
the rest of the Army, the 1962 war proved to be a boon for Signals. The
shortcomings were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken in hand
literally on a ‘war footing’. Equipment shortages were soon made up by
resorting to indigenous manufacture and imports. American aid equipment soon
started flowing in, augmenting and enhancing the capability of Signals. Radio
sets such as AN/PRC 25 and AN/PRC 10, which were much lighter than the World
War II vintage sets such as 19 and 62 were a Godsend for the Corps. Radio relay
was also formally inducted and authorised to the newly raised mountain
divisions, which were raised in the wake of the 1962 conflict. The capabilities
of brigade signal sections were upgraded by converting them into brigade signal
companied, commanded by majors. To look after communications in the rear areas,
communication zone signal regiments were raised. The task of building permanent
line routes in borders areas was taken up in earnest by line construction
sections which were raised for this purpose. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> The
person responsible for planning and implementing these far reaching changes in
Signals was the Signal Officer-in-Chief, Lieutenant General R.N. Batra. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
situation is best described in Raj Batra's own words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>But
then, and if I can say fortunately, came the Chinese intrusion in the month
of October 1962, and like the rest of the Army, our Corps too was caught
completely off balance, At that time, I was already a member
of the P&T Board, and to
supplement our single and totally unreliable speech and teleprinter circuits
rented from the P&T department to our newly formed Corps Headquarters at
Tezpur, the P&T department kindly gave me a full time liaison officer based in Guwahati, and under his supervision our line
construction sections built an open 4
wire copper carrier route from Guwahati to Tezpur in record time. In addition,
P&T department put up a carrier centre for the exclusive use of our Corps
Headquarters at Tezpur in Army accommodation.
They also strengthened their existing carrier centre at Guwahati and with
these we were then able to obtain reliable speech and teleprinter circuits from
Army HQ and Command HQ to the Corps
HQ. Forward of Corps HQ, of course all
Signal communications were provided and maintained by our Corps. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> However, when the withdrawal (shall I say the
disorganised retreat) started, my CSO Corps, (Brigadier P.S. Gill) telephoned
me to say that he had orders to blow up this specially installed carrier centre at Tezpur. I had to use all my powers
to persuade the Chief, General P.N.
Thapar, to prevent this from happening. He very kindly issued direct
orders to both Army Commander
and Corps Commander regarding this. This
non destruction of the carrier centre paid off really well in later days after
the Chinese withdrawal.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> Because of the
Chinese intrusion, not only we did get
considerable American help in terms of equipment but also our Government
realized the necessity of modernising
Signal equipment and considerably loosened their purse strings.
Therefore, after years of stagnation, we were able to get considerable types and
quantities of new Signal equipments. It also gave tremendous incentive to LRDE,
BEL and ITI to develop a new generation of the much needed new signal
equipments for our Army. If I may, in all humility, say that I was lucky to get
this circumstantial golden opportunity, and I grabbed it to the maximum
advantage of the Army.</span></i><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">58</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Endnotes –Chapter 4 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, <i>Himalayan Blunder,</i> Thacker and Company, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>, 1969, p. 40 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Major General D.K.
Palit, <i>War in High <st1:place w:st="on">Himalaya</st1:place>
– The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962,</i> Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, 1969, pp.
38-44. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dalvi, p.151<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">4.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">War Diary 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">5.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">War Diary 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">6.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dalvi, p.193<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">7.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Lieutenant General B.M.
Kaul, <i>The Untold Story,</i> p. 363<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">8.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dalvi, p.285<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">9.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">War Diary, 7 Infantry
Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">10.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dalvi, p.284<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">11.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">War Diaries, 7 Infantry
Brigade and 9 <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">12.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Kaul, <i>The Untold Story,</i> p. 386<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">13.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Dalvi, p.327<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">14. War
Diary, 7 Infantry Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">15.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Major General K.K.
Tewari, <i>A Soldier’s Voyage of Self
Discovery,</i> Auroville, 1995. P. 64<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">16.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">War Diary, 4 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">17. Brigadier Lakshman Singh, <i>Letters from the Border and Other Less Told
Stories,</i> B.L.S Publishers, NOIDA, 2003, p.42<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">18. Lakshman Singh, p.185-6<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">19. Lakshman Singh, p.48<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">20.
Lakshman Singh, p.56<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">21.
Lakshman Singh, p.58<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">22. Tewari, pp. 74-5<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">23. Lakshman Singh, p.65<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">24. Tewari, pp. 76-7<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">25. Lakshman Singh, p.68<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">26. War
Diary, 7 Infantry Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">27. Dalvi,
p.369<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">28. War
Diary, 7 Infantry Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">29. Niranjan Prasad, p.108<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">30. Lakshman Singh, pp.72-4<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">31 Lakshman Singh, p.188<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">32. Lakshman Singh, p.79-89<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">33. Tewari, pp. 78-80<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">34. Dalvi,
p.373<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">35. Major General Niranjan Prasad, <i>The Fall of Towang, 1962,</i> Palit &
Palit, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:city></st1:place>,
pp. 101-2 <b><i><u><o:p></o:p></u></i></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">36. Prasad, p. 114<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">37. Palit, p. 246<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">38. Major Sita Ram Johri, <i>Chinese Invasion of NEFA</i>, Himalaya
Publications, Khurshed Bagh, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lucknow</st1:place></st1:city>,
1968, pp. 101-3<b><i><u><o:p></o:p></u></i></b></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">39. Johri, p. 105<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">40. Resume of Activities, 4 Mountain Division<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">41. Palit, p. 308<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">42. War Diary, HQ IV Corps (GS Branch)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">43. War Diary, HQ IV Corps (GS Branch)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">44. Palit, p. 328<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: -36.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">45. B.N. Mullik, <i>The Chinese Betrayal</i>, p.344<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">46. Johri, p. 215<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">47. Johri, p. 226<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">48. Johri, p. 233<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">49. War Diary, IV Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">50. War Diary, IV Corps Signal Regiment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">51. Tewari, pp. 117-19<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">52 Signal Communications – 4 Infantry
Division in 1962 Operations; Answers to Questionnaire by Major General K.K.
Tewari, CSO Southern Command; Source File No 92 (MCTE), Corps of Signals
History Cell. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">53. Lakshman Singh, pp.68-70<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">54. Lakshman Singh, p. 122<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">55. War Diary, 114 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: -36.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">56. War Diary, 114 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: -31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">57. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, <i>Leadership in the Indian
Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, </i>Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, p.280<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="margin-right: -31.5pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">58. </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> V.K. Singh, p. 246</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8010320710706806536.post-81274381973071090142016-01-16T07:03:00.000-08:002016-01-16T07:03:05.971-08:00CHAPTER 3 - THE LIBERATION OF GOA (1961)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">CHAPTER 3 <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">THE LIBERATION OF <st1:place w:st="on">GOA</st1:place> (1961)<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Preview–
Background</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">.
THE LIBERATION OF <st1:place w:st="on">GOA</st1:place> : <i>Planning and Preliminary Actions - Move to Concentration and Assembly
Areas – The Advance by 63 Infantry Brigade from the East– Advance of 50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade from the North - Capture of Panjim by 50
Parachute Brigade</i>. SIGNALS IN THE <st1:place w:st="on">GOA</st1:place>
OPERATIONS : <i>17 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment – 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company – 1 Medium
Radio Relay Section - Southern Command Signals</i>. <st1:place w:st="on">DAMAN</st1:place>.
<st1:place w:st="on">DIU</st1:place>. CONCLUSION.<b><u><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Preview <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Portuguese enclaves of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> were the last vestiges of colonial rule on the Indian
sub-continent. After <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
achieved independence from British rule in 1947, nationalist movements gained
momentum in these enclaves. However, despite international pressure, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>
refused to vacate her possessions in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, putting down
pro-independence movements with an iron hand. After diplomatic efforts to
integrate them into the Indian Union failed, military action had to be
undertaken. <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, the largest of the enclaves,
was liberated on <st1:date day="19" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">19
December 1961</st1:date> by a force comprising one infantry division, in an
operation lasting less than two days. There was almost no opposition and
casualties were negligible. The much smaller enclaves of <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> were tackled by a battalion each at
the same time, both falling on 19 December. However, unlike <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>,
the defenders of <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>
did not give up without a fight and casualties were suffered on both sides. The
Navy and Air Force played a significant role in the liberation of the three
enclaves. The conduct of the operations in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
has been covered in detail, from the inception stage right up to their
culmination. <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>
have been mentioned only briefly, since there was no involvement of Signals. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though Operation ‘Vijay’, as it was
code named, was of a short duration and there was little fighting, it holds
special significance for Signals. The reason is the partial failure of
communications during the crucial phase of the operation, which resulted in
lack of command and control and necessitated change of plans. At one stage, the
Army Commander had to pass orders that were contrary to those of the task force
commander directly to a brigade major, due to breakdown in communications.
Fortunately, since the enemy capitulated without a fight, there were no serious
repercussions and Signals were spared the opprobrium that would have surely
come their way had the operations not gone the way they did. The failures
occurred due to faulty planning and could have been avoided. The operation
brought out several important lessons for Signals, in planning and execution of
tasks of a similar nature. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Background</span></u></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though Vasco da Gama discovered the
sea route to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1498, it was only in the early sixteenth century that the Portuguese began establishing
their colonies on the West Coast. The credit for consolidation of Portuguese
presence in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
goes to Alfonso de Albuquerque, who became the Portuguese Governor in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> in 1509.
He maintained cordial relations with local rulers and began to recruit locals
in his army, a practice that was copied by Clive and Dupleix for the British
and French a century later. By the end of the sixteenth century Portugal had
possessions at Goa, Daman, Diu,
Salsette, Bassein, Chaul and Bombay on the West Coast; San Thome near Madras
and Hooghly in Bengal. In course of time, she lost most of them through wars or
treaties, including <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>,
which was ceded to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region>
as part of the dowry of Princess Catherine of Braganza, when she married King
Charles II of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">England</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in 1661. When British rule in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
came to an end in 1947, the only foreign colonies that remained were the Portuguese
colonies of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>; and the French colony of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pondicherry</st1:place></st1:city>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Revolts
and agitations against Portuguese rule in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
had occurred sporadically from the sixteenth century onwards. These agitations
were usually violent and were ruthlessly suppressed. With the start of the
non-violent struggle for independence sponsored by Mahatma Gandhi in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>, a
similar movement was born in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, with the
formation of the Goa National Congress in 1928 under the leadership of Dr.
Tristao Braganza Cunha. However, it was only after the end of World War II that
a civil disobedience movement came into being, on the lines of the one launched
by Mahatma Gandhi in 1930 in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
This was supported by the leaders of the freedom struggle in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
including Mahatma Gandhi. In <i>The Harijan </i>of
<st1:date day="30" month="6" w:st="on" year="1946">30 June 1946</st1:date>, he
wrote,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>“I would
venture to advise the Portuguese Government of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
to recognize the signs of time and come to honourable terms with its
inhabitants rather than function on any treaty that might exist between them
and the British Government”</i>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Congress Working Committee, in
its meeting on <st1:date day="12" month="8" w:st="on" year="1946">12 August
1946</st1:date> passed a strong resolution condemning the policies of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region> in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, which had reduced the inhabitants to a state of
poverty, forcing them to migrate to other regions in search of a living. It declared
that ‘<st1:place w:st="on"><i>Goa</i></st1:place><i> has always been and must inevitably
continue to be, a part of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
It must share in the freedom of the Indian people’</i>.<sup>1</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
struggle for independence gained momentum after <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> became free of British rule
in 1947. During the first couple of years, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> had to face many challenges,
such as the large-scale migration of people after partition, the police action
in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hyderabad</st1:place></st1:city>
and the operations in <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and
Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state>. As a result, the country’s leaders could not
do much for the people of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, who continued
the agitation on their own. In June 1948, meetings were held in different parts
of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. The Goan Police carried out a <i>lathi</i> charge (a lathi is a long bamboo
stick, used as a weapon) and arrested the leaders, including Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia, a prominent leader of the Socialist Party in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Though the demonstrations were broken up, it
made the people of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> realize that they did
not have even the right of expressing their views peacefully and holding
meetings.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
the ceasefire in <st1:place w:st="on">Kashmir</st1:place>, the Government of
India approached the Portuguese Government in 1949 for a peaceful transfer of
their enclaves in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in accordance with the wishes of the people, but did not receive any response. Realising
that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>
was unwilling to grant them freedom, the people continued their peaceful agitation,
with the help of Indian nationalist leaders. At the same time, the Government
of India made efforts to resolve the issue with the Government of Portugal.
However, these efforts had absolutely no effect on the Portuguese Government,
which intensified its repressive measures and curtailed civil liberties to
crush the movement inside the enclaves. After <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> became a Republic in January
1950, the French agreed to handover the colony of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pondicherry</st1:place></st1:city> on the East Coast to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. This
gave an impetus to the freedom movement in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
and it was hoped that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>
would follow suit. However, these hopes were belied and the attitude of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region> on the
issue remained inflexible. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Government of India opened a legation in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lisbon</st1:place></st1:city>
in 1950 and suggested to the Portuguese Government to start negotiations for
finding a peaceful solution to the Goan problem. The Portuguese Government refused
even to discuss the issue and in June 1953, the Indian Mission in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lisbon</st1:place></st1:city> was closed. There
was a dramatic change in the situation in July 1954 when Dadra, a detached Portuguese
enclave about 100 miles north of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>,
was liberated by volunteers of the United Front of Goans. Eleven days later, a
similar event occurred at Nagar Haveli, another Portuguese pocket to the east
of <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>, separated from it by narrow strip of
an <st1:place w:st="on">Indian territory</st1:place>, where the people rose and
overthrew the Portuguese rule. The liberation of these two pockets after 175 years
signalled the end of Portuguese colonial rule in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> About
a year after the liberation of Dadar and Nagar Haveli, a serious incident
brought matters to a head. On <st1:date day="15" month="8" w:st="on" year="1955">15
August 1955</st1:date>, the eighth anniversary of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s independence, about 3000
demonstrators entered <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> in small groups, which included
several women. They were unarmed and wanted to offer <i>satyagrah</i> (a form of non-violent protest, popularized by Mahatma
Gandhi) to express their solidarity with the people’s liberation movement in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. The Portuguese authorities opened fire on the
demonstrators as soon as they entered their territory, killing 22 and wounding
225. Many were arrested and the remainder forcibly evicted. In sympathy with
the Indian demonstrators, many Goans hoisted the Indian flag on buildings,
distributed handbills and offered <i>satyagrah.</i>
The Police opened fire on them too, killing two and brutally assaulting the
rest, before arresting them. During the next few days, more <i>satyagrahis </i>entered<i> </i><st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>,<i> </i>many being arrested and the rest being evicted. In protest, the
underground nationalists in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> set fire to
some government buildings and police barracks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The brutal killing of peaceful
demonstrators, including several women, generated considerable resentment and
anger in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
and there were demands on the Government of India to take action against the
Portuguese authorities. Conceding that the Portuguese had the right to evict
intruders, the Indian Government could do little more than seal the borders to
prevent such incidents. This move was criticized by political parties, which blamed
the government for sabotaging the nationalist movement in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>.
