Chapter
4
THE
SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT (1962)
Preview
– Background. EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION -
Operation ‘Onkar’ – Operation ‘Leghorn’ - The Clash at Tsenge-jong -
Namka Chu and Tsangle - 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment & 7 Infantry
Brigade Signal Section (Before the Invasion).
THE INVASION OF NEFA – KAMENG DIVISION – The Battle
of Namka Chu – Signals in the Battle Battle
Preview
The Chinese invasion of India India Indian Territory .
There were several minor incidents that should have given an indication of
Chinese intentions, but these were ignored, due the prevailing belief that the China was not in a position to enter into a
serious confrontation with India China
The Chinese invaded India Namka Chu River
In NEFA, the major operations took
place in the Kameng Frontier Division, where 4 Infantry Division was deployed.
In the Lohit Frontier Division, an important battle was fought at Walong. The
operations in these two divisions have been covered in detail. Some incidents
also took place in the Subansiri and Siang divisions of NEFA, but these were
minor in nature and have been omitted. Similarly, incidents on the Indo-Tibet
border areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh have been ignored, as there
was little or no fighting. There were several chief actions in Ladakh, where
the Indian troops fought gallantly, vacating there positions only after
suffering heavy casualties or on orders from higher headquarters. These significant
actions in Ladakh have been covered in fair amount of detail, the minor ones
being omitted.
Background
British and Chinese interests in Tibet China
and the Regent Tri Rimpoche signed
the Anglo-Tibetan convention, giving Britain
trading and communication rights, alongwith the stationing of a British
representative and military escorts in Tibet Tibet , the Manchu imperial government began to
perceive Britain as a threat
to its own suzerainty over Tibet Lhasa ,
forcing the Dalai Lama to flee again, this time to India China ’s military power, Britain
In 1911 the Manchu empire collapsed and the Dalai
Lama returned to Lhasa India Peking subsequently refused to ratify the agreement.
Significantly, the Chinese objected to the alignment of the eastern boundaries
of Tibet , not the alignment
of the Indo-Tibet border, which ran along the crest line from the Bhutan border to the border of Burma with China ’s
Yunnan Assam and Tibet ,
McMahon prevailed on the Tibetans to concede the Tawang salient to India Tibet
The proceedings of the Simla conference were never
published, and the government of Assam Assam Lhasa India became independent in 1947, the situation
remained unchanged for a few years, until China
occupied Tibet Delhi
The reason for the Chinese silence became clear only
later. Unknown to India , the
Chinese had begun construction of a road across Aksai Chin in eastern Ladakh in
1951, soon after they occupied Tibet Tibet and Lhasa India came to know of the road only in 1958 from
a report by the Indian embassy in Peking . An
army patrol sent to the region was captured by the Chinese and released only
after two months. Indian protests were summarily rejected by the Chinese, who
blamed India
Between August and October 1959 there were three
serious border incidents which made the Indian public aware, for the first
time, of the serious differences between China and India on the border issue.
In August a party of 200 Chinese violated the border at Khinzemane in the
Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA and pushed back the Indian patrol that met
them. However, there was no clash and the Chinese later withdrew. Shortly
afterwards another intrusion took place at Longju in the Subansiri Frontier
Division, where the Chinese fired on an Indian post and apprehended the
occupants. The Prime Minister informed Parliament about these incidents on 28
August 1959, adding that the government had decided to place the border areas
in NEFA directly under the military authorities. Until then, the border posts
were manned by the Assam Rifles, which functioned under the Ministry of
External Affairs.1
In September 1959 the Chinese laid formal claim to
about 50,000 square miles of Indian Territory
in Ladakh and NEFA. The third major incident took place in October 1959, when
the Chinese ambushed a police patrol party under Havildar Karam Singh in the
Changchenmo valley, south of the Kongka
Pass. China
had stepped up her repressive measures in Lhasa India India
and China Asia was now out in
the open.2
Unfortunately, Nehru did not take
these incidents seriously, taking the Chinese at their word that they would not
resort to military force to resolve the border disputes. This was the view held
by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, BN Mullik, whose opinion Nehru
trusted in these matters. The Army did not share this view, and General K.S.
Thimayya, the Army Chief, as well as Lieutenant General S.P.P Thorat, the
GOC-in-C Eastern Command, had informed the government in early 1959 of the
Chinese threat and the men and material required to contain it. Both were
dubbed ‘alarmist’ by the bureaucrats as well as the Defence Minister, V.K.
Krishna Menon. The difference of opinion between them was one of the reasons
for Thimayya’s resignation on 31 August 1959, alongwith Thorat not being
appointed the Army Chief after Thimayya’s retirement in 1961. As was later
learned, Krishna Menon did not inform Nehru about the paper prepared by Thorat
and submitted to him by Thimayya in October 1959, which clearly brought out the
serious shortcomings in the defence of NEFA in the event of a Chinese attack.
EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION
Operation ‘Onkar’
The decision of the government to
entrust the responsibility for guarding the northern border to the Army was
taken in August 1959. However, due to logistical problems, it was only in
November 1959 that 4 Infantry Division was ordered to move to Assam
In 1960 Operation ‘Onkar’ was
launched in NEFA. This envisaged the establishment of a large number of posts
along the frontier, manned by Assam Rifles personnel under Army supervision. Strangely
enough, the exact location was decided not by the Army but the Intelligence
Bureau! In the Central Sector i.e the
UP-Tibet border, due to administrative difficulties the Police Forces continued
to be responsible for the defence of the border, though the Army commands were
instructed to complete all preparations to enable regular troops to take over
border security duties at short notice in an emergency. At this time, the
UP-Tibet border was being guarded by six companies of Special Police Force
(SPF). By July 1961 the strength of SPF had gone up to nine companies, seven of
which manned 17 summer posts on the border, the rest being deployed in Jammu and Kashmir
The decision to hand over the border
in Ladakh was implemented in April 1960 with the induction of HQ 114 Infantry
Brigade comprising 7 and 14 Jammu and
Kashmir
On
2 November 1961 an important meeting was held in New Delhi
In spite of the difficult terrain,
adverse weather conditions and lack of adequate maintenance facilities, a
number of new posts were established near the McMahon Line and the strength of
already existing posts was increased.
Although those posts were being manned by Assam Rifles, they were
physically established under supervision of the Army. In most cases, the posts were in most cases of
platoon strength and almost entirely dependent on air-dropped supplies. In February 1962 the Assam Rifles detachments
had been posted at Chutangmu, Chuna, Khinzemane and Bum La in the Kameng
Frontier Division. In Ladakh, by the time the implications of the new policy
had been worked out, the winter of 1961-62 had far advanced. Hence it was only from April 1962 that the
induction of troops commenced and a battalion was concentrated at Leh by
mid-May 1962. Army units from Daulet Beg Oldi started moving eastwards and set
up posts along the Chip Chap river valley, within a couple of kilometers of the Chinese
posts. Although there were now four
battalions posted in Ladakh, the force was inadequate to defend the 480 km front
from Daulet Beg Oldi in the north to Demchok in the south. As a result, they had to be dispersed into
small, isolated posts each barely 10 to 20 strong. This pattern of deployment was based on the
known Chinese tactics, which was to creep into Indian Territory
whenever it was unguarded, but not to launch an offensive against the Indian
posts. By the end of September, 36 Indian posts had been established in Ladakh
against 47 posts set-up by the Chinese in the region. Around Chushul the Indian
and Chinese posts confronted each other at close range and in the south around
Rezangla and Demchok the Indian posts reached almost up to the international
border.
By May 1962 the Chinese had
reinforced all their posts all along the Indo-Tibetan border. A report on the
Frontier Security Situation prepared by the Intelligence Bureau was discussed on 17 May 1962 at a meeting
presided over by the Defence Minister, who ordered that all the gaps left still
unoccupied in the border areas should be filled up. Even if sizeable forces could not be spared,
there should be at least a platoon of the Army or police or the Assam Rifles at
each of those places. By 20 July 1962, 34 posts – 8 in Kameng, 8 in Subansiri, 7
in Siang and 11 in Lohit Frontier Divisions – had been established in NEFA. Among
these posts was the one at Dhola, established a little south of the Namkha Chu
on 4 June 1962 under the guidance of Captain Mahabir Prasad of 1 Sikh who
accompanied the Assam Rifles party. In
June 1962 HQ 4 Infantry Division designated Tawang as the Divisional Vital
Ground. Consequently 7 Infantry Brigade was moved to Tawang to strengthen the
defences of the town. The force level in NEFA at this time was two infantry
brigades and 74 platoons of Assam Rifles.
Even as diplomatic efforts to
resolve the dispute continued, the tension on the border increased as the
Chinese inducted more troops in the region. By the beginning of September 1962
it was estimated that the total deployment of Chinese troops along the northern
frontier had gone up by six battalions since the beginning of the summer of
1962. Of the total strength of Chinese troops in Tibet North Ladakh , almost double
the force of three battalions that had been there in spring of 1962. In the area in front of South
Ladakh and the central sector, the strength of Chinese troops had
been increased from five to seven battalions. Against Sikkim , three regiments were deployed of which
two were in the Chumbi valley and one opposite North
Sikkim . Across NEFA, the estimated Chinese deployment was of the
order of 19 battalions. In addition to the troops deployed on the border, three
to four Chinese divisions were held as reserves in places like Lhasa
The above military preparations were
followed by a spurt in provocative activities by Chinese troops and intrusions
in Indian Territory . On 10 July 1962, about 300 surrounded the Indian
post at Galwan manned by about 40 Gorkhas.
The post was ordered to stand fast and did not withdraw, though the
Chinese deliberately left a withdrawal route open. The Chinese did not permit
the relief of the post and threatened to open fire on a party that was sent for
the purpose in August. Consequently, the post had to be supplied by air. The
post was subsequently overrun in October 1962 when the Chinese attack was
launched.3
Soon after the Galwan Valley incident,
on 21 July 1962 a Chinese party opened fire with LMGs, mortars and rifles on a routine
Indian patrol of 14 Jammu and Kashmir Militia, about eight km south-east of Daulet Beg Oldi. The patrol returned the fire in
self-defence. In this action, one naik
and one sepoy were seriously wounded. On the same day the Chinese fired on a patrol
of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, wounding two Indian soldiers. On 4 August 1962, the Chinese fired a shot
near Karakoram Pass Galwan Valley
In the Eastern sector, during the
period June/July, the Chinese had intensified their border patrolling opposite
the Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions.
They had intruded about 140 meters inside Indian Territory
at Lhola in the western part of Siang Frontier Division. Several senior Chinese officers were noticed
carrying out reconnaissance in Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions. A Chinese VIP also visited the Thagla Ridge
in July 1962. By that time, the Chinese
had constructed a road up to Le village, approximately 10 km short of the
McMahon Line. During the last few months, all Chinese border posts had moved
forward and had been considerably reinforced. They had constructed defence
works in all the forward posts and the troops had been issued modern machine-guns
in place of the old weapons. Telephone
lines had also been laid right up to the Frontier. The Chinese had deployed two
companies opposite the Khinzemane Indian post and a company at Shao opposite
Bumla. The biggest threat was posed by
the Chinese in the Eastern sector in August when they moved troops to the Thagla
Ridge in the Kameng Frontier Division and occupied it. By the end of August 1962, they had
concentrated about 400 troops in the area.
Operation ‘Leghorn
At this time HQ 7 Infantry Brigade
under Brigadier J.P. Dalvi was located at Tawang, along with two battalions, 9 Punjab and 1 Sikh. On 23 August 1962, after a conference
held at HQ 7 Infantry Brigade, 9 Punjab under
Lieutenant Colonel R.N. Misra was ordered to move forward and occupy certain
posts close to the border. Due to non-availablity of adequate local ponies and porters,
the move commenced only on 27 August and was in small parties. By 8 September
1962, one company had reached Shakti; one was at Lumpu, with the remainder still
at Tawang. At about 3 pm the company at Shakti received a message that about
300-400 Chinese had crossed the Thagla
Pass
The Dhola post had been established
a month earlier as part of Operation ‘Onkar’. It comprised 32 Assam Rifles
personnel under a Junior Commissioned Officer. While setting up the post, the
officer detailed for this task, Captain Mahabir Prasad of 1 Sikh, noticed that the
traditional boundary was in variance
with the boundary shown on the map. According
to the map, Dhola post, which was situated near the tri-junction of
Indo-Bhutan-Tibetan territory, fell north of the McMahon line, whereas
traditionally the boundary ran along Thagla ridge which was to the north of the
post. This had been confirmed from the
local Political Officer and the Divisional Headquarters was informed on 5 September
1962. In facts, the name ‘Dhola’ post was a misnomer, as the actual name of the
area, a small pasture on the south bank of Namka Chu River
The post had been surrounded by the Chinese at 8 am
but the information reached the Brigade Headquarters eight hours later at 4 pm.
The inordinate delay in passage of such vital information needs scrutiny. The
battalion apparently had only four 62 sets. One was with the Battalion HQ and
one with the company at Shakti. The third set for the company at Lumpu was
still on its way, while the fourth was with a platoon at Lumla. There was no
direct communication with the Assam Rifles posts. As an adhoc arrangement, the
62 set at Shakti tuned in to the Assam Rifles net twice a day at 9 am and 3 pm,
and information obtained on this net was then passed on to the Battalion HQ on
the battalion net. Communication between Battalion HQ and the company at Lumpu
was through the Assam Rifles post at Lumpu, using the relay system. The system
was unsatisfactory and caused a considerable amount of delay.
Commenting on the communications arrangements,
Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) K.K. Tewari, who was then commanding 4
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, quoting an entry in his diary dated 3 September 1962, writes:
“God Almighty’s flap
all day in Headquarters. Army Commander arrived. Calls from COAS. GOC asked
about no news from 7 Brigade. Told him communication are OK. Staff is not
sending messages. No flaw in communication.”
Actually the
problem was that Assam Rifles were to be passing the information. After all,
all the border outposts were manned by the Assam Rifles. They would not give
the information to the Army in the forward areas. They would pass the
information to their own headquarters IGAR (Inspector General Assam Rifles) through
their regimental headquarters. In the case of 5 Assam Rifles, which was manning
the Kameng Division out post, their headquarters was at Lokra. The information
took the route from Lokra to Shillong (HQ IGAR) and from there back to us (4
Divisional HQ).” Write up of Tape recorded version of Talk by Maj Gen KK Tewari
on Ops in NEFA-1962.
Information of the Chinese move was conveyed to
Divisional HQ and to Commander 7 Infantry Brigade, who had proceeded on leave,
but was still at Tezpur. Orders were issued to the post commander at Dhola to
hold out at all costs and reinforcements were on their way. Next morning the
Brigade Commander arrived at Tawang by helicopter and conferred with Commanding
Officers of 9 Punjab and 1 Sikh. He ordered 9 Punjab
to move forward to Lumpu and 1 Sikh to send a company to Milaktongla. A strong patrol of 9 Punjab
comprising 40 Other Ranks under Second Lieutenant N.C Kohli was dispatched to
the Namka Chu valley to find out the enemy strength and the extent of damage to
the bridges. One Assam Rifles platoon ex Lumla was ordered to move forward and
reinforce the Dhola post. Leave parties enroute to Misamari were stopped and
were ordered to rejoin their units. By the evening of 9 September the Chinese strength
around Dhola was reported to be about 600.
During the next three days, several more patrols
were sent out. After Kohli returned on 10 September and reported that there was
no enemy at Bridge I, a patrol under a Junior Commissioned Officer was sent out
to establish a firm base at that location. Two other patrols were sent to
contact Dhola post, one along the Namka
Chu River China
Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Tewari, in his talk on Ops
in 1962, describes the above incident in the following words:
On
14 September, we were all in the mess and this God Almighty’s flap was on when
the IGAR came out with the dramatic news for the information of the Chief or
the Corps Commander who was with us that day. …..I was talking about the IGAR breaking
the news dramatically to steal the thunder so to say, in the mess when he came
and announced about the link up of the Army troops with Assam Rifles. The
regular Army battalion, 9 Punjab , linked up
with Assam Rifles at Dhola Post. This information had not been given to the
Army in the forward areas. On this point I made a note in my diary and quote
again, “Signals getting blamed for 9 Punjab
mistakes. Told GOC communications are OK, but perhaps Assam Rifles and 9 Punjab are not on talking terms and Assam Rifles are
deliberately withholding inf.”
Along with the rapidly changing situation in the
forward areas, considerable activity was taking place at higher echelons of the
Army as well as the political leadership. On 9 September 1962, a high level meeting
was held in Delhi Punjab
to Namka Chu, with the rest of 7 Brigade to be ready to follow within 48 hours.
The eviction operation was code-named ‘Leghorn
Two days later at another meeting held in Defence
Minister’s office, General Sen reported that there were some 600 Chinese in
Dhola and he had ordered 7 Brigade to deal with them. The estimate of Chinese
troops was based on the wireless message received from the Junior Commissioned
Officer at Dhola. Based on the advice of the Eastern Army Commander, the
Defence Minister approved the decision to mount an attack on the Thagla ridge.
On 12 September 1962, General Sen conveyed the decision of the government to
expel the Chinese from Thagla to the Corps and Divisional Commanders during a
conference at Tezpur. The Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Umrao Singh, who
had already consulted General Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi on the issue, clearly
told the Army Commander that the task was beyond the capability of the troops
available to him. He also questioned the wisdom of moving the only brigade
available for the defence of Tawang, the vital ground, to Thagla. However,
General Sen was not convinced, reiterating that the decision had been taken by
the government, and they had to follow it. Immediately afterwards, General
Umrao Singh sent a formal letter to HQ Eastern Command, giving a realistic
appraisal of the military situation, based on an appreciation carried out
earlier.6
On 13 September, the Divisional
Commander spoke to Commander 7 Infantry Brigade on wireless and ordered him to
move to Lumpu forthwith. At the same time, 9 Punjab
was ordered to move to Namka Chu. Brigadier Dalvi left Tawang next morning,
accompanied by a staff officer and his rover group, reaching Lumla the same
evening. After marching continuously for
three days, he reached Lumpu on 16 September 1962. All this time, he was out of
communication with his battalions as well as his staff. It was only after 16
September that HQ 7 Infantry Brigade became functional.
On 18 September, a Government
spokesman announced at a press conference that the Army had been instructed to
drive the Chinese out of the Dhola area. On 20 September, Eastern Command issued
instructions that all patrols and posts were to engage Chinese patrols that
came within range of their weapons. At this time, Brigadier Dalvi accompanied
by Colonel Misra was carrying out reconnaissance of the area occupied by 9 Punjab . At 10.30 pm while they were at Bridge II
discussing the points to be included in his appreciation that had been asked
for by Divisional HQ, the Chinese sentry threw a grenade into the Indian sentry
post. Firing started from both sides of the Namka Chu and resulted in two
Chinese being killed and two wounded. Indian casualties were five wounded.
The outbreak of firing on the Namka
Chu and the build-up by the Chinese made their intentions clear. At a meeting
in Defence Ministry on 22 September 1962, General Thapar asked the government
to reconsider the decision to evict the Chinese from Thagla. Since Nehru and
Krishna Menon were out of the country, the meeting was chaired by K.
Raghuramaiah, the Deputy Defence Minister. The Foreign Secretary then explained
the Prime Minister’s instructions that no infringement of the border in NEFA
was to be accepted. It was decided that the Army would have to carry out the
instructions of the government and evict the Chinese from the Dhola area. General Thapar requested for a written order
of the government on the subject. Soon afterwards, he received a note signed by
H.C. Sarin, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence, which stated: “The decision
throughout has been as discussed at previous meetings, that the Army should
prepare and throw the Chinese out as soon as possible. The COAS was accordingly
directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese in the KAMENG Frontier
Division of NEFA as soon as he is ready.”7
General Thapar repeated the
Government’s orders to Lieutenant General Sen. He also warned Lieutenant General Daulet
Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command of the possibility of Chinese reaction in
Ladakh and advised that Indian posts there should be strengthened. On 24 September the Corps Commander, Lieutenant
General Umrao Singh personally conveyed these orders to Major General Niranjan
Prasad, GOC 4 Infantry Division.
By this time, serious differences
between commanders at various levels in the military hierarchy had surfaced. On
14 September, General Sen had ordered General Umrao Singh to carry out an
appreciation and formulate an outline plan for the operation. After passing
through the Corps and Divisional Commanders, the order reached Commander 7
Infantry Brigade. Other than the Army Commander, all three – Umrao, Prasad and
Dalvi – were convinced that the capture of Thagla was not feasible with the
resources then available. However, Dalvi agreed to produce an appreciation highlighting
the maintenance and administrative problems, hoping that this would convince
the higher authorities of the unsoundness of the plan. His appreciation
resulted in a plan with the modest aim of capturing Tseng-jong, a small feature
on Thagla slopes, and then rolling down west to east to the Chinese positions
on the Namka Chu. It was to be attempted with an out-flanking move from Bridge
V near Tsangle. While working out the logistics for the plan, Brig Dalvi made
it clear that unless the proper administrative base was ready within a
fortnight there would be no scope for operations during that winter.
The Divisional Commander approved
the plan after some alterations and then submitted it to the Corps Commander who
had reached Lumpu on 26 September. General Umrao Singh also suggested some
modifications in the appreciation and advised on a more modest tactical aim. The
draft plan was revised accordingly and the Corps Commander personally took it to
Lucknow
The Defence Minister returned from New York Nigeria
Immediately after his appointment as
Corps Commander, on 4 October 1962 General Kaul flew to Tezpur where in an
unprecedented reversal of protocol, he was received by the Army Commander
himself. After spending the day in conference with Generals Sen and Umrao, he
flew to Lumpu next day where he was received by the Brigade Major, the
Commander having been sent forward the previous day by the Divisional
Commander. Kaul promptly ordered HQ 7 Infantry Brigade to pack up and move to
Tsangdhar immediately. Being out of touch with Brigadier Dalvi, the Brigade
staff and Signal Company had little choice except complying with the order.
Kaul then moved forward to Ziminthaung and Serkhim, where a helipad was
constructed during the night on his orders. Accompanied by the Divisional
Commander, he walked to Dhola on 7 October, where he was received by the
Brigade Commander. Realising the enormous problems that the troops were facing,
he sent a message to higher headquarters, informing them of these difficulties.
Still he was all prepared to carry out the task assigned to him. In the plan
that formed part of his appreciation, Brigadier Dalvi had specified 10 October as
the date by which Op ‘Leghorn
On 7, 8 and 9 October General Kaul visited
the posts and held discussions with their commanders. He took a number
measures, such as ordering 2 Rajput and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles to move from Tsangdhar
to Namka Chu to join the other troops along the river line. Earlier, 9 Punjab had already been ordered to occupy Tsangle with
one company. According to the plan which he disclosed to the subordinate
commanders, in view of the difficulties of mounting a direct assault on Thagla he
decided to make a “positional warfare” manoeuvre. Indian troops would occupy
Yumtsola, to the west of Thagla peak which the Chinese had still not occupied. He hoped that this action would satisfy the
government that ‘the Army had done its best to carry out its orders.’8
Prasad and Dalvi tried to explain to
Kaul that the troops in cotton uniforms would either freeze at Yumtsola or
starve to death if their line of communication was cut off by the Chinese. Kaul
brushed aside their objections. However, he agreed to Dalvi’s suggestion to
send a patrol from 9 Punjab before the whole battalion
(2 Rajput) was committed. The patrol would find the best place to cross the
river and take up a position at Tseng-jong so as to cover the move of 2 Rajput
to Yumtsola on 10 October. A platoon of 9 Punjab
under Major M.S. Choudhary left for Tseng-jong and established a bridgehead on
the north bank of Namka Chu on 8 October. One section of this platoon occupied
the Karpola II next morning. Another platoon of Punjab ,
under Subedar Chhail Singh left for Tseng-jong on 9 October to reinforce the
platoon under Major Chaudhary. The Chinese did not react to these moves
instantly. However, our observation posts observed heavy reinforcement of
Chinese positions. The Chinese strength south of Thagla was estimated to be a brigade plus with
artillery support. About 300 artillery guns and mortars had been concentrated
at Le. Wheeled guns could also be seen
south of Thagla through binoculars.9
It would not be out of
place to mention the primitive Signals set up that then existed in the
formation. During the three days that he spent at Dhola, General Kaul sent long
messages addressed not only to his immediate superiors but the highest
political authorities in Delhi Delhi and Lucknow
Some of the entries in the diary of Lieutenant
Colonel K.K. Tewari make interesting reading, as given below:
16th
Sep. Thinking of problems of OP LEGHORN Punjab did not open their set. Amazing state
of affairs. Army Cdr left for Delhi
17th Sep. Corps Cdr annoyed
over interruption on his call. He was
actually annoyed over late arrival of his ac.
