Chapter
8
MISCELLANEOUS
OPERATIONS (1947-72)
Preview – Background.
KOREA (1953-54) : UN Multinational Force
(1950-53) – Custodian Force India
(1953-54) – Signals in
Korea. INDO-CHINA : Background – International Commissions for Control and
Supervision in Indo China – Signals
in Indo-China. GAZA (1956-67) : Background – Operation ‘Shanti’ – Signals in
Gaza. CONGO (1960-64) : Background – Arrival of Indian Troops in Congo. SIGNALS IN CONGO : Indian Signal Company ONUC (1960 - 61) – Indian Independent
Brigade Group Signal Company, Congo – Indian Contingent Signal Regiment
ONUC Congo – Indian Signal Company (ONUC) Elisabethville (1961-62). NATHU
LA (1967) : Background – The Events of 11
September 1967 – Signals in Nathu La – The Cho La Incident. CONCLUSION.
Preview
Apart from the four major wars
(three with Pakistan China Independence India
The first such operation was
conducted in Korea Korea India India
The next major overseas assignment
was in Indo China Vietnam Laos Cambodia India China Canada Poland India India
In 1956 India Gaza Middle East crisis. The Indian contingent comprised an
infantry battalion along with ancillary troops, including a signal section,
which was turned over every year. A total of 11 Indian contingents served
in Gaza
The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
from July 1960 to June 1964 was the largest peace keeping operation mounted by
the United Nations until that time. Initially, in 1960, India Elisabethville . In 1961, India Leopoldville .
The assignment in Congo
Another action in which Indian
troops were involved took place on Indian soil at Nathu La in Sikkim
UN Multinational Force
(1950-53)
During World War II, the Allies
captured the Korean peninsula, which was under Japanese control. When the war
ended, the United States of
America Soviet
Union divided the country along the 38th Parallel,
giving birth to two Koreas 25 June 1950 , North Korea South Korea Seoul North Korea South
Korea North Korea USA North
Korea South Korea Pusan
With his abhorrence for war, Prime Minister Nehru declined to send
Indian combat troops to Korea port of Pusan 20 November 1950 , with a total strength of
346, consisting of 17 officers and 329 OR. The unit had to operate as two entities.
The principal part, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Rangaraj, was assigned
to 27th Commonwealth Brigade at Uijongbu. The remainder of the unit under Major
N.B. Banerjea worked at the South Korean field hospitals in the strategic town
of Taegu
60 Para Field Ambulance remained in Korea 27 July 1953 at Panmunjom . Though the role of 60 Para Field Ambulance
ended with the signing of the Armistice, it was ordered to join the Indian
Custodian Force in the De-Militarised Zone. The unit returned to India
Custodian Force India
The armistice envisaged a complete
cessation of hostilities and establishment of a De-Militarised Zone between the
two Koreas 5 August 1953 . The UN
Command had 14,704 Chinese and 7,900 North Korean prisoners to hand over, while
the joint North Korea People’s Army (NKPA) and the Chinese People’s Volunteers
(CPV) Command had 359. However, the exchange ran into problems when many of the
NKPA and Chinese prisoners held by the UN Command, as also some UN Command
prisoners with the North Koreans did not wish to be repatriated to their
respective countries. A large number of Communist prisoners elected not to return
to the Peoples Republic China Sweden Switzerland Poland Czechoslovakia India India India
Initially, it was visualized that the CFI would have
to take over an estimated 50,000 prisoners of war and a force consisting of a
divisional headquarters with two brigades would be required. However, before
the Agreement was signed, about 27,000 prisoners of war were suddenly released
by the South Koreans. This left only
about 24,000 prisoners that had to be guarded and the strength of the CFI was
reduced to a brigade. Accordingly, 190 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier R.S.
Paintal was earmarked to form the main body of the CFI. After a visit by the advance team comprising
General Thorat and the Foreign Secretary in August 1953 for an on-the spot
study, the CFI left for Korea in five contingents in August-September. The first four contingents comprising the
bulk of the force left by sea from Madras Calcutta Inchon
The
CFI was housed in canvas tents, in three groups, at a place known earlier as
Tong-Jong-Ni. Thorat gave it the name Hindnagar, which soon became well known.
The prisoners were housed in compounds, with each accommodating about five
hundred. Each compound had tents for living, kitchen, dining hall, and
latrines. There was a double wire fence around each compound, with the space
between them used for patrolling. A number of compounds were grouped together
into an enclosure, which also had a double wire fence around it. Initially, prisoners of both sides were quite
friendly with the Indian troops guarding them. However, this changed, as soon
as some of the prisoners began to ask for repatriation. The other prisoners
resented this, and beat up those who wanted to surrender to the guards, for
repatriation. Sometimes, they even killed such prisoners. The Indian troops
tried to prevent such incidents, and this brought them in conflict with the
prisoners.
An essential part of the NNRC’s
mandate was the requirement for each side to explain fully to the benefits of
being repatriated to their own countries, without using any coercion. After the
explanation each prisoner was asked for his option. On 15 October 1953 , explanations
started. A large number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners, captured by the
UN Command, refused to be repatriated. The KVA-CPV Command contended that this
was because false information had been given to the prisoners regarding the
conditions prevailing in their homelands. They argued that if they were given a
chance to explain things to them, they would change their minds. This was to be
done by teams from the parent nations, who would be allowed to talk to each
prisoner, in camera. Each prisoner had to undergo the process of 'explanation',
but was free to make his choice, regarding repatriation.
When the explanations started,
the prisoners refused to come out of their compounds. The troops of the CFI had
a difficult time in persuading the prisoners to come to the explanation tent.
The prisoners often spat on the members of the explanation team, or beat them
up. Sometimes, they even tried to rough up the guards. If force was used by the
troops, they were denounced by the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNRC, who
considered it a violation of human rights. On the other hand, if the CFI did
not do this, the Czech and Polish members accused them of not giving adequate
protection to the explanation teams. Ultimately, on the insistence of the Swiss
and Polish members, who threatened to withdraw if force was not used, the
matter was referred to the Government of India. It was decided that no force
should be used, and prisoners were to be given explanations only if they wished
to. After the ninety day period for explanations had expired, prisoners were
handed over by the CFI, to the side which had captured them. The UN Command
released its prisoners, in January 1954. KPV-CPV Command initially refused to
take back the prisoners captured by them, but eventually did so.
A total of 21,805 prisoners were handed back
to the UN Command, and 347 to the Red Cross representatives of North Korea China India Brazil India
Signals in Korea
When 60 Field Ambulance went to Korea
The
Force Signal Unit was raised in Delhi Delhi Madras 15 August 1953 . Since only two Indian ships
were immediately available, the United
Kingdom Korea Madras UK
On 30 August, the Empire Pride cast anchor three miles off Inchon South Korea
The transmitter
aerial being erected at Hindnagar ,
Korea
The site selected for the
transmitter station was all mined and the ground was soft and boggy. The help of UN Command Engineers was sought
for clearing mines and construction of approach roads and plinths for the
transmitters. The work was completed on
11 September and a transmitter BC 339 was opened on the next day. The link
finally got through on 13 September.
The second transmitter SWB 11 could not be effectively used as it had
got badly damaged in transit. Initially, some difficulty was experienced in the
erection of the aerial masts as the ground was soft and boggy. Later, cemented bases were made and proper
rhombic aerials erected for both transmitting and receiving aerials. The size
of the aerial park was gigantic with the long diagonal being 1500 yards long
(almost a mile) and the short diagonal measuring 400 yards. Having erected the aerials, what transpired
on switching on the transmitter is best described by Captain (later Lieutenant
General) J.S. Nanda who said:-
“I had two
outstanding Foremen of Signals - Naib Subedar Nambiar and a radio mechanic
Havildar Kartar Singh. No amount of
praise is really sufficient to describe their deeds in those early days at Korea
When it was
thought that this transmitter had been put on road, everyone crossed their
fingers and waited for the transmitter to be switched on. As DSO, I gingerly switched on the
transmitter. Immediately, we heard a
huge bang and smoke emanated from the rear side of the set. Quickly I switched off the set.
The SWB 11
worked off a three phase power supply and it had an oil cooled power
transformer in each phase. Each transformer
was immersed in a huge cistern of oil.
The transformer was housed in a small hut and the explosion had caused
the roof of the hut to be blown off. We, therefore, had to obtain a crane not
only to remove the transformer through the hole in the ceiling but also because
the rest of the equipment had been bolted down to the plinth. Having removed the transformer we rewound the
winding, but on switching on the equipment, there was a repeat performance. We just could not repair the power
transformer.
We then decided to work the equipment on two phases
alone. Accordingly, I loaded the third
phase with electric bulbs. When we
switched on the set, to our joy the equipment worked. It is quite likely that instead of the rated
10 KW output power we only radiated about 3 to 4 KW. Nevertheless that was quite sufficient.”1
Extensive line and radio
communications were provided to the Custodian Force. This included communications to infantry
battalions and the enclosures established by them to HQ NNRC and to Army
HQ. Forward radio communications were
based on radio sets 62/22 and the rear communications on 694/B399/SWB 11. The main line arteries, using multi-core
cable were laid by the UN Command personnel but all field cables were laid by
Indian linemen. The operation of SDS between Delhi Tokyo Tokyo Seoul Delhi
It
was soon realised that an alternate channel of communication was required when
the radio link between Delhi Delhi Washington Korea 3 November 1953 , Brigadier C.H.I.
Akehurst, the Director of Signals, wrote to Major General L.P. Sen, the
Military Attaché in Tokyo Tokyo
Brig CHI AKEHURST, CBE DO No 56136/GS/Sigs 2
Director of Signals 03 Nov 53
Dear
The present
message traffic to/from Custodian Force Headquarters and Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission is being cleared over the wireless link that has been
established between Army Headquarters and Custodian Force Headquarters. It is imperative, however, that in the case
of breakdown of the existing link, there should exist an alternative channel of
routing of messages to/from KOREA United States KOREA TOKYO 13 Oct 53 . Furthermore, any message traffic that the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission have for your Embassy or vice versa has
to be routed through INDIA
Capt MS SODHI of
this Headquarters is proceeding on temporary duty to TOKYO/HINDNAGAR on or
about 8 Nov 53 . While at TOKYO TOKYO DELHI TOKYO KOREA
The issue of
formal instructions in this respect by Ministry of External Affairs to the
Indian Embassy at TOKYO
With
best wishes
Yours
Maj Gen LP Sen, DSO
Military Attaché
Embassy of India TOKYO
Captain M.S. Sodhi (he later became a lieutenant general
and the SO-in-C) was sent to Korea
I
was deputed on special duty to Tokyo 08 Nov 53
to examine the feasibility of establishing this radio link. Besides investigating the normal
administrative problems having financial implications, I had to explore the
possibility of obtaining equipment for the radio detachment at Tokyo Japan
I gave a detailed briefing of the problems to the
Military Attaché and he agreed to these proposals in principle. He also indicated that the agreement of the
Japanese Government for establishing this link could be obtained through UN
Command Headquarters in Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo 13 Jan 54 .