Meanwhile, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>
accused <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
of sending ‘armed’ demonstrators to liberate the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar
Haveli, and demanded the right of free passage through <st1:place w:st="on">Indian
territory</st1:place> for her armed forces in order to re-establish her rule
there. The case reached the International Court of Justice at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">The Hague</st1:place></st1:city> in 1955. After four years of
arguments, the case was finally decided on <st1:date day="12" month="8" w:st="on" year="1960">12 August 1960</st1:date>. While recognizing the status
of the enclaves as Portuguese territory, the Court did not agree to the right
of free passage for armed forces, and felt that Portuguese officials could go
there after obtaining visas from the Government of India, which now had
jurisdiction over the intervening territory. The liberated enclaves remained
autonomous territories for some time after the judgment, though requests from
the people to merge them with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>
were continuously being made by the people since their liberation. In August
1961, the Indian Parliament passed two Bills formalizing the merger of Dadra
and Nagar Haveli with the Union of India. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The status of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
was also discussed in the United Nations, when several nations asked <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region> to
submit information about <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> and her other
colonies, as was obligatory under the UN Charter. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region> refused, contending that
these territories were not colonies but part of metropolitan <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>. In
November 1961, the UN Trusteeship Council passed a resolution condemning <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s
refusal and requesting all members to deny <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region> any help that could be
used for the subjugation of the people of these colonies. A month earlier, in
October 1961, Prime Minister Nehru had confessed during a seminar on Portuguese
colonialism that the policy of the Government of India to solve the Goan
question by peaceful means had failed. “<i>We
have been forced into thinking afresh by the Portuguese – to adopt other
methods to solve this problem”,</i> he added. “<i>When and how we will do it cannot be forecast now. But I have no doubt
that <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> will soon be free”.</i> <sup>2</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Though events in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
and on the international stage clearly brought out the futility of further
overtures and negotiations with the Portuguese, the Government of India was
still reluctant to resort to force to solve the problem. However, the
Portuguese themselves provided the spark that lit the conflagration. On <st1:date day="17" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">17 November 1961</st1:date>, the
Portuguese opened fire on the Indian merchant coastal steamer <i>‘Sabarmati’</i> while she was on its normal
course off <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Anjidiv</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Island</st1:placetype></st1:place> near Karwar,
causing injuries to the Chief Engineer. On <st1:date day="25" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">25 November 1961</st1:date>, the Portuguese again opened
fire from <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Anjidiv</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">Island</st1:placetype></st1:place> and killed a
fisherman in a country craft returning along with 15 other boats after a fishing
trip. These provocative actions and the
reported arrival of troops in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Mozambique</st1:place></st1:country-region> could
not be ignored. Finally, the Government of India decided to act. The stage was
now set for the liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> and other
Portuguese possessions in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">THE
LIBERATION OF <st1:place w:st="on">GOA</st1:place><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Planning
and Preliminary Actions<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
the Government of India did not issue any formal orders on the subject, the
Army had discreetly started taking some actions on its own. Based on newspaper
accounts of the unrest in Portuguese Africa and its possible repercussions in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command wrote to Army HQ
on <st1:date day="28" month="4" w:st="on" year="1961">28 April 1961</st1:date>,
suggesting that he be issued a directive to allow him to make a tentative plan
in case military intervention was ever required in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>,
<st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>.
Army HQ confirmed that no military action in these territories was contemplated
by the Government. Despite this reply, General
Chaudhuri felt that it was essential to build up an accurate intelligence
picture so that they were not caught napping if it was ever urgently
required. His staff discreetly started
the process of collecting intelligence. Information from military sources was
negligible and so liaison was established with Mr. G.K. Handoo, the special Inspector
General, Border Police. This liaison
produced good results, particularly on the aspects of topography and communications. In addition to the collation of information,
the process of developing an outline appreciation and plan was also begun.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="29" month="8" w:st="on" year="1961">29 August 1961</st1:date>, while General
Chaudhuri was officiating as the Chief of Army Staff at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, the Defence Minister verbally told him
that military action against the Portuguese held territories in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> was a
distinct probability. An outline plan
for such an eventuality was to be prepared, though for the time being, this
overall plan was to be made without consulting the other two Services. After receiving these verbal instructions, a
suitable directive was also drafted for GOC-in-C Southern Command and put up to
the Army Chief when he returned from his tour abroad. General Chaudhuri also
returned to his headquarters in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
and started his planning and reconnaissance of the Goan borders. For reasons of
security, only the Chief of Staff and Brigadier General Staff at HQ Southern
Command were privy to these preparations.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="7" month="10" w:st="on" year="1961">7 October 1961</st1:date>, Army HQ asked
the GOC-in-C Southern Command for his appreciation and plan based on a main
task, which was to occupy the Portuguese held territories in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> with
utmost speed. On <st1:date day="24" month="10" w:st="on" year="1961">24 October 1961</st1:date>, while the formal
appreciation and plan were being prepared, the Prime Minister who was in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> enroute to the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> sent for
the GOC-in-C and asked him for his estimate of the time it would take to occupy
<st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>.
General Chaudhuri gave a figure of three days in the event of Portuguese
resistance and a considerably shorter period in the event of no resistance or
of qualified resistance. On <st1:date day="28" month="10" w:st="on" year="1961">28 October 1961</st1:date>, while
both were returning to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
after the Armoured Corps Conference in Ahmednagar, Lieutenant General B.M.
Kaul, the Chief of General Staff and General Chaudhuri discussed the
appreciation and outline plan. It was tentatively agreed that HQ 17 Infantry Division
with one or two brigades and 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade would be made
available for the operations against <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. These formations would come from Western and
Eastern Commands. For operations against
<st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>,
troops from within Southern Command would be used.<sup>3</sup> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General Chaudhuri submitted his appreciation
on <st1:date day="10" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">10 November 1961</st1:date>.
The decision of the Government to undertake military operations for the
liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> was formally conveyed to the
Army on <st1:date day="29" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">29 November 1961</st1:date>
and preparations started immediately. A task force under the command of Major
General K.P. Candeth was ordered to be assembled for the operation, which was
to be conducted under the control of HQ Southern Command. The force earmarked
for <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> was to comprise 17 Infantry Division
less a brigade; 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade; two armoured regiments; one
medium artillery regiment and some engineer units. One infantry battalion (1 Maratha
Light Infantry) was nominated for <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and a
composite force comprising 20 Rajput and a company of 4 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> for <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>,
under the command of a brigadier. Major General K.P. Candeth, the Director
Artillery at Army HQ was ordered to relieve Major General M. M. Khanna, GOC 17
Infantry Division, who was to proceed to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">UK</st1:place></st1:country-region> to attend a training course.
Meanwhile, two warships of the Indian Navy, the <i>Kirpan</i> and the <i>Rajput</i>
– had already been sent from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>
to the Karwar coast on <st1:date day="28" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">28
November 1961</st1:date>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 24.0pt; margin-right: .5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 43.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> On <st1:date day="29" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">29 November 1961</st1:date>, Brigadier Sagat Singh,
Commander 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> received a telephone call from Major
General D.K. 'Monty' Palit, the Director of Military Operations at Army HQ, and
was asked to rush to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.
Sagat commandeered a Dakota of the Paratroopers' Training School, and was in
Palit's office in less than an hour. It was here that he learnt about the planned
operation for the liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> and his
own role in it. Later in the day, there was a conference in the office of the Chief
of General Staff, General Kaul, where the plans were finalized. The operation
for the liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, code named 'Vijay',
was planned for <st1:date day="16" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">16 December
1961</st1:date>. General Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command, was entrusted
with overall responsibility of the task. In order to prevent international
intervention and reinforcements from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region> reaching <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>,
it was essential that the operation was quick and decisive. The plan made by
General Chaudhuri envisaged a two-pronged attack. The main force, comprising 17
Infantry Division, was to move into <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> from
the east, while 50 Parachute Brigade was to mount a subsidiary thrust from the north.
<st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>
were to be simultaneously tackled by a battalion each, while the Navy was to
capture <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Anjidiv</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Island</st1:placetype></st1:place> and blockade the ports of Marmugao,
Vasco and <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>. The Indian Air Force was
assigned the task of destroying the airfield at Dambolim and the wireless
station at Bambolim, in addition to providing close support to the ground
troops. To ensure that the Indian troops were not held up at the obstacles, a
large amount of bridging equipment was grouped with the main column. A para
drop by a battalion group of 50 Parachute Brigade was also planned near Panjim,
to capture vital bridges before they could be destroyed by the Portuguese. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Sagat was elated on being informed that
a battalion group from his brigade would be used in an airborne role. Since
time and the riverine obstacles were the main considerations, he suggested that
the battalion be dropped by night in area Ponda, so that the water obstacles of
rivers Sanquelim, Bicholim, Usgaon and Candepar could be avoided. However, the AOC-in-C Operational Command, who
was present, expressed his inability to undertake a night drop. Sagat then
suggested that one company be dropped at dawn, another at first light, and the
rest of the battalion subsequently by day. This was accepted, and Sagat
returned to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>
in high spirits. Before leaving for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
Sagat and the brigade major had devised a code to cover likely tasks so that
this could be communicated telephonically as a Warning Order. As a result, the
commanding officers were informed the same evening and preparations started.<sup>
4</sup> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Warning Order for the operation was issued at 1530 hours on 29 November in the
form of a ‘Personal For’ signal from the Chief of Army Staff to the Army
Commanders, with copies being endorsed to Major General M.M. Khanna and
Brigadier Sagat Singh. The signal bore the precedence FLASH and was signed
personally by the Chief of General Staff, General Kaul. The signal is
significant because apart from giving the code name of the operation, details
of troops, date and time of move (No Move Before 2000 hrs on 2 December) and
concentration area (Belgaum), it also gave out the reasons for undertaking the
operations in these words:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 31.5pt; margin-right: 33.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“…<i>As a result of recent Portuguese hostile
action our nationals, government propose taking certain steps in area <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">ANJIDIV</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Island</st1:placetype> <st1:placename w:st="on">(</st1:placename><st1:placename w:st="on">.</st1:placename><st1:placename w:st="on">)</st1:placename></st1:place>
Portuguese likely to take retaliatory measures which may compel us to take armed
action against their territories in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">INDIA</st1:place></st1:country-region>…”. </i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="vik"></a>According to intelligence reports, the strength of the Portuguese
Army in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> was three infantry battalions
comprising about 2,200 ranks. In addition, there were four squadrons of armour
equipped with armoured or scout cars and three companies of artillery, each
having six 105 mm howitzers. There was some anti aircraft artillery at Dabolim
airfield and Marmagao harbour, in addition to some coastal guns at the latter
location. In addition to the above, there were about 3,000 armed local police
personnel and customs guards in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, equipped
with mortars and light automatics. The naval complement consisted of three
small ships; each armed with three 120 mm cannons and four multiple Pom-Poms.
There was no air force worth the name, though the possibility of a few
transport planes could not be ruled out. However, in the event of operations
being prolonged or adequate warning being given, the Portuguese could reinforce
their naval and air force units. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Move
to Concentration and Assembly Areas <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> HQ
17 Mountain Division had been out on a training exercise near Kapurthala that
had just concluded on <st1:date day="29" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">29
November 1961</st1:date>. The GOC, General Khanna who was on leave, was
summoned urgently to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
where he was handed a Top Secret directive giving out the role of his division.
The same evening, he sent a message from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
ordering the immediate return of all formations and units to their permanent
locations and calling all commanders for a conference next morning at 0800
hours at Ambala. After a night-long drive, the move back was completed at 2130
hours on <st1:date day="30" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">30 November 1961</st1:date>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As soon as he returned from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, the GOC held a
conference where he informed everyone about the impending operation for the
liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. The concentration areas for
<st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> were <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>, Vapi and Una respectively, where the
troops taking part were to reach by <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">11 December 1961</st1:date>. The first train carrying the advance
party left Ambala on 2 December. Next morning, Major General K.P. Candeth took
over command of 17 Mountain Division from General Khanna and left for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> for a briefing by
the Army Commander. Special military trains continued to move during the next
few days and the concentration of troops was completed on 6 December, five days
ahead of schedule. This was a remarkable achievement, considering the long rail
journey that involved a change from broad to meter gauge at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. The vehicles and some of the troops detrained
at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> and
completed the rest of the 400 km journey to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> by road. The movement of supplies,
ammunition, fuel and bridging equipment, which had to be moved from depots in
different parts of the country was completed only around <st1:date day="12" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">12 December 1961</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 50 (Independent)
Parachute Brigade began its move from Agra on 2 December 1961, the major
portion moving by rail to and the rest by air to Poona and thence by rail to
Belgaum. The brigade headquarters was established at Mile 4 Road Belgaum –
Savantvadi immediately on arrival of the brigade commander’s party on 5
December. By the morning of 8 December, the whole brigade had concentrated in
the harbour area. On the brigade’s arrival at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>, certain additional units were placed
under its command. These were 7 Cavalry less one squadron (Stuarts); B Squadron
8 Cavalry (AMX tanks); P Battery 24 Medium Regiment; 64/45 Light Anti Aircraft Battery;
135 Heavy Mortar <st1:place w:st="on">Battery</st1:place>; 380 Field Company
Engineers and 2 Sikh Light Infantry. The last named unit had recently moved to
Begumpet from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>
where it had been performing garrison duties and had done no collective
training for a considerable period. The battalion was also not fully equipped, even
lacking boots. Another factor was that being a non-para unit, the newcomers
were not imbued with the characteristic esprit-de-corps and élan of the 'red berets'.
However, Brigadier Sagat Singh welcomed them, and tried his best to make them
feel at home. Being designed for an airborne role, the brigade was woefully
short of transport. After much cajoling, they were allotted some Nissan 1 Ton
trucks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On <st1:date day="9" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">9 December 1961</st1:date>, GOC 17 Infantry Division
briefed his orders group on the impending task. This was followed by the issue
of the divisional operation order on <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">11 December 1961</st1:date>. The
operation was to be conducted in two phases. In Phase 1, Ponda was to be captured,
while Panjim and Marmagao were to be captured in Phase 2. The advance was to be
undertaken two-up on three axes, named Red, Yellow and Blue. The Red Axis (Doda
Marg- Assonara – Sanquelim – Usgao – Pilliem) was allotted to 50 Parachute
Brigade Group and the Yellow Axis<i> </i>(Anmod
– Molem – Pilliem - Ponda) to 17 Infantry
Division, with 63 Brigade leading and 48
Brigade in reserve. The Green Axis provided an alternate route to Ponda ahead
of Mollem and was to be used by 63 Brigade in addition to the Yellow Axis. Significantly,
D Day for the operation was not specified.<sup> 5</sup> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
the rest of 17 Infantry Division was to follow 63 Brigade on the Yellow Axis on
wheels, two sets of move tables were made with different priorities dependent
on the delay that was likely to be encountered due to the damage done to the
roads and the repair programme of own engineers. The <i>ghat</i>
section of the road between the border and Mollem had not been used for the
last five or six years. As a result, it
was over-grown with thick foliage, forming a canopy. It had precipitous slopes and hairpin bends
with the culverts and two small bridges – in fact an ideal demolition
country. The road was believed to be
extensively cratered, mined and culverts and bridges blown. One move table catered for delay until 1430
hours on D day and the other until last light on D day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Army Commander had decided to
establish his tactical headquarters at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
to exercise intimate control over the operation. Moving in small parties,
Tactical HQ Southern Command was established at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="12" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">12 December 1961</st1:date>. The same day, HQ 17 Division
moved forward to its forward concentration area at Tinaighat. By <st1:date day="13" month="12" w:st="on" year="1950">13 December, 50</st1:date> Parachute
Brigade had moved to a location close to Savantwadi, after certain bridges had
been reinforced by the Engineers. The distance from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> to Savantwadi was about 100 km, of
which about 20 km lay through the narrow and steep sections of the Amboli Ghat,
which was quite a challenge for armoured and heavy vehicles. The Engineers also
improved the approaches up to the assembly area, which was east of
Dodamarg. Bridges that could not be
crossed were supplemented with diversions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"> On
15 December 1961, the COAS, General P.N. Thapar, accompanied by Lieutenant
General P.P. Kumaramangalam, the Adjutant General, and the Army Commander
visited 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade, where Brigadier Sagat Singh
presented his plan for the operation. At the end of the presentation, the Army
Commander expressed the view that the timings were too optimistic, and had
reservations about them being adhered to. Sagat then gave the timings in
writing, and the party left, after wishing the brigade good luck. On return to
his tactical headquarters, the Army Commander conveyed his doubts to his staff.
