Chapter
5
THE
INDO-PAK WAR (1965)
Preview – State of the Corps in 1965. OPERATIONS IN
KUTCH : Op ‘Kabadi’ – Loss of Biar Bet –
Cease Fire & Op ‘Ablaze’. SIGNALS IN THE KUTCH OPERATIONS : Sigs Dte &
Southern Comd – ‘K’ Sector Sig Coy – 50 (I) Para Bde Sig Coy. PAKISTAN’S
OPERATION ‘GIBRALTAR’ : Activities of
Gibraltar Force – Capture of Hajipir Pass – Ops in Tithwal Sector. SIGNALS
IN OPERATION GIBRALTAR : 19 Inf Div Sig
Regt – 68 (I) Inf Bde Sig Coy – 25 Inf Div Sig Regt – 163 Inf Bde Sig Sec – 191
(I) Inf Bde Sig Coy. PAK OPERATION ‘GRAND SLAM’ & RESPONSE BY XV CORPS :
Pak Offensive in Chhamb – The Battle of
OP Hill – The Kishanganga Bulge. SIGNALS
IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’ - XV CORPS SECTOR : Western Comd Sigs – Western Comd Sig Regt –
Western Comd Mob Sig Coy – XV Corps
Sigs – XV Corps Sig Regt – ‘Y’ Comn Z Sig Regt – ‘T’ Comn Z Sig Regt – ‘J’ Comn
Z Sig Regt – 19 Inf Div Sig Regt – 191 (I) Inf Bde Sig Coy - 10 Inf Div Sig
Regt – 41 (I) Inf Bde Sig Coy – 25 Inf
Div Sig Regt. OPERATIONS IN XI CORPS SECTOR : Planning and Preparatory Moves – 15 Inf Div – 7 Inf Div – 4 Mtn
Div – Battle of Asal Utar – 67
Inf Bde
– 23 Mtn Div. SIGNALS
IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’- XI CORPS SECTOR : XI Corps Sigs – XI Corps
Sig Regt -‘Z’ Comn Z Sig Regt –15 Inf Div Sig Regt – 50 (I) Para Bde Sig
Coy – 7 Inf Div Sig Regt – 4 Mtn Div Sig Regt – 2 (I) Armd Bde Sig Coy. I
CORPS OPERATIONS IN SIALKOT SECTOR : Planning
and Build up for Op ‘Nepal’ – 1 Armd Div – 6
Mtn Div – 26 Inf Div – The
Cease-Fire. SIGNALS IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’-
I CORPS SECTOR. : I Corps Sigs – I Corps
Sig Regt – 6 Mtn Div Sig Regt – 26 Inf Div Sig Regt – 1 Armd Div Sig Regt – 14
Inf Div Sig Regt – 1 Air Sp Sig Regt – Air Fmn Sigs. OPERATIONS IN
RAJASTHAN SECTOR : 11 Inf Div. SIGNALS IN RAJASTHAN SECTOR : 11 Inf Div Sig Regt. CONCLUSION
Preview
The
genesis of the Indo-Pak War of 1965 lay in Pakistan’s desire to fulfill her
ambition to annex Jammu & Kashmir and complete the task that remained
unfinished in 1947 when hordes of tribal raiders had entered the State and
reached the outskirts of Srinagar. The military aid received by Pakistan from
USA; India’s defeat at the hands of China in 1962 and her subsequent
pre-occupation with her northern borders; the completion of the Ichhogil Canal
astride the road axis to Lahore; and American
military aid to Pakistan changed the military balance between India and
Pakistan, giving the latter an impression that the time was ripe for inflicting
a crushing defeat on her bigger but militarily ‘weaker’ neighbour.
As
a prelude to the main offensive, Pakistan Kutch in April 1965 with the intention of
testing her newly acquired American weaponry, especially the Patton tank, and
to gauge India India Punjab , as part of Operation ‘Ablaze’. After some skirmishes and the loss of a few
posts like Biar Bet the hostilities in Kutch
ended and a cease-fire was accepted by both sides, largely due to the efforts
of the British Prime Minister. After a meeting between Prime Minster Lal
Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan in London India Punjab instead of withdrawing it to its base in Jhansi
Soon afterwards Pakistan Gibraltar ’, sending thousands of infiltrators into Jammu
& Kashmir in the first week of August 1965 to carry out sabotage,
subversion and indoctrination of the local population, encouraging them to
overthrow Indian rule. India India Hajipir
Pass
After the failure of Operation ‘Gibraltar ’, Pakistan Jammu Kashmir Valley India Sialkot Pakistan Jammu and Kashmir
The offensive by XI Corps started
on 6 September 1965
and that of I Corps a day later. The three divisions of XI Corps – 15, 7 and 4
– commenced their advance concurrently on different axes achieving complete
surprise on the enemy. A brigade of 15
Division crossed the Icchogil canal and reached the outskirts of Lahore 22 September 1965 , in which the unit suffered
heavy casualties. Advancing on the Khalra-Lahore axis, 7 Division had some
initial successes, including the capture of Barki on 11 September after a stiff
fight. 4 Infantry Division ran into the enemy’s 1 Armoured Division which had
concentrated at Kasur for a major offensive into India
The main Indian offensive by the
newly raised I Corps, comprising 1 Armoured Division and three
infantry/mountain divisions – 6, 14 and 26 -
to cut off Sialkot Lahore
In the Rajasthan sector which had
been placed under Southern Command just before the commencement of the 1965 war,
some minor operations were conducted by 11 Infantry Division, which did not
result in any significant gains. While Indian troops captured Gadra City
The cease fire was declared on 23 September 1965 , after a UN
resolution that was accepted by both sides. Subsequently, the Soviet
Union offered to mediate. Prime Minister Shastri and President
Ayub met at Tashkent 4 January 1966
and signed an agreement, giving up all territory captured or occupied during
the war. The crucial Hajipir pass was returned to Pakistan Tashkent
The Corps of Signals played a
prominent role in the Indo-Pak War of 1965. The performance of signals units is
all sectors was, by and large, excellent and was commended by the formation
commanders. However, there were a few instances of communication failure,
mostly at brigade and battalion level.
For ease of understanding, the
operations have been covered sector wise, with the operational details being
covered first, followed by the activities of Signals in the particular sector
or corps zone. Before dealing with the actual history of the war, the state of
the Corps in 1965 has been described briefly.
State of the Corps in 1965
Lines,
wireless/radio, very limited radio relay and signal despatch service (SDS) were
the means of communications in use during the 1965 War. Field signal units were authorised line,
wireless (mostly high frequency) and SDS resources in their establishments.
Radio relay as a means of communication was not authorised to field signal
units, except mountain divisional signal regiments. A few radio relay sections
had been raised, but these were mostly for line of communication functions. In the mountain divisions, signal units were
equipped with better radio equipment, cables and above all radio relay. The
brigade signal sections were upgraded to brigade signal companies. However,
reduced transport affected their capability when deployed in the plains.
Lines
were usually the primary means of communication in all operations of war except
in mobile battle. These included permanent lines (PL) hired from Department of
Posts & Telegraphs (P&T) or Army owned; and field cables (field/carrier
quad, D3/D8 as also assault cables). Cable WD1 with sleeves jointing and a
proportion on dispenser packs began to be received as part of US
Carrier
equipment such as apparatus carrier telephony
(ACT) 1+4, ACT 1+1 and voice
frequency telegraphy (VFT) equipment such as S+DX, transistorised versions, manufactured by
Indian Telephone Industries (ITI) Bangalore started to replace old valve based
similar equipment of World War II vintage. The new versions were much lighter
and easier to align. A very useful but old piece of equipment was balance and
bypass filter unit (BBFU), with which the audio channel could be dropped at
intermediate locations while the carrier channel was strapped through. Vintage
equipment like superposing units was also in use. Carrier and VFT equipment
were mounted in specialist vehicles called TEVs (terminal equipment vehicles).
TEV Type ‘C’ was used at corps level and TEV Type ‘D’ at division. Though
teleprinters were in use at division and upwards, the fullerphone was still in
service mostly in brigades and installations having less signal traffic, for
clearing messages using Morse code.
Radio,
more widely known as wireless, was an important means of signal communications
for the field force, as alternate to lines. At corps, division and brigade,
high frequency wireless were in use. Forward of battalion, both high frequency
(HF) and very high frequency (VHF) sets were authorised. The wireless sets in
the HF range were medium power sets SCR 399 and RS 53, both of World War II
vintage. Wireless sets C11/R210 and 62 were the low power sets in use, with a
few radio sets 19 and 52, work horses of World War II. After the Sino-Indian
conflict of 1962, some mountain divisions were equipped with the AN/GRC 9,
received as part of US
Radio relay had been used by the US
Army Signal Corps during World War II to a limited extent. A few AN/TRC radio
relay sets were available to the Corps in late 1950s. These sets were difficult
to align and not stable. Trials with new radio relay equipment were undertaken
in early 1960s after which C41/R222 started being received. Radio set FM 200
was also under trial. A radio relay section was authorized in the establishment
of a mountain division signal regiment. In1965, radio relay resources were
limited and were mostly kept centralised. R’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment
at Delhi
According to the prevailing law, the
Department of Posts & Telegraphs (P&T) had a monopoly over all
communications in the country and no other organisation could set up any static
communication network. Telecommunication equipment such as switchboards was
manufactured in P&T workshops. Public sector companies such Indian
Telephone Industries and Bharat Electronics, manufactured carrier and radio
equipment. The Corps of Signals was heavily dependent on the P&T and its
infrastructure for back bone/static communications. Similar was the case with
exchanges, telephones and local lines. There was structured and formalised
liaison between Corps of Signals and P&T officers at various levels, from
Army HQ downwards.
Being a commercial organisation,
the P&T Department was not keen to develop line and other communications in
border areas. The Army was therefore
permitted to construct permanent line routes for its use in such areas. There
was a spurt in construction of permanent line routes by the by Corps after the
1962 War, as new roads were constructed and troops deployed along the northern
borders. The scheme was termed BOPEL (Border Permanent Lines). Similar action
was also taken in remote areas in Jammu &Kashmir, Punjab ,
Rajasthan, Gujarat and the North-East.
In
1965, P&T long distance communications in India Punjab , Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir, where most of
the fighting took place, there was hardly any microwave link till then.
Circuits were extended from P&T carrier stations to Signals installations
mostly on underground copper cables. A
few Signals personnel were located at P&T carrier stations for liaison, to
expedite rectification of faults and reorientation of communications. Signals
personnel also ensured that Army’s channels were not unauthorisedly monitored.
In field areas, at places, P&T carrier and VFT stations were housed inside
Army premises.
The
Corps of Signals had set up its own strategic radio network as standby/
complementary to P&T based backbone communications. In addition to linking
stations/formations in the chain of command, certain important stations from
internal security point of view were also linked on STRAN as also locations
where major Army training establishments were located. Circuits derived on
STRAN were extended to signal centres over underground cables/ permanent line
and remote controlled from there. Most of the radio links worked on schedule
but were periodically fully loaded with traffic.
Medium
and high power radio sets like SWAB 8, SWAB 11, HS 31, 53 (all British) and SCR
399 were in use offering radio telephony, radio telegraphy and Morse facilities.
Separate transmitter and receiver stations existed at important military
locations, well away from inhabited areas, spread over scores of acres, to
accommodate equipment, personnel and large HF aerials like rhombic and folded
dipoles. Overhead protection was catered for a portion of transmitters/
receivers as a safety against air attacks. Defence Security Corps personnel
were authorised to guard such installations.
The
Corps of Signals operated a countrywide train despatch service (TDS) to most
military stations in India
There were no secrecy devices in
use over P&T and Army’s systems and radio equipment in 1965. The only
instrument available was the archaic Ultaphone, which provided very low-grade
privacy over telephones. The scales of issue of even this equipment were
meagre. The enemy could therefore pick up a great deal of intelligence by
monitoring our radio and radio relay links and at times by tapping lines in
forward areas.
World
War II vintage book cipher and Type ‘X’ machines were still in use. The
encryption and decryption process was slow and time consuming. As tension along
the borders built up, the cipher traffic increased considerably and the limited
cipher staff could not cope up with the load. To obviate this, security
classification of telegraph circuits derived on lines using VFT equipment was
upgraded, taking into account the security in the areas through which the lines
passed. Also restrictions were placed on officers authorised to originate
messages.1
OPERATIONS
IN KUTCH
Operation
‘Kabadi’
In January 1965 a company of the
Indus Rangers of Pakistan occupied Kanjarkot, a ruined fort about a mile south
of the border on the north-western fringes of the Rann. A meeting of the
commanders of the border posts held on 15 February failed to resolve the issue.
It was then decided to evict the Pakistani intrusion from Kanjarkot and 31
Infantry Brigade was ordered to move from Ahmedabad to Bhuj. On 21 February
Major General P.C. Gupta, GOC Maharashtra & Gujarat Area issued Operational
Instruction No 1 (Operation ‘Kabadi’) to Brigadier S.S.M. Pahalajani, Commander
31 Infantry Brigade, to evict the Pakistanis from Kanjarkot. An infantry
battalion (17 Rajputana Rifles less a company) was already in Bhuj. Pakistan
Lieutenant Colonel (later General
and Chief of Army Staff) K. Sundarji, commanding 1 Mahar and the officiating
brigade commander, recommended the immediate capture of Kanjarkot but this was
not approved by the government. Instead, it was decided to set up the Sardar post,
manned by the State Reserve Police about 500 yards to the south-west of
Kanjarkot, to block the Pakistani route of ingress. Pakistan Pakistan 12
April 1965 . Shortly afterwards Brigadier Pahalajani, who had
returned and assumed command of 31 Brigade, ordered 1 Mahar to vacate Sardar post.
At this stage there was a reorganisation of the Indian forces in Kutch . Kilo Sector
under Major General P.O. Dunn was set up to command the Indian forces in Kutch . 50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade was moved from Agra
Loss of Biar Bet
After the
unsuccessful attempt to capture Sardar post, Pakistan
A unique feature of the operations in Kutch
was that neither side used its air force. It is reported that the Pak Air
Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan rang up his Indian counterpart, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh on 14 April 1965 and
suggested that aircraft of both countries should not fly over the ‘disputed’
area of Kanjarkot as this might escalate the conflict. This was agreed to by
Arjan Singh with the proviso that transport aircraft and helicopters would
continue to be used for supply and casualty evacuation. As a result, none of
the two sides used aircraft in an offensive role during the conflict.
Cease Fire & Operation ‘Ablaze’
The occupation of Biar Bet by Pakistan India China Kutch as this
would result in pulling out troops from the Punjab
and the North East, which were strategically more important. The Rann of Kutch had no strategic or tactical significance
and after a month the area would become impassable due to the monsoons. He
recommended that if necessary, India Pakistan Punjab ,
which would result in more profitable gains and force Pakistan Kutch . Having seen the
result of disregarding military advice in 1962, Shastri accepted the advice of
the Chief. Shortly after wards, Operation ‘Ablaze’ was put into effect, under
which Indian formations moved to their battle locations in Punjab .
Pakistan 17 May 1965 . These posts were later vacated after the
cease fire came into effect.2
The deployment of troops by India Pakistan UK 29 April 1965 . In June 1965 Prime Minister Shastri and President
Ayub met during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London Rann
of Kutch . By July 1965 both sides had withdrawn their troops to
their permanent locations. However, as a mark of prudence, India Punjab
instead of returning to its base at Jhansi
Though Pakistan Kutch (34 killed
and 150 wounded) than India India India China Gibraltar ’,
the ambitious plan to annex the Kashmir .
SIGNALS IN THE KUTCH OPERATIONS
Signals
Directorate &
Southern Command
Major General R.N. Batra, O.B.E. was
the SO-in-C and Brigadier I.D. Verma was the Deputy Director Signals. Colonel
K.S. Garewal, subsequently replaced by Colonel Harchand Singh, was the Deputy
Director Telecommunications, responsible for all communications and equipment
in the Army. From February 1965, when the trouble in Kutch
started, all out efforts were made under by them to provide signal resources in
terms of manpower and equipment to Southern Command. Urgent action was taken to
raise new signal units viz. I Corps Signal Regiment, 10 and 11 Divisional
Signal Regiments. To meet any war situation that might arise, steps were also
taken to procure additional equipment and make up deficiencies of men and
equipment in units. Meetings were held with P&T Department officials to
arrange additional circuits, exchanges and additional permanent line stores and
spares for P&T equipment. General Batra and his staff visited formations
and signal units to ascertain their operational requirements and ensure maximum
operational readiness.
Brigadier
Prem Singh was CSO Southern Command, located at Poona Rann of Kutch started, he had to gather resources from
all over including from other commands and Army HQ to meet the sudden
requirement.
‘K’ Sector Signal Company
When
the operations in Kutch commenced in early
1965, there was no field formation to control them. As mentioned earlier, the
first operational instruction was issued by HQ Maharashtra & Gujarat Area
on 21 February 1965 .
Even after the establishment of ‘K’ Sector under Major General P.O. Dunn, there
was no dedicated signal unit allotted to the force. The responsibility for planning
communications for the operations fell on Lieutenant Colonel H.C. Heffernan,
Deputy Chief Signal Officer (DCSO) Maharashtra & Gujarat Area. Subsequently
Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Unni was appointed DCSO ‘K’ Sector. Based on a signal
appreciation prepared by Colonel Heffernan, the ‘K’ Sector Signal Company was
organised on an ad-hoc basis. In
addition, the resources of 31 Brigade Signal Company, commanded by Major
Ganapathy and later of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company
commanded by Major Y.S. Awasthy, were also pooled for communication tasks in
this Sector.
Major R.K. Verma was commanding
‘K’ Sector Signal Company. Captain Bhupal, the SO 3 (Signals) in HQ Southern
Command was posted as the company officer. He was replaced by Captain S.K.
Paranjape in May 1965. Captain
S.C.
K Sector Signal Company
was an ad-hoc mix of personnel, equipment and vehicles milked from about two
dozen units mostly in Southern Command.
These resources were either on loan or attachment for various periods
during the period February to July 1965, and lacked cohesiveness and
commitment. The state of morale was also low, the administration of personnel
being in a pathetic state. The men were
dispersed at various detachments in an area 150 X 30 kilometres with hardly any
communication amongst themselves. Captain
S.K. Paranjape recalls spending a whole day carrying cash in the morning from
Khavda on the pay day and distributing pay to about a dozen detachments located
at different places along a route of 150 kilometres and returning late in the
evening with some of the cash back from them to send their money orders. The procedure was repeated every month. Officers spent endless hours in making
parade states of personnel and equipment.
Due
to sparse population in the region, the P&T Department had not developed
communications in Kutch and Barmer. The first requirement was to provide reliable
line communications from Bhuj to Vigakot, the likely battle location of HQ 31
Infantry Brigade. Fortunately, a P&T permanent line (PL) route existed
between Bhuj and Khavda. To bridge the remaining distance of 65 kilometres between
Khavda and Vigakot, a poled PVC route was ordered to be constructed within a
week. Captain V.A. Balasubramanyam, who was made responsible for the task,
recalls that the construction of the route was not an easy task. The personnel
were drawn from several units in Delhi Bombay Goa . Movement beyond Khavda was restricted and could only
be carried out at night. Since troops and military vehicles were not permitted beyond
Khavda, the personnel had to wear civil clothes and use civilian transport. There was no vegetation anywhere and direction
had to be maintained with the help of a compass. Being close to the border, there was a risk
of straying across if they lost their way. Within a week the route was completed
and put through. The line was laid initially on ground and subsequently built
up into a poled PVC route. Carrier and VFT equipment were mounted at both ends
to derive additional channels. The channel from Vigakot was directly extended
to Poona
A line route being constructed in the Kutch Sector,
1965
After
a visit by the SO-in-C to Bhuj on 12 April, some readjustments were made to
improve the communication support being provided to ‘K’ sector. A command net
with control at Khavda where HQ ‘K’ Sector was located was established with 31
Infantry Brigade and 50 Parachute Brigade as out stations. In addition a direct
radio link was established with Delhi Poona Bombay Delhi
After the cease fire in Kutch ,
between 9 May and 5 June 1965 ,
Major Bhupal Singh and his men constructed an AB/BC copper route between Khavda
and Dharamsala. Due to the swampy ground, 120 swamp sockets were used in a
short distance of eight kilometres. Another 48- kilometre long route using 70
lb. cadmium copper was constructed between Bela and Shanthalpur in 14 days,
starting 16 June 1965 . About 20 kilometres of the route was laid
over marshy ground, using 5½ foot long angle iron pickets, with the rest of the
route being constructed on multi air line (MAL) poles.
50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company
This
company was commanded by Major Y.S. Awasthy with Captain M.S. Ahluwalia as the second-in-command.
The other officers in the company were Captain D.K. Uberoy, Lieutenant M.
Bhatia and Second-Lieutenants C.J. Appachu and Krishan. The company was in Pauri in the Garhwal
Himalayas attending Exercise ‘Pratigya’ along with the brigade headquarters in
early April 1965 when it received orders to move to Ahmedabad for the Kutch operations. Returning post haste to its base at Agra
“The line laying
commenced in the evening of 23
April 1965 . It should have finished well before mid night, but
there was no news of Appachu. I then moved out for a search and found Appachu
and the line party around Point 84 searching for someone to hand over the line
to. The gunners arrived next morning and all hell broke loose. A Pak helicopter
arrived on the scene and people panicked, the gunners left their guns and ran
back, spreading alarms of an attack. Utter chaos ensued. Meanwhile Appachu and
the line party retrieved what they could to safer distances. This included a
gun of the 17 Para Field Regiment”.
In view of the changed operational
situation, on 24 April 1965
Captain Ahluwalia moved to Dharamsala and line parties under Naib Subedar Sohan
Singh and Naik Balaram laid lines to 2 Para and 4 Para. In the evening, 11
wireless detachments and one battery charging detachment were also moved to
Dharamsala. By 0800 hours on 25 April the advance signal centre and all radio
and line communications were established at Dharamsala. The next few days were
spent in burying the lines, constructing over head shelters for weapon pits,
signal centre and the wireless pit. On 11 May Brigadier Prem Singh, CSO Southern
Command, visited the company and gave a pat on the back to the linemen and
operators for their splendid performance. On 19 May Major Vinod Kumar, the OC-
designate, arrived at Khavda. He took
over command of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company on 23 May
1965, relieving Major Y.S. Awasthy who
proceeded to take over command of 10 Mountain Division Signal Regiment on
promotion.
An
interesting incident pertaining to that period has been narrated Major General
Vinod Kumar in these words:-
At Dharmsala, all the
units deployed themselves along a nullah and its branches parking most of their
stores and heavy/bulky stuff on the nullah bed. Just as we were all
congratulating each other and patting ourselves on the back for excellent camouflage and concealment
effect, that night there was a sudden ‘cloud burst’, and in no time the nullah
was all over with torrential floods and current speed of tens of knots.
Everything was washed away – ammunition boxes, vehicles, rations, POL barrels,
and lots more (some of these items were recovered two days later several
kilometres downstream).
The Brigade
Command Post, the Brigade Officers Mess and the Brigade Commander’s caravan had
been sited on a small island inside the nullah. They were the first to get cut
off. There was constant danger of the Brigade Commander and many others getting
washed away too in the swirling waters constantly on the rise.
Fortunately, the
field cables laid for local lines held on and the exchange was functional all
this while. The rescue parties were organised hurriedly, who moved holding the
cable, braving the fury of the flood and brought back all the beleaguered personnel
to safety. This incident remained a hot topic of casual conversation (and brag
too) with several variations even at Agra
Activities of Gibraltar
Force
Operation ‘Gibraltar ’
was the code name given to the audacious Pakistani plan to seize Jammu & Kashmir
by force. According to the plan, several small groups of armed infiltrators
were to cross the Cease Fire Line and enter the Valley between 1 and 5 August 1965 .