Heptr made available for ferrying of eqpt to Towang which had been made
available earlier also but eqpt was not then available. The eqpts were held up. Maj Sodhi arr from Shillong with the adv tac
HQ of 33 Corps. 4 medium powers set also
arr. Another set opened up on C1 link
while 4 Div set on C11 continued to work.
Had to allot a new area for their medium power sets.
19 Sep. 62 Bde arr today. Sent one RS 52 to Towang for our own
GOC. Later on this moved to Lumpu. Conf held to discuss the proposal by IGAR for
comn. Greasy proposal. I promised to speak to CSO, IGAR. Afternoon meeting at Div HQ. I spoke about high precedence tfc, high
security graded tfc, SDS and use of telephones.
28 Sep. Long discussion with OC
5 TAC and G staff regarding comn for offensive air sp. All these high floating ideas of standard air
sp unit had to be discarded. Finalised
the SDS comn for the L of C upto Towang.
“30 Sep. I was asked to go to Towang. I felt upset.
I should be left alone to decide where I should be. The trip got cancelled immediately after when
the news of COAS (Chief of Air Staff) came.
Actually later changed to Army Cdr and Corps Cdr.
4th Oct. Big changes afloat.
4 Corps took over by 4 PM when GOC 4 Corps Lt Gen Kaul arr. Gill came as CSO. Plans to move the Regt out of air fd
area. I argued that 4 Div is providing all the comns at the
moment not only for 4 Div HQ but for 4 Corps HQ also and least possible
disturbances should be caused to the Sig Regt.
This had to be argued like mad.
5th
Oct.
Brig PS Gill, CSO for the first time started appreciating some of our
difficulties which he never did before as CSO 33 Corps. Agreed to get 10 more cipher staff. By evening, he agreed not to disturb my Sig Regt. Gen Kaul left by heptr with one cipher op at
9 AM to go to Lumpu. Very unsatisfactory
for a senior cdr to go and sit alone. It
is very remote place with only one WS 62 comn.
6th Oct. Delay in flash tfc last night worrying me. Recce by Gill who saw the logic today of not
building around the existing sig centre the corps installations as it would be
too congested. …..Flash message from
Kaul to COAS asking for air sp against Chinese build up. He talked in terms of national disaster.
7th Oct Stupid message from G1
at Lumpu asking for M Sec and 2 Offrs move to Lunghtu without any other sig
staff. This
G1 was really a crazy person and less said about it, the better. Let us not to talk about it. I’ve talked about this same G1 earlier. Then
he ordered the move of RS 399 set from 5 Bde at North
Lakhimpur to Dirang Dzong to work on D6. ….Decided to open D-3
link at Dirangdzone and Gauhati with det in 62 Bde Sig Sec. So many flash msgs from Kaul to Delhi
8th Oct. 7 Bde no comn from 9 PM
to 6 AM. Tfc held up. It is a very
unsatisfactory state for the Corps Cdr so far forward and moving so fast. 62 Bde Sig Sec completely disorganized. C42 air lifted from Towang to Lumpu. Long chat with CSO Gill. …..Gen Kaul and NP in Dhola post last night”.
The Clash at Tsenge-jong
At about 6.45 am on 10 October 1962 a patrol ex Tseng-jong
reported a large concentration of Chinese troops on the north and east of their
post. The patrol was fired upon. The patrol returned the fire and returned to
base without any casualties. The Chinese
came closer and thereafter intermittent fire continued. At about 8 am approximately 600 Chinese
attacked the Indian position at Tseng-jong, which had a total strength of 56
men. Out of this, one platoon had moved in only the previous evening and had
not yet dug in. The men had only pouch ammunition. After heavy exchange of fire
for about 45 minutes the attack was repulsed with heavy casualties to both
sides.
As soon as the attack started Major Chaudhary asked
for medium machine gun and mortar fire on the attacking troops but this was
turned down. After the first assault the Chinese again formed up for a second assault
at 9.30 am. Chaudhary again asked for medium machine gun and mortar fire from
Bridge IV but it was again turned down. In the meantime the section which had
gone to Karpola II moved to a position about 300 yards away on the flank of the
forming up Chinese and brought down very heavy small arms fire inflicting heavy
casualties. This unexpected fire disorganized the second Chinese attempt to
assault. However, the Chinese brought down heavy mortar fire on both positions causing
casualties to Indian troops.
The Chinese were again seen forming
up for the assault. Major Chaudhary spoke to his Commanding Officer on wireless
and informed him that his men had almost finished their ammunition, and that he
would not be able to hold on to the position unless support was provided by
medium machine gun and mortars. The Commanding Officer agreed but this was
again turned down by the Brigade Commander, who informed him that
reinforcements from 2 Rajput were on the way. The Chinese launched the third assault from
three sides - north, east and west – supported by mortar fire. At 12.30 pm the
post was given orders to withdraw. By
this time the assaulting troops were on the position and hand to hand fighting
developed. Major Chaudhary displayed
remarkable leadership and courage in extricating whatever was left of the platoons.
He was himself wounded and later succumbed to his injuries. The Chinese had
suffered heavy casualties, which were later announced by Peking Radio and Press
as 77 dead and 100 wounded. Indian casualties
were six dead, eleven wounded and five missing.11
It is interesting to reflect on the
reasons for denying the Tseng-jong post the support of medium machine gun and
mortars that could have broken up the Chinese assault and reduced casualties to
own troops. The war diary of HQ 7 Infantry Brigade lists five reasons for fire
support not being given. Only two 3 inch mortars were in range and only 56 rounds
of ammunition were available; the medium machine guns had a limited amount of
ammunition; 2 Rajput was moving into Bridge IV to relieve 9 Punjab; the Chinese
had vastly superior artillery and would have subjected the whole front to
intense bombardment; the presence of the Corps Commander and his party.
General Kaul had watched the action and left Dhola post
at 10 am after telling Brigadier Dalvi “this is your battle.” He sent a message
to Eastern Command and Army Headquarters informing them of the grave situation that
had developed at Tseng-jong and sought permission to fly to Delhi Delhi
Namka Chu and Tsangle
On 11 October 1962, a meeting was
held in the Prime Minister’s house late at night. It was attended by the Prime Minister, Defence
Minister, the Army and Air Chiefs, the Cabinet, Foreign and Defence Secretaries,
the Director, Intelligence Bureau, the officiating Chief of General Staff,
Major General J.S Dhillon and GOC IV Corps, Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul. General Kaul presented the tactical picture
of the Dhola Sector at the meeting and then suggested three alternatives viz.
to continue building up this sector and launch an attack on the Chinese despite
their superiority and a possibility of a reverse; or to cancel the orders of an
attack but hold our present positions; or to hold a more advantageous position
elsewhere. 12
The Prime Minister asked the Army
officers present for their views. The GOC-in-C Eastern Command was not in agreement
with Kaul about the inability of Indian troops to hold the Namka Chu position
and therefore recommended the second course, i.e. to hold the present
positions. The Army Chief, General Thapar, concurred with the Army Commander.
The Prime Minister then decided that the Namka Chu position would be held but
no offensive action would be taken to oust the Chinese from the northern bank.
Nehru left for Colombo
On 13 October, HQ IV Corps sent a
signal to HQ 4 Infantry Division confirming the Corps Commander’s verbal orders
issued on 10 October that positions along the southern side of the river were
to be held at all costs; line of communications via Lumpu would be protected; Hathung
La would be held and positions at Tsangle, Tseng-jong and Karpola would he held
at the discretion of the Divisional Commander. The next day, IV Corps amended
the order, specifying that the Tsangle position would also be held at all costs.
On 16 October, Army Headquarters issued orders to Eastern Command to reinforce
Tsangle if possible up to a battalion and carry out aggressive patrolling in
the area. They were also asked to forward their recommendations at the earliest
regarding commencement of Operation ‘Leghorn Leghorn
This was a
severe blow to the Brigade and the Divisional Commanders, who had been pleading
for withdrawal, in view of the reports of further reinforcements by the Chinese
and the condition of the forward defences. By this time General Kaul’s physical
condition had deteriorated – he was suffering from pulmonary oedema and had to
be evacuated shortly afterwards. He sent another message to the Eastern Command
and Army HQ arguing that the Namka Chu position was untenable and pleaded pulling
back the isolated company from Tsangle. To resolve the issue another conference was
held at Tezpur on 17 October. It was
attended by V.K. Krishna Menon, B.M. Mullik, H.C. Sarin, Major General A.S. Guraya (Inspector General Assam
Rifles), and Generals Thapar, Sen and Kaul. General Guraya was in favour of
withdrawal. Kaul also forcefully argued for
an immediate withdrawal. However, the
Defence Minister insisted that we should not yield any more territory,
emphasizing that it was politically necessary to hold Tsangle. According to Mullik,
at this stage he suggested that the civilians withdraw from the meeting to
allow the Generals to take a military decision without civilian
interference. After a closed door
discussion lasting two hours, General Thapar informed the Defence Minister that
it had been decided to hold the Namka Chu front and the Tsangle Sector. The Corps Commander immediately passed these instructions
to GOC 4 Infantry Division.
The Defence Minister and his entourage
flew back Delhi Delhi Delhi
While these high level
discussions were taking place at Delhi
- 4 Grenadiers less two
companies was at Bridge I; one company was at Serkhim with a platoon at
Hathungla; one company was at Drokung Samba under HQ Infantry Division.
- 9
- 2 Rajput less three
companies was at Bridge IV; the remaining three companies were at Bridge
III,
- 1/9 Gorkha Rifles
less a company was located in the area Chauri Hut above Dhola; one company
was covering the gap between Bridge III and Bridge II ahead of Rongla,
with a platoon located at Tsangdhar.
- A battery of 34
Heavy Mortar Regiment and a troop of 77 Para Field Regiment were at as
Tsangdhar
- A platoon each of
C Company of 6 Mahar (Machine Gun) was located with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles and
2 Rajput, the third platoon still at Tawang.
- 100 Field Company
less a platoon was at Rongla, the third platoon being at Tawang.
Although the weapons of the supporting
arms were in position the ammunition held was woefully inadequate. Only two
guns of the troop of Para Field Regiment were able to fire, the other two
having been damaged in the air drop. The total artillery of the Brigade consisted
of four 4.2 inch mortars and two para-field guns. The ammunition available at the dump at Tsangdhar
was approximately 500 rounds of field ammunition and 450 rounds of 4.2 inch
mortar ammunition. The gun ammunition had
been placed at the gun positions but the mortar ammunition had still not
reached the mortar positions. Due to
short range the mortars had to be sited about 1.5 miles north of the Tsangdhar
Dropping Zone. All personnel were employed in preparing mortar positions and no
additional manpower was available to shift the mortar ammunition. One subsidiary small arms ammunition dump was established along side 1/9 Gorkha
Rifles to facilitate ferry forward of ammunition, but this dump had still to be
stocked. 14
While these preparations were going on, the
casualties due to extreme cold conditions increased. There were several cases
of pneumonia, frostbite and pulmonary oedema, some resulting in deaths. The
evacuation of casualties was a major problem, especially from Tsangle. It took
about four days for a casualty to reach the Advanced Dressing Station at
Tsangdhar, with no staging facility enroute over altitude of 16000 ft. The sick
rate was abnormally high (50%) among the Pioneers of the General Reserve
Engineering Force (GREF), which was responsible for the construction and
improvement of roads and tracks. Due to the high casualty rate at Bridge
V/Tsangle, it was decided that snow clothing would be issued on priority to
personnel at these locations, the next priority being Tsangdhar. Since there was no snow clothing held in
stock, the troops deployed in Namka Chu from Bridge I to Bridge IV were
stripped of their snow clothing to meet this requirement. As no porters were available, troop labour had
to be used. A party of 9 Punjab was dispatched
on 18 October with ammunition and snow clothing for Tsangle.
On 18 October a Chinese patrol
attempting to cross the Namka Chu at Bridge II area was fired upon by own troops,
one of them killed. Another Chinese patrol found probing the Bridge V position withdrew
after a short exchange of fire. As a result of orders received from the Corps
Commander from his sick bed at Delhi
On 19 October 1962, a patrol sent out from Tsangle encountered
a Chinese patrol on the track to Bridge IV.
After a brief exchange of fire the Chinese patrol withdrew. Soon
afterwards all observation posts reported unusually heavy concentration of
Chinese troops. Hordes of mules were seen carrying various stores including
mortars and ammunition. About 1200 – 1500 Chinese crossed the Thagla Pass
4 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment & 7 Infantry Brigade Signal Section (Before the Invasion)
After moving from Ambala to Tezpur in November 1959,
4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was faced with two major challenges. The
first was the responsibility for communications over a frontage over 1800 km in
mountainous terrain, against the 30-40 km that an infantry division usually
occupies in the plains. The second was the additional responsibility of
constructing accommodation for troops under Project ‘Amar 2’, the brain child
of General B.M. Kaul, which was inaugurated in the unit area next to Tezpur
airfield by the Prime Minister in April 1960. After the Dalai Lama’s flight to India
In September 1962, the unit was
catering to the communication requirements not only of 4 Infantry Division but
also Tactical HQ of Eastern Command as well as 33 Corps, which had been setup
at Tezpur. The unit was then under the command of Lieutenant Colonel K.K.
Tewari, with Major Ram Singh as the second-in-command and Captain A.K. Bhowmik
as the Adjutant. The other officers in the unit were Major K.G. Gangadharan (1
Company); Major S.S. Gupta (2 Company); Major R.G. Singh (3 Company); Captain
Lakshman Singh (7 Brigade Signal Section - Tawang); Captain A.S. Bawa (5
Brigade Signal Section – North Lakhimpur ); and
Second Lieutenant Lal Singh (11 Brigade Signal Section --deployed in Nagaland
under the operational control of 23 Infantry Division). The Chief Signal
Officers of 33 Corps and Eastern Command were Brigadiers M.B.K. Nair and E.G.
Pettengel respectively. Other Signal officers located in the area were
Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Panwar, Officer Commanding, Tusker Signals; Brigadier
P.S. Gill, Chief Signal officer, 4 Corps (after 4 October 1962); and Lieutenant
Colonel S.N. Mehta, Officer Commanding 4 Corps Signal Regiment (after 10
October 1962).16
The problems
faced by 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment are best described by Major
General K.K. Tewari, who was then commanding the unit. In a memo dated 10 March
2009, he writes:
4 Div Sig
Regt had no previous training or experience in mountain or jungle area and was
not even equipped for it. Troops did not even have clothing issued for the hill
areas. In any case, the so called famous Red Eagle Division had not been able
even to do its normal operational training for months, being deeply involved in
construction work under a strictly controlled schedule and regime. Even the
normal maintenance of technical equipment was neglected in the process.
The other
aspect was the frontage of area for defence allotted to the div from Sikkim to
the extreme north east in a completely undeveloped area with hardly any roads,
electric supply or poorly developed P & T or other communication
facilities. On top of all this was the directive for the troops to build their
own accommodation on a schedule planned by the authorities who were keen to
continue with the apparently popular project of accommodation construction for
the troops, to please certain political bosses. There was little time or
consideration for acclimatising troops in the new area and to study effects of
screening due to hills on VHF radio and to develop land line facilities in an
undeveloped area with frequent landslides in heavy rains. All this was further
complicated with the shortage of equipment and its neglected maintenance.
To add to the
other communication problems was the authority exercised on the deployment of
the army and para military forces by different ministries of Defence, Home and
External Affairs with a lack of coordination and spirit of trying to outdo the
others and show off to please vested rival interests and personalities of
different bosses. To any serious minded commander with a dedicated sense of
commitment to the effective defence aspects of this completely new and
undeveloped area, the usual response was “why are you flapping? The Chinese are
not going to attack.
Shortly after the incident at Dhola
on 8 September 1962, HQ 7 Infantry Brigade had been ordered to move from Tawang
to Lumpu. The Brigade Commander accompanied by the GSO 3 (Intelligence) and the
rover group left Tawang on 14 September, with the move of remainder of the
headquarters and the signal section being spread over the next one week, due to
the paucity of ponies and porters. Due to political considerations, there was a
ban on using ponies beyond Bomdila, as these were owned by Khampas, who hailed from Tibet
The move of 7 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section commenced on 14 September and was completed only on 20 September,
when it closed down its signal centre at Tawang, handing over communications to
the signal detachment under the second-in-command, Major Ram Singh, who had
arrived two days earlier with the task of providing communications to the adhoc
brigade headquarters being set up at Tawang under the Commander Artillery,
Brigadier Kalyan Singh and the Tactical HQ, 4 Infantry Division. Since Major
Ram Singh had arrived with no manpower or equipment, 7 Brigade Signal Section
had to give him some from their own meagre resources. This included two Radio
Stations 499, one of which had been brought to Tawang a few days earlier by
Naib Subedar Dharam Singh who had reported to the Section on 15 September,
having been despatched posthaste from Tezpur, where he was the pigeon training
officer of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. 17
Describing his journey from Tezpur to Tawang and
onwards to Lumla, Naib Subedar Dharam Singh writes:-
“I left Tezpur at 1400
Hours. We were four of us - two linemen,
the driver and myself. It was dark by
the time we reached Bomdila. I made enquires
about the road condition and proceeded ahead.
It so happened that there was a landslide about 12 Kms from Bomdila and
our vehicle got stuck and could not move any further.
I happened to see a
light some distance away and went over there.
It was a detachment of GREF, Project ‘Tusker.’ I explained to him my plight and problem. The Commander of the detachment was helpful
and came along with his Jawans to where the vehicle was truck. They pushed and pulled and with hard labour
were not only able to move the vehicle out of the dangerous position but also
on to the road.
By 11 AM the next day I
was able to reach Darang Dong and got the 499 station loaded and fitted
properly in the one ton Nissan.
On the 11th
of October we started for Senge about 22 km’s away. It is a place where the sun is seen only
occasionally and it rains for 24 hours at times. The road surface was full of mud, difficult
and dangerous to drive, the convoy was accompanied by a bulldozer. There were a number of spots where it was
used to push the stalled vehicles.
Somehow we managed to reach Senge by the evening. However, by now both my vehicles were without
petrol and we could not move forward.
At night I tuned the BC
610 transmitter on the D1 Frequency and spoke to the Commander Signals Lt Col
KK Tewari and told him about my difficulties and non-availability of fuel. He spoke to Lt Col
I was wondering as what
to do. I had to move forward at any cost
but my vehicles were without petrol. The
only source that appeared to me was the Petrol Store of Project ‘Tusker.’ I had been given four bottles of Rum with
instructions from Commander Signals to make good use of them and that is what I
decided to do. I invited the POL NCO of
Tusker for drinking with us. But then I
had a problem as how to go about it being a total non-drinker myself. Anyway I told my men 4 join in drinking and
make him fully drunk and when he is unable to do anything put him on bed and
start filling the vehicles with petrol.”
This is what they did and tanked up the vehicles from the store and also
filled four Jerry Cans and carried them as reserve. I know it was wrong but for a good cause and
my move was an operational necessity.
I got up early next
morning and went to Maj Reddy, OC Tusker, well known to me, and requested him
to push up first. He did so and we were
on the road. We reached Towang the same
day by 1400 Hrs along with the 499 Set and I reported to Capt Lakshman Singh,
OC Brigade Signal Section 16A
He appeared quite
surprised to see the set, wondering as how to employ the same as he already had
one at Towang. I in any case was unable
to throw any light on that.
I have no idea about
Towang as I was ordered by the OC to move the next morning with the Brigade
advance party with a skeleton Signal Centre.
I was totally new to the Brigade and did not know the officers. However, I became quite familiar with them en
route to Lumpu, the next location of the HQ, via Shakti, We established
communication from Lumpu on D1, D2, as also the Signal Centre.18
Though his signal section had left, Captain Lakshman
Singh was not permitted to leave until 23 September, on the grounds that his
services were still required at Tawang for the newly created headquarters.
He reached Lumla next morning after spending the night at Khillan, a
small village enroute. He was happy to find that Naib Subedar Dharam Singh had established
communications on wireless with Lumpu and the battalions. After rearranging the
radio nets working from Lumla, he pushed the remainder forward with the
available porters before starting himself after a day’s halt at Lumla. Though
he was not familiar with the track beyond Lumla, he found no problem in
following the correct route – it was marked with an unbroken line of empty Gold
Flake cigarette packets, which formed part of the troops’ rations at that time!
After a back breaking march he reached Shakti where he halted for the night. On
the evening of 27 September, he reached Lumpu where he met the Brigade
Commander and the rest of the brigade staff, after a gap of two weeks, during
which they had been virtually out of communications with higher headquarters as
well as the battalions. There were no telephones, and they were using a
primitive system based on whistles and flags to communicate with the units,
which were located within visual range of the Brigade Major’s tent.
Captain Lakshman Singh set about
developing communications for the Brigade HQ at Lumpu, hoping it would be the
location from where future operations would be controlled. He felt it strange that he was never
consulted or informed about operational plans by the Commander or the staff. No
one ever asked for his advice on matters concerning Signals and he was not
given any orders, verbal or written, throughout Operation ‘Leghorn
As soon as communications had been
established from Lumpu, the Chinese began to intrude in the radio telephony
nets, telling whoever was listening to vacate the area as it belonged to them.
The intimidating tone in which the message was delivered only added to the
discomfiture of the users, brought about by the uncertain and hostile
atmosphere in desolate surroundings. To make matters worse, most of the signal
equipment that began to arrive from Tawang was found to be damaged due to
mishandling and needed major repairs, which had to be carried out by the
handful of mechanics available. Maintenance was entirely by air, but since a
large percentage of the airdropped stores were lost due to faulty parachutes or
landing in inaccessible ravines, there was an acute shortage of essential items
such as petrol, oil and lubricants. Due to a shortage of jerricanes, petrol was
dropped in 42 gallon barrels, which were difficult to handle over steep slopes.
Telephone cable was dropped on heavy No. 7 drums which were designed for line-laying
in the field, instead of the lighter dispenser packs. Though a headache for the
Signallers, the No. 7 drum was much in demand by others as it could be easily used
as a table.
By 1 October the communications at
Lumpu had stabilized. Telephone lines had been laid to the battalions, which
were all at the same location. Rearward communication on line was available to
the Divisional Tactical HQ at Khinzemane. The rearward links D1 and D2 had been
established using 19 HP and 76/R209 sets respectively. Another net using 62
sets was working with the rear elements of the Brigade at Tawang and Misamari,
as well as the airfield at Gauhati. The signals detachment with 9 Punjab was still at Lumpu, providing a link with the
battalion at Bridge I. As regards the performance of the sets, the old
workhorse 62 set worked well during the day with a wire aerial. However, at
night the performance deteriorated due to poor signal to noise ratio. The
76/R209, a crystal controlled trans-receiver for Morse code, performed
creditably on the traffic clearing D2 link, though it was noticed that its
rotary transformer developed faults after prolonged use. 19
The Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Tewari, had already done his forward planning for
communications in the area. He assigned the task of extending the existing line
from Shakti to Lumpu to Major Ram Singh by 9 October, while Captain Lakshman
Singh was told to lay the cable from Lumpu to Tsangdhar by 8 October. An
important document that gives out salient details of the communication planned
by the unit is the demi-official letter dated 3 October 1962 from the
Commanding Officer to Major Ram Singh and Captain Lakshman Singh, with a copy
endorsed to Major K.G. Gangadharan, Officer Commanding 1 Company as follows:-
OP
IMMEDIATE
Do
No 001/SIGS
INF
DIV REGT
C/o
56 APO
3
Oct 62
My Dear Lakshman
I am writing this to keep ourselves on one net for comns and
priority for ops in the future.
