Chapter
7
THE
INDO-PAK WAR – 1971 (WESTERN
THEATRE)
Preview – Background – Indian Strategy.
XV CORPS OPERATIONS IN JAMMU & KASHMIR : Battle of Punch – Battle of Chhamb – Operations in Other Sectors of
Jammu & Kashmir. I CORPS OPERATIONS
IN THE JAMMU SECTOR : 54 and 39
Inf Div – 36 Inf Div. XI CORPS OPERATIONS IN PUNJAB : The Battle of Dera Baba Nanak (15 Inf Div) –
7 & 14 Inf Div – Foxtrot Sector.
OPERATIONS IN RAJASTHAN & SIND : 11
Inf Div – 12
Inf Div. CEASE
FIRE AND SIMLA AGREEMENT. SIGNALS IN
WESTERN COMMAND DURING OPERATION CACTUS LILY : Western Comd Sigs – Western
Comd Sig Regt –Western Comd Mob Sig Coy-XV
Corps Sigs – XV
Corps Sig Regt – 25 Inf Div Sig Regt – 10 Inf Div Sig Regt -26 Inf Div Sig Regt – 3 Inf Div Sig Regt – 19 Inf Div Sig Regt – J
Comn Zone Sig Regt – T Comn Zone Sig Regt – Y Comn Zone Sig Regt – 121 (Indep)
Inf Bde Sig Coy – XI Corps Sigs - XI
Corps Sig Regt – 7 Inf Div Sig Regt – 14 Inf Div Sig Regt – 15 Inf Div Sig Regt
– 1 Armd Div Sig Regt – I Corps Sigs – 54 Inf Div Sig Regt – 36 Inf Div Sig Regt – 39 Inf Div Sig Regt
– Z Comn Zone Sig Regt – M Comn Zone Sig Regt – 1 Air Sp Sig Regt – 1 Air Fmn
Sig Regt – 51 (Indep) Para Bde Sig Coy. SIGNALS IN SOUTHERN COMMAND : Southern Comd Sigs – Southern Com Sig Regt – 11 Inf Div Sig Regt – 12
Inf Div Sig Regt – Q Comn Zone Sig Regt – 5 (Indep) Air Sp Sig Coy – P Comn Zone Sig Regt. CONCLUSION.
Preview
The war in Western Theatre started after air
attacks by Pakistan 3
December 1971 . The same night, Pakistani troops shelled and
attacked Indian positions in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab .
The attack on Punch, held by 93 Infantry Brigade of 25 Infantry Division, was
beaten back. Actions took place in adjoining areas during which Indian troops
captured some enemy posts. Another major action took place in Chhamb, held by
10 Infantry Division. The enemy attack was supported by armour and some Indian
positions were overrun. The battle lasted for several days and some localities
changed hands several ti`mes. The offensive ended on 12 December 1971 with minor gains for
the enemy.
In addition to Punch and Chhamb, smaller
operations took place in other areas such as Partapur, Kargil, Tangdhar, Uri
and Chicken’s Neck, which were part of 3, 19 and 26 Infantry Division sectors.
Pt. 13620 in
Kargil sector was captured by 121 Infantry Brigade Group of 3 Infantry
Division. In the Tangdhar sector troops of 104 Infantry Brigade of 19 Infantry
Division captured Kaiyan across Tutmari Gali. Another major achievement was the
capture of Chicken's Neck in Akhnur
sector by 19 Infantry Brigade of 26
Infantry Division.
In the Jammu
In the XI Corps sector (15, 7 and 14
Infantry Divisions) there were no major offensives by India Pakistan Hussainiwala Bridge Sutlej River
In Rajasthan, 11 and 12 Infantry Divisions
were operating directly under HQ Southern Command which had moved to Jodhpur Gadra
City
As always, Signals played an important role
in the success of the operations. Almost every signal unit in Western and
Southern Commands was involved, some directly participating in the operations
and others indirectly by providing manpower, equipment and transport. A
considerable amount of advance planning and preparatory work was done at all
levels, starting from Army HQ downwards. As a result, resources were rarely
lacking, as happened in previous conflicts. A welcome sign was the positive
attitude and cooperation extended by the P&T Department in provision of
additional PL routes, trunk circuits and exchanges demanded by units, often at
short notice. The part played by every major signal unit has been covered, to
the extent permitted by constraints of space and availability of archival
material.
Background
The 1965 conflict with Pakistani ended with the
cease fire on 23 September 1965 , followed by the Tashkent Agreement of 4 January 1966 . For the next
five years or so, the situation on the Western Front remained relatively quiet
and except for occasional minor incidents, the cease fire was not violated. But
the events that occurred in East Pakistan in
early 1971 resulted in an increase in tension on the western borders,
especially in Jammu & Kashmir. As the situation in East
Pakistan worsened, the likelihood of Pakistan India India Bangladesh India Punjab and
Rajasthan, but here too India India
Indian Strategy
The movement of Pakistani formations to the
border led to pleas to carry out similar deployments from Western as well as
Southern Command. However, Army HQ accorded permission only after Pakistani
moves and preparations for offensives reached an advanced stage. Even then,
movement was allowed in a graduated and progressive manner. Considering the
time required for defensive preparations such as development of defence works, laying
of mines, dumping of ammunition and so on, the delay in movement of formations
to their battle locations meant that they were ready only by mid November,
whereas Pakistan India Pakistan Pakistan India
At that time, Western Command was
responsible for defence of the territory from Ladakh down to Ganganagar
district of Rajasthan, while Southern Command was responsible for the remainder
of Rajasthan and Gujarat (Northern Command was
created only after the war in 1972). The field formations under Western Command
were XV, I and XI Corps, while Southern Command had 11 and 12 Divisions. XV Corps,
which was responsible for the defence of Jammu & Kashmir, comprised 3, 19, 25, 10 and 26 Infantry Divisions. 3
Infantry Division was deployed in Ladakh, 19 Infantry Division in the Kashmir
Valley, 25 Infantry Division in the Punch-Jhangar area, 10 Infantry Division in
the Akhnur area and 26 Infantry Division in the Jammu area. I Corps comprising 36, 39 and 54
Infantry Divisions was responsible for the defence of the area
Samba-Pathankot-Gurdaspur. XI Corps
comprising 15, 7 and 14 Infantry Divisions and Foxtrot Sector was
responsible for the defence of Punjab and the
Ganganagar district of Rajasthan. In Southern Command, 12 Infantry Division was responsible for the Jaisalmer sector and 11 Infantry Division for the Barmer sector.
Formations all along the Western Front were
to remain on the defensive initially. If Pakistan Pakistan Gujarat and Marala respectively. XI Corps was to be
prepared to launch a limited offensive opposite its sector. 1 Armoured Division
was earmarked as the Army HQ reserve to be made available if an offensive was
decided upon. In Southern Command, 11 and
12 Infantry Divisions were to be
prepared to undertake limited offensive operations, depending on where the
enemy attacked.
On the war breaking out, Western Air Command
was to inflict maximum damage on the Pakistani Air Force, as well as render support
to Western Army Command in its operations. Western Naval Command was to carry
out a strong raid on Karachi Pakistan
XV CORPS OPERATIONS IN JAMMU & KASHMIR
Pakistani troops started shelling the Punch
defences at about 2000 hours on 3
December 1971 followed by simultaneous attacks in different sectors.
The ferocity and repeated nature of attacks indicated that Pakistan Jammu
When Gutrian was under attack, a platoon was
sent from Thanpir which was held by a company minus of 11 Jammu Kalai Bridge Kalai
Bridge
The area between Betar Nullah and Darungli Nullah
was held by two battalions, with 6 Sikh holding the northern part and 8 Jat the
southern part. At 2000 hours on 3 December, the enemy started shelling the forward
positions. Between 2230 and 2330 hours, the enemy attacked the helipad, Tund and
Chichian Bandi but the defending troops beat back the assault. The enemy
launched a second attack at about 0300 hours on 4 December, but was again repulsed.
A little later, the enemy launched a daylight attack on picquet 405. Apart from
the defenders' weapons, Indian Air Force aircraft also strafed the enemy.
However, the enemy managed to capture the helipad position. Picquet 405 was
reinforced with two platoons from 8 Jat and Tund was by a platoon from 6 Sikh.
During the night of 4/5 December, the enemy launched a number of attacks on
Picquet 405, but these were also beaten back with heavy casualties to the
enemy. On the morning of 6 December the enemy withdrew from the helipad, which
was re-occupied by 6 Sikh. Thereafter, the enemy offensive petered out. The
enemy made two more attempts to capture the helipad on 10 and 16 December,
which were repulsed with the help of accurate artillery fire.
The area between Tatan Di Rangur and Betar Nullah
was held by 1/4 Gorkha Rifles, on the picquet complex Durga, which included a
picquet Langoor that dominated the Betar Nullah approach. Along with the main
attack on picquet 405 the enemy launched an attack on Langoor at about 2330
hours on 3 December, which was beaten back. A second attack at 0300 hours next
morning got fairly close to the picquet but this was also beaten back. The
enemy shelled picquet 413, Durga and other picquets but did not attempt any
attack on these. On the night of 8/9 December, 1/4 Gorkha Rifles carried out a
raid on the enemy and occupied Mumtaz, a
piece of ground ahead of Durga.
Along with the main attack on Punch, the
enemy launched attacks on the picquets covering the shoulders of the Mendhar Valley Punjab
captured some posts around the place. On the night of 13/14 December, 14
Grenadiers attacked the Daruchian position repeatedly but as the enemy had been
alerted, the attacks were beaten back. During this period, a group of 9 Para
Commando raided a place called Mandhol, deep inside enemy territory and
destroyed an enemy gun position, killing a number of enemy gunners. Elsewhere
in the divisional sector, 4/9 Gorkha Rifles captured a place called Sukhanban
on night of 11/12 December.2
Due to its strategic importance, Chhamb has
always been a key objective for Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Munnawar
Tawi River
In 1971, two brigades (191 and 28)
of 10 Infantry Division were
responsible for the defence of this area. The other two brigades (52 and 68) of
the division were located outside Jammu & Kashmir. By 15 October, 191 Infantry
Brigade· was moved from its peace time location in Akhnur to the Troti area
while 28 Infantry Brigade remained deployed on picquets in th0e Kalidhar area. However,
shortly before the commencement of hostilities, 191 Brigade was ordered to occupy defences on the west of the
Munnawar Tawi on 2 December
1971 . At the same time, 52
Brigade was ordered to move forward to the area east of Munnawar Tawi and south
to cover the border, while 68 Brigade was ordered to move to the Jaurian area
for counter attack tasks. On the night of 3/4 December, some medium artillery
was also moved forward and the divisional headquarters moved to Andarwal.
On the evening of 3 December, after the
bombing of a number of Indian airfields it became clear that a major attack in
the Chhamb Sector was imminent. BSF posts were withdrawn after dark. At about 2100
hours, Pakistan 600 yards was created
along the line of control between Red Hill and Pir Jamal. At about 2130 hours, a
platoon screen at Pir Jamal was also withdrawn. Advancing through the gap of
about 800 yards
that was now available, Pakistani troops contacted the main positions in the 5
Sikh defended area by 2330 hours. Attacks were also launched against positions held
by 5 Assam
The line of communication to Dewa through
Mandiala North in the 5 Sikh area was cut and Mandiala was overrun by 1230 hours
on 4 December. Moel in 5 Sikh area and Bokan and Burejal in 5 Assam
During the night of 4/5 December, two enemy
battalions advanced through the Sukhtar Nullah with the intention of attacking
Kachreal heights. During the attack, the enemy hit the two forward batteries of
216 Medium Regiment and two companies of 7 Kumaon, causing complete confusion.
The CO and four officers of 7 Kumaon were wounded and the battalion fell back.
The depth medium battery had to fire over open sites during which some of the
forward guns were damaged and the tanks got separated from the infantry. Next morning,
elements of 9 Jat and A Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment cleared the enemy from
the eastern bank. During the same night the enemy pushed back the troops at Mongolian
but failed to capture Dewa and Red Hill.
On 5 December, Pakistani attacks on
positions 5 Sikh and 5 Assam Assam Assam
On 6 December, the enemy captured Gurha in
the 5 Sikh area at 1530 hours but the position was recaptured at 1800 hours by a
company 5/8 Gorkha Rifles with two troops of 72 Armoured Regiment. In the 5 Assam 303. A Squadron 9 Horse was
to deploy south of Chhamb to protect Chhamb and the Mandiala crossings. As
there were no prepared positions, and due to enemy interference, considerable
confusion was created during the withdrawal. Finally, 191 Brigade was ordered
to withdraw across the Munnawar Tawi by the divisional commander on the night
of 6 December. The area to the east of Munnawar Tawi
River
On the night of 7/8 December at about 0130
hours the 10 Garhwal Rifles company at
Chhatti Tahli was attacked, but the attack was beaten back. At about 0230 hours
the enemy attempted to secure crossings at Mandiala, Chhamb and Darh but these
were repulsed. At about 1800 hours on 8 December, the enemy attempted to secure
the Raipur Raipur Raipur
On the night of 9/10 December, the enemy continued his build up and
attacked in the Raipur Raipur
At about 0800 hours on 10 December, a
counter attack was launched with 3/4 Gorkha Rifles less two companies and
elements of 9 Horse and 72 Armoured Regiment. The tanks got bogged down in the
soft ground and the infantry could only get up to a place about 1000 yards from the
objective. There was considerable confusion with regard to the strength and
further intentions of the enemy and it appeared that the divisional commander planned
to withdraw to the old main position. However, Lieutenant General Sartaj Singh,
GOC XV Corps, ordered that there will be no withdrawal from the present positions.
At about 1520 hours the corps commander arrived in the divisional sector and
assumed charge of the situation. He countermanded all orders for any rearward
moves including reconnaissance parties. He also ordered counter attacks to be
launched by elements of 52 and 68 Brigades to recapture Darh and Raipur
Operations in Other Sectors of Jammu & Kashmir
While the battles of Punch and Chhamb were
the major operations in Jammu & Kashmir, smaller operations also took place
in other areas such as Partapur, Kargil, Tangdhar, Uri and Chicken’s Neck,
which were part of 3, 19 and 26 Infantry Divisional sectors. These are covered
in the succeeding paragraphs.
The Partapur sector under Colonel Udai Singh
was responsible for the Shyok and Nubra river valleys lying to the north of
Leh, across the Khardungla pass. Some picquets area was occupied by a company
of Karakoram Scouts of Pakistan, with about two companies held in reserve. To remove the threat to the isolated Partapur
Sector, Colonel Udai Singh was assigned the task of capturing Turtok. The
operations commenced on the night of 7 December, with five companies of Ladakh
Scouts and about 500 personnel of the Nubra Guards. Though the enemy offered
stiff opposition, Turtok was captured by first light on 14 December, followed
by the capture of Thang on 17 December. During the operation Indian troops advanced
about 22 kilometres
along the Shyok River
In Kargil, the enemy was occupying some
features that dominated the strategically important Srinagar-Leh highway. Of
these, the most important was north of
the Shingo. The area was the responsibility of 121 Infantry Brigade Group which
was under 3 Infantry Division. The brigade
was given the task of capturing the Brachil pass-Hathi Matha area and clearing
the picquets that dominated the road. Since Pt. 13620 was very strongly held, it
was decided to tackle the position from the rear. During the night of 7/8
December, 2/11 Gorkha Rifles and 9 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles occupied some features
and captured a number of enemy posts, effectively isolating Pt. 13620,
which was finally captured by the Gorkhas in the afternoon after being
subjected to air strikes. While the attack on Pt. 13620 was in progress, 18 Punjab attacked and captured Brachil pass after bitter
fighting on 7 December. This was followed by the capture of several important
posts by 7 Guards on 8 December. After a long approach march, 5/3 Gorkha Rifles
captured Hathi Matha from the rear on 17 December, when the ceasefire was
announced.
The Tangdhar sector was held by 104 Infantry
Brigade of 19 Infantry Division. In order to deny approaches to the Kashmir Valley Nastachun Pass Bihar captured Wanjal. 9 Sikh was given the
task of capturing Kaiyan, across Tutmari Gali. The battalion captured several
important posts in the Kaiyan bowl. On the night of 14/15 December, 9
Sikh attacked and captured Nankot, after a long and difficult approach march.
Subsequently, 4 Mahar also captured certain important positions in the Kaiyan
area and held firm against counter attacks by the enemy.
In order to eliminate the threat to Akhnur
through the salient known as Chicken's
Neck, the task of capturing it was given to 19 Infantry Brigade which was part of 26 Infantry Division. On the night of 5/6 December, 9 Para Commando
captured the Saidpur ferry while 3/5 Gorkha Rifles captured Khoje Chek and
Gondal ferry, cutting off the enemy's routes of withdrawal and reinforcement.
Concurrently, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles
captured Tibba during the night of 5/6 December. In the next Phase, 11 Guards captured Chanor followed by Phuklean
after overcoming some resistance. Later, they exploited up to the western
extremity of the salient. With the capture of Chicken’s Neck, the threat to
Akhnur was removed and 9 Infantry
Brigade was in a position to pose a serious threat to Marala Head Works.4
I CORPS OPERATIONS IN THE JAMMU
The Jammu- Pathankot-Gurdaspur region was
strategically important for India Pakistan Punjab from the north. The responsibility for defence of
the area was with I Corps, the bulk of whose troops were located far away from
the area of operations in cantonments in Central and Southern
India . Only 39 Infantry Division was available within the general
area, under command of XV Corps, till
the arrival of I Corps. Though Western
Command had made plans for launching an offensive, Army HQ had directed that
they were to remain on the defensive till attacked by Pakistan
Army HQ accorded permission on 4 October for
deploying troops all along the border and orders for induction of troops into
different sectors were issued on 12 October 1971 . Starting their moves from their peace
time cantonments on 13 October by road and rail, formations of I Corps
completed their concentration by 26 October. 54 Infantry Division was made
responsible for general area Samba up to Bein river; 39 Infantry Division for
the area between Bein and Ravi rivers; and 36
Infantry Division for the area south of Ravi
river from Sherpur to Thakurpur. The offensive task of I Corps was breaking
into the Shakargarh salient south of Degh Nadi and capturing Zafarwal-Dhamthal-Narowal;
and subsequently, securing the line Marala-Ravi link canal and later Pasrur.
I Corps’ original plan for its offensive
envisaged launching 54 and 36 Infantry Divisions between Degh Nadi and Ravi
river, supported by 16 and 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigades, after the enemy
reserves were committed south and east of Degh Nadi. These plans were later
modified, based on reports of some enemy movements. The sector west of Degh
Nadi was styled as 'X' Sector comprising 168 and 323 Infantry Brigades. Subsequently, 33 Infantry Brigade of 39
Infantry Division was moved to Punch, depleting the strength of the division
and restricting its ability to carry out its original task of advance to
Pasrur.
On 3 December, GOC I Corps issued his orders
based on the modified plans. 54 Infantry Division with 16 (Indep) Armoured Brigade less 16 Cavalry was to advance between
Degh Nadi and Karir river with a view to capturing line Laisarkalan-Bari Darman,
then Supwal and Barwal, and to be prepared to capture Deoli and Mirzapur. 39
Infantry Division comprising 72 Infantry Brigade ex-36 Infantry Division and 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade less 14 Horse
was to advance between Karir and Bein rivers and capture Shakargarh. 36 Infantry
Division less 72 Infantry Brigade and 14 Horse were to advance across the Ravi on axis Thakurpur-Nainakot-Nurkot and capture
Nurkot.
54 and 39 Infantry Divisions
54 Infantry Division and 39
Infantry Division less a brigade commenced their offensives at 2000 hours on 5 December 1971 . Both divisions advanced across minefields and
secured their initial objectives, beating back repeated counter-attacks at
various levels. In the process, they
suffered heavy casualties but made good progress, along with 36 Infantry Division
on the Sialkot Pakistan Pakistan India
36 Infantry Division
36 Infantry Division was to launch
its thrust from Landi and capture Shakargarh and Nurkot and to subsequently
capture Shakargarh. By the night of 7/8
December, 115 Infantry Brigade and 14 Horse were inducted into Lasian bulge. After capturing the border outposts on 8 December,
the troops captured Bakarwal, Hir, Dhadwal, Sadial, Karwal and Nargal on 9 December.
The bridgehead was enlarged and a class 40 bridge constructed the next day,
along with the capture of Kathel. On 11 December, Sultanpur and Nainakot were
captured.
On 11 December, 14 Horse commenced its advance towards the Bein River Bein River
On 12 December, orders were issued for
crossing the Bein
River
XI CORPS OPERATIONS
IN PUNJAB
The state of Punjab
and the adjoining Ganganagar district of Rajasthan is strategically important
since an offensive by the enemy in this sector leads to the heartland of India Delhi Amritsar Jullundur Ludhiana Jullundur Amritsar
Though Pakistan
The Battle
There was a bridge over the Ravi near Dera Baba Nanak, where Pakistan
Commencing it attack on the night of 5/6
December, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles captured Colonel's Hut by 0100 hours and 'T'
junction at 0600 hours. With the enemy's attention diverted, 10 Dogra launched
its attack at 0330 hours and captured its objectives after fierce fighting in
the early hours of 6 December. The enemy panicked and blew up the bridge over
the Ravi River
Brigadier Gowrishankar was awarded the MVC for this operation. (He later
became a lieutenant general and died in harness as Security Advisor to the
Government of Punjab). His photograph and citation are given below:-
Brigadier
Krishnaswamy Gowrishankar was in command of 86 Infantry Brigade responsible for
the defence of Dera Baba Nanak on the western front during the Indo – Pak war 1971. His brigade was given the task of capturing a
well prepared and heavily fortified locality held in strength by the enemy.