Simultaneously, Pakistani attacks would be launched in the Jammu Sector, tying
up Indian forces in Chhamb and isolating Rajauri and Punch. The Jammu-Srinagar
and Srinagar-Kargil roads would be cut, isolating Srinagar
Operation ‘Gibraltar ’ was daring and brilliantly conceived. However,
it had an inauspicious beginning. On 5 August 1965 two armed
strangers wearing green salwar kameez
uniforms accosted a Kashmiri lad named Mohammed Din who was grazing his cattle
near Gulmarg and offered him 400 rupees in exchange for some information. The
young man agreed, and returning ostensibly to do the needful, rushed to the
police station at Tangmarg. The information soon reached the Army which
promptly sent a patrol that neutralized the infiltrators. In a similar incident
in the Mendhar Sector, some suspicious looking armed men offered a bribe to a
local named Wazir Mohammed, who agreed to get the information but made his way
instead to HQ 120 Infantry Brigade which sent a patrol of platoon strength
under Captain C.N. Singh to investigate. In the ensuing encounter with the
infiltrators the officer and three Indian soldiers were killed, the raiders
escaping after leaving a large amount of ammunition and personal equipment.
Three days later two Pakistani officers, Captains Ghulam Hussain and Mohammad
Sajjad were captured near Narian. Their interrogation revealed that they were
the leading elements of the ambitious plan to capture Jammu & Kashmir –
Operation ‘Gibraltar’ – that had been planned several months earlier and forces for which were trained at various
locations in Pak Occupied Kashmir from May 1965 onwards.5
Though surprise was lost on 5 August 1965 , the infiltrating columns
succeeded in entering Indian territory at
several points and became active from 6 August onwards. The Tariq Force damaged several bridges on
the Kargil - Srinagar Srinagar Srinagar Srinagar
Overcoming
the initial shock, Indian troops reacted swiftly. Some battalions of the Punjab
Armed Police were flown into Srinagar 11 August, 163 Infantry Brigade arrived in Srinagar Srinagar Jammu Delhi
On 15 August
there was a major incident in the Chhamb sector that witnessed the clash of
regular troops from both sides. In an attempt to perk up the spirits of the
disheartened infiltrators Pakistan
The loss of surprise in the initial
stages of Operation ‘Gibraltar ’, lack of local
support to the infiltrators and the response of the Indian troops resulted in
the operation losing steam by the middle of September 1965. It was decided to
carry out counter-infiltration operations to evict the infiltrators, seal the
routes used by them and destroy their bases in Pak Occupied Kashmir. Towards
this end several offensive operations were undertaken in August 1965. Two of
the most important were the capture of the Hajipir pass and eviction of the
Pakistani forces west of Kishanganga
River
Capture of Hajipir Pass
The road connecting Uri and Punch passed
through the strategically important Hajipir pass, at a height of 8,650 feet,
which was the main route of ingress into the Kashmir
valley. It was being used for
replenishment of the infiltrating columns and a number of logistical dumps with
stocks of arms, ammunition and supplies had come up in the vicinity. It was
decided to capture the pass, in order to block this major route of infiltration
and destroy the administrative installations in the Hajipir bulge. A pincer
attack from two directions was planned, with one brigade ex-19 Infantry
Division launching an attack from the north along the road from Uri, and
another brigade ex-25 Infantry Division from the south, along the road coming
from Punch. The task of capturing the feature from the north was assigned to 68
Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Z.C. ‘Zoru’ Bakshi, who had
had proved his worth as a commander, winning decorations in Burma during World
War II, in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, and in Congo in 1962. To indicate
the confidence he enjoyed of the higher command in the Army, the operation for
the capture of Hajipir was code named Operation ‘Bakshi.'
68 Infantry Brigade was allotted five
infantry battalions viz. 1 Para, 19 Punjab, 4 Rajput, 6 Jammu & Kashmir
Rifles and 4 Sikh Light Infantry for the operation. For artillery support it had 164 Field
Regiment, equipped with 25 pounder field guns, 144 Mountain Battery, and a
troop of medium guns ex-39 Medium Regiment. Bakshi's plan for the operation
envisaged a two-pronged attack, from the north, to be conducted in three
phases, which was to commence on 24 August 1965 .
Due to heavy rain on 23 August, all the nullahs (streams) along the right axis
were flooded. Consequently, the attack was postponed by a day and was launched
on the night of 25 August. By 0130 hours on 26 August, 19 Punjab
had captured Pathra. However, it could not proceed further to Bedori due to the
rugged and precipitous terrain and stiff resistance by the enemy, and fell back
to Pathra by first light. On the right axis, 1 Para launched their attack on
Sank as planned but were held up by intense enemy fire and suffered about 30
casualties. Bakshi decided to attack Sank again, using 1 Para, and requested divisional
headquarters to assign the task of capturing Bedori to 161 Infantry Brigade.
The attack by 1 Para on Sank went in at 2230
hours after a heavy artillery barrage. By first light on 27 August, Sank had
been captured. The enemy vacated the feature, leaving 15 dead. 1 Para did not
lose the momentum, and continued to press on. By midday , they had secured Sar and Ledwali Gali. Bakshi now
decided to exploit the success he had achieved on the Sank approach, and ignore
the Bedori approach till the situation became clearer. Hajipir pass, being in
depth, was not expected to be occupied by the enemy, ab initio. However, the
enemy had by now been alerted, and would have started moving additional troops
to reinforce the feature. Once it was reinforced, it would no longer be within
the capability of a brigade to capture the pass. He decided to go for the pass
directly, without waiting for Bedori to be cleared. This meant a frontal
assault from the north under enemy observation and fire and could result in
heavy casualties.
Bakshi spoke to Lieutenant Colonel
Prabhjinder Singh, CO 1 Para , and told him
that he was looking for a suitable officer to capture Hajipir pass. Prabhjinder
suggested the name of his second-in-command, Major Ranjit Singh Dayal. Bakshi
personally briefed Dayal on the mission, advising him to avoid the direct
approach and capture the knolls on either side of the pass from an unexpected
direction. He was given an infantry company, with an additional platoon. An
artillery officer would accompany him, as the forward observation officer
(FOO). Another company of 1 Para was earmarked to reinforce the company after
it had captured the pass. At the end of his briefing, Bakshi told Dayal, "If
you succeed, the credit will go to you. If you don't, I will accept
responsibility for the failure."
Dayal left with his column at last
light on 27 August. He was accompanied by Captain Vaswani, as his
second-in-command, and Second-Lieutenant J.S. Talwar of 164 Field Regiment as
the forward observation officer (FOO). Descending from Ledwali Gali, the
company crossed the Haidarabad nullah, and, began to climb, avoiding the track.
Soon, it started to rain and the valley was covered with low clouds and mist. At
about 2000 hours they reached a house, which was found to be occupied by ten
Pak soldiers, who had fallen back from Bedori and were resting for the night.
After they were disarmed, they were pressed into service for carrying loads.
Soaked to the skin and utterly exhausted, the men kept on moving throughout the
night, weighed down by heavy loads.
At about 0430 hours on 28 August,
the company hit the old Uri - Punch road, where Dayal decided to give the men a
much-needed break. Resuming the advance at 0700 hours, the company moved
towards the objective. After about an
hour, the leading platoon came under intense machine gun fire from the western
shoulder of the pass. Leaving the leading platoon and the FOO to keep the enemy
engaged from the front, Dayal took the balance of the company to the right, and
began climbing up the western shoulder of the pass. Having reached the top,
they rolled down, completely surprising the Pak soldiers, who took to their
heels without offering any resistance. By 1100 hours on 28 August, Hajipir pass
had been captured. Twelve Pakistanis, including one officer, were taken
prisoner. There was not a single Indian casualty. The capture of Hajipir was an important
victory for India Pakistan
Operations in Tithwal Sector
The limited offensive in the Tithwal sector involved the
capture of a number of tactically important features, in order to dominate the
area. On 23 August 1965 , a combined patrol composed of 2
Rajput and 3/8 Gorkha Rifles secured the Ring Contour across the cease-fire
line. This was the first position in enemy territory captured during the 1965
operations. Although no opposition was encountered on the objective, the enemy
shelled the position throughout the night, but the Rajputs and Gorkhas held
their ground. During the following night 1 Sikh less two companies, supported
by 138 Mountain Battery and 17 Field Battery from 7 Field Regiment, attacked and
captured the Pak post on Richhmar Ridge, held by a platoon plus of the enemy.
On night 25/26 August, 1 Sikh attacked and captured the
formidable Pir Sahiba feature, which was held by an enemy company. A subsequent
task given to the battalion was the destruction of the Nauseri Bridge
On the night of 3 September, 3/8 Gorkha Rifles,
supported by field, mountain and light artillery, attacked the massive Sunjoi
feature, and captured it using Khukris The enemy launched two furious
counter-attacks on night 4/5 September and 6/7 September, which were both
repulsed. Enemy casualties were one officer and seven OR killed, with own
losses being one officer and one OR. The battalion next attacked the enemy post
at the Ring Contour overlooking the Mirpur
Bridge Mirpur Bridge
On the night of 20 September, 4 Kumaon captured Pt.
9013, after three hours of heavy fighting during which the enemy lost 55
killed, including one officer. The capture of Pt. 9013 gave Indian troops
complete domination of the Mirpur area up to Jura Bridge on the River
Kishanganga.9
SIGNALS IN OPERATION GIBRALTAR
19
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The
brunt of enemy armed infiltration and activity along the Cease Fire Line was
faced by 19 Infantry Division, which was guarding approaches to the Kashmir Valley
The
first report of sighting armed infiltrators in Gulmarg area was received on 5 August 1965 . Second
Lieutenant O.P. Mehta was immediately dispatched from Baramula with the GOC’s
rover to Tangmarg, where the GOC was then located. It was decided to send out
two columns, one from 7 Field Regiment and the other from 6 Bihar ,
to search and destroy the infiltrators. Since the column from 7 Field Regt did
not have a radio set, the manpack set detachment from the GOC’s rover,
comprising Lance Havildar J.P. Vaid and Signalman Babu Kamble was sent with the column, with a radio
set AN/GRC-694. On 6 August, the
detachment at Tangmarg was reinforced with a terminal equipment vehicle (TEV),
a line detachment and one RS C11/R210 under Major R.S. Chimni and Second
Lieutenant P.K. Ghosh, who established a signal centre at the Dark Bungalow.
Second Lieutenant P.S. Parmar was ordered to move from 268 Infantry Brigade to
Tangmarg with additional line detachments which extended line communications to
Srinagar
At
about 1130 hours the 7 Field Regiment column encountered the infiltrators.
Using his manpack set Havildar Vaid was able to call for artillery fire from
the battery of which had already moved to Tangmarg. The artillery fire wounded
many of the infiltrators, who scattered leaving behind their arms, ammunition,
rations and clothing. A line party under Havildar Jagjit Singh laid field cable
till mid night in spite of coming under fire twice. A column of 13 Jammu &
Kashmir Rifles was sent to general area Toshamaidan with a wireless detachment
comprising Naik Raj Kumar, Lance Naik R.S. Saini and Lance Naik Gurmith Singh
with a radio set AN/GRC- 694. They remained at a height of 8500 ft. for five
continuous days and provided good wireless communication. New lines were laid
by parties led by Lieutenants Ghosh and Parmar. The CO himself stayed at
Tangmarg for three days to oversee the communications. On 10 August, the
Signals personnel at Tangmarg moved back to Baramula, after handing over to 68
Brigade Signal Company, which was placed under command.
A line party at work in the Uri Sector, 1965
Monitoring
of enemy radio links by all brigade signal companies and the ‘I’ Section of the
unit was started from 12 August and interception reports passed to all
formations and 3 Wireless Experimental Centre at Srinagar
Brigade at Punch, Sri Force and 68
Brigade. A civilian tampering with local lines at Pattan was apprehended by the
CO. On the same day a signal detachment was sent with the column of 4 Sikh
Light Infantry tasked to search the Naugam area, where the raiders had attacked
the 8 Kumaon base and killed the CO two days earlier. On 16 August a tank column was also sent to
Naugam to evacuate the casualties of 8 Kumaon. The signal centre at Tangmarg
was taken over by 41 Brigade Signal Company which came under command, 68
Brigade Signal Company moving back to Khrew.
On
19 August a wireless and a line detachment was fired at by infiltrators, two of
whom were apprehended and handed over to the Intelligence Branch. A Pak soldier
with RS AN/GRC-9 was captured at Chor Panjal and brought to the divisional
headquarters for interrogation. On the same day 68 Brigade Signal Company was
ordered to move to Pattan for Operation ‘Bakshi’ (capture of Hajipir pass). Planning and arranging communications for
this highly critical operation became the foremost pre-occupation of the unit.
A bid was made for radio relay detachments, quad cable and dispenser packs.
Cable WD-1 was wound on reels No. 2 for use in mountainous terrain. Colonel Juneja visited all battalions
earmarked for the operation and checked their signal equipment and stores. To
ensure foolproof communications, a wireless detachment and a line detachment
was attached to each unit.
Colonel Juneja conceived an
innovative signal communication plan for the capture of Hajipir pass and
subsequent link-up between Uri and Punch.
A switching centre was established just south of Uri, which proved extremely
effective and useful. It catered for a
small signal centre, ten line exchange, despatch riders, battery charging, line
and radio detachments. To offset the
shortage of charging engines, central battery charging was organized at the
switching centre. This catered for the needs of the battalions in the forward
areas who could get their fresh batteries from the switching centre in exchange
for their rundown ones. These were
collected on a clean exchange basis when their supply columns passed through. The switching centre was connected to Baramula
by two permanent line pairs, one of which was taken over from the P&T Department
for this operation. Two other pairs
belonging to the Electricity Department between Baramula and Mahura were
extended to the switching centre by quad cable.
This arrangement allowed for provision of hot lines from the divisional
operations room to the brigades taking part in the operations as also for HQ
Artillery Brigade.
Radio
communications to the five brigades under command 19 Infantry Division and 93
Infantry Brigade of 25 Infantry Division were provided in an unorthodox manner
by splitting both command (D1) and
traffic clearing (D2) nets into two separate nets. Thus, 68, 93 and 161 Brigades
came up on D1A and D2A nets, while 41, 104 and 268 Infantry Brigades were
outstations on D1 and D2 nets. Two RS 19
were deployed in 161 Infantry Brigade area to simulate induction of an
additional infantry battalion in Uri sector.10
Telephone exchange of 19 Inf Div Sig Regt, 1965
Signal
Instruction No3/65 for Operation ‘Bakshi’ was issued on 23 August 1965 . By 24 August the signal centre for 68 Brigade
had been established, charging and wireless sets humped up and jamming of enemy
wireless nets commenced. On night of 24/25 August laying of lines beyond our
posts on the Cease Fire Line commenced by ‘C’ Section of the unit and line
detachments of the brigades. Lines were
laid towards Pir Sahiba (104 Brigade), Sank and Ledwali Gali (68 Brigade). In
addition hot lines were laid between the divisional operations room and those
of 68 and 161 Brigades. Wireless
communications was established and kept on listening watch, to be opened in
case of disruption of lines.
On 25 August the
Pir Sahiba post in Tithwal Sector was captured by 1 Sikh of 104 Brigade. A Pak signal
instruction recovered during the battle was extensively used by own signal
units in Operation ‘Bakshi’ and subsequent operations, for interception of
enemy links. On 26 August lines were
extended to Sank and Ledwali Gali immediately after their capture by 1 Para.
The same day Signalman Babu Ram of 268 Infantry Brigade Signal Section was
killed in action at Kupwara. On 29 August after the capture of Hajipir Pass
There were two
stalwarts of the Corps of Signals in 19 Infantry Division on command/general
staff appointments, whose deserve mention. Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Kler, a
paratrooper, was the GSO 1 (Operations) in the divisional headquarters. A
dynamic signaller, Kler was of tremendous help to the unit. Brigadier S.N.
Antia was commanding 268 Infantry Brigade which undertook successful operations
against the infiltrators at a number of places. He was shortly thereafter
promoted to major general and given command of a division.
The Signal Centre flag atop Hajipir
Pass, 1965
68
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal Company
Captain
Shamsher Singh was the brigade signal officer of 68 (Independent) Infantry
Brigade, known as the ‘Bakarwal Brigade’, as it was always on the move, on
training and exercises in the mountains, like the Bakarwals (shepherds). For Operation ’Bakshi’, 68 Brigade had been
allotted five infantry battalions and an artillery regiment, which entailed
considerable additional communication responsibility. A few weeks before the
operations, American equipment, particularly radio sets AN/GRC-9, which could
be easily man packed, were withdrawn and replaced with the heavier C11/R210. As
a result, the old but tried radio set 62 was the mainstay of wireless
communication during the operation.
Once
the operation was launched on 26
August 1965 , the brigade commander, Brigadier Bakshi, mostly
remained well up and ahead in the brigade tactical headquarters, which included
a Signals element comprising radio detachments, a small exchange, line detachment
and battery charging facility, all on man/mule pack basis. This enabled
Shamsher, who was part of this setup, to know the latest tactical picture and
the thinking of the brigade commander. In addition to the standard radio
communications i.e. D1 and B1 nets to division and battalions, an extra radio
set 31 was kept open to listen in on the assaulting battalion’s forward net, so
that the brigade commander could gain first hand knowledge and ‘feel’ of the
battle. A radio set was also used to listen in on the net of Pak battalion
being attacked, to gain information about the actions being taken or
contemplated by the enemy. Some Pak radio sets AN/PRC 10 collected on capture
of Hajipir pass came very handy for this purpose during subsequent operations.
Line
communication was extended to all battalion headquarters even while they were
attacking. Field cables were laid along mountain tracks and cross-country at
great heights. Personnel of 68 Infantry Brigade Signal Company worked tirelessly,
faced dangers alongside the infantry battalions and showed tremendous spirit
and devotion to duty even when under shelling and small arms fire. An incident
described below is indicative of the spirit and devotion to duty of the signal
company.
Late
one night in when the battle for a feature called Gittian was in progress,
Brigadier Bakshi had bedded down in a Bakarwal hut. During naps, he heard
whispers around him. On enquiry, Shamsher told him that he was organizing a
line party to go out to repair a line, which was not through. Bakshi instructed
Shamsher not to move about in the dark as enemy troops were in the area and
instead send out a line party at first light. Soon he dozed off to be woken
after some time by the telephone ringing and was surprised when Shamsher told
him that the line was through. Bakshi
asked him if he if he had taken out a line party. The officer answered in the
affirmative. Bakshi asked him why he had gone out at night to repair the line
against his instructions. Shamsher answered, “Sir, if I had not done so, you
could not have collected information from your HQ or the battalions. How could
you then give orders? We all know that you need not be in the frontline facing
shells and bullets. You are doing your
duty and I have done mine”.11
Describing the incident many
years later, General Bakshi wrote to Shamsher: “I can still remember vividly
the night at Hajipir when we were trying to snatch some sleep in that stinking
cow-shed and you were trying to sneak out of the shed to repair a telephone
line. You exposed yourself to grave danger to give me communications with my
units. I was lucky to have you with me in that war.” Coming from a
person of Zoru Bakshi’s well known reputation and stature in the Indian Army,
this is high praise indeed and an accolade that would make any signaller proud.
Sadly, Shamsher’s performance remained largely unknown and unrecognized – let
alone a gallantry award, which he deserved, he did not receive even a ‘Mention-in-Dispatches’
or a lesser award.
Tac HQ 68 (I) Inf Bde atop Hajipir Pass, 28 Aug
1965. Brig ZC Bakshi, MVC in
the foreground.
Capt Shamsher Singh in the far
distance wearing a Balaclava
It
was an intense and prolonged operation lasting nearly three weeks, on which the
eyes of the whole Nation were fixed. Providing signal communications for such a
large, difficult and important operation in high mountains was not an easy
task. However, Captain Shamsher Singh, though having hardly three years
service, functioned like a veteran of many wars and his performance can be
rated as outstanding. All ranks of the signal company also worked admirably in
face of danger, bringing credit to the Corps.
Like Shamsher, the excellent performance of his men also remained
unrecognised, and they have remained unsung heroes of the 1965 War.
25
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
Lieutenant
Colonel Surjit Singh was Commander Signals, 25 Division deployed in Rajauri
Sector in 1965. Major C.S. Joshi was the second-in-command and Captain P.K.
Handa was the adjutant. The field
officers in the unit were Major C.R. Ahuja; Major V.P. Singh and Major S.G.
Rajopadhye. The officers in the brigade signal sections were Captain S.S. Kale
(80 Infantry Brigade); Captain S.C. Anand (93 Infantry Brigade) and Captain
H.S. Grewal (120 Infantry Brigade). The division was looking after a large
area, extending from Sunderbani to Punch. HQ 80 Infantry Brigade was located at
Naushera; 120 Brigade at Galuthi on road Rajauri-Bhimber Gali-Punch and 93
Brigade at Punch, along with respective signal sections. The primary means of
signal communications was PL down to battalions and in some cases to companies
and picquets as well. Radio was stand by and opened on schedule. SDS runs were
undertaken daily.
The linemen had the most difficult
task and had to repair the lines frequently, at times even without escort. Some
acts of bravery and devotion to duty deserve mention. On 21 August, one of the convoys was
ambushed between Bhimber Gali and Surankot. The signal detachment vehicle
providing communications to the convoy was hit by small arms fire and grenades.
The wireless operator, Signalman Basro Ram, was killed and two OR severely
wounded. Havildar Hazura Singh, the NCO in charge of the signal detachment at
Bhimber Gali, immediately rushed to the spot, passed information to higher
headquarters and also repaired the line, which had been damaged by the
infiltrators. He displayed commendable initiative and high sense of duty by
himself going out to repair lines in areas infested by the enemy, not caring
for his personal safety. His personal example was a great source of inspiration
to his men.
In
the 93 Brigade area, Signals personnel were deployed at all vital installations
where there was any likelihood of damage. The security of the operations room was
strengthened and signal cover was extended to all convoys, bridges and
sensitive installations up to general area of Bafliaz, Krishna Ghati and
Surankot. Due to shortage of equipment,
some was readjusted through brigade resources and some more was released
through staff channels on priority basis. The intelligence set up was activated
and two protective patrols along with radio detachment personnel were sent to
apprehend the infiltrators towards Mandi and interior of Bafliaz. The patrols were self contained and Signals
were provided mules for carriage of the radio set, batteries and charging
engine. Relay stations were established
at Surankot and strict radio security and discipline was imposed to conceal the
task of these two special patrols.
A
radio transmitter which was operating clandestinely in this sector was
intercepted by 93 Brigade Signal Section. A close watch was kept on this link,
and though the signal section did not have any sophisticated direction finding
equipment, it was successful in locating this transmitter in one of the
villages in area Krishna Ghati and apprehending the personnel operating the
set.
In mid August 1965, CSO XV Corps
sent a radio relay detachment (RS C41/R222) comprising two JCOs and 19 OR from
XV Corps Signal Regiment, to establish a radio relay chain from Rajauri to
Punch, as the road between the two locations and lines along it were being
disrupted frequently and radio links jammed. The chain was successfully
established with a relay at Bhimber Gali, which ensured reliable communications
to 93 Brigade. A one to one channel was provided between the operations rooms
at both ends. Power supply was a problem and the link was therefore opened on
schedule to conserve generators. On 17 August, an enemy shell nearly knocked
out the terminal at Punch. It was then shifted to the brigade tactical
headquarters location and a power line laid from the civil power house in just
four hours.
The
radio relay terminals were equipped with ACT (1+4), manufactured by Indian
Telephone Industries. An old valve version ACT (1+1) was modified for four-wire
working and at Bhimber Gali, a channel each was patched through on line to 120
Brigade and 52 Brigade. These were early days of use of radio relay and such
innovations were quite an achievement.
SDS
runs were disrupted at times due to roads being cut and enemy action. Through
the efforts of CSO Western Command an air despatch service (ADS) was organized
to Rajauri and Punch, which ensured prompt delivery of official mail. This
service was discontinued after the aircraft was damaged at Punch airfield due
to enemy shelling on 19
August 1965 .
A
major offensive operation was undertaken by 93 Brigade to link up with 68
Brigade attacking from Hajipir side. Major C.R. Ahuja, OC 3 Company, assisted
by Captain S.C. Anand, OC 93 Brigade Signal Section planned the communications
for the operation. For the capture of Raja and Chand Tekri, lines were laid via
Kasba. Raja was captured on the night of 5/6 September after a bloody fight and
line was extended immediately. The lines were duplicated the next day.