First and foremost is
to get line comn going between TOWANG and HQ 7 Inf Bde. We already have double cable from TOWANG via
LUMLA to SHAKTI. Line beyond SHAKTI has
still to be laid. This line (for through
working from TOWANG to LUMPU)has to be laid by 9 Oct 62, without fail.
It will mean a lot of effort and all that with a thousand and one
difficulties. As discussed with you,
RAMU, we should conc first on laying PVC (double) between SHAKTI and
LUMPU. Then we should lay a single line
of PVC between TOWANG and SHAKTI and use (for the second leg of metallic return
cct), the existing double cable bunched
into one. Only later should we think
about laying the second leg of PVC between TOWANG and SHAKTI. We should lay the PVC on the ground to start
with and then lift it to “Tree Slung” gradually at a later stage. CSO has advised that we should string the PVC
up with spunyarn without insulators to start with. I have asked for insulators but they may take
time to come. Sleeves jointing are
coming up by air to TOWANG on 4 Oct with Lt KV RAMDAS.
But whatever happens, this line has to be put between TOWANG
and LUMPU by 9 Oct, as discussed with you verbally, RAMU. I know I am asking a lot but I am certain we
shall rise to the occasion.
Now Lakshman, you have to conc. on the cable line from LUMPU
to TSANGDHAR. Your mention to me on the
RT about move fwd was confirmed by me with the GOC before he left for
TOWANG. You must try and get this line
working by 8th also. Again very tough
assignment but you may consider laying just on earth return single line, if you
feel like it.
GOC has confirmed that cable routes in 4 Arty Bde sector will
take second priority. I was extremely
pleased to note that the TOWANG PENKENGTAG line has been extended up to
MILAKTONGLA and beyond already. This is
good show and I feel that the main requirement will be met by this line in the
sector.
Both of you must consider working of F/Phones on TOWANG LUMPU
and TOWANG MILAKTONGLA (1 Sikh) line.
MANN is at present in GAUHATI chasing the airdrop of PVC and
fd cable. I have managed to get 50 coils
of PVC also which should be easier to tpt on the ground than drum No. 7. I
shall have all future fd cable dropped on drum No. 5. There has been a big hold up on air dropping
of cable in the absence of cluster paras and rig. MANN is sorting things out.
PVC/cable is now being
dropped as follows (in miles):-
PVC Fd
Cables
__________ Drums Coils
TOWANG 35 40 30 (W 110 on No.7)
45
(D3 on No. 5)
LUMLA 20 -
LUMPU 45 10 45 (W 110 on No.7)
Air Force will not drop at SHAKTI.
For pers, we have sent
8 lmn from here, who reached TOWANG on 1 Oct and TUSKERS are making another 8
to 10 available forthwith at TOWANG.
They should suffice (as lmn) providing extra man power for porterage can
some how be grabbed. I was pleased to
note, RAMU that you have fixed that up.
TUSKERS are speeding up the PL route to Jang and then
TOWANG. They expect to be in Jang by 12
Oct, with cable upto Jang in existence, we may be able to talk to DIRANG from
TOWANG.
We are installing our exch AT DIRANG at Reg HQ and PL both
sides will be terminated on this exch.
We shall give 2 junctions to 624 exch in DIRANG. What I am hoping to do
by 5/6 Oct is to install ACT 1+1 between TEZPUR and DIRANG with BBFU at
MISAMARI. All tappings on this line will
be removed by this evening. Once the PL
is through upto Jang, we shall remove all taps between DIRANG and JUNG also,
similarly but that will be later. All
this is for your info.
Coming to wrls, as I told you RAMU, the GOC is thinking in terms
of moving fwd to LUMPU. I have advised
him against it in clearest terms. To
LUMPU, our comns are NOT satisfactory.
Even with C52 set there, it will NOT be a great help. In any case, it will mean opening D1 and D2
links as well as a Signal/Cipher Office at LUMPU once LAKSHMAN leaves. As requested verbally RAMU, kindly let me
know by tomorrow what the final decision is so that we may plan more pers being
sent up. I shall also try for another 76
for D2 (for TAC HQ).
I want to open D4 link (RT) to TOWANG for reasons discussed
with you, RAMU on RT. Lakshman could
come up on this also when necessary.
This link will be opened in the Regt lines at Air Fd and will be free
from interference of other links and other interference at the Signal
Centre. We shall remote control it on PL
and should it prove successful, we could possibly open it as the working RT op
link (with existing D1 becoming standby RT/CW link). As soon as you both can, I would like you to test this link out.
I
am not keen that you should open on D6 from TOWANG. With the tele line to JUNG, we should get
that officer in charge of TCP there to keep TOWANG info of all moves on the L
of C.
Question of wrls sets with bns is what worries me a lot. The inf bns have left their sets behind. I had personally talked to the OC, Adjt and
QM of the 2 Rajput the day before they left that they must collect 62 sets from
DIRANG en route from GREN store. This
was NOT done. Even 1/9 GR could not
carry their sets fwd.
I hope, Lakshman, your 3 bns are now getting their sets moved
up at top speed. RAMU, you may have
noted that we have ordered DIRANG Grn Comdr to shift to TOWANG forthwith, 3/4
62 sets left behind by GRENADIERS as Grn stores. I hope no sets of bns are now left on the L
of C. If so, kindly let me know by
signal, I shall move them up. From 7 Inf Bde there be only 2 Sets, One each
at MISAMARI and GAUHATI and no units sets/left behind with rear parties or on L
of C.
Can you both examine this holding by units (at your own secs)
of 62 Sets, 31 sets and 88 sets and let
me have the data by an ‘O’ sig by return?
Check on 19 sets of 7 Bde Sig Sec and H Sec also. I am moving the following sets at top speed
to TOWANG/LUMPU:-
(a) 62
Sets -6 (2 left by heptr
3 Oct with GOC. (Complete
Stas)
Two leaving by heptr 4 Oct. Two will
follow by 5/6 Oct.
(b) SCR
694 -2 (leaving by rd with 2/Lt
ANAND on 4 Oct.)
(c) 62
Sects -3
(Ex Grn at DIRANG ordered for move on 30 Sep.)
This is to suffice; I
hope till I hear from you but please give details of holding/loc/serviceability
by units so that I can justify my demand for more sets.
Out of the above, RAMU, you can retain any two sets for rear
links of bns under 4 Arty Bde.
All your requirements of teles, adm stores line stores have
already been dispatched, RAMU. Anything
else you may need please let us know.
Both of you have been carrying a big load single handed. So I am sending following offrs up to be used,
I suggest as follows;-
(a) Lt RAMDAS - Leaving by heptr on 4 Oct with
one Hav OWK and 2X62 sets and 4X300 Watt engines plus batteries. He should take over as OC H Sec with Jem
CHANAN SINGH as his 2IC.
(b) 2/Lt ANAND - Leaving by rd on 4 with a ‘red’ priority
for move along with 4x OWL and certain other and other stores. He will act as RAMU’s asst for GOC’s Gp.
Jem DHARA SINGH will stay with Lakshman and as soon he
returns, I shall send CHOPRA as 2IC to Lakshman. I shall try and fly him out (we are recalling
ARUN and DK from Courses.)
For man power, I hope
Lakshman is OK. At TOWANG, we want to
keep GOC’s Rover Gp separate from 4 Arty Bde, if possible. Details of pers requirements should be sent
by you by tomorrow, RAMU. We shall meet
your bids somehow. Work them out
carefully and give me details. I am
sending 6 X OWLs (4 with ANAND and 2 later). One Hav OWK (SREEDHARAN with
RAMDAS) and one OSL (with ANAND). These
OWLs should be given to H Sec for their rear with two bns.
RAMU, I have studied
your DOs to RG dated 2 and 3 Oct.
Condiments, canteen items, two rain coats (Jungle Boots/Snow clothing
are both NA with Ord but I shall keep chasing) and other stores as also signal
centre stationery, have all either left or will leave tomorrow morning.
Both of you must have seen my ‘Y’ signal last night about
SITREPS. Please keep a special watch on
this. There have been avoidable and
excessive delays on SITREPS
as well as METREPS lately. From TOWANG
as from 7 Inf Bde metrep should go direct on 7 Inf Bde B net to GAUHATI within
½ hrs at the most. Give precedence ‘Y’
to sitreps also and warn the DSO about NR Nos of these crypto for special
attention Sitreps from you LAKSHMAN have been badly delayed in the past. G method MUST (rpt) MUST be used.
We are all frightfully busy but not as much as you both and I
want you to know that uptil now, a difficult job has been handled by you, very
creditably. We have some more difficult
job/responsibilities ahead of us still and I have no doubt, we shall discharge
them well. Do not hesitate to ask for
any help, and I can assure you, our answer will be ‘yes’ invariably inspite of
all our commitments here. I shall try
and visit you as soon as I can. I have
delayed my departure a bit because of all the “brass” arriving in TEZPUR
today. CSO is arriving tomorrow morning
and I may leave the following day by rd.
I hope both of you have studied the AR wrls layout. With the spare sets now being positioned as
required by us, their situation is very healthy.
I am insisting that Air Force est their own wrls set at
TOWANG. I hope this will be done
soon. They can work a link to DARANGA
(route of heptrs via BHUTAN
Keep an eye on security
also. There have been serious breaches
lately. Our duty in this respect should
be clear in our minds we are to advise the staff in this respect.
Do keep your VHF sets BE 201 also tested. Requirement may arise at short notice.
With the very best of wishes, and best
of luck.
Yours
Sd/- x x x
KK
Tewari
Maj Ram Singh
OIC Sig Gp with GOC Rover Party
Capt Lakshman Singh
OC 7 Inf Bde Sig Sec
Copy to :-
Maj KG GANGADHARAN,
OC 1 Coy
Lakshman and his men had hardly
settled down when the new Corps Commander, General Kaul, arrived at Lumpu on 5
October 1962. With immediate effect, 4 Infantry Division came under command the
newly created 4 Corps, which became responsible for the operations in NEFA. One
of his first acts was to order the Brigade HQ and Signal Section to get out of
Lumpu and move to Tsangdhar immediately. Though the Brigade Commander was not
present, they had no choice and many of them left the same night, halting for
the night after travelling a short distance in the direction of Tsangdhar. Captain
Lakshman Singh could not leave with the rest, due to the unavailability of
porters to carry his equipment and was instructed by his Commanding Officer to
stay put until further orders. On 7
October 1962 Major Ram Singh landed at Lumpu in a helicopter and took over the
radio detachments of D1, D2 and B21 which were then functional. He left Lumpu
in the afternoon accompanied by Naib Subedar Dharam Singh and 32 Other Ranks,
minus most of his equipment. After spending the night in a chauri hut (shelter made of stones used by graziers) they reached
the base of the 16,000 feet high Karpola
Pass
The clash at Tsenge-jong took place
on the next day, watched from a vantage point by the top brass from the Corps
Commander downwards. Though the enemy got a bloody nose, thanks to the grit and
determination of Major Chaudhary and his boys of 9 Punjab ,
it brought home to everyone the hard fact that the Chinese meant business. Even
as the operation was going on, Lakshman Singh was asked by the Brigade Major to
lay a line urgently from Tsangdhar to a
place where the Commander was located, near 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, and from there
to 2 Rajput and 9 Punjab. Undaunted by the fact that he had no dispenser packs,
hardly any cable and very few linemen, Lakshman set about his task at once. All
available personnel, including the cook, barber and washerman, were pressed
into service to collect the few drums of cable from the dropping zone and make
coils for laying by hand. Realising that it was almost impossible to lay the
entire length with the cable and manpower available, an unconventional solution
was found. There was a line running between 9 Punjab and 2 Rajput, which had
been laid by the regimental signallers of 9 Punjab
for their company which was earlier at Bridge IV. It was decided to lay a pair
of cable from the exchange at Tsangdhar to the location of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles
where it was terminated on a 10 line exchange next to the Commander and the
Brigade Major. Two pairs of cable were then run from this exchange to the Namka
Chu, where the cable between the two battalions was split, and connected to the
newly laid cable pairs. The Brigade Commander was now through to both
battalions. Of course, the battalions no longer had the direct line between
themselves, their calls being routed through the exchange set up near the
Brigade Commander. The battalions were not too happy with the hijacking of
their line by Brigade Signals, but Lakshman can be forgiven for the lapse. If
he had not resorted to this unusual step, it is unlikely that the line would
have been completed the same day. In case the Chinese had reacted during the
night, as was feared, Signals would never have been forgiven for the fiasco
that would have resulted. 20
After laying the line to 1/9 Gorkha
Rifles, Lakshman spent the night sharing the sleeping bag of the Brigade Major,
Major Kharbanda. Fortunately, both were quite slim but still, they did not get
much sleep. The Commander felt that the Chinese would react during the night to
the clash at Tsenge-jong in which they had suffered heavy casualties, and asked
for information every half hour or so. The exchange operator sitting next to
the two officers would crank the handle every time to raise the battalions turn
by turn, and get the latest information, which would be passed on to the
Commander. Fortunately, nothing happened that night and Lakshman returned to
Tsangdhar next morning, after meeting Major Ram Singh who had been sent to
Dhola Post to contact the Corps Commander, but had missed him. By this time
communications had stabilized, and the telephone lines as well as the radio
nets were working. The line and wireless diagram of 7 Infantry Brigade on 12
October 1962 is given below:-
Though the full complement of communications for the
Brigade HQ had been set up by Signals at Tsangdhar, there was no staff officer
to use it. The Commander and Brigade Major were both located with 1/9 Gorkha
Rifles location, from where they talked on D1 net on remote.
As
regards the performance of the link, Lakshman writes:-
“Just as a
matter of interest, while speaking on D1 one morning, with the CO, the signal
strength was so good that he refused to believe that I was operating a 62 set.
The planning range of radio set 62 was just 25 km, where the aerial distance
between the two of us at that time was approximately 200 kms, he being at
Tezpur. Of course, I had the advantage of height. This was good news.”21
On arrival at Tsangdhar, it had been
discovered that most of the secondary batteries did not have any electrolyte,
the porters having drained them enroute to reduce the weight. As a result, two
or three batteries had to be emptied to top up one battery. Again, an
unconventional solution was found by Dharam Singh and his team of mechanics.
The 300 watt charging engine was connected to the battery in use, which then
worked on float charge, one feeding two sets simultaneously. Another problem
was the non availability of poles for erecting wire aerials. Tsangdhar was
devoid of vegetation except rhododendron bushes, and logs had to be cut from
trees about 5 to 6 miles away and lugged up the steep slopes. In the absence of
tents, parachutes had to be used as shelters for the signal centre and the
radio detachments.
The
problem of electrolyte for the batteries was to have serious consequences for Colonel
Tewari, the Commanding Officer of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment – it
was while delivering electrolyte to the forward troops that he was later
captured by the Chinese. Describing the episode, he writes:-
“But we were all in for
a still bigger shock when it was discovered that almost all the secondary
batteries had arrived without any electrolyte. What must have happened (perhaps
done deliberately) was that a porter dropped a battery accidentally when its
electrolyte leaked out. When he picked it up again he would have found it to be
surprisingly light. Word must have spread among the other porters and they may
have all decided to lighten their loads the same way by emptying out the
electrolyte from all the remaining batteries.
How could communications
be established on the radio when the batteries were dead and could not be recharged
even after petrol had been air-dropped! Such a calamity was beyond anyone’s
imagination and I had to get the Brigade Signal officer to check and recheck that
this was what actually happened. One just could not believe it! How to get the
electrolyte up? This time our persuasive powers did not work because the Air
Force helicopter boys refused to carry the electrolyte inspite of our good
relations with them. And there was no question of dropping sulphuric acid by
air.
What was I to
do? Fate was also pushing me to my inevitable destiny. We filled up a jar of
electrolyte (broken sulphuric acid), marked it prominently as ‘Rum for Troops’
to hide the contents. In another kit bag the regimental Subedar Major packed a
roasted pig (we had a piggery in the Regiment) to take to our jawans in the
forward area. They had not received any fresh supplies for many days. The irony
of it all was that in high altitude areas, all the troops were entitled to get
special scales of rations and they were not even getting the basics.
On 18th
October, I flew from Tezpur in an Otter aircraft to Dirranga on the Bhutan Bell
Lakshman Singh’s elation at the performance of his
radio links was shortlived. On 13 October, he was asked to move to Rongla, the
new location of the Brigade HQ. On reaching the new location, he set up the B1
and B21 nets, but could not get through on the D2 net and the daily situation
report was not cleared in time. Rongla was located in a valley, surrounded by
thick jungle, as was Ziminthang, the location of the Divisional Tactical HQ. It
took some time for the equipment to reach Rongla. Even after it arrived, most
of the radios sets could not be used due to the batteries being without
electrolyte, which had been drained enroute again by the porters. After the
receipt of a 19 HP set it was expected that the communications would improve,
but this did not happen. Transmissions from the BC 610 set at Tezpur and the C
52 at Ziminthang could be heard clearly at Rongla, but the transmissions from
the 62 set located there were inaudible at the former locations. With great
effort, Major Ram Singh and Captain Lakshman Singh were able to pass a few
messages at night, but the Commander and staff were unable to talk on the nets.
The problem was aggravated by the mismatch between the different types of sets
being used at each headquarters and the turmoil of frequent moves. As a result,
messages began to pile up in the signal centre and many high precedence signals
were delayed.
The breakdown in radio communications almost
resulted in the sacking of the Officer Commanding 7 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section. After the delay in clearance of an important message, a signal was
received from Divisional Tactical HQ that read:
“Op Leghorn
(.) from tiger to tiger (.) information
not reaching in time (.) suggest change signal officer.”
Lakshman naturally thought that he would soon be
sent packing, but this did not happen. Though the Commander was too pre-occupied
to bother about the message, Major Pereira, the DAA&QMG (Deputy Assistant
Adjutant & Quarter Master General), prevailed on the Commander not to act
on the message, in the interest of the morale of the Signal Section and
the feelings of the Officer Commanding. Brigadier
Dalvi promptly sent signal to the Divisional Tactical HQ that he would prefer
to be sacked himself. It later transpired that the signal from Ziminthang had
been sent by the GSO1 (General Staff Officer Grade 1) without the approval of
the Divisional Commander.23
On 18 October Captain Lakshman Singh and Naib
Subedar Dharam Singh walked half way up to Tsangdhar to receive the Commanding
Officer, Colonel Tewari, who arrived from Ziminthang in a helicopter. He met the Brigade Commander and gave him the
welcome news that it was planned to withdraw the Brigade shortly to Lumpu,
leaving only a battalion at Namka Chu, with a company at Tsangle. He gave a
similar input to the Signal Section, asking Lakshman to plan leave parties for
the winter. After spending the night at Rongla, he planned to visit the
battalions next day to check on their communications and state of signal
equipment. Before he left for 1/9 Gorkha Rifles next day, he spent some time
with Brigadier Dalvi when the latter was talking to the Divisional Commander on
telephone, pleading for permission to withdraw to a tactically sound defensive
position. Dalvi felt that the existing position along the river where he had
been ordered to deploy by the Corps Commander was a ‘death trap’. However,
General Prasad told him not to flap but obey orders and stay put. At this,
Brigadier Dalvi was visibly annoyed and passed the telephone to Colonel Tewari,
saying, “You won’t believe me Sir, but talk to your ‘bloody’ Commander Signals
and he will tell you what all he can see with his naked eyes.” Colonel Tewari
then spoke to General Prasad equally strongly and informed him that he could
see the Chinese moving down the Thagla Ridge like ants and could also see at
least half a dozen mortars which were not even camouflaged, adding that the
Chinese could not be there for a picnic and that their attack was imminent on a
massive scale. But the Divisional Commander was not impressed. He asked Tewari
not to worry and concentrate on his work. 24
Captain Lakshman Singh accompanied his Commanding
Officer to 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, on 19 October 1962. En route, they were amazed to
see the movement of the Chinese on the Thagla Ridge across the Namka Chu. After
having lunch with the Gorkhas, Colonel Tewari was keen to move to the location
of 2 Rajput, but was dissuaded by Lakshman, who pleaded with him to either
return to the Brigade HQ or spend the night with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, the Rajputs
not so well dug in having moved to their location only recently. Tewari agreed
to stay with Gorkhas, Lakshman rushing back to the Brigade HQ. In the evening
there was a request from Major Balraj Nijjar, Officer Commanding 24 Heavy
Mortar Battery for a radio set to establish communications with Tsangdhar.
Lakshman provided the set and the link got through. In the evening he was a
mute listener to the telephone
conversation between Brigadier Dalvi and Major General Prasad, when the
latter ordered him to send the remainder of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles to Tsangle, and
the harsh words exchanged between the two. 25
The communications set up in 7 Infantry Brigade had
undergone several changes since it had moved to the area. On 19 October 1962
line communications existed from the Brigade HQ at Rongla to the infantry
battalions and the dropping zone at Tsangdhar, in addition to the Divisional
Tactical HQ. The B1 net had all the battalions and 24 Heavy Mortar Battery. The
B 21 net was through to Tsangdhar, Lumla, Lumpu, Misamari and Gauhati. The
troop of 17 Para Field had also been put on B 21 to reduce the number of
stations on B 1. Rearward communications on D 1 and D 2 existed to the
Divisional HQ. The line and radio
diagrams of 7 Infantry Brigade (on 19 October 1962) are given below:-
|
During the crucial ten days before the Chinese invasion, Colonel Tewari made several important entries in his diary, some of which are given below, along with his comments:-
10th Oct. Flew with CSO Gill to Zimithang by heptr. Changed the heptr at Dirangdzone. Things very disorganized. Maj Ram Singh there at Zimithang while G1 on
top at Lumpu, 200 ft higher. Persuaded
G1 to shift down next day. …..7 Bde Sig
Sec arr Tsangdar in battered condition, after 3 days of march on 5th
Oct. Bde Tac HQ at Dhola. Maj Ram Singh sent to Tsangdar at 2 PM. He saw 7 Bde Sig Sec and asked them to push
on to bridge 2 to join the GOC – both the GOCs.
But they had left.
11th Oct. Gen Kaul soon flew out in Bell Delhi Bell Delhi
13 Oct. I flew back to Tezpur. GOC Gen Kaul arr back from Delhi
14 Oct. Using full persuasive powers to stop move of
Div HQ from Tezpur to Charduar. (I was
insisting that the HQ if it has to move, as 4 Corps had come in, should move
only to the airfield). Meeting with GOC 33 Corps, Commissioner NEFA, IGAR and
DGBR”.
18thOct I flew in the early
morning by MI4 heptr to Dirang, Zimithang.
From Zimithang I was taken by Sqn Ldr Williams in a Bell
19th Oct. My intention next day was to move upto 1/9
Gurkhas and Rajputs and see their positions.
That was after I visited the Bde HQ
and checked the bde sig sec pers all of whom had done a remarkable march
forward. They were pushed like mad in
their move forward. …..On 19th
evening I came upto 1/9 Gorkhas. The
darkness comes fairly early in those areas.
I decided to stay on and early next morning visit Rajputs and then march
back to Lumpu. Early morning at 5 am,
the Chinese attacked. I was fast asleep
when the shelling started. It was very
intense shelling. Then, the whole show
started.