However, Air Vice Marshal E.W. Pinto, the Theatre Air Commander; Major General
P.O. Dunn, the Chief of Staff; and Mr. G.N. Handoo, of the Intelligence Bureau,
who knew Sagat well, supported him and he was allowed to proceed according to
his plan. As it happened, Sagat had already kept a reserve of four hours and
was able to remain well ahead of the estimated timings when the operations ended.<sup>
6</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">During
his visit, the COAS addressed the troops of 17 Infantry Division and 50 Parachute
Brigade and wished them luck. Next day, a Special Order of the Day from the
Chief was read out to all ranks. The D Day for the operation was originally 14
December. However, this was postponed twice, for political reasons. Diplomatic
efforts were still being made and it was hoped that the United Nations and
other countries may act to avert an armed conflict. On 16 December, the Army
Commander landed at the airstrip near 8 Cavalry and informed GOC 17 Infantry
Division that the D Day would be 18 December.
This was later confirmed by a signal giving the code word ‘Bull Dozer’. Troops were ordered to move forward to the assembly
area on the afternoon of 16 December. The brigade assembly area of 50 Parachute
Brigade was east of Dodamarg, about 50 km from the concentration area at
Savantvadi. On the Eastern thrust, 63 and 48 Brigades moved to their assembly
areas near Anmod. On 17 December, the
order to enter <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> was received through the
codeword ‘Varaha’. Patrolling across the border was allowed after last light on
<st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">17 December 1961</st1:date>
with a view to liquidating the enemy posts enroute near the border,
facilitating further advance and gaining information especially of road
communication and state of defences. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
Advance by 63 Infantry Brigade from the East<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On
the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Yellow Route</st1:address></st1:street>,
the advance guard – 3 Sikh - crossed the start point at the Customs <i>chauki</i> (check post) at 0400 hours and
the border at 0515 hours. Negotiating craters and scattered mines, they moved
with speed and reached Mollem at 0730 hours.
They found both the Nandraon and Mollem bridges intact and Mollem
deserted, the enemy having left a few hours earlier. Resuming the advance on
the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Green Route</st1:address></st1:street>,
the vanguard company reached Collem at 0930 hours, followed by the rest of the
battalion at 1100 hours. On learning that the Portuguese were fast withdrawing
towards Ponda, it was decided to push on as fast as possible so that they did
not get time to reorganize and offer resistance. Leaving a company at Collem to
protect their south flank, the battalion pushed on to Sirgao where some vehicles
belonging to a mining company were put at their disposal by the owners. A part of the battalion then embussed and
reached Darbandora on the Candiapar River at 1700 hours, the remainder building
up by 2200 hours. The bridge over the Candiapar on the <st1:street w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Green Route</st1:address></st1:street> was found demolished, so they
crossed over to the Yellow route by the lateral road.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
second battalion of 63 Brigade, 2 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> was to
move on the Green Axis up to Mollem and thereafter use the Yellow Axis to reach
Ponda. Leaving the start point at 0400 hours, the battalion found Tamri
vacated, the Portuguese having withdrawn after being warned by barking dogs.
Continuing the advance, the battalion passed through Surla and arrived at road
junction approximately 1500 yards west of Mollem at 0515 hours. According to
the plan, Mollem was to be cleared by 3 Sikh, which had still not arrived.
Since there was no wireless contact with the brigade headquarters, the
battalion had to wait there. Eventually after 3 Sikh had taken Mollem, 2 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> also reached there at 0815 hours, where they were
met by the brigade commander, Brigadier K.S. Dhillon and the Chief of General
Staff, General Kaul. The battalion was asked to continue the advance to Ponda
on the Yellow Axis. A few civilian vehicles were commandeered and one company
was made mobile, the petrol being provided by a mining company. The foot column
left at 1230 hours and the mounted column at 1300 hours. On reaching Darbandora,
about ten miles away, it was found that two adjacent culverts had been blown off,
flooding the right side of the road, with the left being mined. While a
diversion was being cleared and marked, local people pointed to an alternative
route to Ponda known as the Miner’s Route.
Leaving the marching column to continue along the <i>Yellow</i> route, the mounted column with the Commanding Officer
proceeded by the miner’s route and arrived at the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Candiapar</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
by <st1:time hour="16" minute="15" w:st="on">4.15 p.m.</st1:time> The bridge having being blown, the leading company
waded across and established a fire base on the far bank where they firmed in
for the night. The remainder of the battalion reached the near bank by 2200
hours. A little after <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>,
4 Sikh Light Infantry that had been following HQ 63 Infantry Brigade had
reached the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Candiapar</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> crossing where it
harboured for the night. This battalion was to lead the advance next day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> During
the night of 18/19 December, the main divisional headquarters column commenced
its move forward along the Yellow Axis, led by bridging train for bridging of
the Candiapar River and followed by 48 Infantry Brigade Group. As the bridging fleet consisted mostly of old
vehicles, there were many and frequent breakdowns along the one-way road where
even a motor cycle could not pass. As a result, 48 Infantry Brigade that was to
pass through the 63 Infantry Brigade at Ponda could not clear Mollem during the
night. The main divisional headquarters was also stranded along the road.<sup> 7</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
GOC with his ‘R’ Group had reached Mollem by 2200 hours on 18 December. After taking stock of the situation and
realizing that the enemy had very little will left to fight, he gave his orders
for advance on 19 December. According to
the Operational Order No. 2 issued at that time, 48 Infantry Brigade was to
advance on Yellow Axis with a view to capture Panjim; 63 Infantry Brigade was
to advance and capture Margao and Marmagao; 50 Parachute Brigade was to firm in
at Ponda and be prepared to take over from 48/63 Infantry Brigades. The grouping
was to be completed by 0200 hours and advance to commence at 0630 hours on 19
December. However, the Army Commander nullified these orders. Since the divisional headquarters was not in
touch with Tactical HQ Southern Command, the Army Commander directly ordered 50
Parachute Brigade to advance during the night and capture Panjim as soon as
possible. This fact was communicated to HQ
17 Infantry Division on telephone at 1000 hours on 19 December and by a signal,
a copy of which is given below:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: center;">
<i><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">SIGNAL MESSAGE<o:p></o:p></span></u></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0.5pt 10pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">FLASH 190825<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0.5pt 10pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">From TAC HQ SOUTHCOM SEC<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0.5pt 10pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">To 17 INF DIV 02066<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0.5pt 10pt 36pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Info<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">50 Para Bde has been
ordered by this hq to move into PANJIM as we could NOT contact you last evening
(.) essential you send one bde to occupy MARMAGAO peninsula earliest possible
and confirm this has been done<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Although
its communication vehicles were stranded all along the ghat section of the Anmod
– Mollem road, by 0800 hours on 19 December the main divisional headquarters had
assumed control with a relay station vehicle in area Mollem. However, 50 Parachute Brigade was still not
in touch. Realizing the urgency of the
task of capturing Marmagao at the earliest, and knowing that 48 Infantry Brigade
units were still held up East of Mollem, orders were issued to Commander 48 Infantry
Brigade to take over 3 Sikh, a battalion of 63 Infantry Brigade halted at Candiapar,
and dash down to Panjim. However, the
orders had to be cancelled as Panjim had already been captured by troops of 50
Parachute Brigade. The other formations of 17 Infantry Division continued with
their tasks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The task allotted to 63 Infantry
Brigade was to capture Margao and Marmagao.
The outline plan was for 4 Sikh Light Infantry to lead the advance at 0600
hours on foot across the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Candiapar</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> to Ponda and then
via Borim to Margao; 2 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> to follow 4 Sikh
Light Infantry; and 3 Sikh to reach Borim and await further orders. The leading
companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry waded across the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Candiapar</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place>
as scheduled and found a few civilian vehicles on the far bank. The battalion reached Borim ferry by 0830 hours
without opposition but found the bridge blown.
The river here is 600 yards wide.
A barge was found and the whole battalion was across by 0930 hours to be
greeted by jubilant Goans who were waiting with trucks and cars. The battalion pressed on and by 1030 hours had
reached Margao where it occupied vulnerable points and waited for 2 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> to pass through as ordered by the brigade commander.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For the advance on 19 December, 2 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place> was divided into two parties. At 0730 hours two companies with the CO left
in mechanical transport by a new lateral route, which joined up with the Green route
to Ponda, while the remainder of the battalion waded through the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Candiapar</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> and continued the advance to Ponda
on foot. The vehicle column route was
bad and both the columns met at Borim at 0930 hours. Having crossed Borim at 1030 hours, the
battalion reached Margao at 1230 hours and took the lead from 4 Sikh Light
Infantry.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Civilians in Verna informed the
leading troops that about 500 Portuguese held a defensive position on the high
ground north of the village. C Company
was sent in an out flanking move to the left under Captain Bhandari. When they were about 300 yards away, the enemy
opened small arms fire on our troops who promptly returned the fire and charged,
upon which the enemy surrendered. The
bag was 11 officers, 23 sergeants, 91 soldiers and large quantity of arms and
equipment. While this was going on, B Company
under Major Bose charged the enemy position from the right further in depth and
they also surrendered. Their bag was 16
officers, 307 soldiers, 14 armoured cars, 21 jeeps and various other equipments.
All this was over by 1430 hours when 4 Sikh Light Infantry was ordered to pass
through and proceed to Vasco da Gama.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Starting from Verna at 1445 hours, 4
Sikh Light Infantry reached the area of road junction east of the Dabolim airfield
at 1530 hours. By a swift out flanking
move, the leading company commander rounded up six enemy officers and over 100
men with huge quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment. The battalion kept
up the pace and reached the out skirts of Vasco da Gama at 1600 hours where a
large number of Portuguese surrendered.
A small party of the enemy was still holding out in the area of the Baina
beach near Marmagao. A platoon sent out
to deal with them captured 40 of the enemy with a large booty of arms and
ammunition. The occupation of the
Western tip of the peninsula was thus completed. However due to a breakdown in communication
between HQ 63 Infantry Brigade and main divisional headquarters, the fact of
capture of Marmagao was not known to the latter until 2300 hours on 19 December
1961. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
third battalion of 63 Infantry Brigade – 3 Sikh - was divided into mounted and
unmounted columns and kept in reserve.
The marching columns reached Dabolim airfield by 2200 hours on 19 December
and the vehicular columns reached Margao by last light. In the early hours of 20 December when Captain
R.S. Dahiya was out on a contact patrol with a small party, he rounded up 400
Portuguese soldiers who were hungry and keen to surrender.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
1600 hours the Governor General of Goa, General Manuel Antonio Vassalo E’ Silva was found at Alparquiros camp in Vasco da Gama
and he formally surrendered in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces to Brigadier K.S. Dhillon, Commander 63 Infantry Brigade at 2030 hours on
19 December 1961. The instrument of
surrender was signed in the presence of COs 4 Sikh Light Infantry and 2 <st1:place w:st="on">Bihar</st1:place>, Lieutenant Colonels R.B. Nanda and K.S. Chadha
respectively. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Advance
of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade from the North <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
brigade commander, Brigadier Sagat Singh had planned to advance into <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> on two axes. The Red Axis (Dodamarg – Bicholim –
Sanquelim – Usgao – Piliem) was allotted to 2 Para while the Maroon Axis
(Dodamarg – Assonora – Tivim – Mapuca – Betim) was to be used by 2 Sikh Light
Infantry. The brigade headquarters was to follow on the Red Axis. The task of capturing Ponda was given 1 Para
which was the only element of the brigade to advance on foot, the rest moving
on wheels. To ensure safe initial entry of the brigade into <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>,
1 Para was to secure Ibrampur, Doddumorgu and Maulinguem before the start time
on D Day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> To
carry out the pre-H Hour operations, 1 Para detailed C Company to secure Ibrampur
and Doddumorogu and D Company to occupy Maulinguem by 0230 hours. Ibrampur was
occupied without any opposition but Doddumorogu was found to be held by a
platoon of infantry and a troop of armoured cars. The Portuguese were inside a building
surrounded by trenches and fortified by barbed wire. When the company assaulted the position, they
came under heavy fire from the armoured cars and the enemy inside the
building. The Company Commander, Major I.R.
Kumar, detailed two men to cut the wire and make gaps and also detailed parties
to deal with the armoured cars. The
attack was driven home, one armoured car being destroyed by a rocket launcher. Portuguese casualties were three killed, two wounded
and 24 captured. Own casualty was one killed. Meanwhile D Company occupied Maulinguem, killing
six and wounding three Portuguese, at a cost of one Indian soldier wounded. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.15pt; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Another preliminary operation was for the
Sanquelim bridge by 2 Para, which is best described in the words of the brigade
commander, Brigadier Sagat Singh:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 44.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 118%;">From a
Portuguese map obtained through smugglers by 2 Para, we gathered information
that they had constructed a 110-foot single span RCC bridge over the river
flowing by the eastern boundary of the Sanquelim town. I felt strongly that if
we could capture the bridge intact, it would speed up 2 Para's advance. We
worked out a careful plan. A company of 2 Para led by Major Uthaya set off on
man-pack </span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 117%;">basis after
last light on the night of December </span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 129%;">15/</span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 117%;">16.
He was guided by seasoned smugglers who knew their clandestine tracks across
country. The tasks given to Major Uthaya were to capture the bridge intact; if
not, to find out a crossing place across the river. The company got to their
forming up place on the eastern end of the bridge. As</span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 106%;"> </span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 117%;">they started crawling forward, trouble began in the form
of incessant barking of dogs. Though the Portuguese map had not shown it, some
hutments of the labourers who had worked on the bridge construction had settled
at the eastern end. Men of 2 Para crawled carefully forward a little at a time
but the dogs would not give up.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: .95pt; margin-right: 44.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 31.5pt; margin-right: 44.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 117%;">The
Portuguese guards became alert and suspicious. </span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 106%;">As </span></i><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 117%;">our men were preparing to charge, the Portuguese blew up
the demolition charges and scurried towards Usgaon. Major Uthaya was able to
locate and mark a crossing place at which all vehicles, tanks and guns got
through without difficulty. I can never forget the scene of Major Uthaya
meeting me at the Sanquelim end of the bridge with tears rolling down his eyes
and in choked voice telling me, "Sorry. I have failed you." -meaning
that he had not got the bridge intact. Actually, the mission was a great
success. The crossing place enabled us to maintain the momentum of our advance
in motor transport. What Major Uthaya did not realize at the time was that he
had prevented the Portuguese from firing all the demolition charges affixed to
the long single span. They could only fire the charges in the demolition
chambers at either end of the single l10-foot span. In the aftermath, the span
was lifted by marine jacks and with additions to the abutments on either side;
the bridge was re-commissioned economically and in a short time. I have
narrated this in some detail not only to commend the performance of the 2 Para Company
but to say that in war, howsoever you
might plan in detail, there would be imponderables (like barking of dogs at
night) to contend with.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> 8</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-font-width: 117%;"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="Style" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; margin-left: 1.15pt; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 18.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Another
reason for the loss of surprise that resulted in failure to capture the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Sanquelim</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Bridge</st1:placetype></st1:place> was the announcement by All India
Radio at 0100 hours that Indian troops would soon be entering <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. Had the radio announcement been delayed until
the morning, perhaps the bridge would not have been blown. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On 18 December, troops of 2 Para started
moving out from the forward assembly area at <st1:time hour="4" minute="0" w:st="on">4 a.m.</st1:time> The advance was held up as soon as it started, due
to a damaged culvert near the abandoned Portuguese customs post en route to the
start point. Vehicles could negotiate it with great difficulty and the AMX
tanks were unable to cross it. The culvert
was quickly strengthened with steel decking and the move forward resumed. The
vanguard company crossed the start point at the given time and the advance
continued. The rate of advance was very
slow owing to darkness and the difficult nature of the track especially at the
nullah crossings. By first light, the
vanguard had reached Corpol, where they met C Company 1 Para which was
escorting a Portuguese prisoner captured earlier. Thereafter, the going got
slightly better and the speed of advance increased. At approximately 0730 hours
a Portuguese armoured car was seen by the vanguard company on the track.