During his visit, Captain Sodhi also went into
various problems being faced by the Force Signal Unit. He noticed that a
considerable amount of damage had been suffered by the equipment during
shipment from India Korea
An interesting point brought out in
the report relates to automatic Morse telegraphy. Extensive trials were carried
out and after a detailed study it was found that automatic Morse telegraphy
could not be successfully used in East-West or near East-West direction on a 24
hour basis because of effects of fading on this type of transmission. Even for shorter schedules, it was necessary
to have a sufficient choice of frequencies and accurate prediction charts. It was observed in the Primary Tape Relay
Station of the UN Command in Tokyo
“Short
waves propagated over great distances in an East-West direction differ markedly
in their behaviour from waves travelling long distance in a North-South
direction. This is because of the way in
which the distribution of sunlight varies along the transmission path at any
one time. The distribution of sunlight along a great circle path lying between
two points at the same latitude is non-uniform so that one part of the path can
be in sunlight while another part is in darkness. Under such a condition it is difficult to
find a frequency that will propagate satisfactorily over the entire
distance. It is thus found that
North-South transmission across the Equator is more reliable and easier to
maintain continuously than is communication over a like distance in an
East-West direction”.
Captain Sodhi spent about two weeks in Tokyo Pershing Heights 15
December 1953 . Describing his experience, Sodhi writes:
On the appointed
day I motored down early to Pershing Heights to avoid all the office-hours
traffic jams on the ‘avenues’ and ‘streets’ of Central Tokyo and be in
time. At the Communication Section I was
met by Commander Morrel and given a quick preview into the nature of my
tour. He then introduced me to a Warrant
Officer Thompson of the Far East Command
Signal Service Battalion (FEC Sig Svc Bn) who was to be my guide for the
day. With little waste of time I went
down with him to the basement of the building to the Terminal Station Branch
(equivalent of our Signal Centre) of the FEC Sig Svc Bn which was a signal unit
organized on a ‘brick system’ for the provision of signal communications for
the UN Command HQ.
At the Terminal
Station Branch I was taken around by an officer by the name of Capt Shannon
(Capt Shannon had met Brig AC Iyappa in Georgia during his visit to the US Army
Signal Corps installation and evinced great interest in explaining things to
me.) This Section was sub divided into
the following main sub sections:-
·
Communications
– the equivalent of our terminal equipment room having about 25 teletypewriters
which cleared traffic to the Primary Tape Relay Station. There were 100% standby VHF circuits to the
two 47 pair gas filled cables which provided keying lines to the relay station.
·
Operations
and registration – the equivalent of our Counter Room.
·
Crypto
Centre – equivalent of Cipher Office.
·
Methods
and Results – a traffic scrutiny and analysis organization consisting of about
two clerks per shift (‘trick’). They,
apart from collecting statistical data, checked on the percentage of errors,
procedural and operational, committed by each shift and logged them on a chart
in the Signal Centre. The average number
of messages handled were 10,000 per day and average time taken in clearing each
message (clear and crypt included in average) about 20 minutes.
·
Tele
Conference Rooms – There were two conference rooms where the Commander, and or
PSOs and their staff got together to have a teleconference with their opposite
numbers in other places – e.g. Washington San Francisco Manila
·
Maintenance
and Services – They looked after the standby power and maintained both the
teletypewriters and cipher machines. I
was not taken there.
An outstanding point of note was that messages were
handled by Signals only for the purpose of electrical clearance. The receipt and registration of ‘OUT messages
and fair copying and distribution of ‘IN’ messages was done by AGs Branch. The distribution of responsibility, they said,
was laid down in their Standard Operating Procedure Regulation which they would
give to me at the end of my visit but discreetly or otherwise forgot. I however got a copy from the UN Command HQ
later on.
Other than the Terminal Station Branch at
Pershing Heights Camp Drake Tsukeeshma Island Tokyo Bay Tokyo Tokyo
Linemen of 190 Inf Bde Sig Sec making a track crossing
at
Panmunjom Bridge Korea
The CFI returned to India Madras Delhi Nagpur Delhi
In conclusion, it can be said that the work of
the CFI in Korea India India
INDO-CHINA
Background
Indo-China was the collective name by which the
region of South East Asia roughly
corresponding to the present-day countries of Vietnam Laos Cambodia India China Laos Vientiane Cambodia Phnom Penh Hanoi Vietnam North Vietnam Saigon ,
popularly known as’ the Paris South Vietnam
Indo-China was under French
colonial rule until the Second World War. With the German occupation of France Vietnam 2
September 1945 , after the August revolution, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam was formed under President Ho Chi Minh. However, by this
time the French forces had returned and were in control of South Vietnam North Vietnam Dien Bien Phu in 1954, where
a large garrison of French forces was annihilated after fifty-five days of
fighting. During this period, similar liberation movements were being carried
on in Cambodia Laos
International
Commissions for Control and Supervision in Indo China
According to the provisos of the
Geneva Agreement of 20 July 1954 , the country was divided into North and South Vietnam North Vietnam South Vietnam Vietnam Laos Cambodia India Canada Poland India Vietnam Hanoi North Vietnam Saigon in South Vietnam Phnom Penh Cambodia Vientiane Laos Canada Poland
The first three
chairmen of the commissions were Mr. M.J. Desai (Vietnam Cambodia Laos
The Vietnam ICSC
was first established in Hanoi Saigon , where it was
based until it moved back to Hanoi Vietnam Vietnam Saigon throughout the 1960-1975 Vietnam conflict.
In Cambodia Svay Reing 14 August 1954 . Elections were held on 11 September 1955 and the
political party backed by Prince Sihanouk won a majority of the seats. By the
first week of October 1955, the work of the ICSC in Cambodia Cambodia
Elections in Laos 4 May 1955 .
Three years later, at the request of the Laotian Government, the Commission was
closed down in July 1958. However, it was reconvened in New Delhi Laos
As the work of the Commission continued, the
officers and the staff personnel serving with the mission were replaced.
Gradually, the requirements decreased. By 1970, the Indian contribution in
Indo-China had come down to a handful of officers and men and all commissions
ceased to exist by 1975. 3
Signals in Indo-China
The International Commissions
Signal Regiment (ICSR) was raised at Delhi 4 August 1954
to provide signal cover to the three International Commissions in Laos Cambodia Hanoi
Lieutenant-Colonel Mehta flew to
Indo-China for an initial reconnaissance to gather information about the local
communications set-up, resources available, power supply, frequencies, etc. The
load tables, composition and priorities were worked out and the advance party
of two officers, four JCOs and 15 OR were flown to Indo-China on 17 August 1954 . They
reached well in time to receive four hundred tons of ordnance stores which
arrived two days later. On 20 August elements of the
advance party deplaned at Vientiane Hanoi Phnom Penh Saigon . By 21 August cipher offices were established at
all four locations and traffic was being passed over civil circuits. The first ‘operational immediate’ message from India Saigon
over civil circuits.
The first batch of the main
party arrived on 3 September 1954 , and the next day, the signal centre at Saigon
was established. Within a week, the
wireless links from Saigon to Delhi Phnom
Penh Vientiane Hanoi North Vietnam
The wireless nets were spread out over
unusually large distances and each net had a large number of stations, some as
many as thirteen. The choice of
frequencies was limited. Due to the
limitation on space, the dipole aerial or its modifications had to be used in
place of the preferable rhombic. The 110
volts power supply was very unreliable and unsteady, fluctuating sometimes
between 60 and 150 volts.
The
signal centres had a host of other problems. The political language used in
most messages made them verbose and the precedence was unduly high. In September 1954, 30% messages were Flash,
5% Emergency and 45% Operational Immediate.
Due to the commissions being composed of delegations of different
nationalities, the layout of messages could not be standardized for quite some
time. It was also not uncommon for two
similar messages to be originated by two delegations, one in clear and the
other in cipher. In the first few
months, the regiment was clearing an average of 250,000 groups per month.
Once
the communications had stabilised, matters improved. The signal communication
system in Indo China Saigon
with smaller signal centres at the headquarters of the commissions for each
state viz. Hanoi Vietnam Vientiane Laos Cambodia New Delhi Saigon and one standby CW hand speed link
between Ranchi Saigon . The main internal wireless
communication in Indo China Hanoi Saigon ,
Vientiane New Delhi Saigon . There was also an ADS connecting the various
commission headquarters and motor despatch service (MDS) between the commission
headquarters and the fixed and mobile observer teams.
Operators at work in the Signal Centre, Saigon
Personal accounts by officers
who served with the ICSR give a vivid picture of the conditions prevailing in Vietnam
My posting as 2 I/C of the Regt (the
CO was Lt Col Staff College School of Foreign Language New Delhi
We were concentrated at Calcutta Saigon . We carried no equipment, vehicles or arms
(the last was a blessing since it saved guard/kot duties) - just our personal
baggage and cipher documents. Throughout
our service in Indo-China we enjoyed diplomatic immunity and nobody’s baggage
(including OR) was ever checked or opened.
The original agreement was that the
French would supply all communication equipment in the South and the Viet Minh
in the North. However, the provision of
communication equipment, vehicles etc was beyond the capacity of the Viet Minh
(they were basically guerrillas) and so the French provided everything both at Saigon and Hanoi Saigon – New
Delhi Saigon and a seat was always reserved for
the signal courier and his SDS bag.
The French provided staff cars (Peugeots)
with drivers to the HQ of the International Commissions in Hanoi Saigon . The share of the Signal Regt was, I think,
two staff cars – one 15 cwt. and one three-tonner. Telephones were given generously by the
French both at Saigon and to a lesser degree
at Hanoi
In order to ease the language problem, the Signal Regt was allotted one
English-speaking French Sergeant for liaison duties. He was a great help since he was a signaller
himself and immediately understood our problems. He was a versatile fellow and
once we had established a happy working relationship, he would obtain for us
anything within reason from the French.
Talking to the Canadians was of course no problem. The Poles had brought
along their own English and French linguists, but the Viet Minh officials made
life complicated. Although I suspect all
of them could speak French, they steadfastly refused to do so, so their speech
had to be translated by one interpreter into French and then a second
interpreter translated the French into English.
The return journey was equally tedious.4
Another interesting account has
been given by Brigadier E.N. Ramadoss, who was posted to the unit from the School of Signals
One of the planes or INS
Magar - I do not now remember which- brought two SCR 399 from India
Another interesting episode relates to the flap that occurred when
the SO-in-C, Major General A.C. Iyappa, wanted to talk on the wireless link
between New Delhi Saigon . Describing the incident, Brigadier
E.N. Ramadoss writes:-
Towards the end of October 1954, Capt. E. N. Pillai and I switched over
as the Duty Signal Officer at Saigon and Hanoi Col Delhi Saigon . Our biggest problem was the lack
of knowledge of conversational French on the telephones between the
transmitter, receiver and signal centre. We had one non-technical French
Warrant Officer as the interpreter but he was not adequate. As the first step,
I got a triple diversity receiver and its aerials erected in our signal centre
by the end of November 1954, eliminating their receiving station from our
circuit. I underwent a crash course in French in the evenings at my own expense
under a civilian instructor. RTT got through to Delhi Col
Finally the circuit got through
towards the end of December and worked a whole morning session of six hours.