Signalmen Kanda Swamy Gounder Kesawan, Ajit Singh and Pritam Singh laid and
repaired the lines under heavy fire and personal risk. For attacks by 3/11
Gorkha Rifles and 7 Sikh on the night of 21/22 September, lines were laid and
maintained under Havildar Shamsher Singh. The NCO showed great qualities of
leadership under fire and inspired his detachment. On capture of Kahuta, a
carrier quad route was laid under command of Naik Uttam Chand along a route
under observation of the enemy.
163
Infantry Brigade Signal Section
163 Infantry Brigade was located at
Leh. As soon as the information about armed infiltration into the Valley was
confirmed, the brigade was moved to Srinagar 11
August 1965 . Captain K.K. Ohri was commanding 163 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section. The task assigned to the brigade was the destruction of
infiltrators south of road Srinagar-Gulmarg, excluding Srinagar
Operations were immediately
launched to seek and destroy the infiltrators and ensure protection of the
airfield as also the Ordnance installations at Khunmuh and Khundru.
Subsequently, combing operations were launched to flush out the infiltrators
from the area and nab them by holding passes on the Pir Panjal range. A large
number of infiltrators were killed and captured by the brigade. These
operations required mobile radio communications and Captain Ohri organised his
resources admirably. He ensured that good communications were provided even on
man pack basis and at high altitude. With the help of DCSO Kashmir and Ladakh,
line communications were ensured to troops deployed for the security of
Ordnance installations.
191
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal Company
This company was raised as 191 Brigade Signal Section at Poona 5 September 1949 and later
moved to Akhnur. In 1955, personnel of this company and those of 93 Brigade
Signal Company at Punch were interchanged en block, to enable Punch Brigade
personnel to serve in the plains. They had been in Punch since 1947-48, as
Punch Brigade was the old Jammu & Kashmir State Forces Brigade and the
personnel belonging to erstwhile Jammu & Kashmir State Forces had remained
posted to the same Section!
In 1965, the company
was located at Akhnur under the command of Major B.K. Mathur with Second
Lieutenant M.S. Bakshi as his second officer. During Operation ‘Ablaze’ the
brigade had moved to Troti, returning to Akhnur in late July 1965. The company had 90 percent of its authorized
manpower and adequate signal equipment for its communication commitments.
However, a large percentage of the personnel were raw soldiers having joined
recently from the STCs. On 9 August the affiliated artillery unit, 14 Field
Regiment arrived at Akhnur.
On 15 August,
Pak artillery shelled Dewa near the Cease Fire Line where Tactical HQ 191 Brigade
was located. To provide communications for the attack that had been planned for
15 August, four radio detachments (for 6/5 Gorkha Rifles, 3 Mahar, 15 Kumaon
and commander’s rover) and one line party under Second Lieutenant M.S. Bakshi
had been concentrated at Dewa. During the shelling the exchange bunker, commander’s
rover and the line party truck received direct hits and were completely
destroyed. The permanent route around Dewa and Chhamb broke like dry
twigs. Second Lieutenant Bakshi and one
OR were killed and four OR wounded. Almost all the signal equipment and
vehicles held by the company were destroyed. Lance Naik Damodar Singh, though
himself seriously wounded, picked up four wounded soldiers and drove them to
the advance dressing station at Aknur, 30 miles away. On reaching Akhnur he
himself collapsed due to heavy bleeding. He was later awarded the COAS
Commendation Card for his devotion to duty.
Brigadier Vinayak Mehta, CSO XV Corps, quickly
augmented the resources of the company, moving radio and line resources from
Corps units. One line party was attached to repair the damaged PL routes, while
three line parties were provided for laying cable routes. One SCR 399 radio
detachment was sent as an outstation on the C1 link, along with an air support
tentacle. One line party and one radio detachment were also given for artillery
communications. Two officers, Captain M.G. Kapoor from 26 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment and Second Lieutenant Curion Joseph from Y Communication Zone
Signal Regiment were attached for two weeks. These timely reinforcements were
of great help in getting the company back on its feet in a short time.
The
company commander, Major B.K. Mathur was a bold and fearless officer, who set
extremely high standards and led from the front. Two incidents that occurred during this
period deserve mention. On 20 August when 2 Sikh lost wireless contact during
their attack on Post 710, Mathur led a small line party under heavy enemy fire
and provided line communication to the post even before it was secured. This
personal example inspired the men under his command to carry out their tasks
even under enemy fire. On 30 August Naib Subedar Ram Chand, Havildar Krishan
Lal and Lance Havildar Bhattacharjee volunteered to repair the 28 kilometre long
cable route from Dewa to Kalidhar without any protection or rations. The area
was hilly and infested with active infiltrators. Before they could complete
their task, Pakistan launched a massive attack on 1 September 1965 and the
party returned to Akhnur.
PAK
OPERATION ‘GRAND SLAM’ & RESPONSE BY XV CORPS
Pak Offensive in Chhamb
Stung by the failure of Operation ‘Gibraltar’ and
the successful counter infiltration operations undertaken by the Indian Army in
Hajipir and Tithwal, Pakistan decided to launch an offensive by regular forces.
Code named Operation ‘Grand Slam’, the massive offensive was launched with a
powerful armoured-cum-infantry force in the Chhamb-Jaurian region with the aim
of capturing the strategic town of Akhnur and the bridge, with a view to
cutting the Jammu-Srinagar highway. If successful, this would result in
complete isolation of the Kashmir Valley as well as bottling up the Indian
forces Naushara, Rajauri and Punch. The
defence of the Chhamb sector was the responsibility of 191 (Independent) Infantry
Brigade Group which was directly under HQ XV Corps. Brigadier Manmohan Singh
had taken over the command of the formation on 15 August 1965, following the
death of Brigadier Masters in enemy shelling a few days earlier.
In the early hours of 1 September 1965 Pakistan
launched a three-pronged attack with a force estimated to be a division of
infantry and two regiments of armour. The attack was preceded by an intense
artillery and mortar bombardment on Mandiala and Chhamb which continued up to 0630
hours. Simultaneously, the enemy mounted an offensive in area Pir Maungawali,
overwhelming the forward companies of 15 Kumaon and reaching within 500 yards
of the brigade headquarters. By nightfall the Pakistanis had succeeded in
driving a wedge between Mandiala and Chhamb. Considering the grave danger to HQ
191 Infantry Brigade, orders for its withdrawal were issued at 2100 hours. The brigade headquarters, 6 Sikh Light Infantry, 15 Kumaon, 14 Field
Regiment and the surviving elements of C Squadron 20 Lancers withdrew to
Jaurian, leaving behind 3 Mahar, 6/5
Gorkha Rifles and remnants of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia to hold their
defences in area Kalidhar.
In view of the depleted strength of
191 Brigade, 41 Mountain Brigade had also been ordered to occupy Jaurian, with
both brigades being placed under 10 Infantry Division, which was made
responsible for the defence of Akhnur.
Acting with commendable speed, 41 Mountain Brigade was reasonably dug in
on Troti Heights, west of Jaurian and prepared to face the enemy by the morning
of 3 September. Meanwhile, the
Pakistanis had consolidated their positions along river Manawar Tawi and by 1930
hours on 2 September, they had crossed the river unopposed and established a
bridgehead. Next evening, at about 1900 hours the enemy mounted a major attack
on Jaurian with approximately 30 tanks, supported by infantry and
artillery. To tide over the critical
situation, 28 Infantry Brigade consisting of 2 Grenadiers and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles was rushed
in and ordered to hold a delaying position on the general line of Fatwal Ridge,
approximately 10 kilometres west of Akhnur and east of Jaurian by first light on
4 September.
After the failure of his attack on 3
September, the enemy launched another attack on Jaurian position at about 2300
hours on 4 September with one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions.
After heavy fighting during which three forward company positions of 41 Brigade
were overrun, the situation was stabilised through counter-attacks. The Army
Commander, who was present in Akhnur during the critical stage of the Jaurian,
approved the withdrawal of 41 Mountain Brigade during the night to Akhnur. Passing through Fatwal Ridge position which
had been occupied by 28 Infantry Brigade on the previous night, 41 Mountain
Brigade withdrew during the night of 4/5 September. A regrettable episode was
the abandonment of their guns by 161 Field Regiment
during their withdrawal. Though orders were issued for their retrieval, this
did not come about due to intensive Pak shelling.
It was appreciated that the only way to relieve
Pakistan's pressure in this sector was to mount a full-fledged offensive in the
more sensitive Lahore and Sialkot sectors, from where Pakistan had thinned out
forces, especially heavy armour and artillery, for the Chhamb offensive. The
Army Chief discussed this option with Prime Minster Lal Bahadur Shastri, who
gave him carte blanche in the matter. Soon afterwards, Indian troops crossed
the border and launched offensives in the Lahore and Sialkot Sectors in
Pakistan on 6 September 1965. As expected, Pakistan reacted immediately,
pulling out troops from Chhamb. This put
paid to her ambitious plans for the capture of Akhnur and isolation of Indian
forces in Jammu and the Kashmir.
Along with the offensives of I and XI Corps in
Sialkot and Lahore Sectors, XV Corps also launched counter-offensives in the
Chhamb Sector. However, these did not make much headway and both 28 Infantry
Brigade and 191 Infantry Brigade Group were halted by intense artillery and
tank fire. After stabilization of the position a fresh offensive was launched
on 9 September with 2 Grenadiers of 28 Infantry Brigade attacking Chak Karpal and a company of 15 Kumaon and two troops of
armour under 191 Infantry Brigade
threatening the objective from the rear. However, both attacks failed. The
Grenadiers disintegrated under the weight of intense artillery and medium
machine gun fire even as there were forming up for the assault, suffering heavy
casualties – 14 killed, 46 wounded and 12 missing. The 15 Kumaon company ran
into a column of Pak Shermans supported by infantry and recoilless guns and returned
to base, after losing three AMX tanks.
On 10 September 1965, 41 Mountain
Brigade was moved to the XI Corps Zone of operations. This took away the strike
potential of 10 Infantry Division and the battle shifted towards the north of
Chhamb. Pakistan made repeated attempts
to dislodge the Indian troops from the Kalidhar Ridge. On 14 September, Indian
patrols reported that the enemy had infiltrated a sizeable force of regular
troops and Mujahids in general area Manani-Gulaba Chappar. For clearing this
intrusion, two battalions, 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 3 Kumaon were employed. On 20
September, 28 Infantry Brigade was warned for a likely offensive task in Dagger
area. This task was later changed for an offensive task along the road
Akhnur-Jaurian on the night of 22 September. However, before the operation
could be launched the Cease Fire came into effect.12
The Battle of OP Hill
The battle of OP Hill took place after the
cease-fire had come into effect on 23 September 1965. Located on the south-west
of the road Mendhar-Balnoi, the feature comprised a complex of hills that was
mentioned in official correspondence as 'OP Hill' since it dominated the road
and gave a clear view of the Indian defences.
In early August 1965 Pakistan had occupied the feature and gradually
developed it into a battalion defended area, while the Indian troops were busy
dealing with the infiltrators. After the
cease fire Pak troops continued to occupy the feature and resorted to shelling
of 2 Dogra base at Balnoi and Picket 636. They also interfered with the
movement of vehicle convoys and large bodies of troops by day on road
Mendhar-Balnoi.
After parleys with the United Nations observers had
failed to produce any result, GOC 25 Infantry Division decided to evict the
enemy from OP Hill and gave this task to Brigadier B.S. Ahluwalia, Commander
120 Infantry Brigade,. A brigade attack was launched on 2 November 1965 by 2
Dogra, 5 Sikh Light Infantry and 7 Sikh attacking in three phases. After two days of heavy fighting, OP Hill was
finally captured, though at heavy cost. Three Maha Vir Chakras were awarded during
the operation, including Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh, CO 5 Sikh Light
Infantry. Two Vir Chakras were also
awarded.
The Kishanganga Bulge
When cease-fire was declared, Indians troops were in
complete control of the area east of River Kishanganga, but the enemy had still
to be cleared from the area between Pt. 9013 and Bugina to straighten the
Kishanganga Bulge. This task was given to 4 Kumaon and 3 Sikh. 3 Sikh was·
tasked to destroy the Shahkot bridge. By 0330 hours on 26 September, a company
of the battalion had occupied the area which dominated the road across the
Kishanganga river and the Shahkot bridge, which was made of concrete and steel
rope suspension and was heavily guarded by Pakistani troops, entrenched in
concrete bunkers. Initial attempts to destroy the bridge by medium artillery
did not succeed even after firing the whole day on 26 September. Another
attempt made by 3 Sikh to raid the bridge on 5 October was foiled by the enemy,
who subjected the raiding party to heavy mortar and automatic fire. After
several attempts the bridge was finally destroyed at 1800 hours on 12 October
by D Company of 3 Sikh.
The task allotted to 4 Kumaon was to destroy the
Jura Bridge. After an arduous 40 kilometre march the assault force reached the
4780 metre high Bimla Pass on 5 October. During the next three days, the
battalion captured a series of features that dominated the bridge. The attack on the Jura bridge was planned on
the night of 10/11 October. Before the attack could be launched the enemy, who had
stealthily infiltrated three companies the Jura bridge, assaulted the
Indian positions. The fighting continued
till mid day, the Kumaonis beating back all the attacks. Realising that a
direct assault on the Jura bridge was unlikely to succeed, it was decided to
destroy the bridge by recoilless guns, which reached only in evening on 14
October. The recoilless guns began firing at the target and in the 7th
round the bridge was destroyed on 15 October 1965. With this, the Mirpur-Bugina
Bulge had been cleared of the enemy, and the Cease Fire Line realigned to
follow the course of the Kishanganga. Indian troops were now in complete
control of the Muzaffarabad-Kel Road, and the infiltration routes into Kargil
and Gurais had been effectively sealed.13
SIGNALS IN
OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’ - XV CORPS SECTOR
Western Command Signals
The 1965 War was primarily fought
in Western Command. During peacetime, HQ Western Command was located at Simla.
The territorial jurisdiction of the command extended from Himachal to Ladakh in
the north, whole of Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab
and to western part of Rajasthan in the west. While XV Corps was deployed in
Jammu & Kashmir, with its headquarters at Udhampur, XI Corps was
responsible for the defence of Punjab and
western part of Rajasthan. Brigadier Ajit Singh was CSO Western Command; Lieutenant
Colonel D.A.J. Beeby the SO 1 (Signals); Major Shanti Swarup the SO 2(Communications);
and Major Bains the SO2 (SD).
CSO Western Command was responsible
for all signal communications in the vast territorial jurisdiction of the command.
Based on the operational planning and priorities, additional resources were
allocated to various formations. Brigadier Ajit Singh ensured that additional
resources were made available where ever needed, by moving these from one
formation to the other, as the operations progressed. A major effort was
required to provide communications to I Corps, which was under raising in
Central Command and was to be inducted in Samba-Jammu sector for offensive
operations. Blessed with a calm and composed nature, Brigadier Ajit Singh had
the ability to get the best out of his team. He also enjoyed good rapport with
the Army Commander, various formation commanders and senior staff. As a result,
he was able to ensure high quality communications during the War.
Western
Command Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Simla under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel S. Tandon with Major P.S. Randhawa as the
second-in-command. Other officers in the unit holding important appointments
were Major R. S. Kardam (OC 1 Company); Major Balbir Singh (OC 2 Company) and
Captain (later Lieutenant General and SO-in-C) A.J.S. Bhalla being the adjutant.
The regimental headquarters was at Jutogh, but the signal centre and the
exchange were at Simla. The regiment had to provide signal communications to HQ
Western Command and from there to HQ XI and XV Corps, as well as static
formations, logistics installations and certain important locations. These were
spread over a very large area and at considerable distance, especially those in
Jammu & Kashmir. While the signal centre staff comprised combatants, quite
a few civilian switchboard operators, a number of whom were ladies, manned the
exchange.
For Operation ‘Ablaze’, the unit
was moved to its wartime location Ambala along with the command headquarters on
12 April 1965, returning to Simla on 12 July 1965. For Operation ‘Riddle’ the
regiment again moved to Ambala between 2 and 4 September. A few days later,
five operators of 87 Switch Board Operating Section from Southern Command
reported on attachment. A number of additional speech and telegraph circuits to
Fazilka, Jullundur Jammu
The
lady exchange operators did a commendable job even when Pak planes dropped
bombs on Ambala Cantt. Miss Marak, hailing from Meghalaya, was the senior lady
exchange supervisor and did excellent work, for which she was awarded the Army
Commander’s Commendation Card. The unit moved back to Simla between 24 February
and 1 March 1965
after Operation ‘Riddle’ was over.
Western
Command Mobile Signal Company
A
need was felt as a result of experience gained in Operation ‘Ablaze’ to provide
CSO Western Command with some mobile resources. To meet this requirement, 4
Company ‘S’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment located at Gauhati was allocated
to Western Command. It moved to Delhi 10 June
1965 and was re-designated as Western Command Mobile Signal
Company. In July, 85 Medium Radio Section (4 Set) Mobile Delhi
On
2 September, 8 Medium Radio Relay Section was attached to I Corps Signal
Regiment for Operation ‘Nepal Mobile
XV
Corps Signals
Brigadier Vinayak Mehta was the CSO,
responsible for planning and providing signal communications to XV Corps. The
area of jurisdiction covered whole of Jammu & Kashmir, from Ladakh to
Pathankot. Operation ‘Ablaze’ between May and July 1965, proved to be a big
boon. All communications for operational locations were tested. Construction of
a number of additional PL routes was taken in hand and existing communications
improved. During Operation ‘Gibraltar ’ XV
Corps had to deal with large armed infiltration and was involved in very heavy
fighting. It also faced the situation posed by the Pak offensive in Chhamb and
induction of formations such as 10 Infantry Division. Providing communication
infrastructure for I Corps for its offensive operations was a big challenge for
XV Corps Signals. Great credit is due to the CSO and his team for providing
high-grade communications for operations involving intense fighting all over
the corps zone.
From
August 1965 onwards, CSO XV Corps had the following signal units under him for
communication tasks:-
·
XV Corps Signal
Regiment at Udhampur (Lieutenant Colonel B.S.
Paintal).
·
DCSO Kashmir &
Ladakh at Srinagar
·
‘T’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment at Srinagar
·
‘J’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment at Kargil (Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Nanda).
·
Y’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment at Jammu
·
3 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Leh (Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Tawatia).
·
19 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Baramula (Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Juneja)
·
25 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Rajauri (Lieutenant Colonel Surjit Singh)
·
26 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment at Jammu
·
121 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Signal Company at Kargil (Major Dhani Ram)
·
68 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Signal Company, near Srinagar
·
163 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section (Captain K.K. Ohri).
·
191 (Indep) Infantry
Brigade Signal Company at Akhnur (Major B.K. Mathur)
In addition to the above, the following units were inducted as the
operations progressed, coming under the jurisdiction of CSO XV Corps:-
·
10 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Y.S. Awasthy) was inducted and located at
Akhnur.
·
28 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major S.C. Roy) was inducted in 10 Divisional Sector.
·
36 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major A.J.S. Bhalla) was raised at Rajauri in August 1965.
·
41 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major V.K. Khanna)
located at Palampur, first moved to Jammu, next to the Valley, then to
Chhamb Sector and later to XI Corps, as part of 41 Infantry Brigade.
·
52 Infantry Brigade
Signal Company (Major K.S. Maini) was inducted in 25 Infantry Division Sector.
XV
Corps Signal Regiment
Till
mid 1965, ‘Y’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was providing signal
communications to HQ XV Corps at Udhampur. The regiment was split in two and XV
Corps Signal Regiment was raised at Udhampur, taking over the responsibility of
providing communications at the corps headquarters, while ‘Y’ Communication
Zone Signal Regiment was moved to Jammu. Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Paintal took
over command of the unit on 3
August 1965 from Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Dhaliwal. The other
officers holding key appointments were Major R.S. Wadhwa (second-in-command);
Major O.P. Kapoor (1 Company); Major A.J.S. Kahlon (2 Company); Major R.N.
Lambah (3 Company); Captain S.K. Jandial (Adjutant); and Captain Bhagat Singh
(Quarter Master).
The
primary means of trunk communications in Jammu & Kashmir was lines. Most of
the circuits were hired from the P&T Department and some were also derived
on BOPEL routes, using Army’s own carrier and VFT equipment. At Udhampur, the
civil carrier station was located in the Army signal centre, which helped in
maintaining very close coordination. P&T personnel rose to the occasion and
met demands placed on them expeditiously. Shri R.P. Saini, RSA, deserves
special mention.
In
spite of long distances and mountainous terrain, line circuits to Srinagar Jammu
4
Medium Radio Relay Section was deployed to provide the radio relay chain
between Udhampur and Srinagar via Patnitop and Banihal as also between Srinagar
and Kargil via Gulmarg and Dras. Once the operations started, these radio relay
chains were wound up and the resources re-deployed to meet urgent operational
requirements of 25 Infantry Division and I Corps. On 21 August, a radio relay
detachment consisting of two JCOs and 19 OR was sent to 25 Infantry Division
for providing radio relay communications in the Rajauri-Punch sector. Two days
later another detachment consisting of one officer and seven OR was sent to
Pathankot for carrying out trials between Jammu UK
The
unit provided additional resources to 191 Infantry Brigade Signal Company on 17
August, to make up losses suffered on 15 August as a result of shelling by the
enemy in area Dewa. Resources were also provided to ‘T’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment for providing communications to HQ SRI Sector on its raising. A
radio detachment of the unit led by Lance/Naik Pratap Singh Rialch provided
first-rate communications across very rugged terrain to Pran Force, which flushed out infiltrators from area Riasi-Budil.
On 15 September, Havildar Shiv Singh of the regiment while on a SDS run on road
Jammu-Pathankot was killed during strafing by enemy aircraft. A line party led
by Second-Lieutenant Man Prasad laid a
carrier quad route on 13 September in
one night, along the northern bank of Ranbir Canal between Jammu and Akhnur, as
an alternate to the permanent line route, which had been damaged due to enemy
shelling.
‘Y’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The
unit was located at Udhampur until mid 1965, when it moved to Jammu Jammu
When the enemy launched an
offensive in Chhamb on 1 September,
Major J.C. Sarin with some signal resources was placed at Akhnur from 2 to 7
September to provide communications to Tactical/Advance HQ 10 Infantry
Division, until the arrival of 10 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. Two line
parties were also deputed to maintain the PL between Akhnur and Jaurian.
To
cater for communications for I Corps, which was to be inducted in the Jammu-
Samba area for offensive operations, a number of steps were taken. A large
number of channels were arranged from Jammu Jammu
It
was considered necessary to augment the signal resources of I Corps for its
offensive. ‘Y’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment was therefore placed under
operational control of I Corps from 9 September 1965 . The unit constructed a number of poled
carrier quad and 70 and 200 lb. cadmium copper spaced cable routes in I Corps
Zone, which were used to provide carrier and VFT circuits between HQ I Corps
and its formations. A nine-mile long two pair copper PL route was built between
Bishnah and Pindi. Two line construction sections were attached to the unit
from XV Corps Signal Regiment and ‘J’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment
respectively during the period August-October 1965.
‘T’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The
unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Vishwanath was located at Srinagar
Once
the Pak infiltration came to light on 5 August, the unit had to provide
communications to a number of mobile columns sent to flush out infiltrators.
Radio communications were established for troops deployed for the defence of
key installations like the airfields at Srinagar Srinagar
48
Line Construction Section was deployed for the maintenance of PL between Srinagar Srinagar
49
Line Construction Section was allotted to I Corps in the first week of
September 1965. It constructed a number of PL and PVC routes in the thick of
operations of I Corps. 58 Line Construction Section was attached to 19 Infantry
Division and did commendable work in ensuring line communications to places
like Pattan, Kupwara, Chowkibal, and Bandipur. It also worked on constructing
the line route to Hajipir and Kahuta, at times under fire. 69 Line Construction
Section was deployed between Srinagar
‘J’
Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Kargil under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Nanda. It was responsible for
communications between Zojila and Leh and line routes in Ladakh. The regiment
also operated signal centres at Kargil and some locations along the L of C to
Leh. It also provided wireless communications and SDS. During Operation
‘Ablaze’, the regiment provided cable, line and a wireless detachments to 121
Brigade located at Kargil. The unit also assisted the brigade by carrying badly
needed mortar ammunition to two high features close to Kargil, which facilitated
the capture of Pak picquets. In one case, four Jeeps of the unit were used to
carry the ammunition on a very narrow and tricky mountain track at night and
without headlights. On the return journey the Jeeps brought down battle
casualties.