However, before any action could be taken it turned round and sped away towards
Bicholim. Unfortunately, the AMX tanks were approximately 1000 yards to the
rear. At 0830 hours the vanguard cleared Bicholim where the bridge was found
demolished. However, the river was crossed by a ford immediately to the north of
the bridge. A good tarmac road was now available and the advance was resumed at
a good speed, with a view to linking up with the company at Sanquelim which was
causing some anxiety, its whereabouts not known to the battalion. The vanguard
established contact with C Company on the outskirts of Sanquelim at 1030 hours. As both bridges had been blown, the vanguard
was guided to a ford through which it crossed and resumed its advance to Usgao. The crossing at the ford took considerable
time as the tanks of 7 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry were also using it and there were
frequent breakdowns. C Squadron of 7 Cavalry,
which was acting as mobile troops, had moved on to the Red Axis, ahead of the
vanguard, from the area of Maulinguem.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
mobile troops and the vanguard reached Usgao at 1140 hours to find the bridge
over River Madei blown. The river was a
formidable water obstacle, 600 feet wide and unfordable. The banks on either side of the bridge were
reported to be mined. However, with
adequate caution, a landing place was reconnoitred south of the bridge. Two country boats were immediately acquired
for ferrying troops who had now dismounted from vehicles and the CO decided to
resume the advance on foot from the far bank. It was decided to build rafts to ferry jeeps
which would be utilized to carry two detachments 106 mm RCL, one section MMG
and one troop of heavy mortars. Work on construction of improvised rafts commenced
and officers were dispatched to commandeer barges and landing ship tanks which
were reported in the area. Troops started crossing the river in boats at <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time>. By 1330 hours, B and D companies
and the CO’s party had crossed and were on their way to Ponda, which was
secured by A Company at 1345 hours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
arrival at Ponda, it was found that the Portuguese had set fire to their
equipment and baggage and some buildings were burning. Hooligans were seen looting the
barracks. Immediately a platoon each was
posted to the three army barracks in the town and the fire was brought under
control. As more troops arrived, guards were put on various public utilities
like petrol pumps, municipal offices, post offices, police station and the
administrator’s office. The bazaar area
was patrolled and unruly crowds dispersed. Meanwhile C Company, which was at Sanquelim,
was lifted in vehicles and moved to Usgao to rejoin the battalion, leaving
behind one platoon for garrison duties. The
CO arrived at Ponda at 1430 hours. Accompanied by the Second-in-Command and a
few officers, he proceeded to reconnoitre the ferry site at Unde where a large
number of barges were reported to be moored, and the bridge at Banasterim. At Unde,
they found six large iron ore barges, each of which could carry 500 men in
addition to two or three jeeps. The
ferry owners’ agents and drivers were warned to stay with their ferries and be
prepared to move at short notice during night 18/19 December 1961. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> It
was now dark and the party went towards the Banasterim bridge from Ponda by a
detour. The bridge at Mardol had been
blown and the nullah in the immediate vicinity was not easily fordable. Another bridge had been cratered but with a
little engineer assistance could be made fit for transport. The CO returned to Ponda at approximately 2030
hours where he met the brigade commander who had arrived from Candiapar River
and apprised him about the ferry at Unde and the state of bridges on road Ponda
– Banasterim. Brigadier Sagat informed them that 1 Para had reached Banasterim
and ordered the battalion to send out a contact patrol. Contact was established with rear elements of
1 Para at 0730 hours next morning, the battalion having moved towards Panjim earlier.<sup>
9</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Tasked to advance on the Maroon
Axis (Dodamarg – Assonora – Tivim – Mapuca – Betim), 2 Sikh Light Infantry
started on time but was delayed by approximately two hours due to obstacles
encountered inside the border and
crossed the start point at 0900 hours on 18 December 1961. A Squadron of 7 Cavalry and a troop of B
Squadron of 8 Cavalry led the advance. The advance was rapid until they reached
Assonora, where the bridge was found to be demolished. The mobile troops
reported the presence of eight tanks on the far bank and exercised great
caution in pursuing the advance. With
the engineer resources at hand and local labour and material available, the
force commenced crossing the river by a diversion at 1145 hours. At 1300 hours the
column reached Tivim where the bridge was again found demolished and a diversion
was taken via Colvale. At 1400 hours the
head of the column hit the Pernim – Mapuca road where numerous anti-tank mines
were encountered. Considerable time was
spent in disarming and removing these mines.
However, by 1600 hours the column got well under way and reached Mapuca at
1700 hours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> One
company group was detached at Mapuca to round up the Portuguese personnel still
around, creating confidence amongst the public and affording protection to the
town. The route from Mapuca to Betim was
mined at places and obstacles had been created by demolishing culverts and
felling trees. By 1745 hours the entire
column reached Betim. Since permission to cross the creek at Betim had not been
granted, the column was split into groups and went into night harbour. At about
200 hours a priest from Panjim came in a boat to the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">harbour</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">A Squadron</st1:placename></st1:place>
7 Cavalry with a letter written in Portuguese, purporting to be an offer of surrender
from the military commander of Panjim. Major S.S. Sidhu, the squadron commander,
took the letter to Lieutenant Colonel Cherian, CO 2 Sikh Light Infantry, who
declined to cross the creek to accept the surrender at Panjim as he had not
been able to contact the brigade commander to get his clearance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
returning to the harbour, Major Sidhu came to know that his men had captured
two men who claimed to be locals from a nearby village, which fell on the route
that the squadron was to take next morning. Wishing to confirm if the men were
telling the truth, Major Sidhu decided to reconnoitre up to the village.
Accompanied by four officers, three OR and the two prisoners, Major Sidhu left
in a Dodge 15 cwt. truck at 2230 hours. On reaching the village, the prisoners
were released after they were identified by the residents. However, another
local informed Major Sidhu that about 50 to 60 nationalist prisoners in the
Aguada Fort were likely to be murdered during the night by the five or six
Portuguese soldiers who were guarding them. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Deciding
to rescue the prisoners, Major Sidhu immediately left for the Aguada Fort,
about seven miles away, accompanied by the informer. The party reached the fort
at about 2330 hours and found the gate closed. Major Sidhu asked the sentry to
call his commander, telling him that the Portuguese authorities in Panjim had
decided to surrender. The Portuguese suddenly opened fire with automatics,
mortars and grenades. Major Sidhu and his party were taken by surprise but returned
the fire. However, they were overwhelmed and suffered heavy casualties. A light
machine gun burst hit Captain V.K. Sehgal who died instantly. The truck was
loaded with ammunition which exploded, setting it on fire. Major Sidhu was also
hit and ran back about 100 yards where he was caught in a medium machine gun
burst. Two officers and one OR who were not seriously injured walked back to
the harbour, reaching there at about 0330 hours. A troop of AMX tanks, a troop
of Stuarts and two rifle troops were immediately dispatched to the fort,
reaching there at 0530 hours. After a few bursts of machine gun fire, the Portuguese
hoisted the white flag and surrendered. Major Sidhu and Captain V.K. Sehgal
were killed in operation, with two officers and two OR being seriously wounded.<sup>10</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
third battalion of 50 Parachute Brigade, 1 Para started from the assembly area
at 0500 hours and arrived at Matna post of own border police at 0600 hours. After halting for an hour, when 2 Para was
approaching Maulinguem, 1 Para also left for the same place, arriving there at
approximately 0800hours. The battalion had to halt for another hour awaiting the
success signal indicating occupation of Bicholim and allowing the brigade
column to pass through. To save time, the battalion was allowed to march, keeping
the track clear for vehicles, without waiting for the entire column to pass
through. This enabled the battalion to reach Bicholim at about 1030 hours. After
a short halt outside the town, the battalion marched to Piligao ferry reaching
there at 1245 hours.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> There
were no local boats at the ferry site when the battalion arrived, but after a while,
a large boat appeared followed by a small Z craft. In the meantime, two
engineer vehicles fetched up with four storm boats. After the guns were in
position to give fire support, the first company was ordered to go across. As
the first company was about to shove off, it was learned from the local
civilians that the ferry site on the opposite bank was mined. Actual
reconnaissance on the far side proved that the site was suitable for the
infantry but a diversion had to be made for vehicles to avoid the mines. This was done by the engineers with great
speed. Three jeeps carrying 106 mm RCL guns were landed and the advance towards
Banasterim bridge started at 1630 hours.
On reaching the Banasterim bridge at 1745 hours, it was found blown and
there being no boats, the battalion took up position on the eastern side.
Shortly afterwards, a message was received from brigade headquarters that the
Army Commander would visit the unit next morning and they were to stay put in
that position till further orders.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Capture
of Panjim by 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At about 2100 hours, the Chief of
Staff Southern Command spoke to the brigade major of 50 (Independent) Parachute
Brigade who informed him about the latest disposition of the forward troops,
which was the general line Betim, Piligao, Banasterim and Ponda. Thereafter at about 1000 hours the Army
Commander spoke to the brigade major, informing him that the Government of Goa
was assembling in Panjim at 0800 hours next morning to finalize the terms of
surrender. He desired that Indian troops
should be on the outskirts of Panjim and ordered the immediate advance by 1
Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry into Panjim. The Army Commander wanted this to
be conveyed to the GOC 17 Infantry Division also. However, as wireless communications were not
through, this was communicated to the duty officer at Tactical HQ Southern Command,
who sent a special officer courier to convey the message to GOC 17 Infantry
Division. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> In
his report General Chaudhuri has explained the reasons for his decision, as under:-
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 17.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On the evening of 18
December, Tactical HQ Southern Command discovered that both 63 Infantry Brigade
of 17 Infantry Division and 50 (Indep) Para Brigade had been ordered by GOC
Task Force to harbour for the night, and that the next morning the GOC intended
to advance his reserve brigade, 48 Infantry Brigade, through the Para Brigade
on to Velha Goa and Panjim. This action
had probably been taken as communications within 17 Infantry Division had not
been working too well and the GOC wanted to make sure of fresh troops for the
advance. The GOC-in-C Southern Command,
in his capacity as the overall Commander, felt however that in view of the very
small resistance offered by the Portuguese there was no reason why the advance
could not immediately continue, and with the same troops, after a small break
for reorganization. In any case if the
reserve brigade was to pass through the Para Brigade and then continue the
advance into Panjim there would be a further delay. It must be remembered that 48 Infantry
Brigade which was in reserve was still in the Anmod area and had not been moved
behind the Para Brigade. He accordingly ordered the advance to be resumed as
soon as possible, during the night, and by the troops already in the lead.
Because Signal communications were still poor, HQ 50 (Indep) Para Brigade was
informed of this decision, with some difficulty in the early hours of 19 December.</span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">
<sup>11</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Based
on the orders received from the Army Commander, 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light
Infantry were ordered to cross the Banasterim and the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Mandovi</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">Rivers</st1:placetype></st1:place>
respectively and advance on to Panjim from the north and the east. At 0730 hours two companies of 2 Sikh Light
Infantry crossed into Panjim in local ferries and secured the police
headquarters, custom house, governor general’s residence, secretariat and
military camp. Except for some rifle
fire and two automatics which were later neutralized, no major opposition was
encountered. The civilian population
collected in large numbers. Their
enthusiasm was so great that the movement of troops to their objectives was
delayed by about an hour and a half. Meanwhile the forward elements of 1 Para also
arrived. During the day the bulk of the Portuguese were rounded up and put
inside prisons. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Being
unable to procure any boats and the ferry not operating, 1 Para decided to
cross the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placename w:st="on">Banasterim</st1:placename>
<st1:placetype w:st="on">River</st1:placetype></st1:place> on their own. Two
companies were ordered to swim across on two equipment rafts. One of the
hastily prepared rafts sank, taking with it a rifle and a sten. In the meantime,
the Z craft also arrived along with a couple of small boats and this hastened
the crossing of the battalion. The rest of the story is related by the CO,
Lieutenant Colonel Sucha Singh, VrC, MC who wrote:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 39.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Realizing
that the show was up and that I had very little time if I wanted to win the
race for Panjim, I commandeered a civilian car and two trucks which had arrived
on the far side with passengers apparently to welcome Indian troops. Collecting
whatever men who had put their uniforms on from the two companies who swam
across and my battery commander I started in that car and two trucks for
Panjim. I left instructions that other companies will follow me as they come
across using whatever civilian transport was available. It is worth mentioning
that civilians were so enthusiastic that they were begging to be given a chance
to lift troops in their vehicles.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 39.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 120%;">At about 0830 hours on December 19, I arrived at Governor-General's
Secretariat (The Palace), occupied it, and placed a guard there. The civilians
accorded a very enthusiastic welcome and what is more it was spontaneous. Then
we made for the ferry crossing in order to contact 2 Sikh Light Infantry in
case they were across. When I reached the police station I noticed that 2 Sikh
Light Infantry troops had entered that place.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">12</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-font-width: 120%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Lt Col Sucha Singh of 50 (I) Parachute Brigade accepts
surrender of<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 38.9pt 0.0001pt 36pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 36pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Portuguese troops at Bambolim, Goa – 19 Dec 1961<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 39.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Even
as 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry were vying for the prize of Panjim, 2 Para,
which was in Ponda, was preparing to cross into Velha Goa. The divisional
commander visited Ponda at approximately 0900 hours and went round the town accompanied
by Commander 50 Parachute Brigade. Soon after his departure, information was
received that 1 Para had entered Panjim. Hence the proposed advance to Velha
Goa was called off. The battalion was
ordered to take over the administrative responsibility of Ponda. At 1130 hours
Brigadier Sagat Singh left Ponda escorted by a platoon from C Company, taking the
ferry route from Unde to Panjim.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">General Chaudhuri accompanied by Air
Vice Marshal E.W. Pinto and the Chief of Staff landed by a helicopter at Banasterim
at 0900 hours on 19 December 1961. On
being told that a battalion of 50 Parachute Brigade had already reached Panjim,
he decided to drive into the town. After crossing the Banasterim by ferry, he drove
straight down to Velha Goa from where he passed a wireless message to the Chief
of the Army Staff giving the news of the fall of Goa. He stopped just short of
Panjim to visit a hospital where the Portuguese wounded in action were being
treated. Mr. Sardesai, the nationalist
leader was also admitted there for treatment.
The Army Commander then drove to the Secretariat where he was mobbed by
the joyous civilian population. They
wanted him to fly the Indian National Flag on the Secretariat building which he
did.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
Army Commander then drove to the Broadcasting House, met the Goan
Secretary-General in the latter’s house and then went to the Portuguese officers’
mess where he accepted the surrender from the local military commander. Thereafter, he expressed a desire to see the
Mandovi Hotel, but due to small arms fire still continuing in the vicinity he
decided to go back to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>.