Brigadier Krishnaswamy Gowrishankar showed boldness and originality in planning
of the brigade attack. During the attack
he was always in the forefront, directing operations and exercising personal
control, undeterred by heavy tank, medium machine gun and artillery fire. By his presence with the forward troops,
sharing their hardships and dangers, he not only inspired confidence but was
able to modify the plans to ensure speed and maintain momentum of the
attack. He displayed conspicuous
gallantry, outstanding leadership, personal bravery, great determination and
utter disregard to personal safety. His
skill and inspiring presence ensured success of this attack with heavy losses
to the enemy. For displaying exemplary
valour, leadership, professional skill of the highest order and utter disregard
to his personal safety Brigadier Krishnaswamy Gowrishankar was awarded the Maha
Vir Chakra.
7 & 14 Infantry Divisions
In
the 7 Infantry Division Sector, an Indian enclave across the headworks over the
Sutlej River Punjab . On the
evening of 3 December 3, the Pakistanis attacked the enclave after intense shelling.
The bridge was damaged and there were no tanks across the river. The CO, who was
on the eastern bank, did not go forward and lost control. The enemy was able to
overrun the position across the bridge though D Company fought gallantly. In
this sector another important area was the Sehjra bulge which was attacked and
captured by 1/5 Gorkha Rifles (FF). The
battalion crossed a river and attacked along the most difficult approach, taking
the enemy from the rear and achieving total surprise. 6 Mahar established road-blocks to cut off the
enemy’s route of withdrawal and 9 Sikh Light Infantry and 6 Mahar captured
adjoining posts. The operation was well executed
and any threat that the enemy could pose from the bulge was eliminated.8
In the 14 Infantry Division sector, some
Pakistani enclaves south of the Sutlej
River
Foxtrot Sector
In the Foxtrot Sector, a serious reverse
took place in the Fazilka area held by 67 Infantry Brigade. Pakistan had a
large enclave east of the Sutlej in the area of Suleimanke headworks, which not
only provided depth to the headworks but also enabled her to launch an
offensive into India if she so desired. 67 Infantry Brigade group of Foxtrot
Sector was responsible for the defence of Fazilka, a major town located nearby.
The main defences of the brigade were on
Sabuna distributary, well ahead of Fazilka and also in depth. One battalion (3 Assam Assam
On the evening of 3 December, Pakistan Beriwala
Bridge Assam Beriwala Bridge Assam Beriwala
Bridge
There was considerable confusion and the
brigade suggested that it should fall back on the inner defences of Fazilka.
The Army Commander overruled this and ordered that the Sabuna drain position
would be held at all costs. On the night of 4/5 December, 4 Jat once again
attacked the Pakistani position but failed to capture it, though nine tanks
were lost. The brigade was reinforced by 3/11 Gorkha Rifles from 116 Infantry
Brigade and 115 Infantry Battalion (TA). The brigade commander was also
replaced. On 6 December, the divisional commander who had gone forward was
wounded but stayed on. 15 Rajput, who were relieved by 3/11 Gorkha Rifles,
launched a counter attack on night of 8/9 December, but did not succeed. 15
Rajput captured Muazzam post on the night of 11 December and Ghazi post on the
night of 13 December. However, the enemy launched a counter-attack and evicted the
Rajputs from their positions. The enemy counter attacked the position held by 4
Jat several times, but could not dislodge the Jats. It was later learned that the
Pakistanis planned to continue their attacks for capturing Fazilka, but the
cease fire on 17 December prevented them from doing this.
The reverse at Fazilka was attributable to
weak leadership and ineffective conduct of the battle. The large number of
casualties suffered - 189 killed, 425 wounded and 196 missing - did not justify
the results achieved. Although exaggerated reports indicated that two brigades
attacked the 67 Infantry Brigade position, in fact it was carried out by
elements of 105 (Indep) Infantry Brigade, which was the local Pakistani
formation responsible for the defence of the area. Apart from Fazilka, further south
near Nagi (opposite Jalwala headworks), there was a Pakistani intrusion, which
was cleared by 4 Para.9
OPERATIONS IN RAJASTHAN & SIND
The border areas of Rajasthan and Sind provinces of India Pakistan India Gujarat
with the exception of the Ganganagar sector of Rajasthan, which was the
responsibility of Western Command. It was appreciated that Pakistan Pakistan Kutch and Bikaner
Southern Command was responsible
for operations in the sector and an advance headquarters was set up at Jodhpur Bikaner Kutch sectors respectively. These sectors
mainly had para military forces, though 13 Grenadiers, a camel battalion, was
allotted to Kilo Sector.
The Army Commander, Lieutenant
General G.G. Bewoor, planned to initially deploy a brigade each in the
Jaisalmer and Barmer sectors, to cover the concentration of the remainder of 11
and 12 Infantry Divisions from cantonments in the rear. Subsequently, the divisions
were to be prepared to launch offensive operations into Pakistan Kutch sectors were
to carry out some local offensives, eliminate the enemy's border out posts and
improve their defensive posture. The firm bases were occupied by 26 October and
preparations completed by 3 December. After Pakistan Jodhpur
11
Infantry Division
11 Infantry Division started its
operations at last light on 4 December. Advancing from three directions, it captured
Ratok, Relnor and Mankor in the north; Kajlor, Vitala and Khokhropar in the
middle; and Gadra
City
11 Infantry Division contacted the
Nayachor defences on 15 December. Probing attacks and reports revealed that that
the position was strongly held, having been reinforced by a brigade and an armoured
regiment. Concurrent with the operations on the main axis, one brigade of 11
Infantry Division advanced in the south and captured Gadra City 7 km
east of Umarkot on 16 December but
fell back on being counter attacked on the next day. In the north, 17
Grenadiers took over some of the captured areas and protected the approaches to
Miajar, although originally it was to advance on axis Relnor-Nayachor. The
attack on Nayachor could not be mounted due to the ceasefire on 17 December.
The performance 11 Infantry
Division during the operation was commendable. In spite of the extremely
difficult nature of the terrain which was devoid of communications and the
hazards involved, the division had advanced fairly deep into enemy territory
and posed a serious threat to the main enemy defences at Nayachor. Towards the end
of the operation, the division was reinforced by a brigade from 12 Infantry
Division, but it could not be utilized due to logistical problems involved and
shortage of time.
12
Infantry Division
The operations of 12 Infantry Division
started on the evening of 4 December and the leading brigade captured
Sakhirewalakot and Islamkot the same night. Next morning, a company of 23 Punjab deployed in the area of Longewala reported some
tank movement opposite its area. Subsequently, the air observation post of the division
reported a 20-kilometre long enemy armoured column moving on track Kharotar-Ghabbar.
The Pakistani column came quite close to the Longewala post and shelled it
heavily. The isolated company of 23 Punjab was
in a precarious position but held on to its defences in a most gallant manner.
The divisional commander called for immediate air strikes by the Indian Air Force,
which responded with alacrity and flew 11 air strike missions from first light
onwards, inflicting heavy casualties on Pakistani armour, vehicles and troops.
The enemy plans for advance to Jaisalmer via Ramgarh were thus completely
frustrated. The air strikes broke up the enemy advance, which could have
resulted in a serious rout for own troops in this area. As a result of the
enemy action, the Army Commander decided to give up his plans for the offensive
in this sector and instead go on the defensive and consolidate the position. 12
Infantry Division launched counter attacks on 8 December and cleared the enemy
from Kharotar by the evening. Sarkari Ka Tibba was captured by the next evening.
Thus, the entire area was cleared of the enemy. Later, it came to light that
the enemy had withdrawn from the area to his main defences.10
10 Para Commando raided Chachro on 7 December
and took a number of prisoners. Birawah was raided on 8 December and some
prisoners captured from there also. An ambush was laid on the track to Mithi, west
of Islamkot, and a number of enemy troops were killed or captured. However, he
raid on Badin originally planned was not carried out. Over all, the operations 10
Para Commando of proved to be useful. The CO,
Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Bhawani Singh, was awarded a well deserved MVC for the
operation.
CEASE FIRE AND SIMLA
AGREEMENT
As soon as the war came to an end and East Pakistan was liberated, India 17 December 1971 . Though India West Pakistan . She
also held about 93,000 Pakistanis as prisoners of war. After the cessation of
hostilities, India Pakistan 14 February 1972 . Although the
initial response of Pakistan Pakistan 2 July 1972 . After several rounds of talks and protracted
negotiations, an agreement was reached on the night of 2/3 July 1972.
During the 1971 war, India Pakistan India Pakistan Kashmir problem.
Unfortunately, the Army was kept out of the negotiations and the Army Chief,
General Manekshaw was not consulted before or during the talks. Though Bhutto
and Indira Gandhi had informally agreed to accept the cease fire line in Kashmir as the international border, this was not reduced
to writing. As a result, the military gains, achieved at great cost in human
lives, were frittered away. When the Prime Minister returned from Simla, she
told General Manekshaw about what had transpired during the meeting. Bhutto had
told her that he had recently taken over and was not in a position to take
major decisions. He needed more time and promised that in six months everything
would be done as she desired.11
In accordance with the terms of the Simla
Agreement, the process of delineation of the Line of Control was begun soon
afterwards. The Indian team was led by Lieutenant General P.S. Bhagat, VC,
GOC-in-C of the newly created Northern Command. The other members of the Indian
team were Major General M.R. Rajwade, Chief of Staff Northern Command and Major
General I.S. Gill, the Director of Military Operations at Army HQ. The
Pakistani team was led by Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan. The main task of
the teams was to delineate the Line of Control along the entire border in Jammu and Kashmir 3 September 1972 . This was followed by others, at Lahore 11 December 1972 at Suchetgarh. After
the delineation agreement, India Pakistan
The
prisoners taken by India Pakistan 1 December
1972 . However, the withdrawal of troops of both sides had still not
taken place due to disagreement on the alignment of the Line of Control. There
was a deadlock due to conflicting claims of both sides over certain key areas,
including the village
of Thako Chak Jammu Kashmir .
The enclave of Thako Chak in the Chicken's Neck had been occupied by Pakistan
To resolve the issue, General Manekshaw flew
down to Lahore 20 December 1972 .
SIGNALS IN WESTERN COMMAND DURING OPERATION ‘CACTUS
LILY’
Western Command Signals
HQ Western Command was located at Simla in 1971. The
CSO was Brigadier J.S. Kalra, the other officers in the Signals Branch being
Lieutenant Colonel V. Balasubramaniam, SO 1 (Signals); Major Shivraj Kumar, SO
2 (Communications), Major Joginder Singh SO 2 (Staff Duties) and Captain
Vijay Chandra, SO 3 (Cipher & Signal Security).
By the middle of 1971, it was known
that operations for the liberation of Bangladesh Pakistan
As
in previous operations, the communications infrastructure of the P&T
Department was to form the backbone of signal communications, especially in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. A large number of
additional circuits had to be hired and several new PL routes had to be
constructed. These required coordination and liaison with the P&T
authorities at the highest level. The Deputy SO-in-C, accompanied by the Deputy
Director Telecommunications, Brigadier M.S. Sodhi and Mr. Shenoy, a member of
the P&T Board visited each sector personally to take stock of the existing
resources. Decisions to augment the infrastructure such as PL, carrier centres
and exchanges were taken on the spot and demands placed on the P&T
Department, which reacted with commendable enthusiasm and alacrity. Wherever it
was felt that the P&T would not be able to provide the required assets in
time, it was decided to provide these from Army resources. If PL could not be
laid in time, alternate means of communications such as microwave or radio
relay was explored.
In mid October HQ Western Command
moved to its operational location at Jullundur Jullundur Jullundur Jullundur Delhi
Western
Command Signal Regiment
Western Command Signal Regiment was
located at Simla, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ashutosh Kumar. The
other field officers in the unit were Major M.S Gujral (second-in-command);
Major B.K. Bhardwaj (1 Company); and Major H.G. Karkare (2 Company). The bulk of the unit was at Jutogh, where the
living accommodation and transmitters were located. The signal centre and
exchange were in Simla, alongside HQ Western Command, while the receiver
station was at Sanjauli.
The unit moved to Jullundur 16 October 1971 . The move included carriage of
all static signal equipment installed at the transmitter and receiver stations
at Jutogh and Sanjauli respectively. During the next few days, communications
for a full fledged command headquarters was set up at Jullundur Delhi Amritsar Delhi
Speech
and teleprinter circuits were taken over from the P&T Department to the
operational locations of formations and several other communication centres. By
25 October the unit had taken over all communications at Jullundur Jullundur Delhi
The
war started on 3 December
1971 . Radio silence was broken at 1930 hours and all radio links
were activated. After the links had stabilised, they were closed down at midnight with orders to outstations to
open on schedule and when line circuits fail. Thereafter all radio links worked
on schedule for two hours a day and two hours at night. For the first few days the line circuits
functioned well and there were no disruptions in communications. However, the
frequency on the link to Kotkapura was changed on 6 December, Amritsar
The first break in line
communication occurred on 9 December when the coaxial system at Jullundur Delhi
Western Command Signal Regiment was
a static unit, without the transport and equipment needed for a mobile role.
However, the unit rose to the occasion and moved from Simla to Jullundur
Western
Command Mobile Signal Company
Western Command Mobile Signal
Company was located at Ambala under the command of Major R.E. Colombowalla. On 17 October 1971 the
company was ordered to move to its operational location at Jullundur Jullundur Amritsar Jullundur Amritsar
On 7 November trials were conducted
for the integration of Army radio relay net work with P&T microwave
systems. The trials were carried from Pathankot to Dalhousie on radio relay and
Dalhousie to Jullundur
After commencement of the
operations on 3 December the radio relay links functioned without any hitch. On
13 December the radio relay detachment at Bhatinda was ordered to move to Moga
in order to improve the speech level of the link and for better communications
with Main HQ XI Corps at Kotkapura. The new link was Jullundur Amritsar Amritsar Amritsar
XV
Corps Signals
HQ XV Corps was at Udhampur in
1971. The CSO was Brigadier S.L. Juneja, while Lieutenant Colonel K. K. Tuli
and Major V.K. Puri were holding the appointments of SO1 (Signals) and SO 2
(Signals) respectively. The CSO drew up the signal plan for Operation ‘Cactus
Lily’ in consultation with all the commanders and staff. The plan was approved
by the Chief of Staff and discussed with the SO-in-C during the presentation
held on 15 September 1971
at Jullundur
Based
on the Signals plan, which had been approved by the GOC, a signal instruction
was issued on 24 October
1971 . Subsequently, the
SO-in-C, Lieutenant General E.G. Pettengell also visited HQ XV Corps, 10
Infantry Division and 19 Infantry Division from 15 to 18 November 1971, during
which he discussed the communications plans with the formation commanders, CSOs
and unit commanders. These visits proved extremely useful since on the spot
decisions were taken and implemented expeditiously.
During November 1971 several
measures were taken in preparation for the impending operations. Arrangements
were made to provide telephones and military trunk facilities to various
civilian officials and the control headquarters at various stations in Jammu
& Kashmir for close liaison with the formation and unit commanders to
regulate the affected civil population close to the border areas. To ensure
that radio discipline was maintained, special monitoring detachments from the
Central Monitoring Organisation were positioned at Jammu Srinagar India
Radio
silence was lifted on 4
December 1971 when the operations commenced and all radio nets were
activated. During the entire operation, signal communications worked well in
the whole theatre. SITREPs (situation
reports) were cleared within three hours and other operational messages in less
than 18 hours. There was a sharp increase in message traffic, cipher traffic
and trunk calls. While the message traffic doubled from 1,20,000 to 2,50,000
groups, the cipher traffic increased more than
twenty times, from 2,000 to 45,000. The on-line cipher traffic on ECL
also rose from 2,000 to 12,000. As regards trunks calls, these registered a two
fold increase from 1,200 to 2,400.
Radio
and radio relay communications were extremely reliable and remained through at
all time. Line communications was
generally stable, except in 10 Infantry Divisional Sector, where the PL
suffered heavy damage due to intense enemy shelling even when the shells landed
at a considerable distance from the route.
A line construction section was inducted to continuously carry out
repairs on the route and restore communications on carrier quad which was
buried. Young officers and linemen did a commendable job in carrying these
tasks. The casualties sustained by Signals personnel in XV Corps Zone were not
inconsequential - five killed, two missing (later declared killed) and 15
wounded, including one officer.
XV Corps Signal Regiment
XV Corps Signal Regiment was at Udhampur,
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.A. Newton, with Major N.B.
Phansalkar as his second-in-command. Other officers holding important
appointments were Major S.A. Rao (1 Company); Major S.K. Sikka (2 Company);
Major R.S. Jham (3 Company); Captain C.L. Kauldhar (HQ Company); Captain A.
Fotidar (adjutant); and Captain Iqbal Singh (quartermaster).
During
October and November 1971 the unit carried out preparations in accordance with
instructions received from CSO XV
Corps. A large number of new speech and
telegraph circuits were taken over from the P&T Department viz.
Udhampur – Jammu Speech I & II (26 Infantry Division Main); Udhampur-Akhnur
Speech (10 Infantry Division Main);
Udhampur-Akhnur Bridge and Udhampur-Samba Speech. At the same time, a number of
circuits that were not required were handed back to the P&T Department.
These included Udhampur-Simla Speech I & II; Udhampur-Jammu (Airfield) and
Udhampur-Pathankot teleprinter circuits. Consequent to the move of Tactical HQ
XV Corps, the Signals element comprising one radio detachment and one signal
centre detachment was moved to Akhnur on 14 November 1971 . One radio detachment also moved to Jindra to
provide communication on C-1 and C-2 links.
During the operations from 4 to 17
December communications functioned without any break. During battle telephone
lines were damaged from enemy shelling and movement of own tanks. Though air support communications functioned
well, the non availability of crystals and adequate channels for the RS GU 734
was a constraining factor. Instances were reported of the enemy trying to join
our radio nets. There were also
instances where the enemy had got hold of our frequencies used by the Forward
Air Control (FAC) and directed our aircraft to our own positions. The air
support tentacles were issued with Rs 62, which was found to be bulky and
inhibited mobility.
25
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
25 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was located at Rajauri under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.S.
Grover with Major S.C. Mehra as his second–in-command. Other officers holding
important appointments were Major Shri Krishan (1 Company); Captain J.S. More (2
Company); Captain Sudhir Kumar (3 Company); Captain A.G. Rajan (HQ Company);
Major A.K. Mahajan (93 Infantry Brigade), Major Hari Singh (80 Infantry
Brigade) and Major S.K. Seth (120 Infantry Brigade).
Preparations for the impending
operations had been going on for several months but the tempo increased in
November 1971, when the construction of underground splinter proof bunkers for
signal centre, crypto centre and carrier room commenced. Radio relay trials
from a new site within the unit were carried out and found successful. Dhanidhar Fort located on a hill across the valley at
Rajauri about 4 km from the unit location
was planned to be used as a site for establishing radio relay repeaters and VHF
radio rebroadcast (RRB) station for the D1 and D1A links. To facilitate
extension of carrier tails and communication to the Fort, Second Lieutnant O.P.
Beniwal was tasked to carry out recconnaisance for laying of two pairs of PL
route from the divsional headquarters to the Fort on 22 November. The route was
laid the next day by utilising available
manpower including non combatants.
A
large number of PL routes were completed, linking important picquets in the
sectors of 80, 120 and 93 Infantry Brigades. After the induction of 33 Infantry
Brigade on 25 November, a number of new PL routes were constructed linking its
new location at Surankot with other formations and its own units. A large
quantity of radio equipment was received from the Central Ordnance Depot, 25
Infantry Division Ordnance Maintenance Company and 1 Signal Park. This included
several radio sets, line equipment and generators, which went a long way in
making up the unit’s deficiencies of these critical items.
On 3 December the speech link to 10
Infantry Division was disconnected as the formation moved forward. All radio
links including tentacles were activated at 2200 hours and kept on listening
watch. During the night heavy enemy shelling in Punch and Naushera disrupted
line communication to and within 93 Infantry Brigade. All trunk lines near traffic
control post at Punch were destroyed. Telephone lines were also cut by
infiltrators near Kalai
Bridge
On 5 December a radio relay link was established with 33 Infantry
Brigade by positioning the terminal at
Jarnawaligali and extending link tails to the brigade headquarters location at
Surankot. Line detachments were positioned at Thanamandi and at Narian for
maintenance of the PL routes to Surankot and Tarala-Keri village respectively.
An additional commitment given to the unit was to cater for communications to
the Mike Sector that was created at Mandi comprising two units of Jammu &
Kashmir Militia, and one each of the Border Security Force and the Indo Tibetan
Border Police. A signal detachment under a JCO equipped with radio sets,
telephones, cable and a 10 line exchange was sent in two vehicles provided by 93
Infantry Brigade Signal Company for this purpose. For operations in Thanpir area by
13 Mahar communications were established by 33 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
on line as well as radio. Lines from Punch to Banwat were cut by three civilians believed to be Pak agents. They were were caught by linemen and handed
over to the Police.
On
6 December a line detachment was sent from
Rajauri to Naushera for maintaining the Tarala-Siot Bridge PL
In
view of increase in communication commitments as a result of induction of
additional troops, the unit asked for additional equipment which was loaned by
other units under orders of CSO XV Corps. On 9 December five radio sets AN/PRC – 25 , (including two with booster) and 10 km of cable was sent to 93
Infantry Brigade Signal Company for the attack
by 21 Punjab
and 9 Rajputana Rifles. Some additional manpower made avilable by Y
Communication Zone Signal Regiment was also sent to the signal company. The CO flew
by helicopter to Punch to tie up communications details for offensive operation
of 93 Infantry Brigade that was to be launched on night of 10/11 December 1971.
On
10 December line parties of 93 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company were positioned at Jhalas and Jhoola bridge for quick
rectification of faults due to enemy shelling during offensive operations of 21
Punjab. In Rajauri a line party led by an
officer was sent to Upper Krishnaghati to
maintain trunk lines during an offensive operation for capture of Jungle Tekri
area. Mike Sector, which had started functioning at Mandi was provided
extensive communications on radio as well as line, from the divisional as well
as brigade headquarters, apart from cipher cover. Naib Subedar Gian Chand was made responsible for signal communications at
HQ Mike Sector.