Next morning when we established communications
I got a message
from Lt SAP Rao, ADSO at Delhi signal centre, that Gen AC Iyappa, our SO-in-C, would be
coming to their centre and personally converse on the circuit. We all stood by
the circuit which packed up promptly 15 minutes before his arrival. I heard
later that ACI
arrived with a congratulatory message to hear of the 'let down'. Well-meaning Lt SAP Rao volunteered to
send his message on the standby WT link - that was the last straw. I heard that
the General swore at all of us and stormed out angrily. Even after the circuit
stabilized, there was to be no congratulatory message from ACI. I mentioned
this incident to ACI in Bangalore India
In April-May 1955,
inter-zone transfer of inspection teams was carried out. This involved a changeover of 78 wireless
stations but was carried out without any break in the communications. In August
1955 the first turnover of personnel took place. On 3 August the first plane from India Saigon carrying one
officer, one JCO and 50 OR. The next day, an equal number were repatriated to India China Peking to Cambodia Hanoi
Indian Signals
linemen maintaining lines in Cambodia
The third turnover of personnel
was carried out in July 1956. On 7 July Major
K.K. Tewari, the CO designate arrived in Saigon
with Captain J.L. Rathan, two JCOs and 70 OR. The outgoing CO, Lieutenant
Colonel V.D. Deshpande returned to India Saigon . The latter
task was gradually taken over by the Vietnamese Army.
With the
improvement in the political situation in Indo-China, there was a gradual
reduction in commitments of the regiment from 1957. Wireless communications to
all team sites except two were closed in May 1957. The strength of the regiment was consequently
reduced to nine officers, five JCOs and 231 OR. In May 1958, the Laotian
element of Signals closed down, followed by the Cambodian element in July
1958. The size of the regiment was
further shrunk to that of a company in 1960.
During
its stay in Indo China 31 October 1954 on his way to China Saigon
airport. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the
Vice-President of India, visited the regiment in 1957. Throughout their stay,
the regiment and its personnel faced many hazards. In April-May 1955, Saigon saw a lot of street fighting for two weeks,
resulting in the disruption of keying lines for three days. In July 1955, there were violent
demonstrations against the Commission in Saigon .
Two Commission cars were burnt. One despatch rider was surrounded and plastered
with posters. As a result, the despatch
riders moved about in taxis in civil dress for a week. In September 1955, Hanoi
The unit
also had its share of physical casualties. Signalman K. S. Menon was wounded in
the leg in Plain Des Jars (Laos India Saigon was bombed and damaged by two airplanes of the
South Vietnamese Air Force in February 1962.
One of the bullets hit the Senior JCO’s office. Subedar Bur Singh was
fortunately elsewhere at the time. There
was another narrow escape when the MDS courier to Cap St. Jacques was ambushed
by the Viet Cong in March 1962.
Signalman Pillai was lucky to come out of it with only scorched
trousers.
Commenting
on the accidents and casualties suffered during his tenure as CO of the
regiment, Major General K.K. Tewari writes:-
Two or three incidents I remember distinctly. The first was when one of my chaps was shot
dead by the civil police in Saigon on 6 March 1957 . Lots of inquiries were held, followed by a
number of meetings. I was very adamant
that the South Vietnam South Vietnam South Vietnam
Another incident was about my DR,
Signalman Venugopalan who was killed in a jeep accident on 21 March 1957 . He was brought back in a serious condition
but we could not save his live. He died
two days later. I remember I attended
the post-mortem and I was very sad. We had two Indian officers on the
Commissions who died, one was a Major who died in an accident on 11 December
1956 and the other a Colonel, a fine soldier of the Indian Army, who died in
Laos on 9 April in a helicopter crash. I
was one of the pall bearers and it was a very sad occasion. All these incidents brought a lot of load on
Signals by sudden increase in traffic.
All messages reporting such incidents were marked ‘Flash’.7
The regiment earned a good name
for providing reliable signal communications in Indo China
At a meeting of the Commission
in May 1956, the Polish Ambassador said, “I
would like to mention particularly the personnel of Signals who have
incessantly and perseveringly managed to send all my Flashes with my errors and
mistakes, so promptly and efficiently”.
A letter from Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Walker
of the Canadian Army, popularly known as a “Sakth
Gora Sahib” by the signal centre staff reads:-
“I
would be pleased if you would extend to your men that I am in contact with and
those behind the scenes, my sincere admiration for their patience, skill and
genuine co-operation. In the event that
I should ever serve again in war, I would be pleased to do so with the Indian
Signals”.
In a
farewell message, M.B. Williams, the Canadian Ambassador at a special meeting
of the Commission in February 1956 said:-
“Mr. Chairman, your
delegation has borne the major burden of the Secretariat work of the Commission
and we are grateful to those many unknown Indians who have processed accounts
and dispatched messages and telegrams.
Your Signal Regiment is a credit to your Service”.
The names
of COs of the International Commissions
Signals Regiment, Indo-China are given below:-
Name
of Officer From
To
Lieutenant
Colonel V. Mehta 2 Sep 54 15 Sep 55
Lieutenant
Colonel V.D. Deshpande 16 Sep 55 27 Jul 56
Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Tewari 28
Jul 56 24 May57
Lieutenant Colonel N.J.S. Sethi 25
May 57 28 Feb 58
Lieutenant
Colonel Hari Singh 1 Mar 58 2 Oct 58
Major H.C.
Heffernan 3 Oct 58 15 Dec 58
Major Rattan
Singh 16 Dec 58 28 Sep 59
Major G.S.
Sodhi 29 Sep 59 1
Jul 60
In 1960, the strength of the
Signals complement was reduced to a company. The names of the officers
commanding International Commissions Signals Company, Vietnam
Major S
Subrahmanyan 2 Jul 60 19 Mar 61
Major P.S.
Jauhal 20 Mar 61 29 Dec 61
Major Harbans
Singh 30 Dec 61 21 Oct 62
Major P Thakoor
22 Oct 62 4 Mar 63
Major A. L. Teri 5 Mar 63 17Aug 63
Major R.J.
Patel 18 Aug 63 12 Jun 64
Major P.N.
Kapoor 13 Jun 64
29 Nov 64
Capt B.M.
Kapoor 30 Nov 64 24 Dec 64
Major R.S.
Trehan 25 Dec 64
Background
The genesis of the Middle East crisis of 1956 was the rise of President
Nasser of Egypt Israel Czechoslovakia Nasser ’s
recognition to Mainland China US Taiwan Nasser ’s. Needing an
alternate source of cash fast, Nasser nationalised
the Suez Canal in July 1956. After various
initiatives to avert war failed, Britain France Israel Britain France Israel Egypt 29 October 1956 , starting
a chain of events that resulted in the Middle East
crisis and UN intervention.8
Unfortunately, Britain USA Egypt Britain France US 2 November 1956 adopted the
US Middle East . Major
General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations’ Truce Supervision
Organisation was nominated as Chief of Command of the proposed UNEF. The five
permanent members of the Security Council were debarred from being part of the
UNEF.
Several nations offered troops for
the UNEF. However, finally troops from ten countries were accepted. These were Brazil Canada Colombia India Denmark Norway Yugoslavia Finland Sweden Indonesia Indonesia
The headquarters of the UNEF was located in Gaza New York
Operation ‘Shanti’
As one of the founder members of the UN and an
unqualified supporter of its activities, the Government of India responded
without any reservations to the request to contribute an infantry battalion and
ancillary troops for this mission. India India India
3 Para moved to its staging area in Bombay together
with other services components, where they were seen off by Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru, who addressed all ranks at a ‘Sainik Sammelan’ and asked them ‘to remember that they were
going as ambassadors of peace and friendship’. The battalion and other
components were airlifted to Egypt 4 December 1956 . The Indian contingent
concentrated at Tiba Camp near El Ballah in Egypt Gaza
As the British
and French forces began to withdraw from Port
Said Suez Canal was taken over by 3 Para, deployed on both
banks of the Canal. Once the Suez Canal area
was stabilised, UNEF HQ decided to re-deploy the battalion on the Armistice
Demarcation Line (ADL) in the Gaza Strip. In March 1957, the battalion took
over the Gaza Strip from the Israelis. There, the battalion set up company
camps, designated as Camp
Delhi Camp Lucknow Camp Chandigarh Camp
David ’s Field. Camp
Delhi
When it became known that the UNEF
would operate in West Asia for a prolonged
duration, the contributing nations began rotating their troops periodically.
The Indian battalion groups were rotated annually, and a total of 11 groups
served in Gaza Egypt
Apart from
contributing troops to the UNEF, Indian provided several officers to man senior
appointments. Colonel (later Major General) Indar Jit Rikhye served with UNEF
as commander of the Indian contingent and Chief of Staff of the Force from
October 1957 to February 1960, when he was relieved by Colonel R.K. Ranjit
Singh. India Dominican Republic
Signals in Gaza
On 22 November 1956 the raising of the Operation
‘Shanti’ Signal Section was ordered by Army HQ. Captain K.P.G. Kurup was
nominated as the OC. The composition of the section was one officer, one JCO
and 26 OR, who were drawn from various units.
The section comprised two radio detachments, one line detachment, two
cipher detachments and a signal centre detachment. Besides the above, there were four drivers,
one EFS and two radio mechanics. The raising was to be in Agra
At
that time the role of the signal section was not defined, as the problems
facing the United Nations Emergency Force in its infancy were not clearly
visualized. However, an assurance was
given by the United Nations that items of equipment and transport which the
signal section would require for its efficient operation would be provided when
the section landed in Egypt Agra India 7 December 1956 the signal section together with all their
equipment took off for Egypt Beirut US Ismailia
According to the planning at HQ
UNEF, the main responsibility for the provision of communications rested with
the UN Field Service Communication personnel and with the 56 Royal Canadian
Signal Squadron, the latter having at that time only an advance element on the
ground with little or no equipment. The
arrival of the Indian signal section, therefore, was welcomed by hard pressed
UN and Canadian personnel, who had been sharing communication responsibilities
during the earlier phases of the operations.
The signal section, with its
characteristic efficiency, got on to the task of providing essential
communications required by HQ UNEF and in particular to 3 Para, then deployed
in the buffer zone along the Suez Canal supervising the evacuation of the
Anglo-French forces. Inter-communication
within the battalion was provided from battalion headquarters to its companies
on both the banks of the Suez Canal and this
was followed up when the buffer zone was being shifted as the phased withdrawal
of the Anglo-French forces took place.
No direct rear link was provided to HQ UNEF located at that time in Cairo
After the withdrawal of the
Anglo-French force from Port Said Gulf of Suez to El Tor to take over the town from the
Israeli Defence Forces. El Tor is the
well known Egyptian port in the Sinai Peninsula
from where Muslim pilgrims for centuries have taken the old pilgrim route to Mecca Mount Sinai . The distance from the battalion headquarters
at Shandhura to the forward companies was approximately 150 miles and it is to
the great credit of the signal section that efficient RT/CW communications were
maintained on WS No 19 throughout the battalion’s stay in this area.
The telephone exchange at Rafah in Gaza manned by the
Indian Signal Unit
Not content with providing
communications for the Indian contingent, the signal section found time to help
out other national contingents with their communication problems. One line detachment which was attached to the
combined Danish-Norwegian battalion on the Mitla Pass road in the Central Sinai
desert laid a telephone line of approximately 40 miles in length through the
desert on WD1 cable providing a very efficient means of line communication from
the Danish-Norwegian (DANOR) battalion headquarters to its forward companies.
On relief of 3 Para by a Finnish company at El Tor, a wireless detachment of
the Indian signal section provided communication for the a Finnish company,
first from El Tor and later from Sharm El Sheikh to HQ UNEF.
By mid January 1957, the Royal
Canadian Signal Squadron had completed its raising and was subsequently
deployed to provide all communications to the military counterpart of the UNEF
thus relieving the Indian signal section of its communication commitments. The
section then moved to Gaza 15 March 1957 ,
after the UNEF’s entry into the strip.