On 9 August 1965 , the
detachment of the unit located at Shamsha
Bridge
19 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment
The
part played by the unit in Operation ‘Bakshi’ for the capture of the Hajipir
pass has already been described earlier. After the commencement of the Pak
offensive code named Operation ‘Grand Slam’, the focus shifted to the Chhamb –
Jaurian sector, and the Valley was relatively quiet. However, the unit remained
busy in building up communications to threatened sectors. On 3 September
carrier quad cable was laid up to Silikot, where HQ 68 Infantry Brigade had
moved after the capture of Hajipir. The same day line communication was
extended to Sanjoi, which was captured by 3/8 Gorkha Rifles after a hand to
hand fight.
On 4 September Second Lieutenant
O.P. Mehta proceeded to Sank with direction finding equipment, a second set
being sent to Rustom on main pack basis.
Signalman K.N. Bhat was wounded and evacuated to the military hospital
in Srinagar Punjab . By
20 September the PVC route to Hajipir had been completed. After the linkup
between 68 and 93 Infantry Brigades, communications were established with
Kahuta on line and wireless, the radio sets being lifted by helicopter. On 23 September 1965 , the day the cease fire was announced,
Signalman Kulbhadur Thapa was wounded while laying cable beyond Demari
Gali.
A number of congratulatory messages
were received from GOC 19 Division during the course of and after the War. The
one received on 1 October read, “Communications at all times given to the
forward most troops have been very good. Good show, keep it up”. The
good work of the unit was recognised by several awards, including ‘Mention in Despatches’
to Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Juneja;
Lieutenant Pritam Singh Parmar; Subedar Harbans Lal Ratra; Naik Chandrasekhar
Pillai and Signalman K.B. Thapa.
191
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal Company
The brunt of the Pak offensive in
the Chhamb sector on 1 September 1965 was faced by 191 (Independent) Infantry
Brigade which pulled back from Mandiala during the night through 41 Brigade at
Troti and took up defences at Akhnur. During the day, line communications
forward of brigade headquarters suffered heavy damage due to shelling and tank
movement. By the afternoon, only the lines to 15 Kumaon and Akhnur- Udhampur
were still working. These two lines were also cut later but repaired
expeditiously. Major B.K. Mathur ensured that radio communications functioned
efficiently during this critical period when the whole brigade was bearing the
impact of the Pak offensive.
On
6 September, XI Corps launched its offensive in the Lahore
During
this period, Naib Subedar Ram Chand, the senior JCO of 191 Brigade Signal
Company personally led line parties through enemy infested areas several times.
He was ‘Mentioned in Despatches’ for his acts of daring. Another incident worth
recounting took place on 20 September, when the bridge on the Tawi on the road
from Sunderbani to the two battalions deployed on Kalidhar was damaged due to
shelling and along with it the lines also got cut. Lance/Havildar S.S.
Bhattacharjee tied the cable to his body, swam across the fast flowing Tawi
three times while the area was under shelling and restored line communication
to the forward battalions. This act of daring at grave risk of life was
recognised by the award of the Chief of Army Staff’s commendation card.
Though
the cease fire came in effect on 23 September 1965 , operations did not stop and some
battalion size attacks were put in to evict Pak encroachments in the Kalidhar sub
sector. During one such attack on a feature called Malla, Major Mathur
accompanied 6 Sikh Light Infantry with a line party and radio detachment and
was able to pass minute to minute information to the brigade commander. The H
hour had to be changed twice at very short notice and Major Mathur ensured that
the information was speedily passed to the artillery and others, thus
contributing to the success of the operation. As a follow up of the Tashkent
Agreement, Pak and Indian Troops withdrew to positions held before the War.
Accordingly, on 26 February
1966 , the brigade reoccupied its original sector in Chhamb,
including the area that had been overrun during the Pak offensive. This
entailed laying large number of cable routes, installing exchanges and
providing radio communications over long distances.
Major
B.K. Mathur showed great qualities of leadership and courage during the
operations. He was always cheerful and exhibited a bold spirit, which was
infectious. His motto was to ensure that communications were always through, in
keeping with the Corps ethos. For his several acts of bravery and providing
reliable communications under trying and dangerous conditions for operations
lasting over two months, he was awarded the Sena Medal.
10
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The
unit was raised at Yol in February 1965 under XI Corps, as 11 Mountain
Divisional Signal Regiment. From 2 May to 2 July 965 , it was deployed in Punjab
during Operation ‘Ablaze’, after which it joined its parent formation at Bangalore
During
Operation ‘Riddle’, the unit left for Pathankot on 25 August along with HQ 10 Infantry
Division and arrived there on 6 September 1965. It moved to Akhnur the same
day. Though the unit at this time was part of 10 Infantry Division, its
official designation remained as 11 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment. The divisional
commander had arrived earlier to carry out reconnaissance and was without his
headquarters. On 1 September, after Pak launched the offensive in Chhamb and
the situation became critical, he was ordered to take over command of all
troops in Chhamb-Akhnur Sector. He had to function without the signal regiment
for six days, while intense fighting was going on in Area Troti-Jaurian. During
this period, Major J.C. Sarin ex-Y Communication Zone Signal Regiment located at
Akhnur provided communications to the divisional commander and his truncated
staff.
The
situation improved somewhat on arrival of 10 Divisional Signal Regiment on 6
September evening. However, the unit was short of equipment and did not have its
full complement of manpower. A central battery exchange located at Akhnur was
used for providing telephones to important subscribers of HQ 10 Infantry
Division. The trunk lines to Udhampur, Jammu
41
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Signal
Company
41
Infantry Brigade was an independent brigade located at Palampur. Major V.K.
Khanna was in command of the signal company with Lieutenant Bhutkar as his
second-in-command. Once the extent of armed infiltration into Jammu &
Kashmir was known, the brigade concentrated at Phalora near Jammu 9 August 1965 and was nominated as the corps
reserve. Subsequently the brigade was moved to Tangmarg and took over the existing
communications to Srinagar
On 31
August the brigade moved to Udhampur. Next morning it was ordered to move to
Akhnur with all speed after alarming reports were received regarding a major
offensive by Pak in Chhamb and enemy armour breaking out towards Mandiala. The brigade
arrived at Akhnur at 1130 hours on 1 September and was immediately placed under
10 Infantry Division. It was ordered to occupy a defended sector in area Troti,
astride road Akhnur-Chhamb, west of Jaurian. 41 Brigade Signal Company arrived at
Troti at 1900 hours the same day.
The PL pair, which was being used
by 3 Punjab Armed Police located at Jaurian Rest House for rearward
communications was taken over and extended to Troti, establishing direct speech
communication with Akhnur. A radio set was opened on C24 net and radio
communications established with the HQ XV Corps. Lines were also laid to the
infantry battalions and gun areas, though it was extremely difficult to locate
them, since the unit guides being new in the area themselves were not sure of
the locations. 191 Brigade withdrew through Troti during the same night.
On
2 September, Pak Sabre jets strafed Jaurian and fired rockets. As a result,
nearly two miles of PL was completely destroyed. Rearward communications were
disrupted and field cable was laid to patch up the line. Radio communications
to Akhnur and Udhampur remained commercial and lines were built up on poles,
where possible, since the cable was being cut frequently due to move of own tanks.
A tentacle for close air support communications arrived the same day, but the
detachment did not have frequencies and code signs. Demands for close air
support were therefore passed on C 24 link. However, when the aircraft came
over target, these could not be contacted on the ‘ground to air link’. A
general bomb line was therefore given to the aircraft beyond which they could
take on targets.
On
3 September at about 1500 hours brigade patrols contacted enemy tanks. There
after the enemy repeatedly attacked the brigade defences at Troti, the attacks
extending into the night. Enemy shelling around the brigade headquarters and
gun areas was accurate and lines suffered extensive damage. At 0400 hours on 4
September, orders were received that the brigade could pull back at the
discretion of the brigade commander. However, since daylight was approaching,
it was decided to stay put and pull out during the next night. Enemy infantry
and tanks supported by heavy artillery fire launched a number of attacks during
the day and some positions of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and 9 Mahar were overrun but
were recaptured by counter attacks.
Radio
communications in the brigade and rearwards functioned throughout. However, the
lines got damaged time and again due to shelling and move of tanks. The brigade
started withdrawing at 2000 hours on 4 September, passed through 28 Brigade at
Fatwal Ridge behind Jaurian and concentrated at Akhnur. The company retrieved
all its technical equipment, while pulling out from Troti. The next two days were spent in planning for
a counter offensive. On 9 September orders were received that 41 Brigade was to
take part in the divisional attack on Jaurian. Major Khanna along with the brigade
operations group went to 28 Brigade to study the Signals aspects so that he
could and plan for the offensive. However, at 0900 hours the orders were
changed and the brigade was ordered to join 26 Infantry Division.
The
brigade arrived at Miran Sahib at 1515 hours and to everyone’s surprise
received fresh orders to move to Amritsar, where it reached next morning and was placed under 15 Infantry Division. It
was ordered to relieve 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade occupying defences in
area Khasa along the Grand Trunk Road. Communications were taken over and changes
effected where required. On 12 September, the brigade was placed directly under
HQ XI Corps. Orders were received on 16 September for the company to reorganize
as an independent brigade signal company.
On 18 September, the brigade was placed under
command 4 Mountain Division deployed in Asal Uttar Sector. 41 and 29 Brigades
were given the task of capturing Khem Karan. Major Khanna met Commander Signals
4 Mountain Division (Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Rawat) and discussed the signal
plan for the new task of the brigade. Commander 41 Brigade issued his orders
for the attack on Khem Karan at 1000 hours on 21 September. The signal detachments
left for the assembly area at 1430 hours and established communications to the
battalions. Rearward communications included speech circuits to HQ 4 Mountain
Division and HQ 29 Brigade; and a radio relay and a wireless link to the divisional
headquarters. The attack on Khem Karan was launched in the evening and
continued at night. A radio and line detachment was attached to each assaulting
battalion. Lines were laid as the two battalions advanced. The lines worked up
to the forming up place but thereafter these were badly damaged due to
shelling. Radio communications on B1 Link, however, functioned throughout. The attack
only had limited success and Khem Karan could not be captured.
Commenting
on the frequent changes in the
location and designation of the company, Major General Khanna, who was then
commanding the company, writes:
At
Palampur and Akhnur it was a mountain brigade signal company since there was no
concept of an independent mountain brigade signal company. Later on we became
an infantry brigade signal company as our brigade also became an infantry
brigade. Subsequently 41 Brigade again became a mountain brigade but fresh
orders came changing our WE and re-named us as independent infantry brigade
signal company. We had the unique distinction of a mountain brigade being
supported by an infantry brigade signal company. Another feature was that
though 41 Brigade had become integral to 4 Division we were not part of 4
Divisional Signal Regiment as per AHQ orders. This was more so since Signals
Directorate could not keep pace with the fast changing scenario of 41 Brigade.
As OC of signal company, I was directly under the CSO. We however had the best
of relations with the divisional signal regiment.
25
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The
role of the unit during counter infiltration operations has already been
described. The Pak offensive on 1 September was launched in Chhamb, to the
south of the sector occupied by 25 Infantry Division. The Indian counter
offensive also took place at a distance from the division’s area of
responsibility. Consequently, the unit did not play a major part in Operation
‘Riddle’. However, the personnel were kept busy carrying out maintenance of
lines, which were prone to frequent interruptions. Ironically, some of the
major operations in this sector took place after the Cease Fire had been
declared.
On 9 September 1965 , Naik
Tushar Kanti Sen located at HQ 120 Brigade at Galuthi, was ordered to repair
lines to two infantry battalions and Rajauri, which had suddenly developed
faults. He and his two colleagues were given an escort of a CRP (Central
Reserve Police) Section. After travelling a few miles, Naik Tushar noticed that
the road had been breached and telephone wires deliberately cut. He ordered the
CRP Section to deploy and along with two other linemen went to repair the
lines. As they moved forward they were fired upon from the nearby high ground.
Naik Tushar told the CRP Section to return the fire, crawled forward to the
nearest pole with the other linemen, quickly raised the ladder and tapped the
line. Getting through to the brigade headquarters, the NCO briefed them about
the situation and enemy location. Artillery fire was quickly brought down and
Naik Tushar gave corrections to the guns to adjust the fire. He remained
steadfast and faced the enemy till an infantry platoon and an artillery officer
arrived, who engaged the enemy and killed nearly 40 of them. It was later
revealed that there were approximately 200 infiltrators in the area and the
bold action by Naik Tushar thwarted the designs of the enemy to lay a major
ambush for convoys coming from Punch.
Naik Tushar Kanti Sen was awarded the Sena Medal for his act of bravery
in the face of the enemy and danger to his life.
Another important operation was the
capture of OP Hill in Mendhar Sector on the night of 2/3 November 1965, to
evict the enemy. Three battalions - 5 Sikh Light Infantry, 2 Dogra and 7 Sikh
took part in the brigade size attack launched under Commander 120 Brigade. 5 Sikh Light Infantry commanded by the legendary
Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh (he was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for this
battle and won the same award again in 1971), played a leading role in the
success of the operation. He explained that he was through on radio all the
time during the bloody battle with the companies directly and the brigade headquarters.
Naik Uttam Chand and Lance/Naik Joga Singh provided line communications to the
battalion during the attack. Signal communications for this operation were
planned and executed under Major C.S Joshi the second-in-command of the unit.
Major S.G. Rajopadhye (1 Company) and Captain H.S. Garewal (120 Brigade Signal
Company) were responsible for the communications during the operation, which
was commended by the brigade commander. An important task was the interception
and jamming of enemy nets. Throughout
the war, arrangements were made for intercepting enemy radio links and
important intelligence passed to the Staff. For the OP Hill operation, enemy
frequencies were identified after monitoring and these were jammed during the
attack, using SCR 399. A deception plan was also put in effect in area
Jhangar.
As
a result of the Agreement at Tashkent
OPERATIONS IN XI CORPS SECTOR
Planning and Preparatory Moves
According
to the plan made by Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, GOC-in-C Western
Command, simultaneous offensives were to be launched by I and XI Corps I order
to divide the enemy reaction and reduce the possibility of a counter attack. In
the event, the offensives had to be staggered due to the delay in move of
formations of I Corps that were located at a distance from the area of
operations. This gave Pakistan the margin of time to launch her offensive
first, which was brilliantly repulsed by XI Corps.
Lieutenant
General J.S Dhillon was the GOC XI Corps. The divisional commanders under him
were Major General Gurbakhsh Singh, M.V.C. (4 Mountain Division); Major General
H.K Sibal, M.V.C. (7 Infantry Division) and Major General Niranjan Prasad (15
Infantry Division). In addition, he had Brigadier T.K. Theograj (2 Independent
Armoured Brigade).
The
tasks assigned to XI Corps by HQ Western Command were to secure the line of the
Ichhogil Canal Lahore Punjab . HQ XI Corps was in Jullundur Amritsar Patiala Jodhpur
The
go-ahead for commencement of the operations was received from Army HQ on 3 September 1965 and the
move of the formations from their interim locations commenced at first light
next morning. In the interest of security no vehicles were permitted to cross
the Beas before last light on 5 September,
leaving them with just nine hours of darkness to get into their assembly areas
for the attack that was scheduled to go in at 0400 hours on 6 September. In
order maintain secrecy, the move of the operational headquarters of Western
Command from Simla to Ambala was held back till the last minute. To further deceive
the enemy, the Army Commander and several senior officers of HQ Western Command
agreed to attend a large civilian lunch party in Simla in the afternoon of 5
September.14
15 Infantry Division
The
task allotted to 15 Infantry Division was to secure Pakistan territory up to
east bank of Ichhogil Canal and capture the important bridges on the GT Road,
Ichhogil Uttar and Jallo. The advance
commenced at 0400 hours on 6 September as scheduled and achieved complete
surprise. The advance was led by 3 Jat of 54 Infantry Brigade, under Lieutenant
Colonel D.E. Hayde, who had taken over only the previous evening. Advancing rapidly the battalion assaulted and
captured the enemy post at Gosal by 0630 hours, clearing the village of Dial
Due to a breakdown in the wireless link, HQ 54 Infantry
Brigade was not aware of the success achieved by 3 Jat, which linked up with 15
Dogra at about 0930 hours. The brigade commander, Brigadier M.S. Rikh, who went
forward to contact 3 Jat, met CO 15 Dogra, Lieutenant Colonel Inderjit Singh,
who informed him that his battalion had suffered very heavy casualties at Wagah
and he was not in a position to carry out his task. It was later found that
this account was exaggerated. However, based on the information given by Colonel
Inderjit, Brigadier Rikh modified his plan and ordered 3 Jat to capture the
bridge near Dograi, asking 15 Dogra to firm in at Dial.
Led by the intrepid Desmond Hayde, 3 Jat raced forward and
captured the east bank of the Ichhogil
Canal Lahore
Indian troops on the outskirts of Lahore, 1965
At
this stage, the corps commander gave a fresh set of orders according to which
54 Infantry Brigade was to capture Dograi and 38 Infantry Brigade was capture
Bhasin, sending a battalion to capture Bhaini-Malakapur. The divisional
commander vehemently protested against this, both verbally and in writing,
arguing that the diversion of 38 Brigade to secure Bhasin and Bhaini-Malakapur
would hamper his advance. He also reported that the situation in his sector was
desperate due to heavy casualties, and that no further offensive action was
possible. Alarmed at this report, the army and corps commanders rushed forward
and met the divisional commander at near Attari at 1400 hours on 6 September. A
quick on the spot assessment revealed that the situation had been grossly
exaggerated by Major General Niranjan Prasad, who appeared to have been
demoralized by the recent events. He was asked to pull himself together and
carry out the assigned tasks with vigour.
On the GT Road axis, 38 Infantry
Brigade was to capture Dograich-Bhasin and secure the East bank of Ichhogil
Canal, in Phase II of the operation on the night of 6/7 September. In view of
the set-backs already encountered, the task of the brigade was modified and it was
ordered to secure the east bank of Ichhogil
Canal
Not knowing the whereabouts of 38 Brigade due to disruption of the
wireless link, the divisional commander along with a small party set off to
locate them at night. Unfortunately, they ran into an ambush and were captured
by the enemy, though General Prasad managed to escape in a jeep. However, 12
men and four jeeps fell into enemy hands. One of the vehicles had Prasad’s memo
pad and a personal file containing references to his representations against
his removal from the command of 4 Mountain Division in 1962. Pakistan India
On 7 September, fresh orders were issued to 38
and 54 Infantry Brigades to complete their allotted tasks by first light of 8
September. Commander 38 Brigade ordered 1/3 Gorkha Rifles to advance north of
the road and attack the bridge on 8 September. But the enemy reacted fiercely and
the attack failed. From this date till the cease-fire, 38 Infantry Brigade
remained in the same area, but was unable to secure the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal Punjab reached the objective and completed digging of
fire trenches by first light. The enemy withdrew from the canal road bridge but
reinforced the railway bridge. When D Company advanced to the railway bridge,
it came under heavy army shelling. By first light, Pak armour also arrived, and
13 Punjab withdrew without orders.
During
8, 9 and 10 September, Pakistan maintained pressure on all the Indian positions
by raids, artillery shelling and armour attacks, which were repulsed with heavy
losses to the enemy, except on the Ranian axis. On 10 September, in face of
enemy pressure the remnants of 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon withdrew to Lopoke; and
Ranian and Kakkar fell into enemy hands. The same day, 96 Infantry Brigade was
relieved by 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade (Brigadier A.M.M. Nambiar) and placed under command 15 Infantry
Division for securing the right flank of the divisional sector and preventing
any ingress of Pak armour from the Syphon area. It was then moved to area
Kohali to restore the situation on that axis and be prepared to advance up to Ichhogil Canal
After its arrival at Hudiara Drain
on 10 September, 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade was first given the task of
capturing Bhasin by first light 14 September. However, after being relieved by
41 Mountain Brigade on 13 September, the brigade was given new tasks of
securing Pak territory up to Ichhogil Canal, and capturing the Jallo bridge
intact by last light 16 September, which was later extended to last light 17 September, at the
request of the brigade commander. Moving
along the drain on both sides of the UBDC, 2 Para reached the junction of
Khaire distributary and the canal and advanced towards the objective, suffering
heavy casualties from enemy fire. Undeterred by the stiff opposition, 2 Para
assault elements reached the Jallo bridge, to discover that it had already been
destroyed by the enemy. The demolition party detailed for the bridge also came
under heavy fire and two sappers were killed and six wounded. At the same time
6 Para attacked the rail bridge at about 0030 hours on 17 September and
occupied it. Though both battalions captured their objectives they were
subsequently withdrawn to the area Bhamma-Bhatha to occupy a defensive
position, due to ambiguity in orders issued by the brigade commander. In the
bargain, valuable territory captured at great cost was vacated. For withdrawing
his troops without orders, the brigade commander was replaced.
On 21/22 September, 15 Infantry
Division made a fresh attempt to get to the Ichhogil Canal. According to the
plan, 54 Brigade was to recapture the Dograi area; 38 Brigade was to advance to
the canal in its area and 96 Brigade was to secure the Syphon area to the
north. While 38 and 96 Brigades could not secure their objectives, 54 Brigade
succeeded, despite heavy odds. Once again 3 Jat under the inspiring leadership
of Colonel Hayde recaptured Dograi on 22 September and held it against repeated
counter attacks by the enemy. Both the Jats and the Pakistanis suffered heavy
casualties in this battle. For its gallant performance, 3 Jat received three
Maha Vir Chakras and a number of other gallantry awards.16
7 Infantry Division
The advance of 7 Infantry Division commenced at 0530 hours
on 6 September 1965 .
The leading elements of 48 Infantry Brigade Group (Brigadier K.J.S. Shahaney)
contacted enemy defences at Hudiara at about 0700 hours coming under heavy,
long-range automatic fire from enemy positions in Hudiara, Nurpur and Hudiara
Drain. By this time, 17 Rajput had captured the enemy border post east of
Bedian, achieving complete surprise. By
1030 hours 6/8 Gorkha had secured Hudiara village. A frontal attack on Hudiara
Drain being ruled out due to accurate artillery and small arms fire from the
enemy, it decided to launch an attack from the left, eliminating enemy
resistance at Nurpur and up to a distance of 1000 yards from the west bank of
Hudiara Drain. The task was entrusted to 5 Guards, which launched its attack on
Nurpur at 1330 hours on 6 September. The enemy put up stiff resistance but the
Guards persisted. Early next morning, the enemy withdrew, after blowing up the
bridge over the Hudiara Drain. 48 Infantry Brigade then firmed in while 7
Divisional Engineers started constructing a bailey bridge on the Hudiara Drain.
Brigadier Shahaney, himself a Sapper, prevailed on the young Engineer officer
at the bridge site to construct a causeway on priority for the jeeps carrying
recoilless guns. This delayed the work on construction of the bridge.17
Placing under his command the Central India Horse
(CIH) equipped with Sherman Madras village of Barka Khurd Punjab attacked
and captured the village on 9 September. Continuing its pressure on the enemy,
65 Infantry Brigade advanced further for the capture of Barki and east bank of Ichhogil Canal
The attack on village Barki was launched at 2000 hours
on 10 September by 4 Sikh, after an intense preparatory bombardment by Indian
artillery. When the assaulting troops were very close to the objective, CIH
less two squadrons moved forward to provide fire support after the artillery
fire had lifted. Due to the continuous
Indian armour fire at night, the Pakistanis thought that India had brought in
new tanks with night-firing capability and abandoned Barki at 2100 hours after
suffering a large number of casualties. When permission was given to the Pak
troops to collect the dead bodies of their comrades from the battle-field, they
took away four truck-loads of corpses, including the dead body of Major Aziz
Bhatti, who was posthumously awarded Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan's highest
gallantry award.