THE INVASION OF NEFA –
KAMENG DIVISION
The Battle
At 5 a.m. on 20 October 1962, the Chinese opposite
Bridge III fired two Verey lights. This was the signal for commencement of the
heavy bombardment by 76 mm guns and 120 mm mortars on the Indian positions at
Bridge III and IV; log and temporary Bridges; Tsangdhar and Rongla. The Punjabis
and Grenadiers at Bridge I and II were not subjected to the hour-long bombardment
after which massive infantry assaults were launched on Bridge III, Dhola and
Tsangdhar between 6 and 7 a.m. In the
very first few minutes of the shelling, telephone lines linking the Brigade HQ
with the battalions had been cut. At about 7 a.m., two wounded Assam Rifles
soldiers came running to the Brigade HQ and informed that Dhola Post had been
completely over run. Fifteen minutes later
Captain Ravi Eipe of 2 Rajput reached the Brigade HQ to report that his company
had been wiped out. He informed that the
Chinese attacked his position from the rear through the Dhola area. At about 7.30 am, the Brigade Commander had a
radio telephony conversation with Commander Signals 4 Infantry Division, who
was at that time with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles. At about 7.45 a.m. Colonel Tewari spoke
again with Brigadier Dalvi and informed that the extreme left company of 1/9
Gorkha Rifles had been overrun, the company commander and two other officers reported
killed. At about 8 am, a few stragglers
from 1/9 Gorkha Rifles arrived and stated that the battalion’s positions had
been overrun.26
Brigadier Dalvi spoke to Major General Prasad and
obtained his permission to withdraw the troops to Tsangdhar, so as to be able
to give the Chinese a fight there. Since direct communications with the
battalions had broken down, the message could not be passed to them. Brigadier
Dalvi appreciated that since the Commanding Officers of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles and 2
Rajput knew his mind, they would automatically fall back on Tsangdhar. He requested the Divisional Commander to pass
these instructions to 9 Punjab and 4 Grenadiers
who were still through on line with the Divisional Tactical HQ.
Indian
troops were completely taken by surprise when they were assaulted from the
rear. The Rajputs and the Gorkhas
deployed at Bridges IV and III and the area between Bridges III and II fought
gallantly but were soon over-powered.
There was hand to hand fighting and many casualties on both sides. After having annihilated the Indian positions
along the Namka Chu on Bridges II to IV and the surrounding areas, the Chinese
directed heavy fire on Indian positions at Tsangle and Bridge V. The artillery link between Brigade HQ and Tsangdhar
that had been established only the previous evening also failed. The Battery Commander, Major Nijjar had been trying
since 6 am to contact his mortar positions and the gun positions at Tsangdhar, but
he could not get through, as the Chinese had jammed the radio frequency used by
the gunners. As a result the guns did
not fire a single round.
Of the units deployed on the Namka Chu, the Rajputs
suffered the most. They were preparing
for the morning ‘stand to’ (routine practice in adopting defensive positions at
sunrise and sunset, when most attacks take place) when they were caught between
the frontal fire of the Chinese guns and the main attack from the rear. Their companies were widely dispersed and
each fought its own battle, taking on wave after wave of the enemy as long as
men remained standing. In some cases,
entire platoons were wiped out. The high casualty figures – 282 killed- are
ample proof of their valour. Among the dead were many officers, including
almost all the company commanders. The second-in-command, Major Gurdial Singh
displayed exceptional gallantry. After most of the posts had been over-run by
the enemy, he rallied the remnants and led them in a final charge. Most of these men died fighting or fell
wounded, while Gurdial Singh was over-powered and captured. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra while in
captivity. After the battalion had been
almost annihilated, the only bunker still holding out was that of the
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel N.S. Rikh, who had with him his
Adjutant, Lieutenant Bhup Singh, and Intelligence Officer, Captain Bhatia. They
were surrounded by the Chinese and asked to surrender, but Rikh refused. The
Chinese threw a grenade, killing Bhatia and wounding Rikh. Finally, they
destroyed the bunker with a pole charge. The severely wounded Rikh and Bhup
Singh were both captured. 27
The Gorkhas, who were holding
positions on the northern slopes of Tsangdhar, between Bridges III and II, were
surprised when they were attacked suddenly from the flanks and later from the
rear. They fought gallantly but could
not withstand the Chinese assault. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel B.S.
Ahluwalia, ordered his men to abandon their positions and move to
Tsangdhar. He was wounded in the battle
and later on in the afternoon, he was taken prisoner along with a few of his
men.
After giving orders to the Brigade Major to destroy
documents and follow him with the rest of the Brigade HQ, the Brigade Commander
left Rongla for Tsangdhar at about 8.10 am, with a protection party and a few
staff officers. Moving on the track along the nullah to Tsangdhar, they came
under heavy shelling. They left the main track and started climbing the ridge
on the left. By this time, the Chinese
had occupied Tsangdhar. When Brigadier Dalvi and his party came to know of this,
they headed for Serkhim area through Dhola pass. Enroute, he was separated from
most of the others and was finally left with only Captain Talwar of 17 Para Field
Regiment and a few Other Ranks. On 22
October 1962 they ran straight into a Chinese company near Serkhim and were captured.
28
By the afternoon of 20 October, the
Chinese had driven back all the Indian troops from Bridges I to V along the
Namka Chu, Tsangle, Khinzemane and Tsangdhar. The brunt of the fighting had
been borne by the Rajputs, Gorkhas and Assam Rifles. However, 4 Grenadiers and
9 Punjab had not been attacked. Deciding to
pull back the available troops to the line Hathungla -Chutangmu just after mid day, GOC 4 Infantry Division personally spoke to the Commanding
Officers of 4 Grenadiers (Lieutenant Colonel Harihar Singh) and 9 Punjab
(Lieutenant Colonel R.N. Misra) ordering
them to withdraw to Hathungla. In the event, the battalions commenced their
withdrawals but could not reach Hathungla, which was attacked and occupied by
the Chinese early in the morning on 21 October.
Realising that the Divisional Tactical HQ at Ziminthang would soon be
attacked, General Prasad ordered its withdrawal to Tawang. After destroying the
cipher documents and radio sets, General
Prasad left Ziminthang on foot, accompanied by Brigadier Kalyan Singh,
Lieutenant Colonel Manohar Singh and the Signals rover detachment. 29
After covering a distance of
approximately 35 km on foot, the Divisional Commander and his party reached
Lumla at 2 am on 22 October, where he came to know that the Army Commander was
then at Tawang. He could not talk to him personally but was told that he should
stay on in Lumla. However, these orders were changed next morning and he was
allowed to proceed to Tawang, reaching there at 6 pm on 22 October. However, he
found that the Army Commander was not at Tawang but at the helipad about 3 km
away, waiting for a helicopter to take him to Tezpur. Meanwhile, the Chinese
occupied Zimithang on night 22/23 October and Lumpu at 9.30 am on 23
October. With the occupation of Lumpu by
the Chinese, Indian troops lost all physical contact with Dhola-Thag La area. This
marked the end of the battle of Namka Chu.
Signals in the Battle
On 20 October 1962, at about 5 am, Captain Lakshman
Singh was sleeping in his one man arctic tent fully clothed as was his
practice, when he was woken by a mortar bomb that landed in the Brigade HQ. Hurriedly pulling on his boots, he rushed to
the signal centre only to find the telephone lines to the battalions cut. On
switching on the B-1 net, 2 Rajput came up on the air to inform that they were
under attack. Soon after this, the battalion set went off the air. (It was
later learned that the bunker housing the Signals detachment had been
demolished by enemy fire, killing all the operators). The Battalion Signals
Officer of 2 Rajput, Captain Mangat was also killed on the spot. The set was
through to 1/9 Gorkha Rifles and Divisional Tactical HQ. The telephone lines
from the Brigade HQ to the battalions had been cut, but a portion of the lines
from Divisional Tactical HQ that passed through 9 Punjab
and 4 Grenadiers was intact. Both battalions had tapped the lines to eavesdrop
on the conversation between Division and Brigade. This enabled Brigade HQ to
keep in touch with them after the direct lines were cut. Surprisingly, the
battalions were also able to remain in touch with each other on radio, possibly
due to incorrect tuning and netting.
Lakshman was soon talking to his Commanding Officer,
Colonel Tewari who was giving a running commentary on the shelling going on in
the location of 1/9 Gorkhas, where he
had spent the night. After 8 am, he went off the air. His linemen were ready to
move out to repair the lines, but seeing the intensity of the shelling, Lakshman
held them back. Soon afterwards, he saw Lieutenant Ravi Eipe of 2 Rajput
stagger in, the worse for wear and almost incoherent. He was followed by a
shaken Major Pawar of 1/9 Gorkhas, whose company was holding the forward left
flank of the Brigade HQ. He walked in a dazed condition, informing the
Commander that the Chinese were just 200 yards away.30
Soon after this, Lakshman received orders to
organize his Signal Section in 10 minutes and move to Tsangdhar. He asked Naib
Subedars Dharam Singh and Arumgam to destroy the signal centre, the ciphers
already having been sent with the Brigade Commander’s party. The Signals
contingent, numbering 40 personnel, set off with two 62 sets, two small 22
Ampere Hour batteries, one pedal generator, one ten line exchange and three
field telephones J. With this, Lakshman hoped that he would be able to set up
‘hard scale’ communications at the new location. Before leaving, Rongla, he
called up the Divisional Tactical HQ on radio. He spoke to Major Ummat, the
General Staff Officer Grade 2 (Staff Duties) and informed him that he was moving
to Tsangdhar.
The Signals were the last to leave Rongla, along
with the Brigade Administrative Officer, Lieutenant Didar Singh. Naib Subedar
Dharam Singh, who was among the last to leave, writes:-
“The Chinese had
cut all the lines and I did not hear anything from Col
I got all the wireless
equipment and all the things in one place.
I broke all the sets and put them on fire except the slidex. All the secret papers were also put on fire. I was alone with nobody there. I had even sent my orderly away. Heavy smoke was emitting from the HQ location
due to this burning of documents, which helped the Chinese to concentrate
mortar fire there. However, I was lucky
to survive. It is a reality that the
Chinese were just 50 yards away from me”.31
Lakshman and his band made their way
to Lumla via Lumpu and Shakti, all of which they found occupied by the Chinese.
Learning that Tawang had also been abandoned, they decided to head for Bhutan Bhutan Leghorn
As mentioned earlier, Colonel
Tewari, had stayed on with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles on the night of 19 October 1962.
Early on the morning of 20 October he was woken up by the noise of intense
bombardment. There was a lot of shouting and yelling and he could hear men
running around. It was dark and he was not familiar with the area, so he
lingered, expecting that someone would come call him. After waiting for some
time, he came out of his bunker and made his way to the Signals bunker where
two signalmen of his unit were manning the rear link radio set. He found that the telephone lines had been
cut but the radio was working. He was able to talk to
Brigade
and well as Divisional HQ and inform them of the Chinese bombardment. After
some time the shelling stopped and there was an ominous silence, followed by
short bursts of small arms fire. Peeping out of the bunker, he saws khaki clad
soldiers advancing towards them. He then realised that all the battalion HQ
personnel had withdrawn, leaving him and the two operators. He later found that
the medical officer had also been left behind while he was attending to the
wounded in the regimental aid post.
Colonel Tewari immediately withdrew
into the bunker and decided to lie low for a while, asking the two operators to
do likewise. The first wave of attackers passed them. Then they heard the
second wave, firing as they moved along, lobbing grenades into each bunker.
When the first couple of Chinese soldiers entered their bunker, Colonel Tewari fired his 9 mm Browning
pistol, emptying the whole clip. The first Chinese was hit above the eye and
fell back wards, being killed. The second was also hit on the shoulder and
fell, wounded. Suddenly several more Chinese entered, yelling and firing. Both the
operators were hit, one probably being killed immediately. Colonel Tewari threw
down his empty pistol. A Chinese soldier hit him with the butt of his rifle and
kicked him out of the bunker. He became a prisoner of war and was finally
repatriated to India
At about 10 am on 20 October 1962, a Bell
The circumstances under which Major
Ram Singh flew to Tsangdhar have been explained by Major General Niranjan
Prasad, GOC 4 Infantry Division. The radio set of HQ 7 Infantry Brigade being
closed, it was found that the link to Tsangdhar was also not working. Thinking
that the set at that location may have gone out of order, Major Ram Singh
suggested sending a replacement set, offering to fly it in himself. General
Prasad agreed, deciding to go with him, to keep an eye on the battle and
supervise the withdrawal from Tsangle. However, the pilot, Flight Lieutenant
Vinod Sehgal objected to the load of two passengers along with the heavy
wireless set and its batteries. The choice was either to go himself or send the
radio set with the signal officer. Ram Singh argued that establishing the radio
set at Tsangdhar was more important, otherwise the GOC would be without
communications once he landed there. In any case, it would take the helicopter
only 20-25 minutes to drop the set and return.
Seeing the logic, General Prasad allowed Ram Singh to go with the set,
deciding to go on the second trip. 35
The death of Major Ram Singh and the
capture of Lieutenant Colonel Tewari at almost the same time were a severe blow
to the beleaguered 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. With the Commanding
Officer away from his post, the decision of the second-in-command to leave also appears questionable. However, in
the prevailing circumstances, the importance of establishing communications
with Tsangdhar where 7 Infantry Brigade was to redeploy perhaps justified the
unusual step taken by Major Ram Singh. There can be no two opinions about his
personal courage and commitment to his profession, which resulted in the loss
of his life.
The Fall of Tawang
Tawang is a small town located on
the bank of the Tawang Chu at a height of about 10,000 feet. Its importance lay
in the existence of the famous gompa (monastery)
and the junction of three important tracks that led to Tibet
- 1 Sikh was
deployed on the Bum La axis with the Battalion HQ, A and C companies in area Milaktong La; B Company
at Pamdir with a platoon at Sumatso; and D Company at Tongpeng La with a
platoon at IB Ridge, two km south of Bum La.
- 4 Garhwal Rifles
was looking after the defence of Tawang, with A Company located at Tawang,
overlooking the track to Bum La; C
Company at Landa Village on the
track; and D Company at Pankentang, with a platoon at Gyshie La for
patrolling. The fourth company (B) was at Ziminthang, looking after the
defence of Divisional Tactical HQ.
- In addition, one
company of 13 Dogra was available, having arrived at Tawang on 21 October.
Commander 62 Infantry Brigade with his headquarters also reached Tawang by
22 October 1962.
- HQ ‘A’ wing 5
Assam Rifles with two platoons was at Tawang; with one platoon at Bum La
and one platoon at Sumatsu. Two other platoons were in area Chuna and
Dhola.
By the evening of 22 October, the enemy
had reached Shakti and blown in up the bridge at that location. They reached
Lumla in the early hours of 23 October and their next objective appeared to be
Tawang. With the troops at his disposal,
the Divisional Commander concluded that Tawang was not really defensible
against a determined Chinese attack. He
appreciated that the Chinese would by pass the Sikhs on Bum La-Tawang track and
make for Se La by the Chaksang track. If
the Chinese blew up the bridge at Jang on the Chaksang track, they would trap
the Indian troops on the Tawang side of the river. He decided to withdraw all troops from Tawang
to Se La and fight the main battle from there. General Prasad met General Sen
at Tawang on 23 October and sought his approval for the withdrawal of troops to
Jang on way to Se La. Reportedly, the Army Commander told Prasad to do whatever
he wished, since he was the Divisional as well as the Corps Commander. 36
Before
leaving for Tezpur on 23 October, the Army Commander ordered Brigadier Kalyan
Singh, who was responsible for the defence of Tawang, to abandon it forthwith. Orders confirming this decision were received
at about 10.30 am from HQ IV Corps. The
order, however, enjoined the troops to withdraw not to Se La but all the way to
Bomdila. Another signal from the IV Corps to 4 Infantry Division confirmed it
by ordering the induction of fresh troops for the build up to hold Bomdila. In
the evening of 23 October, the order was amended by Corps HQ, and the troops
were now instructed to hold Se La.
According to the withdrawal plan
prepared by Brigadier Kalyan Singh, all non-essential personnel at Tawang were to
withdraw to Jang forthwith, with HQ 4 Artillery Brigade withdrawing at 4.30 pm
on 23 October. The withdrawal route from Tawang to Jang would be covered by 4
Garhwal Rifles less two companies and one company of 13 Dogra, while 1 Sikh
with one company of 4 Garhwal Rifles would remain at Milaktong La till last
light on 23 October. The task of protecting the bridge on the Tawang Chu at
Jang and preparing it for demolition was assigned to 18 Field Company of
Engineers. However, the withdrawal could not be carried out according to the
plan, as the Chinese had already started pushing down the Indian troops
deployed on Bum La-Tawang approach even as the withdrawal plan was being worked
out. However, HQ 4 Artillery Brigade was able to withdraw as per plan and reached
Jang at about 11 pm on 23 October. It located itself in the Officers Mess of Project Tusker at Jang, as a
telecommunication link with the Divisional HQ at Dirang-Dzong was available.
The Chinese advanced towards Tawang on three axes. A
column of about a regiment moved from Lumpu via Zimithang, Shakti and Loongla.
It reached the western outskirts of Tawang in the evening on 23 October. Another
column of about the same size after overcoming the company of 4 Grenadiers at
the bridge below Khinzemane, climbed to the Soktsen monastery from where it
took the Sumatsu route, reaching Tawang in the evening of 23 October. The third
column of about two battalions followed the Bum La route. This column faced
heavy opposition from 1 Sikh, resulting in the award of the only Param Vir
Chakra during the 1962 operations to Subedar Joginder Singh. The battle of Bum
La merits recounting, being one of the high points of the operations in which
Indian troops gave an excellent account of themselves.
1 Sikh was deployed to defend the
Bum La approach, its most forward company (D) located at Tongpeng La, whose No.
11 Platoon was located at IB Ridge, about
550 metres south of Bum La. On the morning of 20 October, Jemadar Roy of
the Assam Rifles at the Bum La Post noticed that more than 1000 Chinese or
Tibetan labourers with digging implements and protected by Chinese soldiers arrived
on the Raider’s Ridge and started digging.
After watching the Chinese closely for sometime, Roy Tongpeng La.
After over-running the Assam Rifles
post at Bum La, about 200 of the enemy attacked the platoon position at IB
Ridge at about 5.30 am. As the Chinese
negotiated the steep climb, they were subjected to intense small arms fire and
were forced to retire after suffering heavy casualties. Subedar Joginder Singh
asked for more ammunition from the Company HQ. By this time the Chinese had cut
the telephone line from the platoon to the company and had contacted Tongpeng La.
Meanwhile, the enemy prepared to attack Tongpeng La.
In the meantime, orders had been
received from 4 Artillery Brigade for withdrawal from the Tawang area to Jang.
According to the withdrawal plan, 1 Sikh with 1 Company of Garhwal Rifles was
to deny Milaktong position to the enemy till last light of 23 October; D Company
was to hold its position at Tongpeng La till 3 pm and then to withdraw to
Milaktong La; after D Company’s arrival at Milaktong La, the Battalion HQ was
to start its withdrawal to Jang, leaving D Company to hold Milaktong La against
the enemy till 11 pm.
The Chinese launched their third attack
on Tongpeng La at about 11.30 am but were again repulsed. Throughout this day,
the artillery observation post officer kept bringing down accurate and heavy
fire on the enemy enabling the infantry to hold the position till about 3.30
pm. The Chinese suffered heavy casualties and could not penetrate the defences
of Tongpeng La. Se La.
In accordance with the orders issued
on 23 October, 4 Garhwal Rifles had withdrawn to Jang by 4 am next morning. In
the evening of 24 October the sentry on the bridge noticed some movement on the
Tawang track. The information was conveyed to Major Rai, Officer Commanding C
Company, who was responsible for the defence of the bridge. The sentry on the north of the bridge was
withdrawn and the Company took up firing positions. The enemy started shelling from three different
locations, north of Jang. Indian Artillery engaged the Chinese in the area
opposite Jang Bridge
After the bridge had been demolished,
the intensity of enemy shelling decreased and small enemy parties were seen
probing forward at Lao and Rho
THE CHINESE ADVANCE TO
THE FOOTHILLS
After occupying Tawang, the Chinese did
not pursue the Indians and stopped their push north of Tawang Chu. There was a lull in the fighting in Kameng
which lasted a little over three weeks.
This was necessitated by the need to replenish their supplies and
ammunition and induct fresh troops before undertaking a further thrust into Indian Territory . The Chinese had suffered heavy
casualties and already extended their lines of communications. They needed time
to construct a road up to Tawang to bring up their guns and heavy equipment.
The bridge over Tawang Chu at Jang had been blown up by the Indian army and had
to be re-constructed. To gain time for
making preparations before commencing fresh attacks, China issued a statement suggesting a ‘friendly
settlement’ of the boundary question, a copy of which was sent by Premier Chou
En-Lai to Prime Minister Nehru, through the Chinese Charge d’Affairs in Delhi on the evening of 24 October 1962. The conditions stipulated by China were such that the offer was bound to be
rejected by India
Together with the decision to vacate Tawang, changes
in the deployment of forces were ordered by HQ IV Corps. The responsibility for
defence of Se La was assigned to 62 Infantry Brigade while Bomdila was to be
held by 65 Infantry Brigade. There were important changes in the command
structure of IV Corps. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh was appointed the new
GOC IV Corps, replacing General who was at that time lying sick in Delhi. Major General A.S. Pathania, MVC, MC, replaced
General Prasad as GOC 4 Infantry Division on 25 October 1962. Major General M.S. Pathania was appointed the
GOC of the newly created 2 Infantry Division which was to look after the
operations in all the NEFA other than Kameng Frontier Division. Along with the Corps and Divisional Commanders,
most of the brigade commanders were also changed. Brigadier G.S. Gill replaced
Brigadier Kalyan Singh as Commander 4 Artillery Brigade; Brigadier Hoshiar
Singh replaced Brigadier N.K. Lal as Commander 62 Infantry Brigade and Brigadier
A.S. Cheema succeeded Brigadier G.M. Sayeed as Commander 65 Infantry Brigade.
The new Divisional Commander, Major General A.S.
Pathania arrived at Tezpur, along with the newly appointed Corps Commander,
Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh on 24 October 1962. The Army Commander briefed
them about the impending task of defending area Se La- Dirang- Bomdila, code
named Operation ‘Olympus’, which was to come into effect from 10 November 1962. With its four battalions - 9 Punjab , 2 Rajput, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles 4 Grenadiers - having
completely disintegrated, 7 Infantry Brigade had virtually ceased to exist. The
only troops available to 4 Infantry Division were scattered elements of three
battalions - 1 Sikh, 4 Garhwal Rifles and 13 Dogra. While new troops were being inducted, the new
Divisional Commander established his Rover Group at Shukla Camp between Senge
and Se La and shifted his Main Divisional HQ from Tezpur to Dirang. After handing over its additional
responsibility of commanding infantry elements to 62 Infantry Brigade, HQ 4
Artillery Brigade joined the Main Divisional HQ at Dirang. Exactly five days
after his appointment as Corps Commander, General Harbakhsh Singh was replaced
by General Kaul, who returned from Delhi on 29 October 1962.
During the lull in the battle, extensive
patrolling by Indian troops along with aerial photography revealed considerable
vehicular traffic from Shao to Tawang through Bum La. Mukto
Bridge
After a detailed reconnaissance, Major
General A.S. Pathania felt that a force of nearly 17 battalions was necessary
to ensure a coordinated defence of the area allotted to 4 Infantry Division. However,
the troops made available were 12 Infantry battalions. In the event, only ten
battalions could be inducted before the operations commenced. Of these, five
were deployed at at Se La as part of 62 Brigade; two at Dirang Dzong under 48
Brigade and three at Bomdila under 65 Infantry Brigade.
Of the three brigade defended sectors, Se La was the
strongest, being a natural fortress which was difficult to storm even by a
stronger attacking force. The new Commander, Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, had taken
over on 29 October 1962. By
mid-november, all the five battalions earmarked for the defence of Se La had
occupied their defences. A few
anti-personnel mines had been laid around the covering defensive positions of
the battalions and the Brigade HQ. The
Brigade was being maintained almost completely by air. It had about two first–line scales of small
arms ammunition and ten days rations stocked with the units. However, only one and a half scale of first
line artillery ammunition was held. The battalions allotted to the Brigade were
4 Garhwal Rrifles, 2 Sikh Light Infantry (ex 65 Infantry Brigade), 4 Sikh Light
Infantry (ex 48 Infantry Brigade), 1 Sikh, and 13 Dogra (ex 11 Infantry
Brigade). Of these, 4 Garhwal Rifles was deployed as covering troops between
Nuranang and Jang. For fire support, the Brigade had 5 Field Regiment, a
battery of 22 Mountain Regiment and a troop of heavy mortars of 36 (Maratha) Light
Regiment (Towed). It also had a platoon of medium machine guns of 7 Mahar (MG)
and a section of 6 Mahar (MG). Engineer support was to be provided by 19 Field
Company.