On the deployment of 3 Para along the Armistice Demarcation Line,
covering the battalion frontage of approximately 12 miles, the signal section
helped the battalion to lay lines from battalion headquarters to its companies
and the platoons. The section also helped the battalion in carrying out their
annual classification and in general helped not only the Indian contingent in Egypt
By June, 1957, the Air Transport Support Force
including 115 Communication Flight of the Royal Canadian Air Force was
established at El Arish which is approximately 50 miles west of Gaza India India Cairo India India Karachi
In accordance with the role allotted
to the section, cable routes were laid to the air transport unit and the
Yugoslav battalion. These routes were
subsequently replaced as soon as the cables deteriorated. The section was also
charged with the responsibility of clearing all official mail to India India Cairo Delhi Delhi
Indian signallers settling down to work on the beach
near El Arish in 1957
As the life of the contingent was extended,
the cable routes laid earlier were gradually transferred to permanent alignment
on telegraph poles. The cable used
initially was the American WD ITT reel which was later replaced by cable
telephone four conductor in September 1962. Most of the equipment for the
section was carried from India
After spending about a year in Gaza
the signal section was turned over in December 1957. Captain B.P. Upasani was
the OC of the second contingent. One of the drawbacks of the first Indian
contingent was that there was no overall commander. The contingents from the nine other nations
had a commander designated as such before they left their countries. This was not the case with the Indian
contingent where the senior Indian officer had only been designated as liaison
officer and not contingent commander.
This was not a satisfactory arrangement and did not project a good image
of the country. Just as it took one year
to allot a role to the signal section, it took about the same amount of time to
rectify this anomaly of not appointing a contingent commander. The second contingent which replaced the
first in December 1957 was headed by Colonel I.J. Rikhye, who was designated as
commander of the Indian contingent.
Some interesting details have been
given by Captain S.P. Sethi, who went with the 5th contingent in
November 1960. He writes:-
“The ration
scales were plentiful and all modern facilities and amenities were provided for
the OR. Indians in Egypt Egypt
“Al Hindi” was a
magical pass word which permitted move of Indian personnel and vehicles without
much hindrance. No doubt the contingent
members had a very heavy responsibility in that they were ambassadors of the
country and had to project the Indian image in the correct perspective. Nevertheless, there were some amusing
incidents when our troops were suddenly confronted with the Western ways
abroad.
Some of our
troops had never seen or known of lifts.
They were thrilled and amused to see these function and quite frequently
got into one and started riding up and down without permitting anybody else to use
it. Our section located at El Arish
excelled in traditional Indian Hospitality.
Members from units of UNEF were invited at functions hosted to celebrate
National Days. Periodic screening of Hindi films was a great attraction to
locals who literally thronged the improvised open air theatre”.12
While the UNEF troops were finally
withdrawn in June 1967, the signal section was withdrawn and disbanded a year
earlier, in February 1966. Though the scales of communications provided in Gaza
- Captain
K.P.G. Kurup November
1956 to December 1957
- Captain
B.P. Upasani December
1957 to November 1958
- Captain
K.V. Singh November
1958 to December 1959
- Captain K.K.K. Seth December 1959 to November 1960
- Captain
S.P. Sethi November
1960 to November 1961
- Captain
K.S. Caveeshar November 1962 to October 1963
- Captain
Shiv Raj Kumar October
1963 to October 1964
- Captain
M.S.K. Mohan October
1964 to October 1965
- Captain
J.S. Narsimhan October
1965 to February 1966
Background
The UN Operation
in the Congo Congo Zaire Africa with an
area of about one million square miles (nearly three-fourth the size of India province of Katanga Congo Africa .
In January 1959,
anti-colonial riots began in Leopoldville , the
colonial capital. These were followed by more radical movements, such as the
Congolese National Movement (Mouvement
National Congolais or MNC), led by Patrice Lumumba. At a round-table conference
held in Brussels Belgium 30 June 1960 . During elections for the
Congolese Parliament and provincial assemblies, two rival dominant Congolese
leaders were elected to two key positions - Joseph Kasavubu became President of
the Republic while Patrice Lumumba became the Prime Minister. On 29 June 1960 , in a clever
manoeuvre to retain a stranglehold on the mineral rich country, a treaty of
friendship, assistance and cooperation was signed (but never ratified) between Belgium Congo
Confusion
enveloped the country soon after independence. The euphoria rapidly vanished
and tribal violence broke out in Kasai .
Clearly, the common Congolese felt that their aspirations and expectations had
been ignored. There was also trouble in the Force Publique, which was
intended to promote and maintain internal stability. On 4 July 1960 , Congolese
troops at Camp Hardy Leopoldville (now Kinshasa Congo
On 13 July 1960 , UN
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, relying on the lessons of first UN
Emergency Force (UNEF) in Gaza Belgium 15
July 1960 , the first units from Ghana Tunisia Congo Guinea Morocco Mission
While its
original mandate as outlined in Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) remained
valid, ONUC was given many new responsibilities and new tasks during the four
years of its operation, as the situation on the ground changed. The Congo
·
Phase I (July – August 1960):
withdrawal of Belgian forces and restoration of law and order.
·
Phase II (September 1960 –
September 1961): constitutional crisis provoked by the sacking of the President
by the Prime Minister, and vice-versa.
·
Phase III (September 1961 –
February 1963): implementation of the UN
mandate, the restoration of freedom of movement of the people by the UN forces
and dealing with the secession of Katanga
Province
·
Phase IV (February 1963 – June
1964): consolidation of the Congolese Government and the withdrawal of the UN
force.
Arrival of Indian Troops in Congo
During Phase I,
as a result of Bunche’s negotiations with the Belgian ambassador, UN troops
first deployed at the radio and power stations, as well as along the main
thoroughfares of Leopoldville . Their presence
helped in defusing the tension and enabled the complete withdrawal of Belgian
troops from Leopoldville by 23 July 1960 . By early August 1960,
Belgian forces had withdrawn from the rest of Congo Katanga Province Kolwezi
The Government of
India supported the establishment of the UN mission. Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye
was nominated as a Military Adviser to the UN Secretary-General. Mr.
Hammarskjöld also requested Prime Minister Nehru to permit Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal,
who had earlier served on the UN mission in Lebanon Congo India Congo Leopoldville . The Indian contingent included a signal
company commanded by Major N.A. Patil.
The assassination of Patrice Lumumba
on 17 January 1961
shocked the world. President Gamal Abdel Nasser confiscated all Belgian property
in Egypt 14 February 1961 ,
led the first moves with the Soviet Union , to
recognise the Lumumbist government in the Oriental Province of North Eastern
Congo, with East Germany Ghana Yugoslavia Congo Congo 4 March 1961 , India Congo Congo
The Indian
brigade group arrived in Congo Congo Bombay 19
April 1963 . The Indian contribution to ONUC was 28.3 percent of the
total forces deployed. The Congo Mission was a remarkable chapter in Indian
experiences in peacekeeping. The Indian troops displayed an exceptional sense
of duty in the service of the UN and the Government of India did not withdraw
the brigade, even when the casualties were mounting. It was a true reflection
of India
SIGNALS IN CONGO
Indian Signal Company
ONUC (1960 - 61)
After it was decided to send a
signal detachment with the ONUC, towards the end of August 1960 Lieutenant
Colonel K.S. Garewal of Signals Directorate in Army HQ visited Congo
DCSO Delhi and Rajasthan Area was
made responsible for raising the company at Delhi Cantt, in the precincts of 1
Air Support Signal Company. Major Patil arrived in Delhi Leopoldville via Aden Khartoum
The initial role of the company was
to provide wireless communications down to the battalion headquarters in Katanga Elisabethville .
In addition to his duties as company commander, Major Patil was appointed Chief
Signal Officer for the two provinces and was made responsible for the
coordination of all signal communications. The headquarters of the Sub Command
Eastern Province (SCOME) was located at Elisabethville
along with the Swedish battalion. The Irish battalions were at Albertville Kolwezi
Communications to the above stations
was provided by four wireless nets as under:-
·
UN net (CW) - control
at Leopoldville and outstations at Elisabethville , Albertville
·
Canadian net (RTT) - one to one link between Leopoldville
and Elisabethville .
·
Moroccan net (CW) - control
at Elisabethville with outstations at
Jadotville, Kolwezi
·
Swedish net (CW) – one
to one link between Elisabethville and Kamina
Base.
The Moroccans
and the Swedish were using AN/GRC9. For
the distance involved this set could not provide reliable communications. Apart from the above wireless nets there was
no alternate means of communications. The initial problem was to reorient the
communications by installing medium power sets at battalion headquarters,
thereby releasing the battalion wireless sets for their internal
communications. It was, therefore, decided
to establish two radio nets, with the controls at Elisabethville . The first net had out stations at Goma,
Kabalo and Albertville Kolwezi India
Subsequently, depending on the
operational deployment of troops some adjustments to the wireless network were
carried out. The Kaminaville detachment was moved with the Indonesian troops to
Kabongo on 25 November 1960
and closed on withdrawal of troops on 3 January 1961.The Kabalo detachment was
withdrawn on 15 January 1961
when the Ethiopian battalion was placed under command of the Nigerian brigade.
The Kolwezi Leopoldville on 5 August.
At Kabongo interrupted electric
power was available only during the night.
Communication had, therefore, to be maintained on battery operated
sets. For battery charging no battery
chargers were available and the only source of charging the batteries was the
charger at the railway station. The
arrangements of charging batteries at the convenience of the Belgian station
master were not satisfactory and they had to be sent to Kamina for charging
with the UN train guard whenever trains were despatched.
Due to the disturbed conditions
that existed permanent lines could not be used.
Since complete reliance had to be placed on wireless, selection of appropriate
frequencies to provide twenty four hours communications was important. In the absence of appropriate frequency
prediction charts the frequency selection had to be done by a trial and error
method. The other great hindrance to reliable wireless communication was the
deliberate jamming by the local post and telegraph wireless station. This problem had to be overcome by proper
liaison and cooperation between the ONUC and the local civil authorities.
The company took over signal centre
duties on 5 October 1960 . The maximum traffic handled was 23,000 groups
during the Niemba incident, the average traffic being 10,000 groups per
day. The standard of message writing was
poor and originators often sent letters in the form of messages with complete
disregard to use of precedence. Strict
observance of rules could not be implemented in view of the composite nature of
the force. For all the men this was a first experience to serve in an
international peace force and many lessons about administration and signal
communication were learnt. 15
Indian Independent Brigade Group Signal Company, Congo
The decision to send 99 Infantry Brigade to the Congo
It was initially planned that all personnel, light
vehicles and essential stores would be transported by air and heavy vehicles
and remaining stores by sea. However, owing to the non-availability of adequate
aircraft, personnel, vehicles and stores had to be transported by sea. The air
move was carried out in Globe Master aircraft of the Military Air Transport
Service (MATS) of the United States Air Force. Out of a total of 43 sorties,
the signal company was allotted six sorties spread over 24 days. The first
detachment of the company, attached to 3/1 Gorkha Rifles, left Delhi Leopoldville on 16 March 1961 . A total of 137 men, 11 jeeps, two wireless
sets SCR 399 mounted in trailers, two charging sets 6 KW and 55,050 pounds of
signal stores were moved by air. By 9 April, the air lift was completed and the
company less those elements which were coming by sea, was concentrated in Leopoldville .