In
Upper Krishnaghati, Tactical HQ 33 Infantry Brigade moved forward and was terminated on the 9 Rajputana Rifles exchange. Communication details were tied up so that 33
Infantry Brigade could take over the operational control of Krishnaghati sector in case Punch sector was
threatened by the enemy. Line
communications was also provided to Tactical HQ 33 Infantry Brigade from Punch as well as Bhimbergali through 13 Jammu Upper Krishnaghati . Net radio communications was provided
on the D-1 net, as well as the B-1 net of 93 Infantry Brigade, with another one
to one link to Surankot.
After the capture
of Jungle Tekri by 21 Punjab on 11 December,
lines were extended and kept through inspite of heavy shelling by a line party
led by Second Lieutenant Ravindra Singh. In Bhimbergali
lines from T Junction to Krishnaghati came under
heavy shelling and were broken at several places. A line party from 120 Infantry
Brigade was sent and repaired all
lines during the night. Three more line parties from 120 Infantry Brigade were
sent to maintain PL routes from Balnoi to FDLs
which were heavily shelled by the enemy. In Naushera
a line was damaged due to heavy shelling on the
night of 10/11 December in 80 Infantry
Brigade Sector. A line party under
Second Lieutenant Hoshiyar Singh repaired all the lines. Tactical HQ 80 Infantry
Brigade was established at a forward location.
On
12 December Tactical HQ 33 Infantry Brigade
moved back to Surankot. In Naushera, line parties from the unit were sent
to lay lines for the impending offensive in 80 Infantry
Brigade Sector. The early warning link in the divisional sector taken over by
Air Force personnel, who were given two radio sets AN/PRC-25 for this purpose.
On 13 December Colonel Grover proceeded to Bhimbergali and Surankot
alongwith the divsional commander to tie up communications for the attack by 14
Grenadiers. Due to heavy shelling by the enemy during the afternoon local lines
in Punch town were disrupted. All lines were repaired and communication
restored by 1600 hours by line parties of
93 Infantry Brigade. In Bhimbergali an additional radio set on
D-1 was opened at Tactical HQ 120 Infantry
Brigade for the attack at Daruchian.
Another set was kept on listening watch on the forward net of 14
Grenadiers. In addition, B-1A link was opened with 14 Grenadiers, with the two flanking battalions on listening watch.
In Naushera a line detachment ex 1
Company was sent for establishing line communications from Tactical HQ 80
Infantry Brigade for the impending attack. To cater for the operation in
Daruchian by 14 Grenadiers, a 10-line exchange was set up for the brigade tactical headquarters from
where PL was available to Bhimbergali
and Balnoi. Field cable was also laid to
14 Grenadiers exchange and a line to the artillery brigade exchange at T
Junction.
On
14 December trials were conducted to patch up 10
Infantry Division on radio relay. At Naushera
additional divisional radio links were
established with Tactical HQ 80 Brigade
at FDL 546 for the impending offensive. Enemy shells fell in the MT park of 93
Infantry Brigade Signal Company at Moti Mahal and one shell hit the zero pole
near the central battery exchange. Many
lines were disrupted due to shelling but
were quickly restored by line parties.
On
15 December the CO accompanied the GOC to HQ 80
Infantry Brigade for tying up communications for the attack. In Naushera,
Second Lieutenant Hoshiyar Singh and Subedar
Swaran Singh with linemen reached Kalsian base. They set up two
10-lines exchanges, an ad hoc air
support tentacle and line communications with Rajauri. Radio communications were established by
positioning the GOC’s Rover Group at Advance Tactical HQ 80 Infantry Brigade,
which was to come up as an out station on the divsional HF and VHF nets. In Bhimbergali
a radio detachament (C11/R210 and AN/PRC 25)
from 120 Infantry Brigade Signal Company accompanied 6/11 Gorkha Rifles for the
attack in 80 Infantry Brigade sector. Five officers joined the unit from
the signal officers’ degree engineering (SODE) courses which had been
terminated due to Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. They were Captains A.G. Rajan, J.S. More, N. Kumar, P.K. Sehgal and Raj
Seth. With Major P.P.S. Yadav having joined a day earlier, the strength of
officers saw a substantial increase.
On
16 December CSO XV Corps, Brigadier S.L. Juneja
visited 80 Infantry Brigade, accompnaied by Colonel Grover. The FDC was
established at Kalsian for 80 Infantry Brigade’s attack. Line communications to the advance FDC was
provided by extending one of the support circuits derived from channelling
equipment working between advance tactical headquarters at FDL 546 and the
tactical headquarters of 80 Infantry Brigade. For the advance tactical
headquarters, two speech circuits were provided with tactical headquarters at
Naushera. One speech was on direct line
while the second speech circuit was derived from channelling equipment. Line communications were provided for
locations of all battalions which were to take part in the attack. ‘B’ Echelon
was established at Fort Hill of Kalsian base with full communication set
up. Second Lieutenant O.P. Beniwal with
a line party of 11 linemen was sent to 80 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
to assist in line communications for ‘B’
Echelon and the impending offensive.
On 17 December the unit received
the sad news of two fatal casualties that occurred in Naushera. Havildar Roshan Lal and Naik Inder Singh of 80
Infantry Brigade Signal Company were killed due to a direct hit from an enemy
shell at 1320 hours when restoring line communication at advance tactical
headquarters. Soon afterwards the operations came to an end and a cease fire
came into effect.
The excellent performance of 25 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment during
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ was commended by commanders as well as staff. This was
due to advance planning, attention to detail and the high level of motivation
of all personnel, the credit for which should go to the CO, his team of
officers and the dedicated JCOs and OR of the unit.
10
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
10 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was at Pathankot under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.
Balachandran. The other field officers in the unit were Major R.S. Anand (second-in-command),
Major M.S. Yadav (1 Company) and Major A.K. Mishra (2 Company). The officers in the brigade signal companies
were Major Vishnu Haritats (28 Brigade); Major A.S. Sandhu (191 Brigade); Major
Vinod Kumar (52 Brigade); Major H. P. Singh (68 Brigade) and Captain P.K
Sharma (10 Artillery Brigade).
The unit mobilized for operations
and moved to Akhnur on 12
October 1971 . On arrival at the new location the unit established a
signal centre and exchange, on which local and trunk lines were terminated.
Speech circuits on line were available to Udhampur, Jammu
On 3 November, 52 Infantry Brigade which had moved
to the operational area from its permanent location at Dalhousie a day earlier
was provided communication on line. On 5 November the CO, Lieutenant Colonel V.
Balachandran, proceeded on a route reconnaissance from Khunda to Chhamb and on
wards along the road to Manavar and Barsala. He was accompanied by Major M.S
Yadav, OC 1 Company and Captain U.P. Sangwan, in charge of the line detachment. Next morning the line detachment comprising
13 linemen under Captain Sangwan commenced laying carrier quad cable and
completed up to 11-Kilometre
milestone towards Chhamb. The cable had
to be buried at certain places. Continuing its work next day, the detachment built
overhead cable across Lokhikhad utilizing electric poles and ballies and
reached square Kilometre 9. On 8 November the cables were
laid overhead from Kilometre
9 up to village Palanwala. The same day
the Jammu
Cable laying continued during the
next few days. One channel to Udhampur was connected from Jammu Jammu 28 km of carrier quad
cable. The two detachments, one from the
unit and the other from XV Corps Signal Regiment, comprised 20 linemen and two
officers, Captain Sangwan and Second Lieutenant S. Bhatnagar. They built six
cables from Khunda to Palanwala.
Throughout the month of November
the unit remained busy on tasks aimed at improving the communication
network. On 2 December the reconnaissance
and layout group of the main divisional headquarters left for the new
operational location along with arrangements for step up communications. Next
day, the step up signal centre was established at the new location. By the end
of the day communications on line had been extended to HQ XV Corps, 52 and 191
Infantry Brigades, 10 Artillery Brigade and the rear divisional headquarters.
The M3 group of the main divisional headquarters moved to the new location
during the night.
On 3 December, after war was declared,
a radio relay detachment was despatched to 191 Infantry Brigade. All radio
links were activated and kept open during the night. Three line parties, each
under an officer, were organised to carry out repairs on lines as soon as they
occurred. Captain Varma of XV Corps Signal Regiment was made responsible for
lines to XV Corps and lines on the southern axis; Second Lieutenant Bhatnagar for lines on the
northern axis; and Second Lieutenant Vohra for patching forward lines from
Anderwar to the new location. Due to enemy shelling, there were frequent
breaks in lines to HQ 191 Infantry Brigade and 10 Artillery Brigade.
On 4 December radio relay communications were through
with 28 and 191 Infantry Brigades.
However, the link with 191 Brigade was disrupted at 1600 hours when the
generator was hit by enemy shelling which also damaged the vehicle. Lance Naik
R.K.R. Kurup who was in the vehicle was seriously
injured and later succumbed to his injuries. There was another fatal casualty
at about 2000 hours when Signalman T.R. Sharma 191 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company was killed due to enemy shelling. At 2100 hours a spare radio relay detachment
was despatched to HQ 191 Infantry Brigade. However, it could not cross the River
Manawar Tawi due to enemy fire and had to return.
At 0700 hours on 5 December Major
R.S. Anand left for HQ 191 Infantry Brigade with a step up D1, a radio set on
commanders’ net and a spare radio relay terminal via the northern axis.
However, he could not proceed as Mandiala
Bridge
Next morning, Major Anand left HQ
191 Brigade with the step up D1 and radio relay terminal. The radio relay
vehicle got stuck near Chhamb and could not be recovered. Colonel Balachandran
left for HQ 191 Brigade with AN/PRC 25 sets but could not cross the bridge
which was under observed enemy fire. He proceeded on foot along Chhamb crossing. The line to 191 Brigade was put through
and the GOC spoke to the brigade commander from FDC. At 2000 hours HQ 191 Brigade started
withdrawing from Chhamb to Anderwal. The
brigade signal company destroyed crypto material before withdrawal.
On 8 December carrier quad was laid
to Troti to replace the WD-1 which had been laid earlier. Two speech circuits provided to 10 Artillery
Brigade were put through at 1400 hours. At about 1600 hours the line party
under Havildar Khan which was carrying out maintenance of the line to 68
Infantry Brigade came under heavy enemy shelling. Their jeep was hit and went
up in flames. The line party continued to
work and put through the line. The CO and CSO XV Corps, who were then visiting
HQ 68 Infantry Brigade, met the line parties a few minutes later. Shortly afterwards, the radio relay link to
HQ 68 Infantry Brigade was through and tails were extended to the exchange.
At 0600 hours on 9 December
frequencies were changed for all radio links. The line parties under Captain
Sangwan and Havildar Khan were positioned permanently at Khunda for maintenance
of 68 Infantry Brigade lines. Hotlines were provided to 68 and 52 Infantry
Brigades and 10 Artillery Brigade. Two more speech lines were put through to 10
Artillery Brigade on the southern axis PL route. In addition, laterals between all three
brigades were provided.
On 10 December, 57 BSF battalion was netted on
D-1A link. The CO proceeded on northern axis to provide communications for the
combat group consisting of a squadron of the Central India Horse and a company
of 7 Grenadiers. On 11 December, Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment started
laying carrier quad between main divisional headquarters and 68 Infantry
Brigade on the northern axis. A tentacle vehicle with 68 Brigade was destroyed
by enemy shelling. On 12 December a
lateral line between 52 and 68 Brigades was provided on PL on the southern
axis. The carrier quad cable laid by Y Communication Zone from the main
divisional headquarters to 68 Brigade was also put through. Five officers
joined the unit on 15 December from CME and MCTE, where the courses had been
terminated in view of the war. However, operations ended the next day on 16
December.
26 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment
Before the commencement of
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, 26 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was located at Jammu
Early in November 1971 the main
divisional headquarters was at Beli – Charana, while the rear headquarters was
at Bahuwali Rakh. Speech circuits from the main divisional signal centre on
line were provided to 19, 36 and 162 Infantry Brigades, 26 Artillery Brigade
and 3 (Indep) Armoured Brigade, in addition to HQ XV Corps and flanking
formations viz. 10 Infantry Division and 54 Infantry Brigade. Telegraph circuits to all brigades were on
fullerphone, while a teleprinter circuit was provided to the corps signal centre.
Radio relay links had been established to 19 and 162 Infantry Brigades, 3
(Indep) Armoured Brigade and HQ XV Corps. However, they were seldom used as the
line circuits were stable and breaks in communication did not last long. Radio nets had also been established but
complete radio silence had been imposed after 2 October 1971 .
On 15 November the SO-in-C visited
the unit. He was accompanied by CSO XV Corps and two staff officers from
Signals Directorate. Around this time
there were changes in the order of battle. 3 (Indep) Armoured Brigade was
placed under command 10 Infantry Division, while Y Sector was placed under
command 36 Infantry Brigade.
At about 0800 hours on 3 December the
GOC in his morning conference said that an intercepted message indicated that Pakistan Srinagar
·
HQ 3 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade moved to area Karanbagh. Speech
and telegraph circuits were provided by reorienting existing PL.
·
HQ 36 Infantry Brigade
moved forward and to Bishnah. Communications were provided by extending PL on
field cable from Gidar Galian to Bishnah and extending one line by Pindi route.
·
HQ 162 Infantry Brigade
moved to area Ranbir Singh Pura. Speech
and telegraph circuits were extended on copper routes constructed earlier.
·
8 Cavalry moved to area
Sunderpur and was placed under the armoured brigade. A line was provided to 8
Cavalry from 162 Infantry Brigade Exchange.
At about 0915 hours on 4 December,
there was an air raid on Jammu
Next
morning the CO personally went to the location of HQ 19 Infantry Brigade to
coordinate the communications for Operation ‘Glow Worm’. He met the brigade commander and discussed
the communication arrangements, including those for infantry tank cooperation.
The attack on Chicken’s Neck was launched at 2000 hours by 19 Infantry Brigade
along with 4 Dogra (36 Infantry Brigade), one commando group from 9 Para
Commando and a squadron of 8 Cavalry. The GOC’s rover group was also at Kirpalpur
with the brigade headquarters, for which a telephone line was extended from the
brigade exchange. Radio was opened and kept on continuous listening watch. Radio relay was also opened for artillery
communications for fire support and as standby to lines.
The
operations continued throughout the night. Next morning at about 0730 hours a
combat air patrol (CAP) consisting of two Hunter aircraft were in position over
Chicken’s Neck. Air support
communications were satisfactory and a GU 734 was provided to monitor
transmissions between the pilots and the ground troops. At about 0800 hours
four enemy Sabres appeared over the divisional headquarters and a dog fight
with own aircraft ensued. The enemy
aircraft fired rockets and machine guns but could not cause any damage. At
about 0900 hours the CO left for 19 Infantry Brigade to supervise the build-up
of line communications to the battalions advancing in Chicken’s Neck. For the
next couple of hours there was a flurry of calls from GOC XV Corps, and also the
COS and BGS, which were put through to the
divisional commander. Fortunately, lines to HQ 19 Infantry Brigade remained
stable and there were no breaks in communication. But circuits remained busy
throughout and more than 80 calls were cleared in the exchange. At about 1830
hours information was received that area Chicken’s Neck had been captured and
mopping up operations were in progress.
On
7 December there were reports of heavy enemy pressure in 10 Infantry Division
sector and sounds of intense artillery firing could be heard at Main HQ 26 Infantry
Division. Line communications from HQ 19
Infantry Brigade were extended to 11 Guards, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles and 3/5 Gorkha
Rifles in Chicken’s Neck. The line
laying was seriously hampered by sporadic enemy shelling and intense air
activity. Furthermore, the battalions
did not indicate clearly their locations, which changed frequently. Soon after the lines had been laid, 7/11
Gorkha Rifles and 3/5 Gorkha Rifles moved out of Chicken’s Neck area rendering
the line effort redundant. In area
Chicken’s Neck the only remaining battalion of 19 Infantry Brigade, 11 Guards, had
moved company groups to various ferry crossings on River Chenab, with the
battalion headquarters located at Khoje
Chak. In view of the distances involved
following steps taken to provide line communications in the area:-
·
One line party was
requisitioned from Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment to lay carrier quad
cable between Alfa Chanor and Phuklian over a distance of 11 kilometres .
For this purpose, 15 kilometres quad
cable was issued from the ‘C’ Section of the unit to the battalion.
·
One pair of this
carrier quad was connected to 11 Guards at Khoje Chak by patching on enemy PL. The second pair of the carrier quad was put
through to the battery of 176 Field Regiment near Phuklian in order to provide
communication to HQ 26 Artillery Brigade at Anorian Rakh. From Alfa Chanor to the battalion
headquarters the carrier quad was extended on existing PL.
·
Three line parties from
‘C’ Section were given to 19 Infantry Brigade Signal Company for laying lines
in area Chicken’s Neck. One of these
parties under Second Lieutenant Suraj Bhan was located with 11 Guards to lay
lines to forward ferry sites with the help of the battalion signal platoon. The
distance from the battalion headquarters to these sites varied from 10 to 15 kilometres and
was clearly beyond the capability of battalion signallers.
·
HQ 26 Artillery Brigade
was connected to 19 Infantry Brigade by reorienting the existing border PL Allamaidi
- Kothi – Makhwal Khaika– Chanor – Kirpalpur.
During the next few days own and
enemy air was very active. Numerous
aircraft flew over the divisional sector at low level going to and from 10
Infantry Divisional sector. Line communications were sometimes disrupted but
were quickly restored. On 10 December noise of intense artillery shelling was
heard from 10 Infantry Divisional sector. There were a large number of
telephone calls to HQ 26 Infantry Division for dispatch of reinforcements to 10
Infantry Division from HQ XV Corps as well as the concerned division and
brigades. Line communications to 10 Infantry Division from Akhnur CB exchange
were also disrupted. Fresh cipher documents were sent to all infantry brigades
through Second Lieutenant V.F. D’Souza and Second Lieutenant Jagdish Singh.
On 11 December at about 1300 hours
four Sabre aircraft bombed and strafed the air field and surrounding
areas. However, there was no damage to
personnel or installations. At 1400 hours HQ 168 Infantry Brigade was warned
for move to 10 Infantry Division. On the
request of OC 168 Infantry Brigade Signal Company for a second officer, Second
Lieutenant V.F. D’Souza was sent. He reported to the company within two hours
of the request being made. At 2300 hours, the orders for move of 168 Infantry
Brigade were cancelled.
On 12 December Central India 6 kilometres
of carrier quad cable was laid between Andrian Rakh and Ranbir Singh Pura to
extend the carrier quad cable to 162 Infantry Brigade as an alternative to
PL. Lateral communications between 162
Infantry Brigade and 26 Artillery Brigade were established. The forward PL to 19 Infantry Brigade was
terminated on 162 Infantry Brigade exchange.
On 14 December five officers joined the unit from the CME
and MCTE where they were undergoing the degree engineering course. They were
Captains Shaktawat, Aggarwal, Rajan, Bareja and Grewal. Aggarwal was posted to
26 Artillery Brigade Signal Section to take over from Captain S.K. Budhwar. Second Lieutenant Jagdish Singh and Captain Bareja
were posted to 36 and 162 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies respectively as
seconds-in-command.
On 16 December at about 0800 hours
a transmission between Calcutta Dacca East
Pakistan . Soon afterwards it was officially learned that India 17 December 1971 . During Operation
‘Cactus Lily’, signal communications functioned well in spite of extended
ranges and wide dispersion of troops. Disruptions to lines caused due to
frequent moves and redeployment of armour and artillery were speedily
rectified. The capture of Chicken’s Neck was a very important victory for India
Cable being reeled up from Chicken’s Neck Sector,
1972.
3
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The
unit was located in Leh, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.R.
Visvanathan, with Major B.P. Mamgain as the second-in-command. The other field
officers in the unit were Majors R.P.S.
Rathore, S.K. Dhawan and N.C. Daspal. The role of 3
Infantry Division in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ was mainly defensive, since no
major operations were conducted in this sector. A brief resume of the
activities of the unit during the period are given in the succeeding
paragraphs.
On 1 November 1971 , Tactical
HQ 3 Infantry Division was established at Kargil, alongside HQ 121 (Indep)
Infantry Brigade. The Signals element sent with the tactical headquarters
consisted of one officer and 20 OR, along with necessary transport and
equipment. Shortly afterwards, 163 Infantry Brigade Signal Company moved out to
take part in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ under F Sector. The communication commitments at the location
of 163 Infantry Brigade were taken over by 3 Artillery Brigade Signal Company.
To supplement its strength, five OR were sent from the unit to man the signal
communications at Upshi. The Ladakh Scouts Signal Company also moved out from
its permanent location along with HQ Ladakh Scouts, which was converted into an
infantry battalion and placed under command HQ 3 Artillery Brigade. The signal
communications at Karu complex were taken over by a detachment of one JCO and
fifteen OR provided by the unit. The detachment of 2 Company, 1 Air Support Sig
Regiment that was attached to the unit was withdrawn and joined its parent unit,
leaving behind five OR.
On 5 November a teleprinter circuit
was opened with Udhampur and RTT timings were extended to clear extra traffic.
Apparatus VFT 3 channel duplex was installed on HI system to provide telegraph
circuits Leh – Udhampur and Leh – Srinagar
Apparently
the number of personnel looking after the signal communications at Kargil was
still inadequate. On 9 December Major Mamgain, Second Lieutenant D.S. Pathak
and 15 OR moved to Kargil to supplement the resources of 121 (Indep) Infantry Brigade Group Signal Company. To
meet the communication requirements during operations the D1 and D2 nets were
split into three nets, two being controlled from the tactical headquarters at
Kargil and the third from the main headquarters at Leh. The out stations on D1A
and D2A, controlled from Kargil, were 70 Infantry Brigade, 121 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade and Partapur Sector, along with the main divisional headquarters. D1B,
controlled from Leh, had outstations at 14 Infantry Brigade, 3 Artillery
Brigade and 30 Light Regiment, which was at the permanent location of 70
Infantry Brigade.