On the way he stopped for a while at Velha Goa to visit the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">church</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename w:st="on">St. Francis
Xavier</st1:placename></st1:place>. He took off for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> in the helicopter at 1320 hours. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_3"
o:spid="_x0000_i1026" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="The Indian Chief of Army Staff, Gen"
style='width:291pt;height:220.5pt;visibility:visible'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\dell\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image003.jpg"
o:title="The Indian Chief of Army Staff, Gen"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><img alt="The Indian Chief of Army Staff, Gen" height="294" src="file:///C:/Users/dell/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image003.jpg" v:shapes="Picture_x0020_3" width="388" /><!--[endif]--></span></u></b><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0.7pt 0.0001pt 0cm; text-align: center;">
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The COAS, Gen PN Thapar (far right) with deposed
Portuguese <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Governor General Manual Antonis Vassalo E’ Silva
(seated<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">centre) at a POW facility in Vasco Da Gama, Goa</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-IN;"> </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">SIGNALS
IN THE GOA OPERATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">17
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 17
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was kept busy throughout the year of 1961 with
a series of training events and inspections. The unit was located at Ambala
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.V.S. Juneja, who had assumed command
in January 1961. During the month of
October 1961, the unit was inspected by the divisional commander, Major General
M.M. Khanna. From 14 to 17 November, the CSO XI Corps, Brigadier M.B.K. Nair
visited the unit, including the brigade signal sections of 48, 63 and 64
Infantry Brigades. On 21 November, the unit proceeded to take part in the Western
Command Army/Air Cooperation Exercise ‘Parakram’. The exercise was to end on 29
November and the troops were looking forward to a welcome break after several
months of hectic activity involving a series of training events and
inspections. After the end of the exercise on <st1:date day="29" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">29 November 1961</st1:date>, a campfire was organized in
the unit area. Among the guests was the officiating GOC, Brigadier K.S.
Dhillon. The festivities were suddenly interrupted by a message from the divisional
headquarters directing everyone to pack up and move back to Ambala before first
light, next morning.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The CO and the command group left
shortly after <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time> and
reached Ambala at 0345 hours. The rest of the unit followed and by 0830 hours on
<st1:date day="30" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">30 November 1961</st1:date>,
the whole regiment was back in Ambala and standing by for further orders. After
attending a conference chaired by the GOC who had just returned from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, the CO informed
all officers of the impending operations for the liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> and ordered preparations for the immediate move to
the concentration areas. Telegrams and signals were sent to recall all
personnel on leave and temporary duties and Colonel Juneja left for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> to request the SO-in-C
to make up the deficiencies of personnel, equipment and transport. The SO-in-C
promised to do his best. He was as good as his word – the unit was provided
most of what it asked for and had almost its full complement of officers and
equipment before the operations commenced. By the time the CO returned the next
evening, the unit had completed its preparations and was ready to move. The CO issued
his orders at 2100 hours on 1 December and gave out the plan for move of the
unit and subsequent deployment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The next morning, an advance party of the unit
left for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
by a special mixed train. Apart from the CO, the party comprised three officers
(Major M.D. Rana, Captain Amrik Singh and Captain R.K. Bhavnani), two JCOs and
32 OR. The step-up signal centre, cable detachment and the GOC’s Rover formed
part of the advance party. The first party from the M3 Group comprising the
Adjutant (Captain M.B. Dwivedi), Subedar Major M.S. Pondian and 39 OR left by a
troops and baggage train at 2200 hours on the same day. By this time most of the officers who were on
leave had rejoined. This included Major C.M. Nanda, Captain K.L. Bakshi and
Lieutenant M.L. Sehgal. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The bulk of the unit’s vehicles left on <st1:date day="3" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">3 December 1961</st1:date> by a
special vehicle train under the command of Second Lieutenant S.C. Dhawan. The
remainder of the M3 group was further split into two parties. One party under Major N.S. Chahal, OC No. 1
Company, comprising one JCO and 37 OR, left in another train in the forenoon. On
the same day Captain S.P. Khetarpal and Lieutenant I.N. Talwar reported to the
unit at Ambala on attachment from 5 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. A cipher
officer, Captain K. Parthasarthy reported on attachment from UP Area
(Independent) Signal Company at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bareilly</st1:place></st1:city>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The personnel of the advance
party that had left Ambala on 2 December arrived at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> on 4 December. On <st1:date day="5" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">5 December 1961</st1:date>, the balance of the M3
Group under the Second-in-Command, Major C.M. Nanda, left Ambala at 1000 hours.
The party comprised five officers, three JCOs and 59 OR. A little later the
last contingent of the unit under Major H.R. Gogna, the Quartermaster, left in
another train with one JCO and 13 OR. All that remained at Ambala was a small rear
party under Captain Chanan Singh. A welcome addition to the unit’s strength was
the arrival of Lieutenant B.B. Mathur, who joined at the railway station as the
unit’s first regimental medical officer. By the evening of 5 December, the
party under Second Lieutenant S.C. Dhawan that had left two days earlier, had
reached Kirkee. By this time the divisional commander, Major General K.P.
Candeth had arrived in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
and established his headquarters in the M.E.S. Inspection Bungalow. The advance
party provided essential communications through the civil telephone exchange.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
6 December, the Adjutant’s party arrived at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> by train. The unit was deployed next
to the divisional headquarters near the golf course. On 7 December, Major
Chahal’s party that had detrained at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Sholapur</st1:place></st1:city>
reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
by road. The same evening, Second Lieutenant Dhawan who had detrained at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> also reached with
his vehicle column without any mishap. Considering that this was his first
experience leading a convoy on a difficult road, with a number of <i>ghats</i> (steep inclines) and without any
light vehicles or despatch riders for patrolling, the young officer’s
performance was commendable. On 8 December, Major C.M. Nanda also reached with
his road convoy. The last party under Major Gogna that carried most of the
heavy stores such as ammunition, cable, tentage and equipment arrived at night
by train. With this, the concentration of the unit at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> was complete. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Communications in the
concentration area were provided on line and scheduled despatch service (SDS)
to the main and rear divisional headquarters, the divisional administrative
area, the divisional troops, and the three brigades. Only two of the division’s
own brigades – 48 and 63 – had accompanied it to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>, the third brigade (64) being left
behind at Kasauli. However, the deficiency had been made up by 50 (Independent)
Parachute Brigade Group which had been placed under command of 17 Infantry Division
for the operation. The combined force for operation had been designated
‘Special Task Force’ for Operation ‘Vijay’. Line communications to brigades were
provided on permanent lines hired from the Department of Posts and Telegraphs.
Tactical HQ Southern Command had also been set up at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>, with its own signal centre. Rearward
communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> were
provided under arrangements of Southern Command Signal Regiment.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> A major problem faced by the unit
was a shortage of secondary batteries. Against a deficiency of 700 secondary
batteries of 125/175 AHC (ampere hour capacity), the unit was able to get only
102 new batteries. These had to be put through the ‘initial charge’ before they
could be used. All available avenues such as the Police, Posts and Telegraphs
Department and the local market at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
were explored to get these batteries charged quickly. There was also an acute
shortage of portable batteries used by Signals as well as other units. Against
an overall shortage of over 2,000 portable batteries, only about 200 were
released. These were delivered on <st1:date day="24" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">24 December 1961</st1:date>, after the operation was over. As a
result, some units were forced to carry heavier 125/175 AHC batteries on
improvised manpack carriers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">11 December 1961</st1:date> the SO-in-C, Major General
R.N. Batra and CSO Southern Command, Brigadier Jaswant Singh, visited the unit
and discussed the Signals plan and the problems being faced by the unit. Most
of the demands placed by the unit earlier had already been met. Additional bids
for equipment and cable to meet the requirements of the operational plan were
examined and almost all were accepted. Brigadier Sagat Singh arrived in the
unit accompanied by Major R.R. Chatterji, OC 50 Parachute Brigade Signal
Company and joined the discussions. Two adhoc air-support tentacles had been
allotted to 50 Parachute Brigade for the operation. The Commander wanted them
to be given ASREX code documents, so that they were fully operational. This was
agreed to. Another demand of Brigadier Sagat Singh was for allotment of the
radio relay equipment that had recently been received from the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United Kingdom</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
The equipment was then located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>
still undergoing trials. Sagat offered to provide an aircraft from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city> to ship the
equipment so that it could reach in time. General Batra appreciated the offer
of the airlift, and agreed to provide the radio relay detachments from 1 Medium
Radio Relay Section that was already on its way for Operation ‘Vijay’. This
proved to be crucial in the success of 50 Parachute Brigade in the operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon after the departure of the
SO-in-C, the M1 (layout) group of the unit moved under Major M.D. Rana to the assembly
area at Tinaighat on the Londa-Anmod road, near the border. At about 2130 hours
that night, the CO gave out his orders to all officers. The unit moved out next
morning and by afternoon of 12 December, communications had been established at
the new location. Rearward communication to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> was provided on the permanent line
route from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
to Tinaighat railway station, which was extended to the location of 17 Division
by a carrier quad cable laid by the line detachment under Major D.S. Bawa from
Southern Command Signal Regiment. Wireless silence had been imposed and
communication was on line and SDS. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At Tinaighat, the unit received two
important reinforcements. One was a detachment from 1 Air Support Signal
Company under Captain Rangarajan. The second was No. 1 Medium Radio Relay
Section under Captain A.S. Kahlon to extend and bridge gaps in line communications
for 17 Infantry Division along the axis Tinaghat-Ponda-Pauda. Two detachments
of No. 1 Medium Radio Relay Section had been left earlier at Belgaum under
Captain G.A. Newton and allotted to 50 Parachute Brigade for similar tasks
along the axis -Belgaum-Sawantwadi-Banda. A carrier quad cable was laid between
Tinaighat and Custom Chauki for providing the carrier tail to the radio relay
terminal to work backwards to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>.
The next few days were spent in tying up loose ends. On 16 December the code
word ‘Bulldozer’ for commencement of the operations was received and it became
known that D Day was <st1:date day="18" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">18
December 1961</st1:date>. This was followed on 17 December by the codeword
‘Varaha’, signifying the permission for the Task Force to enter <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. All was now set for the commencement of Operation
‘Vijay’. The rearward communications to Tactical HQ Southern Command (<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>) were as given
below:-<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Three speech circuits
were derived on the two pairs of permanent line hired from the Posts and Telegraphs
department by mounting ACT 1+1 on one pair and using the other pair as
physical. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One telegraph circuit
was provided by mounting equipment <st1:place w:st="on">S+DX</st1:place> on the
physical pair and using a modified fullerphone, popularly known as
‘Tingaphone’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A wireless link using
radio telephony (RT) or speech was provided with <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> also as an outstation. A similar
wireless link using Radio Telegraphy (RTg), commonly referred to as a Continuous
Wave (CW) was also provided. Wireless silence was imposed on both links. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Forward
communications in 17 Infantry Division was as under:- <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">One speech and one telegraph
circuit were provided to 48 and 63 Brigades. For 50 Parachute Brigade, only a
speech circuit was provided through <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
military exchange. Two speech circuits were provided to HQ 17 Artillery Brigade
and one speech circuit to the divisional administrative area. Between main and
rear divisional headquarters, one speech and one telegraph circuit was
provided. Fullerphones were used on all telegraph circuits. To facilitate
traffic control, a direct line using D3/D8 cable was laid for the Provost from
Tinaighat to the start point at Custom Chauki. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Wireless nets D1, D2,
D4, D5, D8, S11 and S12 were provided. These were to stay on listening watch
until wireless silence was lifted. Two SCR 399 sets were provided, one at the
control of D1 net and the other for 50 Parachute Brigade. According to the unit
war diary, <i>‘due to the distance involved
and the fact that 50 Para Brigade was required to work on a different axis in
difficult country, it was essential to use 399 sets<b>’</b></i><b>.</b> Apparently, the
limited mobility of the heavy vehicle in which the set was mounted was not
taken into account, with calamitous results. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">For air support
communications two air support tentacles each were given to 63 Brigade and 50
Parachute Brigade, with the control station at the main divisional headquarters
where the joint operations centre (JOC) was also located. The ground liaison
officers’ (GLO) net was established with airfields at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
and Sambre (<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>).
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At 1630 hours on 17 December,
codeword ‘Menakshi’ was flashed to all concerned. This was the signal for all
wireless links to open at 2000 hours on the day frequency with a short tuning
call on CW. Meanwhile, Second-Lieutenant P.Z. Mani had joined 63 Brigade with a
jeep mounted No. 19 HP set to work as a relay station on D1 net. At 2000 hours,
all wireless links were opened as ordered. After establishing communications
the sets were closed down, with orders to open again at 0445 hours on 18
December, shortly before the commencement of advance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Fifteen minutes before the ‘H’ Hour
on <st1:date day="18" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">18 December 1961</st1:date>,
all wireless links were opened. According to the unit’s war diary, at 0730 hours
all stations were through, with the control station using wire aerials. At 1245hours,
Captain R.K. Bhavnani was sent out with a SCR 399 station to act as a relay
station. Apparently, the state of wireless communications deteriorated and it
was felt that this was due to extended ranges. The war diary entries of the day
tell their own story:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1400 hrs – Extended distance between forward troops to
Brigade HQ and Brigade HQ to Main Division is having its effect on wireless
communications. It is essential for troops using all means including Liaison
Officers if necessary to keep the higher HQ informed of latest
position/situation.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1600 hrs - Relay
stations manned by 2/Lt P.Z. Mani and Captain R.K. Bhavnani doing well.
Messages are being cleared between Ops Room Main Division, GOC’s Rover, and
Commander 50 Para Brigade.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1630 hrs – 50 Para Brigade reached CANDIAPAR River
far bank (TONY given). Medium Radio Relay terminal through from new location 50
Para Brigade back to BANDA. This has proved the ease of move and speedy
establishment of communications by means of radio relay terminal. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1635 hrs – Divisional Recce and Layout Party left to
recce new harbour area on Road MOLEM-PILIEM, inside GOA. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">1800 hrs – Commander Signals gave the following
orders:-<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(a)<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></i><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Cable
diagram to be made and left with detachment Southern Command Signal Regiment
for reeling including brigades (63 Infantry Brigade laid 7 miles to Start
Point)<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(b)<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></i><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Rear tyre of one 399 vehicle was punctured. As
there is no spare tyre, ferrying will have to be carried out. On arrival of Main
HQ in new location one wheel from another 399 vehicle will be removed to ferry
the first vehicle. The detachment will wait in the old area even if the Rear
Division moves out in the meantime.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">(c)<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></i><!--[endif]--><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Relay
station between Divisional Administrative Area and Rear Division to stay at
Start Point tonight and join Rear Division on 19 December morning. One L/Hav to
be briefed in detail about the road. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">2100 h - Commander Signals left with GSO 1 for area
MOLEM-PILEM to join up with the GOC’s Rover.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Both main and rear headquarters moved
out from their previous locations at 1130 hours. The movement was slow due to
the blown up bridges and craters on the road. Between Custom Chauki and Mollem,
the convoy was held up due to a damaged bridge that had earlier been built by
the Engineers. Apparently, both the main and rear headquarters had no
communications with anyone during this period. According to the war diary, <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">…the speed of advance of forward troops and lay of
the land had an adverse effect on wireless communications, including relay
stations. Difficulty of move on the main axis – YELLOW Route, particularly when
the HQ convoy was held up made efficient communications extremely difficult.
The road was so narrow throughout the ghats area that even a jeep could not
cross even in the same direction. This prevented the replacement of faulty equipment.