The ‘sea move’ included the rail move from Delhi to
Bombay, the port of embarkation; Bombay to Mombasa/Dar-es-Salaam by sea;
Mombasa to Kamina-Leopoldville by air; and Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma by rail and
finally Kigoma to Albertville (Congo) by barges over Lake Tanganyika. The
personnel and stores included in the ‘sea party’ embarked from Bombay Leopoldville . The last
person of the party arrived at Leopoldville on
19 May 1961 . The
vehicle group which had arrived at Dar-es-Salaam was despatched by rail-cum-barge
to Albertville 2 June 1961 .
The move of the company which had commenced on 14 March was completed after 81
days.
Based on the past experience of the Indian Signal
Company ONUC and appreciation of the prevailing situation in the Congo by
Colonel Garewal, the war establishment and war equipment table of the company
was tailored to provide extensive wireless communication between formation and
unit headquarters and adequate resources for the provision of the local
despatch service and local line communication. Wireless sets SCR 399 were
provided for communication between HQ ONUC and brigade headquarters and
wireless sets C 52 for communication from brigade headquarters to battalion
headquarters, and also to advanced brigade headquarters (tactical
headquarters). SCR 399 was used for communication between Leopoldville and New
Delhi in the initial stages until the HQ Company of Indian Contingent Signal
Regiment, Congo established an ET 4331 station and took over the commitment.
The distances over which satisfactory communication was provided by these sets
varied up to 5000 miles with SCR 399 and up to 1,000 miles with wireless sets C
52. Aerials used were mainly dipole with SCR 399 and end-fed with wireless sets
C 52. Secondary batteries were given an initial charge at Delhi Congo
It is interesting to note that there was no specific
allotment of frequencies for use in the Congo
Indian
signallers in Congo
Signal centre staff and operators had to
re-orientate their ideas to conform to the United Nations message writing (or
letter writing in a message form). Personnel had to study and comprehend the
layout of various types of message forms. They also had to understand the
degrees of precedence in use in India vis-a-vis those in use in the United
Nations and learn how to replace one by the other. Against five degrees of
precedence in vogue in India – Flash, Emergency, Operational Immediate,
Priority and Routine – the UN had only three viz. Priority Nations, Priority
and Routine. One aspect which had to be constantly kept in view was that there
were no alternative means of communication. Traffic pending on one wireless
link could at best be routed only through another wireless circuit. The
alternative means of clearance such as teleprinters, fullerphone or SDS just
did not exist.
To start with, the cipher staff was overloaded.
However, the classified traffic decreased steadily and was brought down by
1000 to 1500 groups a day in each cipher office. Owing to the non-availability
of line circuits and the degree of secrecy to be maintained, especially in the
initial stages, battalion headquarters were provided with a cipher operator
each and rifle company commanders were trained to operate low grade ciphers
for communication between the battalion and company headquarters. It was
considered essential to continue this practice because battalion headquarters
were located hundreds of miles away from the brigade headquarters and had no
other means of encrypting/decrypting classified messages. United Nations
ciphers were being used but were available only at important stations where
civil or military headquarters were located, always away from battalions. These
ciphers could be used only between civil/ military headquarters. Indian ciphers
were used for all classified messages within the brigade as well as to India
Indian Contingent
Signal Regiment ONUC Congo
In
view of the increase in communication commitments in Congo, it was decided to
raise a third signal company and a regimental headquarters in April 1961 under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel K.D.
Bhasin. The other officers in the unit were Major S.N. Mookerjee (company
commander); Captain S.N. Bhatia (company second-in-command); Captain A.K.
Minocha (adjutant) and Captain Gurdial Singh (TOT). The unit was raised at Delhi Cantt. at short
notice and stores collected hurriedly. Colonel Bhasin preceded the move of the
unit and emplaned at Palam along with the Indian Independent Brigade Group
Signal Company personnel on 1 April, arriving at Leopoldville
on 3 April 1961 . The balance of the unit personnel embarked at
Bombay Leopoldville on 06 May 1961 via Dar-es-Salaam.
On arrival at Leopoldville he discovered
that HQ ONUC and HQ Indian Contingent were unaware of the formation of the regimental
headquarters and HQ Company and its induction into the Congo, despite the fact
that Colonel Garewal had come shortly before the move for a reconnaissance
along with Brigadier K.A.S. Raja. This
was however soon sorted out and clearance for the induction of the unit
obtained from New York Leopoldville . Policy on command and control of the sub
units of the regiment was issued by the CO soon after his arrival. HQ Company and Indian Signal Company at Elisabethville (Patil) were to be generally under regimental
headquarters for all purposes whereas over the Indian Independent Brigade
Signal Company (Sawhney), mainly technical control was to be exercised. The CO of the Indian Contingent Signal
Regiment was also deemed to be the Commander Signals of the Indian contingent
taken as a whole.
The Indian Signal Company at Elisabethville was being employed in providing ONUC
communications under orders of the CSO ONUC.
After the formation of the regiment this arrangement was not disturbed
except that hereafter executive orders on communication matters would be issued
through the regimental headquarters.
With proper liaison and good relations with the CSO and his staff, this
arrangement worked satisfactorily. The regiment was generally under HQ Indian
Contingent for national matters, under CSO HQ ONUC for general technical
control and directly under HQ ONUC for administrative purposes. For local matters it was under Station Headquarters,
Leopoldville .
The establishment of HQ Company
provided for a link working back to India Congo Leopoldville
to New Delhi 15 May 1961 . The ET 4331 provided on the establishment of
HQ Company for this purpose could not be opened up due to deficiencies in
essential stores required for a rhombic aerial array. In the event after a great deal of
improvisation, proper provision of power and technical accommodation, and local
manufacture of certain stores, the ET 4331 station was established with effect
from 15 June 1961. The link worked on
schedule for 8 hours a day in the beginning, which was increased to 12½ hours a
day with effect from 1
November 1961 .
In August 1961 HQ ONUC issued a
policy letter whereby contingents were not authorized to operate separate
wireless links to home countries unless specially sanctioned by UN headquarters
in New York
Even before the issue of the above
mentioned policy letter the unit had asked Army HQ whether sanction for the
operation of the link to India India Congo
With the formation of HQ
Leopoldville Command with operational territorial jurisdiction over Leopoldville and Equator provinces of the Congo Leopoldville
command net besides a rover for the commander. On 5 August 1961 the unit provided an officer to
function as signal officer for the command.
Weekly air despatch service (ADS) from
Leopoldville to Albertville Elisabethville was introduced from middle of July 1961,
consequent to brigade units having concentrated in both places. On 27 January 1962 the couriers Havildar Prem Prakash Bhatt
and Signalman M. Ganapathy who were travelling back from Albertville Leopoldville
in a UN DC 4 aircraft along with other UN personnel force landed in Luanda Angola New York
Congo is generally good wireless
country and communications were been
maintained over distances which are not normal for the sets in use e.g. a WS
C52 was used between Leopoldville and Albertville, a distance of about 900
miles with generally good results. A wireless diagram of the regiment as on 15 March 1962 is shown
below:-
During the Katanga India 13 November 1961 .
A requirement was also felt by Army
HQ in New Delhi India Albertville India 24 September 1961 . The Albertville Elisabethville
in April 1962 the link was re-established as Poona-Elisabethville with effect
from 4 April 1962 . The traffic carrying capacity of this link
was limited due to the distance and relatively low power of the set used.
After the first Katanga Congo Elisabethville and No 2 at
Kamina. These ACTs were used with effect
during the second Katanga
After completing a year at Leopoldville the regiment was turned over in April 1962.
The officers who formed part of the relieving unit were Lieutenant Colonel M.S.
Krishnamoorthy (CO); Major W.V. Ferris (second-in-command); Captain J.H. Moreau
(adjutant); Captain B.P. Murgai (company
commander) and Captain Santokh Singh (TOT). The unit was raised at Ahmednagar
where it was organised into cohesive elements.
From there it moved by train to Bombay Leopoldville , where they
took over from the outgoing contingent.
The regiment was accommodated out of the main city
on the highway to the airport along with the Irish unit. The living
arrangements were adequate and the men were reasonably comfortable. The regiment quickly settled down and
established communications as directed by HQ ONUC. A particular achievement was that Captain
Santokh Singh, despite tremendous constraints, established his RS ET 4331
transmitter as a link back to India Congo
According to Major General Murgai, “The exposure to new environment, different
organizational methods of working by the other nations of the World was very
educative and enlarged our horizons. All
ranks benefited from such experience”.
During August 1963, Captain Murgai was selected to be a UN Military
Observer in West Irian. This was a six-week assignment after which he returned
to Congo
Another
year passed and the tenure of the contingent came to an end. The mercenaries had been pushed out of Congo Katanga Kasai
had joined the rest of the provinces forming part of the republic of Congo India Mombasa Bombay
Indian Signal Company
(ONUC) Elisabethville (1961-62)
The Indian Signal Company (ONUC) at Elisabethville was due for turnover in September 1961.
Major P.K. Roy Chowdhury was selected as the OC and Captain S.C. Mehra as the second-in-command.
The company was raised at Poona Elisabethville on 9 August 1961 . The main body
embarked at Bombay 27 August 1961 where they were greeted by the CO,
Lieutenant Colonel Bhasin. The company
was transported from Dar-es-Salaam to Elisabethville
by air on 3 and 4 September.
The company was responsible for manning the wireless
links of the UN internal radio net work as directed by the CSO HQ ONUC, Leopoldville . It
was also manning the signal centre and exchange at ONUC Elisabethville. Even
before the arrival of the main body of the company the advance party had taken
part in Operation ‘Rum Punch’, which is described by Captain Mehra in the
following words:-
On 27 August 61 at 2000 hrs Captain Ghosh my predecessor and
I were in our villa which was situated 500 yards behind main Gendarmerie Camp Massart Katanga
The
tasks given to our company were:-
(a) Capt S Ghosh with one telegraph mechanic
to put out of action the civil telephone system from the city post office at
280500 hrs.
(b) Jem Bhaskar Ram, F of S, to put out of
action a subsidiary Radio Katanga Elisabethville Post
Office. The task of capturing the Post
Office and above studio was given to D Company 1 Dogra and our technicians
accompanied them.
(c) Hav Packianathan and Nk Kewal Singh were
to accompany 3 Company XII Swedish Battalion to put out of action Radio
transmitter at Kilobelobe.
(d) I was given the task of taking over the
technical control of Radio Katanga
(e) Apart from the above additional tasks
given to our company we were to provide normal signal communications.
We all reached
our respective assembly areas by 280200 hrs.
All objectives were captured without any major fighting. Exactly at 0500 hrs the telephone system of
the city was out off. Katanga Katanga Katanga Katanga
The after effects of Operation ‘Rum
Punch’ were not very pleasant for the UN.
The Gendarmerie who had shown no inclination for fighting so far started
digging in the positions vacated by UN troops on 28 August. On 5 September on receipt of information that
the UN headquarters in Connaught
Building Katanga
On 12 September the company was ordered to move to
the Castle compound in preparation for Operation ‘Morthor’ which was to commence
next day. Working throughout the day the men moved all heavy stores to the
allotted area and started digging. The plan for Operation ‘Morthor’ was similar
to that of ‘Rum Punch.’ The signal
company had to provide technicians with assaulting troops to handle
installations like the Katanga Elisabethville central
telephone exchange and the transmitters.
