LIEUT-GENERAL ZC BAKSHI, PVSM, MVC, VrC, VSM
Zorawar Chand Bakshi is
one of the most distinguished soldiers of the Indian Army, who won laurels both
in peace and war. He took part in every war fought by the Indian Army after
Independence, except the Indo-China War of 1962, when he was in the Congo. He
also has the unique distinction of being the most highly decorated officer in
the Indian Army, having won awards for gallantry at every level, from company
to division. A rare combination of a fighting and thinking soldier, he is as
well known for his achievements as for his reluctance to talk about them. Rules
regarding seniority and age prevented him from reaching the top, and the Army
was deprived of a first rate Army Commander, and Chief. Even without attaining
these ranks, he is known and admired more widely in the Army, than many who
did. A perfect blend of a soldier and a gentleman, 'Zoru' Bakshi, as he is
affectionately known throughout the Army, is an icon, who has been a source of
inspiration for an entire generation of officers.
Bakshi was born on 21
October 1921, in Gulyana village, in Rawalpindi district of Punjab, which is
now in Pakistan. His father was Sardar Bahadur Bakshi Lal Chand. After
graduating from the Gordon College, Rawalpindi, he joined the Indian Military
Academy in 1942. He was commissioned on 27 June 1943, into the Infantry. After
a short attachment with a British battalion, he was posted to 16/10 Baluch,
which was then in the Arakan, in Burma, and part of 51 Infantry Brigade, under
25 Indian Division. The battalion was being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
John Fairlay, who was very fond of Indian officers, having earlier been an
instructor in the Indian Military Academy, at Dehradun. The second-in-command
was Major Mohd. Usman, who later became a Brigadier, and was posthumously
awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, in 1948, after the capture of Jhangar. The
battalion had two companies of Pathans, one company of Punjabi Mussalmans, and
one of Dogras. Unlike the Dogras in most other regiments, the Baluch Dogras
were not Rajputs, but Brahmins. Bakshi was assigned to one of the Pathan
companies.
When Bakshi joined the
battalion, the monsoon had just finished, and operations started, after a long
gap. Usman sent Bakshi with a patrol, through the No Man's Land, to probe the
Japanese defences. Since Bakshi had just joined the battalion, and was
inexperienced, the patrol was led by a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO), who
was told to keep an eye on the young officer. As they were climbing a hill, the
Japanese opened fire. Immediately, everyone went to the ground. The JCO asked
Bakshi what they should do. They could either withdraw, or bypass the enemy
position. However, there was a sheer drop on one side, and a steep climb on the
other. If they withdrew, they could walk into an ambush. Bakshi thought for a
moment, and then decided that they should go down. They were able to bypass the
enemy position, and returned safely, after completing the task.
The JCO reported to
Usman, and told him about the firing, and how the young subaltern had handled
the patrol. Next day, Usman sent another patrol, and asked Bakshi to lead it.
Zoru took some men from his own company, which comprised Pathans. On his
return, he was able to give some more information about the hill feature, which
was held by the Japanese. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Fairlay,
was leaving on transfer next day. However, he gave orders for the hill to be
captured, and the Dogra company was assigned to carry out the task. Fairlay had
begun his career in the Dogras, and had a soft corner for them. However, he did
not have much faith in the British officer who was commanding the Dogra
company, and ordered Bakshi to lead the attack. Zoru would have preferred to
take his own company, but he had no choice in the matter. Since the Dogra
company was not up to full strength, he decided to take a few non-combatants,
such as cooks. One of these was Sepoy Bhandari Ram.
Bakshi took the Dogra
company, and launched the attack on the feature from three sides, using a
platoon from each direction. There was a bloody fight, at the end of which the
feature was captured. After the company had reorganised, it was found that
Bhandari Ram was missing. Bakshi had seen him during the assault, and had been
impressed by his gallantry. Later, Bhandari Ram was located, and evacuated to
the Regimental Aid Post. Apart from stopping several bullets, a grenade had
burst right in front of him, and he was seriously wounded. The Regimental
Medical Officer was a South Indian, who was rarely sober. He promptly gave his
opinion that Bhandari Ram would be lucky to survive. But he was wrong. Bhandari
Ram not only lived, but also became a hero.
After the operation,
Bakshi reported to Major Usman, who was officiating as Commanding Officer,
since Fairlay had left, and the new incumbent, Lieutenant Colonel LP 'Bogey'
Sen, had still not reported. Usman decided that Bhandari Ram deserved a
Victoria Cross (VC), and when the new Commanding Officer joined next day,
requested him to forward his name for the award. Sen did forward Bhandari Ram's
name for an award, but for the Indian Order of Merit (IOM), which ranked much
lower than the VC. Usman felt that this was not fair, and since he had been in
command when the action took place, insisted that his opinion should count.