On
12 December Major S.K. Dhawan reported arrival on posting from MCTE, Mhow. Two
days later, additional strength of one JCO and seven OR moved to Kargil. The
signal centre at Kargil was taken over by 3 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment and J Communication Zone Signal
Regiment from 121 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Group Signal Company, which was relieved so that it could concentrate
on its forward communication responsibilities. The same day Signalman Nirmal
Singh who was part of the radio detachment attached to 5/3 Gorkha Rifles was
injured by a bullet when the battalion was putting in an attack. On 18 December
Colonel R.A. Bhola, DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh visited Kargil. By this time the
operations were over and a cease fire had been announced.
19
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
19 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
was located at Baramula, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D.K. Vaidya. Other officers holding important
appointments were Major K.S. Nair; Captain S.N. Chatterjee (1 Company)
and Captain S.S. Dahiya (2 Company).
Due
to wide dispersal of the division even in cold war locations, the signal
resources were stretched to the utmost to meet normal communications needs.
Once the formations moved to their battle locations, the existing
communications were found to be inadequate and additional line and radio relay
circuits were provided to conform to the operational plans. To provide radio
relay communications between the divisional headquarters at Baramula and
Tactical HQ 161 Infantry Brigade, one radio relay terminal each was positioned
at Singhpora and Sher on 13
November 1971 . However, the PE-95 generator mounted in a trailer
could not be taken up to Sher due to the low classification of the road leading
to the feature. An effort to transport the PE-95 by towing it with a jeep
failed due to sharp bends in the road and steep gradient. Another effort was made by means of manual
labour but this too was unsuccessful.
The idea of taking the PE-95 up to Sher
was abandoned and it was decided to keep the generator at the base and lay 2.5 kilometres
of spaced PVC cable up to the location of the radio relay terminal at Sher.
This unorthodox solution worked and the radio relay got through at 1230 hours
on 16 November but from terminal to terminal only. The RF reading being low, the channelling
equipment could not be mounted. A cubical quad aerial was improvised locally
and tried out on the radio relay link working between Sher and Singhpora. However it did not give satisfactory results
for mounting the carrier equipment. The radio relay terminal at Singhpora was
then shifted to the animal transport lines, but this too was not successful,
using both cubical quad and yagi aerials.
The link finally got through and all channels were aligned on 21
November after shifting the Singhpora terminal by about one kilometre. Carrier quad cable was laid from
Baramula to Singhpora road/track junction and PL route from there to the
terminal located at Singhpora was used for deriving tails at Baramula for the
radio relay chain to Sher.
On
17 November the SO-in-C visited the unit accompanied by DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh
and was briefed by the CO on the Signals plan during offensive and defensive
phases. On the night of 24/25 November,
268 Infantry Brigade moved to its battle location in general area Rampur Rampur Rampur
On
3 December, it was announced that war with Pakistan Pakistan midday
on 5 December orders were received for patching the radio relay channel between
19 and 25 Infantry Division through Udhampur-Srinagar. This was done and the
link was put through immediately. The
signal centre at HQ 104 Infantry Brigade location was established in an
underground bunker in view of enemy threat. One radio set AN/PRC 25 was sent to
104 Infantry Brigade Signal Company for immediate use by the battalion going
for an operation. A visual observation team of the IAF, consisting of two
airmen also arrived.
On 8 December, OC 2 Company
went on a route reconnaissance to area Uri, Chaukas and Pt. 9108 for
providing line communication to 268 Infantry Brigade in case it moved to that area for
operations. A line detachment
consisting of one JCO and six linemen was positioned at Uri for maintenance of
PL routes Uri - Chaukas – Pt. 9108 and laying field cable in the area. The
laying of field cable between Chaukas – Khetar Dana commenced at 0600 hours on
10 December and was completed by 1500 hours.
On
12 December at about 0800 hours the Baramula-Kupwara line was out. The line
party sent to repair the fault found that the copper line had been cut. The matter was reported to the police and
with the help of tracker dogs the culprit was traced and one person named
Rasool Pandit of village Warigam was arrested. He was handed over to the
Intelligence and Field Security Company for interrogation but nothing useful
was found.
Signallers repairing equipment in the Uri Sector,
1971.
On
13 December the Jeep based rover detachment went out with the GOC up to
Paro. Thereafter it accompanied the GOC
on foot to Tilpatra and Nargis which had been captured from Pakistan Srinagar Rampur Rampur
On
16 December three officers – Captains A.S. Tiwana, R.M. Shastry and R.K. Malik
-reported on posting, two from CME and one from MCTE. Next day, Tiwana and Shastry were sent to 161
and 268 Infantry Brigade Signal Companies respectively as seconds-in-command.
Malik was posted to 1 Company to relieve Captain S.N. Chaterjee. Captain J.
Babaja was sent to KG Sector to look after its communications. The same evening
Rampur-Uri and Sher-Uri physical PL routes were damaged due to enemy shelling.
Communication was restored at 2100 hours by using interruption cable. Next
morning about 18 kilometres
of field cable were burnt in 104 Infantry Brigade due to enemy shelling and
subsequent fire in the area. By this time the operations had ended and cease
fire had been declared.
Though
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ had come to an end, the commitments of the unit did not
finish. A large area hitherto held by the enemy had been captured and occupied
by our troops who had to be given communications. This was true of the Lipa Valley 10
kilometres
of carrier quad cable was sent to Naugam for providing line communications in
the Naukot area liberated by 104 Infantry Brigade. Two days later another 7 kilometres of
carrier quad and one charging set 500W was sent to 104 Infantry Brigade for use
in Kaiyan.
A message is received on radio in the Tithwal Sector,
1971.
After the operations, the GOC,
Major General E. D’Souza wrote to the SO-in-C, CSO Western Command and CSO XV
Corps, commending the performance of the unit. He wrote:-
I
have much pleasure in writing to you about the excellent work put in by the
personnel of the Signal Corps in my division, under the guidance and leadership
of my Commander Signals, Lt
Col
The Signals personnel in my division
have worked most efficiently during the operation with a rare sense of duty,
devotion and determination. They have
undertaken hazardous tasks, braved enemy shelling and small arms fire, showing
complete disregard for personnel comfort and safety. The linemen and radio operators deserve a
special mention for the exemplary manner in which they ceaselessly worked to
maintain efficient communication inspite of heavy shelling and small arms
fire. On occasions when our lines were
cut, they were replaced expeditiously without any delay. It is entirely due to the efficient
functioning of the signal communication and the bravery and devotion of those
concerned that throughout the operations there was not a single case of any
circuit going out or the radio not functioning.
I was therefore able to keep in constant touch and formation commanders
were able to exercise effective command and control. It also goes to the credit of my Signal
Regiment that there was no occasion for me to use the radio relay link.
I would also like to mention about
the excellent work done by the backroom boys in the cipher office and signal
centre. The unprecedented increase of
traffic in classified and precedence signals was of a very high magnitude. The individuals however rose to the occasion
and working cheerfully round the clock, ensured that there was no undue hold
up.
I have recommended some of my
Signallers for suitable awards.
J Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The unit was at Leh, under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel B.B. Sarin, with Major Karam Singh as the second-in-command.
Other field officers in the unit were Major B.S. Bedi (2 Company) and Major K.
Deshpande (3 Company) The unit was responsible for line construction and
maintenance tasks in Ladakh under the technical control of DCSO Kashmir and
Ladakh, Colonel R.A. Bhola.
During Operation ‘Cactus Lily’
except for 2 Company which was involved in actual operations at Kargil in
support of 121 (Indep) Brigade, the unit’s resources were utilised to
supplement those of other signal units in Western Command. However, the unit
carried out construction of several new PL routes. In October a line detachment
of one JCO and 16 OR under Lieutenant A. K. Saini constructed the route Loma –
Hanle – Koyul. The PL route was to cross over the mountain range at Hanle for
connecting Fukche airfield. In November another line detachment comprising
Lieutenant A. K. Saini and Second Lieutenant P. Nambiar, Naib Subedar
R.C.Tiwari and 23 OR proceeded to Karu for realignment of the trunk PL route to
avoid STAKNA Hydel project. The situation has been described by Lieutenant
General Saini, who was commanding the line detachment, in the following words:-
The diversion of the 10 km route involved crossing
of Indus river at Karu for connecting back to
the original route. Probably, for the first and perhaps also the last time,
Pistol Schermally was actually used for throwing a line across the river span
of about 80 metres
for pulling the cables. Pulling of eight wires of 242 lb copper weld wires
took the entire day. It was an extremely hazardous and difficult task due to
the fast current and slippery, frozen river banks. The extreme cold and fog
added to the difficulty of pulling heavy wires across the river. The task was
completed by evening without any break. The test call to Leh on the new route
was the proudest moment for the 57 Line Construction Section.
In December, a line party under
Lieutenant Saini and Naib Subedar Tiwari was tasked to lay a PVC route between
Thoise airfield and Turtuk via Chalunka. It was a 28 kilometre
route that was to connect HQ Partapur Sector to Turtuk, the last captured
location in Pakistan
The line party was lifted
lock-stock and barrel next morning in an IAF Packet aircraft and dropped at the
Thoise ALG in the afternoon. At the ALG, a Ladakh Scouts NCO was waiting with
one horse, four yaks and six mules to ferry the stores to the start point. The
horse was for the officer in charge to reconnoitre the route and up and down
movement. In those days, Turtuk was connected only by a mule track. The laying
of the entire route on 8/16 feet wooden poles, using mules, yaks and porters
took about two months. The route passed through rugged mountains as well as
sandy desert stretches in high altitude area. The line party shifted its camp
three times. The last stretch involved crossing the Shyok River Shyok River 1972. A test call from
Turtuk to Leh, on completion of the line was another glorious moment for the
line party.
After the commencement of the
operations the PL route Srinagar
After the end of the operations on
17 December the unit was involved in rehabilitation of several PL routes that
had been damaged. A new PL route from
own Picquet 10 to Point 13620 captured from the enemy in Kargil sector was
constructed and handed over to 121
(Indep)) Brigade Signal Company. Lieutenant Lekhvir Singh, (known as Tambi
Khalsa due to his spoken proficiency in Tamil language) played an important
role in laying lines in the brigade sector.
T Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The
unit was located at Srinagar
Shortly
before the commencement of Operation ’Cactus Lily’ the unit established radio
relay links and engineered direct speech circuits from Baramula to Rajauri, Kargil,
Udhampur and Srinagar. In order to improve radio relay communications between Srinagar Srinagar Srinagar
On
9 December some changes were carried out in the radio network. The control of
C64 net was taken over by 2 Company, J Communication Zone Signal Regiment and
out stations on C1, C2 and C2A were closed down. A new out station was opened on C25A. Next
day the Udhampur- Srinagar microwave channel meant for Leh was patched to
Kargil due to operational commitments. A
total of 14 line patrols were sent out on various PL routes during the week. To
control the rise in message traffic a staff message control centre (SMCC) was
established. This proved to be very
effective and resulted in reduction of total traffic by about 25 %.
During the week a 3 channel
stackable system was tried between Srinagar Srinagar Srinagar Srinagar
Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The
unit was located at Jammu
During the months of October and November
1971 the unit was involved in preparations for the impending operations. A
number of PL routes were constructed and additional circuits engineered for
formations in their operational locations. Several radio relay links were also
established between important locations. To supplement the resources of the
unit, manpower and equipment was given by other units which were not so heavily
committed viz. J Communication Zone Signal Regiment. A traffic control net was
established using radio sets ANPRC-25, with the control at Udhampur and
outstations at Jindra Domail, Katra, Riasi, Paoni, Bhagot, Sunderbani, Naushshera,
Narian, Kalakot and Rajauri.
War between India Pakistan 3
December 1971 . The same day the enemy launched attacks in Punch and
Chhamb sectors occupied by 25 and 10 Infantry Divisions. This was followed by
the capture of Chicken’s Neck by 26 Infantry Division. Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment played
an important role in all these operations. Soon after the commencement of the
attack on Chhamb, Captain R.K. Kak was asked to check the communications at
Akhnur by CO 10 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. In view of the importance
of Akhnur, on 4 December direct communications were engineered to that location
from Udhamapur, Jammu
On 6 December a line party of J
Communication Zone Signal Regiment under an officer was sent Akhnur for
maintenance of PL routes between Akhnur and HQ 10 Infantry Division. The CO and
OC 1 Company personally went to the area to check the above lines. Major Nayar
was able to acquire two pairs of PL from the Irrigation Department from Akhnur
to Jaurian. By this time the operation in Chicken’s Neck had started. A line
party under Second Lieutenant Jayant Singh laid 13 kilometres of
carrier quad cable route in 19 Infantry Brigade sector in the Chicken’s Neck
area from Chanur (India Pakistan
At this time, the battle was still raging in the
Punch sector. On 8 December some manpower was sent to 25 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment to boost their strength. Power line from Jaunipura was taken
over and used to provide circuits Rajauri - Udhampur and Jammu Jammu
On
10 December Captain Kak while maintaining the lines near River Tawi saw a
suspicious character in the graveyard near the anti aircraft gun position. He reported the matter to Major Nayar who
discussed the matter with Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mr. Khurana. The
caretaker of the graveyard, Mr. Alia, was taken into custody by the police. A
large quantity of equipment and stores was sent to Akhnur for construction of PL
and carrier quad routes in 10 Infantry Divisional sector. During the next two
days 12 kilometres
of carrier quad was laid from HQ 10 Infantry Division to HQ 68 Infantry
Brigade. About 6 kilometres
of carrier quad was laid on ballies
along the canal on the northern axis for extending the local leads to Rear 10
Infantry Division. The work was a
supervised by Major K.C. Garga and Major D.K. Ghosh, who had recently joined
the unit.
121
(Indep) Infantry Brigade Signal Company
121 (Indep) Infantry Brigade Signal
Company was located in Kargil in 1971. The company was under the command of
Major M.S.G. Rao, with Captain Gautam Singh as the second-in-command. It was
manning the signal centre and exchange at Kargil, in addition to the forward
communications to units under command of the brigade viz. 2/11 Gorkha Rifles,
18 Punjab, 7 Guards and 9 and 13 Jammu & Kashmir Militia.
Preparations
for Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ began in mid October 1971, when radio detachments
from the company were sent to each battalion with a radio set 62. Major Rao and
Captain Gautam visited the forward posts held by the units, to check on the
communications. Colonel R.A. Bhola, DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh also visited Kargil
in late October and early November, to oversee the communication set up. In mid
November a telegraph circuit to Srinagar India
On
4 December, a detachment of 12 OR along with a 10 line magneto exchange
was sent to Post 22 with the task of installing the exchange and
to provide line communication to 87
Light Regiment, 7 Guards, 18 Punjab and 9 Jammu & Kashmir Militia. Next
morning Captain Gautam also moved to Post 22 with the rover party. A line was laid from Post 22 exchange to
Observation Post (OP) for operations room and OC 87 Light Regiment. The B1 detachments of 7 Guards and 18 Punjab were given a detailed briefing and their equipment
was checked. Line parties were detailed for the two battalions for laying the
line to the forward area. One line
detachment consisting of 1 JCO and six linemen started laying the lines from
Post 22 to Brachil
Pass
On
7 December one JCO and one OR started laying the line on move of 2/11 Gorkha
Rifles from the new location at 1700 hours and completed up to Post 12 at 2100
hours. Major Rao went to Post 10 along
with a line party for laying a new line.
The brigade headquarters was subjected to heavy shelling by the enemy
from early morning. The line party
reached Conical which is 6
kilometres away from Post 22 at 0200 hours. The line party, weighed down by the cable
that they were carrying could not keep pace with the battalion and lagged
behind. They lost their way and strayed
into enemy held area. When challenged by
Pakistani troops they ran back and reached the same location at 0800
hours. In the mean time the line to Post
22 was damaged by mortar and artillery shelling. The post was cut off from the front as well
as from rear, as the line from the brigade headquarters to Post 22 was also
damaged by enemy shelling at 0900 hours.
Captain Gautam and one lineman went out to rectify the fault. They restored communications at 1330 hours
and reached Post 22 at 1700 hours. The
battalion headquarters of 18 Punjab was at
Post 22, hence the B1 out station was also available. Radio communication
between the battalion headquarters and attacking companies was on AN/PRC-25.
On 8 December a line patrol
comprising Captain Gautam and one lineman started from Post 22 at 0730 hours
for Brachil Pass Brachil Pass Punjab as well as 7 Guards at 1400 hours. A line patrol of four linemen under Captain
Gautam again left Brachil
Pass
During
the subsequent days all personnel of the company continued to lay new lines to
posts that were captured and repair those that were damaged due to enemy
shelling. The line patrol was sent daily, leaving Brachil at about 2200 hours
and reaching Conical at 0200 hours. It started on its return journey at about
0800 hours, getting back to Brachil after midday .
New lines were laid from Chora Post to Pathar and Black Rock to Pt. 13620 on 10
December; and from Post 12 to village Gundarwan and Brachil to Snow Peak Punjab
location and extended a tie line from the brigade exchange. Another line was
laid from 7 Guards to a pass about one kilometre east of Brachil where the
battalion was fighting.
On 14 December six OR and five porters
proceeded to Post 22 with batteries, dispenser packs and telephone sets. A
party of three OR was sent to Post 3 with one RS 62. Another party of 20 men
including non combatants enrolled (NCsE) was sent to Post 17, from where cable
was carried and dumped in area Gundarnan village occupied by 5/3 Gorkha Rifles.
Cable left by the enemy was utilized to extend the line from Post 16. On 15 December Major Rao proceeded to Harka Bahadur
Bridge 100 kilometres
of cable from T Communication Zone Signal Regiment. A new line was laid from
Post 24 to Chora Post. Next morning a line was also laid to Chora Post from Brachil Pass. 11 in accordance with move of
2/11 Gorkha Rifles. One RS AN/PRC 25 was stationed at Post 3 to facilitate
radio communication with the battalion.
On
17 December a line was laid from Brachil Pass to Post Bali, a distance of 5 kilometres . The
outstation on C-1 link was handed over to personnel of J Communication Zone
Signal Regiment. 26 linemen of that unit attached with the company were sent to
Post 10 for repairing the line. Radio and
line detachments with 15 porters advanced along with 2/11 Gorkha Rifles to Post
3. One NCO with five linemen and 10
porters moved from Post 3 at 0230 hours and reached Sarcha Gaon at 0700 hours. The party continued its task and moved from
Sarcha Gaon at 0830 hours, reaching base at 1400 hours. After resting with the battalion headquarters
for two hours, they moved out at 1600 hours reaching Jankar Top at 2030 hours
on the same day. The party rested at
Jankar Top till 0830 hours on 18 December, when they started for Post 11,
arriving there at 2030 hours, half an hour after the cease fire had been
declared.
121
(Indep) Infantry Brigade Signal Company did a sterling job in providing
communications during Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. All personnel of the company
worked under exceptionally arduous conditions, moving with the battalions as
they moved. The two officers of the company were always on the move, often with
the line parties, ensuring that communications were always through. As always, the linemen worked the hardest,
laying and repairing lines without a break for several hours each day in
extremely cold weather and rugged terrain.
XI Corps Signals
HQ XI Corps was located at Jullundur Jullundur Amritsar Camp Pratap Camp
Ranjit Amritsar
The move of the corps headquarters
was planned, but the actual dates had not been decided. The manner in which
orders for the move were issued has been described by former SO-in-C, Lieutenant
General Prakash Gokarn, who was then SO2 (Signals), in the following words:-
11 Corps had practiced
various operational roles under the command of Lt Gen PS Bhagat, VC (till early
1970) and Lt Gen NC Rawlley, MC (during the operation). CSO 11 Corps, Brig Mohinder Singh Dhillon
and SO 1 (Sigs) Col VL Narayanan had ensured that the Signals Branch and units
were well prepared for any eventuality.
They were out on recce on the night of 8th Oct 71, when I was
called by Lt Col (later Maj Gen) Bachhitar Singh, GSO 1 (Ops) HQ 11 Corps who
verbally informed me about the impending move to Kotkapura (which I had never
heard of till then), the likely ORBAT and locations of formations. I
immediately informed my superiors who gave me clear instructions and thereafter
conveyed these to the COs of the Signal Regiments i.e. Lt Col Bahl (11 Corps
Sig Regt), Lt Col YR Ratra (Z Comn Sig Regt) and Maj RS Arora (ASSU). Written Sig instructions were issued on 15th
Oct 71 after receipt of the HQ 11 Corps Op instructions. The concept of
splitting the Corps HQ into three i.e. Main, Advance and Rear HQ stretched our
resources but we met the comn demands admirably thanks to the infrastructure
(BOPEL) spadework done by our erstwhile CSOs Brig KS Garewal and Brig JV Pinto.
Advance parties were sent to the
projected locations of the headquarters based on verbal orders received from HQ
XI Corps. By the time formal orders were received line and radio relay
communications had been established from the new locations. The advance and
main headquarters actually moved on 20 October, the Signals elements having
moved the previous week and set up communications. Teams from Z Communication
Zone Signal Regiment were positioned in P&T carrier centres at Bhatinda,
Abohar, Fazilka and Sriganganagar. Air force speech and air support telegraph
circuits were provided to airfields at Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot and
Sirsa.
By early November communications
had stabilised. One complete shift for the signal centre, crypto centre and
exchange at the advance corps headquarters was being provided by Z
Communication Zone Signal Regiment, which also sent a shift to Abohar to assist
F Sector Signal Regiment. Communications were also catered for a flooding
scheme for which a flooding control centre was established at Doburji Rest
House. Though communications were stable, the volume of traffic saw a marked
increase. On recommendations of the CSO, a staff message control centre (SMCC)
was established on 5 November, which was manned round the clock. This brought
down the traffic by more than half and also reduced the number of messages that
needed encryption.