Captain Mehra and Naik A. Fernandez accompanied C Company 1 Dogra to
Radio Katanga Katanga Katanga Katanga
The tasks allotted to the company
were completed and during the next few days everyone was kept busy digging and
providing overhead protection using Eucalyptus logs and sand bags. On 16 September about 2030 hours the company
was subjected to a mortar attack. The
first mortar shell landed in the mess tent killing outright Lance Naik Chanchal
Singh, the mess NCO, who was getting stores ready for the next morning tea. The
two cooks were unscathed. However, Havildar Sowaran Singh, Lance Naik K. Kesava
Pillai and Signalman Sukumaran Nair received splinter injuries as they were
getting into the trenches.
On receipt of information of the injury to his men,
Mehra rushed from the signal centre to the mess tent amidst mortar shell bursts
and machine gun fire and evacuated the injured who were bleeding profusely, to
the headquarters building basement and arranged first aid for them. He then
took Lieutenant Colonel Oyen, Senior Medical Officer, to examine Lance Naik
Chanchal Singh who was unconscious, and who was eventually pronounced
dead. Next he went to the neighbouring
location, defended by the camp personnel of HQ Indian Independent Brigade and
evacuated Jemadar Thomas, personal assistant to Brigadier Raja who was unable
to walk due to a leg injury, and one OR of the Indian Independent Brigade Group
Signal Company who was also injured. For his daring acts on 13 and 16 September
Captain Mehra was later ‘Mentioned in Despatches’.
At this stage the CO ordered that
Major Roy Chowdhury would maintain the static communications while Major
Sawhney would be responsible for the tactical communications of HQ Katanga
Command. Roy Chowdhury was directed to
provide whatever assistance he could to Sawhney to carry out his task. Towards
the end of November 1961 the Gendarmerie became active and starting kidnapping
UN soldiers and established road blocks on the airport road at Tunnel which
divided the city in two and particularly the UN dispositions on a diversionary
route called ‘Route Charlie’. Then they
started interfering with the movement of UN troops and vehicles. In the
meantime Sawhney was admitted in Leopoldville ONUC hospital. With the help of
the COS , Major Dhar, Roy Chowdhury was able to
get four C 52 detachments from the Brigade Signal Company Albertville for the
tactical wireless network.
The operation commenced on 5 December 1961 which involved
mostly clearing the road blocks, capture of Camp Massart
The achievement of the five-month old company can be
summarized in the Force Commander’s words when on 16 December 1961 before his
departure for Leopoldville he sent for the signal officers (Major Roy
Chowdhury, Major Sawhney, Captain Mehra and OC Canadian Signal Detachment, an
infantry officer, Lieutenant Beau-Regard) and said “I have no words to express my feelings towards you. The results of the operations prove your
devotion to duty, efficiency and morale.
Thank you very much. Keep it up
and God bless you”. 18
Shortly before New Year’s Day in
1962, the company composed a poem and sent it for publication in the Signalman.
New
year’s eve in the town of E’ville
Not a creature astir, all appear to be still.
The
khukris are hung by the tent with care
In hopes that gendarmes would not be there.
When
out of the bush, to the Gorkha’s delight
charge a horde of gendarmes, at mid-night.
The
alarm is sounded, each man to his post,
the signallers are ready to return a fiery toast.
The
attack is repulsed, there never was a doubt
the poor beggars lost heart, and turned back in a
rout.
The
commander awoke in his room at HQ
he called for a drink, “what else is new?”
And
when he was told, he shouted with glee
“begad! the Gorkhas are fighting for me”.
He
hurries downstairs to a blacked out room
where he finds the signallers in a bit of a gloom.
“It’s
a bit of a shame,” they shout aloud
“that such fun and games are ever allowed.
New
year is ruined, we have to stay here
and all we can do is toil hard and sincere”.
He
retorts “lads, you’re in your glory,
now it’s up to you to get out the story”,
So
the cables go out, one after another
addressed to all tiger, lion, and their brother.
There
were flashes in cipher and ops in plain
but throughout the ordeal, did we complain?
To
the top of the list our company arose
and the wireless circuits never did close.
Though
our hours are long and nights are dark
like jolly St. Nick our traffic do we park.
So
while bullets may fly and shells may fall
a very happy new year we wish to you all
Indian
Signal Company (ONUC)
In April 1963, the term of the ONUC came to an end
and all Indian troops returned home. During their stay in the Congo
On the eve of
your departure with your unit for India
Vast distances
separate various Formations and Units of UN Forces in the Congo Congo India
I understand
that on repatriation you are being redesignated as 6 Indian Mountain Congo
NATHU LA (1967)
Background
Nathu
La lies on the Old Silk Route Tibet India Tibet Lhasa Tibet China Great Britain Sikkim Tibet Sikkim China Tibet Sikkim Nathu La.
In the first week of August 1967,
the border out posts (BOPs) at Nathu La were occupied by 2 Grenadiers,
relieving 18 Rajput. Lieutenant Colonel Rai Singh was then commanding 2
Grenadiers. Major Bishan Singh took over
as ‘Tiger Nathu La’, as the company commander holding the pass was generally
known, with Captain P.S Dagar as his second-in-command.
Even while 2 Grenadiers was in the
process of taking over the defences at Nathu La, Chinese activities increased.
They were noticed repairing their bunkers on North Shoulder and making
preparations to construct new ones. On 13 August the observation post at Sebu
La reported that the Chinese had arrived on the crest line and dug trenches on
our side of the international border. When challenged, they filled up the
trenches and withdrew. On the same day
they added eight more loud speakers to their already existing 21 speakers on
South Shoulder. Due to this the volume
of their propaganda increased and could now be heard at Changgu. On the Indian side 30 watt transistorized
amplifiers with six speakers had been installed on South Shoulder by 112
Mountain Brigade Signal Company.
Propaganda was relayed through tape recorders from Hotel.
In view of the increase in Chinese
activity at Nathu La, Major General Sagat Singh, GOC 17 Mountain Division ordered
a three strand wire fence to be laid along the border from Nathu La to South
Shoulder. This task was completed by 2 Grenadiers by the end of August 1967
On 4 September Sagat went to Nathu
La. He directed that the wire fence be converted into a Cat Wire Type 1 obstacle,
using concertina coils. The task was assigned
to 2 Grenadiers. A platoon of 70 Field Company Engineers under Major Cheema was
allotted to assist them. On 5 September
work started at 0500 hours but the Chinese objected. There was an argument
between Colonel Rai Singh and the Chinese Political Commissar as to alignment
of the border. The work was stopped at 0800 hours. However, work on Chinese
defences on North and South Shoulder continued.
During the night the Chinese came up to the Bump and cut off one
shoulder so that if water was poured on the other shoulder it would flow into China
On 7 September the work started
again on the laying the wire. This time
about a hundred Chinese came to the fence and there was hand to hand fighting
between the troops. Realising that they
were unequal to the Jats, the Chinese withdrew and began pelting stones, the Grenadiers
responding in the same manner. Because of all this fighting there was not much
progress in the laying of the wire. The
Chinese suffered a few casualties in wounded and we had two wounded. On 8 and 9
September things were relatively quiet but the Chinese continued work on their
defences.
. On the night of 10 September the
GOC held a conference at HQ 112 Mountain Brigade in Changgu, where he
personally briefed everyone on how the operation for laying the wire was to be carried
out on 11 September. Additional
resources in men and material were moved for this purpose. One company of 18
Rajput was brought in to reinforce the defences. An ad hoc force of 90 men was
organised into a protection party to charge the Chinese positions if they
opened fire. Major Bishan Singh was in charge of the work with Captain P.S
Dagar as his assistant. Apart from the platoon of 70 Field Company, a pioneer
platoon was to assist in the construction of the fence.19
The Events of 11 September 1967
As soon as work commenced on 11
September, the Chinese came up to the fence, and tried to stop it. There was a
heated discussion between the Chinese commander, who was accompanied by the
Political Commissar and CO 2 Grenadiers. Sagat had foreseen this eventuality
and told Rai Singh not to expose himself but remain in his bunker, where the
brigade commander, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, was also present. But this was not
heeded and Rai Singh, with an escort, came out in the open to stand face to
face with the Chinese officers. As the arguments became more heated, tempers
rose, with both sides standing their ground. Suddenly, the Chinese opened fire,
causing several casualties among the troops working on the wire fence. Colonel
Rai Singh was hit by a Chinese bullet, and fell down.
Chinese and Indian soldiers face-off at Nathu La, 1967
The company of 18 Rajput, under
Major Harbhajan Singh, and the sappers and pioneers working on the fence had
been caught in the open, and suffered heavy casualties from the Chinese firing.
Realising that the only way to neutralise the Chinese fire was a physical
assault, Harbhajan shouted to his men, and led them in a charge on the Chinese
position. Several of the Indian troops were mowed down by Chinese machine guns,
but those who reached the Chinese bunkers used their bayonets and accounted for
many of the enemy. Both Harbhajan and Dagar lost their lives in the action,
which developed into a full scale battle, lasting six days. Sagat had asked for
some medium guns, and these were moved up to a height of over 10,000 ft. The
artillery observation posts proved their worth in bringing down effective fire
on the Chinese. Because of lack of observation, and the steep incline west of
Nathu La, most Chinese shells fell behind the forward defences, and did not
harm the Indians. The Indian casualties in the action were just over two
hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered
about three hundred casualties.
Signals in Nathu La
Second Lieutenant N.C Gupta was
commanding 112 Mountain Brigade Signal Company. He had recently relieved Major
R.K. Marwaha, who had proceeded on leave. Gupta had joined the brigade after
completing the Commando Course at the Infantry School, and was promptly
christened ‘Commando’ by the brigade commander, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, M.V.C. A soft spoken and affable officer with a
diminutive frame, Gupta made up in courage and diligence what he lacked in
size. For his fearless actions in the Nathu La operations, he was awarded the Sena
medal. Thanks to his innate modesty, very people in the Corps of Signals know
that he was in fact recommended for a Maha Vir Chakra.
Though young in years, Gupta
maintained a diary of events as they occurred. Filling several foolscap sheets
of paper now yellowed with age, the record makes fascinating reading. The
Author of this volume was also serving in 17 Mountain Divisional Signal
Regiment in 1967. Most of the details given in this account are based on the
diary maintained by Gupta, and the biography. of Lieutenant General Sagat Singh
written by the Author, as part of his book Leadership in the Indian Army –
Biographies of Twelve Soldiers ,published
in 2005
The communications set up within the
battalion was based on radio and line.
The B1 outstation was on radio set AN/GRC-9. The battalion radio net was
using radio set VM-25. There were lines from the battalion exchange to all
forward posts and rearwards to brigade headquarters. The line to HQ 112
Mountain Brigade at Changgu was on PL, the others consisting of WD1/D3 cable laid
on the ground or on ballies.
The events of 11 September are
described by Colonel N.C. Gupta in the following words:-
GOC’s conference
of 10 September finished at around 2300 hrs. Throughout this period and over
the following night the Engineers were busy moving their stores to Nathu La for
the fence laying next morning. As part
of the signal plan a new line was laid overnight from Brigade HQ to Sherabthang
and patched backwards directly to the Divisional HQ. A back up Rover was created to be positioned
at Brigade HQ to be used by BM in case required. The primary Rover was to move with the
Brigade Commander to Nathu La in the morning.