Supported by the divisional artillery, 16 Punjab now advanced to complete Phase 2 of the plan. It
passed through Barki at and secured the east bank of Ichhogil Canal Lahore Lahore
4 Mountain Division
4 Mountain Division under Major
General Gurbaksh Singh had been reorganised and specially trained for mountain
warfare after the 1962 operations against the Chinese in NEFA. It was located
in Ambala and the Simla Hills when it was ordered to move for the operations in
the Khem Karan sector. The tasks allotted to the Division were to secure Pak
territory east of the Ichhogil Canal south of Bedian right up to the Sutlej;
destroy the bridge over the Canal on the Kasur Khem Karan Road; and to occupy a
divisional defended sector to contain a likely offensive by Pak 1 Armoured
Division and an infantry division astride the Kasur-Khem Karan and
Gandasinghwala-Khem Karan axes.
The
operations commenced at 0500 hours on 6 September. 9 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles
of 62 Mountain Brigade captured Rohi Nala on the main axis at about 0915 hours while
13 Dogra secured area Rohiwal by 1030 hours. Two battalions of 7 Mountain
Brigade, 7 Grenadiers and 4 Grenadiers, also advanced towards Ballanwala and
Theh Pannun respectively. By 1130 hours 4 Grenadiers secured the line of Rohi
Kala and east bank of Ichhogil Canal from Theh Pannun southwards. However, 7
Grenadiers could not capture Ballanwala, which was heavily defended. The
battalion made another attempt at 0200 hours but failed. The enemy reacted quickly. At 1530 hours 13 Dogra was subjected to
heavy artillery fire prior to a counter-attack by the enemy. The battalion
abandoned the position and disintegrated as a unit. Throughout the night all
defended localities and gun areas were subjected to very heavy, accurate and
sustained artillery fire. By first light on 7 September, it was discovered that
7 Grenadiers and two companies of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles had also abandoned their
positions. At about 0700 hours, 9 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles was encircled by
enemy armour and strafed by the enemy aircraft. The CO and one company
withdrew, leaving the rest of the battalion to its fate.
The situation in 4 Mountain Division
appeared to be desperate. Not only had the division failed to carry out any of
its tasks, two and a half battalions had disintegrated, leaving about three and
half battalions that were still holding their positions. The corps commander recommended
that the division be replaced by another formation, but this was ruled out by
the Army Commander after a personal visit to the division to assess the
situation. The divisional commander was
confident that he would be able to pull his troops together and re-establish
command and control. He was as good as his word, and the division performed
creditably in the crucial actions that took place during the next few days.18
Battle of Asal Utar
By the morning of 8 September, 4
Mountain Division had hastily occupied a defended sector at Asal Utar with the
three and a half battalions that were still functional and the armoured
regiment that was available. At 0930 hours approximately two squadrons of
Chaffees approached the divisional defended sector through Ballanwala on a
reconnaissance-cum-probing mission.
Approaching on a broad front, they surrounded the Indian defended
localities, and from their right flank attempted to infiltrate to the gun
areas. In the action which followed, the enemy lost two Chaffees and withdrew.
Again at 1445 hours, they carried out a reconnaissance in force with a regiment
of Pattons and over-ran the position of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles. 9 Horse now played
an important role in stopping the enemy in front of the Indian defended sector.
A diversionary attack by Pattons fell on 4 Grenadiers and the gun area, but it
was halted in area Rattoke. The enemy tried to by-pass the defended sector on
the north, but a squadron of 3 Cavalry in the area Bhikhiwind had anticipated
this move and was ready to receive them. It moved down immediately and attacked
the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing him to withdraw.
After this reconnaissance in force by the enemy, it
became evident that a major armoured thrust was likely to take place next day.
Immediately, 2 (Independent) Armoured
Brigade was ordered to concentrate 3 Cavalry
less a squadron from the area Chabal Kalan and Rajatal and 8 Cavalry
less a squadron from the Amritsar by-pass area to the 4 Mountain Division
sector. All moves were completed smoothly on the night of 8/9 September, and
the defences were strengthened by laying more mines. At 0200 hours on 9
September the enemy combat group of two Patton regiments, making use of
moonlight and infra-red equipment, attacked 18 Rajputana Rifles. The Indian
artillery brought down heavy fire and the infantry engaged the attacking enemy
with recoilless guns. Though the enemy tanks had a free run, they failed to
dislodge the Indian defences and the attack was beaten back.
On 9 September, 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was
placed under command 4 Mountain Division. Orders were issued that the Indian
armour would function at night, and 9 Horse would stay in forward defended
localities and gun area in an anti-tank role. The enemy made another attempt
during the night to over-run 18 Rajputana Rifles’ positions. However, the
battalion held fast and the enemy was engaged by medium artillery and tanks,
located in forward defended localities. At 0330 hours the enemy infantry,
brought up in armoured personnel carriers, probed forward, but, on hitting the
mine-field, withdrew, and a lull followed. Pakistan carried out reconnaissance
in force with tanks throughout the latter part of night of 9/10 September.
The final enemy attack came at 0700 hours on 10
September. A strong enemy combat group attacked the position held by 4
Grenadiers, but the attack was foiled by Indian artillery and a squadron of 3
Cavalry that was patiently waiting for an opportune moment, and opened up once
the enemy Pattons came out of a sugar cane field, exposing their broadsides. After
the failure of the attack on 4 Grenadiers, the enemy made another outflanking
movement towards Mahmudpur-Dibbipura, aiming for the gun area. The enemy column
was shadowed by 3 Cavalry and was attacked from three sides. Trying to
extricate themselves from the trap the Pattons got bogged down in the mud and
were shot like sitting ducks by Indian tanks and recoilless guns. This broke
the back of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division which was forced to pull back in
complete disarray. The infantry played its part and Havildar Abdul Hamid
knocked out three Patton tanks with his recoilless gun before losing his life.
He was awarded a posthumous Param Vir Chakra.
The battle of Asal Utar turned the tide of the war
in 1965. Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division was decimated, with it evaporating her
hope of a decisive victory over India. In three days of fighting at Asal Utar,
Pakistan lost 97 tanks, including 72 Pattons. This included the entire tank
fleet of 4 Cavalry, whose CO, 12 officers and several soldiers surrendered en
masse on the morning on 11 September.
The casualties suffered by 4 Mountain Division were 60 killed, 206
wounded and 93 missing, in addition to 10 tanks. The losses of 2 (Independent)
Armoured Brigade were one OR killed with two tanks destroyed.
After the withdrawal
of the bulk of the Pakistani armour, 4 Mountain Division was ordered to re-take
Khemkaran. Gurbakash gave the task to 7 Brigade, which was given two battalions,
4 Sikh and 2 Mahar, for the operation that was launched on 12 September. The Sikhs
were used on an outflanking movement, while the Mahars put in a frontal attack
on the Khemkaran Distributary position. Unfortunately, about two companies of
Sikhs were captured by the enemy; while the Mahars supported by Deccan Horse,
could not overcome the position, despite some initial success and suffering
heavy casualties. The brigade put in a second attack, which also failed.
Subsequently, 4 Division was given two new brigades, viz. 29 Brigade and 41
Brigade, but lost 7 Brigade. The division launched yet another attack on
Khemkaran on 21 September, but even this could not make any headway, the enemy
determinedly holding the position with a strong brigade group with armour.
67 Infantry
Brigade
GOC XI Corps tasked
Brigadier Bant Singh, Commander 67 Infantry Brigade Group, to defend the area
from Harike headworks to Anupgarh in Rajasthan. On 6 September, the enemy
shelled Indian defences in the Sulaimanke sector followed by three attacks on
night of 7/8 September on 14 Punjab which were
all repulsed. On 8 September, Pak F-86 jets bombed 2 Maratha positions, which
were also subjected to artillery fire. During the night of 9/10 September, the
enemy attacked 14 Punjab defensive position in
Fazilka and captured a platoon locality, which was recaptured after a counter-attack.
During the period
12-18 September, there was intermittent shelling by both sides. On the night of
19/20 September, 2 Maratha at Hussainiwala was attacked by an enemy infantry
battalion supported by tanks. The Pakistanis also attacked the Bhagat Singh
Samadhi area at Hussainiwala and destroyed the memorial. However, the main
attack was repulsed and the Indian garrison at Hussainiwala was reinforced with
two infantry companies and two troops of armour from Fazilka.
23 Mountain Division
23 Mountain Division,
commanded by Major General D.K. Palit, VrC, was located in Rangia in Assam Ludhiana
During 15-18 September1965, the division was
asked to be prepared for launching an offensive in the Kasur area with a view
to drawing out Pak I Corps from Lahore Ravi in Dera Baba
Nanak sector to hit the Pak forces from the south. This was considered necessary to stimulate the
progress of the Indian offensive in the Sialkot
On 20 September,
orders were issued to the division to concentrate in Dera Baba Nanak area by 26
September. As the Division did not have any armour, one squadron of PT-76 tanks
was provided. Since the task required the crossing of the river Ravi , and as the formation had no river-crossing
experience, it was asked to practice the same on the Sutlej .
However, all these preparations proved futile, as the cease-fire took place on
23 September 1965.
SIGNALS IN
OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’: XI CORPS SECTOR
XI
Corps Signals
Brigadier K.S. Garewal (later
Lieutenant General and SO-in-C) took over as CSO XI Corps in the first week of
August 1965. He had, however, to return to Signals Directorate soon afterwards
to finish certain important actions dealing with Plan AREN. Before returning to
Delhi
On 2 September, the Signals branch
was asked to prepare a signal instruction to be issued along with the corps
operational instruction. Since details of the operational deployment and tasks
were not known, it was decided to issue the signal instruction in two parts.
Part I contained what could be foreseen and was not location specific i.e.
general policy, wireless diagram, frequency assignment, authentication sheets,
codes and ciphers, scale of line communications and SDS plan. Part II covered
detailed line communication plan, routing and engineering diagrams and SDS time
table. Part I was issued on 3 September and Part II on 4 September 1965 .
Lines
were to be the primary means of signal communications supplemented by radio
relay. On 2 September orders were received for attachment of 9 Medium Radio
Relay Signal Section ex ‘R’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment with XI Corps
Signal Regiment. Patti was developed as
a switching centre and a civil as well as military carrier centre. Radio relay
equipment (Radio Set C41/R222) was new to the unit and only limited training
had been carried out. A link was established between Main HQ XI Corps and Patti
and from Patti to 4 and 7 Divisions. A radio relay chain was also established
to 15 Division. Radio relay proved highly stable and at places became the
mainstay of communications.
XI
Corps Signal Regiment
Lieutenant
Colonel D.B. Lahiri was commanding XI Corps Signal Regiment at Jullundur
On
2 September evening, the CO was summoned by the corps commander, Lieutenant
General J.S. Dhillon and informed that hostilities with Pakistan were imminent
and that the corps headquarters would move out to its operational location on 5
September. Signals could send small
parties to make preliminary arrangements but all work was to be done during
hours of darkness. General Dhillon mentioned that formations will not be moving
to any concentration areas but directly to operational locations.
On
return to the unit, the CO gave orders for a crash exercise. On 3 September
Major Sarjit Singh, OC 2 Company and the GSO 1 (Operations) proceeded on a
reconnaissance of the new site of the corps headquarters at Rayya. The GSO 1(Operations) decided to locate both
the main and rear headquarters in Beas .
However, Sarjit did not agree to this due to technical and tactical reasons and
informed the CO, who immediately apprised the corps commander of the
implications of the selected area. A fresh reconnaissance was ordered and this
time Colonel Lahiri himself accompanied the GSO 1. By the evening of 3
September, a new location about one kilometre from the carrier station near
Rayya, already established for the Army, was agreed upon.
The
CSO, Brigadier Garewal, arrived from Delhi Jullundur Jullundur
Working
throughout the night, the personnel of the unit completed the task of
re-engineering the circuits. At 0600 hours on 5 September, the CO gave a
completion report to the corps headquarters that all line communications had
been re-routed to Jullundur Delhi Jullundur
The
CO, dumb founded at the sudden change in the move plan, rang up his unit from
the nearest telephone before rushing back to issue fresh orders. By 1030 hours Major Sarjit Singh had left
with the advance elements and the rest of the unit vehicles were lined up and
ready to move. Fortunately detailed reconnaissance and engineering of circuits
from the new location had already been carried out a day earlier, and the
communications were re-established from the operational location in record
time. General Dhillon arrived at 1600
hours and asked to be connected to the Army Commander. The call was put through
immediately. Shortly afterwards the GOC left for a visit to the forward areas
accompanied by his rover. During the night the rover vehicle met with an
accident near Tarn Taran, in which the rover operator Havildar Bhagat Singh was
injured and evacuated to hospital.
Officers were placed on all axes
along with line parties to extend lines to formations as these arrived. By
about 0030 hours on 6 September, the line parties waiting on different axes for
formations moving in contacted the advance parties. By 0200 hours all lines and
radio relay links were through. Wireless links had been established and kept on
listening watch. Wireless detachments from formations under command had been
called earlier at the corps headquarters for tuning and netting as also
marrying up. At 0400 hours when the shooting war started, radio silence was
broken and wireless and radio relay communications established in addition to
lines. A deliberate decision was taken not to activate rearward wireless links
till 8 September. It had been planned to
move the rear corps headquarters close to the main headquarters on 6 September.
However, on request from the CO, its move was deferred by three days.
XI Corps
was heavily dependent on the P&T for trunk communications. Mr. Harkrishan
Singh, the Divisional Officer, Telegraph at Jullundur
Lahiri
recalls an interesting incident to prove that luck favoured his unit during the
war. The corps commander was concerned about the location of Pak 1 Armoured
Division, which could launch a potent offensive into the corps zone. The war
was two days old and Lahiri was standing near the signal centre when he saw
Brigadier P.S. Grewal, the Brigadier General Staff almost running towards the CSO.
The two met and then the CSO also almost ran towards the signal centre. On
seeing this, Lahiri ran towards him. Brigadier Garewal gave him a signal and
said, “Clear it to 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade immediately- it’s Flash”.
Lahiri did not look at the message.
He knew that the line to 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was under repair and
so he made a dash to the C 2 link about 150 yards away and told the operator to
clear the message immediately. The operator said that he had just then agreed
to the request of the operator on the other end to close down for 30 minutes
for change of batteries and adjusting the aerial. Lahiri told the operator to
call 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade all the same. Luckily the other end
operator had not yet switched off his set. The ‘Flash’ message, just two lines,
was cleared immediately in clear. Its contents were: “Enemy Armoured Division thrust
had begun. Position own forces in pre determined locations as already decided,
in shortest possible time to thwart the enemy Armoured Division thrust”.
An
important drill started by Colonel Lahiri was the ‘Technical Stand To’. As is
well known, all units in operations carry out ‘Stand To’ early in the morning
and in the evenings, when all personnel man their trenches/weapon pits and are
in a state of readiness to face any attack. In case of Signals, it was
considered necessary that they in addition have a ‘Technical Stand To’. With
experience, it was concluded that between 0100 and 0330 hours signal traffic
was minimal. It was therefore decided to start the Signals ‘Technical Stand To’
at 0200 hours. During this Stand To, equipment was checked, batteries changed
and all circuits lined up, so that when the commanders and staff got active
early in the morning and desired to make telephone/radio calls to obtain latest
situation reports, all the communications were working at optimal efficiency.
Another reason was that enemy and own troops usually launched attacks in the
early hours and it was necessary that communications should be optimised before
such happenings. However, care was taken to ensure that all the circuits to
each formation were not disturbed at the same time due to testing/aligning.
It
was a challenging task to provide communications to XI Corps, which was
involved in very intense fighting. XI Corps Signal Regiment under the command
of Colonel Lahiri acquitted itself creditably, earning praise from commanders
as well as staff. Lieutenant K. Veluswamy and Subedar Major Pritam Singh were ‘Mentioned
in Despatches’. In addition, a number of Chief of Army Staff Commendation Cards
was awarded. The corps commander visited the unit after the hostilities were
over and at a grand ‘Sainik Sammelan’ presented an impressive trophy. While
addressing all ranks he said, “Your performance during the Indo-Pak War
was so superb that it has never been equaled by any signal regiment in any war,
at any place and time”.
Z
Communication Zone Signal Regiment
The
unit was located at Jullundur Jullundur
A radio relay
terminal in the open, 1965.
Before
the 1965 War, there were two line arteries towards the border from Jullundur
viz. Jullundur- Beas- Amritsar and Jullundur-Hoshiarpur-Dasuya-Pathankot. In
July 1965, it was decided to build another PL route between Jullundur Beas
at Naushera and this posed a big problem as the river was swollen due to the
monsoon rains. Brave linemen of the regiment under Lieutenant M.S. Toor
succeeded in putting across four wires after a few unsuccessful attempts and
the route was completed with the help of the P&T Department by the end of
August 1965.
Orders
for establishing AMAs (Army Maintenance Areas) at Moga and Beas
were received on 1 September. A 40-line F&F (Field & Fortress)
exchange, signal centre and radio detachments were put in place by the evening.
On 2 September, CSO XI Corps ordered laying of a carrier quad cable between
Patti and Valtoha, the projected location of HQ 4 Mountain Division. The task
was completed by 4 September. The unit was also tasked to establish a number of
additional speech and telegraph circuits from Jullundur Jullundur
Pak
Air Force bombed Adampur airfield and communications were disrupted. The unit
had to send line and radio detachments to restore the communications with Jullundur Jullundur
On
15 September two untoward incidents occurred. The daily motor despatch service
(MDS) vehicle carrying official mail between Ludhiana Jammu
At
the commencement of hostilities, the technical control of 2 Company of the unit
located at Pathankot, which was earlier with CSO XV Corps was transferred to DCSO
Punjab & Himachal Pradesh Area. After the induction of I Corps,
communication load at Pathankot increased considerably. This company also
became a reporting and staging centre for signal detachments and personnel
moving in. A large number of messages and official mail packets accumulated due
to lack of information about change of locations of units and formations.
Considerable signal equipment meant for other units also remained uncollected.
CSO Western Command arranged an additional officer from Army HQ Signal Regiment
to take care of this load. On 12
September 1965 , DCSO Andhra Pradesh Independent Sub Area was moved
from Secunderabad to Pathankot to coordinate signal communications in that area
and 2 Company was placed under him.
Once
the cease fire came in to effect on 23 September, the unit was ordered to
assist the P&T Department in constructing a number of PL routes in area
Dera Baba Nanak-Gurdaspur, Dasuya and Mukerian. 4 and 11 Line Construction
Sections of the unit along with 51 Line Construction Section ex ‘T
Communication Zone Signal Regiment (XV Corps) completed the task by 1 January 1966 .
On
11 October, CSO Western Command ordered laying of submarine cable across major
rivers and nullahs in Punjab at seven places.
This step was taken to cater for any damage to PL existing across various
rail/road bridges due to enemy air bombardment. 645 Army Troops Engineers were
detailed to carry out the task along with Signals and the P&T Department. Each cable drum weighed 21 tons and it took
several days to lay the cable, depending on the width of the river and state of
approaches. Getting the cable from Ordnance depots, unloading from wagons,
transporting them to the laying sites and the actual laying along the riverbeds
and burying were some of the challenges that were met with ingenuity. Four
crossings were completed by 5 November and the remaining by 7 February 1966 .
Headquarters
United Nations India Amritsar Delhi
The unit performed creditably
during the 1965 war, particularly since it was spread out throughout the corps
zone. In recognition of the services rendered, Lieutenant Colonel C.P. Katarya
was ‘Mentioned in Despatches’.
15
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
15 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was under raising at Dehradun when it was ordered to move to Punjab for Operation ‘Ablaze’ in April 1965. The CO was
Lieutenant Colonel S.L. Norton, the other field officers being Majors B.N.
Satyamurti, K.S. Bindra and M.S. Saharan. After termination of Operation
‘Ablaze’ the unit was located in Amritsar Amritsar
The operational location of Main HQ
15 Infantry Division was a few miles ahead of Amritsar Amritsar 6 September 1965 . Wireless was the primary
means of communications for the advance up to Ichhogil Canal
Unfortunately, there was a critical
failure of wireless communication in one of the brigade nets on the first day
itself. Leading the advance of 54 Infantry
Brigade on the GT Road Ichhogil Canal Lahore
The unit had its share of
casualties during the operations. On 8 September
Lance Havildar Budhiballabh Gahrola was killed in enemy action. On 15 September
Havildar Lekh Raj was killed by an enemy shell while repairing a disrupted line
in a forward location. The unit was plagued by casualties even after the cease
fire. On 10 October Lance Naik C. Rajamanickam died in an accident while on
duty. On 13 October Signalman Mirendra Mohan Banerjee while on escort duty
accidentally fell down from the running train near Sanahwal and died. On 22
October Naik Mukhtiar Singh of 81 Field Regiment Signal Section died.
However,
the unit had the distinction of winning for the Corps the only Vir Chakra
during the Indo- Pak War of 1965. Lance
Havildar K.G. George had been working diligently for several days, repairing
lines damaged by enemy action. On the night of 8/9 September, he went beyond
the call of duty and at the risk to his life established line communications to
a forward battalion during the enemy’s counter attack. For displaying conspicuous courage and
dedication to duty in leading his line party under constant heavy shelling and
strafing from the air and restoring disrupted line communications for a number
of days, he was given the
immediate award of a Vir Chakra. The citation for the award is
reproduced below:-
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50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company
After
taking part in the Kutch operations, 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal
Company returned to Agra. It was only after the commencement of operations that
it was ordered to move to Delhi Delhi 10 September 1965 .
The signal company was under the command of Major Vinod Kumar, with Captain
D.K. Uberoy as the second-in-command. The other officers in the company were Captain
M. Bhatia, Lieutenant C.J. Appachu and Lieutenant Krishan.
50 (Independent)
Parachute Brigade was initially deployed in Area Hudiara as the corps reserve
and later placed under 15 Infantry
Division. On the night of 11/12 September the brigade was moved to Pulkanjiri
with the task of capturing Bhasin. On 13 September, the task was changed to
that of securing the road bridge at Dograi. It was also asked to capture intact
the Jallo Bridge Ichhogil Canal
Lieutenants
Bhatia and Krishan were in charge of communications with 2 Para and 6 Para
during their attacks on their respective objectives. The lines to the forming
up place were through even before the assaulting battalions reached there! The
line parties extended the lines beyond the forming up place as the battalions
moved forward and kept on passing information to the brigade headquarters. The
B1 net with the battalions also worked throughout using wireless set 62.
Lieutenant Appachu was the rover officer and accompanied the brigade commander,
Brigadier A.M.M. Nambiar. A dedicated speech line was also provided to the commander’s
rover in addition to wireless communications.
Narrating the story of the capture
of the Jallo Bridge
Jallo
Bridge was about 5-7 kms from our HQ on the Ichhogil Canal. The communication plan was real great ….we were to establish a
communication centre mid way from where we were to lay lines to the battalion
going in for the attack. The lines would be to the FUP initially and thereafter
extended wherever the battalion was. I was in charge of this forward
communication centre ….we were to give a running commentary of the attack and
its progress to the Brigade HQ. Three line parties under the three lieutenants
started laying lines once darkness set in. The situation was extraordinary –
here were the Signals personnel moving about in ‘no man’s land’. At one point
two line parties crossed each other and I had a miraculous escape…Krish heard
sounds coming from a direction, he thought it was an enemy patrol and took
position to fire. As I turned the corner of the building, I don’t know why but
I just whispered Krish’s name… fortunately he heard me and when I met him I found him cold!!!. He told
me that if I had not spoken he would have shot me; range was 2-3 yards, his sten
was on automatic.
The brigade signal company suffered a few
casualties. On 17 September Signalman S.S. Mane manning the radio detachment
with 6 Para sustained major injuries. On 21 September Naik Edward who was part
of the radio detachment with 411 Para Field Company was killed due to shell
wounds. Signalman Hukam Singh was killed on 22 September while laying lines.