The Dirang Dzong Sector was held by 65 Infantry
Brigade comprising 19 Maratha Light Infantry (Dirang) and 4 Rajput (Sappers’
Camp). HQ 4 Infantry Division and HQ 4 Artillery Brigade were also located in
Dirang. One company of 1 Madras
The Bomdila Sector was held by 48 Infantry Group,
comprising 1 Sikh Light Infantry, 5 Guards and 1 Madras
Withdrawal from Se La
Reports of the Chinese infiltration
on both flanks of their defences had reached HQ 62 Infantry Brigade. On 16
November, troops of 4 Sikh Light Infantry positioned in Two-Lake area had reported
the movement of more than 1,000 Chinese troops along the Bhutan Se
La. Se La.
The Chinese had reportedly pushed
more than a division through Kye La and Poshingla axis and were using the
numerous tracks to bypass the defended localities on the main road axis. On 15
November they captured Poshingla, overwhelming the two Assam Rifles platoons
and the platoon of 5 Guards that had been sent to reinforce them. Orders were
immediately issued to 48 Infantry Brigade to send a battalion to Thembang to stop
the Chinese and if possible recapture Poshingla. 5 Guards left Bomdila on 16
November and reached Thembang the same evening. Meanwhile, the company at Lagam
was attacked by the Chinese and the company second-in-command killed. On 17
November the Chinese attacked Thembang and overwhelmed 5 Guards, which
retreated in disorder, some element being able to reach Bomdila, with the rest breaking
up into small parties that headed for the plains. By the evening of 17
November, the Chinese had cut the road Bomdila – Dirang. 40
The Divisional Commander talked on
telephone with Commander 62 Brigade, who felt that he would be able to hold out
for 5 to 6 days. General Pathania told Brigadier Hoshiar Singh to formulate his
plans for withdrawal to Bomdila on night 19/20 November, but not to communicate
it below the level of battalion commander. During the conversation, the Brigade
Commander informed the GOC about his earlier orders to 4 Garhwal Rifles and two
companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry deployed in Two-Lake area to withdraw to the
main defences at Se La. Se La.
Soon after the telephone conversation
with GOC 4 Infantry Division, Commander 62 Infantry Brigade chalked out the
plan of withdrawal as follows:-
·
4 Garhwal Rifles was to
withdraw from Nuranang and occupy a delaying position at Senge and cover
withdrawal of the Brigade.
·
13 Dogra less
two companies with 4 Garhwal Rifles was to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the Brigade from Se La.
·
2 Sikh Light Infantry
would abandon Kye La at 4.30 pm on 18 November and take up a delaying position
at Nyukmadong to cover the withdrawal of rest of the Brigade.
·
4 Sikh Light Infantry
would abandon its defences at 9 pm and concentrate at Bridge 1.
·
1 Sikh would abandon
its defences at 11 pm on 18 November.
·
The Brigade HQ would
move in two parts. The non-essentials would leave at 9.30 pm with 4 Sikh Light
Infantry and the rest would withdraw at 11 pm with 1 Sikh Light Infantry.
Later, at about 10 pm, the Brigade Commander
advanced moving out of 2 Sikh Light Infantry from Kye La from 4.30 pm on 18
November to 10.30 pm on 17 November. The Battalion less one company was asked
to take up covering position at Nyukmadong, with one company being left to
cover the Nuranang road. The Commander informed the GOC and the battalion
commanders about this change on telephone.
Though there was no change in the withdrawal timings of 1 Sikh, the Commanding
Officer, Lieutenant Colonel B.N. Mehta, ordered his battalion to withdraw on the
night of 17 November itself, a day earlier than planned. This decision was taken
by the Commanding Officer on his own, i.e. without any orders from the Brigade
Commander. It is likely that information about the withdrawal of 2 Sikh Light
Infantry having been advanced was probably not passed on to the troops of 1
Sikh. Consequently, when the troops of 2
Sikh Light Infantry were passing through 1 Sikh defences at night, the latter
got jittery and began leaving their posts. This triggered a panic and lead to
the premature abandonment of Se
La.
At about 4 am on 18 November, when the
Brigade Commander went to Se La to watch the progress of the withdrawal, he saw
that troops of 2 Sikh Light Infantry and 1 Sikh had got mixed up and were completely
disorganized. All communications from Brigade
HQ to the battalions had broken down or were cut off. Rearward communications on line and wireless
was disrupted after 5 am and progress of the withdrawal could not be
communicated to Divisional HQ. Realizing that the right side of Se La was
completely devoid of troops, at about 5.45 am the Brigade Commander ordered
that all troops should withdraw immediately, and concentrate at Senge. These
orders could not be communicated to 4 Sikh Light Infantry, there being no communication
and the route to the battalion being blocked by the Chinese. The Brigade Commander
left Se La and reached at the location of 13 Dogra at Senge at about 6.30 am. At 8 am, the Brigade Major of 62 Brigade informed
the GSO 1 of IV Corps from Shukla Camp that the Brigade was on its way to
Dirang. He also informed the Brigade Major of 48 Brigade that they expected to
reach Bomdila on 19 November after clearing the enemy on Dirang - Bomdila road.
When the withdrawing troops reached
Senge, the Brigade Commander divided them into three columns. The vehicle
column was asked to move immediately to Dirang Dzong. Of the two marching columns, one consisting
of two companies of 4 Garhwal Rifles under their Commanding Officer was ordered
to reach Dirang Dzong by the old mule track Nyukmadong – Dirang along the
heights and not by the main road, with a view to protect the left flank of the
Brigade Column, which consisted of all the other troops, i.e. the Brigade HQ, 2
Sikh Light Infantry, 1 Sikh, 4 Garhwal Rifles two companies and the remaining
two companies of 4 Garhwal Rifles. 4 Sikh Light Infantry and section of 7 Mahar
(MMG) were still at Se La as they had not been conveyed the withdrawal orders.
The Chinese began occupying the defences of Se La
even as they were being vacated. Soon
afterwards, 4 Sikh Light Infantry positions came under fire from localities
held earlier by 2 Sikh Light Infantry. After repeated attacks on their
positions including the Battalion HQ, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel R.B. Nanda, ordered his troops to withdraw. The troops divided
themselves into small parties and started marching south of Se La. Bhutan
The vehicle column of 62 Brigade
left Senge at 8.30 am on 18 November for Dirang. At about 10.30 am, when it was
2 km short of Bridge 1, it was ambushed by the enemy. More than 30 all ranks were killed and many
were made prisoner. Only a few could
escape. The 4 Garhwal Rifles column
under the Commanding Officer cleared enemy delaying positions of about one platoon
strength in the area of Nyukmadong and a series of enemy stops, suffering many casualties. Just after midnight on 18/19 November when the
column reached Dirang Dzong, it ran into an ambush, most of them being killed
or captured. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bhattcharjea and Lieutenant
S.N. Tandon were captured in the early hours on 19 November.
The Brigade column came under fire when they
were a little ahead of Bridge 2. The
leading battalion, 2 Sikh Light Infantry tried to clear the enemy located on
high features on both sides but failed. In the meantime, 13 Dogra which was in
the rear was attacked twice and could not be brought forward to assist 2 Sikh Light
Infantry or 4 Garhwal Rifles. The lack
of wireless communication between Brigade HQ and the units led to loss of
command and control and the column was disorganized. The column was pinned down with enemy medium
machine guns sweeping the road. When darkness
fell, command and control broke down completely and men began dispersing in ones
and twos. Some of these parties were again ambushed that night while trying to
escape. Brigadier Hoshiar Singh’s party was reportedly ambushed near Phudung on
27 November 1962 and he was killed, four days after the ceasefire announced by
the Chinese government with effect from 23 November. Some idea of the confusion and disorder that
prevailed can be gauged from the fact that on 1 December 1962, i.e. after 14 days of withdrawal, 2291
personnel of 62 Infantry Brigade were still missing. This included two officers, one Junior
Commissioned Officer and 54 Other Ranks of the Signal Section.
Dirang Dzong is
Abandoned
The Chief of Army Staff, General
P.N. Thapar, accompanied by Major General D.K. Palit, arrived in Tezpur on the
evening of 17 November 1962. Earlier in the day, they had briefed Prime Minister
Nehru about the situation in the NEFA, where the Chinese had launched another
attack in the Walong sector a few days earlier. Lieutenant General L.P. Sen,
the Army Commander, was already in Tezpur. However, General Kaul, the Corps
Commander had still not returned from the Walong sector, where he had gone
after the situation there had worsened, prompting him to send an urgent signal
to Delhi to request for foreign intervention. It was only after reaching Tezpur
that the Army Chief was informed about the Chinese attack in the Kameng sector
and the plans for withdrawal from Se
La.
During the day, information was
received that the enemy had established a road block between Se La and Dirang
and another road block north of Bomdila. The strength of the enemy road blocks
was not known. After his return to Tezpur in the evening, the Corps Commander
spoke to the Divisional Commander. The latter was apprehensive of his ability
to hold out in view of the interruption of his communication to 62 Infantry
Brigade (Se La) as well as to 48 Infantry Brigade (Bomdila). He expected strong
attacks next day and sought permission to withdraw his troops from Se La as
well as Dirang Dzong to Bomdila. The Corps Commander told him to hold his
present positions, though he could plan for the withdrawal if the position
became untenable. He was also told that
based on the tactical and operational situation, the final orders would be
issued next morning. Instructions were also issued to Commander 48 Infantry
Brigade to clear the road blocks north of Bomdila. A signal confirming these
instructions was issued by IV Corps shortly afterwards.42
For some reason, the Divisional
Commander was convinced that by withdrawing the troops from Se La and Dirang
Dzong, he would be able to fight a defensive battle at Bomdila
successfully. Consequently, he had
ordered the withdrawal of 4 Garhwal Rifles from Nuranang to Se La and that of 4
Sikh Light Infantry from Two-Lake area earlier. At a conference held at Divisional
HQ at 7.30 pm on 17 November, immediately after his telephone conversation with
the Corps Commander, he ordered 62 Infantry Brigade to withdraw to Dirang Dzong during the
night 17/18 November and advance to Bomdila with 65 Infantry Brigade and Divisional
HQ during the night 18/19 November. The entire Division was to concentrate at Bomdila.
At about 5.30 am on 18 November the Divisional
Commander again spoke to the Corps Commander and sought permission to fall back
to Bomdila. The Corps Commander left the
decision of withdrawal at the discretion of the Divisional Commander, as the
necessary authority had already been delegated to him. Immediately after his telephone conversation
with the Corps Commander, GOC 4 Infantry Division called a conference at his HQ
at which Commander 65 Infantry Brigade and the Commanding Officer of 6 Field
Regiment were present. While the situation resulting from the happenings of Se
La and the cutting off of the lines of communication with Bomdila was being
discussed, reports came in at about 7 am
that enemy was advancing on Dirang Dzong from the direction of Bomdila while
another enemy force was coming down from the hills in the north.
The news of Chinese advance from
Munna Camp towards Dirang came as a complete surprise. With no troops at the Divisional HQ to stop
the enemy and the certainty of the Dirang– Manda La track also being cut by the
enemy any moment, in order “to save the garrison and troops”, the GOC ordered withdrawal of Dirang Dzong
Garrison to Bomdila. The GOC, along with his Rover Group, left Divisional HQ
about 8 am on 17 Novemeber. At 8.25 am, Lieutenant G.S. Sodhi, the Commanding
Officer of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, informed Brigadier P.S. Gill,
the Chief Signal Officer, IV Corps, that he would be moving out towards Bomdila
and Tenga Valley
After the GOC had left Dirang Dzong,
some officers of the rank of Major and below made attempts to rally the troops
into a scratch force to fight their way to Bomdila. But in the face of Chinese pressure, these
efforts did not succeed. The men divided themselves into small parties and made
for the plains. Like his GOC, Commander
65 Infantry Brigade also left the place immediately without giving any
withdrawal plan to his troops. Later,
General Prasad and a few officers of HQ 4 Infantry Division were picked up by
the Corps Commander on 22 November 1962 in his helicopter near Bhairabkund.
‘B’ Squadron of 7 Cavalry under Major
S.D.S. Jamwal had only four serviceable Stuart tanks at Dirang. On the morning
of 18 November, the GOC ordered the Squadron to break through to Bomdila. In case they failed, they were to abandon their
tanks and withdraw on foot. Starting at
8 am, the column encountered a road block in the village of Dirang Dzong
The two infantry battalions at
Dirang also withdrew at the same time. 19 Maratha Light Infantry left at 8.15 am
after setting fire to their bunkers and tents.
They were joined by a company of 4 Rajput enroute and halted near Manda
La at night. The unit reached Phudung at 2 pm on 20 November. The other battalion, 4 Rajput could not
withdraw as one body as its companies were widely dispersed. D Company, ordered to withdraw to Foot Hills
after destroying its heavy stores, reached Bhairabkund on 24 November. The rest of the battalion was to withdraw
after troops of 62 Infantry Brigade had passed through their location on their
move downward. After waiting the whole
day on 18 November but getting no news about them, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel B.N. Avasthi, decided to withdraw to Dirang Dzong next morning. However, during the day one company was
ordered to withdraw. It left at 4 pm and came under heavy enemy fire near
kilometer stone 33. The Commanding
Officer and the rest of the battalion left on 19 November, taking the Dirang
Dizong – Manda La route. The column of
300 men crossed Rupa Chu on 22 November and climbed the hill which skirts
Shergaon. The next morning, on 23
November, the column was heavily engaged by medium machine guns and mortars,
even though the enemy had declared a unilateral ceasefire. Being caught unawares, the column tried to
extricate itself and in the process killed more than a hundred Chinese, suffering
heavy casualties itself. Among those
killed was the Commanding Officer.
The Battle
With the disintegration of 5 Guards
after their defeat at Thembang on 17 November, the Chinese were in a position
to cross the river at any moment and also occupy the Mandala Ridge. In fact, the same evening they cut the Line of
Communication and established a road-block on the road Bomdila-Dirang
Dzong. When the Corps Commander was
apprised of this situation, he ordered Brigadier Gurbax Singh, Commander 48 Infantry
Brigade to send a mobile column of two companies and two tanks to open the road
to Dirang Dzong. But the Brigade Commander
protested that he had no extra force and was not in a position to undertake the
task and the order was cancelled later the same night. The Divisional Commander again discussed the
issue with the Brigade Commander and it was decided that the latter would make
an attempt to clear road Bomdila – Dirang on arrival of reinforcements on 18
November 1962. On the night 17/18 November, 48 Infantry Brigade had only six rifle
companies, three of 1 Madras (the fourth had been sent to Dirang Dzong earlier)
and three of 1 Sikh Light Infantry (the fourth was at Phudung).
At about 10.40 am on 18 November, the
Corps Commander directed 48 Infantry Brigade to send a mobile column to Dirang
to link up with HQ 4 Infantry Division. The
column, comprising two companies of 1 Sikh Light Infantry, two tanks and a
section of mountain guns, moved at about 11.15 am, leaving the Battalion Defended
Area held by only one company and Battalion HQ personnel. At about 12.30 pm the Chinese launched an
attack from the direction of Old Bomdila Pass.
At that time, only one platoon of A Company and one section of medium
machine guns were in the defences. After
severe fighting, the attack was beaten back and the enemy withdrew. In the meantime, a patrol of C Company
returned and was rushed to their locality, which had been completely
vacant. At about 1.30 pm the enemy launched
another attack, which was also repulsed with the help of artillery, 3-inch
mortars and medium machine guns. After
this there was a lull in the battle for about half an hour, during which all
the casualties were evacuated. Some
personnel of 3 Jammu and Kashmir
The mobile column started its
advance at midday on 18 November to clear the road-block. The column had hardly advanced about 4 km
when the enemy opened automatic fire from the ridge on the left of the
road. The Infantry troops returned fire,
but the tanks could not open fire, as the enemy was not visible. The mobile
column was ordered back, as it appeared held up by enemy fire. The mobile column returned without suffering
any casualty. At about 2.45 pm when they were trying to get back into their
defences, the enemy put in a massive attack with approximately 600 to 700 men. At
this stage a thick fog set in. Taking advantage of the poor visibility, the
enemy surrounded the battalion defences from three sides. By about 3.15 pm, A
and C Companies and the Battalion HQ were completely over-run. The Battalion
pulled back to lower heights and took up a new defensive position. The Commanding
Officer went to the Brigade Commander and apprised him of the latest position. By
this time, the enemy had gained control of all the dominating heights and was
firing at the Brigade HQ and gun positions.
All attempts to restore the situation failed and 1 Sikh Light Infantry fell
back to the school building at Bomdila, where it remained there till 3 am on 19
November 1962.
The two tanks which returned to
Bomdila along with the mobile column were ordered to position themselves in the
Circuit House area to guard all approaches from the west. As the two tanks got in position, heavy enemy
fire came from the ridge. The tanks
opened up on the enemy positions and prevented any further advance of the
enemy. The tank commander of the
off-road tank put two light machine guns under his tank, one each guarding the
front and the rear. The Chinese, who had
thought Bomdila as virtually captured were taken by surprise when subjected to
firing from the machine guns of the tank and withdrew into the hills, leaving
behind several dead. This action gave
the troops some time to organize the defences.
Having failed to advance towards
Bomdila town because of the tanks on that side, the enemy assaulted the 1 Madras Tenga Valley
Along with the attack on the left
and right flanks of 48 Infantry Brigade, the Chinese put launched a massive
attack on Bomdila at 3 pm on 18 November.
After the fall of 1 Sikh Light Infantry location, the Brigade Commander
found it difficult to hold on to Bomdila any longer. The two battalions - 6/8 Gorkha Rifles and 3 Jammu and Kashmir Tenga
Valley
At about 9 pm, the Brigade Commander
returned to Bomdila. He met the
Commanding Officers of the 3 Jammu
and Kashmir
When the Corps Commander came to
know of the withdrawal of troops from Bomdila, he sent a special message
through Major Nahar Singh, Signal Officer of Tusker Force for the Commander 48
Infantry Brigade, ordering him to occupy the defences at Rupa. The Brigade
Commander ordered 1 Sikh Light Infantry to occupy a high ground near Rupa. At about 8 am, when the battalion was getting
ready to move, the Chinese opened up with automatics from all the features
around the Rupa defile. By that time,
troops of 6/8 Gorkha Rifles, which had returned to Tenga Valley
The Commanding Officer of 6/8 Gorkha
Rifles was ordered to position his troops in a narrow defile, approximately 2
km south of Rupa gap, until all units of the Brigade had passed through. The battalion held the gap until midday on 19
November, when the Brigade Commander ordered that the troops should withdraw
from Rupa to Chako to foil a possible Chinese attempt to cutoff the entire
force there. However, the enemy
continued following the withdrawing troops. 3 Jammu and
Kashmir Rifles, which had withdrawn from Bomdila directly to Tenga Valley
When 48 Infantry Brigade reached
Chako at last light on 19 November, it was already growing dark. Brigadier
Gurbax Singh sent for ammunition, digging tools and rations which started
arriving. The troops were still busy preparing their
trenches when at about 2.45 am on 20 November, they came under heavy enemy fire
from the surrounding heights. Soon afterwards, the position was attacked at
different places along the perimeter. Meanwhile,
the stores continued to arrive. Unfortunately, at 3.15 a.m. a vehicle carrying
ammunition overturned and blocked the road. The Sikh Light Infantry troops, who
were on the high ground astride the Chako Check post, had to pull back as their
ammunition got exhausted. After this the
Chinese surrounded the 6/8 Gorkha Rifles positions. By 3.30 am, two attempts by the enemy to
break into their defences had been thwarted.
But the Battalion HQ was overrun by the enemy at about 3.45 am. Although
they continued to suffer casualties, the Gorkhas held on to their respective
positions tenaciously till 5.30 am, when the Commanding Officer ordered them to
withdraw to Foot Hills. Till 1 December 1962, more than 150 all ranks were
still missing.
The Aftermath
The withdrawal from Se La marks an ignominious
chapter in India
According to General. Pathania, GOC 4 Infantry
Division, his decision to withdraw from Se La was based on an input from
Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, Commander 62 Infantry Brigade that the on the evening
of 17 November the brigade defences had become untenable. However, the decision
had already been taken by the GOC before the conversation took place and everyone
in the Divisional HQ knew that they were to move back to Tenga valley, south of
Bomdila. At 3 pm on 17 November Lieutenant Colonel G.S. Sodhi, Commander
Signals 4 Infantry Division spoke to Brigadier P.S. Gill, Chief Signal Officer
of IV Corps and informed him that at 4.30 pm he would be moving out with the
layout group for the purpose of establishing the Divisional HQ at the new
location. In fact, a staff officer from the Divisional HQ had already been sent
to Tenga, where HQ 4 Infantry Division was initially planned to relocate.
However, after the fall of Thembang and the establishment of a road block
between Bomdila and Dirang Dzong in the afternoon, the plan to move to Tenga
was shelved and the officer was called back.
During his conversation with
Brigadier Gill, Lieutenant Colonel Sodhi told him that his GOC wanted to speak
to the Corps Commander. When he was told that the Corps Commander was not
present – he had gone to Walong – he spoke to Brigadier K.K. Singh, the
Brigadier General Staff and requested for permission to withdraw from Se La.
At
about 7 pm, the Corps Commander returned to Tezpur from his trip to Walong.
After talking to the Divisional Commander and discussing the situation with the
Chief and the Army Commander, he ordered a signal to be sent to 4 Infantry
Division to withdraw to Bomdila. Brigadier Gill recalls that the signal was
given at about 7 pm. Since the signal was classified, it had to be enciphered
before transmission and deciphered at the other end. To save time, Brigadier
K.K. Singh telephoned Commander 48 Infantry Brigade at Bomdila and asked him to
pass the message to GOC 4 Infantry Division on telephone. After encryption, the
signal was transmitted to Bomdila for onward transmission to the Divisional HQ.
Apparently, after a discussion with the Chief, the Corps Commander General Kaul
changed his mind, and ordered that the signal should be cancelled. Brigadier
K.K. Singh again telephoned Brigadier Gurbax Singh at Bomdila and asked him not
to pass the message that he had given to him earlier, regarding the withdrawal
of 4 Infantry Division. Brigadier Gurbax Singh confirmed that the message had
not been passed since the telephone line between Bomdila and Dirang was out of
order.
After
the cancellation of the above signal, General Kaul gave another handwritten
signal to Brigadier K.K. Singh to be passed on to GOC 4 Infantry Division,
directing him to hold on to his present positions to the best of his
ability. However, if any position became
untenable, the Divisional Commander was delegated the authority to withdraw to
any alternate position he could hold.
The message was cleared to HQ 4 Infantry Division at about 2.30 am on 18
November 1962.
At about 10.30 pm on 17 November,
Commander 62 Infantry Brigade telephoned the GOC to inform him about the latest
situation in his Brigade. General
Pathania told Brigadier Hoshiar Singh that he could make his withdrawal plan
but final orders would be given in the morning.
But the situation changed during the night, when 2 Sikh Light Infantry
was pulled out of Kye La at about 10.30 pm that night, triggering the premature
withdrawal of 1 Sikh without orders. 2
Sikh Light Infantry was withdrawn according to plan and not because of enemy
pressure. The GOC was informed by the
Brigade Commander regarding this step. If 1 Sikh had not withdrawn on their
own, it is unlikely that Se la would have been abandoned on the night of 17/18
November, setting off the alarm that resulted in the panic stricken flight of
the troops of 62 Infantry Brigade from Se La.