Ultimately, Usman went to the Brigade Commander, who supported him, and
Bhandari Ram was awarded the VC.
In January 1945, 51
Infantry Brigade took part in the Battle of Kangaw, which was one of the
hardest fought battles of the Burma Campaign. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier
RA Hutton, was awarded the DSO, and so were all three Commanding Officers of
the famous 'All Indian Brigade', i.e.
SPP Thorat, KS Thimayya and LP Sen. Zoru Bakshi was Mentioned in Dispatches,
and this was the first in a string of gallantry awards that he was to win, in
different wars, over the next thirty years. After the operations ceased in
Burma, the battalion was sent back to India, for rest and refit, and was
located at Pollachi, near Madras. But the battalion did not stay in India for long,
and was soon moved to Malaysia, with the rest of the division. However, as soon
as they landed, the Japanese surrendered, and the battalion was given the task
of looking after prisoners of war. It remained in Malaysia for about a year,
before being repatriated to India.
In August 1947, Bakshi
was posted to the Punjab Boundary Force, which had been set up to maintain
peace in the Punjab. The task of dividing the state had been entrusted to Sir
Cyril Radcliffe, who was expected to finalise the alignment of the boundary by
15 August 1947, when Partition would come into effect. It was anticipated that
the announcement of the boundary award would be accompanied by large scale
disturbances, and a special force was set up to maintain order when this
happened. With its headquarters at Lahore, the Punjab Boundary Force was
created, under the command of Major General TW Rees, who was commanding 4
Indian Division. It comprised a force of about 25 battalions, drawn from
different regiments. The staff and troops of 4 Indian Division formed the
nucleus of the force. Rees had senior Indian officers, of the rank of
brigadier, from both countries, to act as his advisers. They were KS Thimayya
and DS Brar from India, and Mohd. Ayub Khan and Nasir Ahmad from Pakistan.
As a member of the
Boundary Force, Bakshi witnessed the horrors of Partition, at close hand. As
the exodus of people from both sides began, it was accompanied by violence,
which quickly escalated from individual acts of looting and revenge to full-scale
attacks, by armed gangs. Scenes of carnage, accompanied by looting and rape,
became an everyday occurrence. Entire villages, columns of walking refugees,
and trains were attacked by armed mobs, driven by hatred and vengeance. The
brutality of these attacks surprised even the battle-hardened soldiers of the
Boundary Force, whose officers had to strive hard to ensure that they
themselves remained unaffected by the virus of communalism. In his report,
General Rees was to remark; "The killing was pre-medieval in its ferocity.
Neither age nor sex was spared. Mothers with babies in their arms were struck
down, speared or shot."
It was soon realised
that the Boundary Force would not be able to maintain peace, with the meagre
resources at its disposal. Civil administration had virtually ceased to exist,
and the Force not only had to look after law and order, but the arrangements
for transportation, shelter, and food for the refugees, whose numbers had
swelled to over two million. There was also the danger of the troops themselves
becoming affected, as they came to know of atrocities against their own
families, and relatives. Rees told the Supreme Commander that the situation was
critical, and recommended that the responsibility for maintaining peace in
their areas should be taken over by the respective governments. The Joint
Defence Council agreed this to, and on 1 September, the Punjab Boundary Force
ceased to exist. Ten battalions of the Force, which belonged to regiments that
had been allotted to Pakistan, left to join their new formations. The
remainder, comprising units that were to stay in India, were formed into the
East Punjab Area. General Rees was appointed Military Assistant to the Governor
General, Lord Mountbatten, and moved to Delhi. He took Bakshi along with him to
his new appointment. In his new assignment, Bakshi had to man the operations
room in the Governor General's House (now Rashtrapati Bhawan).
As a result of the
Partition, Bakshi's parent unit, 16/10 Baluch, was allotted to Pakistan. Bakshi
was transferred to the Fifth Gurkha Rifles, which was one of the six Gurkha
regiments that were to remain in India, while four were transferred to the
British Army. Till then, Indian officers had not served in Gurkha regiments, and
the sudden departure of British officers left a void that had to be quickly
filled by posting officers from other regiments. These officers initially had a
difficult time, since none of them knew about the customs and background of the
men, and neither could they speak 'gurkhali'. Unlike other regiments, where the
Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCOs) knew English, and acted as a link
between the officers and the men, very few of the Gurkha Officers (as the VCOs
in Gurkha regiments were then called) knew English. The Regimental Centre of
the Fifth Royal Gurkhas was at Abbotobad, and this was moved to Dehradun, where
most of the other Gurkha regimental centres were located. After joining the
Indian Army, the appellation Royal was dropped, and the spelling of the word
'Gurkha' was also changed to 'Gorkha', in February 1949. Bakshi joined the
Centre at Dehradun, where Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Niranjan
Prasad was posted as the Centre Commandant.