Lack of space off the road made it impossible even to sling wire aerials. The
present type of Command Vehicles proved to be entirely unsuitable in hilly area
with narrow and steep one way road. These vehicles are only suitable in the
plains and should in any case be replaced by smaller 1 ton 4X4 vehicles. </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
convoy of Main and Rear HQ 17 Infantry Division and Signals moved only at
midday on 19 December, after the road was cleared. By 0730 hours, both
headquarters were deployed on Road Molem – Ponda. At this time 48 Brigade was
in Ponda; 63 Brigade in Margao and 50 Parachute Brigade in Mapuca. All wireless
links were established but their performance was still unsatisfactory. It was
felt that this was due to the effect of iron and manganese in the soil. Mobile
wireless sets working on rod aerials or low slung wire aerials could not work
even over short distances. The war diary of the unit records:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <i>The
speed of advance of forward troops was particularly fast. It is however
essential that for effective command and control all HQ must stop at regular
intervals, put up proper wire aerials for communication to higher HQ and then
move on. If this temporary halt is not acceptable for tactical reasons then
commanders at all levels must ensure effective and frequent use of LOs or
possess speedy means of transport e.g. helicopters to visit subordinate HQ and
use of light aircraft e.g. Auster to communicate with forward troops. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Of course, there was no line
communications with the brigades or rearwards. The only line that existed was
between main and rear divisional headquarters on which one speech and one
fullerphone circuit was functioning. However, the unit was impressed with the
performance of the radio relay terminals that had been allotted. An entry in
the war diary records:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The requirement of
radio relay equipment as an integral part of an Infantry Division has been
proved beyond doubt. It should be available down to Battalion HQ for speedy
establishment of communication between Battalions and Brigade HQ and between
Brigade HQ and Divisional HQ.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The unit’s
suggestion to provide radio relay communications to battalions was obviously
unreasonable. At that time, radio relay terminals were mounted in vehicles,
with generators carried in trailers. The size of the Yagi aerials also made
their use impractical in battalions. In hindsight, it could be said that the
unit was literally asking for the moon. After 50 years, radio relay between
brigade and battalion has not been provided even in mechanized formations let
alone infantry and mountain divisions. The
logic for including recommendations in a war diary, which is a record of events
as and when they occur, is not clear. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
was liberated on <st1:date day="19" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">19
December 1961</st1:date>. However, the commitments of the unit did not end
immediately. Major General K.P. Candeth, GOC 17 Infantry Division was appointed
the Military Governor of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. On 21 December,
the main and rear divisional headquarters moved to Ponda. Colonel Juneja flew
to Panjim in a helicopter to tie up the communications for the Military
Governor. A detachment under Captain R.K. Bhavnani was positioned at Panjim to
provide communications to the Military Governor and his staff. A ten-line
exchange of Portuguese origin was installed and wireless links established to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>, <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>, in addition to a net working back to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. Line communications
were provided through the Panjim central exchange. On 25 December, the whole
unit moved to Panjim and took over the communications of the Military Governor’s
headquarters in addition to the forward communications to the brigades and to <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On <st1:date day="3" month="1" w:st="on" year="1962">3 January 1962</st1:date>, the unit moved into the
permanent buildings of the Portuguese Camp and established the signal centre and
exchange. On <st1:date day="24" month="1" w:st="on" year="1962">24 January 1962</st1:date>,
the unit handed over all commitments at <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> to
a detachment of Southern Command Signal Regiment and left <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>
by road for Desur. The unit was divided into three groups, comprising
personnel, vehicles and specialist vehicles. The first group entrained at Desur
on 25 January while the vehicles left by road for Kirkee, where they entrained
on 30 & <st1:date day="31" month="1" w:st="on" year="1962">31 January 1962</st1:date>.
By <st1:date day="5" month="2" w:st="on" year="1962">5 February 1962</st1:date>,
the entire unit except for 48 Infantry Brigade Signal Company, had arrived in
Ambala, in time to celebrate the Corps Anniversary on <st1:date day="15" month="2" w:st="on" year="1962">15 February 1962</st1:date>. This brought to an
end the role of the unit in Operation ‘Vijay’.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Many reasons have been advanced for the failure of
communications during the advance of 17 Infantry Division. Most of these
reasons are valid and deserve serious consideration and study, if only to avoid
similar occurrences in future operations. It may come as a surprise to many
that in 17 Infantry Division, the communications within the battalions
functioned well while the communications manned by Signals failed. Given that
the terrain was the same, how did this happen?
According to Brigadier P.Z. Mani, the communications between the
infantry battalion headquarters and companies was good because of the smaller
distances between them. Most of the time, the sets were between two spurs or
within the same re-entrant. If one company went ahead and was out of
communication with the battalion headquarters, the message was relayed by one
of the other companies. Alternately, the radio operator or officer would climb
up the spur and get through. On the
other hand, the distances between the control and outstations on the divisional
nets were larger, and often there were several spurs intervening between them.
Since the radio sets were heavier and used secondary batteries, the option of
carrying them manually to hill tops was not available. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As regards the reasons for the good performance of the
brigade nets of 50 Parachute Brigade, Brigadier Mani feels that this was due to
the difference in terrain over which they were operating. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">50 Parachute Brigade was deployed
from north to south along the coast or near the coast. They had a usable
road and open country, as they were almost along the sea. Another factor
was the type of equipment being used. Paratroopers use radio sets that are
lighter and can be man packed. This enabled them to move up the spurs in case
the signal strength was low.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As
mentioned earlier, relay stations were deployed before the advance commenced,
but these did not prove very effective. Brigadier Mani, who was manning one of
the relay stations, has this to say: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Captain RK Bhavnani, OC ‘A’
Section took out a relay station even before me with a 19 HP set. The 19
HP sets use a lot of battery capacity and the batteries require frequent
charging. The small charges are adequate for short periods and not for
large number of batteries required by 19 HP sets. During the move of the
battalions and the first brigade, Captain RK Bhavnani took a SCR 399
station to relay. That also was not effective as the SCR 399 required the
generator to be working all the time and Captain Bhavnani had to stop and relay
from a static node, which was in a valley again under high screening<b>”.</b></span></i><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Another factor was the lack of VHF
sets with the formation. The signal regiment and brigade signal companies were
holding HF sets such as RS 62 and RS 19 for forward communications. For rear
links, they were using RS 399 or RS 53 which were mounted in specialist called
Command Vehicle High Power (CVHP) or Command Vehicle Low Power (CVLP), which
had large generators under tow. As the first battalion entered the zigzag
hilly roads, even the 62 sets were found to be ineffective due to screening.
The heavier sets were found to be useless since they were installed in heavy
vehicles that could not get off the narrow roads, which were jammed. As soon as
they came out of the hills and reached the plains, communications improved. But
this was after the critical period was over. The only VHF sets that were
available were with the infantry battalions, for communication between company
and platoon. These functioned well, except for short period when they were
screened by intervening features. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Perhaps the most important factor
was the mental outlook of the officers and men, who had been operating in the
plains of the <st1:place w:st="on">Punjab</st1:place> and had got used to the
communications that existed in that area. On being moved suddenly to a
different region, they were not able to change their techniques to suit he new
environment. This lack of flexibility in mental outlook was perhaps the most
important factor for the problems that the unit faced. This is best described
by Brigadier Mani who states:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">17 Infantry Division and its
brigades were located in Ambala. We had intensive training for plains
warfare and we were good at it. The Signal Regiment had perfected drills
and communications to brigades on the move and never failed. Since
brigades could go on more than one axis (1 or 2) and if the distance to either
or the front brigades were stretched, we had perfected the relay station drill
which was very effective and never failed. The GSO2 (ops) who manned the
D1 link at the Divisional HQ and would pass the message to me at the relay
station and from the relay station I would pass on to the forward brigade
or brigades and back to the division and there were no failures at
all. But in Goa the situation was completely different due to the terrain
i.e. zigzag roads with high spurs and hilltops. If the two sets are
within a re-entrant communications were good, if the front set went beyond
the spur it was completely screened. It was impossible to lift the set
and go up the spur to rebroadcast as the sets and batteries were very
heavy. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 36.0pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">As far as I knew the orders from the
Army HQ to HQ 17 Division was to move at fastest pace and capture Goa. They
arranged the rolling stock and we were in Belgaum without
delay. Thereafter we had to drive a long divisional convoy along bad
underdeveloped roads. Then came the move down the steep curvy hill
roads. If one vehicle stopped the convoy could not move, as there was no
space for overtaking. We were not bold
enough to push a broken down vehicle down the hill and go ahead. The
plains movement plans and the fear of loss to the government in the loss of a vehicle and the explanation
that was to be given to the auditor was also a big thought in that
direction. This was paramount in our minds, as we were all in a peacetime,
auditable environment. Subsequently a stalled vehicle stopping the convoy
was thrown down the hill after the arms, ammunition and passengers were taken
out. </span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">13</span></sup><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 7.2pt 79.2pt 115.2pt 151.2pt 187.2pt 223.2pt 259.2pt 295.2pt 331.2pt 367.2pt; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As
mentioned earlier, Commander 50 Parachute Brigade was summoned to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="29" month="11" w:st="on" year="1961">29 November 1961</st1:date>. In the
afternoon all unit commanders were asked to assemble at the brigade headquarters
for a conference, which was chaired by Lieutenant Colonel Sucha Singh, VrC,
M.C., CO 1 <st1:place w:st="on">Para</st1:place>, in the absence of Brigadier
Sagat Singh who was still in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>. The assembled unit commanders were informed that
the brigade would move for operations at short notice. For a highly trained and
motivated formation like the 50 Parachute Brigade, moves did not pose much of a
problem, as load tables, tried and tested, existed for all contingencies. The
units had done it many times earlier and each individual knew precisely what he
had to do. However, the post <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Independence</st1:place></st1:city> period was
one of acute austerity and deficiencies existed in equipment and stores. Since the details of the projected operations
were not known and the brigade commander was not present, there was a slight
feeling of apprehension and uncertainty.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Major
R.R. Chatterji was then commanding 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company, with
Captain Vinod Kumar as the Second-in-Command.
The two section commanders, who also carried out the functions of Quarter
Master and Mechanical Transport Officer, were Lieutenants G.C. Sah and M.S. ‘Tilly’
Ahluwalia. Captain Vinod Kumar was on annual leave and had just got
married. Inevitably, he had to be
recalled and he arrived back in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>
with his wife on <st1:date day="2" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">2 December
1961</st1:date> just in time to be briefed by the OC, who was leaving by the
first train. He was to bring up the
vehicles and equipment, which were to follow in a special train subsequently.
Fortunately, Agra was home not only for 50 Parachute Brigade but also the Central
Ordnance Depot which held signal equipment for the entire Army, as well
as 509 Base Workshop which specialized in repairs to such equipment. Both these
establishments were imbued with the ‘para’ spirit and went out of their way in
making up deficiencies, repairing wireless sets and initial charging of a large
number of secondary batteries. This was done on a war footing, and according to
Major R.R. Chatterji, these two establishments were the first ones in action in
Operation ‘Vijay’. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Most
of the men of the company left by the first military special on <st1:date day="2" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">2 December 1961</st1:date> along with
the Major Chatterji and Lieutenant Sah. Captain Vinod Kumar and Lieutenant M.S. Ahluwalia
followed in the vehicles special that carried the vehicles and equipment. The <i>Panditji</i> (Religious Teacher) of the company,
Naib Subedar Dogra, was left as OC of the rear elements left at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Agra</st1:place></st1:city>. The railway staff had
also caught the war fever and ensured that all trains moved speedily, sometimes
to the discomfiture of the troops, who complained that they hardly got a chance
to stop and cook! This was a refreshing change from the past experience of having
to chivvy the railways to keep a military special moving.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">By 6 December, most of the
personnel of 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company were established near between kilometres
9 and 14 on road Belgaum – Savantwadi. Since the first party had moved without
its equipment, rudimentary communications were established between the major
units and the brigade headquarters on an omnibus circuit using the cable of the
battalions. The vehicle and equipment party caught up subsequently, having
moved by road from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>.
In spite of being short of equipment, in true para spirit the company agreed to
loan a complete SCR 399 wireless station and its associated PE 95 generator to 17
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, which had recently been raised and was
woefully short of equipment. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> On
12 December the unit moved to the forward concentration area near Savantwadi. Brigadier
Jaswant Singh, CSO Southern Command, visited the company at Savantwadi and gave
them the welcome news that they would be allotted a section of the new radio relay
equipment, C 41/R222 which had recently been inducted and was still undergoing
trials. Since the equipment was still on trial, he stressed that it should be
handled with kid gloves as any damage would cause embarrassment. From path
profiles that had been drawn it appeared that communications could only be
established on radio relay once the forward terminal reached Bicholim. This was
the only planned direct communication from HQ 50 Parachute Brigade to the
Tactical HQ Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>.
Radio communication to the rear was to be established with HQ 17 Division once
radio silence had been broken at H Hour.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
parachute brigade moved out of Savantwadi and was in Dodamarg by the evening of
17 December. Since radio silence had been imposed and lines could not be laid
at such short notice, it was known that the brigade would be without rearward
communications till H Hour, when it would come up on the wireless net of 17
Infantry Division. By a stroke of good luck, an unused permanent line route of
the Posts and Telegraphs Department was found at Dodamarg, running very close
to the radio relay terminal. The intrepid signallers of 50 Parachute Brigade
Signal Company commandeered the line for use as a ‘tail’ from the brigade headquarters
to the radio relay terminal. By evening of 17 December the brigade exchange had
a direct line to Tactical HQ Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>. When the CSO was informed of this
development he was agreeably surprised. This had a sequel though – after the
operations 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company had to explain why it had
resorted to such unauthorized tactics. In response the unit tendered its
unqualified apology and promised not to do so ever again in future operations.<sup>14</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Radio
silence was broken at 0500 hours on <st1:date day="18" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">18 December 1961</st1:date>. While forward nets functioned well, communications
to 17 Infantry Division were not satisfactory. Major Chatterji and Captain
George Newton, who was in charge of the radio relay detachment, had earlier
decided to try the equipment from Dodamarg and other intermediate positions
before reaching the planned location at Bicholim. Hence, the rear terminal had
been asked to remain on listening watch from first light on 18 December. Once the forward terminal at Dodamarg was
switched on it got through immediately and the CSO Southern Command had his
second pleasant surprise within a matter of twelve hours when the Major
Chatterji spoke to him and gave him the latest situation report. However, the
radio relay terminal had to be closed after the brigade headquarters moved
forward. Due to breakdown in radio communications with 17 Infantry Division, 50
Parachute Brigade had no rearward communications until the radio relay terminal
was again set up at Bicholim.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
major problem faced by the advancing troops was not from enemy opposition but
the terrain. The infantry elements had to overcome the problem of blown bridges,
which in view of the feebleness of opposition could be overcome by using water
crossing expedients or rounding up ferries and boats manned by enthusiastic
locals. For Signals, the biggest difficulty was the choked roads blocked by bigger
vehicles of the bridging column, which had been given priority in the move
plan, in anticipation of blown bridges. As a result, the brigade command
vehicles got mixed up with the bridging vehicles and could not reach the brigade
headquarters until after Panjim had been entered. Fortunately, the brigade
major had moved ahead of the bridging convoy with the step up and a reserve
radio detachment, both in jeeps, and so forward command communication to the
battalions and the armour could be maintained.
The brigade forward net had a 19 HP set at the control and mostly man
pack 62 sets as out stations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Though
the speed of advance of 50 Parachute Brigade was swift, Tactical HQ Southern
Command at Belgaum remained in the dark, due to breakdown in wireless
communication in 17 Infantry Division once its communication vehicles entered a
screened area in the region of Anmod and got stuck there among their own
complement of broken down bridging vehicles. They managed to get through to
their own brigades at about 0800 hours on 19 December by establishing a relay
station at Mollem. The division got
through to the parachute brigade only intermittently. In the afternoon a message was received by
the brigade to halt all further advances and firm in where they were as the
advance would be resumed by 48 and 63 Infantry Brigades the next day on the
axes Ponda-Panjim and Margao-Mormugao respectively. The said message was cleared to the
battalions. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Sometime
in the afternoon of 18 December, an IAF aircraft was sent to find out what was
happening on the front of 50 Parachute Brigade. It flew over the brigade headquarters
and dropped a message. Unfortunately it was fired upon with small arms when it
flew over 2 Sikh Light Infantry, but suffered no damage except for two bullet
holes in its wings. The battalion could not be blamed as the aircraft had no
identifying marks under the wings. As if in retaliation, four Vampires of the
IAF put in a set piece rocket attack on 17 Para Field Regiment which was
deployed in the region of Piliem. Once again, the damage was slight - a damaged
trailer wheel. Here again, it was not the IAF’s fault as 50 Parachute Brigade
had gone beyond the initially fixed bomb lines and corrections could not be
sent as the rear links were not operational. Major Chatterji had been visiting
the artillery unit and had just left when the attack was launched. He saw the
attack from a few hundred meters away and rushed back to pass the information
back to Tactical HQ Southern Command. Fortunately, when he got back to brigade
headquarters, he found Captain Newton there with his radio relay terminal. The
set was opened and communications to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
established immediately. The first message passed back was to request the IAF
to “cease and desist”.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As the sun went down, the wireless
nets began to misbehave and brigade headquarters lost touch for good with 17
Infantry Division. Even the battalions, at the limit of radio range, were
barely in communication. However, they had been told of 17 Division’s embargo
on further advance. A message came through from Tactical HQ Southern Command that
the Army Commander would visit 1 Para at Banasterim at 0930 hours on 19 December.