After the fall of Chako, all semblance of any defence
ended. The famous Red Eagle Division, which had won universal acclaim for its
victories in World War II had been virtually destroyed. After the fall of Se La and Bomdila, all
command and control was lost. Proud battalions
had crumbled into small parties, some heading for the foothills and others to Bhutan
Alarmed by the debacles at Se la and
Bomdila, and the developing threat to Tezpur, Army HQ ordered 5 Infantry
Division to be airlifted from Punjab , for the
defence of Tezpur. The advance party of HQ 5 Infantry Division along with one
Brigade HQ and one Infantry battalion landed at Tezpur on 19 November and began
to dig in for the defence of Tezpur airfield. On 20 November, the situation at Tezpur was completely
out of control after a part of HQ IV Corps left for Gauhati. Rumour started that the Army was vacating Assam
On 21 November 1962, the Chinese declared a
cease-fire. Soon afterwards, General Thapar retired on health grounds though he
had offered to resign. General J.N. Chaudhury, the GOC-in-C Southern
Comamnd , was appointed the new Chief of Army Staff. Lieutenant
General B.M. Kaul resigned, succeeded by Lieutenant General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw,
who moved on promotion from his appointment as Commandant of the Defence Services
Staff College
at Wellington
THE INVASION OF NEFA
–WALONG SECTOR.
Other than Kameng, the only part of NEFA invaded by
the Chinese was Walong in the Lohit Frontier Division. Incursions did take
place in Subansiri and Siang divisions of NEFA and along the Indo-Tibet border
areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, but these were minor and did not
involve significant fighting. Even in Walong, the number of troops involved was
small, in comparison to those that took part in the operations in Kameng.
However, the heavy casualties incurred by both sides bear testimony to the
intensity of the conflict and merit recounting.
Before the responsibility for the
defence of NEFA was handed over to the Army in 1959, only 2 Assam Rifles was
deployed in the Lohit Division, with a wing each at Dibang Valley
On 18 October 1962, the deployment
of Indian troops in the three subsectors was as under:-
- Kibithoo
sub-sector - 6 Kumaon.
- Walong
sub sector – 4 Sikh less two companies.
By this time the Chinese strength
on NEFA-Tibet border had gone up to nineteen battalions, of which six were
positioned opposite the Lohit Frontier Division. In September 1962, Chinese
troops had moved closer to the border and had been observed digging and
preparing defensive positions opposite Indian posts. According to intelligence
estimates of HQ IV Corps, the Chinese had deployed one infantry division in
area Shugden – Drowa Gonpa – Tithang. Shugden was on the main Lhasa-Chamdo
highway, from where Rima could be approached via two routes, Shugden – Drowa
Gonpa – Rima and Shugden – Tithang – Rima.
The Chinese were known to have improved the Drowa Gonpa – Rima road that
led to Kibithoo and onwards to Walong on the Indian side of the border.45
Fall of Kibithoo
Located on the western bank of the Lohit River Taluk Pass.
The Brigade Commander arrived at
Walong at 9 am to personally review the situation. After talking to the Commanding Officer of 6
Kumaon on telephone, he gave orders to cut all the twine rope-ways across the Lohit River
Shortly afterwards, 2 Infantry
Division was raised to take over operational responsibility in Subansiri, Siang
and Lohit Frontier Divisions of NEFA. The first Divisional Commander, Major
General M.S. Pathania, arrived at Walong on 26 October. In order to control the
two battalions located at Walong, 181 Infantry Brigade was raised. This was
replaced by 11 Infantry Brigade, then in Nagaland, which was placed under 2 Infantry
Division. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier N.C. Rawlley, MC, along with his
Rover Group arrived at Walong on 31 October.
On 31 October 1962, the Brigade comprised 6 Kumaon, 4 Sikh, two
companies of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles and one company of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. Supporting
troops were a platoon 6 Mahar MG, a troop of 62 Para Field Battery and 71 Heavy
Mortar Battery .
After the withdrawal of Indian
troops from Kibithoo, the Chinese had occupied positions behind Ashi Hill. Since then it had become a daily routine for
the Chinese troops to fire at the Mithun and Ladders positions and also to
carry out probing attacks on Indian defences.
This exchange of fire was so regular that Indian troops from the other
post used to visit the Mithun-Ladders area daily to witness the ‘fire works’,
to amuse themselves. The Indian firing taxed the Chinese so heavily that on 2
November the local commander sent a message to the rear for permission to
withdraw, which was refused, since the Chinese did not like to lose face. Chinese
fire on the Mithun and Ladder’s positions was, in fact, a ruse to cover their
activities somewhere else. Behind the
screen of their firing, the Chinese constructed a track from Ashi Hill to the
Green Pimple post and started their build-up unchecked. 46
To check the enemy incursion,
Commander 11 Infantry Brigade decided to occupy the area Tri-junction – Yellow
Pimple – Green Pimple which was crucial to the defence of Walong. Additional troops allotted to the Brigade for
the offensive were 3/3 Gorkha Rifles and 4 Dogra. By 13 November Tri-junction had
been occupied by 6 Kumaon, while 4 Sikh was on the forward slopes of West Ridge
and Ladders. The newly arrived 3/3 Gorkha was deployed on Dakota Hill and the
Dong Plateau, while 4 Dogra was still in the process of being inducted, most of
its elements at Walong.
The attack on Yellow Pimple was
launched by 6 Kumaon on 14 November. The enemy reacted violently and by
nightfall the Kumaonis had been able to capture only a part of the feature.
Next morning, the Chinese counter attacked with a battalion supported by
artillery. After fierce hand to hand fighting the Kumaonis were forced to fall
back to Tri-Junction, after losing 110 men out of the 200 who had taken part in
the assault the previous day. Not pausing on the recaptured objective, the
Chinese attacked Tri-Junction, where the troops had withdrawn from Yellow
Pimple. After a bitter fight lasting over two hours the attack was
repulsed.
The Chinese launched a massive
attack on Tri-Junction at 7.30 am on 16 November, which was beaten back.
However, the position was completely surrounded, and the enemy had cut-off the
routes of replenishment and reinforcement and the number of casualties was
mounting, with no hope of evacuation.
Realising that further resistance was useless, the Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Madiah decided to disengage and withdraw his troops.
Tri-Junction was occupied by the enemy at 9 am on 16 November. As they
withdrew, the Kumaonis were repeatedly ambushed by the enemy on their downward
march.
The West ridge was held by A Company
of 6 Kumaon, which was attacked by the Chinese after they had overcome the
Indian defences at Tri-Junction. The first assault mounted frontally failed. The
next attack was made with larger numbers from three directions, supported by medium
machine guns and heavy artillery. After
holding out for several hours, the Company found itself encircled and asked for
permission to withdraw. One Junior Commissioned Officer and 17 Other Ranks were
able to break through the Chinese ring, but the rest died fighting including
the Company Commander, Lieutenant Bikram Singh.
Similar attacks were launched by the
Chinese on other posts. They attacked Patrol Base which was held by A Company
of 4 Sikh at 9 pm on 15 November. With the help of artillery fire, the attack
was repulsed. The Chinese attacked the position several times during the night,
being beaten back on each occasion. After fighting resolutely throughout the night,
the company asked for and was given permission to withdraw to the Maha Plateau.
During the withdrawal, the Company Commander was killed. The casualties
suffered by the Sikhs during the operation were one officer, one Junior
Commissioned Officer and 20 Other Ranks killed, while two Junior Commissioned
Officers and 40 Other Ranks were wounded. Among those killed were four Olympic
sportsmen. 47
One of the fiercest battles was
fought at Ladders which was being held by C Company of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles under
command of 4 Sikh. At about 3 am on 16 November, the Chinese attacked Ladders
after destroying the bunkers occupied by the Gorkhas. The Company Commander,
Major N.B. Chand ordered his men to come out into the crawl trenches to fight
the enemy. The situation became critical when small groups of enemy started
infiltrating to the Indian gun positions under small arms fire. The Company Commander
requested 4 Sikh for reinforcements and ammunition, which could not be sent.
Finally the position was abandoned. After
his bunker was destroyed, the Company Commander found himself alone and was
later captured by the Chinese.
Maha Plateau, Lachhman Ridge and the
Mithun track were held by C Company of 4 Sikh and D Company of 3/3 Gorkha
Rifles, under command 4 Sikh. After over-running the Patrol Base on 16
November, the Chinese advanced and launched an attack on these positions, which
were overrun and the troops dispersed, both company commanders being
captured.
The High Plateau on the right
extremity of the Walong Front was held by D Company of 4 Sikh under the
operational command of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. At 11.30 pm on 15 November a strong
enemy force attacked the position but was beaten back. The second attack was at
about 1.30 am on 16 November during which the Company Commander, Lieutenant Yog
Raj Palta was killed. After his death, Havildar
Gurmukh Singh took over command, when only 18 men were left in the company. At
4.45 am the Chinese launched the third attack overwhelming the position. The
Sikhs lost 36 men including the Company Commander. During the early hours of the day, efforts
were made to re-inforce the Sikhs, but the Gorkhas could not go beyond the
southern edge of High Plateau. At about 8 am the artillery observation post
officer, Second Lieutenant P.S. Bhandari reached the post and assumed command
of the few non-combatant Sikhs who were still alive. For some time he directed
artillery fire on the Chinese but was soon killed. When the Chinese captured
the position there was not a single Indian soldier left alive. 48
The battle for the capture of Yellow
Pimple was witnessed by the Brigade Commander, Brigadier N.C. Rawlley on 14
November. The Corps Commander and the Divisional Commander were at Walong with
the Brigade Commander from the afternoon of 15 November till they left Walong
for Hayuliang by an Otter aircraft at 11 am on 16 November. While leaving
Walong, General Kaul instructed the Brigade Commander to hold the Defended
Sector to the best of his ability. However, if the position became untenable, he
was to fall back to an alternative position. These orders were confirmed by a
signal from HQ IV Corps to 11 Infantry Brigade in the evening.
After launching attacks on Indian
positions all along the front the enemy had secured a foothold both on the western
and eastern side of the Lohit
River
11 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section in Walong
11 Infantry Brigade was on its way from
Kangpokpi in Naga Hills to Darranga near Bhutan when it was diverted to Chabua
from where it was airlifted to Walong. The Section was then under the command
of Captain Lal Singh. The Brigade Commander and his rover detachment which had
already reached Darranga were flown to Chabua and then to Walong on 31 October
1962. The Brigade Headquarters and Signal Section reached Chabua by train and
road on 1 November. Two wireless detachments were immediately sent to Walong to
work on D1 and B1 links, while the rest of the personnel and equipment moved by
air over the next two days, when airlift became available. The vehicles and
heavy equipment were left behind at Chabua. Since the battalions already had
their wireless detachments with them, the Signal Section was asked to leave an
equivalent number of personnel and equipment behind.
On arrival at
Walong the Signal Section got down to the establishing the essential
communications on line and radio with the battalions and rearwards. The lines
to 4 Sikh and 3/3 Gorkha Rifles which were both located nearby were completed
the same day, while the line to 6 Kumaon at Tri-Junction took more than two
days. After the direct lines had been completed, lateral lines were laid
between battalions. Multiple strands of
cable were laid along steel twines across the Lohit River to ensure
reliability. To improve survivability of local lines, these were laid through
communication trenches on the side walls. Lines to the operations room and the
Brigade Commander were duplicated, using different routes.
The line to Tri-Junction
required considerable effort. The distance involved was about 15 miles from Walong
(height 5000 feet) to Tri-Junction (height 13000 feet). The cable used was D 8(T), all on man pack. Speed being of the utmost importance, the route was divided into three sections. The cable was air dropped on drums No 5 Mk I,
which were collected and placed at intervals of about half a mile with the help
of porters and pioneers. Each section
was laid by a different line party, working simultaneously. The route was completed
in a very short time and worked well thereafter. Lance/Naik K. C. Singh, who
was in charge of the line party working on the farthest section did a
creditable job but was taken prisoner. The
laying of the line was supervised by Jemadar Risal Singh, the Jemadar GD (general
duties) of the Section. Though he was an operator by trade, he guided the linemen
well.
All line laying was
done on manpack basis. There were only six
linemen, so each line party comprised
just two linemen. One lineman was on duty on local lines and one was engaged on
repair of faulty trunk lines. At times linemen were helped by operators for
specific short durations. The lateral lines proved to be extremely
useful and there was never a chance when at least one of the alternate lines to
a battalion was not through. The
Divisional Commander, General Pathania, who was in Walong on Night 15/16 November,
remarked that he could speak to any platoon on telephone. The line to Tri Junction served another
useful purpose – it served as a track guide to the troops being inducted into
the area.
The wireless links
to HQ 2 Infantry Division at Dinjan, D1 and D2, were based on 19 HP sets, using
end fed wire aerials. For the B1 net to battalions, 62 sets were used, with rod
aerials. The B21 net worked with the rear headquarters of the brigade at Chabua
and the airfield at at Tezu, using WS 19. The B1 net to battalions was not used
except during attack for a short time and during withdrawal. The wireless links functioned well, though
the speech was not clear during night on D1 when key conversation had to be
resorted to. There was no interference
experienced from the Chinese stations, though the detachment of the wireless
experimental unit in Walong did monitor some messages of the Chinese. Captain
Lal Singh recalls that he was once given a report about “a Chinese lady”
passing a message on channel 8 of WS 31.
He immediately opened the set and tried to monitor the channel but found
nothing.
A
major problem was man packing of WS No 62 with the 300 watt charging engine on
the hills. The 80 watt engine did not
function due to the low temperatures at heights. During the withdrawal two detachments with WS No 62 and charging
set 300 watt engine were brought till the first halt. The charging set had to be abandoned
thereafter. The rest of the equipment consisting
of WS No 19/19 HP and 1260 watt engines had to be left since it could not be
carried on man pack on the 110 mile long route, along with other essential
stores. However, two wireless sets 31 were brought back by the Signal Section.
Wireless communication during withdrawal
was not very satisfactory for several reasons. The entire route followed the
valley, the track being hardly 1-2 ft wide. Halts were dictated by the enemy at
awkward places on narrow tracks on sheer rocks where there was hardly any place
for correct direction and height of aerials.
The halts were mostly during night between 11 pm and 4 am. The
maintenance of the column had been planned but could not be carried out as one
of the helicopters which came to deliver food to the battalion in a delaying
position was shot down by the Chinese.
The SDS (scheduled despatch service)
proved very useful. An ADS (air despatch service) was maintained between Chabua
and Tezu using IAF Dakotas. At Chabua, a detachment of divisional signals was
stationed to handle the SDS mail. At Tezu the Brigade Transport Officer, who
was part of the B Echelon, was responsible for dispatch and receipt both
ways. From Tezu an ADS was organised
with IAF Otters for the maintenance of Walong garrison. At Walong airfield, a runner from the Brigade
Signal Section collected the incoming mail and handed over the outgoing mail to
the pilot. The battalions collected their mail by sending their runners to the
signal centre every 3-4 hours. However, important messages with precedence ‘Op
Immediate’ or above were cleared by a runner from the brigade. When the runner was not available, the battalion
was informed on telephone to send their messenger.
11 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section worked under trying conditions at Walong. The communications
functioned well throughout, for which credit is due to the officer commanding,
Captain Lal Singh. Though all ranks worked with dedication, the performance of
Lance Naik Sat Parkash deserves special mention. He was the operator manning
the wireless link with division. For his devotion to duty in maintaining communications
on D2 net on 16 November 1962 under
enemy shelling he was recommended for the award of VSM. In fact, four personnel (linemen and
operators) were recommended for awards. Unfortunately,
none of these came through. In the battle of Walong, 11 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section had one officer, to JCOs and 62 OR.
Out of these four OR were killed and six were taken prisoner. All these belonged to battalion wireless
detachments, rover and line detachment.
SIGNALS IN NEFA
IV Corps Signals
IV Corps was created on 4 October 1962 and
Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul appointed its first Commander. This was a unique
case of a military formation being created for a commander, instead of a
commander being found for a formation. One of the first officers to join the
newly formed headquarters was the Chief Signal Officer, Brigadier P.S. Gill. Since
he had recently moved from Shillong to Delhi after handing over charge of Chief
Signal Officer of XXXIII Corps to Brigadier M.B.K. Nair, he was familiar with
the area and its problems. The story of his appointment and subsequent events
are best described in his own words:-
“Biji
Kaul’s IV Corps was born at midnight of 3rd Oct 62. I was awakened and summoned to Kaul’s
residence around 1 AM that night to be told by him personally, I had been
selected to be his CSO, Lack of seniority, the basis of moving me from Shillong
in May to Sigs Dte as DD Tels (the very job I had held as GSO1 Tels from 1953
to 1957) was given the go-by. Some 10
hours later (4th October) I accompanied him to Tezpur, in a Viscount
of the Presidential flight. En route,
quite naturally, I quizzed him regarding the role, area of responsibility of IV
Corps and the troops allocation. He had
no satisfactory answer but kept on repeating “ap nahin samjhen ge” I was left
with the impression that he was going to Tezpur more to instill some urgency
into the Dhola affair/action.
I
had never worked with Kaul. I was picked
because I had known the NEFA region as CSO XXXIII Corps, since handed over to
MBK Nair. Kaul left for LUMPU etc on
fifth. I was to organize and set up the
new Corps HQ. Kaul had asked me to send
the BGS and the CE to join him at the front on arrival. My good friend “Bhaiya” Rajwade who had been
CE XXXIII Corps along with me and was shunted to the CME, also for lack of
seniority, was brought in on 6th October as the CE. KK Singh of the Armoured Corps another good
friend joined on the seventh as BGS.
Both were sent on to join Kaul.
I
soon realized what a clout Kaul wielded.
DG P&T Nanjappa of the ICS, would call me twice a day to ascertain
what he could do for IV Corps and so also other worthies at Army HQ. In no time there were direct telephone and
tele-printer lines connecting Tezpur to Delhi Delhi
planners in their keenness to fulfil Kaul’s bidding failed to instruct the
Courier aircraft to make a stop at Lucknow
In
the fortnight prior to the Chinese attack of Twentieth October there was very
little that IV Corps could do for 7 Bde.
I visited Zimithang (TAC HQ 4 Div) and met Ram Singh who despite the
various odds had the situation under control.
I was certainly appalled by the difficult terrain conditions and the
extremely precarious porter-based supply line forward to Namka Chu. Recovery of air dropped supplies was as low
as 30 percent-most of it falling into deep ravines. Two-seater Bell
IV Corps Signal
Regiment
Though the skeleton Corps HQ had been created, it
took some time before it got its integral signal regiment. Formal orders for
the raising of IV Corps Signal Regiment at Agra
On 10 November 1962, the advance
party of the unit comprising of one Junior Commissioned Oficer and 39 Other
Ranks left by rail for Tezpur under Lieutenant N.T. Singh. A day later a
smaller party of ten men under Major H.V. Dixit left for Tezpur by air. The Commanding Officer left by air on 14
November, via Delhi Agra
Meanwhile a party of four officers, two Junior
Commissioned Officers and 40 Other Ranks had moved by train from Agra Lucknow Agra
On 1 December the orderly room staff arrived and the
Regimental HQ became functional. Two days later, all the personnel of 4
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment who had been assisting the unit since 28
October were relieved and personnel of IV Corps Signal Regiment began manning
the signal centre and exchange on their own. 50
4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
As mentioned earlier, 4 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment virtually disintegrated right at the beginning of
the Chinese invasion on 20 October 1962, with the commanding officer becoming a
prisoner and the second-in-command being killed. With the defences being
overrun or vacated in quick succession and the Chinese systematically cutting
the telephone lines, the only means of communication left with the brigades and
battalions was wireless. The rapid rate
of withdrawal often resulted in loss of signal equipment that could not be
replaced, with consequent adverse effect
on communications.
The
survivors of 7 Infantry Brigade Signal Company withdrew from Namka Chu and
initially headed for Ziminthang, little knowing that the Divisional HQ was
already on its way to Tawang. Eventually
most of them made their way to Bhutan
In the second phase of the Chinese
operations, the Walong front crumbled on the morning of 16 November and 11
Infantry Brigade was forced to withdraw. On 17 November the enemy isolated the
Divisional HQ and the Signal Regiment by establishing a road block about a
kilometer North of Bomdi La on the Bomdi-La-Dirang Dzong road after bypassing
Sela. 62 Infantry Brigade was ordered to
move back to Dirang Dzong. During the
withdrawal one officer and 32 Other Ranks of 62 Brigade Signal Company went missing. On reaching Dirang Dzong the
survivors of the Brigade, found it under enemy occupation as the Divisional HQ
had left for Bomdi La on hearing the news of Chinese occupation of Munna
Camp. On their way to Bomdi La, the
Divisional HQ learnt about the fall of Bomdi La through a radio message. The Divisional HQ and elements of the
Divsional Signal Regiment dispersed and made their way to the plains. 65 Infantry Brigade also suffered a similar
fate. 48 Infantry Brigade had been
withdrawn to Rupa from where the Chinese evicted them on November 19 and they
reached Chakku foothills on the subsequent morning.
Stragglers
of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment continued to arrive at Misamari, Charduar, Bhairakund and Tezpur
for many days. The bulk of the unit
equipment and vehicles were destroyed or lost. The casualties suffered by the
unit were three officers and 21 Others Ranks killed, while one officer and 29
Others Ranks had become prisoners of war.
On 7 February, 1963, the unit was converted to 4 Mountain Divisional
Signal Regiment and moved back to Ambala shortly afterwards.
A conspicuous feature of the
operations was the apparent breakdown of command and control and lack of
coordination between various formation headquarters. There were many instances
of information not reaching higher headquarters in time or orders not being
passed down the chain of command. This led to doubts on the reliability of
communications provided by Signals. While it is true that communications did
breakdown at certain periods, a detailed analysis reveals that most of the
criticism is unfounded. Apart from the obvious constraints of lack of equipment
and terrain, the systematic disruption of lines by the Chinese ensured that the
only means of communications available once the operations commenced was
wireless. The shortage of equipment, especially batteries and the electrolyte
needed to keep them charged has been well documented. Another factor that needs
to be kept in mind is that this was the first time Indian troops were operating
in such terrain with almost total dependence on air supply for replenishment of
essential spares and supplies including fuel, oil and lubricants. The fact that
the Commander Signals of the Division had to personally carry a jar of
sulphuric acid needed to charge the batteries of 7 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company in Namka Chu shows the peculiar constraints under which the unit was
working.
An important point that needs to be
brought out is that most of the criticism about failure of communications
originates from lack of authentic information and is based more on surmise than
actual facts. Significantly, the formation commanders themselves have generally
been appreciative of the quality of communication support provided to them by
their signal units. In some cases, communications functioned until the last
moment and ceased only when the headquarters itself closed down or withdrew,
sometimes without informing the higher headquarters. There are several entries
in war diaries of the formations and units that mention their inability to pass
an important message or obtain the latest information because of lack of
response from the other end. This naturally led to the conclusion that
communications had broken down, not an uncommon occurrence in those days, given
the type of equipment then in use.
Two signal officers who were
primarly responsible for the communications during the critical phases of the
operation were Lieutenant Colonel K.K.
Tewari, commanding 4 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment and Captain Lakshman Singh, commanding 7 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company. Both have dwelt on this aspect
in their books as well as in inputs sought from them subsequently. In his book published in 1995, Major General Tewari
writes:-
“It has been said
earlier that when something went wrong in operations there was a tendency to
put the blame on Signals for the lack of communications. I had personal experience of this on many
occasions before and after the 1962 operations.
But in this particular case, although the staff did indulge in the same
tactic, I am happy to note that the two commanders most intimately concerned
with the battles in October have given a very balanced and correct picture
about the signal communications in the books they wrote afterwards.