An additional line was also laid between Sherabthang – Nathu La Exchange
at Hotel Section.
I left at around 0500 hrs on 11 September with the Rover,
one line party and an additional Radio Set VM 25 as part of the Commander’s
entourage to Nathula. We reached H
Section at around 0515 hrs and were met by CO 2 Grenadiers and OC 70 Field Company. CO of the Artillery Regiment was also with
us. After a quick review of the
situation CO 2 Grenadiers, OC 70 Field Company and CO of Artillery Regiment left for South
Shoulder where the fencing was to take place and I along with the Commander and Company
Commander of 2 Grenadiers went to area
of Central Bump. This was an
excellent vantage point. It also housed
a MMG Section. The visibility was good
and it was a clear day with a clear sky.
By the time we reached area of Central Bump laying of fence,
along the slope of North Shoulder and in this area of the pass itself, had
started. There was quite a lot of
shouting going on. We had around 120 men involved in the fence laying. They were working in small teams at around
six points on the slope and the pass.
All the posts at and adjoining Nathula were at full alert and
communications to these parts on battalion radio and on cable were
through. Artillery network was on and
cables also through. North Shoulder,
South Shoulder, Pass, and H Section were working directly to the Brigade
Commander on the B1 net, which also had CO 2 Grenadiers and Tiger Nathula on
it. The Chinese had around 150 troops
opposing the wire laying in a hand to hand battle. Barring the commotion and despite the hand to
hand opposition things seemed to be moving as planned and the fence appeared to
be getting into position.
From the vantage
point we noticed that the number of Chinese opposing the fence had gradually
reduced. The PA equipment on the Chinese
side started a speech of Mao Tse Tung in Hindi.
The volume of the PA equipment was unusually high and had shielded the
noise of the commotion on account of the hand to hand fight. Just as we thought
things are in control all hell was let loose.
Every bunker and gun of the Chinese on North and South Shoulder started
firing on the Indian troops laying the fence.
They were in the open and bore the initial brunt of the firing. Our troops at South Shoulder who were hardly
30 mtrs from the Chinese were also taken by surprise.
The Commander got onto the B1 net and started speaking to
the people at the other end. In due
course of time it was learnt that the CO of 2 Grenadiers had been injured. It was also learnt that the number of
casualties amongst the troops involved in fence laying would be high but no
exact figures/estimates were available.
Major Bishan Singh, Tiger Nathula, was in communication with the
Commander, who instructed him to try and evacuate the CO and other casualties
to H Section.
I suddenly heard a sharp whistling sound overhead. It appeared as though it was an aircraft that
had made a quick pass. It was no aircraft - it was the sound of artillery
shells that had overshot our position to land in the valley below. It was clear the Chinese had opened up their
artillery on the pass. After some
adjustments shells were falling all around us and in the entire area of
Nathula.
Soon I learnt my first lesson of war – if you hear the
whistle of a shell you do not have to duck (especially in the mountains) as it
will over shoot and you are safe. The
information of the Chinese opening fire was flashed to Divisional HQ and
upwards to Army HQ. However it took
quite some time before permission for retaliation was received. Our artillery fire was guided by the OP at
Camels Back. By later accounts it was
learnt that our fire in the rear areas had been very effective and had resulted
in a lot of casualties.
By about 0930 hrs, Chinese fire had intensified and
gradually we started getting out of touch with the troops at North Shoulder and
South Shoulder. By 0945 hrs we had no
contact with anyone on the position on the shoulders even on the Artillery
network. It was a panic situation for
me. All the lines were down and so was
the B1 to the pass. I tried to enter the
battalion net and the company net but failed.
There was no response on any of the almost dozen frequencies of the
battalion in use that day for various nets.
I asked the operator at Brigade HQ to press in additional radio sets and
keep trying for a response directly on AN/GRC-9 working to the Artillery OP and
CO of the Field Regiment.
This created a panic for us. The Commander asked me to
call South Shoulder but there was no response. We tried to observe the area of
South Shoulder but could see no movement.
The shelling on the South Shoulder had also increased.
Under the circumstances perhaps there was no other option
for the Commander but to ask me to send someone to South Shoulder to restore
the communication. While I had a line party and spare radio sets with me it was
decided that a radio be sent to South Shoulder, a distance of around 500
mtrs. The route was open at places and
involved going down around 300 mtrs and then up around 200 mtrs. The linemen with me were new to Nathula and
had never gone to South Shoulder.
Havildar Bhakuni of the Rover had gone there many times. The choice was therefore between him and
me. Seeing the gravity of the situation
and the shelling, the Commander said, “OK, Commando (my pet name in Brigade
HQ), off you go”.
I reached South Shoulder at around 1000 hours. To my astonishment I found the post totally
abandoned. I informed the same to the
Commander. He asked me to look around for wounded if any and remain at the post
and keep him in picture. From the bunkers
on South Shoulder I could see the Chinese in their bunker across. By this time intermittent fog had started
setting in. I informed the Commander that I can see a few dead soldiers in the
area ahead of our defences close to the fence
At around 1100 hrs the Commander informed me that
re-enforcements are on their way but would take at least three hours to reach
and that I must hold on till then.
By 1200 hrs the fog had intensified. As I was watching
from one of the bunkers I saw one of the bodies moving. He was just next to the
fence barely 10 mtrs from the Chinese bunker. Taking advantage of the fog I
went ahead to try and recover him. To my surprise it was Major Bishan Singh,
Tiger of Nathula who had been injured in the initial firing. He was a 6 foot
tall Jat. He was badly injured. With great difficulty I managed to lift him and
partly drag him into our defences. Once inside I made him speak to the
Commander.21
The shelling was on off. On my way back I was hit by shrapnel
of one shell. However I never came to known of it at that point of time. I say
so because that was the closest any shell had exploded near me. I came to know
about it after three days when I was changing the uniform. My vest was full of
dried blood with a small wound on the chest. In our family we had a tradition
to give a silver coin when someone was going out on some important job. My
mother had given me this coin when I left Delhi
By about 1330 hrs the reinforcements had reached South
Shoulder. After passing necessary instructions the Rover Group decided to move
to area Steps and then to Sherabthang. Before moving I left Havildar Bhakuni
and the line party with the task of restoring the line in the battalion
defended area including those to South Shoulder, H Section and the OP. I took
the B1 radio myself and moved with the Commander.
The events of 11 September at Nathula had been an
experience for me. We lost around 70 troops in the day. The skirmish lasted
five days before being called off. The most amazing event was the recovery of a
wounded soldier from the fence after six days in the open. It was nothing short
of a miracle.
After returning to Sherabthang with
the brigade commander Gupta took stock of the state of communications in the
sector. He has recorded the events of 11 and 12 September in his diary. 20
The
lines to forward locations were through.
B1 at Sherabthang was through with B1 at Nathula. But they needed some more dry batteries and
wire aerial which had been destroyed by shelling. Sigmn Daryao Singh, operator of PA equipment
at H Sec who had come down to Sherabthang when firing started was with me. He seemed to be quite fresh and he was the
only person with me who knew the Nathula area so I detailed him to take two dry
batteries & one wire aerial to Nathula & give it to L/Nk Om Prakash I/C det.
This man I guess was rather afraid for he went about ¼ of the way and
returned two hrs later with an excuse that he has stomach ache in fact gas
trouble and cannot go to Nathula.
1830
h.
In
the mean time I had got my three linemen ready with cable to go with me to lay
a new line to Nathula. They could not
move alone for none of them knew the route.
Any way I took two dry batteries & one wire aerial. The two linemen
took one drum each. The third lineman
Mannu showed cowardice and said that he cannot go because he has pain in
leg. At this time I felt like emptying
my sten magazine into his stomach.
Anyway I did not want any malingerers with me so I took the two linemen
& proceeded with line laying. With great caution due to the intermittent
fire that was going on we continued with the line laying.
It
was a well moon lit night & the enemy could easily have spotted us but we
were rather lucky. We reached Gole Ghar
at 2000 hrs but we fell short of cable by about 200 meters. I knew in the morning my rover det had
brought a coil of about 300 meters. I
went to Centre Bump & luckily found the coil there. So we joined it & put the line through to
Tiger Nathula & Nathula Exchange in parallel at 2030 hrs. There we wasted no time but returned to
Sherabthang. On our way back we crossed
many wounded soldiers slowly making their way back to Sherabthang. Most of them were without their arms &
equipment.
2200hrs.
When
I reached Sherabthang the Commander was briefing & making liaison for the
plan which the GOC had given when he had come to Sherabthang. Same time Maj Balwant Singh came from Changgu
to take over as Tiger Nathula. Commander
briefed him of what he was supposed to do.
Maj Balwant left at 2300 hrs via area Steps with one radio det &
some dry batteries of VM 25-B. At 2400
hrs we had some dry chapattis which were lying in Sherabthang with pickle. We were really very grateful to SM for he
managed to give us a glass of hot tea which put us back into mood.21
2400hrs.
Things were being married up for the
next morning’s operation which had three phases. In phase one two patrols under
JCOs would patrol area S Shoulder & N Shoulder for casualties and bring
back as many as they can. In phase two a
platoon under Capt Daniels would assault S Shoulder from Camels Back side,
destroy or capture as many enemy as possible, bring back enemy arms,
ammunition, dead, wounded, alive or any other souvenirs. Also Capt Rathor was to be on S Shoulder with
his platoon. As soon as S Shoulder would
fall Maj Cheema & Capt Rathor would go ahead with the rest of the wire
which was to be laid. Priority of laying
was to lay the wire on the Bump. We all
hoped that the weather should be bad for this operation but unfortunately it
was a moon lit night.
Commander
also rang up Maj Chandrashekar and told him what was expected of him. The task given must be fulfilled under all
circumstances. He also told him that Maj
Balwant Singh was coming up to take over as Tiger & that he should stay at
South Shoulder & supervise the operation from there.
Capt
Lamba’s company which had gone to area Steps was to be in radio communication
with Tiger Nathula, Camels Back, Sebula, & Sherabthang but he was not
through with anyone. I knew that when
all the net was through, either he has not opened his set or his batteries are
drained out. Any way myself and Capt R.
Prakash took one VM 25-B set and left for area Steps via the road. On the way we met many wounded slowly making
their way to Sherabthang. We also saw a
lot of arms & equipment lying on the road.
Anyway when we reached area Steps we found that Capt Lamba’s set was not
put on. I put my set on & in the
very first call we were through. I then
put his set through, briefed the operator & returned to Sherabthang
0530hrs.
The
Chinese opened fire on the party which went to lay the wire under Maj Cheema
with small arms. Most of them were
pinned down & two killed.
0630hrs.
I
took my line party of two linemen to lay a new line to area Steps. When we reached area Steps at about 0800 hrs
I found Capt Daniel was not there with his company. Anyway I went to look for his company. A
little below area Steps I met Capt Daniel with his platoon. He told me he has been ordered to report to Maj
Balwant Singh. I advised him to follow
the route via Sebula. Anyway I soon met
Capt Lamba, gave him a telephone & put the line through. We were back in Sherabthang at about 0830
hrs.
0830hrs.