In March 1948, Bakshi
was posted as the Brigade Major of 163 Infantry Brigade. The coveted
appointment of Brigade Major is normally given to officers who perform well on
the staff course. Bakshi had not done this course, but the shortage of staff
trained officers, after the departure of the British, resulted in his being
given the prestigious appointment. 163 Infantry Brigade had been initially
raised as 'Z' Brigade at Srinagar, in the spring of 1948. At that time, there
were three brigades in the Kashmir Valley, which were part of the Sri (later 19)
Division, under the command of Major General KS Thimayya. 161 Infantry Brigade,
had been inducted in October 1947, soon after Pakistani tribesmen had entered
Kashmir. After pushing back the tribesmen, it had been holding on throughout
the winter. 77 Parachute Brigade had arrived in May 1948, and 163 Brigade had
been raised at about the same time. In the summer of 1948, after the snows
melted, a general offensive had been planned, to throw the enemy out of the
Kashmir Valley. According to this plan, 161 Brigade was to advance on the
Uri-Domel axis, and 163 brigade on the Handwara-Tithwal axis. The commanders of
161 and 163 Brigades were 'Bogey' Sen, and Harbaksh Singh, while 77 Brigade was
under HL Atal.
163 Infantry Brigade was
given the task of advancing towards Tithwal, clearing enemy opposition enroute,
and recapturing lost territory, including the strategic town of Tithwal. The
Brigade comprised four infantry battalions viz. 1 Sikh, 1 Madras, 6 Rajputana
Rifles and 3 Garhwal, during various stages of the battle. It also had a
squadron of 7 Cavalry, equipped with armoured cars, and two batteries of
artillery guns. The brigade commenced operations from Handwara on 18 May, and
by 20 May, had taken Chowkibal. The next day, the 10,000 foot high Nastachun
Pass had been captured, and by 23 May, Tithwal was in Indian hands. In five
days, 163 Brigade had advanced 65 kilometres, killed 67 of the enemy, and taken
many prisoners. It was poised to advance to Muzaffarabad, which was just 30
kilometres away, when operations were halted on orders from Army Headquarters,
as a result of the United Nations resolution, after India took her case to that
organisation. This came as a severe jolt to the morale and spirits of the
soldiers, who were all set to drive the invaders out of the Kashmir Valley.
The loss of Tithwal was
also a severe blow to the Pakistanis, who reacted violently, and launched
several counter attacks to recapture the feature. These attacks were supported
by heavy shelling, and there were many casualties. There were also several
individual acts of bravery, including that of Company Havildar Major Piru
Singh, of 6 Rajputana Rifles, who was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra,
the country's highest award for gallantry. Bakshi played a prominent part in
the battle, and displayed conspicuous gallantry, and leadership, for which he
was awarded the Vir Chakra. This was remarkable, because Bakshi was not
commanding troops, but a staff officer in the brigade headquarters. Unlike
commanders, staff officers rarely get a chance to display gallantry on the
battlefield. The fact that he was recommended for the Vir Chakra, and won the
decoration, was truly a brilliant achievement.
Shortly afterwards, Bakshi notched up
another feat that resulted in his being awarded the Macgregor Memorial Medal.
This medal was instituted in 1888, in memory of Major General Sir Charles
Metcalfe Macgregor, the founder of the United Services Institution of India. It
is awarded every year for the best military reconnaissance or journey of
exploration or survey, in remote areas of India. However, it is awarded only if
the journey or expedition is exceptional, and in case there are none, no award
is given that year. In fact, there have been only about a dozen awards, during
the 50 years since Independence. Bakshi was assigned the task of carrying out
an important strategic military reconnaissance of certain areas in Tibet.
Dressed as a Buddhist monk, Bakshi went from Nathu La into the Chumbi Valley,
and then to Gyantse and Lhasa. He covered a distance of 400 kilometres, in 80
days, and traversed over some of the highest passes in the Himalayas. For this
feat, he was awarded the medal in 1949. He was the first recipient of the medal
after Independence.