7
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The
unit was raised at Ferozepore Cantt on 1 July 1963 as a mountain divisional signal regiment and
subsequently reorganized as an infantry divisional signal regiment on 1 May 1964 . It was
originally tasked to provide signal communications from Madhopur to Ganganagar,
the area of operational responsibility of its parent formation. On arrival of
15 Infantry Division in Amritsar
During Operation ‘Ablaze’, the division
was deployed in Bhikiwind-Patti sector and the unit was able to rehearse its
operational role and communication lay out. For Operation ‘Riddle’, the unit
moved from Ferozepore to its operational location on 5 September 1965 . By 1100 hours the step up
divisional signal centre was opened at a place called Narla about three miles
short of the international border. Line communications were established with
the brigades, rear division headquarters at Patti and with the base at
Ferozepore. With the increase in movements of tanks and B vehicles the lines
started snapping very frequently and the line parties remained on their lines
to carry out repairs as faults occurred, instead of coming back to the unit.
Strict wireless silence was observed with control sets kept on listening watch.
Most of the outstations had netted before leaving the base; those grouped later
were quickly netted in harbour without radiating.
Wireless
silence was lifted at 0400 hours on 6 September and all stations were through.
The battle for Hudiara started. There
was some confusion about 17 Rajput that was detailed for flank protection.
Since it was located away from 65 Brigade, its parent formation, it was not
clear whether the battalion was to come up on the brigade or the divisional
net. The brigade did not want to lose control over the battalion though it did
not give it any resources for rearward communications. The regiment sent a locally modified 1 Ton
Wireless Truck fitted with radio set C11/R210 to enable 17 Rajput to come up on
the D-1 link. However, the truck could not proceed beyond Wan police post where
the battalion rear was located as the whole area was subjected to very heavy
shelling. The divisional commander was
very keen to speak to battalion commander, who was in position near Bedian
bridge about two miles ahead. A remote control unit which was made out of an H1
unit to work with C-11 Sets (no unit J’s were available with the unit) was
quickly installed on the line between the battalion’s main and rear positions
to solve the problem. This line was
duplicated at the first opportunity. Soon the enemy shelling started
playing havoc on all lines. Lines were often disrupted but an efficient fault
control organization and the unbounded zeal of the linemen kept the
communication going. The artillery
brigade lines were the worst affected, but the divisional line detachment and
the ‘H’ Section linemen and kept the regimental and fire order lines
operational.
On 9 September the unit had its
first battle casualties, when enemy aircraft launched attacks on the divisional
headquarters as well as the forward brigades. Signalman Driver Jasudan Khosla
of 29 Infantry Brigade Signal Section and Lance Naik Driver Rajagopal of 65
Infantry Brigade Signal Section were killed in action. Major A. Basu recounts his experience during
the air attack:-
Pakistani
Star fighters, flown by young Bangladeshi pilots (many of them were brought
down by ack ack Bofors located at Dograi and pilots bailing out) almost
regularly flew sorties over our area. One morning (after 3/4 days of battle) I
was returning from the Div HQ when the air–raid alert sounded and I was caught
in an area where there were no trenches or shelter nearby. I hugged the ground
quickly as per our training, lying prone absolutely motionless. Soon a fighter
flew over me strafing. I heard the noise and I saw a line of dust progressing
with the bullet noise just about a metre or less near my side. Soon the
aircraft was gone and the all clear was sounded. I got up and went to my
company without any reaction. Much later I realized about the consequences, in
case the line of dust that went by my side during strafing was a metre closer.
An
important event on 10 September was the occupation of Barki up to the east bank
of the Ichhogil Canal
On 12 September lateral lines
between the infantry brigades and artillery brigade were completed. On the same night a special task force
created from 48 Infantry Brigade was sent to capture Jhaman. In the evening Second Lieutenant Bhupinder
Singh, OC Line Section took the line from Khalra exchange to the brigade
tactical headquarters. This was a
difficult task as all movement had to be done stealthily at night and the
tracks were very close to enemy territory.
The Punjab Armed Police guides panicked and pushed off at the first
sound of firing. Moreover when the line
was taken to the point ordered by the divisional headquarters, there was nobody
there. Bhupinder left the line detachment at the place indicated and began to
hunt for the brigade tactical headquarters in pitch darkness. However, the line was through before the
commencement of the operation. The enemy
had come to know about the move and at midnight
pounded Khalra with heavy artillery.
This shelling cut the line at places but it was soon repaired, Bhupinder
remaining on this line throughout the night.
A radio set C-11/R210 was also provided on D1 net for the task force but
it was not permitted to go up to the tactical headquarters as the station was
mounted on a one-ton vehicle and had to remain a mile behind. The attack was not successful and the
wireless truck was brought back in the morning keeping the line in position for
any future use.
On
18 September orders for a special task force operation were issued. The task
was to clear the area between Hudiara and Bedian and then to occupy Rajoke and
Dholan to assist 4 Mountain Division’s operation against Khemkaran. An exchange was placed at Wan and 17 Rajput,
82 Light Regiment, and several logistic elements were put on the exchange. The old 17 Rajput line was used to connect
this exchange with the main divisional exchange. Also from this exchange a line kept on
trailing behind the task force commander as he moved forward.
Wireless communications experienced
considerable static and atmospheric interference. There was serious
interference between Indian and Pak command radio nets. However, a policy of
live and let live was followed by Signals of both sides and each side normally
waited for the other to finish its transmission before initiating own calls!
Surprisingly, after the cease fire, Signals of both sides got more aggressive
and often interfered with other’s wireless communications.
The
advance made by 7 Infantry Division was limited and the divisional headquarters
did not move during the operations. This reduced the communication challenges
for 7 Infantry Division Signal Regiment to some extent. Second-Lieutenant
Bhupinder Singh, Naik P. Kalan and Lance/Naik Rajagopal were ‘Mentioned in
Despatches’, the last one posthumously.
4 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment
The unit was located at Ambala under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Rawat, with Major H. Subramanian as the
second-in-command. The other field officers in the unit were Majors R.B.
Babulkar and J.S. Dhillon. The officers
in the brigade signal companies were Major Yatindra Pratap (62 Brigade) and
Major N.K. Rastogi (7 Brigade). The third brigade of the Division - 33 Mountain
Brigade – did not take part in the operations. Being a mountain division,
equipped and trained to fight in the mountains, 4 Division lacked anti-tank
resources and had comparatively lighter artillery guns. However, just before
the war, infantry battalions were issued 106 mm recoilless guns. In terms of
signal resources, it was equipped with US
4 Mountain Division
concentrated in Khem Karan sector during the night of 5/6 September, after an
approach march of nearly 200 miles. The main divisional headquarters was
located at Warnala and rear headquarters at Tung. The line section and skeleton
signal centre had arrived the previous night and laid lines to the projected
locations of brigades and other entities and these were through by 1800 hours on
5 September. The brigade signal
companies and rest of the regiment arrived around midnight . Line
communications were available to commanders and staff on arrival.
7 and 62 Mountain Brigades launched
the offensive on 6 September and initial surprise was achieved. 62 Mountain
Brigade attacked astride Kasur axis and 7 Mountain Brigade was further north.
Wireless silence had been imposed and was lifted at 0430 hours. Though C1, C2
and D5 wireless links were through, the D1 link to 7 and 62 Mountain Brigades
and 9 Horse got through only at 0830 hours due to non receipt of the signal
operation order and late arrival of wireless detachments. Radio relay terminals
of the unit had been deployed in area north of Simla and reached only on 6
September. The radio relay link with 62 Brigade was established soon thereafter
but the one to 7 Mountain Brigade did not get through due to a technical
problem. The link became functional only at 2300 hours after the CO visited the
brigade and a new terminal was sent to them on his orders.
By mid day on 6 September, most of
the initial objectives had been captured.
After being initially surprised, Pak troops regained balance and in the
afternoon counter attacked with infantry and armour and resorted to heavy
artillery shelling. Lines extended to forward battalions were damaged due to
enemy shelling and move of vehicles. On the
night of 6/7 September, there was further shelling and attacks by Pak infantry
and armour to throw back the Indians as also to establish a bridgehead across
Rohi Nala. During the night, two battalions of the division – 13 Dogra and 7
Grenadiers - left the line and withdrew, closing down their wireless links to
the brigade headquarters.
The main divisional headquarters
moved near village Boparai by 0200 hours on 8 September and line communications
were re engineered to new locations of brigades and 9 Horse. Rear divisional
headquarters stayed put at the original location. To minimise damage from
shelling, wherever possible lines were laid on the enemy side of water
channels.
The decisive battle of Asal Utar
took place on 10 September. Major Naresh Rastogi, OC 7 Brigade Signal Company,
has described the events of 9 and 10 September in the following words:
09
Sep. Next morning the enemy came close to probe our defences, but 4 Grenadiers
were ready. Especially, CQMH Abdul Hamid had destroyed three tanks, for which
on the recommendation of the Bn Cdr, Brig Sidhu asked me to send an ‘Emergency’
Signal, recommending him for Maha Vir Chakra. In the mean time some tanks
outflanked us from the West but were stuck up in the flooded fields where the
drains had been ruptured by the Artillery fire. They surrendered to the
Infantry Pl of 4 Grenadiers sent to round them up.
10
Sep. Early morning, plenty of smoke and dust, but the enemy was halted at a
distance only. Later we learnt that their commanders expecting the road to
Delhi to be clear were advancing in jeeps protected by armour, to reach Harike.
CQMH Abdul Hamid again destroyed one tank, but was killed on the spot. Cdr
asked me to send a ‘Flash’ message to read ‘Param Vir Chakra, posthumous’ in
place of ‘Maha Vir Chakra’. Luckily the same evening AIR announced his
decoration and Pakistan Radio, the decoration, Hallal- e –Zurrat, for their
GOC. Brig Shami, their C Arty was killed and his jeep with his body was
captured along with their Op Order and fully marked Arty map. The body of
another Cdr, perhaps the Armd Bde Cdr had been taken away.
In
the afternoon, one Pakistani tank had reached behind our location but was
abandoned when bogged down on a bund near the water tank along the road. We had
a shower of machine gun fire from behind. Everyone lying doggo thinking the end
of our stories, since surrounded by enemy tanks. Somehow I heard some shouting
and thinking it to be our own troops, I crawled forward along the grove to meet
them with a soiled so-called white kerchief. Maj Vohra (?) of 3 CAV had been
told that our position had been overrun so they came to liberate us. Luckily we
escaped again, this time from our own fire.
Radio
relay and wireless were the backbone of signal communications down to brigade
level during intense fighting on 8, 9 and 10 September. Due to milling around
of nearly 300 Indian and Pak tanks, other vehicles and intense shelling, lines
got damaged frequently. Though a great
deal of effort was put in to repair the damaged lines these could not be kept
through for long periods. Since radio relay was only available at divisional
and brigade headquarters, wireless was the main stay at regiment/battalion
level. However, at times jamming was experienced from the enemy and in the
evenings and at night there was considerable atmospheric interference also.
Duplicate command nets were established using VHF radio sets (AN/PRC 25 and
AN/PRC 10) and proved invaluable.
After being placed under 4 Mountain
Division on 8 September, 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade came up on D1
wireless link and a radio relay link was also established. The brigade
headquarters was through on line as well. However, the brigade commander
functioned mostly from his tactical headquarters using his rover set.
Having blunted the Pak offensive, 4
Mountain Division planned to recapture Khem Karan and all ground up to Ichhogil Canal
The final attack to recapture Khem
Karan was launched on 21 September. 41 Mountain Brigade from Amritsar
An EFS repairs a charging set in the field, 1965
4 Mountain Division Signal Regiment
acquitted itself well in face of intense enemy shelling and infantry and tank
assault. Communications were always available to commanders and staff and
proved to be a battle-winning factor. The divisional commander, Major General
Gurbaksh Singh, presented a trophy to the unit after the War. During the
presentation he said, “Pak Army launched their major offensive
during the War in Khem Karan Sector using its US equipped 1 Armoured Division
and 11 Infantry Division. 4 Mountain Division was inferior in equipment and had
less strength. That the Division was able to blunt this offensive and decimate
Pak Armour with excellent command and control, is a glowing tribute to the
Divisional Signals.” The unit
was awarded four ‘Mentioned in Despatches’, including one to Major R.B.
Babulkar, who commanded 1 Company. The casualties suffered by the unit were
three OR killed and six wounded.
Major (later Major General) Yatindra
Pratap was commanding 62 Mountain Brigade Signal Company during the operations.
He has described his experiences in the following words:-
Before
moving from Kasauli, I had married up the radio detachments for rear links with
the respective infantry battalions.
Similarly I had sent the line party commanders with the battalion commanders
to see their assembly areas on 5 Sep 1965.
This resulted in lines being laid to these places before troops moved
in. Of course it is a different story
that the troops in their rush to cross the start line, totally bypassed the
assembly areas. To my horror, the
control station for battalion radio net, and rear links to division did not
catch up with brigade headquarters by H hour.
We had to take attacking battalion on my brigade commander’s rover
set. We came up on all radio nets later
in the morning and remained functional, till my rear link with 9 JAK went off
air due to injury to the radio operator and his brief separation from the
adjutant. The line were finally put
through to attacking battalions as soon they firmed in their limited objectives
and remained through till the last light, when these were disrupted by heavy
artillery fire. Soon after last light
the battalion commanders ordered radio sets to be switched off.
Our
withdrawal from Khem Karan to Asal Utar was so fast, with enemy following us
that we could not reel any lines laid for attack. Once we occupied defences around Asal Utar,
our communications remained through. To
save our lines from enemy shelling, we laid them in irrigation drains, on enemy
side. In no time, there were plenty of
WD 1 line laid by Signals, Gunners and Infantry on either side of road and
tracks. Nobody had time to label
these. In case of faults, linemen always
preferred to lay fresh lines instead of finding and repairing faults in the
existing ones. In these operations, the
Company lost three men killed, one taken prisoner of war and any number
injured. We lost three trucks to enemy
air strafing.
2
(Independent) Armoured Brigade Signal Company
2 (Independent)
Armoured Brigade was directly under HQ XI Corps and played a crucial role
during operations in Khem Karan sector. Brigadier T.K. Theograj was the brigade
commander and Major Gurdial Singh was commanding the signal company.The brigade
moved to its operational location on 5 September 1965, from Patiala, Nabha and
Sangrur. Line communications were established to all units as these arrived.
The XI Corps offensive started at 0430 hours on 6 September. However, the
brigade was not actively involved at this stage of the operations. The brigade headquarters was split into
tactical and main headquarters. The brigade commander had a rover detachment
and the GSO3 had a duplicate rover set with him in the tactical headquarters
near village Cheema.
The
enemy’s 1 Armoured Division launched fierce attacks from 7-10 September. On 8 September wireless communications
between tactical and main headquarters was broken due to heavy interference. A
step up detachment was sent to act as a relay station between the two headquarters. The area between village Dialpura and
Bhikiwind proved to be dead ground for wireless communications, which was
maintained by setting up a relay station. On 9 September communications between
HQ XI Corps and Tactical HQ 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was disrupted due
to heavy jamming and interference.
Another step up wireless detachment was sent to main headquarters to act
as a relay station. The wireless vehicle
was strafed at Bhikiwind crossing but no damage was done to the men and
equipment.
Brigadier
Theograj exercised command and control using his rover wireless set in an
unorthodox manner. The COs of armoured
regiments and the artillery regiment mostly remained with him at the brigade
tactical headquarters, along with the signal company commander. The presence of
the COs of units enabled the brigade commander
to get first hand information about the progress of the battle from them. He
was able to pass orders to them directly, saving a lot of time. This also
ensured that there were no clashes between tanks of own formation and everyone
knew and understood the overall battle situation and brigade commander’s
mind. Of course, the absence of the COs from their units during battle was undesirable, from
the point of command and control and morale. In the event, this unorthodox procedure
seemed to work and did not evoke any criticism.
On 11 September, the major portion
of the brigade was ordered to move to 15 Infantry Division as a precautionary
measure against armour threat that was believed to be developing in the Amritsar
On 21 September one company of 19
Maratha Light Infantry supported by one troop of 7 Cavalry attacked from
Rattoke. The wireless vehicle of 7
Cavalry got stuck in one of the canal distributaries. As a result the regiment
remained without communications for two hours.
The communications were restored by sending a standby wireless vehicle from
the signal company.
Naib
Subedar Karnail Singh, the Foreman of Signals, was an outstanding
technician. He repaired a number of
radio sets not only at brigade headquarter but in the armoured regiments even
while the battle was in progress. The repairs were undertaken a number of times
in forward positions as quite a few radio sets developed faults during the Asal
Uttar battle due to rough terrain and enemy action and there was no time to
bring the sets back. He was awarded the Sena Medal for his services. Major
Gurdial Singh was ‘Mentioned in
Despatches’, along with two other personnel.
I CORPS OPERATIONS IN SIALKOT
Planning and Build up for Operation ‘Nepal
The
decision to launch the Indian counter-offensive was taken on 3 September 1965 , soon after the Pak
offensive in the Chhamb Sector. The original plan to launch I and XI Corps
simultaneously had to be amended due to the wide dispersion of the formations
of I Corps, which had been raised only few months earlier in May 1965. In the
event, XI Corps operations were launched on 6 September while those of I Corps
commenced on the next night. In hindsight, this proved to a blessing, as it
resulted in the crippling of Pakistan
I
Corps was a newly raised formation, under the command of Lieutenant General
P.O. Dunn. The divisions under I Corps were 1 Armoured Division (Major General
Rajinder Singh, MVC); 6 Mountain
Division (Major General S. K. Korla, DSO, MC); 14 Infantry Division (Major General R.K. Ranjeet Singh);
and 26 Infantry Division (Major General
M.L. Thapan). Having been raised only in
mid May 1965, the Corps was plagued with all the teething troubles common to a
new raising. Of its four divisions, two were new and truncated. 6 Mountain
Division had been raised in 1963 and had been deployed on the Himalayan border
ever since. It was neither equipped nor trained for plains warfare. 14 Infantry
Division was still in the process of raising and when called up for action, had
to make frantic efforts to assemble the formation headquarters and units from
outstations. Only 1 Armoured Division and 26 Infantry Division were suitably
located and trained for the type of operation that had been envisaged. The corps
had no third line transport; civil vehicles had to be commandeered to fill in
this gap in the administrative chain.
The
task assigned to I Corps was to isolate Sialkot from Lahore, by driving a wedge
into the area of Daska, north of Gujranwala. The operation was given the
code-word ‘Nepal
By
last light 7 September 1965, I Corps was ready to cross the international
border on a frontage extending from west of Basantar River to Suchetgarh. The
formations were deployed according to plan except for 14 Infantry Division, which could not be concentrated to
participate in the establishment of the bridgehead as its 58 Infantry Brigade
employed for the security of Madhopur road bridge and the headworks
could not be relieved from Pathankot for this role. Also, 28 Infantry Brigade,
which had been promised to the division, could not be made available, as it was
involved in the Chhamb sector. Still, promptly at 2300 hours on 7 September, 6
Mountain Division and 26 Infantry Division crossed the international border
into Pakistan Nepal
To
carry out its assigned task, 6 Mountain Division assigned Charwa to 99 Mountain
Brigade and Maharajke to 69 Mountain Brigade Group in Phase I of the operation.
Two battalions of 99 Mountain Brigade launched attacks on enemy positions on
the flanks of the village Charwa, clearing them by 0300 hours next morning. Exploiting
their success, the assaulting battalions pushed forward beyond their objectives
to cover the roads coming into Charwa from Maharajke, Chobara and Ikhnal. Commencing their attack on Maharajke at the
same time, 3 Madras Madras
26
Infantry Division, tasked to capture Anula and Bajragarhi, launched an attack
with two brigades on the night of 7/8 September. By 0200 hours on 8 September, 162 Infantry
Brigade had captured Point 857 and Wains, astride the main Suchetgarh-Sialkot
road. In a simultaneous attack, 168 Infantry Brigade captured Anula and
Bajragarhi by 0530 hours without much fighting. Thus, both 6 and 26 Divisions
succeeded in taking their initial objectives on schedule.
1 Armoured Division
1
Armoured Division (Major General Rajinder Singh ‘Sparrow’) was located in Jullundur 5 September 1965 . The task allotted to the division was to
capture Phillora-Pagowal by last light 8 September 1965 . According to the outline plan 1 Armoured
Brigade (Brigadier K.K. Singh) was to advance on axis
Ramgarh-Kangre-Sabzkot-Chobara-Phillora while 43 Lorried Brigade (Brigadier
H.S. Dhillon) was on axis Salehriyah-Sabzipur-Cross Roads-Mastpur-Pagowal.
At 0600
hourson on 8 September, 1 Armoured
Division crossed the border in
two columns, 43 Lorried Brigade on the
right and 1 Armoured Brigade on the left. The left column of 1 Armoured Brigade
advanced rapidly until 0930 hours when the leading armour (16 Cavalry)
encountered some enemy tanks, recoilless guns and dug-in infantry in area
Gadgor. About the same time, 17 Horse encountered a similar opposition in area
Tharoh, south-east of Phillora. A serious tank-to-tank battle ensued, in which
the enemy air force also took a hand. However, in the melee both regiments
failed to determine the strength of the opposing armour and could not
out-manoeuvre the enemy. The brigade commander ordered 17 Horse to withdraw
from Tharoh to counter what he thought was a serious tank threat on the left
flank to area Pindi Bhago. 16 Cavalry was also disengaged and deployed along
Hasri Nala.
The
advance of 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade came to a halt after some tanks of 2
Lancers got bogged in the quagmire created by a heavy shower of rain the
previous night, and had to be diverted to an alternative route via Ramgarh. The
brigade cleared Salarian and captured Cross Roads. Subsequently, it was ordered
to advance via Maharajke-Kaloi and capture Pagowal. Advancing on the morning of
9 September, the brigade secured Kaloi but could not get to Pagowal. Heavy
enemy shelling and air attacks throughout 10 September followed by heavy rain
made all tracks unfit. This coupled with the indifferent state of
communications in enemy territory, caused a virtual breakdown in administrative
support. The division decided that it could not continue its advance, and spent
9 and 10 September reorganising and replenishing.
After
an extensive reconnaissance on 9 and 10 September, the divisional commander located
an opening in area Rurki-Kalan to the north. He decided to abandon the earlier plan
of advancing to Phillora via Gadgor. Instead, 1 Armoured Brigade would switch
from the left to the right, regroup and advance to Phillora via Maharajke –
Rurki Khurd. The ground in this area was full of paddy fields and sugarcane
plantations and there was the risk of tanks being bogged down. However, General
Rajinder Singh chose to mount the attack from this unexpected direction in
order to achieve surprise.
The
assault on Phillora commenced at 0600 hours on 11 September after a brief but
intense pre-H hour bombardment. As 1 Armoured Brigade reached the line Libbe -
Nathupur-Saboke, there was a serious clash with the enemy armour. Carrying out
an outflanking movement, 4 Horse compelled the enemy to withdraw from the eastern
side. 43 Lorried Brigade then tried to launch an attack on the Phillora
position, but due to enemy's heavy artillery fire and strafing, could not press
on. The brigade then cleared the villages Khananwali and Wachuke. By 1530 hours
on 11 September, Phillora Cross Roads was secured. Operating on the right of 4 Horse, 17 Horse took
part in the battle, displaying great gallantry and aggressiveness. In a classic
tank engagement with the enemy at a range of only 100 yards that lasted for
about 45 minutes, 17 Horse destroyed 28 tanks of the enemy, losing only one of
its own. After the capture of Phillora, the enemy tried to dislodge the brigade
but could not succeed. It also transpired that GOC 15 Infantry Division, who
was trying to land in the Phillora area by helicopter was shot up by 17 Horse
and killed.
Attempts
to capture Pagowal with 62 Cavalry on 11 September did not succeed and the task
was given to 6 Mountain Division. On 13 September, 69 Brigade of this division under Brigadier E.A.
Vas, supported by 62 Cavalry, captured Pagowal against heavy opposition. The
enemy reacted by raining approximately 1000 shells into the brigade sector
within two hours, but the troops held their ground. A Pakistani attempt to
launch a counterattack from the south-west with approximately two squadrons of
Patton tanks supported by infantry was foiled by own artillery and tank fire.
With the repulse of this counter-attack, 69 Mountain Brigade had consolidated
the defended sector around Pagowal.