Signal JCO of 18 Rajput came to me
for three drums of WD1 cable required for lines at Nathula post. I gave him three drums & then left for
Nathula via Sebula at 0900 hrs. In the
mean time we laid a new line to mortar position, which was completed by about
1000 hrs. As soon as this line was put
through the enemy opened up heavy arty fire on area Steps, mortar position
& Sherabthang. I was very close to
the exchange when this fire opened up. I
saw couple of operators running out of the exchange room. Thinking that it might be abandoned I went
inside but I saw that a Grenadiers operator was inside & still manning the
exchange. Anyway I stayed along with
him. The Corps Commander was also at
this time in area Sherabthang. Our B1
under Naik Bhakuni was through strength 5.
Anyway as we sat in the exchange the line to Steps & Camels Back
went out. The shelling stopped at about
1130. I at once sent a line party to
Camels Back.
1130hrs.
This
shelling had created lot of confusion in our adm tail that was going up to
Nathula via Sebula. One mule was killed
& six injured near mortar position and a message was sent on B1 to Brigade
for RVC doctor. Capt Lamba’s company in
area Steps had scattered, left the area & come down to as far as Kupup
road. Capt Daniel’s company took cover
there only and stayed there indefinitely. The Rajput Subedar carrying cable
also remained somewhere near mortar position
1200hrs.
We
started work to shift the Sherabthang exchange from the wooden barrack to a
shell proof bunker. The work was
completed by 1400 hrs. The work done by
Signalman Mohinder Singh was commendable.
Unfortunately no sooner was the exchange shifted the lines to Mortar
position, Sebula, Nathula, Steps & Camels Back were out. The two lines to Brigade were also down but
B1 was through. Anyway, I sent a line
party to Nathula, one to mortar position & Sebula & one to Camels Back
& I myself went on Brigade line with one lineman. Luckily the Brigade was through by 1600
hrs. But at about 1630 enemy started
shelling Area Theguk & Haryana as a result these two lines were again out. The Brigade line party reached our location
at about 1730 hrs laying a new line. But
when they reached our exchange they could not get 112 Brigade exchange. Mortar position line was through at 1800 hrs,
Sebula at 2100 hrs, Nathula at 2330 hrs and Camels Back line was not through
that night. They were however through on
VM 25-B to Tiger Nathula. Line to Tiger
Steps was through but his telephone was faulty & as such no calls were
made. He was not through on wireless
also.
1800hrs.
Commander,
CO 182 Light Regiment with his radio det, GLO & myself left for Nathula via
area Steps. At Kupup road junction we
met a party who were bringing back two casualties. A little ahead we met a section of D Company
18 Rajput resting. On questioning we
came to know that they had left area Steps and come down due to heavy shelling
and would be going up after darkness.
Commander ordered them to go forthwith.
A little short of Steps we met Capt Lamba with the rest of his
company. Commander questioned him &
took him to Steps and saw his position & told him to bring up his full
company & send one of his JCOs to
Nathula Tiger to take orders if his platoon was required to move up to South
Shoulder.
A
little ahead we saw lots of equipment like packs, steel helmet, ammunition
& cable drum lying on the ground. We
met a few men of Capt Daniels’ platoon who had left in the morning trying to
make their way to South Shoulder via area
Lake
We
reached Tiger’s Bunker. Commander had a
few words with him & told him his plan & how they were to bring out the
casualties from North & South Shoulders.
The plan to lay the wire had been dropped. We left Tiger’s Bunker at about 2000
hrs. On our way back we met the
stretcher bearer parties going up to bring back the casualties.22
The skirmish at Nathu La continued for another five
days. As would be evident from the personal account and diary of Second
Lieutenant N.C Gupta, the events left a deep impression on his mind.
Gupta’s actions in holding South
Shoulder alone for a few hours, and saving the life of the badly wounded Major
Bishan Singh under enemy fire were indeed commendable and deserved to be
rewarded. His actions had been witnessed
by the brigade and divisional commanders and it was expected that he would be
given a gallantry award. Unfortunately, the fact that South Shoulder post had
been left unoccupied for some time was mentioned in his citation. On account of its likely repercussions the
portion about Indian troops vacating their posts was removed. In the event, N.C. Gupta was awarded a Sena
Medal instead of the MVC that he deserved.
An interesting sidelight of the
Nathu La incident has been given by Lieutenant General M.S. Sodhi, who writes:-
I
recall the Nathu La incident too. I was commanding XXXIII Corps Signals. The
telephone lines were down and the GOC wanted immediate confirmation of action
proposed by him. He dictated his very clear cut and precise appreciation
of the situation on the telephone to me and had me send a message to the
GOC-in-C with copy to Army HQ !! General JS Aurora
considered dictation to me more expedient than sending
for his BGS/GSO 1. The message was encrypted and cleared on
RTT in a Flash. He got concurrence to his proposed action in very good
time.
I also recall a
conversation with General Sagat when I happened to meet him at the airport a
few days later. I asked him how the communications support was during the
operations. His response was, with tongue in cheek, "Bloody awful!
The Corps Commander could contact me in the most forward post!"23
The
Cho La Incident
The
incident at Cho La, another post located to the north west
As
the arguments became more heated, the Chinese opened fire, with the Indians
responding in like fashion. The Gorkhas charged the Chinese positions and there
was hand-to-hand combat, the kukris flashing repeatedly. The officiating CO,
Major K.B. Joshi, was on his way to Point 15,450 when the incident started. He
was at Rai Gap, held by 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles, which also came under
heavy fire and was attacked by the Chinese,
The news of the firing was conveyed
to HQ 63 Mountain Brigade by Major Nair, the second-in-command of 10 Jammu
& Kashmir Rifles. Brigadier Kundan Singh, who was also officiating as the
divisional commander, immediately ordered the rest of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles to
move up from Tamze. He himself moved up to Twin Huts, to see things for
himself, where he met Major Joshi, who requested permission to recapture Point
15,450, which was granted. The attack was launched next morning and the
position recaptured by the Gorkhas. The battalion was awarded two Vir Chakras
during the incident.24
Lieutenant General S.R.R. Aiyengar,
who was commanding 63 Mountain Brigade Signal Company, recounts the incident in
the following words:-
The Cho La
incident took place barely a month after the Nathu La incident. Our Brigade 63
Mountain Brigade was operationally responsible for this Sector. On my numerous
visits to this Sector, I had seen visually the close proximity of troops on
either side of the LAC. In fact, there is a very famous snap of bayonets of two
soldiers –Indian and Chinese facing each other and bayonets pointing towards
each other and crossing across the face. I had also noticed the Chinese troops
walking side by side whenever we walked across the wire obstacle we had laid
after the Nathu La incident to demarcate our side of the LAC. In fact the
troops then occupying Cho La Post (10 JAK RIF )
often used use to narrate how the Chinese troops would toss up Mao’s red badge
across the fence in return of any cigarette packets thrown across by our
troops. They had also installed a PA system similar to the one they had at
Nathula. My Sig Coy - 63 Mtn Bde Sig Coy had also installed one from our side
of the LAC beaming transmission towards the Chinese post.
On one morning
(I am not able to remember the exact date now), we had frantic calls from Cho
La that a heavy exchange of fire was taking place. CO of the Battalion (10 JAK RIF ) was returning from leave and his 2ic was manning the
fort. Reportedly at one of the forward posts a scuffle had taken place and some
hand to hand combat had followed thereafter. The post was also in the process
of being handed over to 7/11 GR troops. The Chinese started firing all across
our post especially on the Bn/Coy HQ locations and generally restricting any
movements in areas where could easily see. The matter was reported to Bde Comdr
(Brig Kundan Singh) and our attempt to speak to the 2ic was futile, his
telephone was ringing but there was no response. His bunker was also under heavy firing from
the Chinese side. I had asked my B-1
operator, I do still remember his name –L/Nk Moga Singh, a tall young man, full
of josh. I asked him to take our radio set to the 2ic‘s bunker taking advantage
of the lull in firing. We finally
managed to speak to him on the radio set, but my own feedback from Moga Singh
was that the officer was in a state of shock and the telephone was repeatedly
ringing. We got some version of the event from the 2ic. Commander then decided
to visit Cho la next day and wanted me to accompany him. I had done these
visits on number of occasions with him and he was appreciative of our attempts
to keep these communications going despite all the odds of weather and terrain
etc. In fact I do remember after almost every visit of his to Cho La post, he
would send some Rum to our boys and especially our linemen who used to maintain
a tenuous WD-1 route. On reaching the Cho la post next day, the Comdr had a
good idea of what had happened the previous day.
I had put up
L/Nk Moga Singh for a citation but somewhere down the line it got lost. My
Comdr did meet and congratulate him for his efforts to keep the communications
going .Yes, Moga did us proud.25
CONCLUSION
As one of the original signatories
of the UN Charter, India India
A Signals complement has always
formed part of the Indian contingent that is send abroad on an UN assignment.
Without exception, they have delivered the goods, always and every time. One
reason is that unlike most other arms where an entire unit or sub unit is
earmarked for an overseas assignment, in the Signals contingent each man is
selected individually, based on past performance. As a result, almost every
signaller who forms part of an overseas mission is above average, and there are
almost no ‘bad hats’, a problem which newly raised units often face.
The Nathu La operations in 1967 were an acid test
for the Indian Army, which faced the Chinese for the second time in five years.
Though the results of the skirmish were inconclusive, it proved that the
Chinese were not invincible. For Signals, the operation was significant,
bringing to light the high standards of professionalism and training of its
personnel, because of which even a young and inexperienced officer was able to
perform his role in battle without any disruption in communications.
ENDNOTES
TO Chapter 8
This chapter is mainly based on
Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar’s For the Honour
of India – A History of Indian
Peacekeeping; Captain M.S. Sodhi’s Report on Performance of Force Signal Unit
In Korea; Regimental History, Indian
Contingent Signal Regiment ONUC (Congo); personal diary of 2/ Lt. N.C Gupta and
personal accounts of officers,.
Specific references are given below:-
1.
Col New
Delhi
2.
Captain M.S. Sodhi, Report on Performance of Force Signal Unit
In Korea, 1954.
3.
Lt. Gen. Satish
Nambiar, For the Honour of India India New Delhi
4.
Col. S.N. Mehta,
Personal Account.
5.
Brig.
E.N. Ramadoss, Personal Account.
6.
Brig.
E.N. Ramadoss, Personal Account.
7.
Maj.
Gen. K.K Tewari, Personal Account.
8.
Nambiar, p. 134
9.
Lt
Col
10.
Nambiar, p. 152
11.
Shavey, “The Indian
Signal Section with the UNEF”, The
Signalman, October 1957.
12.
Captain S.P Sethi,
Personal Account
13.
Nambiar, pp. 191-199
14.
Nambiar, p. 222
15.
Regimental History –
Indian Contingent Signal Regiment ONUC (Congo
16.
Major P.D. Sawhney, ‘Indian Independent
Brigade Group Signal Company in the Congo
17.
Regimental History –
Indian Contingent Signal Regiment ONUC (Congo
18.
Lt. Col. P.K. Roy Chowdhury, Personal Account.
19.
Col. R.D. Palsokar, The Grenadiers – A Tradition
of Valour, 1980, p. 363
20.
2/
Lt. N.C Gupta, Personal Diary.
21.
Major Balwant Singh was the Officiating CO of
18 Rajput.
22.
2/
Lt. N.C Gupta, Personal Diary.
23.
Lt. Gen. M.S. Sodhi, Personal Account.
24.
Lt. Col. Gautam Sharma, Path of Glory – Exploits
of the 11th Gorkha Rifles, Allied Publishers, Delhi
25.
Lt. Gen. S.R.R. Aiyengar,
Personal Account.
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