An
interesting development was Plan ‘Delta’, a deception plan that was to be put
into operation under HQ Central Command, then being commanded by
Lieutenant General P.S. Bhagat, VC. It
comprised an infantry brigade, some armour and elements of Engineers, Signals
etc. Their vehicles would be painted with formation signs and the radio nets
would simulate traffic of 1 Armoured Division, leading the enemy to believe
that a major Indian offensive was planned in that area. Communications and
radio deception measures were being coordinated by a team of signal officers
under Brigadier V.C. Khanna (he was CSO Central Command earlier, but doing the
NDC course at that time). The other officers in the team were Colonel H.S.Gill,
Major Y.M. Narula and Major K.V. Nair, all from MCTE. Based on the requirements worked out by the
team, a composite signal company was created, resources for which were provided
by various units of Western Command. Z Communication Zone Signal Regiment
provided the company headquarters, line parties and administrative elements.
Composite radio detachments were provided by XI Corps, 1 Armoured Divisional
Signal Regiment, 14 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, 14 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade Signal Company and 474 Engineer Brigade Signal Section. Some radio
detachments were also taken from XV Corps.
The
composite signal company under Major Mehta of Z Communication Zone Signal
Regiment reached Amritsar 9 November 1971 .
HQ XI Corps Signal Instruction No. 24 for Plan ‘Delta’ was issued on 11
November. Only three copies were distributed - one each to Brigadier Khanna,
Major Mehta and 474 Engineer Brigade Signal Section. In the event, Plan ‘Delta’ was never
implemented and the signal resources were returned to the respective units.
On 1 December the Deputy SO-in-C,
Major General K.S. Garewal arrived at Amristar. Accompanied by Lieutenant
Colonel R.N. Bhatia, GSO 1 Signals 7,
Mr. Rau of the P&T Board, Mr. Amrik Singh and other P&T Officials, he
visited Main HQ XI Corps (Camp Ranjit),
XI Corps Signal Regiment and 15
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, including the brigade signal companies. Next day the team visited Advance HQ XI Corps
(Camp Pratap
At
1740 hours on 3 December Pakistan Camp Ranjit
During the night communications were stable though
there was a flurry of trunk calls between command, corps and divisions. Direct
lines from the operations rooms of subordinate formations were extended to
JOIR. These hot lines were fully
utilised and important messages passed using ECL. The CSO left Bhatinda at 2300
hours and arrived at Camp
Ranjit Camp Pratap
Describing his experience of the night the operations
started, General Gokarn writes:
We were all completely in underground dugouts within
ten days of reaching our HQ. My
underground bunker was next to the GSO1 (Ops) at Kotkapura. CSO and SO1 (Sigs) were located at Jandiala
Guru. A shameful personal event
occurred on the night of 3rd Dec 71 when Pakistan Air Force launched
an air strike and bombed Bhatinda Railway Station. The intensity of the sound and fury of the
bombing was felt at Kotkapura. After
spending the entire night in the Sig Centre and Ops Room I returned for a wash
to my bunker. To my horror I found a
rifle, unused bullets and a note on my camp cot belonging to my helper who
stated that he was very afraid and was therefore running away. He was a Signalman from Bombay (Mumbai) and
to this date I have been looking for him ever since I retired! It was my first
and thankfully last experience of cowardice in service.
By midday on 4 December communications for Mike Force at
Netawali had been established both on radio and line from Advanced HQ XI
Corps. Alternate line communications
from 51 (Indep) Parachute Brigade were also provided. It was learned that Plan
Delta was not being implemented and the signal resources that had been placed
at its disposal were being returned. An analysis of the traffic handled the
previous day revealed that it had almost doubled. At Main HQ XI Corps, it rose
to 140,000 groups from the daily average of 75,000 over the previous week. At
Advance HQ XI Corps, the rise was even more marked – from 27,655 to 77, 543
groups.
The communications provided were
lavish, thanks to advance planning and excellent work done by the previous CSOs
and the BOPEL routes laid during their tenures. From Main HQ XI Corps, there
were three speech circuits to the divisions and the advance headquarters, four
to the rear headquarters and two to HQ Western Command. The number of telegraph
circuits was equally generous - two to the divisions and three to command. As
regards Advance HQ XI Corps, the number of speech and telegraph circuits to the
divisions was three and two respectively. There were two speech and two
telegraph circuits to HQ Western Command at Jullundur Delhi
Though
line communications were reliable, radio and radio relay links were also
established and used when line circuits were disrupted, which happened rarely.
On 5/6 December, offensive operations were conducted in the Sehjra bulge and
Dera Baba Nanak. Communications to both 7 and 15 Infantry Divisions functioned
well during the operations.
At that time, XI Corps Artillery
Brigade did not have its own signal company. Before the commencement of the
operations, an ad-hoc artillery brigade signal company has been rigged up by
milking the resources of 3 Company, XI Corps Signal Regiment. The primary task of the company (in the
absence of an FDC so far) was to provide communications to air defence guns and
warn them of movement of own aircraft. Due to operational requirements, the
necessity was felt to establish an FDC at Fazilka. However, the resources of
the signal company with the artillery brigade were inadequate for this task.
Accordingly, orders were issued on 7 December for a major portion of 21 (Indep)
Artillery Brigade Signal Company to move from Fatehgarh Churian to Fazilka to
establish communications for the adhoc FDC to be set up under the Commander
Corps Artillery, XI Corps.
On
9 December it was learnt that six RS C41/R222, less generators and channelling equipment
were being despatched from Special Signal Regiment in Delhi 16 kilometre
tail from Harike to the location of HQ 7 Infantry Division. The same afternoon
an Emergency message was received from Army HQ intimating that Air Support Code
Sox 762/Edition 40 had been compromised and the next edition should be taken
into use forthwith. A special courier
was immediately sent to Advance HQ XI Corps with the fresh ‘letter code’ and
instructions for putting it into use immediately. Couriers from 7 and 15
Infantry Divisions were asked to come and collect the instructions. By 0500
hours next morning the new set of documents were available with all tentacles
and airfield detachments.
During
the next few days two new formations, 123 Mountain Brigade and 50 (Indep) Parachute
Brigade arrived in XI Corps Zone. On 13 December a speech circuit was extended
from Pratap Camp to Malaut, the location of 50 (Indep) Parachute Brigade via
Bhatinda on P & T system. Lateral
line circuits were also given from Abohar (F Sector) and Muktsar (1 Armoured
Division). Communications for 123 Mountain Brigade had been catered for in
Batala, where it was to be located. However, on 15 December it was learnt that the
location was being changed to Majitha and subsequently to Kohali. Since no spare P & T pair was available,
another circuit was disconnected and the pair utilised for providing
communications to 123 Mountain Brigade from Amritsar
There
was a major disruption of coaxial cable from 1030 to 1615 hours on 17 December,
probably due to power failure near Sangrur, in Ambala-Ludhiana sector. The coaxial was restored at 1615 hours but
went down again at 1800 hours due to a fault in Amritsar Jullundur Delhi Jullundur 18
December 1971 , marking the end of Operation ‘Cactus Lily’.
XI
Corps Signal Regiment
The unit was at Jullundur
On 15
Sepetmber 1971 the Signals plans for XI Corps for defensive operations were
presented by CSO XI Corps and were discussed at Jullundur. Those present
included the SO-in-C, Deputy SO-in-C, CSO Western Command, CSO XV Corps, CSO I
Corps, CO XI Corps Signal Regiment and other senior officers of the unit. This
was followed by a reconnaissance on 25 September by the CO accompanied by Major
Nath and officers from HQ XI Corps (Signals Branch). The area adjacent to Kotkapura town was
selected as the location of Advance HQ XI Corps because of availability of
P&T communications (coaxial and carrier), power supply and Kotkapura being
an important rail/road communication centre. During another reconnaissance on 3
October the area Manawala Khurd near Amritsar Amritsar
The move of the unit was planned on
15 October. On 14 October a ‘Barakhana’ was being held for the men and their
families when a message was received that an enemy attack in area Fazilka was
anticipated that night. Major Kapil was ordered to move to Kotkapura with three
medium power sets and four low power sets at 2200 hours. At the same time, Major Sikand was to move to
Four Fields with four medium power sets and two low power sets. Major Kapil, Captain Sushil Kumar and
Lieutenant D. Sharma left Jullundur Amritsar Amritsar
Describing
the move of the unit from Jullundur
XI
Corps Signal Regiment moved from Jullundur to Main & Advance Headquarters
at Amritsar & Kotkapura on Night 14/15 October 1971. The quantum of
communications to be provided from these two locations was nearly equal. While
communications from Main Headquarters was already foreseen and planned; it was
at Advance Headquarters at Kotkapura where communications had to be
provided at short notice to the newly inducted formations.
The time gap between the information regarding the
induction of new formations and requirement for the provision of communications
was very short. Resources at Advance Headquarters were already utilised in
providing these communications. To our horror it was noticed that most of the
PL routes in Kotkapura area were affected by the high tension power lines laid
by Punjab State Electricity Board without any intimation to the Army
authorities. There were a few mishaps - though not fatal - when our line
parties were working on these PL routes. Special mention must be made of
Lieutenant M.K. Chaterjee, who was our OC Lines, and his men for their
dedication and hard work to maintain and keep these PL routes functional
despite these handicaps.
Our main priority was to establish RR
communications between Main and Advance Headquarters. Initially efforts were
made to establish a direct RR Link - success was achieved to some extent.
However we experienced a lot of interference and unreliability in this direct
link. It was then decided to scout for a suitable relay station and have a two
hop RR Link. A number of locations were tried out and ultimately a relay
station was located atop a village main water tank. We could thus obtain a
height of 100 - 120 feet
for this. Our RR between the two headquarters functioned very well thereafter.
A number of our generators and charging engines were not
in working order - awaiting repairs by EME workshop. Normal procedures to get
these on-road would have taken some time. While getting into our location at
Kotkapura, we had seen a large numbers of repair shops along the main highway.
Enquiries were made to find out if our generators and charging engines could be
repaired by these shops. The shop owners readily agreed to check them and
help us .Within 7 - 10 days they not only carried the repairs but asked to
approach them for any further assistance. When we wanted to pay them for these
repairs, no money was accepted.
By
the end of November signal centres and exchanges at the advance and main rear
headquarters had been moved to dugouts. All radio and radio relay terminals had
been checked. The radio detachments from
1 Armoured Division, 14 Infantry Division and F Sector were called to Camp Pratap
The
Deputy SO-in-C accompanied by Mr. B.S Rau, Member (Planning) of the P&T
Board visited the unit in Four Fields on 1 December and Kotkapura the following
day. He was full of praise for the amount of effort put in by the unit. On 3
December the war started after air strikes by Pakistan Amritsar Amritsar
On
4 December, 1 Armoured Division moved to their new location south of Muktsar,
where line communications were extended to them. On 5 December Mike Force comprising 18 Cavalry and 62
Armoured Regiment was established at Netawali, south of Ganganagar and provided
communications. Instructions were issued
to the signal officer of 62 Armoured Regiment to come up on C2A link. On 6 December speech circuits Ferozepur –
Kotkapura and Jodhpur
On
8 December morning an intercept was received that the enemy is likely to bomb
all headquarters between 0900 and 1000 hours. One Pakistani aircraft came over
Kotkapura at 1000 hours and was engaged by own anti-aircraft guns. The aircraft
made two attempts to dive but fled without attacking. A similar intercept was
received on 9 December which gave out the exact grid reference of all
headquarters that were to be attacked. However, no aircraft were seen that day.
Between 7 and 15 December, nine
officers joined the unit, most of them from CME and MCTE. They were Captains S.
Nambirajan, A.K. Banerjee, M.N. Thadani, N.S. Vasavan, D.R. Bhatiani, S.K.
Chopra, S. Kulkarni and P. Dass. On 16
December Pakistani forces in East Bengal
surrendered and India
7
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Ferozepore
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R.
S. Trehan with Major I.M.
Dawer as the second-in-command. Other
officers holding important appointments were Major H.C. Malhotra (HQ
Company); Major S.P. Karir (1 Company) and Major S.S. Bains (2 Company). The officers in the brigade signal companies
were Major S.C.
Nautiyal (48 Brigade); Major D.A.P. Christy Davis (29 Brigade) and Captain V.K.
Chadha (65 Brigade).
On 14 October the unit moved to its
concentration area at Patti Crossing. Three days later, it moved to its
operational location at Manakpura. The unit’s induction had an ominous
beginning, with the radio relay terminal of 29 Infantry Brigade catching fire
in the unit lines. After settling down
in the new location communications were established with the brigades and
rearwards with corps headquarters. In early November, the unit sent three radio
detachments to 15 Infantry Division for Plan ‘Delta’. Ferozepore being located close to the border,
it was vulnerable to artillery shelling. To prevent damage to communication
centres blast walls were built around the exchange and signal centre. The
P&T carrier centre at Ferozepore was sand bagged to protect it from damage
due to enemy shelling.
On 2 December the Deputy SO-in-C
visited the unit along with a team of officers from the P&T Department. On
3 December the enemy commenced hostilities in 7 Infantry Divisional sector by
intensive shelling of border out posts (BOPS) followed by a limited offensive
in Hussainiwala which was held by an
infantry brigade supported by approximately two squadrons of armour. Due to
heavy shelling, line communications to Hussainiwala were disrupted. Working through continuous
shelling, the line was restored by unit linemen led by Captain Rajbir Singh of 35 Infantry Brigade Signal Company, which had
been placed under 7 Infantry Division for the operations. Indian artillery was
able to retaliate effectively, thanks to excellent line and radio
communications. A direct channel on
radio relay as stand by to line was provided from the artillery command post to
the fire direction centre at Ferozepore.
There was considerable damage to the
PL routes in this sector due to shelling.
However, circuits were restored promptly. A large number of lateral and duplicate lines
had been provided and there was no disruption in communications. To boost outgoing
signals, mini amplifiers were installed in the telephones of commanders down to
battalion level. On 6
December 35 Infantry Brigade reverted to its parent formation, 14
Infantry Division. Operation ‘Lightning’ was conducted by 48 Infantry Brigade
the same night and the enemy thrown out of Sehjra bulge. Line detachments of 2 Company and 48 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company gave a good account of themselves in providing
uninterrupted communications in spite of heavy shelling by the enemy.
On the night of 7/8 December, 14
Rajput carried out their attack for which the battalion radio detachment of 65
Infantry Brigade Signal Company provided good communications. Signalman Surendera Pandey of the detachment
was reported missing during the battle but subsequently joined the battalion
after about 12 hours. Between 13 and 16 December four officers joined the unit
from MCTE, on termination of the SODE course. They were Captains S.K. Jain,
T.L. Francis, V.D.S. Mehra and B.P.S. Virk. The operations ended on 17 December 1971 .
7 Infantry Divisional did not carry
out any major offensive during Operation ‘Cactus Lily”, except for the
clearance of the Sehjra bulge by 48 Infantry Brigade. However, the unit did a
commendable job and there was no instance of communication failure. Lance Naik
Sri Kant of 48 Infantry Brigade Signal Company was awarded a
Mention-In-Despatches for his courageous action during the war.
14
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The unit was at Clement Town
On 11 October 1971 the unit
received the warning order for move to the concentration area. The brigade
signal companies moved with their respective formation headquarters on 13 and
14 October, followed by the main and rear elements of the unit which moved on
17 and 18 October. The final destination was not disclosed until the first night
halt at Patiala 35 km
away and under command 7 Infantry Division; 58 Infantry Brigade was at Ajnala, 150 km away under command 15
Infantry Division; while 116 Infantry Brigade was at Muktsar, 45 km away as corps reserve.
By the end of October the unit was
settled in its new location and communications had stabilised. On 2 November
Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Sibal, Army HQ Liaison Officer visited the unit and 116
Infantry Brigade. On the same day Colonel H.S. Gill, Major Y.M. Narula and
Major K.V. Nair from MCTE visited the unit to carry out traffic scrutiny and analysis. On 12 November the unit sent five radio
detachments (three with RS 42 and two with
C11/R210) to 15 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Amritsar, for special a communication task (Plan
Delta). Shortly afterwards ten radio detachments (AN/PRC 25 with boosters) were
sent to Main HQ XI Corps for Plan Delta.
One air support tentacle (divisional terminal) was withdrawn from the
unit by HQ XI Corps and an adhoc tentacle was kept as standby. Three radio
detachments (C11/R210) were sent to Ganganagar under Second Lieutenant R. Kohli
for monitoring tasks. The detachments were deployed at Mukkalnwala, Mirzawala
and Karanpur to monitor enemy links and pass any information if picked up.
The
unit suffered its first fatal casualty on 25 November when Lance Naik M. G.
Narayan Pillai of 2 Company died due to bunker collapse in 58 Infantry Brigade
location at Ajnala. He was inside the
bunker with his radio relay set when at about midnight , the bunker roof collapsed over him. Major
Rautela and Captain D.K. Sharma with a party of one JCO and ten OR attended the
cremation at Amritsar
On 29 November the CO left for
reconnaissance of the forward location near Jalalabad after information was
received that Pakistan
On 3 December enemy aircraft
attacked several Indian airfields including Faridkot. Heavy shelling took place
in 35 Infantry Brigade throughout the night. Radio silence was lifted next day
at 1300 hours. In the evening line parties were sent to replace field cable by
carrier quad between main and tactical headquarters of 116 Infantry Brigade and
to patch it on PL to the divisional headquarters. Second Lieutenant Joshi also
left with an Ericsson exchange, BBFU and S+DX (3A) with the task of
establishing communications between main and tactical headquarters of 116
Infantry Brigade. At about 2140 hours
information was received that the 1-Ton Nissan truck in which Joshi was travelling
collided with a 3-Ton vehicle on Sadik-Muktsar road. Joshi and the driver Signalman
T. Sasidaran sustained minor injuries and were later admitted to the
hospital.
Next morning radio relay
communications were established with 116 Infantry Brigade and two speech
channels extended to the exchange. Radio
communications on D1 and D2 were established with 35 Infantry Brigade and the
sets kept on listening watch. A radio
relay link with Advance HQ XI Corps was also established and closed after
trials. Meanwhile Second Lieutenant
Kohli along with three radio detachments returned from Ganganagar after
completion of his monitoring task.
On 5 November, 35 Infantry
Brigade reverted to 14 Infantry Division. Captain D.K. Sharma was sent with a
terminal to establish a radio relay link to the brigade. The carrier quad laid
to provide a direct line to the brigade developed a fault which was rectified
only next day at 1500 hours. On 6 December the GOC, Major General H.K. Bakshi
was injured in a mine blast and had to be hospitalized. A telephone was
provided to him in the military hospital, Fardikot by M Communication Zone
Signal Regiment. After a few days, Major General O.S. Kalkat was appointed the
new GOC. On 14 December three officers reported to the unit from the College of Military Engineering
15 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Amritsar
The unit moved to its operational
location in early October 1971. By 10 October lines had been laid to 86, 96 and
54 Infantry Brigades and 14 (Indep) Armoured Brigade. Line communication with 38 Infantry Brigade,
which had concentrated at Khasa was established temporarily through 56 Armoured
Regiment exchange. Three junction lines were provided from Amritsar 19 October, 58
Infantry Brigade located at Rajasansi was also placed under the division.
Communication was provided to the brigade by extending UG cable from Gumtala
bridge. The brigade subsequently moved to Ajnala where it was given a line from
the local exchange.
During
the months of November efforts to improve the communication layout continued.
Lines were buried wherever possible and laterals were laid between brigades.
The number of junction lines to Amritsar
On
3 December Pakistani aircraft attacked Rajasansi airfield. Shortly after midnight the line to Khangarh was
disrupted due to heavy shelling and an enemy attack was expected. Havildar K.S.
Negi went out and restored the line, working under shelling for more than two
hours. At 0500 hours another attack on Ranian was expected and the line from HQ
54 Infantry Brigade to 9 Punjab went out. Signalman Phool Singh the line detachment commander
went out with his line party and repaired the line under intense enemy
shelling.
After
the move of 86 Infantry Brigade to Dera Baba Nanak, certain changes were made
in the existing line communications. In
order to provide communications to 21 (Indep) Artillery Brigade that had moved
to the location earlier occupied by HQ 86 Infantry Brigade, the existing line
to the latter was split at Ajnala and terminated on Ajnala exchange. One pair going from Ajnala towards Batala was
terminated on Fatehgarh Churian exchange.
The second pair from Ajnala was given to HQ 14 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade. Of the two pairs from Batala to
Ajnala one was terminated on Fategarh Churian exchange and the other given
directly to 21 (Indep) Artillery Brigade.
An additional line was provided to HQ 86 Infantry Brigade from Ajnala
via Ramdas. This line was disrupted due to shelling at about 2300 hours but was
restored at 0230 hours next morning.
On the night of 4/5 December,
during the capture of the Pakistani post
at Therpura, Signalman Keshri Prasad
Pandey of 58 Infantry Brigade Signal Company extended a line from Rajatal to
Therpura. In spite of enemy shelling, he carried out repairs and kept the line
through. At about 0100 hours on 6 December the line to HQ 86 Infantry Brigade
was again disrupted. The corps commander was put through to GOC 15 Infantry
Division at the location of HQ 86 Infantry Brigade on radio relay. Meanwhile,
line parties dispatched from Ajnala and Batala restored the line at 0300 hours.
The GOC was given a RS AN/PRC 25 for listening in on the B1 net.