Reference can be made
to the books written by the GOC 4 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad
and the Commander, 7 Infantry Brigade, the late Brig John Dalvi. I am grateful to them for having put the
record right for the sake of posterity and it would not be out of place in this
narrative to quote from their books.” 51
General Tewari goes on to quote the
following excerpt from The Fall of Towang
written by Major General Prasad:-
“In order to ensure that I could influence the matters
after battle has been engaged, it was imperative that I had good communications
to all the sectors and posts concerned.
In this, I had been served very well, both by my Chief Signals officer
(Lt Col Tewari, even now on a visit to the Namka Chu area) and by his No 2, Maj
Ram Singh, who was with me in Zimithang.
My communication state, briefly, was as follows:-
To the Rear – both line and wireless link with Corps HQ
and my Rear HQ at Tezpur.
To 7 Brigade Sector - line and wireless to all posts –
but I could listen into all the wireless sets with units forward of Brigade –
Tsangle, Tsang Dhar, Bridge 3 & 4 and 1/9 Gorkhas.
To Centre Sector – line and wireless to all posts –
Bridge 1 & 2, Lumpu, Hathungla, Khinzemani, Chutangmu and Brokenthang.
To Towang Sector – line and wireless.
“My signals officers and personnel had ensured that the
wireless sets and telephones worked well and I had no trouble in keeping touch
with all the sectors and outposts. I was
therefore confident of being able to help and guide my command once the attack
had started …. The signallers manned their sets or telephones and coolly
handled incoming and outgoing signals traffic”.
General Tewari also quotes from the
book The Himalayan Blunder written by Brigadier John Dalvi:-
“On
11 September, I was constantly prodded to give the ‘exact’ location of the Assam Rifles and Punjab
patrols which were moving post – haste to Dhola. My staff maintained round-the-clock vigil by
the wireless set but could not establish contact. There were cynical and sarcastic remarks
about the standard of 7 Brigade’s wireless proficiency, as if the brigade
signallers could redress the inadequacies of our antiquated equipment.
“On the evening of the 18th (October), Lt Col Col
“I was once asked to sack my Brigade Signals Officer but
I refused and said I would prefer to be sacked myself. I was responsible for giving him tasks which
were beyond his capability. Tewari was
grateful for my intervention on behalf of an innocent young officer. I hope that young Lachman Singh reads this
small tribute from a grateful commander, for his untiring efforts to keep me in
touch.
“There was a sad sequel to Tewari’s visit. He asked my permission to visit 1/9 Gorkhas
and I readily agreed. When the Gorkhas
were attacked, Tewari found himself in the midst of any infantry battle. He was taken prisoner after the Chinese had
overrun the position. Who has ever heard
of a Commander Signals being sent to an infantry battalion on the night before
a massive attack. He would have been at
Divisional HQ attending to Division’s requirements”.
Many years later, Major General K.K. Tewari was
interviewed and his impressions recorded on tape. He was also given a
questionnaire dealing with various events of that momentous period. In response
to a specific question regarding failure of communications, he said:-
“Lot of incorrect
statements have appeared in books and other articles written on 1962 Ops,
regarding failure of signal communications. Major Ohri in his book “Chinese
Invasion of NEFA” talks of only an Artillery
set providing the only communications
from 7 Infantry Brigade to the outside world on 20 October. This is absolutely false. There was no rear link of Artillery from Namkachu
area. Upto the time when the Chinese
attack came on 20 October morning, both line and radio communications at HQ 7
Infantry Brigade forward as well as rearward were fully operational and working
entirely satisfactorily. Lines were
systematically cut by the Chinese early that morning. This included the line to the DZ at Tsangdhar
prior to the commencement of attack which was preceded by a heavy barrage of artillery and mortar
fire. I spent the night of 19/20 October
with 1/9 GR and was sitting on the rear link (B1) radio set talking to Brigadier
Dalvi when the assault on the battalion HQ came and gave him a sort of running
commentary on the battle. I later
flicked the frequency to talk to Divisional HQ at Zimithang and spoke to my
2IC, the late Major Ram Singh. Rear link
radio set of 2 Rajput was destroyed when it received a direct hit on the bunker,
killing its occupants including the Mortar officer Captain Mangat and wounding
the CO, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Rikh seriously. As far as I know, 9 Punjab rear link radio
set was working upto the time perhaps when the control set at brigade HQ packed
up to withdraw. I am not sure of 4 Grenadiers
rear link set.
On my return from China
In fact the only people
left behind were myself with two Signalmen (radio operators) and the RMO
(Regimental Medical Officer), Captain Sud with his wounded in the RAP
(Regimental Aid Post) and we were both taken prisoners of war in the battalion HQ
area. Rest of the personnel of battalion
HQ of 1/9 GR were captured later at other places while retreating and NOT in
the battalion HQ area. It is interesting
to note on Page 357 of Neville Maxwell’s book ‘India ’s
China
Communications were
disrupted only when the Chinese attacked the rear link radio bunker in which I
was sitting on the set with two of my signal operators. I fired with my 9mm Browning pistol and
killed one Chinese and wounded another before the Chinese assaulted the
bunker. The radio set was riddled with
bullets, one of the radio operator killed outright and the other badly wounded.”52
Captain
(later Brigadier) Lakshman Singh has also quoted the remarks of Major General
Niranjan Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi mentioned above. In addition, he writes:-
“Many commanders and
staff officers have blamed communications for their failures in Training
Exercises and in Operations. Brigadier
PS Gill, the then CSO 4 Corps had written in a letter to me dated 30th
January 2002, about his own experience.
I quote: “It is also my (1962) experience that often good signal
communications, for some, was an unmitigated nuisance since the user commander
could be asked for a decision or such like.
So he was always ‘gone forward’ without the rover set. I once even asked one such commander as to
where was his Rover WS. He replied he
did not need one”. Possibly this was
also the reason that Lt Col Mishra CO 9 Punjab
had left the Signals detachment on the Brigade net, as recorded earlier, behind
at Lumla. I have already narrated the
incident of my sacking. ……..
Lakshman Singh writes that his own commander, Brigadier
Dalvi had his own views of Signals and quotes the following excerpts from his
book:-
When the GOC
ordered me to leave at once, I decided that someone had taken leave of his
senses, so I pretended that I could not hear him and could not follow his
orders due to heavy atmospherics. I
asked the operator to tell the GOC to call me again when reception conditions
improved …..”
When Lakshman was informed by the operator
of D1 of this and not being aware of the reason behind the instructions to the
operator, he was most upset. With the 400 watt Transmitter at his disposal, he was
confident and proud of providing communications round the clock. He was also
aware of the quality of the wireless link at that time. He does not remember as
to how he reacted, and whether he spoke to the BM or the Commander. He goes on
to give another excerpt from Dalvi’s book:-
“Again ….. 4 Division’s Signals Regiment
managed to get a telephone line through from Division to 7 Brigade over the Hatungla Pass.
……..On 16 October I was
able to set up my HQ at Rongla about 1000 yards from Dhola post. The location was not ideal but only one
possible in the circumstances, unless I went to Tsangdhar.
Lakshman wonders what would have
happened if the headquarters had been set up at Tsangdhar. Perhaps all of them would have been killed or taken
prisoners, on 20 October when the Chinese attacked. But this new location was the beginning of
all his troubles in so far as communications go. It was totally unsuitable for wireless
communications, heavy screening by thick vegetation and over head cover of
thick jungle trees, it was also sited deep in the valley of the River Namka
Chu, with massive mountain features between the Brigade HQ and the Division TAC
HQ at Ziminthaung. In one stroke he had
lost the advantage of the heights provided by Tsangdhar. All the signal officers of the battalions had
been called to the Brigade HQ on 18 October for tying up the
communications as he was having difficulty in contacting 9 Punjab and 4
Grenadiers, mainly due to siting of the sets and the terrain. The Signals detachments of these two
battalions were still on move, since they had been inexplicably left behind at
Lumpu and they had opened their own sets on B1.53
Brigadier P.S. Gill, the Chief Signal Officer IV
Corps, also refutes the charge of communication failure. In his letter of 30
January 2002 to Lakshman Singh, he writes:-
“Those days I personally (from Tezpur) closed
down the VHF (AN/TRC) link at Sela, as everyone of any consequence had
vanished. The same happened at Darrang (4 Div HQ) and Bomdila (48 Bde HQ).
Sodhi (who had taken KK’s place) contacted me to know what he should do now
that Anant Pathania and his GSO1 Manohar were nowhere to be seen. I authorised
him to make his own way as best as practical. Lakhanpal, the 48 Bde Signals
Officer, contacted me and presented a similar situation and I had to authorise
the ‘pull-out’ and a move back by certain ‘bounds’. He was intercepted by the
Chinese at the second bound and was olliged to hide till nightfall in a nearby
stream. A week later he turned up looking famished and under weight, but in
good heart.
At the HB Committte
later on, of course Signals were the favourite whipping boy. I however had
taken good care, to provide convincing proof to the contrary in every case.
Even our DD Sigs (Chakerburti) had turned up at Tezpur ‘to know what went
wrong. I directed him to the BGS who directed him back to me, saying ‘nothing
went wrong, and, to remember PS Gill gave us signal comns while we were
retreating.” 54
Signal Task Force (Project Tusker)
Two Signal Task Forces were raised
at the General Reserve Engineering Forces (GREF) Centre at Allahabad Jammu and Kashmir
The priority task assigned to the Force
after arriving in NEFA was to construct two permanent line routes viz. North Lakhimpur – Lakhabali – Along and Tezpur – Misamari
(Foothills) – Dirang Dzong – Bomdila – Tawang. Both routes were to be built up
on 300 lbs copper wire. To start with
only one pair was to be built on each of the two routes. In September 1962, One of the routes had
reached just short of Bomdila when the Chinese started infiltrating across the
border. After the infiltration commenced,
Colonel Panwar ensured that only regular Army personnel were used for the
construction ahead of Bomdila whereas GREF personnel were used for construction
work in the rear, well away from the border.
The Task Force was under the command of 4 Infantry Division.
When the induction of troops into
the Namka Chu Area started, the Task Force provided assistance by making
available all its transport for the move.
The transport fleet with the Task Force -Nissan vehicles - was better
than that with the Division which largely held the Second - World War vintage
15 cwt trucks. When it became clear that the Chinese meant business, Colonel
Panwar speeded up the construction of the route Bomdila – Dirang Dzong – Sela –
Tawang. Colonel Panwar managed to obtain
some radio sets AN/TRC with which he established a radio relay link from
Bomdila to Sela to provide a duplex speech circuit. After the initial attack on
20 October 1962, there was a lull in the battle that lasted almost a month.
When the next major action took place on 17 November, Colonel Panwar was watching
a film in the Officers’ Mess. His
Adjutant, Captain S.V.S. Chaudhary, quietly walked up to him and told him that
both Bomdila and Dirang Dzong were cutoff.
Colonel Panwar immediately spoke to the Brigadier General Staff at HQ IV
Corps and came to know that the Chinese had once again infiltrated and cutoff
the lines.
Next day, on 18 November, Bomdila
fell. Colonel Panwar spoke to Lieutenant
Colonel G.S. Sodhi, who had taken command of
4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment after the capture of Lieutenant
Colonel K.K. Tewari. Colonel Sodhi informed him that they were abandoning
Bomdila within the next hour. Six
personnel of the Corps of Signals who were part of the Task Force and were
involved in the maintenance of the lines ahead of Bomdila were killed. On 20 November the Chinese declared a
unilateral ceasefire. Later it was
discovered that almost the entire route built up by the Task Force had been
stripped of the copper wire. The Chinese
had probably taken away all the copper.
LADAKH
Daulet Beg Oldi
Daulat Beg Oldi abbreviated as DBO,
was an important post in Ladakh on the Old Silk Route
The Chinese had been building up
their strength in the sector from July 1962 onwards, unhindered due to own lack
of resources and also the policy of not provoking the Chinese. Shortly before the invasion, on 19 October
1962 the Chinese had surrounded or dominated all the Indian posts in Chip Chap
valley. The Chinese started their offensive on 19 October 1962 with simultaneous
attacks on two Indian posts, one held by a section of 14 J&K Militia and
the other by a few men of 5 Jat. The Chinese used more than a company supported
by mortars and medium machine guns against each post, whose defences consisted
of open trenches and sangars (stones
placed in a heap above ground level). The posts fought back and withstood the
Chinese onslaught until next morning when they went out of communications with
the Headquarters, this being the first indication that they had been overrun.
In the early hours of the morning on
20 October, the Chinese launched attacks on two other posts on the northern
bank of Chip Chap River
During the night of 21 October, the remaining
isolated posts were ordered to fall back on DBO, which was soon surrounded by
the Chinese. On 22 October, the battalion commander sought the brigade
commander’s permission to withdraw the troops to a more defensible position.
The Corps HQ was fully in picture and as early as 20 October itself had ordered
114 Brigade to withdraw the isolated posts. However, DBO, Post 14 (Jyotish), Track
Junction, Sultan Chushku, and Galwan Shyok river junction which were tactically
sound were to be strengthened and held.
At 6 p.m. on 22 October 1962, HQ 114
Brigade asked 14 J&K Militia to commence withdrawal, which started at 9 pm.
To deceive the enemy who had been known to be intercepting our wireless nets,
the Battalion Commander passed a false
message to HQ 114 Brigade indicating that he had decided to hold on to DBO and
Track Junction. The withdrawing troops destroyed all heavy stores, including 3
inch mortars, recoilless guns and most wireless sets. The platoon of 1 Mahar refused
to destroy their Vickers machine guns and carried them along. The seven
available vehicles - mostly jeeps and a few 1 tons - were loaded with the sick
and wounded and driven on the frozen river surface. However, about 24 km from
DBO, the frozen surface gave way under the weight of the vehicles which had to
be abandoned. It was an organized withdrawal, with the advance party led by Major
Randhawa, who was familiar with the route and the main body under Lieutenant Colonel
Nihal Singh. A rear party consisting of a platoon of J&K Militia under Captain
S.P. Rigzin occupied the dominating features of Pt 18763, withdrawing only on
23 October to a half way point. This
marked the end of the fighting in Daulet Beg Oldi during the 1962 operations.
Changchenmo and Galwan
The Galwan post was held by a
company of 5 Jat, with the rest of the battalion at Phobrang. The posts at Hot Spring, Nala Junction and Patrol
Base were held by a platoon each, in addition to a post opposite the Chinese
position at Tsogtsalu. In the first week
of October, 5 Jat relieved 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, which had been holding the post
earlier when it had been in the news in September for not budging when
surrounded by the Chinese. Coinciding with their attack elsewhere in the Ladakh,
the Chinese launched an attack on Galwan post in the early hours of 20 October
1962. Communications with the post also
ceased but sound of light machine gun and 2 inch mortar firing could be heard
from the direction of the post. On 21
October Indian helicopters sent to fly over the area were fired at by the
Chinese and no contact could be established with Galwan post. On his return the pilot reported that he saw
no signs of life on the post. Details of
the fighting at the Galwan post were known only after the return of Indian prisoners
of war.
The Chinese attack on the post had started
at 5.30 am on 20 October with heavy artillery and mortar bombardment, which
destroyed most of the temporary shelters and tents. After an hour of shelling the Chinese attacked
the forward sections with nearly about a battalion. The defending troops moved
to open trenches and fought a last ditch battle with small arms, there being no
artillery or mortars. After the forward
positions had been overrun the rear positions continued to fight and it was
only in the evening that the Chinese succeeded in capturing the post after
launching their third attack. Out of 68 Indian personnel in Galwan, 36 were killed.
The exact number of Chinese casualties is not known, but they were no doubt
heavy, as can be deduced from the caution they displayed when tackling other posts
such as Patrol Base, Nala Junction and Hot Spring. The Galwan post battle also demolished
the assumption that was the foundation of the ‘Forward Policy’ viz. the Chinese
back down if the defender stands his ground.
After eliminating the Indian posts in
the Galwan valley, the Chinese turned their attention to Changchenmo valley in
the south, which had platoon-sized posts
at patrol Base, Nala Junction and Hot
Spring, with the Company HQ at Hot
Spring. On 21 October, the Chinese
shelled all the three Indian posts. Since
the utility of Patrol Base as a link between the Nala Junction and Galwan posts
had come to an end with the fall of the latter, it was ordered to withdraw to
Nala Junction. As darkness fell, the
platoon broke contact and withdrew, leaving a behind section to cover their
move. Next morning, on 22 October, the Chinese launched an assault on this
section. The men fought with great
bravery and inflicted many casualties on the Chinese before being overwhelmed.
At 2 pm on 22 October 1962, the Chinese
launched an attack on Kongma post on the southern flank which was held by a
platoon 5 Jat, fighting for four hours before being overrun. Out of 33 men at
Kongma only seven survived and withdrew to the Battalion base at Phobrang under
the cover of darkness. The Chinese also
attacked the platoon post at Anne La on the same day. The post fell by last light on 22 October
after a stiff fight. With the fall of
these two posts the Chinese were now in a position to pose a threat to the rear
of the Indians deployed in Changchenmo valley.
The situation became critical, as
from Kongma the Chinese could cutoff the Jats deployed at Hot Spring, Nala
Junction and Tsogatsalu. On 23 October HQ XV Corps issued orders to withdraw
all troops and prepare positions at Tsogatsalu,
Shortly afterwards, HQ 114 Brigade ordered even Tsogatsalu area to be
abandoned and the troops to withdraw to Phobrang. Due to the extreme cold, nearly every one
suffered from frostbite or chilblains during the withdrawal by a difficult
route to Phobrang. The situation soon
stabilized, and on 24 October a platoon under Major Ajit Singh of 5 Jat reoccupied
Nala Junction. By 28 October, 5 Jat had
consolidated their positions from Shyok to Phobrang. The forward positions at Tsogatsalu continued
to be held and Indian patrols could still dominate the area. The Chinese did not attempt any further
advances in this sector and the situation remained unchanged right up to the
ceasefire.
Chushul
The defences at Chushul were held by
two companies of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, After being relieved by 5 Jat in second
week of October 1962, a company less platoon strength was deployed in Siri Jap
complex north of Pangong lake. This post was supplied by boats across the
lake and had no land link with the battalion.
South of Pangong lake was the Yula complex comprising three posts manned
by another company of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles.
Nearly two companies defended the Spangur gap, holding the hill on the
northern shoulder named Gurung hill and to the south named Nagar hill, in
addition to a post in the gap itself.
Since early September the Chinese
had surrounded the Sirijap post. The enemy
strength opposite Chushul sector was estimated to be approx a regiment. At about 6 am on 21 October 1962 the Chinese commenced
their assault on Sirijap after heavy shelling, using light tanks against which
the defenders had no weapons. Soon after the shelling started communication
with Sirijap was disrupted. A patrol from another post reached within 1000
yards of Sirijap-1 but could not see
any signs of life on the post. On its return it reported that the entire post
including the company commander Major Dhan Singh Thapa had been killed. After
capturing Sirijap-1 the Chinese attacked and captured Sirijap-2 after heavy
fighting. The few who escaped reported that after collecting the wounded the
Chinese lined them up and shot them dead.
By 22 October the Chinese were in complete control of the Northern bank
of Pangong Lake
On 21 October, a two mile long
column of Chinese vehicles had been seen proceeding towards Spangur gap by
Indian transport aircraft flying in the area.
The move of Chinese vehicles was confirmed by troops in the area,
causing alarm regarding imminent threat to Chushul. Since there was only a weak
battalion covering the entire front of nearly 60 km from Changchenno to Dungti,
13 Kumaon was ordered to move from Leh to Chushul. A platoon of 1 Mahar with
medium machine guns and a field battery equipped with 25-pounders was also ordered to Chushul. However, the Chinese attack came only after
the lull period was over.
The Indus Valley
The Indus
valley sector to the south of Chushul was held by 7 J&K Militia. The
Battalion HQ with one company was in Koyul, a company was in Dungti and the
rest of the troops were deployed along the passes on the International Border. The Chinese were estimated to have a battalion
located in Tashigong. The Chinese
attacks in this sector started on 27 October, with simultaneous assaults on Changla,
Jarala, New Demchok and High Ground (northwest of Demchok).
Changla was a well dug-in post held
by 17 men of 7 J&K Militia under a Junior Commissioned Officer. Early on the morning of 27 October, the
Chinese opened fire on the Indian post with machine guns mounted on vehicles. The
Indians returned the fire with 2-inch mortars, setting fire to the leading
Chinese vehicles. As the enemy came closer, he was engaged with rifles and
machine guns. After fighting resolutely for three hours, when he found himself
surrounded by about 300 Chinese, the post commander decided to withdraw.
Dividing his men in two parties, he ordered half of them to move while the
other remained to give covering fire, he himself manned the light machine
gun. Most of the men were able to withdraw
to Fukche but the post commander was killed. .
Jarala, which was held by 17 men
under a Havildar, was attacked at the same time as Changla. About 200 Chinese surrounded
the post from all sides and began firing with machine guns, the Indians replying
with 2-inch mortars and light machine guns. After fighting through the day, at
last light the post commander decided to break-out and rejoin the battalion
main defences at Koyul. Using fire and
move, the men successfully withdrew during the night.
In the south at New Demchok and High
Ground the situation was different. High
Ground was a well dug position held by five platoons, which had two sections of
3-inch mortars and two medium machine guns. About 200 to 300 Chinese attacked the position
in the early hours of 27 October. However, in the face of defensive fire of
mortars and machine guns they had to beat a hasty retreat, after suffering
heavy casualties. For the rest of the day, the Chinese were pinned down and
could not move, since the ground was open. Unfortunately, the fall of Changla, Jarala and New Demchok cut
the route of withdrawal maintenance for the post, forcing it to pull out. Reluctantly, Battalion HQ ordered the post to
withdraw at 7.30 pm on 27 October and the men were redeployed at Fukche.
New Demchok post across the Indus was a ‘Forward Policy’ post on the International
border, not tactically sited. It was
held by two platoons who were deployed in the historic Zorawar fort area. About 400 Chinese attacked the post on the
morning of 27 October and suffered heavy casualties due to the heavy fire from
Zorawar fort. Some Chinese crossed the Indus and positioned themselves in the area of old
Demchok on the western bank between High Ground and New Demchok, threatening
the southern positions of 7 J&K Militia. The troops were ordered to
withdraw in conjunction with those at High Ground during the night 27/28
October. The withdrawal was successfully
completed and the men reached Koyul by 11.30 pm after evading a Chinese
road-block under cover of darkness.
The newly established 3 Himalayan
Division as well as HQ XV Corps considered a withdrawal from Koyul as well, but
left the decision to the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.M.
Banon. He preferred to stay put and
strengthen the defences rather than withdraw.
As a result, the Indians continued to occupy these positions. There was some confusion regarding outposts
at Hanle, Zarser and Chumar which were held by CRP/ITBP and were not in
communication after 27 October. These posts
were also presumed to have fallen to the Chinese but it was learnt on 31 that
they all were intact. When the fighting in this sector ended on 28 October, the
Chinese had established control of the eastern hills flanking the Indus valley. They
dominated the road that passed through the valley, denying its use to the
Indians. The Chinese had apparently achieved
their aim and there was no further fighting in this sector.
The Lull: 28 October to
18 November
With a well co-coordinated Chinese
attack in Ladakh and NEFA on 20 October 1962, the basic hypothesis of the
‘Forward policy’ stood disproved. HQ Western Command, which had been pleading for deployment based
on military logic considerations rather than guess work, felt itself vindicated
and now put into action its own plan for
the defence of Ladakh. The earlier
operating injunction about not withdrawing resources and troops facing Pakistan Pakistan
Many new formations and units were
raised to control the large number of troops deployed in the sector. On 26 October 1962, Major General Budh Singh,
MC raised 3 Himalayan Division at Leh. HQ 114 Brigade was moved to Chushul and made
responsible for Chushul and Phobrang sectors.
Brigadier R.S. Grewal, MC, arrived in Leh with HQ 70 Infantry Brigade on
25 October and took over responsibility of the Indus Valley
To enhance the
fire power of troops in Ladakh, 13 Field Regiment equipped with 25-pounder
field guns was inducted. One battery of
this unit was already in Chushul. By 3
November another battery reached Dungti.