This was communicated to 1 Para, but this was the last message that could be
cleared to any battalion that night, as the ionospheric conditions made
communication impossible till just before dawn the next day. Immediately after
this, General Chaudhuri spoke to the brigade major on radio relay, which was
still working, and told him that he had reliable information that the
Portuguese were ready to surrender and ordered the parachute brigade to move
into Panjim early next morning. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> When
this message was received at the brigade headquarters, Major R.R. Chatterji was
away on reconnaissance in Bicholim to assess the tele-communication resources in
the town. On his return he found his Second-in-Command, Captain Vinod Kumar,
about to set off with the message to 1 Para, who were the nearest. However,
both the brigade major and OC signal company felt that Vinod’s life at that
juncture could not be thrown away as they had, only a few days before, torn him
out of the arms of a brand new wife. Sending anyone else at that late hour was
also inadvisable as the route was unmarked and there were mines on the way.
Fortunately, after a tense night, the brigade forward net got through before
dawn and both 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry were given the go ahead to race
into Panjim. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Soon
after the entry of Indian troops into Panjim, the Army Commander arrived. His
helicopter landed about three kilometres outside Panjim where he was met by the
bridge major and the signal company commander, the brigade commander being away
with the divisional commander. The brigade major took the Army Commander into Panjim.
Major Chatterji followed in a jeep with a radio set, with the Army Commander’s
pilot, Squadron Leader Liddel accompanying him. Since the roads were choked
with cheering crowds, the rear jeep got separated and was misdirected on to a
wrong road. As a result, Chatterji and Liddel found themselves at the Cortalim
ferry miles away from Panjim and on an uncleared axis. At the ferry they found some sour faced
Portuguese officers and men and also noticed a number of armoured cars in an
adjacent grove with their guns painting menacingly in their direction. They did a quick about turn and got away as
fast as possible. According to the Liddel, Chatterji’s Jeep moved faster than
his aircraft. Just outside Panjim, they
met 1 Para advancing towards them in extended order. The CO, Lieutenant Colonel Sucha Singh was
not a little surprised. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The Army Commander, after visiting
various installations and the Portuguese military hospital was just leaving Panjim
when Major Chatterji and the pilot caught up with them. Fortunately, they had not been missed. On being noticed, a number of messages addressed
to Army HQ and Tactical HQ Southern Command were handed over to Major Chatterji.
He had them cleared to the brigade headquarters from where they were cleared on
radio relay to Tactical HQ Southern Command. The message to the Chief of Army
Staff read: <i>“Entered PANJIM to tumultuous
welcome (.) Am going to try and find 17 Div now”</i>.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the Army Commander took off,
the brigade major took the radio Jeep and got back to the brigade headquarters Major
Chatterji’s Jeep got stuck till late in the evening between two ferries, as the
rear elements of 1 Para were moving up in the opposite direction. Major
Chatterji and his driver had not eaten anything that day and were agreeably
surprised when the cheerful proprietress of a Taverno, housed in a dilapidated
mud hut in a small village brought out chilled Becks beer out of a kerosene-powered
refrigerator and charged only one rupee for a bottle. Major Chatterji being
fully aware of his responsibility towards government transport restricted the
drivers to one bottle of beer with their lunch. There being no such constraint
in his case (the driver having been reinstated to driving by then) he had a
more substantial lunch. They managed to
get back to the brigade headquarters by the evening.<b> </b><sup>15</sup> <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">1 Medium Radio Relay Section<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-top: 12.0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 1
Medium Radio Relay Section (1 MRRS) had been raised as an independent unit in
1959 at Delhi to conduct trials on multi channel radio relay equipment imported
from UK. The initial trials were conducted on radio set SPO 50-50, which was being
used by the British Post Office. The civilian system could not satisfy the
stringent military requirements of terrain and climate. In 1960 the unit received eight RS C41/R222,
the militarized radio relay equipment developed by ATE Bridgeworth<b> </b>for the British Army. The equipment
provided only the radio and had to be integrated with indigenously developed
multichannel equipment ACT 1+4 for multiplexing. The militarized system was found suitable and
approved as the standard system for multichannel radio relay communications in
the Indian Army. Additional sets were
ordered and received during 1961. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Operational and technical control of
1 Medium Radio Relay Section was exercised by Signals Directorate at Army
HQ. On 9 December 1961 at about 11 am the
OC, Captain A.S. Kahlon was summoned urgently to the office of the SO-in-C, Major
General R.N. Batra, where Brigadier Jaswant Singh, CSO Southern Command was
also present. On being asked by General
Batra how soon could he move for an operational task, Kahlon replied “Within two
hours, Sir”. He was told to move as soon as possible and report to CSO Southern
Command in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>,
where he would be told his task. As both
subalterns posted to the section were away on course or leave, orders were
issued on telephone to attach Captain G.A. Newton, who had been assigned the
task of raising a radio relay section at Lucknow, to move overnight to 1 Medium
Radio Relay Section. Two detachments were provided by 1 Army HQ Air Support
Signal Unit at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> At 0900 hours
on <st1:date day="10" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">10 December 1961</st1:date>,
the personnel and equipment of 1 Medium
Radio Relay Section under Captain Rangarajan reached <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New
Delhi</st1:place></st1:city> railway station where Captain G.A. Newton
reported on attachment. As the military
special that had been allotted to the section had spare capacity other elements
of Army, Air Force and Navy were accommodated as they arrived on the
station. The military special left at
about 1600 hours under Captain Kahlon, who was nominated as the OC Train. On
reaching Kirkee near <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
on 11 December, the section detrained.
Kahlon and Rangarajan proceeded to HQ Southern Command where Lieutenant
Colonel V.C. Khanna, the SO 1 (Signals), issued them further instructions.
After topping up at Southern Command Signal Regiment overnight, the section
moved by road to Belgaum at first light on 12 December, arriving there next
afternoon after an overnight halt at Kolhapur. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At Advance HQ Southern Command at Belgaum, Major
Fonseca, the SO 2 (Signals) tasked the section to extend/bridge the line of communication (LOC) along Axis
Tinaghat-Anmod-Panjim and Sawantwadi-Bicholim-Panjim to support the advance of
17 Infantry Division and 50
Parachute Brigade respectively. It
was decided to allocate four radio relay detachments to engineer two links or a
chain over two hops to support operations of 17 Infantry
Division and two radio relay detachments to provide the link rear wards
from HQ 50 Parachute Brigade. The section less two detachments under
Captain A.S. Kahlon along with the detachments of 1 Air Support Signal Unit
left at first light on 15 December for Tinaighat where HQ 17 Infantry Division
was located. Captain Newton with two detachments reported to HQ 50 Parachute Brigade
at Sawantwadi on the same day. The radio
relay detachments were attached to the respective formations for
administration, while their operational and technical control was with CSO Southern
Command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Captain Kahlon discussed the deployment
and outline plan for provision of radio relay communications with the General
Staff of HQ 17 Infantry Division, and obtained their approval for pre D Day reconnaissance
up to Custom Chauki and grouping of radio
relay detachments with the divisional reconnaissance party. Captain Kahlon and Havildar Onkar Singh, the
detachment commander of the anchor station to be located in area of Custom Chauki,
were escorted by 4 Sikh Light Infantry which was deployed in the area during
early hours of 17 December. The anchor
detachment moved into the site at Custom Chauki at last and line detachments of
Southern Command Signal Regiment under Major Bawa laid the carrier quad cable from
Tinaighat to the anchor station the same night.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The forward detachments advanced with
the reconnaissance party of the main divisional headquarters at last light on
18 December. Due to the narrow and
congested road axis the vehicular movement was slow, and the party reached
Ponda only at <st1:time hour="12" minute="0" w:st="on">midday</st1:time> on 19
December. The divisional headquarters representative
decided to use the Portuguese Army barracks (the present location of 6 Technical
Training Regiment of 2 STC) for the main divisional headquarters and the signal
regiment. Since the location did not afford suitable radio line of sight (RLOS)
for VHF communications, Captain Kahlon moved the radio relay detachments about
a kilometre ahead towards Panjim. The detachments
deployed at about 1500 hours and immediately got through to link Ponda to
Custom Chauki. The line party of the
divisional signal regiment laid two pairs of local tails on WD cable to
terminate two channels derived over the radio relay system to Advance HQ
Southern Command well before the arrival of the main divisional headquarters in
the evening. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> As described earlier, 50 Parachute
Brigade was ordered to capture Panjim thanks to the rearward communication link
provided on radio relay by Captain Newton. After the capture of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> on <st1:date day="19" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">19
December 1961</st1:date>, the radio relay detachments earmarked for Panjim
moved forward with Captain Kahlon on 21 December to augment the communications
being organized for the tactical divisional headquarters established for the
GOC, General Candeth, who had taken over as Military Governor. As the main axis was still not open to
vehicular traffic, the route followed was Ponda-Margo-Marmagoa-Panjim. While
passing through Bambolim, Captain Kahlon saw some high towers with aerials in the
barracks and drove in to investigate. He
discovered that it was Portuguese Defence Services wireless station for
communicating to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lisbon</st1:place></st1:city>
and other enclaves. It had been engaged
earlier by the Indian Air Force and the personnel manning the installation had
fled. The mains standby power to the
SWAB 8 high power transmitter and associated Hillicraft receiver was still on
and the equipment intact. The radio
relay detachment reached Altinho in Panjim at about 1600 hours and immediately
got through to Ponda. The speech channels
were extended to the field exchange established for the tactical divisional
headquarters the same evening, providing a linkage to the main divisional
headquarters at Ponda and to Advance HQ Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>.
The radio relay terminal was located in the vicinity of the present officers’
mess of HQ 2 STC which was being used as a prisoner of war camp for captured
Portuguese soldiers. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Elements of HQ 17 Infantry Division
and 17 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment kept moving into Altinho area in Panjim
over the next few days. Carrier quad tails were laid on priority from the radio
relay terminal to their exchange/signal centre.
The radio relay chain was re-engineered during the night on 24 December
to get through directly from Panjim to Custom Chauki, to provide four channels
for speech/telegraph directly to Tactical HQ Southern Command at Belgaum over
the channelling equipment which had been installed by the Posts & Telegraphs
Department. With the closing down of the relay station at Ponda its two radio
relay detachments were moved, one each
to Custom Chauki and Altinho as standby. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Prior to Operation ‘Vijay’, there
was only a single wire permanent line earth return circuit from Custom Chauki
to Panjim for telegraph traffic to <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. The
Posts & Telegraphs Department put in considerable effort to convert this
route to take on their multichannel equipment under Mr. A.K. Bannerjee who was working
with CSO Southern Command. On his request
on 25 December, after approval by Brigadier Jaswant Singh, as an interim measure
one speech channel derived over the radio relay system was extended for
termination on the Panjim central battery civil exchange. The termination posed a technical problem as
the ACT 1+4 working over the radio relay system catered only for magneto calling. The limitation was overcome by a minor
modification at the civil exchange. The termination of this channel patched the
Indian Posts & Telegraphs communications provisionally to Panjim the same
day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">After the direct line from Poona to Belgaum was put
through on 29 December, it was decided that one radio relay detachment be left
at Panjim and another at Custom Chauki as a standby to speech and telegraph
circuits that had been provided on lines. The rest of 1 Medium Radio Relay
Section was ordered to move back on 30 December. Before they left, they were
asked to perform another task. Soon after the liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>,
Mr. Neurikar of All India Radio had requested the help of the Army to sort out
and salvage the equipment left by Emissora de Goa, the Portuguese broadcasting
station in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>. On directions of the Military Governor,
Captain G.A. Newton was made available for this assignment from 25 to 29
December. With his assistance, the engineers of All India Radio soon rigged up
a 5 Kilowatt transmitter at Bambolim. On completion of its task, 1 Medium Radio
Relay Section, less the two standby detachments mentioned earlier, left on 30
December 1961 for Belgaum enroute to Delhi under the OC, Captain A.S. Kahlon,
along with Captain G.A Newton who was on attachment. The 1 Air Support Signal
Unit detachments joined at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>
the same day for the road move next day for <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>, arriving there after a night halt in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Kolhapur</st1:place></st1:city> on <st1:date day="1" month="1" w:st="on" year="1962">1 January 1962</st1:date>. Entraining at Poona on a special train on 3
January, the section arrived at Delhi on 4 January 1962, four weeks after it had
left the station.<sup>16</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> By all accounts, the performance of
1 Medium Radio Relay Section during Operation ‘Vijay’ was commendable. It was a
fledgling unit, still in the process of finding its feet, using equipment on
which the men had not been fully trained. In spite of these handicaps, it
provided reliable communications, which proved crucial for the success of the
operations. Considering the lack lustre performance of signal units with
considerably larger resources, the officers and men of the section deserve high
praise. In fact, the performance of this small unit was one of the redeeming
features of signal communications during Operation ‘Vijay’, which served to
dilute the harsh criticism that Signals was subjected to for its overall
performance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Southern
Command Signals <o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
operations for the liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place> were
conceived and planned by GOC-in-C Southern Command, while the actual execution
was the responsibility of GOC 17 Infantry Division, the Task Force
Commander. A soon as Brigadier Jaswant
Singh, CSO Southern Command, came to know that the decision to undertake
military operations had been taken, he sought permission to visit Belgaum,
which was to be the concentration area for the troops taking part in the
operation as well as the Advance HQ Southern Command. His visit brought to
light certain factors that had a bearing on communications. Southern Command
Signals would have to cater for rearward communications of the Task Force. He
felt that there would be no problem providing communications from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city> up to <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>, provided a representative
of the Posts and Telegraphs Department of reasonable seniority was placed under
Army control. Fortunately, the Government of India held a similar view. One
fine morning Brigadier Jaswant Singh received a call from the Secretary,
Ministry of Communications, Mr. Nanjappa, who informed him that one Mr. A.K.