Plans were now made
for the capture of Chawinda. Briefly, the plan was that 4 Horse was to advance
from Chahar and cut the Badiana-Pasrur and Chawinda-Pasrur roads in the area of
the railway line Sialkot-Narowal. Thereafter, 17 Horse was to advance to Alhar
from Gil and then swing towards Kalewali-Chawinda. 16 Cavalry and 2 Lancers
were to provide flank protection from the west and the east. Once the armour
had created a favourable situation, 43 Lorried Brigade was to attack Chawinda.
The operation was to take place on 14 September.
Chawinda was held by
about two regiments of armour and infantry. The operation commenced on 14 September
but due to stiff opposition, 1 Armoured
Brigade could only secure some of the objectives, viz. Wazirwali and Alhar railway
station. Kalewali was secured by 5 Jat but was taken back by enemy armour.
However, in the early hours of 15 September, the Jats recaptured Kalewali.
Owing to the heavy
opposition encountered at Chawinda, the corps commander appreciated that unless
a strong force was established behind Chawinda and the position cut off, it
would not be possible to capture the town. Accordingly, 17 Horse and 8 Garhwal
Rifles group was ordered to establish itself in the area Jassoran-Butur
Dograndi area on 16 September. On the
morning of 16 September, 17 Horse with a company of 9 Dogra captured Jassoran,
after suffering heavy losses. The Garhwalis managed to reach Butur Dograndi
after suffering heavy casualties, including the loss of their CO, Lieutenant
Colonel J.E. Jhirad. However, Butur Dograndi changed hands several times, with
the enemy ultimately retaking part of the position. 43 Lorried Brigade was then
ordered to launch their attack on Chawinda on 17 September. However, as the
troops were far back and could not fetch up in time, the attack was called off.
During the heavy tank battles, Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Tarapore of 17 Horse was
killed. He led his regiment with great distinction and gallantry and inflicted
considerable tank losses on the enemy. He was posthumously awarded the Param
Vir Chakra.21
6 Mountain Division
The Chawinda position
proved to be a tough nut to crack. The corps commander decided to put in an
attack with 6 Mountain Division, with armour in support. For this purpose, 6
Division received two brigades of 14 Division, viz. 35 Brigade and 58 Brigade.
The attack was to go in the early hours of 18 September, but had to be
postponed, to facilitate adequate reconnaissance. Meanwhile, Jassoran and Butur
Dograndi were lost, despite determined resistance and heavy losses among the
Garhwalis. However, 20 Rajput from the Lorried Brigade recaptured the position on
the night of 18/19 September.
6 Mountain Division
mounted the attack as planned on the night of 18/19 September. Surprise had
been lost and the enemy started shelling the forming-up places, dislocating the
attack from the very beginning. However, 35 Infantry Brigade did achieve
partial success in its assault; 6 Maratha were able to capture their objective
while 5 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles encountered heavy enemy resistance. At first
light, enemy tanks opened up from Chawinda. It was found that enemy was using
tanks as pill boxes from inside the town and the defences were well dug in and
organised in depth. Heavy casualties were sustained and the troops were
compelled to fall back on Jassoran. Two companies of 6 Maratha which had fought
their way to Chawinda railway station had to be extricated with the assistance
of 4 Horse.
The situation on the 58
Infantry Brigade front was even worse. Enemy shelling was so heavy that it
unnerved the troops, causing confusion and loss of control. The leading troops
lost direction, and 14 Rajput barged into a neighbouring position in Wazirwali
held by a company of 5 Jat and a squadron of 2 Lancers of 43 Lorried Brigade.
Stunned by the unexpected opposition en route to their objective the Rajputs
dispersed in confusion. Two companies of 4 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles (the
other assaulting battalion) which had managed to reach Chawinda were thrown
back by the enemy. By this stage, all control at battalion and brigade level
was lost and the formation ceased to be a cohesive force. Commander 58 Infantry
Brigade ordered 3/1 Gorkha Rifles, the reserve battalion, to restore the
situation, but it did not succeed in the face of intense artillery and tank
fire. The failure at Chawinda
automatically ruled out further operations for the capture of Badiana and
Zararwal.
In his scathing comments
on the reasons for the debacle at Chawinda, the Army Commander, General Harbaksh
Singh, writes: “This battle is a classic
study in command failure and poor execution. Lack of control at Corps level
paved the way to defeat - an indifferent leadership at lower levels made
disaster inevitable. The depressing combination decided the fate of the battle
and foredoomed the outcome of the entire campaign".22
26 Infantry Division
On the far right
flank, 52 Mountain Brigade was nominated to capture Tilakpur and Muhadipur on
the Chaprar-Sialkot road on the night of 17/18 September 1965. The D Day was,
however, postponed by a day to conform to operations at Chawinda. In a well
executed outflanking manoeuvre, 52 Mountain Brigade launched the assault from
the right rear at 2230 hours on 18 September. The enemy, though taken by
surprise, quickly rallied round to offer stiff resistance. By 0300 hours on 19
September, areas Mile 8 Road Sialkot-Chaprar, Tilakpur and Muhadipur had been
captured. The enemy reacted sharply to the loss of these villages by bringing
down heavy artillery and launching a number of determined counter-attacks with
infantry and armour groups. But Indian troops stuck on doggedly to their
positions and repulsed the assaults with heavy loss to the enemy.
The most serious of
these counter-attacks was launched on the night of 22/23 September. The enemy
demonstrated against 1 Madras at Tilakpur, but carried out the actual assault
against 10 Mahar from the area west of the road. A penetration was effected
into the left hand forward company, posing a direct threat to the battalion
headquarters at Muhadipur. After a brief but bitter fight, the enemy withdrew
in confusion. Indian artillery took full advantage of the inviting targets
offered by the disorganised, retreating enemy and inflicted heavy casualties,
which included 150 killed and seven tanks destroyed.
The
Cease-Fire
On 22 September, a
message was received from Army HQ s ordering a cease fire with effect from 0330
hours on 23 September 1965 .
The orders were communicated to the troops who were, however, cautioned to
remain vigilant. It was apprehended that enemy forces might put in a series of
strong offensive actions in a last-minute bid to save face and strengthen their
subsequent bargaining capacity. In the event, this proved to be a correct
surmise. The Pak Army made frantic efforts to recapture lost areas in the
intervening period up to the deadline for the cease-fire. The most desperate of
these attempts was the assault on village and railway station of Alhar, which
was repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy. Pak artillery continued
shelling in the entire area of operation until the very last. Indian guns
retaliated suitably. At 0330 hours on 23 September 1965 , the last of the shells was fired and
all became quiet.
When the cease-fire
came into effect, I Corps had approximately 500 square kilo-metres (about 200
square miles) of Pak territory under its control. It had also taken a heavy
toll of enemy armour. The number of enemy tanks destroyed was estimated to
total 144, of which 31 lay scattered in enemy territory firmly held by India
SIGNALS IN OPERATION ‘RIDDLE’ - I
CORPS SECTOR
I
Corps Signals Regiment
I Corps Signal Regiment was a newly raised
unit, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel C.S. Randhawa, who was due to
retire at the end of October 1965. During Operation ‘Ablaze’, the unit had
moved from Varanasi Jhansi Varanasi Jhansi Jhansi Jhansi
The
CO-designate, Major B.C. Banerjee, arrived in the unit on 28 August. Three days
later, Colonel Randhawa left on leave pending retirement, as there was no
indication of the impending all out war. The move orders for Operation ‘Riddle’
were issued at a conference the very next day i.e. 1 September 1965 . Most of the elements were to
move by rail and a few by road. The first train left Jhansi Jammu
The unit had very little equipment
fitted in vehicles except wireless sets. Items like exchanges, carrier and VFT
equipment and teleprinters for the signal centre had to be unpacked and placed
in vehicles/dug outs. The rear headquarters was located at Mirthal, a distance
of over 75 miles. The offensive was due to be launched on night 6/7 September,
leaving very little time for the unit to get organised. The road party, which
left Jhansi
CSO
I Corps (Brigadier H.S. Bains, VrC) issued the first signal instruction on 5
September 1965. With effect from 9 September, ‘Y’ Communication Zone Signal
Regiment located at Jammu was placed under CSO I Corps, considerably
augmenting his resources,
particularly of lines.
49 Line Construction Section ex
‘T’ Communication Zone Signal Regiment
(XV Corps) constructed a permanent line pair
from Tawi bridge in Jammu
I Corps Signal Regiment was not
fully geared for operations initially. However, within a few days the situation
improved as line arteries started to be built, technical equipment stabilised
and personnel returned from leave. HQ 26 Division, Jammu
As
operations progressed, it became clear that a carrier/ switching centre would
be required at Charwa. Two carrier quad cables were laid between Kaluchak and
Pindi. Subsequently, spaced PVC cable routes were constructed between
Kaluchak-Vishnoi, Charwa-Sabzpir and Vishnoi-Charwa. ‘Y’ Communication Zone
Signal Regiment constructed a multi air line route between Charwa and Maharajke
and a PL pair was also extended from Vishnoi and Pindi. Line routes were thus
extended to headquarters of divisions as these moved forward and laterals were
also provided between formations. SDS was used extensively to clear important
despatches, documents and also low precedence signal traffic.
Initially,
a radio relay link was established only to Pathankot with a relay at Samba. As
more resources became available, radio relay links were established with all divisions.
These proved to be very reliable, except for initial technical hiccups, due to
the equipment being newly introduced. Fullerphones were used for clearing
signal traffic between corps and divisions. Teleprinters worked to HQ Western
Command and Army HQ.
6
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment
6
Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment was raised at Bareilly 20 April 1963 , out of assets of the Indian
contingent that had served with the UN Peace Keeping Force in Congo Punjab
from 8 May to 8 July 1965 ,
and returned to Bareilly
In
mid August 1965, the unit was staged forward to Ambala along with the parent
formation. Towards the end of August, on receipt of the operational instruction
for Operation ‘Nepal
6
Mountain Division was given the task of capturing villages Maharajke and Charwa
and establish a bridgehead for the break out by 1 Armoured Division on 8
September. The task of capturing the two villages was assigned to 69 and 99
Brigades respectively. The brigade signal companies were briefed about their
operational tasks by the CO and a signal instruction was issued. The attack was
to be launched after last light on 7 September. However, in the morning of the
same day Pak aircraft strafed the main and rear divisional headquarters and the
divisional troops. Seven OR of the unit were wounded during the attack which
also damaged three unit vehicles and one wireless set 19.
The
attack was launched at 2300 hours on 7 September as planned. The enemy was
taken completely by surprise, thanks to the security precautions taken by the
formation. By 0330 hours next morning 99
Brigade had captured Charwa after a grim battle. By 0530 hours 69 Brigade had
also captured Maharajke. Wireless communications functioned throughout and
lines were extended behind advancing battalions as also brigades and were
always through. Elaborate arrangements had been made to ensure speedy fault
rectification. According to the Army Commander, the battles of Charwa and
Maharajke are classic examples of meticulous preparations and flawless
execution of a deliberate night attack.
After
the capture of Maharajke and Charwa, 35 Infantry Brigade was ordered to move
forward and clear the cross roads near Sabzipur, which was to act as a firm
base for the assault by 1 Armoured Division.
On 8 September one OR was wounded due to strafing near Sibbu Chak. One line vehicle with all its equipment was
burnt completely. On 9 September the main divisional headquarters moved to
village Naria. On 11 September after the
battle of Phillora, certain regroupings were carried out and new tasks assigned
to formations. 99 Brigade was placed under 1 Armoured Division and ordered to
move to Phillora; 69 Brigade was tasked capture Pagowal; and 35 Brigade was to
continue to occupy Sabzipr. Commencing its advance at first light on 13 September, 69 Brigade
secured the intersection of roads Maharajke-Pagowal-Badia and Phillora-Sialkot
by 0700 hours. During the day the enemy
launched several counter-attacks which were beaten back. Finally Pagowal was
captured at last light on 13
September 1965 . Communications during these operations were
excellent and there were no disruptions. However, there were a few casualties
in 99 Brigade Signal Company on 12 September, when one OR was killed and three
were wounded.
On
16 September the corps commander reviewed the situation and assigned new tasks
to the divisions. According to the revised plans, 6 Mountain Division was to
capture Chawinda on the night of 17/18 September. For this operation, 35 and 58
Brigades of 14 Division were placed under command and 99 Brigade reverted to 6
Mountain Division, though it remained committed for holding Phillora. The main
divisional headquarters moved to Sabzpir.
The attack had to be postponed by a day due to the move of 35 Brigade
from Gangore to Phillora ordered by 1 Armoured Division due a misunderstanding.
Further confusion was created by the withdrawal of its troops from Jassoran and
other pivots by 1 Armoured Brigade on 18 September, resulting in 35 Brigade
ordered to secure it at the last moment. The attack on Chawinda was launched on
night 18/19 September but failed, due to loss of surprise, lack of coordination
and strong reaction by the enemy.
Before
operation, the resources of 35 and 58 Brigade Signal Sections ex 14 Division
had to be augmented as they did not have adequate wireless and equipment. There
were difficulties of coordination as the regrouping happened at very short
notice. However, there were no major breakdowns in communications. After the
unsuccessful attacks on Chawinda, 6 Mountain Division took over the defence of
areas captured and extensive line laying was undertaken to have reliable
communications. On 21 September Subedar Hari Singh of 69 Mountain Brigade
Signal Company and two OR of 99 Mountain Brigade Signal Company were killed due
to enemy action. In addition six OR of 69 Mountain Brigade Signal Company were
wounded. On 22 September 35 Infantry Brigade Signal
Section was established in area Monga after its capture. The main divisional headquarters was strafed
by enemy air craft at midday and one OR was wounded.
A DR is offered
refreshments by village damsels in Punjab, 1965
6
Mountain Division Signal Regiment suffered rather high casualties during the
operations: six killed and 20 wounded. However, the unit’s contribution did not
go unrecognized – it received no less than eight ‘Mentioned in Despatches’. The
recipients were Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Unni; Major Joginder Singh; Subedar
Major M.C. Nelson; Naib Subedar K. Apukuttan Nair; Havildar M. John; Havildar
K.R.P. Shinde; and Lance Naiks Keshar Singh and Amar Singh.
26
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
26 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was located
at Jammu
The
task allotted to 26 Infantry Division was to contain the enemy forces in area Sialkot
162 Brigade crossed the border at 2300
hours on 7 September and launched an attack on its objectives, Point 857, Unche
Wains and Niwe Wains. By first light the objectives had been captured.
Communications functioned well except for the second phase of the attack, when
the communications with 1 Sikh Light Infantry failed, leading to a change in
orders by the brigade commander. 168 Brigade also launched its attack at the
same time and captured Anjula and Bajragarhi by first light, the opposition
being light. Lines were extended to both brigades but were frequently disrupted
due to heavy shelling that continued after the objectives had been captured.
Line parties sent out to restore
communications had to work under enemy fire, sometimes sustaining casualties.
On 9 September Signalman Inder Singh Manhas was killed by enemy shelling while
working on a line. On the same day, Second-Lieutenant Sharma, the
second-in-command of 162 Brigade Signal Section was sent out to repair the line
to 1 Sikh Light Infantry. He reported that due to heavy shelling it was not
possible to proceed further and asked for further instructions. He was told to finish his task allotted to
him, which he did. Next day, the CO personally went forward to check on the
lines to the brigades, and ordered additional line detachments to maintain the
forward lines.
Subsequently local actions took
place in the divisional sector. On 12 September, 52 Brigade was moved from 25 Division and
placed under command 26 Division. It was
tasked to capture areas Tilakpur-Muhadipur in conjunction with the attack on
Chawinda. The brigade made good progress and the enemy reacted strongly. By the
time the cease fire took place on 23 September, 26 Division had secured its
objectives, in spite of strong enemy reaction.
Since the division advanced only a few miles and was located close to
operational area, the communication support was relatively easy. The brigade
signal sections provided sound communications for various battalion and brigade
attacks, though there were a few breakdowns. Communication support for the
advance of 52 Brigade from the north was also well planned and executed.
The
unit had its share of casualties during the operations. On 13 September enemy
aircraft bombarded the rear location of the unit. Three OR came under the
debris caused by the bomb explosion and suffered injuries. On14 September, Major Y.G. Gore was shot by
infiltrators near Ranbir Singh Pura. He was evacuated to the hospital, where he
succumbed to his injuries. The officer had joined the unit just eight days
earlier on 6 September, on promotion.
1
Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment
On termination of Operation ‘Ablaze’
in July 1965, 1 Armoured Divisional Signal Regiment did not return to its
permanent location at Jhansi Jullundur
On 5 September 1965 the unit moved to its
concentration area south of Mile 113 on Road Samba- Jammu. The next day the divisional
commander issued verbal orders for Operation ‘Nepal
Wireless silence was lifted at 2330
hours on 7 September and communications on wireless were established. The advance commenced at 0600 hours 8 September 1965 . D1 (HF)
and D1A (VHF) nets worked satisfactorily.
For the first time two command RT nets were provided for the general
staff. The divisional headquarters
operations room however found it difficult to man both the nets
simultaneously. The same difficulty was
experienced by the staff at brigades.
However this difficulty was overcome by getting the staff to communicate
on the D1 (HF) net only and use the D1A (VHF) net as standby.
As the distance between brigades
and the main divisional headquarters increased, by 1100 hours the
communications on D1 (HF) became weak but command and control was effectively
maintained through the GOC’s rover set which was located in the forward battle
area. On D1A (VHF) net also the signals
began to get weaker as ranges increased beyond line-of-sight. The aerials being
used were the manufacturer’s eight feet rod aerials with the antenna tuning
unit. The problem was overcome to some
extent by using an innovation known as the ‘Balaram aerial”. These dipole rod
aerials had been designed by Lieutenant Colonel K. Balaram and manufactured
locally when the regiment was located in Punjab during Operation ‘Ablaze’ and
comprised a rod dipole aerial mounted on
a 36 feet tall mast. The VHF signals
immediately improved to strength five by using the new aerial. Communications on the D1A net remained stable
during both day and night over longer ranges than was otherwise possible with
the eight feet rod aerials of the wireless set C-42.
Other than D1 and D1A, problems
were also encountered on other radio nets.
The D2 net worked well. However
on D4 net, 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade could not get through due to a faulty
wireless set. D3 links with 6
Mountain Division and 14 Infantry Division were not established. Similarly, C-1
was working but C-2 was not through.
By 1000 hours the advance of 43
Lorried Infantry Brigade had been stalled, while that of 1 Armoured Brigade
axis proceeded according to plan. The situation in the evening was a bit worse,
with 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade being not through on D4 as well as D1A. However, D2 net continued to function well.
Next morning three wireless sets 19 Mk 2 were collected from the Ordnance Field
Park and handed over to 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade Signal Section. By last
light on 9 September, the divisional headquarters had moved forward in
preparation for the advance to Phillora.
On 10 September 116 Infantry
Brigade was placed under command 1 Armoured Division. Frequencies and link signs were issued to the
brigade signal section. The advance for the
capture of Phillora was resumed at first light on 11 September. During the
battle of Phillora communications functioned well and there were no major
failures. Enemy aircraft carried out several attacks on the divisional main and
rear headquarters, but there was no damage to Signals elements. On 11 September
Signalman Ram Nandan Singh of 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade Signal Section was
killed by enemy shelling. On 12 September Naik Nadarapu Venkanna, of 1 Armoured
Brigade Signal Company was killed in action.
The same night Naib Subedar Ayyadurai and Havildar Raghbir Singh with an
escort party were sent area to Charwa to deliver link signs and frequencies to
the Divisional Commander’s command tank and repair the wireless set 19 that had
become faulty.
Nk NK Singh and Sigmn Ram Singh, Ram Bilas and MV
Peter of 1
Armd Div Sig Regt laying cable near Phillora.
On 13 September the unit commenced
its move to Charwa, located about a mile across the border in Pak
territory. The road was very dusty and
movement was slow, since most of the time vehicles had to move in first gear. Military requisitioned civil trucks moving in
the opposite direction as well as some overtaking the convoy split the unit
convoy in parts. As a result some
vehicles diverted from the actual route and ultimately fetched up at the
harbour at 0630 hours, nearly four hours after the rest of the main body. On arrival in harbour at 0230 hours communications
on D1 HF and D1A VHF had been
established. Shortly afterwards, D4 to rear divisional headquarters and C1 and
C2 to I Corps were also through. However, D3 was not through with 6 Mountain
Division.
Line communications with HQ I Corps
could not be provided due to shortage of carrier quad cable. The CO suggested a circuit utilization plan
to the CSO. The proposal was to derive a
circuit between main corps and main divisional headquarters by using a balance
bypass filter unit (BBFU) at Rear HQ 1 Armoured Division and ACT 1+1 at either
end. The following circuits could then be provided:-
·
Main I Corps to Main 1
Armoured Division – One speech on
carrier and one telegraph on fullperphone through S+DX
No 2.
·
Main I Corps to Rear 1
Armoured Division – One speech on audio and one telegraph on phantom
fullerphone
·
Rear 1 Armoured
Division to Main 1 Armoured Division – One speech circuit on audio and one telegraph circuit on
phantom fullerphone.
Shortly
before the attack on Chawinda on 14 September a radio relay terminal was
provided by CSO I Corps for communication from Main HQ 1 Armoured Division to
HQ I Corps. A speech circuit was put through
at 0800 hours on 14 September. However, the incoming speech at I Corps end was
poor, which improved with the intervention of the CSO.
After
the failure of the attack on Chawinda the divisional headquarters continued to
be located at Charwa, 43 Lorried Brigade at
Phillora and 1 Armoured Brigade north of Phillora. The state of
communications on 16 September was not very good, with some of the links not
functioning due to extended ranges or lack of equipment. Line had been laid to
58 Infantry Brigade, 1 Artillery Brigade and rear divisional headquarters. However, there was no line communication with
1 Armoured Brigade and 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade. Brigadier Ajit Singh, CSO Western
Command and Brigadier H.S. Bains, CSO I Corps visited the unit during the day
to discuss its communication problems.
The
second attack on Chawinda by 6 Mountain Division also failed and the attack on
Badiana by 1 Armoured Division could not be mounted due to a series of
misunderstandings. From 19 September onwards there were no major actions,
though measures to improve communications continued. On 21 September the CO went
to Tactical HQ I Corps with the intention of setting up a fullerphone circuit
between Main 1 Armoured Division and Main HQ I Corps, by engineering a bypass
through two superposing units at the tactical headquarters location. The fullerphone circuit was tested on one
pair of quad cable between Main HQ 1 Armoured Division and Tactical HQ I
Corps. However, the signal centre at
Main HQ I Corps was not ready for the test.
After briefing Lieutenant Prasad at Tactical HQ I Corps regarding the
connections required to the fullerphone circuit going, Colonel Balaram returned
to the unit. Next day, Major K.F. D’Lima proceeded to the corps forward
exchange at Pindri to arrange establishment of a fullerphone circuit between
Main HQ 1 Corps and Main HQ 1 Armoured Division. By the evening the fullerphone
working between the unit and the corps forward exchange had been tested.
However, it could not be extended to Main HQ I Corps due to the carrier quad
pair that was being used between the two locations being faulty. The circuit
was transferred to a PVC pair and started working. Unfortunately, the PVC pair developed a fault
and the circuit could not be established.
The
cease fire came into effect on 23
September 1965 . On 7 October the unit suffered a misfortune when the
SDS jeep met with an accident on road Samba- Jammu. Lance Naik V.P. Appukuttan
Nair and Signalman B. Narayanan died on the spot, while Signalman Kamta Prasad
was injured. Colonel Balaram, who had ably commanded the unit during the war
left on 9 November 1965, handing over to Major K.F. D’Lima, who was promoted
and appointed the new CO.
14
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
14 Infantry Divisional Signal
Regiment was under raising at Saugor when it received orders to proceed to the
concentration area to take part in Operation ‘Riddle’. The CO was Lieutenant
Colonel R.A. Mousinho, with Major B.B. Sarin as the second-in-command and Major
N.B. Phansalkar commanding 1 Company. Second Lieutenants D.C. Dutta and A.S.
Shaikh were commanding 58 and 116 Infantry Brigade Signal Sections respectively.