The third battery was located in Leh along with the Regimental Headquarters.
114 Heavy Mortar Battery
equipped with 4.2 inch mortars was inducted in Chushul between 26 October and
31 October. One troop was sent to Lukung
to support 5 Jat and the rest of the battery was sent to Dungti. The Indian Air Force achieved a major feat
when the AN-12 aircraft airlifted a troop of AMX-13 tanks of 20 Lancers to
Chushul on 25 October 1962.
On 30 October, HQ XV Corps informed the Army
Commander, Western Command that 3 Himalayan Division was not being asked to make
any plan for withdrawal from Chushul, as it was felt that this would have an adverse
effect on the morale of the troops who had given a good account of themselves
in the recent battles with the Chinese. Orders were issue that Chushul and
Dungti were to be defended to the last man.
A bid was also made for close air support for the defensive battle.
All possible routes to Leh were held
in strength. In the north, D Sector with
strength of nearly two battalions held Saserla, Sultan Chushku, Shyok, and Galwan-Shyok
river junction. The route passing over
Changla was defended at the pass itself, as well as at Dorbuk. To give depth to the Changla defences, troops
were deployed at Phobrang and Chushul with some artillery support. In the Indus Valley
Battles of Rezangla and
Gurung Hill
The Chinese utilized the lull period
to build up their strength in the Spangur area.
This was not hidden from Indian troops occupying Gurung hill and Yula
III, who duly reported these activities.
In the absence of long range weapons and the decision to not use the Air
Force, the Indians did not have the capability to interfere with the Chinese
build up, which continued unabated. The Indian build up was proceeding apace
but it had been decided to not send the newly inducted troops to threatened
areas like Chushul.
After the raising of 3 Himalayan
Division, 114 Brigade moved to Chushul on 27 October and assumed sole responsibility
for the defence of this sector. Out of the three battalions that were part of
the Brigade, 1 Jat had a company each at Tokung, Yula III and Lukung with the
rest of the battalion at Gompa Hill. 1/8
GR was deployed to cover the northern flank of Spangur gap, with two companies
on Gurung hill and a company to the north of Pt 5167. The fourth company was located in the Spangur
gap itself, while the battalion headquarters was located at the airfield with
an adhoc company as reserve. 13 Kumaon was
looking after the southern flank with two companies on Muggar Hill, a company
with a section of 3 inch mortars at Rezangla and battalion headquarters with
one company at Track Junction. Tsakala
also had a company of 5 Jat. The total
frontage held by the brigade was nearly 40 km.
Most of the troops were committed to a ground - holding role and the
only reserves available at the brigade level were two troops of tanks and an
adhoc company located at the airfield.
The Chinese had concentrated nearly
a regiment plus a battalion in the vicinity of the Spangur gap. The two major concentrations were in area north
of Gurung hill and in Spangur gap itself.
They had deployed their heavy mortars in the gap in full view of the
Indians deployed on Gurung hill. On 29
October the Chinese opened mortar fire on Gurung hill. Once the Indian guns opened up and engaged
the Chinese Observation Post located at Black Top that overlooked Gurung hill,
the Chinese promptly stopped their fire.
The real Chinese attack in this
sector started on 18 November, coinciding with their attack on Se La in NEFA. In
a coordinated attack on Chushul defences the Chinese used nearly two battalions
in south against Rezangla and about a regiment in the north. Rezangla is an isolated 18,000 ft high
feature, about 11 km south of Spangur gap.
The importance of Rezangla was that it dominated the road link with Leh via
Dungti, which was the life line of the Chushul garrison. The nearest Indian position to the south was a
5 Jat company at Tsakla. The Rezangla
position, though forming part of the main defences, was thus in reality an
isolated company post. The battery of 13
Field Regiment located in Spangur gap could not support Rezangla, which only
had a section of 3-inch mortars located within the company position as fire
support. In view of its isolated
location, the company was sited for all round defence.
Early in the morning on 18 November,
the forward observation post to the south of company defences detected nearly
400 Chinese approaching the defences. The company immediately went to their trenches
but held their fire, waiting for the Chinese to come within range. Soon,
nearly a battalion of the enemy assaulted Rezangla from the south and the east.
At about 5 am, when the enemy had climbed up the slopes and was within range,
the Kumaonis opened fire. Caught in the deep nullahs, the Chinese suffered heavy
casualties from 3-inch mortars and grenades.
After nearly half an hour of intense fighting the attack lost momentum,
the assaulting Chinese taking shelter behind boulders.
Once the Chinese failed to capture
the position by a silent attack, they opened artillery and mortar fire. Though
the fire was not very effective and did not cause much damage to the defences,
the telephone lines to the Battalion HQ were cut and the radio set
destroyed. C Company of 13 Kumaon was
now out of touch with the rest of the battalion. The post at Tsakala could see the firing and
reported the news of fight to the Battalion HQ. Under the cover of artillery fire, two companies of Chinese
troops attacked the rear platoon. The
Indians jumped out of their trenches and tackled the enemy with bayonets and
even bare bands. All the men of the platoon died fighting, and there was not a
single survivor. However, the 3-inch
mortars were continuously firing at the advancing enemy at point blank range
and the ground was littered with dead Chinese soldiers. The Company Commander, Major Shaitan Singh,
moved from trench to trench, encouraging his men and redeploying the light
machine guns. He was ably assisted by his Havildar Major, who was always at his
side and with his fixed bayonet he warded off attacks on the Company Commander,
sending many Chinese soldiers to their graves.
Rezangla was a hard fought battle. The
Indian machine gun fell silent only at about 10 pm. The ferocity of the fighting can be gauged
from the fact that out of 112 all ranks at Rezangla, only 14 survived and no prisoners
were taken by the Chinese. In November
1963, nearly a year after the battle, the dead bodies were recovered by the
Indian Red Cross. The parties that
visited Rezangla saw the place littered with field dressings and blood marks,
giving some idea of the heavy losses suffered by the Chinese. The Company
Commander, Major Shaitan Singh, was awarded the Param Vir Chakra for the battle
of Rezangla.
The Chinese attacked Gurung hill
complex simultaneously with their attack on Rezangla. At 5.30 am on 18
November, the Chinese began intense bombardment of Gurung hill as well as the
Indian posts located in the Spangur gap and Muggar Hill. Two companies of 1/8
Gorkha Rifles were defending the East area of Gurung Hill. The first wave of
the attackers made contact with the northern company on Gurung hill at 6.30 am. When still outside small arms range, they
were engaged by accurate fire from the troop of 13 Field Regiment. The enemy launched a series of attacks and
after two hours succeeded in occupying some portions of Gurung hill. The Gorkha came out of their trenches and
fell on them with their khukris (a
small curved knife). Unable to face this fierce onslaught, the Chinese fell
back. By 10 am the situation became stable and Gurung hill remained firmly in
Indian hands.
The Chinese soon launched another
attack, which was preceded by intense shelling.
The brave Gorkhas were finally overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers
and the forward platoon fell. Out of 17
men in this platoon, not even one survived. The Chinese then turned their
attention to the lower company. At this
stage, they came under accurate fire from the tank troop of 20 Lancers. With no answer to the tanks, the Chinese
suffered heavily and fell back.
The Gorkhas had suffered heavy
casualties, with nearly 50 killed and several wounded. With the shelling of the airfield and
village, reinforcements as well as ammunition supply was difficult. At this
crucial juncture the line and radio communications link between Gurung hill and
Battalion HQ as well as Brigade HQ was disrupted due to heavy shelling. Keeping
in mind the overall picture, HQ 114 Brigade decided to withdraw the troops from
Gurung hill, Muggar hill, Spangur post and Tokung and to redeploy them on mountains
West of Chushul. This was in conformity
with instructions of HQ XV Corps, and the new positions had been already decided.
The closing down of Chushul airfield and the threat to Dungti track after the fall
of Rezangla meant that the brigade was now dependent on the long and difficult
mule track from Leh that passed over Changla and reached Chushul via Tangtse
and Tartar camp. It was clear that while
the defenders might be able to hold on for some more time, the sacrifice in men
and material would not be justified. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier T.N.
Raina, ordered a withdrawal on the night of 19/20 November.
The withdrawal was conducted in an
orderly manner and most of the major equipment was retrieved. A major share of the credit for the successful
withdrawal is due to the battery of 13 Field Regiment, which carried out accurate
shelling on the Chinese positions during this period. On 19 November the
Chinese launched another determined attack around mid-day on Gurung hill. But the artillery and tank fire was so accurate
that the enemy had to fall back and made no further attempt. After the Indian troops had withdrawn, the
Chinese occupied Gurung hill. The
Chinese did not follow the withdrawing Indians.
They also made no attempts to secure the Chusul airfield for their own
use, as that would have meant tackling the Indian defences west of
Chushul.
Chushul was the only organized defensive battle
fought by the Indian Army in 1962. Though
the Chinese outnumbered the Indians and had more fire support, the contest was close,
and honours even. If 114 Brigade had an
extra battalion and an artillery regiment, which is the normal fire support
complement of a brigade, it is quite likely that they would have been able to
repel the attacks on Gurung hill and Rezangla and win the battle of Chushul.
114 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company in Ladakh
114 Infantry Brigade Signal Company
was in Leh at the beginning of the year 1962.
The company was then under the command of Major P.K. Mukherji with Captain P.C Route Jammu Captain Route Jammu Military
Hospital in Allahabad Captain
Route
Since 114 Brigade was directly under
HQ XV Corps, technical control over the Signal Company was exercised by Chief
Signal Officer XV Corps, Colonel Ajit Singh. To cater for the increased
commitments of the Signal Company, it was given some additional equipment. In
February 1962 it received one medium power radio set SCR 399 and two PE 95
generators from Chief Signal Officer XV Corps. A month later, trials were
carried out of radio set SCR 694 with hand generators GN 58 on Road Leh –
Sheora at a distance of about 50 miles, climbing to a height of approximately
17,000 ft. The communication on the link was found to be quite good. It was
therefore decided to use the set with the Brigade Commander’s Rover. In April
1962 Brigadier S.N. Gairola, who had taken over as the Chief Signal Officer XV
Corps, visited Leh and discussed the communications problems with the Officer
Commanding. Shortly after this, four miles of additional cable electric W110B
(Single) was sent to Daulet Beg Oldi by helicopter along with two wireless sets
48 for providing wireless communications
for patrols in the area. In May, trials were carried out with radio set 76 and
R209 on Road Leh – Rangbir Pura – Kaura at a distance of 15 miles.
By this time, another officer Lieutenant P.B. Vartak
had also joined. In the middle of the year Major R.M. Rajan was posted in and
assumed the appointment of Company Commander, Captain Route
By 10 October 1962, the 50 men from
T Communication Zone Signal Regiment had arrived at Leh and taken over the
signal centre, local lines and rear wireless links. After the Chinese attacks on 20 October 1962
on Daulat Beg Oldi, Galwan and Changchenmo valley, things moved rapidly. It was
decided to move HQ 11 Infantry Brigade to Chushul, with the newly raised 3
Himalayan Division being located at Leh. On 25 October Major Rajan was sent to
carry out reconnaissance for a new location for the Brigade HQ on Axis Leh –
Dungti. The Tactical Group of HQ 11 Infantry Brigade left Leh next morning at 4
am. It was accompanied by the advance party of the Signal Company under Captain
Harbhajan Singh, who had reported arrival only two days earlier to relieve Captain Route
Brigadier S.N. Gairola, Chief Signal
Officer XV Corps, visited Chushul on 7 November. He was accompanied by
Lieutenant Colonel Harjit Singh, Commander Signals 3 Himalayan Division. By 10 November full scale line and wireless
communications had been established with all posts and battalion headquarters
and to Leh. The detachment of 2 Company, T Communication Zone Signal Regiment in
Chushul was relieved and de-inducted. Line communication between Chushul and
Leh was provided by extending the existing permanent line at Shera to Chushul by
ground PVC cable. This was done with the assistance of 11 Signal Company, Project
Beacon.
On 16 November the Brigade
Commander, Brigadier T.N. Raina, sent Major Rajan to Leh to bring up the remnants
of the Brigade HQ and some additional signal equipment. Shortly afterwards, the
Chinese attacked Rezangla and Gurung Hill.
However, the communications remained stable and was commended by the
Brigade Commander. Immediately after
this it was decided to move the Brigade HQ to Tariar Camp. On 19 November a
line was laid to the new location. On 27 November the advance party of the
Brigade HQ and Signal Company moved to Thangse, with the main body arriving two
days later. Communications at Chushul were handed over to a detachment of 2
Company, T Communication Zone Signal Regiment. On 10 December, the Brigade HQ and Signal
Company moved again, to Darbuk. By 12 December lines had been laid to all units
of the Brigade in Darbuk. Rearward communication to Leh was established by a poled
PVC route between Leh and Darbuk via Changla.56
Air
Support Signals in Ladakh
The
Air Support Signal Unit (ASSU) was located in Palam
(Delhi Cantt). Its tentacles were spread
all over Ladakh. Each tentacle consisted of three men, a WS 62 and a 300 W
charging engine and a 40 1b tent. Brigadier T. Barreto, the Chief Signal
Officer Western Command has this to say about air support during the operations
in Ladakh:-
I visited
some of these tentacles when I was CSO Western Command, and was distressed to
see the condition of these small detachments attached to infantry
battalions. I particularly remember the
one at THOISE and their little 40 1b tent, completely uncared for.
I tried, unsuccessfully, to impress on Sigs Dte and
the Air Force that I could not guarantee communication with WS 62 from these
tentacles in Ladakh to Palam. These
tentacles were designed to call for support from air-fields in North Africa
which were within 40 miles of the front.
I had on my office
table in Simla the wireless diagram of the ASSU layout. When the Chinese attacked, I read the SITREP
every morning. One by one these infantry
battalions were over run and with them the ASSU detachment. I crossed out relevant circle in my diagram. Eventually there were hardly any left. In any case, as Air Force was not used, air
support was never called for.
I tried to plan a control station at SRINAGAR which
would relay calls for air support by SCR-399 to Palam but the Air Force did not
agree.
CONCLUSION
The Sino – Indian Conflict of 1962 is an important
landmark in the history of India India Assam
For the Indian Army, the war with China
Perhaps the saddest part of the 1962 war is the fact that the real
story has still not been revealed to the public. An official enquiry was
ordered by Army HQ to go into the reasons for the debacle. It was headed by
Lieutenant General Henderson-Brooks, with Brigadier P.S. Bhagat, VC, as the
only other member. The Enquiry Report was submitted to the Chief of Army Staff
on 12 May 1963, and he in turn forwarded it to the Defence Minister on 2 July
1963. Though it had been ordered by the Army Chief, the Ministry of Defence
decided that its contents should not be made public, and it was graded as Top
Secret. This was probably because it showed certain failings on the part of the
political leadership, including Nehru, Krishna Menon and a few others in the
Government. It also brought out the failures in the military leadership. Though the Report was not made public, the
Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, made a statement in Parliament on 2 September
1963, in which he referred to certain portions of the Report, and its
recommendations.
The four specific terms of
reference which the Enquiry had been asked to examine were shortcomings in
training and equipment; system of command; physical fitness of troops; and
capacity of commanders at all levels to influence the men under them. The
Enquiry decided to include three other points, pertaining to operational
aspects, in order to give a comprehensive picture. It thus also covered
intelligence; staff work and procedures; and the higher direction of
operations. Though the report was never made public, Neville Maxwell was
somehow able to read it, and he has written about it in his book 'India's China
War'. 57
It is generally agreed that the 1962 conflict should not be taken as
a yardstick for assessing the performance of the Indian Army, which was
severely handicapped by factors such as political interference, inferior leadership in the higher echelons of
the Army, lack of training, shortages of weapons, equipment and clothing and so
on. In a sense the Army fought with one hand tied behind its back and it was no
surprise that it was bested by the adversary. Though every arm and service
faced difficulties, the ones confronting Signals were unusual. The demands placed on 4 Divisional Signal Regiment
were truly extraordinary. It was saddled
with the responsibility of providing communications not only for its own division
but also the corps headquarters, before the latter could raise its own signal
regiment. In addition, it had to look after the tactical headquarters of
Eastern Command and XXXIII Corps, as well as that of the Inspector General
Assam Rifles (IGAR) in Tezpur.
Apart from being overburdened by the task of catering for so many
headquarters, the unit had to meet the exceptional demands of clearing messages
not just to the next higher or lower formations but direct to command headquarters
and Delhi with the highest precedence and security classification. To add to this unusual load were the numerous
para military forces like the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB), Assam
Rifles, Project ‘Tusker’ (Border Roads) with their peculiar needs and demands.
All this has to be viewed in the light of the psychological impact of the Chinese attack on
minds conditioned by intelligence inputs that asserted that only one in three
Chinese was armed and that too with old Japanese rifles with defective ammunition!
If commanders raised doubts or sounded the alarm they were told all too often
not to complain and flap as the Chinese are not going to attack, quoting the
highest authority in the defence set up, the Defence Minister.
The
most difficult problem faced by Signals was the lack of experience and peculiar
traits of certain senior commanders, such as General Kaul. According to General
Tewari:-
For a three star general to give a 2/3 page message at a forward
post on 5 Oct (even before the troops had time to settle down and establish
communications on obsolete radio equipment which had been man packed up there)
not only marked as FLASH and TOPSECRET but addressed to the highest in Delhi
political authorities with copies to intermediate army formations like Command
and Corps HQ – just shows complete disregard and even basic knowledge of
available communication facilities in the new field area. There were no machine
cipher facilities for enciphering but only the book ciphers of low
classification and morse code key transmission of enciphered version. Number of
available cipher staff was another major factor – only meant to cater for
normal divisional traffic and not be flooded with traffic imposed big higher
commanders. Should not the worthy Corps Commander have known this? All this was
at to be at the expense of establishing minimum communication channels and
coping with their primary responsibilities of handling Signals traffic at
brigade, divisional level for normal functioning while still in the process of
settling down.
Literally, it was an
impossible situation and it is being described by one who was involved
personally as the Comdr Sigs of the Div at the time - by one, who had gone
through Burma operations in World War 2 with air supply and other facilities.
And now in Oct 1962, to be faced with denial of even basic clothing and
equipment and on top of that to be imposed with impossible demands while being
threatened with consequences, in case of failure.
Like
the rest of the Army, the 1962 war proved to be a boon for Signals. The
shortcomings were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken in hand
literally on a ‘war footing’. Equipment shortages were soon made up by
resorting to indigenous manufacture and imports. American aid equipment soon
started flowing in, augmenting and enhancing the capability of Signals. Radio
sets such as AN/PRC 25 and AN/PRC 10, which were much lighter than the World
War II vintage sets such as 19 and 62 were a Godsend for the Corps. Radio relay
was also formally inducted and authorised to the newly raised mountain
divisions, which were raised in the wake of the 1962 conflict. The capabilities
of brigade signal sections were upgraded by converting them into brigade signal
companied, commanded by majors. To look after communications in the rear areas,
communication zone signal regiments were raised. The task of building permanent
line routes in borders areas was taken up in earnest by line construction
sections which were raised for this purpose.
The
person responsible for planning and implementing these far reaching changes in
Signals was the Signal Officer-in-Chief, Lieutenant General R.N. Batra. The
situation is best described in Raj Batra's own words:-
But
then, and if I can say fortunately, came the Chinese intrusion in the month
of October 1962, and like the rest of the Army, our Corps too was caught
completely off balance, At that time, I was already a member
of the P&T Board, and to
supplement our single and totally unreliable speech and teleprinter circuits
rented from the P&T department to our newly formed Corps Headquarters at
Tezpur, the P&T department kindly gave me a full time liaison officer based in Guwahati, and under his supervision our line
construction sections built an open 4
wire copper carrier route from Guwahati to Tezpur in record time. In addition,
P&T department put up a carrier centre for the exclusive use of our Corps
Headquarters at Tezpur in Army accommodation.
They also strengthened their existing carrier centre at Guwahati and with
these we were then able to obtain reliable speech and teleprinter circuits from
Army HQ and Command HQ to the Corps
HQ. Forward of Corps HQ, of course all
Signal communications were provided and maintained by our Corps.
However, when the withdrawal (shall I say the
disorganised retreat) started, my CSO Corps, (Brigadier P.S. Gill) telephoned
me to say that he had orders to blow up this specially installed carrier centre at Tezpur. I had to use all my powers
to persuade the Chief, General P.N.
Thapar, to prevent this from happening. He very kindly issued direct
orders to both Army Commander
and Corps Commander regarding this. This
non destruction of the carrier centre paid off really well in later days after
the Chinese withdrawal.
Because of the
Chinese intrusion, not only we did get
considerable American help in terms of equipment but also our Government
realized the necessity of modernising
Signal equipment and considerably loosened their purse strings.
Therefore, after years of stagnation, we were able to get considerable types and
quantities of new Signal equipments. It also gave tremendous incentive to LRDE,
BEL and ITI to develop a new generation of the much needed new signal
equipments for our Army. If I may, in all humility, say that I was lucky to get
this circumstantial golden opportunity, and I grabbed it to the maximum
advantage of the Army.58
Endnotes –Chapter 4
1.
Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, Thacker and Company, Bombay
2.
Major General D.K.
Palit, War in High Himalaya
– The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, 1969, pp.
38-44.
3.
Dalvi, p.151
4.
War Diary 9 Punjab .
5.
War Diary 9 Punjab .
6.
Dalvi, p.193
7.
Lieutenant General B.M.
Kaul, The Untold Story, p. 363
8.
Dalvi, p.285
9.
War Diary, 7 Infantry
Brigade
10.
Dalvi, p.284
11.
War Diaries, 7 Infantry
Brigade and 9 Punjab .
12.
Kaul, The Untold Story, p. 386
13.
Dalvi, p.327
14. War
Diary, 7 Infantry Brigade
15.
Major General K.K.
Tewari, A Soldier’s Voyage of Self
Discovery, Auroville, 1995. P. 64
16.
War Diary, 4 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment.
17. Brigadier Lakshman Singh, Letters from the Border and Other Less Told
Stories, B.L.S Publishers, NOIDA, 2003, p.42
18. Lakshman Singh, p.185-6
19. Lakshman Singh, p.48
20.
Lakshman Singh, p.56
21.
Lakshman Singh, p.58
22. Tewari, pp. 74-5
23. Lakshman Singh, p.65
24. Tewari, pp. 76-7
25. Lakshman Singh, p.68
26. War
Diary, 7 Infantry Brigade
27. Dalvi,
p.369
28. War
Diary, 7 Infantry Brigade
29. Niranjan Prasad, p.108
30. Lakshman Singh, pp.72-4
31 Lakshman Singh, p.188
32. Lakshman Singh, p.79-89
33. Tewari, pp. 78-80
34. Dalvi,
p.373
35. Major General Niranjan Prasad, The Fall of Towang, 1962, Palit &
Palit, New Delhi
36. Prasad, p. 114
37. Palit, p. 246
38. Major Sita Ram Johri, Chinese Invasion of NEFA, Himalaya
Publications, Khurshed Bagh, Lucknow
39. Johri, p. 105
40. Resume of Activities, 4 Mountain Division
41. Palit, p. 308
42. War Diary, HQ IV Corps (GS Branch)
43. War Diary, HQ IV Corps (GS Branch)
44. Palit, p. 328
45. B.N. Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, p.344
46. Johri, p. 215
47. Johri, p. 226
48. Johri, p. 233
49. War Diary, IV Corps Signal Regiment
50. War Diary, IV Corps Signal Regiment
51. Tewari, pp. 117-19
52 Signal Communications – 4 Infantry
Division in 1962 Operations; Answers to Questionnaire by Major General K.K.
Tewari, CSO Southern Command; Source File No 92 (MCTE), Corps of Signals
History Cell.
53. Lakshman Singh, pp.68-70
54. Lakshman Singh, p. 122
55. War Diary, 114 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company
56. War Diary, 114 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company
57. Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian
Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, p.280
58. V.K. Singh, p. 246
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