Banerjee was going to be attached to HQ Southern Command. He requested that he
should be given all assistance in the execution of his tasks and that this had
the Government’s approval. Brigadier Jaswant Singh’s initial reaction was
negative. He had his own tasks to perform, and did not like someone from the
Posts and Telegraphs Department being foisted on him. He told Mr. Nanjappa that
he was happy to hear that Mr. Banerjee was coming to his headquarters, but he
hoped that his first priority was military requirements until the operations
were over. Very tactfully, he suggested that Mr. Banerjee should be under
control of or in support of HQ Southern Command, but if the Government’s
perception of his duties was different then he had better have a talk with the
Army Commander. This did the trick – Mr. Nanjappa agreed to place Mr. Banerjee
under CSO Southern Command. In the event, he proved to be a great asset both as
an individual and as a senior representative of his Ministry. Brigadier Jaswant
Singh informed the Army Commander who approved the arrangement. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Brigadier
Jaswant Singh was able to appreciate the difficulties that would be faced by
Signals because of the terrain. He writes:-<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 33.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Another factor
that stood out was that on the main axis the road from the border into Goa was
very narrow and only 44 miles long. Therefore heavy vehicles would be very
restricted in allocation of sufficient road space. Therefore, I suggested that
it would be best not to “Overload” the Divisional Signal Regiment with too much
equipment and Signal stores. I offered to create a suitable ad hoc Advance Signal
stores dump or Depot from where the Signal Regiment could draw equipment and
stores as required. But Commander Signals 17 Division had different views: he
wanted everything authorized in the Regiment’s Equipment Tables plus more – e.g.,
I still remember that 180 miles of D8 Twisted Cable was demanded. Even the
Chief of Staff suggested that since the total distance to Panjim was only 44
miles, this demand was far too much. In the end the Regiment did get 180 miles
of cable, but in the event very little of it was used if at all.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 33.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Troops were to
cross the border on night D-1, and the Main Divisional HQ was to be located on
our side of the border up to which all line and wireless channels as required were
laid and began working beautifully. However, after about 2 hrs of H Hr, no
officer could be contacted and therefore no calls from Command HQ could be put
through to Division on any channel line, Radio Telephony or wireless
message. I therefore decided to send a
senior officer from the Command Signal Regiment in a jeep wireless detachment to
find out and report immediately the problem, and at least to restore some one channel
to Main HQ.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 33.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; tab-stops: 31.5pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> What he found on reaching there was classic. All heavy vehicles, including wireless vehicles
working back to Command HQ were left behind and most officers of Divisional HQ
had moved forward behind the leading troops!
All the important officers of the Divisional Signal Regiment similarly
had moved forward minus any means of communications. And no vehicle was permitted forward of the
Traffic Control point without a very high level permit.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 39.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">…..On the other
hand, communications with 50 Para Brigade worked all right – until they went
under command 17 Division.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 39.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Perhaps 17 Division
had some justification. The road was
indeed bad, the second Brigade of the Division had to be pushed forward from
the positions gained by the initial Brigade, and on top of it all, the Chief of
the General Staff, Army HQ, was to land near the forward Brigade. On the other hand, the Commander Signals who
could have made do with lighter wireless sets was keen on the higher powered
sets only and these were left well behind.
In any case, the operations were moving too fast for them to react
really efficiently.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 39.0pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> …..In
general, it is evident from the official history of Goa Operations that not
only did the links back did not work, but also their links forward, and to 50
Para Brigade were not a roaring success.
Fortunately, there was little opposition from the enemy and nothing
serious happened.</span></i><sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> 17</span></sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 36.0pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: center;">
<st1:place w:st="on"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DAMAN</span></u></b></st1:place><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The Portuguese enclave of <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> lay at the entrance of the <st1:place w:st="on">Gulf
of Cambay</st1:place> about 100 miles north of <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Bombay</st1:place></st1:city> and had an area of 22 square miles. A
tarmac road connected it to the former settlement of Nagar Haveli. The
Portuguese strength in <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place> was estimated to
be three companies consisting of 360 all ranks. (It was later found to be an
underestimation). In addition there were some police and customs outposts along
the border contiguous with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The task of liberating <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
was given to 1 Maratha Light Infantry, which was located at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>. The CO was Lieutenant Colonel S.J.S.
Bhonsle. The original plan was to commence the operation in Daman some time
after Goa had been entered, but it was subsequently decided to launch it
simultaneously. The unit was allotted one battery of field guns, an air control
team and two Auster aircraft for air observation post tasks. The Navy was to
assist by blockading the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">port</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Daman</st1:placename></st1:place> and the Air
Force would provide some pre-arranged sorties for close air support. The
battalion was given a Signals detachment equipped with a WS 399 for
communicating with Tactical HQ Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city> and a VHF set for ground to air
communications.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
battalion moved from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Poona</st1:place></st1:city>
by train on 12 December and arrived at Vapi in the early hours of the morning
of 13 December, detraining silently so as not to cause alarm among the local
population. The next few days were spent in reconnoitring the border and
spreading a rumour through the local police and civil officials that the force
that had arrived was only an advance party, to be built up to a brigade
supported by armour. As a deception measure, a platoon accompanied by a party
from the State Reserve Police was to threaten Moti Daman from the south and
liquidate Portuguese outposts on that side. On 17 December, the battalion was informed
that D Day for the operation was 18 December and they could commence the
offensive. Two hours after <st1:time hour="0" minute="0" w:st="on">midnight</st1:time>, two companies advanced
towards their objectives, the flying control tower and Post 175. Both companies
captured their objectives, with minor casualties. However, surprise had been
lost and the Portuguese were ready to retaliate. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> After
a rocket attack by the Air Force on the Big Fort at first light on 18 December,
the operations commenced for the capture of Nani Daman. However, the Portuguese
offered stiff resistance, bringing down fire on the attacking troops with
medium machine guns, mortars and artillery. By the end of the day, the two attacking
companies had made little progress, and the CO asked them to firm in for the
night, deciding to move up the reserve companies for a fresh attack next
morning. At about 0745 hours on 19 December two Mystere aircraft fired rockets
at the Big Fort and some guns near a temple inside the town. Half an hour
later, the Portuguese surrendered. The Governor, Antonio Jose Da Costa Pinto,
who was himself wounded, signed an unconditional surrender at 0830 hours. By
1300 hours the town was occupied by Indian troops. About 600 white soldiers,
seven 25 pounder guns, eight 81-mm mortars and large amount of small arms and
ammunition was captured. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> Unlike,
in <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, the local population did not greet the
Indian troops, being unsure of their conduct. Being used to atrocities at the
hands of the Portuguese, they expected similar treatment from the victors. It
was only after a few days that they began coming out of their houses and going
about their daily business. The Indian casualties in the operation were one JCO
and three OR killed; and one JCO and 13 OR wounded. The Portuguese casualties
were 10 killed and two wounded. The total number of prisoners was 853,
including 24 officers, 544 soldiers, nine Portuguese police, 268 local police
and eight Portuguese civilians.<sup>18</sup><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">DIU<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">island</st1:placetype>
of <st1:placename w:st="on">Diu</st1:placename></st1:place> lies off the southern
extremity of the <st1:place w:st="on">Kathiawar</st1:place> peninsula separated
from it by a narrow creek. It was the
smallest of the Portuguese possessions in India, having an area of about 38
square kilometres and a population of 14,280 according to the 1960 census. Like
<st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>, the strength of troops holding <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> was estimated to be 360, which again turned out to be
an underestimation. The task of
capturing <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> was given to Brigadier Jaswant
Singh, Commander 112 Infantry Brigade, which was located at Ahmedabad. The troops allotted to him were 20 Rajput; a
company of 4 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city>;
and an air control team from Air Force station <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jamnagar</st1:place></st1:city>. The Navy was to support the
operation by positioning the cruiser I.N.S. <i>Delhi</i>
off the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:placetype w:st="on">island</st1:placetype> of
<st1:placename w:st="on">Diu</st1:placename></st1:place>, who would be prepared
to engage targets but fire in close support of troops. The Air Force would provide limited air
support in the form of some pre-arranged sorties from <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jamnagar</st1:place></st1:city>. Communications for the operation
were provided by 112 Infantry Brigade Signal Company. In addition to being an
outstation on the brigade command net, 20 Rajput was to have a direct link with
Tactical HQ Southern Command at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Belgaum</st1:place></st1:city>.
For this purpose, a Signals detachment equipped with one WS 399 would accompany
20 Rajput. A wireless link would also be established with INS <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><i>Delhi</i></st1:place></st1:city><i>.</i> For air support communications, a
ground to air link between the aircraft and the air control team that would
accompany the battalion was provided, in addition to a link to the IAF station
Jamnagar.<sup>19</sup><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">According to the operation orders, 20 Rajput, under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bhupinder Singh, was to carry out an assault
crossing of the tidal creek at low tide south of Kob at night and then move on
to capture Diu airfield, followed by Diu town.
An hour before the assault by 20 Rajput, C Company of 4 <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Madras</st1:place></st1:city> under Major C.W Curtis was to capture
Gogla on the mainland near the eastern border of <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>
opposite the citadel, and then await further orders. The troops were to
concentrate at Una by <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">15
December 1961</st1:date>. The force commenced its move from Ahmedabad on 13
December. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Moving in three stages, via <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Rajkot</st1:place></st1:city> and Veraval, they arrived at Una on <st1:date day="15" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">15 December 1961</st1:date>. Next
evening, Mr. Bernardo, the Police Commissioner of <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>
met Mr. Jadeja, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Junagadh and told him: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-right: 44.5pt; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">“<i>We know that
we would be defeated but we will fight. We hope you will treat us nicely when
we lose</i>”<i>.</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">At 2100 hours that night, All India Radio broadcast
a distorted version of Mr. Bernardo’s conversation, announcing that the Portuguese
in <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> were ready to surrender. Shortly
afterwards, the Army Commander spoke on telephone to the brigade commander, who
gave him the correct version. On 17 December the codeword for commencement of
operations against <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> was received from
Tactical HQ Southern Command. At 0130 hours on 18 December, C Company 4 Madras
launched the assault on Gogla. However,
the enemy brought down heavy fire from small arms and 25-pounder guns on the
attacking troops, who did not have any artillery to counter it. After a bitter
fight, the company was forced to withdraw at 0400 hours. The second attack at 0630
met the same fate and several men were wounded. The attempt by 20 Rajput to
force the crossing was delayed due to the long march over soft and marshy
ground, leading to loss of surprise. Two companies launched their improvised
boats in the creek opposite at 0230 hours, an hour after the attack by the
Madrassi Company. As both companies reached the middle of the creek, the
Portuguese opened up with medium and light machine guns, sinking two of the
four boats. Two men were killed and 15 wounded including one of the company
commanders. The crossing was abandoned at 0500 hours and the troops had to
return to the home bank. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Realizing that it would be difficult to counteract
the enemy’s defensive fire without artillery support, a message was flashed to
I.N.S.<i> Delhi,</i> indicating the targets
that needed to be neutralized. The Air Force also started engaging targets
after first light. On being informed of the situation, the Army Commander
directed that no attempt should be made to cross the creek during day. The Navy
and Air Force should be asked to engage Diu Fort and the coastline opposite
Gogla, which could then be captured at night. This proved to be quite effective
and by evening the enemy guns fell silent. At about 0845 hours a Portuguese
officer came over with a message from the Governor of Diu offering to surrender
with a request that all Portuguese nationals be permitted to seek protection in
Brazilian embassy. The message was relayed to the Army Commander who directed
that only an unconditional surrender was to be accepted. The Portuguese were
informed at 2130 hours that if they did not surrender unconditionally by 0900
hours next day, the attacks would start again. At 0830 hours on <st1:date day="19" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">19 December 1961</st1:date> the
Governor agreed to surrender unconditionally and Indian troops began to enter <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place>. At a ceremony held at 1100 hours the Governor of Diu
personally surrendered to Brigadier Jaswant Singh, with 16 officers, 43
sergeants and 333 soldiers laying down their arms. The Portuguese casualties in
the operation were one killed and 22 wounded. The Indian casualties were eight
killed and 17 wounded. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The
liberation of <st1:place w:st="on">Goa</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st="on">Daman</st1:place>
and <st1:place w:st="on">Diu</st1:place> in 1961 was an important landmark in the
history of post independence <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Though it cannot be termed a major operation in military terms – the
overwhelming superiority of Indian troops made it an unequal contest, with the
outcome foregone – it was nevertheless important for the Indian Army. Being the
first conclusive military victory after 1947, it imbued the public with
confidence in the prowess of the armed forces. The swiftness of the operation
and the finesse with which it was conducted came in for praise from all
quarters. However, the operation was not without glitches, especially for
Signals, which suffered perhaps its first major breakdown in communications
during a military operation. For this reason, Operation ‘Vijay’ is of special
interest and significance for signallers, bringing out several important
lessons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"> The problems faced by 17 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment were genuine. However, they were not new. Units that
took part in the <st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Jammu and Kashmir</st1:place></st1:state>
operations in 1947-48 had faced similar problems and learned how to overcome
them. For Signals, breakdown of communications is an unforgivable sin, and 17
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment cannot be absolved of blame in this
respect. The lack of mobility of heavy vehicles in hilly terrain should have
been foreseen. The move of both main and rear divisional headquarters at the
same time violated the time-tested principle of ‘one leg on the ground’, and
should have been objected to by Signals.
The failure of the unit to cater for a spare tyre for a vehicle as
important as the command vehicle in the divisional headquarters is surprising,
considering the unstinted support it received from everyone, all its demands
being met by higher headquarters. Fortunately,
Operation ‘Vijay’ succeeded due to the absence of opposition by Portuguese
forces. Consequently, Signals escaped the embarrassment of being censured for
the breakdown of communications during a crucial phase of the operations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-right: .5pt; text-align: center;">
<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">ENDNOTES
TO CHAPTER 3<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(This
chapter is largely based on the official history published by the History
Division, Ministry of Defence viz. P.N. Khera’s, <i>Operation Vijay – The Liberation of Goa and Other Portuguese Colonies
in India; </i> Historical Report of 50
Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’; Report on Operation ‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant General J.N.
Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command; unit histories and personal accounts). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">1.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Khera, P.N., <i>Operation Vijay – The Liberation of Goa and
Other Portuguese Colonies in India</i>, History Division, Ministry of Defence
(HD-MOD), New Delhi, 1974, p.31.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">2.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Khera, p.39<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">3.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Report on Operation
‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command dated <st1:date day="4" month="5" w:st="on" year="1962">04 May 1962</st1:date>, (HD-MOD), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, File No.
SEC/11/182/H. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">4.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Historical Report of 50
Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’, (HD-MOD), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">5.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ 17 Infantry Division
Operation Order No 1/61 dated <st1:date day="11" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">11
December 1961</st1:date>, (HD-MOD), New <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">6.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, <i>Leadership
in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers,</i> Sage Publications, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>,
2005, p. 303.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">7.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">‘Operation Vijay’, Historical Records, HQ 17 Infantry Division, </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">(HD-MOD),
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, File
No. SEC/11/185/H. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">8.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">First Person Account –
‘Reminiscences of a Historic and happy Association’ by Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh,
published in <i>The Story of the Indian
Airborne Troops,</i> by Maj. Gen Afsir Karim, Lancer International, New Delhi,
1990. pp. 153-4 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">9.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Historical Report, 50
Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’, History Division, Ministry
of Defence, (HD-MOD), <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">10.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Report on Aguada Fort
Incident, (HD-MOD), New Delhi, File FMN/BDE/224/H/III.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">11.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">R</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">eport on Operation ‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant
General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command, (HD-MOD), New Delhi, File
No. SEC/11/182/H. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">12.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">First Person Account –
‘Operation in Goa’ by Brigadier Sucha Singh, VrC, MC, published in <i>The Story of the Indian Airborne Troops,</i>
by Maj. Gen Afsir Karim, Lancer International, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:city>, 1990. p. 171 <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">13.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Personal input by
Brigadier P.Z. Mani (Retd)<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">14.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Write Up entitled <i>‘Operation Vijay – 18/19 December 1961’</i>
by Major R.R. Chatterji, OC 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company. <i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">15.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Ibid.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 0cm; margin-right: .5pt; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l13 level1 lfo17; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">16.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Personal input by Major General A.S. Kahlon (Retd). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">17.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Write Up by Brigadier
Jaswant Singh, CSO Southern Command. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">18.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Khera, p.103.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">19.<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">HQ 112 Infantry Brigade
Operation Instruction No 1 dated <st1:date day="17" month="12" w:st="on" year="1961">17 December 1961</st1:date>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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veekayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06511693917756347959noreply@blogger.com0