After the capture of Dera Baba
Nanak on 6 December there was a lull in the battle in the divisional
sector. However, at about 1730 hours on
10 December it was learned that the enemy tanks were was building up opposite
Ranian, which was subjected to heavy shelling at 1800 hours. The line to 9 Punjab
was out and there was a lot of interference on the radio also. Signalman Ram Bahadur Singh went out and
restored it three times during the night, working on the line for more than four hours under
heavy shelling.
On
11 December a reserve VHF radio detachment was dispatched to HQ 96 Infantry
Brigade to supplement their resources.
During the battle of Fatehpur the same night radio was extensively used
by the brigade and proved very reliable.
Lance Naik Mira Singh Adhikari of 96 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
located at Chuchak Wal repaired the line to Dagtoot under heavy enemy shelling
and MMG fire. The line went out several
times but the NCO repaired it on every instance in a very short time. After the capture of Fatehpur post the NCO
also extended line from Dagtoot to Fatehpur.
On 15 December Pakistani aircraft
strafed the railway station at Gurdaspur and damaged the PL route passing
through. The unit line party had a
narrow escape but 16 P&T hired labourers sustained injuries. The same evening a detachment from the wireless
experimental company with VHF Receivers D 28 was sent to Ajnala to intercept
enemy radio transmissions. The detachment was augmented by Captain K.G. Kutty
and two operators of the unit. Next day Captain Kutty was sent with the
detachment again to intercept enemy radio towards area Attari. He intercepted enemy transmissions but could
not interpret them as all transmissions were made in Pashto.
Shortly
before the cease fire was declared on 17 December the enemy started shelling HQ
54 Infantry Brigade. An enemy attack was
also building up opposite Ranian.
However, there was no line communication with 54 Infantry Brigade. Signalman Kashi Ram repaired the lateral line
between 96 and 54 Infantry Brigade spending more than three hours under heavy
shelling at Khamashke. Subsequently this
line was directly given to the operations room at Main HQ 15 Infantry Division
and used for passing important orders to the brigade.
1 Armoured Divisional
Signal Regiment
The unit
was at Jhansi
The unit mobilized for Operation
‘Cactus Lily’ in mid October 1971. The advance party moved on 14 October,
followed by the harbour party and main body on 15 and 16 October respectively.
After staging halts at Mathura
The unit remained at Muktasar
during the operations as 1 Armoured Division played no active role in Operation
‘Cactus Lily’. Captain Nikhil Kumar, who joined the unit from CME along with several other after the war
started relates some interesting highlights in these words:-
I was appointed as OC
Radio Section and sent as the rover officer to the GOC. The Rover group in the
Division consisted of five Topaz APCs in addition to the command troop of the
Divisional HQ Squadron. One APC was fitted with a 400 watt HP Radio set for
communication on the C1 (Rover) with the Corps HQ, another was fitted out as an
ad hoc ACT for effective close air support. The third APC was the command APC
in which communications were provided on the D1 as also facilities to listen on
to the three brigade B1 nets. The C1 extended a remote facility to this APC.
One APC was fitted out with two C41/R222 radio relay sets for speech and text
communications with the divisional HQ. The fifth APC was the administrative APC
for use by the GOC.
This setup of
communications for a rover group as early as 1971 was ground breaking and
futuristic. All the modifications for fitting these communication equipment
into the APCs was designed by the Regiment and executed in conjunction with the
EME workshop in a record time prior to mobilisation.
The
Rover Group was located in the cotton fields close to a Canal Inspection
Bungalow. While the GOC, the C Arty, G1 Ops and personal staff stayed in the
IB, we made ourselves comfortable by digging a trench under an APC and using a
stretcher as a bed. It was cold but a safe and comfortable home for those few
months. One had to deal with the large field rats though!
I Corps Signals
HQ
I Corps was located in Mathura
Orders for
mobilisation were received by the unit on 1 October 1971 . A day earlier the CO had left
for a reconnaissance of the operational area along with the brigadier general
staff, HQ I Corps. A party of 20 OR from 1 Company under a JCO was immediately
despatched to Pathankot for liaison with the P&T Department, taking over of
circuits and extension of local leads. Line parties of the unit along with
those of M Communication Zone Signal Regiment proceeded to lay a 7 pair VIR to
extend the UG cable from the carrier centre. To supplement the strength of
personnel at Pathankot, another party of two JCOs and 31 OR was despatched from
Mathura
The
main body of I Corps Signal
Regiment left Mathura Delhi Jullundur
A number of civil trucks was
allotted to the unit for carriage of defence stores and heavy baggage to the
operational location between 15 and 17 November. The warning order for the move
to Samba was received on 1 December. The move of the unit commenced soon after
mid night and by 1000 hours next morning the unit had reached the operational
location. Communications were established to subordinate and neighbouring
formations and rearwards to HQ Western Command and Army HQ. Carrier systems
installed were as under:-
·
8 channel systems
Pathankot – Samba and Samba – Jullundur
·
3 channel stackable
systems Pathankot – Samba, Pathankot – Dinanagar, and Samba -Main HQ 39
Infantry Division.
·
3 channel composite
system between Samba and Jammu
·
ACT (1+4) 3A between
Samba and Main HQ 54 Infantry Division.
Speech circuits were working to Delhi Jullundur Jammu Jullundur Jullundur
On 7 December four enemy aircraft
(MIG 19) flew over the unit area. A
light machine gun mounted for anti aircraft role opened fire. On 9 December a
speech circuit was extended to ‘X’ Sector comprising 168 and 323 Infantry
Brigades. Manpower and equipment including a radio relay detachment was sent
from the unit to provide communications to ‘X’ sector. On 10 December
information was received that some para troops have been dropped by the enemy
about a kilometre away from the corps headquarters. Patrols were sent out but they returned
without any news of the enemy. On 14 December Captain A.K. Dube, Captain R.M.
Awasthi and Lieutenant U. Dasgupta reported on posting from MCTE, Mhow. Captain
Alind Dayal had also reported a few days earlier on termination of the SODE
course. A day later another five officers reported on posting from CME and
MCTE. They were Captains D.B. Bhide, R.S. Bhatia, Rajeshwar Singh, Mohar Singh
and J.P.N. Srivastava.
At
1630 hours on 16 December news of the Pakistani surrender in Dacca
54 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment
54
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was at Secunderabad under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Malik. The other field officers in the unit were Major
M.S. Ahluwalia (second-in-command) and Major R.N. Dhawan.
The unit received the warning order
for mobilisation on 26
August 1971 . On 4 October a liaison group under the second-in-command
left for the concentration area. The main body of the unit left Secunderabad by
a military special train on 8 October arriving at Kartarpur on 12 October,
further move to Pathankot being carried out by road. The unit reached its concentration
area near village Wat Mangaon on 14 October. The move to the operational
location at Deani was carried out on 20 October. Two days later, 168 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company was placed under command 54 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment.
On 15 November the SO-in-C visited
the unit accompanied by CSO Western Command and CSO I Corps. He was highly
appreciative of the loop antenna fitted on rover jeep for radio communication
on the move. On 22 November information was received of a possible Pakistani
air raid during the next 48 hours. On 28 November there was an unfortunate
accident in the unit. After morning ‘stand to’ Signalman Uday Prasad Rai died
of gunshot wounds and Naik Dew Ram was injured when the 9 mm SAF carbine of Signalman
Jit Bahadur Rai went off by accident.
Codeword ‘Barish’ indicating
commencement of hostilities was received at 2345 hours on 3 December 1971 . Next evening at 1730
hours all brigades moved to their firm bases except for 74 Infantry
Brigade. At the same time 168 Infantry
Brigade Group moved out of command of the division. As planned the troops
crossed the border at 2000 hours on 5 December and eliminated the border
outposts by next morning. The operation was conducted by 16 (Indep) Armoured
Brigade, 47 Infantry Brigade and 91 Infantry Brigade. The GOC’s rover was
located in Chamnakhurd, one of the border outposts that had been captured. A
line was laid between 47 and 91 Brigades at the new location. PL routes and cable were badly damaged due to
movement of tanks during the night.
For the next phase of the operation
– establishment of a bridgehead across the minefield - the main divisional headquarters moved to
area Mawa on the night of 6/7 December. On 8 December four Pakistani Sabre jets
strafed and bombed the main divisional headquarters and gun position areas
located nearby. A portion of the village Mawa was seen burning. At 2100 hours on 11 December an aircraft
emitting coloured light flew over the main divisional headquarters and forward
locations. It was assumed to have taken air photos with infra-red equipment.
On 12 December 72 Infantry
Brigade was placed under command 54 Infantry Division. A line was laid from
Main HQ 54 Infantry Division to 72 Infantry Brigade. However, next morning the
brigade moved to Shahbazpur, necessitating patching of the line from the old
location. Apparently, the communications to 72 Infantry Brigade were
unsatisfactory, as recounted by Major V.R.P. Sarathy, OC 72 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company, who writes:
When the brigade
was put under 54 Infantry Division the CO 54 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment (perhaps having already stretched his signal resources) could not
provide line and RR communication and signal centre traffic outlet to our
brigade resulting in total absence of
rearward communication (line, RR and traffic clearance facility) for more
than 48 to 72 hours in an actual war! Ad hoc arrangements like patching
up lateral line communication between the two forward battalions of the two
divisions deployed adjacent to each other or patching up our line to 39
Infantry Division from their “step up” to 54 Infantry Division did not work!
There were no dedicated line, RR and telegraph circuits to 54 Infantry Division
despite being under direct command. Surely this would be viewed extremely
adversely in any communication exercise during peace time! Hand written
messages (including death messages of officers and jawans of our formation) had
to be sent directly to Samba (geographically closer than any of the divisional
headquarters) to 1 Corps Signal Centre where they were accepted on course mate
net!
Being the only available officer in
the company (the second officer authorized but not posted for the entire
duration of the war) the sparrow despite being in the thick of the war and
unable to give satisfactory answers to the brigade staff on absence of
secure rearward (line and RR) communication for talks with higher formations
was forced to go back on a personal visit initially to 54 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment to plead for
direct “rearward” line and RR communication and when that failed had to go and
meet CSO I Corps personally to get rearward line and RR communication and
an outlet to some formation HQ and to signal centre!
A shocked CSO (Brigadier Nanda)
immediately ordered that we could open RR directly with immediate effect with
the Corps and engineer a telegraph circuit to Corps Signal Centre for traffic
clearance. He also ordered carrier quad communication to our brigade. In the
meanwhile probably on CSO’s instructions the sparrow 72 Infantry Brigade
received C41 crystals from 54 Infantry Division, 36 Infantry Division (with a
relay RR chain) and from I Corps Signal Regt with instructions from each of
them to immediately open links with each! With only one RR terminal, it was
prudent, possible and desirable to open the link with I Corps (geographical
proximity without relay) which was done and communication for higher divisional
HQs provided through the Corps Exchange!12
On 14 December the main
divisional headquarters moved to Badala Gujran and 72 Infantry Brigade to area
Dusri. On 16 December eight enemy aircraft strafed the divisional headquarters
area. The GOC’s rover group located at Lagwal was also heavily shelled during
the battle of Basantar
River
Between
14 and 16 December several officers rejoined the unit from CME and MCTE after
suspension of their courses. These were Majors U.S. Tiwari and K.G. Mathews; Captains J.S. Brar, P.K. Malhotra, P.K. Sanyal
and S.R. Biswas.
On
17 December enemy aircraft raided HQ 54 Infantry Division nine times during the
day, the duration of each raid being 10 to 15 minutes. At 1650 hours the air defence battery located
near the divisional headquarters shot down one Pakistani aircraft, a Chinese
made MIG-19. During the day Signalman Bhup Singh (DR) was killed and Signalman
Ramanand (DR) was wounded during strafing by enemy aircraft and a 3-ton lorry
was completely burnt. The weapons (two rifles), equipment (four telephones and
six secondary batteries) and documents (personal and official mail of HQ 74
Infantry Brigade Signal Company) being carried in the vehicle were completely
destroyed. The heavy shelling of the location of 16 Madras
36 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Saugor in Central India under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Harbans Bahadur with Major S.S. Bains as the second-in-command. Other officers
holding important appointments were Major B.M. Kapoor (1 and 2 Companies), Captain
K.N.A. Narayana (adjutant) and Captain S. S. Davood (quartermaster).
The officers in the brigade signal companies were Major S.P. Sahni (115 Brigade), Major G.V.
Raju (18 Brigade) and Major V.R.P. Sarathy (72 Brigade).
In
October 1971, preparations for concentration of troops for the expected
operations against Pakistan Gwalior Mathura Delhi Jullundur Mathura
The
advance party reached the concentration area at Namala on Pathankot – Gurdaspur
road on 17 October and was joined by the main body by road and rail on 20
October. By 22 October, full scale line communications had been provided for
the division and its formations which had moved in by then. With 2 (Indep)
Armoured Brigade being placed under command and 72 Infantry Brigade going under command 39 Infantry Division, all
speech and telegraph circuits were reoriented and stabilized.
Planning and preparations for the
likely operations continued during November. Operational plans were rehearsed,
defences strengthened and local defence coordinated. Signal communication plans
were revised and updated, and construction of cable trunk routes to the likely
deployment areas was carried out. Senior commanders frequently visited the
formations and units to discuss the plans. On 28 November, the Prime Minister
visited the division and addressed the troops for which the public address
system was arranged by the unit. Captain
K.N.A. Narayana was the liaison officer with the Prime Minister’s secretary.
On the evening of 3 December,
hostilities commenced after air attacks by Pakistani aircraft on Pathankot
airfield. Air raid precautions were brought into effect and the communication
centre moved underground. On 4 December, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade went out of
command of the division. The codeword for commencement of operations was
received and radio sets put on listening watch. With the advance of the
division into Pakistan
With the changing operational
situation, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade and 87 Infantry Brigade came under
command. The divisional headquarters moved into its first location inside Pakistan
All of us in the trenches watched the air attack and
the dogfight. And suddenly there were two bombs descending from the skies. We,
the Signallers, had a prayer on our lips that no hits come on to the
Communication Centre. The bombs landed right in the Div HQ area; we waited with
bated breath till we realized that these were not bombs but petrol tanks
ejected by the warplanes! These became our war trophies. There were no casualties
during this attack.13
The unit had so far worked with reduced
scales of officers throughout, but finally got reinforcements of five officers
between 14 and 16 December, when Captains O. P. Bhatia, J. R. Purohit, Om
Prakash, S.B. Moitra and G.B. Tripathi reported to the unit from MCTE. The
cease fire was ordered on 17 December. During the subsequent period defences
were strengthened with bricks and line routes improved. The communications were
rationalized, lateral lines between brigades put through, and all lines to
brigades built up on ballies/trees/ poles. The SO-in-C visited the unit
accompanied by CSO Western Command and CSO I Corps.
For
their dedicated and outstanding work during the operations, three persons of
the unit, Lance Havildar Hari Ram, Naik Sansar Singh, Lance Naik Balbir Singh
and Signalman Randhir Singh were ‘Mentioned-In-Despatches’.
39 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment
39
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was located at Yol Camp in Himachal
Pradesh, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel T.S. Anand, with Major K.K. Lakhanpal as the second-in-command. The other
field officers in the unit were Major S.S. Kapoor and Major
R.B. Sharma.
In
mid October 1971 the unit received orders to move to its concentration area
north of the Ravi
River Punjab . Towards the middle of November the unit moved to
its operational location at Badali. 323 Brigade had moved to area Chak Chatakan
and placed under command 54 Division, while 72 Brigade ex 36 Division had been
placed under command 39 Division and moved to area Chak Mathal. 168 Brigade was located at Gadwal. On 18 November, 16 (Independent) Armoured
Brigade went out of command and was placed under 54 Division. On 24 November 33 Brigade had moved to Surankot and placed
under command 25 Division.
On 2 December communication was
established with the corps signal centre which opened at Samba at 1400 hours.
On 3 December, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade moved to general area Jasrota and was
provided with two pairs of line on WD-1cable.
The same night radio silence was lifted.
At 2300 hours on 4 December the main divisional headquarters moved to
area Chappar. HQ 72 Brigade and 2
(Indep) Armoured Brigade moved and established at Rajpura and Sanora
respectively. Radio relay and radio
communications were established with both and line communication re-established
from area Chappar.
On
5 December Major Lakhanpal and
Second-Lieutenant Surinder Tyagi with two line detachments and a radio
detachment moved to Rajpura for MFC communication. Meanwhile the rear
divisional headquarters moved to area Jasrota on the night of 5/6 December and
to area Dayala Chak on the night of 7/8 December. The step up divisional headquarters had also
moved forward and line communications extended to 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade
and FDC. On 8 December Major R.B. Sharma was sent to Badali to establish ‘X’
Sector communication. The same day the reconnaissance and layout group moved to
area Nidhala where the main headquarters was to move that night but the move
was cancelled. However, HQ 72 Brigade moved to Bhopalpur, 2 (Independent)
Armoured Brigade to Chechwal and the FDC to Sarthikalan.
To establish line communications
Major S.S. Kapoor was sent to 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade with a line party on 9
December. Line communication with 72
Brigade was also established from the step up divisional headquarters at
Nidhala where Major Lakhnapal was stationed.
Second-Lieutenant L.K. Toshakhani stayed on with 72 Brigade with a line
party. After establishing communications with 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade Major
Kapoor returned to Nidhala relieving the second-in- command who proceeded to
the main divisional headquarters on 10 December.
On
11 December there was an air raid
over 72 Brigade, 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade and FDC. Three men from 39 Artillery Brigade Signal
Company were killed while two who were seriously injured were evacuated to the
section hospital at Samba, where one later died. On 12 December Main HQ 39
Division moved to area Badli. On 12
December line communication was established with 168 Infantry Brigade, 323
Infantry Brigade and 16 Cavalry which were at Keranwali, Chak Chatakan and
Sarwa respectively. During the next few days several officers reported to the
unit on posting. These were Captains S.S. Ahluwalia, R.N. Ganguly, I.P.
Khullar, V.K. Rao and Jaya Shanker. The
operation ended on 17 December and the cease fire came into effect at 2000
hours.
Z Communication Zone
Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Jullundur Amritsar Jullundur
Though the unit was located at
Faridkot, it had to send out a large number of detachments to other stations.
It took over the static signal centres at Ferozepore and Amritsar
Another important
assignment given to the unit was in connection with Plan ‘Delta’, a deception
plan under HQ Central Command. Though manpower and equipment for the
project was collected from several units, the major component came from Z
Communication Zone Signal Regiment, which provided a composite signal company
under Major Mehta for the task. The
company reached Amritsar
Cable being laid across River Ravi
during 1971 operations.
The unit was also asked to provide
communications for the ‘Mike’ Force that was created at the same time. For this
purpose one mobile radio detachment (C11/R210) was provided to work on the C2A
net with Advance HQ XI Corps. A line party was also provided by the unit to
extend line communications to this force.
The detachments were sent on 4 December and communications established
on both radio and line from Advance HQ XI Corps and HQ 51 (Indep) Parachute
Brigade. However, later in the day it was learned that the force was not being
deployed and the signal resources were returned.
M Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Gwalior
The unit was responsible for
manning the carrier centres at Pathankot and Samba, the exchange and local
telephones at the corps maintenance area (CMA) at Mirthal; and communications
at the airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. The unit provided some
manpower for signal centres duties at the main and rear headquarters of I
Corps. The unit was involved in the construction and maintenance of PL routes
in the area. It also laid field cable routes to formations deployed on the
border, including laterals. Maintenance
detachments were provided to formations at the scale of one per division along
the line of communication including line detachments at carrier centres for
fault control.
1 Air Support Signal
Regiment
The
unit was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.K. Ghorai, the other field
officers being Majors S.N. Capoor (1 Company), S. Ganguli (2 Company), and R.S
Arora (3 Company). In addition, Major P.D. Gera was recalled from reserve and
reported to the unit in October 1971. The regimental headquarters and 1 Company
were at Delhi Cantt., 2 Company at Udhampur, while 3 Company was at Jullundur Jullundur
During
the months of October and November air support tentacles and airfield
detachments were sent to join their respective formations. Radio sets GU-734 were issued to all
detachments for air to ground communications after carrying out suitable
modifications to match the frequencies being used by the aircraft. New crystals
were received from Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) just a few days before the
operations started. Extensive trials were carried out at Adampur during the
last week of November to test their working with aircraft. The crystals were distributed to companies on
3 December, the day the operations started.
On 4 December, 15 ground plane
antennae received from Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) were distributed to
companies. All sets opened up and became
active as demands for close air support began to be initiated. Being located
with the forward troops, there were many instances of damage to equipment and
transport of tentacles. On 5 December the radio sets of the tentacle with 52
Infantry Brigade were destroyed due to enemy shelling. Next day, intimation was received from HQ 14
(Indep) Armoured Brigade that the tank in which the forward air controller
(FAC) of 71 Armoured Regiment was travelling along with two radio sets GU 734
was hit by enemy fire. Both the radio
sets were destroyed. Another tentacle was immediately sent to replace the destroyed
sets.
On 7 December the tentacle with 191
Brigade in the Chhamb sector was completely destroyed due to enemy shelling.
The vehicle, equipment and documents as well as the personal kits of all men was
lost in the shelling. A few days later, on 11 December the tentacle with 93
Brigade suffered a similar fate. On 12
December the tentacle with 68 Infantry Brigade was also destroyed due to enemy
shelling. On 14 December enemy aircraft strafed 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade in
the Gurdaspur sector. Signalman Suleh Singh Yadav who was part of the tentacle
sustained injuries and was evacuated to the hospital. The equipment and
documents of the tentacle were damaged due the strafing. The cease fire came
into effect on 17 December.
1 Air Formation Signal
Regiment
The regimental headquarters of unit
was located at Palam in Delhi Cantt., with 1 and 2 Company at Jullundur Jodhpur
The
unit took part in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ from 4 to 17 December, 1971 . Detachments of the
unit were located with various Air Force units such as Leh, Srinagar, Udhampur,
Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar, Jullundur, Ambala, Halwara, Adampur, Chandigarh,
Kotkapura, Faridkot, Abohar, Barnala, Sirsa, Bikaner, Nal, Jodhpur, Utarlai,
Jaisalmer, Jamnagar, Baroda, Rajokri, Hindon, Tilpat Range (Delhi) and Delhi
Cantt.