The
unit received orders to move on 2
September 1965 . On 4 September the layout group comprising Major
N.B. Phansalkar, Second Lieutenant S.K. Sanan, Subedar R. Rangachari and 20 OR entrained
for Pathankot along with HQ 35 Infantry Brigade and 20 Rajput. Loading of the unit’s vehicles in flats and
stores in covered wagons continued throughout the day and was completed a
little after midnight . The
main body of the unit entrained at 1430 hours on 5 September, along with the
divisional headquarters. The unit was still under raising and had less than
half its complement of men and equipment. The strength of the unit that moved
with the main body was seven officers, five JCOs and 261 OR. The situation was
aggravated by the departure of the second-in-command, Major B.B. Sarin on
posting to Police Wireless in Delhi
The
layout group reached Pathankot on 6 September and was directed to its location
on the Basoli track. The flats carrying the vehicles arrived soon afterwards
and were unloaded. A little after midnight
the train carrying the main body arrived at Pathankot. However, the Movement Control did not allow
the personnel to detrain, since air strikes were expected from first light
onwards. Finally at about 0600 hours on 7 September the train reached Sarna
railway station and unloading commenced. By 1400 hours the unit had moved to
its allotted area near Janglote. Telephone communications were established to
116 Infantry Brigade at Basoli track, which was connected to Rear HQ 14
Infantry Division located nearby; and also to Jammu
On
8 September wireless communication was established with HQ I Corps on C-1 and
C-2 links. At this stage 35 and 116
Brigades were placed under command 1 Armoured Division for the operations for
the capture of Phillora. On 9 September the unit moved to Samba where it
remained until 11 September when it was ordered to move to Ramgarh. The main
body left Samba at 1930 hours but reached Ramgarh only at 2200 hours, since
most of the drivers were not proficient in convoy drills and driving at night without
lights. After reaching Ramgarh the unit laid local lines to the divisional
headquarters. At 0200 hours a line party
was sent out to 116 Brigade under the command of Second Lieutenant S.K. Sanan.
A line party was also sent to 58 Brigade at 0500 hours. These lines did not get
through until the evening and at 2030 hours the CO together with Second
Lieutenant G.D. Diwana and a line party left to check the lines to 58 and 116
Brigades and to provide lateral communications between these two formations.
The line to 116 Brigade was through at midday
on 13 September while telephone communication to 58 Brigade and lateral lines
between the two brigades got through only by 1930 hours after the CO reached
the location of 58 Brigade at Charwa.
On
14 September the CO came under fire twice from enemy aircraft. At 1330 hours while
visiting the location of 58 Brigade he came under an air attack by two enemy
Sabre jets in the area cross roads 800 yards north of Sabzpir. No casualties were sustained by the unit
personnel. However, one jeep of the brigade signal section was slightly
damaged. At 1700 hours while returning from Sabzipur the CO was again fired
upon ineffectively from Charwa.
On the night of 14 September the
unit moved to Dundial in Pak territory, arriving there at 2230 hours. For the
first time the unit was able to get through to HQ I Corps on radio relay. The
link could not be established earlier because of lack of aerial leads and
connectors. The same night the unit strength was augmented by the arrival of
three officers. The second-in-command, Major B.B. Sarin, who had left on
posting to Delhi 31 December 1965 . Second Lieutenant R. Mehrotra joined the unit
on posting from 2 STC and Second Lieutenant N.V. Chalapathy returned from
annual leave.
For the battle of Chawinda that
took place on 18 and 19
September, 35 and 58 Brigades were allotted to 6 Mountain
Division. During the attack,
Lance/Havildar Ram Singh Mehar and Signalman Surjit Singh Puri of 58 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company were killed in action from enemy shelling, while manning
the B1 link. On 21 September the unit moved back to Sabzipur. Telephone
communications were established with Tactical HQ I Corps and 116 Brigade. At
this stage 58 Brigade reverted from 6 Mountain Division was located at Gadgor.
The line party went out at 2100 hours on foot because of bad road conditions.
The line did not get through until next morning and at 0600 hours another line
party under Second Lieutenant Diwana was sent out. At 1400 hours Colonel R.A.
Mousinho himself left for Godgar and was subjected to shelling from enemy
medium guns enroute. The CSO and the CO visited 58 Brigade Signal Section in
the evening at their new location at Chobara. Telephone communications were
established to HQ 58 Infantry Brigade at 2000 hours on 22 September. Simultaneously wireless communication on D1
and D2 links were also established.
The unit remained at Sabzipur after
the cease fire came into effect on 23 September. Though 14 Infantry Division
did not play a major role in the operations of I Corps, its brigades were
grouped with the other divisions for various actions. The unit was still under
raising and handicapped by shortage of manpower, transport and equipment, which
continued to trickle in even during while the operations were going on. There
were very few experienced officers in the unit, and the brigade signal
companies were commanded by subalterns. In spite of these limitations, the unit
performed creditably.
1 Air Support Signal Regiment
Close air support to ground troops
commenced in the evening on 1
September 1965 , when enemy advancing columns in Chhamb were
attacked by Vampires. The Indian Air Force flew a total of about 800 sorties
during the war in support of the Army. However, as it took a long time for the
aircraft to arrive over the target, it was often difficult for the pilots to
recognise the targets and the effect of the attacks was not appreciable. Air
photographs took inordinately long to be received at tactical headquarters as
control of sorties and interpretation was exercised at army/command
headquarters.
Signal communications between the
JOCs at corps headquarters and supporting wings/airfields did not function
efficiently, which adversely affected planning of pre-planned demands. RT
communications between the air control teams and fighter bomber aircraft also
did not work in a number of cases. Some of the reasons were that the supporting
aircraft flew too low, radio equipment had limited range and the air control
teams could not locate themselves at vantage points or move cross-country with
speed. Remedial measures, both technical and organisational were taken after
the war and additional training conducted with the Air Force.
1 Air Support Signal Regiment was
responsible for providing signal communications for immediate close air support
to all formations in Western Command. The unit was under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel S.P.S. Bedi. Before the war the regimental headquarters and
1 Company were located at Delhi Cantt.,
while 2 and 3 Companies were at Udhampur (under XV Corps) and Jullundur (under
XI Corps) respectively. Orders were received on 1 September 1965 for the
regimental headquarters to move to Ambala and 1Company to move to Kaluchak for
impending operations of I Corps. On the same day orders were issued for
detachment 4 Air Support Signal Company ex Central Command (six tentacles, one
airfield detachment and one control detachment) to move to Ambala to supplement
resources of 1 Air Support Signal Regiment.
While
the company headquarters were located with respective corps headquarters, the
tentacles moved and married up with formation headquarters/ units concerned by
5/6 September. During the operations, 1 Company with I Corps received 64
demands for immediate close air support but very few sorties materialised. In
most cases, reason for refusal given was ‘Priorities Prevent’! The tentacle
allotted to 1 Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division was ambushed on night of
8/9 September near Charva along with administrative vehicles and one OR was
missing for 15 days. Signalman Gurbachan Singh Jandu, the wireless operator
with the tentacle allotted to 162 Brigade of 26 Infantry Division, was
seriously wounded due to shelling while he was adjusting the length of the
aerial. He died in the hospital on 15 September. Signalmen Lal Singh, Ram Lal
Sheresta and Rattan Lal Sharma were injured in area Phillora due to shelling
while working with 43 Lorried Brigade. The tentacle allotted to 58 Brigade of
14 Infantry Division was destroyed due to shelling near Alhar Railway Station
while the brigade was advancing.
In
2 Company (XV Corps), the tentacle with 191 Brigade in Chhamb Sector was
destroyed at Mandiala Crossing on 1 September during the Pak offensive. The
operators were able to save the documents and worked from an ad-hoc tentacle.
On 12 September, Signalman Ram Singh with 41 Mountain Brigade tentacle suffered
facial injuries due to shelling. He maintained communications till the evening
and refused to be evacuated. An ad-hoc JOC was established at 6 TAC for 3
Infantry Division for which the required communications were established by 2
Company.
3
Company with XI Corps established wireless communications with all the formations
by 0800 hours on 6 September, wireless silence having been lifted at 0400
hours. The company handled 117 demands for close air support but very few were
executed. The main reason for refusal was ‘Priorities Prevent”! Naik Dharam
Vir, the detachment commander with 54 Brigade tentacle suffered injuries as a
result of enemy shelling.
Air
Formation Signals
The
Chief Air Formation Signal Officer (CAFSO) was Colonel J.V. Pinto. 1 Air
Formation Signal Regiment located at Delhi Cantt was responsible for providing
signal communications at the airfields in Western Command. The unit was
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel K.T. Bopaya. Companies of the regiment
activated line and other communications at all operational airfields during
Operation ‘Ablaze’ and later in August when the situation on the western border
became tense.
Communications
at some airfields like Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara were affected by air
strikes by the Pakistan Air Force. CSO Western Command helped a great deal in
improving communications at and to Adampur and other airfields. Though there
was hardly any ground action on the border with East
Pakistan , Pak aircraft carried out a number of air strikes on
Indian airfields such as Kalaikunda, Bagdogra, and Barrackpore. The IAF also struck
at Chittagong
OPERATIONS
IN RAJASTHAN SECTOR
11
Infantry Division
Till August 1965, the Rajasthan Sector (less Ganganagar
Sector) was part of the operational responsibility of HQ Delhi and Rajasthan
Area under Western Command. In September
1965, when the fighting in Jammu & Kashmir Sector intensified and Western
Command found it difficult to deal with such a vast theatre, Barmer Sector was
handed over to the Southern Command. Lieutenant General Moti Sagar, GOC-in-C,
Southern Command, entrusted the task of tying down Pak Forces in Sind to 11
Infantry Division commanded by Major General N.C. Rawlley. When the war started
11 Infantry Division was at Ahmedabad, with 31 Infantry Brigade at Bhuj, 30
Infantry Brigade at Dhrangadhara and 85 Mountain Brigade at Belgaum
On 4
September GOC 11 Infantry Division issued orders to 30 Infantry Brigade to
capture Gadra City and establish a firm base in area Nayachor with a view to
exploiting towards Mirpur Khas. The
attack to capture Gadra City, which was planned for the night of 6/7 September,
had to be postponed by 24 hours due to want of information about the enemy and
lack of armour and artillery support. The attack on Gadra City
Another
task assigned to the Brigade was to raid Dali on the road Gadra – Chhapar
-Chachro. One company of 1 Garhwal Rifles with one section of camels (13
Grenadiers) and a detachment of medium machine guns and 3-inch mortars left Gadra City Gadra
City
The
newly raised HQ 85 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier H.N. Summanwar) arrived at
Barmer from Ahmedabad on 18 September. After regrouping of the forces, 5
Maratha Light Infantry and 17 Madras
On 21 September, a combined force
of two companies of 5 Maratha Light Infantry and two companies of 17 Madras
under their respective COs and a troop of tanks ex 3 (Independent) Armoured
Squadron concentrated at Dali for further advance to Khinsar- Chhapar-Chachro.
The enemy was holding defences in area Naupatia, Dhole-Ki-Beri and Khutkari
with two companies of 18 Punjab and one
company of Indus Rangers. The combined Indian force
attacked the enemy positions at first light, capturing them by 1130 hours after
overcoming minor opposition.
Unfortunately,
wireless communication between this force and HQ 85 lnfantry Brigade and its
firm base had broken down. At 1630 hours the enemy commenced shelling Dali and
this was followed by strafing after an hour. The counter-attack came at 1930
hours and Dali fell at 2030 hours on 21 September. The Indian position astride
Naupatia was cut off and surrounded, and had to be abandoned. Due to the
breakdown of the wireless link, HQ 85 lnfantry Brigade was not aware of the
fall of Dali till some stragglers reported there. A patrol under Major C.K.
Karumbaya was sent to Dali on 22 September. The patrol returned to base at midday and reported that Dali was in
enemy hands. The COs of 17 Madras and 5 Maratha Light Infantry fell back and
occupied Jessa-Ka-Par
Meanwhile,
the divisional commander issued orders to 30 Infantry Brigade to capture
Munabao by the first light on 23 September. However, before the attack could be launched,
the cease fire came into effect. Immediately after the cease-fire, Pak troops violated
the cease-fire agreement and resorted to large-scale infiltration into Indian territory , occupying Miajlar, Sato, Chohtan,
Udisyar, Dedusar, Kelnor, etc. The Sodhi Column, Hammer Force and Bull Force,
formed to clear the Pak infiltrators from the Indian villages, succeeded in
their mission to a great extent. 1 Garhwal Rifles and 4 Maratha Light Infantry with
attached troops attacked Miajlar on 16 November and captured it, despite tough
resistance by the enemy. In the
Rajasthan Sector, the battle of Miajlar was the first well-planned,
well-executed and gallantly contested action in which Pak troops had to yield
after much loss of men and material. The Pak forces, especially the Indus
Rangers, fought boldly in this operation that took place after the cease-fire.
Apparently,
Pakistan's intention was to capture as much Indian territory as possible in the
Rajasthan Sector and to create panic and disorder in the area. At the time of
cease-fire, India held about 390 square kilometres of Pak territory across the
Barmer border, whereas Pakistan had occupied only a small Indian outpost at
Munabao. Besides, a large number of police out-posts, which were occupied after
the cease-fire by the Pak infiltrators, were ultimately vacated after the
Tashkent Agreement.
SIGNALS IN
RAJASTHAN SECTOR
11
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
The
unit was raised as 10 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment at Ranchi 30 June 1964 , with 71 and 83 Mountain Brigade
Signal Companies forming part of it. On 9 December 1964 , the regiment moved from Ranchi Bangalore Kutch , under command of 11
Infantry Division. Subsequently, the unit moved to Ahmedabad, which became its
permanent location thereafter.
At
the commencement of the operations in September, the unit was located at
Ahmedabad, while the brigade signal sections of 30 and 31 Brigades were at
Dharangdhra and Bhuj respectively. The third brigade signal section (85
Brigade) located at Belgaum 7
September 1965 , after the commencement of the operations. The CO was
Lieutenant Colonel C. Soni, with Major A.G. Desai as the second-in-command. The
other field officers in the unit were Majors Shiv Raj Kumar (1 Company),
S.S.Das (2 Company) and S.K. Rawla (HQ Company). The adjutant was Second
Lieutenant P.Y. Poulose while the quartermaster was Major S. Ayaswamy.
The task given to 11 Infantry
Division was to seal the Kutch border and
conduct operations that would pin down Pak forces in Sind .
The sector assigned to the division was vast, extending from Khavda to Barmer
and north of Munabao. In order to accomplish the task, an offensive defensive
posture was adopted. P&T Department communications in the area were not
well developed. However, some improvements/additions carried out during the Kutch operations and Operation ‘Ablaze’ proved very useful.
On 2 September, 30 Infantry Brigade
Signal Section moved from Dharangadra and 57 Engineer Regiment Signal Section
from Ahmedabad to their concentration areas at Gadra Road Gadra Road Gadra
City
The
attack on Gadra was launched on 8 September and was successful. The same day a
detachment of the mobile signal company from Southern Command that had been
placed under 11 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was dispatched to
Barmer. To derive additional channels,
Major V. Mehta proceeded to Jodhpur S+DX . On 9
September the train carrying the special courier was rocketed by enemy air
craft near Gagaria railway station.
Signalman Anand was seriously wounded and died later in the hospital on
the same day. Naik Mange Ram was injured,
but carried the mail on his person since the train service was discontinued
immediately. He delivered the mail at 30 Infantry Brigade Signal Centre after
walking a distance of about 17 kilometres without regard to his personal
safety.
On 10 September buried PVC cable was
laid to patch up the disrupted PL route between Barmer and Gadra Road
On 20 September, troops of 85
Brigade were inducted to relieve 30 Brigade for capture of Munabao. 85 Infantry
Brigade Signal Company, which had moved from Belgaum Gadra City 21 September, 85 Brigade
took over operations in Dali sub sector, 30 Brigade moving to new positions in
area Munabao. After the capture of Dali, it was held by two companies of 17 Madras
The cease fire was declared on 23 September 1965 but was
not followed in Rajasthan, where the enemy continued his attempts to capture
Indian positions employing regular troops, rangers, Mujahids and even
dacoits. Large scale infiltration by
Pak-Indus Rangers also took place just before the cease fire. Orders were given
to 11 Infantry Division to throw out all infiltrators covering an area of 300 kilometres. Operational tasks for the formation were
spelt out as holding the Rann of Kutch sector and the enemy territory captured
up to 40 kilometres deep as also to carry out long range attacks by troops up
to brigade level to evict enemy infiltration that had taken place on night
22/23 September. One brigade was to hold Kutch
sector, another to hold Gadra city while the third brigade less a battalion was
made responsible for the Jaisalmer sector.
Hammer Force, Bull Force, Sangram Force and Sodhi Column were organized
for these anti-infiltration operations. Three additional Rajasthan Army
Constabulary (RAC) battalions were placed under command.
On 23 September, two signal detachments under
Second Lieutenant K.M. John were provided to the Sodhi column, consisting of
one company of 3 Guards and one company of 1 Garhwal, operating directly under
HQ 11 Infantry Division. The column was
required to clear out Pak infiltrators from area Shobaia, Dedusa, Nawatala and
Bijliap. In view of the extended ranges,
a mobile wireless detachment with radio set C 11/R210 was sent to Chotan to
establish a step up station for the column.
To provide signal cover to the Bull Force, 11 Artillery Brigade Signal
Section comprising one JCO and 28 OR was moved to Kalron Kataia on 6 October.
Apart from wireless, extensive line communications was catered for the Bull
Force by laying approximately 80 miles of field cable.
On 11 November, a signal detachment
under Second Lieutenant John comprising two mobile wireless detachments and a
cipher detachment proceeded to 1 Garhwal Rifles which was to form the Sangram
Force. The task given to Sangram Force was to capture Miajlar post occupied by
PAK infiltrators. The operation was
carried out successfully. Due to the
distances involved, wireless was the only means of communications with the
force, which continued to operate for several weeks, its resources being
supplemented from time to time. On 20
November another mobile wireless detachment with cipher cover was sent to a
guerilla company operating under the Sangram Force in the Khavdala area. On 30
November 11 Artillery Brigade Signal Section moved with HQ 11 Artillery Brigade
from Bull Force to Sangram Force, the former being sustained on wireless and
daily runs of scheduled despatch service.
Apart from wireless, considerable
amount of cable had to be laid for the anti-infiltration forces. By the end of
1965, about 80 kilometres of cable had been laid for the Sangram Force, all of
it buried. Similarly, about 150 kilometres of field cable was laid to 4 Maratha
Light Infantry, which formed the Bull Force. In addition, extensive cable had
been laid in the divisional and brigade sectors. 30 Infantry Brigade Signal Section
had laid 85 kilometres, all buried one foot deep; 85 Infantry Brigade Signal
Company had laid 45 kilometres, 30 kilometres of which was buried; while 120 kilometres
of PVC cable had been laid at the divisional headquarters and locality signal
centres at Gadra Road and Girab.
During
the operations in Rajasthan, 11 Divisional Signal Regiment had taken steps to
mount medium and low power radio sets in
1- Ton vehicles and studied laying lines in desert terrain. In spite of this,
sand dunes and desert tracks beyond Gadra
City
This
was the first major operation carried out in the desert and everything did not
go as visualized. However, valuable lessons were learnt as regards
communications. An assessment was also carried out of signal resources required
in Barmer Sector, keeping in view the large distances. These helped in planning
and creating sound communications infrastructure for the future.
The
unit was known as 10 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment though it was part of
11 Infantry Division during the War. To rationalise designations, the regiment
was re-designated 11 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment on 1 November 1965 . Similarly, 11
Mountain Division Signal Regiment, which was part of 10 Infantry Division, was
re-designated as 10 Infantry Division Signal Regiment.
CONCLUSION
The
Indo- Pak War of 1965 is an important landmark not only in the history of the
Indian Army but also that of the country. This was the first time after Independence Pakistan Kashmir were foiled, this time more emphatically. The Pak
Army suffered a serious setback, the much flaunted superiority of its weaponry
and the fighting quality of its troops being disproved convincingly.
For
the Corps of Signals, the 1965 War is of special significance. In all previous
operations, the equipment available to the Corps was similar to what had been
used during World War II. After 1962,
there was a concerted effort to improve the quality of signal equipment.
However, the new acquisitions were small in number, while indigenous
development efforts were yet to fructify. As a result, in 1965 the situation
had improved only marginally, and the Corps still depended on orthodox line
communications, single channel HF radio and despatch riders. Some
transistorised equipment had arrived in the previous years but these were given
to formations deployed on the border with China USA Pakistan
Due
to constraints of technology and availability of equipment, the scales of
communications that could be provided in 1965 were limited. It was not possible to provide one-to-one
circuits between operations rooms, hot lines or dedicated direct communications
between commanders, due to lack of channel capacity. VHF sets were at a premium and communications
for mobile operations depended primarily on HF wireless. In spite of these
technological and organisational constraints, the communications functioned
well. However, there were a few cases of failure of communications between
brigade headquarters and infantry battalions, some leading to changes of
fortune in battle. Units often resorted to innovative and unorthodox methods to
provide communications and tasks were completed with grit and determination,
often in face of danger and risk to life.
The linemen of the Corps once again
wrote a glorious chapter of devotion to duty in the face of enemy fire and
vagaries of terrain and weather. Time and again, they repaired lines damaged by
infiltrators, shelling, tanks, vehicles and landslides, swam across swollen
rivers and laid or repaired lines in areas infested by the enemy. Another
dedicated breed that had to remain outdoors were the desptach riders, who went
about their task delivering, messages in all weather conditions and round the
clock, searching out units and formations even under shell fire and often in
darkness. Some came under air attacks and one was captured by enemy infiltrators.
The wireless operators, particularly those with brigades and battalions and
armoured regiments, manned their sets while under attack and shelling. A number
of linemen, operators, despatch riders, and drivers made the supreme sacrifice.
Cipher
and exchange operators had their own critical tasks cut out and did a
commendable job. The traffic load increased many fold but the operators worked
almost round the clock for weeks to clear the calls and messages speedily. The
mechanics worked long hours and at times repaired equipment while tanks were
actually engaged in battle or their locations being strafed or shelled. The
brave deeds of the signallers were duly acknowledged, though understandably not
all. One Vir Chakra. five Sena Medals, a considerable number of Mentioned in
Despatches and a large number of Commendation Cards were awarded to the Corps
personnel during the War. The casualties suffered by the Corps were
substantial. Two officers, one JCO and 37 OR were killed, while 87 personnel
were wounded.
An important factor in the
marvelous performance of the Corps was leadership, at all levels. The SO-in-C,
Major General R.N. Batra, had been at the helm for over four years. Having
experienced the problems faced by the Corps during the Goa
operations in 1961 and the war with China
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 5
This
chapter is largely based on Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh’s War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 (New Delhi,1991); Gen K.V. Krishna Rao’s Prepare or Perish, (New Delhi, 1991 and Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh’s Corps of Signals History - 1965 Indo-Pak War (unpublished),
2004. Specific references are given below:
1.
Lt. Gen. Harbhajan
Singh, Corps of Signals History - 1965
Indo-Pak War (unpublished), 2004.
2.
Maj Gen Lachhman Singh
Lehl, Missed Opportunities: Indo-Pak War
1965, Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun, 1997, p 119.
3.
Colonel V.A.
Subramanyam, A History of the Corps of
Signals, Macmillan, New Delhi
4. Lehl, p. 122
5. Lt. Gen. Harbakhsh Singh, War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 (New
Delhi,1991); p. 26
6. Lehl, p. 123
7. Harbakhsh Singh, pp. 27-36
8. Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership in
the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, New Delhi
9. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 53-5
10. Subramanyam, p.156
11. Lehl, p. 145
12. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 66
13. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 67
14. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 87
15. Brigadier Desmond E. Hayde, The Battle of Dograi, p.152
16. Gen K.V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish, New Delhi
17. Lehl, p. 200
18. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 103
19. Harbakhsh Singh, p.91; Hayde, pp. 89-90;
Lehl, pp. 192-195
20. Krishna
Rao, p. 138
21. Krishna
Rao, p. 139
22. Harbakhsh Singh, p. 157
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