51 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company
The
company was located at Ambala under the command of Major C.J. Appachu. The
other officers in the unit were Captains P.K. Janmeja, S.S. Atri and A.P. Shahane. During
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ the company was placed under command HQ F Sector and
moved to Sadhuwali in August 1971. After spending a little over a month there,
it moved to a new location on the Abohar-Ganganagar road on the outskirts of
Ganganagar town on 6 October
1971 . Two BSF battalions
were placed under command 51 (Independent) Parachute Brigade which was employed
in the role of covering troops.
Soon after arrival at the new
location, the company established an exchange and took over speech circuit
Raisinghnagar-Ganganagar. A radio relay link was established with HQ F Sector
on which standby speech and telegraph circuits were engineered. For the covering
troops role, speech circuits were provided between Karanpur – Raisinghnagar and
Ganganagar – Karanpur (via Padampur). In addition, tie lines were provided to
the Ganganagar civil exchange. By the
end of October all units in Ganganagar were connected by UG and overhead lines.
The signal centre was also shifted to an underground location.
In November with the move of ‘M’
Force additional speech circuits Ganganagar – Ganeshgarh and Ganganagar –
Kotkapura were taken over. About 10 kilometres of WD-1 cable was laid to provide
communications to 62 Cavalry on Ganganagar-Suratgarh road. The existing 40 line
exchange was reinforced with a 10 line magneto exchange to meet subscriber
requirements. On 1 December ‘Night Watch’ detachments comprising 40 men each were
placed at Chak 5 FD and Madera
Radio
silence was lifted on 3 December.
Detachments for battalions were despatched and radio communications
established. After this there was little activity until 14 December when a
radio detachment accompanied 3 Para in its raid on Hamewala. On 16 December
another detachment went with 11 Dogra in the attack on Kodewalla post. The same
night a radio detachment accompanied 4 Para in the attack at Lala Bamba post.
Though
cease fire was declared on 17 December, certain operations continued in the
sector. An important action was the attack on Naggi post by 4 Para on the night
of 27/28 December. Before the attack, a line was laid from Karanpur to Naggi
during the night. One line party was positioned at Padampur to ensure that the
Karanpur-Ganganagar line remains through. The attack was launched at midnight and 30r (opposite Naggi post)
was captured. The battalion lost three officers and 20 OR in the action, with
about 50 being wounded. There was no disruption in line or radio communications
during the operation. Next day the brigade tactical exchange was installed at
Karanpur and the radio detachment at Naggi post was withdrawn.
SIGNALS IN SOUTHERN COMMAND
Southern Command Signals
HQ Southern Command
at Poona Gujarat and
Rajasthan (less Ganganagar district) along an international border of
approximately 1350 km .
The CSO was Brigadier S.K Batra, while the other officers in the Signals Branch
were Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Andhare,
SO 1 (Signals); Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Apte, SO 2 (Communications);
Major B.B. Vishnoi, SO 2 (Cipher & Signal Security) and Captain V.K. Azad,
SO 3 (Signals). Southern Command Signal Regiment was under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel G.Y. Sowani. DCSO Maharashtra & Gujarat Area, which was
responsible for static communications in Kutch ,
was Lieutenant Colonel B.D Bhardwaj, while Major Khorana was commanding
Maharashtra & Gujarat Area Signal Company.
The Southern Command theatre of
operations was divided into four sectors, each of which was the operational
responsibility of a different formation. The two infantry divisions – 11 and 12
– were responsible for the Barmer and Jaisalmer sectors respectively. HQ
Bikaner Sector (later re-designated ‘K’ Sector) was responsible for Bikaner Kutch
sector. In the Kutch and Bikaner Jodhpur
The
assets initially available to CSO Southern Command in terms of signal
resources, other than the integral signal units of field formations, for
planning of provision of signal communications in the Rajasthan and Gujarat
Sectors were as under:-
·
Southern Command Signal
Regiment.
·
Q Communication Zone
Signal Regiment.
·
Maharashtra &
Gujarat Area Signal Company.
·
5 (Indep) Air Support
Signal Company.
·
4 Radio Monitoring
Company.
A signal instruction for the
operations was drawn up by the CSO and issued to all signal units on 25 March 1971 , so that
signal planning down the chain of command could start. In the absence of a
corps headquarters, HQ Southern Command had to plan for forward communications
to the field formations from the tactical headquarters at Jodhpur Delhi Poona Bikaner
Another area that required attention
was the development of PL routes. The existing routes, most of which were being
used by the BSF, were in poor state of repair and required a lot of maintenance
effort. To cater for the planned advance, additional PL routes had to be built.
These requirements were projected to the Army HQ along with the demand for
additional speech and telegraph circuits. To cater for Tactical HQ Southern
Command at Jodhpur Jodhpur 56 kilometres were
made available to the P & T Department from Army stocks. Demands were also
placed for air defence circuits, which were inadequate or non-existent at many
places. For air support communications, additional tentacles were needed for Kutch and Bikaner
Extensive
trials on radio relay communications in the theatre of operations were carried
out during the period February to April 1971.
During May an administrative exercise with troops was conducted in the
Rajasthan sector where most of the line communications required for operations
were activated. The poor state of maintenance of the BOPEL routes was detected
during this exercise. As a result, concerted efforts were directed on these
routes and by October these routes had improved a great deal. Work on the
expansion of Jodhpur
The
radio communication facilities at Jodhpur Poona Jodhpur
Radio
relay detachments from Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment were positioned
along the 11 Infantry Division axis at Barmer, Ramsar and Munabao and along the
12 Infantry Division axis at Jaisalmer, Ramgarh and Tanot. No radio relay links
were established between Jodhpur – Barmer and Jodhpur – Jaisalmer as no
equipment was available and as it was considered that line communications
between these places were less likely to be disrupted than in areas forward of
Barmer and Jaisalmer.
On 10 October 1971 , Brigadier S.K. Batra presented
the Signals plan for the Southern Command theatre of operations to the SO-in-C
in Delhi Mysore Poona Jodhpur 15 December 1971 .
A case was also taken up for augmenting the line construction and maintenance
resources considering the vast area of operations in this theatre. On the same
grounds a case was put up for augmentation of radio relay resources. As a
result one line section ex 1003 (Indep) Line Company was allotted and the
deficiencies in Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment were made up to a
considerable extent.
HQ
Southern Command moved to Jodhpur 20 October 1971 .
On 12 November the raising of Kilo Sector Signal Company commenced at Jodhpur 3 December 1971 , the signal
communications network was fully functional and the radio and radio relay
communications ready to open on lifting of radio silence. The radio and line
diagrams are shown on the following pages.
For
the advance of 11 Division on the Barmer - Munabao axis, the divisional
headquarters was initially located at Ranasar. During this period only line
communication was provided by making use of existing PL pairs on routes between
Barmer and Munabao along the road and railway alignments. For formation
headquarters located away from the alignments, line was extended by using field
cable. A few days before launching the divisional advance on the night of 4/5
December, Main HQ 11 Division moved from Ranasar to Jaisindhar. The divisional
centre line was the axis Munabao –Nayachor.
Initially field cable was laid along this axis but soon the
international PL route along this axis was repaired and made serviceable. This route had three 300- lb. copper pairs
which could be utilized to provide a number of essential circuits. Since the rate of advance was very fast the
distance between divisional headquarters and forward troops tended to get
stretched. Communications with the GOC’s
rover group which was advancing close behind the forward brigade also became
difficult. A forward communication
centre was, therefore, established at Khokropar. By 8 December, the forward brigade advancing
along the centre line had gone about 55 kilometres ahead
of the main divisional headquarters, which was, therefore, ordered to move to
Rahal, a distance of 50
kilometres . It
took nearly 48 hours to complete this move due to difficulties in vehicle
movement over desert terrain. At this
stage, communications from and to the main divisional headquarters were
disrupted. The communications already
existing at Jaisandhar, however, remained through. The brigade operating on a southern axis and
a battalion operating on a northern axis away from the centre line also went
out of range of field cable communications.
Communication to these elements were therefore, maintained on radio and
radio relay only.
The radio and line communications between
HQ Southern Command and HQ 11 Division remained disrupted from 1500 hours on 9
December to 0800 hours on 11 December. For some reason, a radio relay terminal
had not been grouped with the divisional headquarters. The reasons advanced by
HQ Southern Command (Signals) for the disruption in communications are as
under:-
·
Main body (M-3) of 11
Infantry Division was ordered to move before communications could be
established by M-1 Group.
·
The ‘going’ in the desert
was very difficult for heavy vehicles of 11 Infantry Division. A number of
vehicles got begged down in sand. The
signal centre and radio vehicles could not reach the main divisional headquarters location.
·
There was an acute
shortage of petrol for generating sets of C1 and C2 radio links.
·
The PL pairs to be used
for communication to 11 Infantry Division in enemy territory remained disrupted
due to enemy action.
The measures taken for restoring
communications are no less interesting. They are as under:-
·
Line communication was
established between Khokhropar and old location of main divisional headquarters
(Jaisindhar).
·
Additional line parties
were sent to repair the lines in enemy territory.
·
Air support net was
kept open to pass message traffic.
According to Lieutenant Colonel
Jaswant Singh, CO Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment, he prevailed on the
CSO, Brigadier Batra to order the move of two radio relay terminals of his unit
that were kept as reserve with 12 Division at Tanot to 11 Division sector on 8
December, but the GOC 12 Division refused to let them go. Finally, the
terminals were released only after the intervention of the Army Commander and
reached Jaisindhar on 10
December 1971 . The radio relay link between Jaisindhar and HQ 11
Division was established on 13 December and channels patched to Jodhpur
In contrast, signal communications
in the 12 Divisional sector functioned well. Prior to the operation the
division was deployed between Jaisalmer and Ramgarh. Later on 31 October it moved to Tanot with a
view to occupying a firm base for launching its offensive operations. Due to the enemy thrust in the Longewala area
on 5/6 December, the planned offensive could not be undertaken and the division
remained in its second deployment area till the end of the war. Communications
to the division initially were on lines only. Radio links were established but
these were seldom used rear of brigade headquarters. Radio relay functioned effectively.
Signal communications in the Bikaner 19 October 1971 by the
Artillery branch of HQ Southern Command. The troops allotted to this sector were
one infantry battalion (13 Grenadiers) and two BSF battalions, located at
Bikampur, Nachna and Pugal respectively, the distances varying from 100 to 220 kilometres from Bikaner A PL Bikaner A PCO PL Bikaner 27 kilometres
short of Bikampur. This was extended to Bikampur by a spaced WD1 cable laid by
Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment. No line communications existed to Nachna.
A detachment of this unit also
established a signal centre at Bikaner Bikaner
On
29 November, the sector commander decided to shift the sector headquarters to
Bikampur. But after a discussion with the CSO, who explained the difficulties
that would arise in provision of signal communications from the new location,
the proposal was shelved. The communication layout, thereafter, consisted of
line speech circuits to 13 Grenadiers and 12 BSF Battalion, all other
communications being on radio. The line to Bikampur was not satisfactory as it
was a makeshift arrangement comprising D1 wire, PCO lines and a 27-kilometre
route of WD1 spaced cable. There were certain procedural and organizational
difficulties in communications by radio with the BSF units. Notwithstanding
these, satisfactory communications were provided for this sector during the
operations.
The
operational responsibility for Kutch Sector was initially with the BSF. In July
1971 it was decided by HQ Southern Command that in the event of an emergency,
Commander Bombay Sub Area would exercise operational control of this sector.
Maharashtra & Gujarat Area Signal Company was given the responsibility of
providing signal communications to HQ Kutch Sector, at Bhuj. As the resources
of the company were inadequate, additional man power and equipment was provided
under arrangements of the CSO Southern Command. Communications in this sector
functioned effectively throughout the operations.
Southern Command Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Poona 30 November
1971 . The only other field officer present in the unit at that time
was Major S.K. Ralhan.
The
main role of the unit was to provide static signal communications for HQ
Southern Command at Poona Jodhpur Poona
At Jodhpur the personnel provided
by Southern Command Signal Regiment and 2 Company of P Communication Zone
Signal Regiment worked in close cooperation with personnel from Q Communication
Zone Signal Regiment which was responsible for communications in the
operational area. They proved to be very useful in the expansion of the
transmitter and receiver stations at Jodhpur
11 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Ahmedabad under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel B.N. Satyamurti, who
was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Satish Chandra on 22 November 1971 , just
before the operations commenced. The second-in-command, Major M.M. Bhanot, and
OC 2 Company, Major Ramesh Chandra both joined the unit after the operations
had started, on 7 and 12 December respectively.
The other field officers in the unit were Majors S.G. Mohiadin (1
Company), M.S. Chauhan (85 Brigade); Thomas (330 Brigade) and Arvind Vij
(31Brigade).
On 16 October 1971 the unit received orders to
move to its concentration area in Marudi, about 440 kilometres from
Ahmedabad. The layout group moved out the same day, followed by the main body on
the next day. By 22 October communications had been established with 31, 330
and 85 Brigades as well as with Jodhpur Jodhpur
On 4 November the SO-in-C
accompanied by CSO Southern Command visited the unit at Ranasar. On 19 November
the rear divisional headquarters moved up alongside the main divisional
headquarters. By the end of the
month Tactical HQ Southern Command had been established at Gadra Road from
where comunications was extended to Ranasar on carrier quad/field cable.
In accordance with the operational
plans, the divisional headquarters commenced its move to a forward
concentration area near Jaisindhar after last light on 2 December.
Communications on line were provided to forward brigades and rear divisional
headquarters. A locality exchange was established at Gadra Road midday
on 3 December line parties and radio relay detachments had joined 31 and 85
Brigades to provide communications for the impending offensive.
At 0400 hours on 4 December, the
warning order was issued for crossing the International border at 1830 hours
the same evening. Shortly afterwards,
the GOC’s rover group moved to Munabao Rest House, where a 10-line exchange was set up providing local
communications. The divisional offensive commenced on three axes as planned at
1830 hours, with 11 Division less 31 Brigade on axis Munabao – Nayachor; 31
Brigade on axis Gadra Road Gadra City
At 1130 hours on 6 December
communications with 85 Brigade were restored when it was connected to
Khokhropar exchange. Shortly afterwards HQ 330 Brigade moved to Khokhropar and
was through on line. The same evening HQ
85 Brigade moved to area Bitala and was connected to Khokhropar exchange at
0245 hours on 07 December. At 1720 hours the same day HQ 31 Brigade reached Gadra City
On 8 December all lines beyond
Munabao remained disturbed due to enemy air action. Three radio detachments (two C-11 and one Siemens)
reached Khokhropar to reinforce the resources of the communication centre. A
signal detachment sent to establish a forward communication centre at Jalu Jo
Chaunro could not reach the destination since it got bogged in the sand along
the railway line. After carrying out a reconnaissance of the next location
indicated by the GOC, Colonel Satish Chandra advised that no further move
should be carried out till the tracks are developed. However, next morning the GOC
ordered his R (reconnaissance) Group to move ahead of Khokhropar. At 1200 hours the CO and the divisional
commander’s ADC along with the R group vehicles left for the new location near
village Vasarabh. At 1430 hours the M1 group of the divisional headquarters
also moved, the last vehicle reaching the new location at 2300 hours on 10
December.
Line communications were
established from Vasarabh with HQ 85 Brigade and Khokhropar. The main body of the divisional headquarters
was to start from Jaisndhar for Vasarabh at 2200 hours on 9 December. However,
at about 1830 hours a message was received from the GOC, who had gone to 85
Brigade location, that the location of the main divisional headquarters had
been changed to Rahal, six kilometres ahead of Vasarabh. The R group
immediately left for the new location with Captain T.C. Mathur, since OC 1
Company had not reached till then. The M 3 Group of the main divisional
headquarters left Jaisindhar at 2230 hours on 9 December. The essential
elements of this group reached the new location at 2200 hours on 11 December, i.e.
after almost 48 hours. This was even after the minimum functional vehicles had
been sent up, with 15 vehicles being retained at the previous location.
At
about 0230 hours on 10 December, one 1-ton and four jeeps of the R Group had
reached Rahal with great difficulty. Shortly afterwards, the GOC and the COS (chief of staff), HQ Southern Command reached that
location. The few Signals personnel tried their best to provide some
communications. A WD-1 pair was laid across country on manpack basis up to the
PL pair to Khokhropar. Since the operations room vehicle had not reached and
neither had the exchange, a single telephone was made available to the staff to
enable them to communicate with 85 Brigade and HQ Southern Command at Jodhpur
Line
parties were working on the 22 kilometres of WD 1 extension from the PL from
Khokhropar which was temporarily restored at about 0700 hours. At 1000 hours the GOC spoke to the Army
Commander on the line, which was disrupted after the call was over. However, it
was again restored. Soon afterwards a 40 line magneto exchange that had been
retrieved from the broken down vehicle was installed. A radio relay link with
17 Grenadiers was also established at about 1830 hours. By the end of the day
D-1 and D-2 links were through from the new location. However, speech and telegraph communications
with HQ Southern Command remained unsatisfactory. There were no charged batteries for the radio
links and the vehicles were without fuel.
At about 0600 hours on 11 December
the second pair of the international route was restored and ACT (1+1) mounted
to engineer the channel between the new location and Barmer for further
extension to Jodhpur 0001 to 0345 hours due to a break in
the PL caused by enemy air action. The
CSO, Brigadier S.K. Batra, arrived at Jaisindhar at about 1830 hours on 12
December and after spending the night there proceeded to Rahal next morning
accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Jaswant Singh, CO Q Communication Zone Signal
Regiment. He also visited HQ 85 Brigade near Nayachor on 14 December and
Munabao and Gadra Road Gadra Road
On 13 December five officers joined
the unit from CME and MCTE after suspension of the courses at these
institutions. They were Captains A.K. Ray, K.D. Kaushal, M.S. Rana, Jasbir Singh
and A.R. Patil. That evening the lines were again damaged due to extensive
enemy air action. However, all radio and
radio relay links were through except radio relay to 31 Brigade. On 14 December another officer, Captain B.N.
Dhingra reported to the unit. On 15 December at about 1630 hours there was a
severe enemy air attack on HQ 85 Brigade during which half a kilometre of cable
route was burnt by Napalm bombs, resulting in disruption of communications to
85 and 330 Brigades. This was followed by another severe attack next morning on
HQ 85 Brigade in its new location where it had moved the previous night,
resulting in disruption of trunk communications to 85 and 330 Brigades. At 1730
hours there was yet another air attack on the brigade headquarters, during
which the D-2 link vehicle and connected equipment were destroyed. The belongings of the men in the vehicle and that
of the newly arrived Captain A.K. Ray were also destroyed.
At 0630 hours on 17 December the
radio detachment of 330 Brigade Signal Company attached to 18 Madras
Tps of 11 Inf Div adv in Pakistan,
using the railway line near Khokhropar, in Dec 1971.
12 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The unit was at Jodhpur
On 17 October
1971 the unit moved to its initial concentration area near Jaisalmer. The main and rear divisional headquarters as
well as the brigades were deployed on the road Jaisalmer - Ramgarh. By the end
of October, the unit moved to area Tanot. The main divisional headquarters and
45 Brigade were located at Tanot; the rear divisional headquarters at Ranoa; 30
Brigade at Ghantiali and 322
Brigade at Ramgarh. The entire stock of cable held by the unit had been used up
on first deployment for leading in PL pairs to various
formation headquarters. For the second deployment, 500 kilometres of
WD-1 cable had to be issued from Army HQ stocks, in addition to some PL stores.
Radio
relay links were established between the main and rear divisional headquarters;
main divisional headquarters and 30 Brigade; and rear divisional headquarters
and Ramgarh. In addition, Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment provided a link
between Ramgarh and Jaisalmer where they had established a signal centre. This link continued throughout the war.
Two pairs of PL were available
between Jaisalmer and Ramgarh. In addition there was a Public Call Office (PCO)
pair, on which a channel doubler was mounted. One channel was given to the PCO,
the other being used between 14 BSF Battalion at Ramgarh and their base in
Jaisalmer. Another two pairs were available between Ramgarh-Tanot-Kishengarh.
To supplement the existing PL routes, four PVC pairs were laid between main and
rear divisional headquarters and one pair on ballies between Tanot and
Longewala.
In preparation for the divisional
offensive towards Rahim Yar Khan on 4 December, 30 and 322 Infantry Brigades
moved to their concentration areas on 3 December. A deception plan and electronic
warfare measures were put into effect by the unit. The Pakistan Rangers radio
at Bhaikhenwala, whose frequency was known through the wireless experimental
unit, was jammed as soon as the operations started. To deceive the enemy, radio
relay aerials made out of wood were erected at Sadhewala and Tanot. Brigadier
V.M. Jog, who was commanding the unit at that time, relates some interesting
incidents regarding attempts made by the enemy to disrupt our communications.
He writes:-
On 1st
December Net Radio was opened. After the
tuning call the first outstation was PAKISTAN.
The operator said that he too was a Muslim and would ensure that no
working would be possible on the net.
Since all outstations were on line they were instructed not to reply on
the radio. Acknowledgement was given one
way by the Control and the net went on listening watch. Thus the enemy was kept guessing. The Divisional Command net radio frequency
was changed and remained ready for operation.
On
3rd night Pakistani artillery roving OP party from Longewala side
came to Ramgarh and established an ambush.
The hired vehicles were stopped and drivers shot dead. Their bodies was pulled out and set on fire. They also fired about ten rounds at the PL
route breaking one wire out of the six wires.
The party appears to have gone towards Nachna. It is possible that this
could have been done by smugglers of Ramgarh.
Since only one company of Maratha Regiment ex 322 Infantry Brigade was
located at Ramgarh, this possibility is ruled out.
On
the line carrying ACT 1+3 that had been broken, noise level increased on the
carrier channels and the physical got disconnected. The Commanding Officer himself detected this
and ordered a line party to move and check up.
The line party reached the spot at 0600 and reported the matter direct
to the Officer Commanding. Empty
cartridges bearing Chinese markings were handed over to the GOC in the morning.
At
about 2300 somebody rang up the Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment radio
relay Naik from the BSF exchange telling him “I am Captain Dogra, change the
frequency of your set.” Since there was no Captain Dogra in the Signal Regiment
and RR frequency cannot be changed in isolation the NCO did not take any action
but reported the matter.
For
the attack on Rahim Yar Khan the Divisional artery was being laid along the
duck track. Till 4th night 15 Km of carrier quad light
was laid under Captain M Khan’s supervision but it could not get through since
it being Siemens cable had a half turn coupler. Since at night the men had not
applied equal pressure with each hand, one pair used to get disconnected. This
was of course discovered after the war while investigating the cause but during
the war all kinds of doubts had arisen.14
A
few days earlier, buried carrier quad cable and poled PVC had been laid from
Kishangarh, where Tactical HQ No. 1 had been established, to Shakhere Wala
Khu. A skeleton line party was kept at
Kishangarh to maintain the lines from Kishangarh to Shakhere Wala Khu and
Tanot. On 4 December one speech channel
from Tanot to Jodhpur
The
divisional attack on Rahim Yar Khan scheduled for the night of 4 December was
postponed to next morning since marshalling of troops got delayed due to
shortage of second line transport. At
about 2000 hours that night Signalman S.M. Dey of a line detachment reported
seeing corpses burning along with vehicle 20 kilometres east of
Ramgarh. The line was also cut which was
repaired with field cable. At midnight the platoon commander at the
border post beyond Longewala reported hearing sound of tanks estimated to be a
whole regiment. The matter was reported to Commander 45 Infantry Brigade at
Tanot who termed the report as an inexperienced officer’s fantasy. However, when the tanks reached Longewala at
about 0400 hours it left no doubts. Reports of the presence of enemy tanks were
conveyed right up to Army HQ. This was possible because of the foresight in
laying a PVC cable route from Tanot to Longewala via Sadhewala as part of the
deception plan. This saved the day since
the Army Commander at Jodhpur
During an air support exercise held
in June at Lathi it had been found that the air support sets of the Army and
the Air Force were not compatible. The
problem was discussed between CO 12 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment and
Commander 30 Brigade and satisfactorily resolved. This paid dividends during the battle of
Longewala.
One outstation of D1 net was placed
at the Base Operations at Jaisalmer. Top
priority was given to calls for the Air Force on line. At first light Major Atma Singh of the air
observation post was air borne and kept the enemy armour under
observation. He was constantly in
contact with Longewala which in turn was through with the HQ 12 Division on
line.
When
the Air Force planes flew over the area for the first time they reported no
enemy armour. Major Atma Singh however
got in touch with them and directed them to Longewala. Once at Longewala the assorted aircraft fired
rockets which merely bounced off the enemy tanks. The enemy armour adopted evasive tactics but
the fuel drums being carried on the tanks proved to be their undoing. When the
rockets had been expended, our air craft opened up with machine guns and
punctured the fuel barrels which caught fire.
With this discovery the Air Force went for the kill taking a toll of 23
tanks out of the 40 odd that were seen. The rest got away and later were
concentrated at Naya Chor in 11 Divisional Sector.
By
1100 hours the enemy had called off their attack. At this stage the enemy radio transmission
was intercepted and the tank commander was heard saying “we have been asking for air support. If it does not come now there
will be no further need”. The reply came “Star fighters arriving indicate target by yellow smoke”. This intercept was passed on to the Air
Force. However, by this time the battle
of Longewala had ended.
As
30 Brigade attack developed two pairs of PVC pairs had been laid on the ground
and later built up on ballies between Ramgarh and Longewala. Radio relay was
also established, thus forming a triangular grid of PVC duplicated by RR.
During the entire period radio nets remained on listening watch since at no
stage did the line circuits break down. In view of the enemy attack on
Longewala the planned offensive of 12 Infantry Division did not take place.
However, during the next two weeks 45 Brigade captured Islamgarh along with 18
BSF Battalion. No secrecy was maintained on radio and the action was swift, the
enemy vacating the area as our troops closed in. Posts were established about 25 kilometres across
the border.
Shortly
after the operations started CSO Southern Command asked the unit to provide a C
11 set with an operator who could be air dropped. The GOC’s rover operator Naik
Ramnaiya was detailed for this task. He
accompanied 10 Para Commando during their raid on Chachro in 11 Division
sector. The frequency allotted was the D-1 net frequency of 12 Division which
also worked throughout the operations for 11 Division. The NCO did an excellent
job and was able to communicate directly with Jodhpur
Between 14 and 15 December five
officers reported to the unit from CME and MCTE. They were Captains J.N .Kapil,
M.S. Rana, K.L. Sharma, Kailash Singh and G.V. Mehta. The operations ended on 17 December when the
cease fire came into effect. In view of its excellent performance the unit won
a number of awards. Naik Basant Pawar and Naik Ramnaiya were both awarded the
Sena Medal. Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Jog, Naib Subedar Gurmohinder Singh and
Lance Naik Inder Singh were ‘Mentioned in Despatches’.
On the occasion of the Corps
Anniversary on 15 February
1972 , the GOC, Major General R.F. Khambatta had this to say:-
Signals have done a fine job throughout all theatres
in the last war. In particular 12
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment has given an excellent performance. Not once have they failed in any emergency. I have no doubt it was the capacity to
communicate which gave the Company Commander at Longewala the courage to hold
on successfully and finally, throw out the enemy. Throughout the divisional sector our small
and big fighting echelons have gone about carrying out difficult tasks
completely confident of their capacity to communicate. Truly you have fulfilled your motto “TEEVRA
CHAUKAS”. I wish you all success for the future. God Bless.
Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The
unit was at Poona 23 November 1971 , shortly before the commencement of
Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. Other officers holding important appointments in the
unit were Major N.N. Gupta (second-in-command); Major A.P. Fernandes (HQ Company);
Major R.S. Dhanota (1 Company); Major N.K. Joshi (2 Company); Major B.M.K.
Khosla (3 Company); Captain P. Thangavelu (adjutant) and Captain V.A. Paul (quartermaster).
In
early October 1971 the unit moved to Jodhpur Bikaner
After assuming command on 23
November, Lieutenant Colonel Jaswant Singh noticed that though the unit had to
provide communications to both 11 and 12 Divisions, all reserves were placed
with the latter. When he wanted to know the rationale for this deployment he
was told by CSO Southern Command that he would be informed at the right time if
considered necessary. Not satisfied with this response, Colonel Jaswant Singh
decided to visit both divisions and see things for himself. The rest of the
story is told by him in the following words:
After assuming command and familiarisation, I
decided to visit Headquarters of 11 and 12 Division. On hunch or intuition whatever one may call
it, I decided to visit 11 Div first on 29 Nov 1971. After briefing by Lt Col Satish Chandra, C
Sigs it was realized that the Div will go out of communication, the moment they
decided to move from the present location.
Realising this, I instructed Maj NN Gupta, 2IC to dispatch the reserve
line detachment under a JCO by the night
train to report to 11 Div Sig Regt, which he did. This detachment was then instructed to move
with the Div HQ and restore the damaged PL route to keep the Div HQ in
communication with Command HQ since there was no deployment of reserve RR
detachments on this axis for this purpose.
On
return from 11 Division, I requested the CSO to shift two RR detachments from
TANOT to 11 Div side and it took Army Commander’s intervention to shift these
only after 11 Div had gone out of communication.
The
operations started on 4 December 1971. All radio links were opened and kept on
continuous listening watch. A radio detachment (C-11/R210) consisting of three
operators was sent to 10 Para Commando for communication with HQ Southern
Command during the special mission being undertaken by them. Radio links C-9
and C-10 were opened and kept on listening watch for communication with the
battalion.
On the night of 4/5 December five
spans of PL route Jaisalmer – Ramgarh – Tanot were damaged by enemy
infiltrators about 15 kilometres
short of Ramgarh. Communications to 12 Division were restored on radio relay
that had been established for this purpose earlier. The PL route was repaired by 1600 hours. The
next day due to enemy bombing at Jaisalmer, the Air Force lines were damaged.
This was repaired by the line party from 1 Company with the help of linemen
from the P&T Department.
On 9 December there was a break in
communications with 11 Division during its advance. Describing the crisis,
Colonel Jaswant Singh writes:-
On 09 December 1971, 11
Div which had since moved into Pakistan without meeting much opposition went
out of communication. On 10 December, I
proceeded to 11 Div to restore communication.
Two RR detachments from TANOT also reached JAISINDHAR. On 11 December, I reached KHOKHROPAR.
On
12 Dec 1971, I along with a lineman of 11 Div Sig Regt started from KHOKHROPAR
along the Railway line to restore the International PL Route. After 11 Div had moved into Pakistan, the
line detachment under the JCO positioned with 11 Div Sig Regt earlier, had started
doing the same from their side. This
work was done under bombing and strafing by Pakistan Air Force. By about lunch time this line was restored
and when I was still talking to the line detachment JCO, Chief of Staff and GOC
11 Div came on the line and started talking before I could disconnect my
telephone. What transpired in that
conversation, I would not like to divulge.
As recorded in the war diary of HQ
Southern Command (Signals Branch), communications with 11 Infantry Division
remained disrupted from 1500 hours on 9 December to 0800 hours on 11 December.
Even after the line was restored, it was subject to frequent interruptions.
Communications became satisfactory only on 13 December after the radio relay
link between Jaisindhar and Main HQ 11 Infantry Division was established and channels
patched to Jodhpur
On 13 December five officers
reported to the unit from CME and MCTE. They were Captains Komal Singh, M.G.
Datar, A.K. Puri, A.K. Bhanot and D.K. Bewtra. The operations ended on 17 December 1971 .
Commenting on the performance of
Signals in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, Colonel Jaswant Singh writes:-
In my opinion
operational plans were faulty and did not cater for enemy’s
reaction/counterattack and speed of movement of our forces if there was no
opposition. We now well know what happened
on both the axes of operations. 12 Div
hardly faced towards RAHIM YAR KHAN when they were struck in the rear at
LONGEWALA by Pakistan. Thanks to Indian
Air Force, otherwise they would have easily captured JAISALMER, which shows
that there was no plan to protect the Rear.
All the communication reserves were concentrated on this axis and there
was no provision for communication to 11 Div once it moved out of
JAISINDHAR. Probably too much reliance
was put on International PL Route which was not correct as it was running along
the Railway line and was bound to be target of Pakistan Air Force. There was no flexibility to cover all
eventualities in case things went wrong.15
5 (Indep) Air Support
Signal Company
5 (Indep) Air
Support Signal Company was located at Poona Jodhpur Bikaner Jamnagar
One
of the first tasks undertaken by the company was to coordinate the frequencies
to be used on the radio nets. Crystals
At
2000 hours on 3 December information was received about the bombing of various
air fields in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir
by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). A quick joint conference was held at JOC in
which pre-planned missions, mostly in the shape of tactical reconnaissance (Tac
R) were decided. All air support links
were ordered to be opened at 0630 hours next morning. By a strange coincidence,
both Major Khanna and Captain Raheja were down with ‘Flu’ since early
morning. Khanna’s temperature was
recorded as 103 degrees Fahrenheit but he carried on after a shot of Penicillin
in the MI Room.
At
2230 hours on 3 December the first air raid warning sounded in Jodhpur
On
4 December the company had the chance to carry out its first operational task
since its raising in 1967. A Tac R mission report containing 68 words was
handed over to the detachment at Uttarlai by the GLO at 1243 hours. It was
cleared within seven 7 minutes and handed over to JOC at 1255 hours. The total
time taken between the initiation of the report and clearance was 12 minutes, a
commendable performance by any standards.
The contents of this report indicated that one aircraft was hit and the
pilot bailed out. Shortly afterwards the unit processed the first immediate air
support demand of Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. It was initiated by 12 Infantry
Division at 1435 hours, encoded in full, cleared over the radio net, decoded
and handed over to the JOC at 1450 hours.
The total time taken for processing was 15 minutes only, a fantastic
pace setter. The acceptance message for this demand was initiated by the JOC at
1555 hours, encoded and cleared to the air field at 1603 hours i.e., within 8
minutes.
The morning Tac R broadcast on 5
December indicated tank movement near Longewala. Repeat missions were ordered one after
another for 30 Brigade. The ground to
air communication with the air control team (ACT) with 30 Brigade was
excellent. One radio set GU 734 carried
by the forward air controller (FAC) in a tank was damaged due to enemy tank
fire at about 1630 hours. The set was replaced by CO 12 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment by 2200 hours the same day.
A total of four pre-planned and 22 immediate sorties were flown by the
IAF. The score of the day included 18
enemy tanks beside other things. All air
support links functioned smoothly, till they closed down at 1900 hours.
With
the battle of Longewala being won, operations in 12 Infantry Division sector
virtually ceased and the focus shifted to 11 Infantry Division which was advancing
into Pakistan. Air support demands were initiated every day and cleared without
delay. There was a flap on 8 December when a message was received from 11
Infantry Division that a tentacle was missing since the previous day. The
tentacle was through on radio and immediately contradicted this statement. When
challenged, it replied correctly. The tentacle clarified that the FAC and GLO
in the tentacle jeep were missing since 1000 hours on 7 December. Major Khanna spoke to the Colonel GS of 11
Infantry Division, who insisted that the tentacle of 85 Infantry Brigade was
not in his sector. When the tentacle was
asked to confirm its location it was revealed that it had been attached to 10
Sikh Light Infantry. The Colonel GS later confirmed that the tentacle had been
with the battalion throughout. However, the FAC, GLO and jeep were still
missing.
On 10 December the tentacle with HQ
11 Infantry Division reported that it had moved to a new location. However, due
to a complete breakdown in rearwards communications from the divisional
headquarters all pre-planned demands for 11 December were being cleared on the
immediate air support net. The NCO in
charge of the tentacle Lance Naik R.S. Yadav under the guidance of Naib Subedar
Sansar Singh did a wonderful job in encoding and clearing five pre-planned
demands without any delay. Due to
breakdown in communications the CSO Southern Command ordered that air support
links to 11 Division would l be kept opened throughout the night. A large volume of traffic from signal centre Jodhpur
In addition to clearing signal
centre traffic the tentacle had to clear pre planned demands along with immediate
air support demands. The tentacle was given six such demands on the night of
12/13 December. The whole night Lance
Naik Yadav and Naib Subedar Sansar Singh kept on encoding the demands and
cleared them between 0540 and 0800 hours.
The tentacle also reported that it had run out of white petrol (73 NL)
used for charging sets and could not charge its batteries. Since none was
available with the divisional headquarters or the signal regiment, the
detachment was ordered to use ordinary petrol (MT 70) for battery charging. A
similar problem was encountered in the 30 Brigade tentacle, where the NCO in
charge Havildar Armugham reported that he had not been able to get any petrol
for battery charging for the last two days.
However, displaying great initiative, he took his batteries to the
advance workshop detachment (AWD) of the brigade and got them charged.
On
15 December the tentacle ex 322 Brigade was placed under command of 85 Brigade.
The NCO in charge Havildar Shinde came under heavy enemy artillery fire and air
strafing. However, in spite of all this
he maintained good communications on the air support net and cleared eight
immediate air support demands without any delay. On 16 December also 85 Brigade was in contact
with enemy and their tentacle cleared 11 immediate air support demands.
On
17 December a total of 14 immediate air
support demands were processed, including 12 from 11 Division Sector. At 1500
hours information was received about the unilateral cease fire that was to come
into effect at 2000 hours. The last joint conference of the campaign was held
at JOC at 1700 hours, presided over by the Chief of Staff, who thanked the IAF
for their excellent co-operation and magnificent support given during the last
fortnight. He then referred to immediate
air support communications provided by 5 (Indep) Air Support Signal Company and
pointed out that the unit had provided excellent communications over extended
distances throughout without any break, especially when rearward communications
from 11 Infantry Division failed on 10 and 11 December and the only link that
worked not only to the divisional headquarters but even to the forward brigades
viz. 85 and 330 Brigades was the air support net.
Information
was received at 1730 hours on 17 December that HQ 85 Brigade had come under
heavy enemy strafing and Napalm attack.
The brigade operations room and signal centre vehicles were completely
gutted. The tentacle vehicle was only 75 yards away but just escaped from being hit.
The last Tac R broadcast of the campaign was made at 1900 hours after which all
links were closed.
P Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The unit was
located at Alwar under the command of Lieutenant Colonel H.P. Bhardwaj, with
Major D.K. Sachar as the second-in command. The other field officers in the
unit were Majors R. S. Makker, Avtar Singh and H.S Goel, who was recalled from
regular reserve in October 1971.
The
unit did not play any active role in Operation ‘Cactus Lily’. It was made
responsible for holding reinforcements on behalf of signal units. However, 2 Company under Major Avtar Singh
was allotted to Southern Command and moved out on 16 October 1971 . It was later merged with H
Communication Zone Signal Regiment which was raised on 3 December 1971 . Subsequently, some more
section bricks were allotted to H Communication Zone Signal Regiment and moved
out on 7 December. On 10 December the CO was also posted out and Major Sachar
officiated until the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel J. Bagchi in January 1972.
CONCLUSION
The Indo- Pak War
of 1971 was fought on two fronts, against East and West
Pakistan . The Indian Army’s offensive in the East resulted in the
liberation of Bangladesh Pakistan India
For Signals, the
war in the West had few surprises, since troops were familiar with the area and
the existing communication infrastructure. The backbone of communications was
line, thanks to the extensive PL network that had been built up over the years.
Radio was rarely used and radio relay acted mostly as a standby to line. Since several months were available for
advance planning, shortages of equipment and manpower were made up well before
the operations. Signals Directorate played a crucial role in ensuring that
units had the wherewithal to perform their tasks. The SO-in-C, Deputy SO-in-C and
DD Tels visited almost every signal unit accompanied by senior officers from
the P&T Department to tie up loose ends. As a result, no unit could
complain of lack of attention or shortage of equipment that could affect its
functioning.
Communications by and large were stable and
came in for praise by commanders and staff. However, there were a few serious
lapses that could have been avoided. There were two glaring instances of
communications failure during the operations. The first occurred in 72 Brigade of
36 Division which was placed under 54 Division. For more than two days, the
brigade did not have any speech and telegraph circuit, on line or radio relay,
to the divisional headquarters. Major V.R.P Sarathy, who was commanding the
brigade signal company, made desperate appeals without any result. It was only
after he brought this to the notice of Brigadier J.S. Nanda, CSO I Corps that
he was provided a line and radio relay link for rearward communications. Communication
breaks that occur due to equipment failure, terrain, atmospherics and accidents
can perhaps be condoned. However, the case in point can only be attributed to
faulty planning and lackadaisical attitude, which are unpardonable, especially
during war.
The second case of communication failure
occurred during the advance of 11 Infantry Division into Pakistan
One
cannot help marvelling at this inexcusable lapse in signal planning, in sending
a division into battle without making adequate provisions for rearward
communications. This is all the more
surprising in view of the fact that there was no shortage of radio relay
equipment in 1971 and units were given whatever they asked for. Perhaps the
peacetime role of the formations played a part in the fiasco. Unlike the other
two commands – Eastern and Western – that participated in Operation ‘Cactus
Lily’, Southern Command had hardly any field formations with an operational
role in peace time. This probably bred a sense of complacency which was
difficult to shake off. Colonel Jaswant
Singh assumed command of Q Communication Zone Signal Regiment on 23 November
1971, just before the war started. When he arrived in the unit at Jodhpur
It is pertinent to recall that a
similar failure in communications had occurred ten years earlier, during the Goa operations in 1961. At that time too, HQ Southern
Command was out of communications with 17 Mountain Division. As a result, 50
(Indep) Parachute Brigade, which was through on radio as well as radio relay,
was asked to capture Panjim, a task that had been originally assigned to 17
Mountain Division. In the jubilation of victory, these critical failures of
communication were overlooked in 1961 and 1971.
Notwithstanding the few instances
of faulty signal planning, the performance of signallers was exceptionally
good. The testimonials from formation commanders bear testimony to the high
standard of communications provided to them. A large number of signallers
earned decorations and awards, and there were many who lost their lives in the
operations. As always, the young officers and signalmen surpassed the others in
initiative and intrepidity.
ENDNOTES TO
CHAPTER 7
This
chapter is largely based on Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao’s Prepare or Perish, (New Delhi, 1991); Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo (ed), The Indian Army – A Brief History (New
Delhi, 2005); and personal accounts. Specific references are given below:
1. Gen K.V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi
2. Krishna Rao, p.214
3. Krishna Rao, p.220
4. Krishna Rao, p.222
5. Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo (ed), The Indian Army – A Brief History,
United Services Institution of India (USI), New Delhi, 2005, p. 152
6. Krishna Rao, p.234
7. Krishna Rao, p.235
8. Ian Cardozo, p. 153
9. Krishna Rao, p.237
10. Krishna Rao, p.240
11. Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership in
the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, p.211.
12. Personal input, Brigadier V.R.P. Sarathy.
13. Personal input, Brigadier B.M. Kapoor
14. Personal input from Brigadier V.M. Jog
15. Personal input from Lieutenant Colonel
Jaswant Singh
2 comments:
Strange there have been no comments. This is a very valuable document that adds multi-dimensionality to the Western Theater ground operationsI will be quoting from this in a book I am writing for Helion UK.
I really impressed your blog. It’s informative.
House Mover and Packers in Islamabad
Post a Comment