After completing his
tenure in 163 Infantry Brigade, Bakshi was posted back to the Regimental
Centre, at Dehradun, in July 1949. Early in 1951, he was posted to 2/5 Gorkha
Rifles, which had recently moved to Dehradun, after short tenures in Meerut and
Jhansi. The battalion was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Niranjan
Prasad, who had brought it to Jhansi from Hyderabad, where it had taken part in
the Police Action in 1948, and then stayed on for internal security duties. In
April 1951, the battalion moved to Jandiala Guru, in Punjab, as part of 43
Lorried Brigade. While he was with the battalion, Bakshi appeared in the
entrance examination for the Staff College. Having qualified, he was nominated
on the Fourth Staff Course, at the Defence Services Staff College, at
Wellington, which commenced in October 1951. He performed exceptionally well on
the course, and was recommended for an instructional appointment, in his course
report. On completion of the course, in August 1952, he was posted as Brigade
Major of 123 Infantry Brigade. He remained in this appointment till October
1955, i.e. well over three years. He thus had the distinction of not only doing
two tenures as Brigade Major, but an unusually long stint in this coveted staff
appointment.
After his tenure as
Brigade Major of 123 Infantry Brigade, Bakshi was posted to 2/5 Gorkha Rifles,
which was then located at Mahura, in the Uri Sector of Jammu and Kashmir. In April 1958, he was posted as an
instructor, to the Infantry School, Mhow, where he remained for almost two
years. In January 1960, he was promoted Lieutenant Colonel, and posted to the
Staff College, Wellington, as an instructor. During his tenure at the Staff
College, Major General (later Field Marshal) SHFJ Manekshaw was the Commandant,
against whom an enquiry was ordered, at the behest of Lieutenant General BM
Kaul, the Chief of General Staff. The charges related to Manekshaw's so called
anti Indian views, and were frivolous. Bakshi was one of the officers who were
questioned, by the Court of Inquiry, headed by Lieutenant General Daulet Singh.
None of the charges could be proved, and the enquiry was dropped.
Bakshi had completed
about a year and a half at Wellington, when he received orders posting him as
Commanding Officer of 2/5 Gorkha Rifles, which was then in Calcutta, in August
1961. The battalion had been ordered to move to Silchar, but these orders were
cancelled, and they were ordered to go to Congo. At that time, the battalion
had two Victoria Cross winners - Subedar Major Gaje Singh Ghale and Subedar
Agansing Rai. According to Army rules, holders of the Victoria Cross and Param
Vir Chakra are not permitted to go into areas where there is likelihood of action.
However, both Ghale and Rai were adamant about accompanying the battalion to
Congo, and Bakshi had to refer the matter to Army Headquarters, which agreed to
make an exception in their case.
In January 1962, they
left Calcutta for Ahmednagar, en route to Bombay. On 10 March 1962, they
embarked on the US Naval ship 'General Blatchford'. They reached Dar-e-Salaam
after a voyage of nine days, from where the troops were flown to
Elizabethville, while the baggage was transported by barges across Lake Tanganyika,
and by train. By 25 March, the battalion had concentrated in Elizabethville, as
part of the Indian Brigade, which was in the Katanga province. The Indians
formed part of the twenty-seven nation United Nations Force, called the
Organisation Des Nations Unies Au Congo (ONUC), which had its headquarters at
Leopoldville.
After grant of
independence by Belgium, Congo (now Zaire) suffered civil war, due to tribal
disunity, and breakdown of law and order. The army mutinied, and one of the
tribal leaders, Tshombe, seized power. The task of the United Nations
peacekeeping force was to maintain law and order, and protect vital
installations, from sabotage. In most cases, the battalion had to fight the
Katangese Gendarmerie, and there were several skirmishes, as well as some hard
fought battles, resulting in heavy casualties, to both sides. By the end of the
year, 2/5 GR had cleared Elizabethville, and the surrounding area, within a
radius of about twenty kilometres, of all enemy positions, as well as minefields.
The battalion returned to India in March 1963, after a year, on the same ship
it had sailed on earlier. It had been awarded two Sena Medals, and four
Mentioned-in-Dispatches. Bakshi had missed the India China War of 1962 - in fact, this was the only operation he
missed - but was awarded a Vishist Seva Medal for his role in the Congo. On
return to India, the battalion moved to Almora.
In August 1963, Bakshi
was posted to the Military Operations Directorate, in Delhi. Military
Operations is the most important branch in Army Headquarters, responsible for
operational planning, and only officers with the highest rating are posted to
this directorate. From December 1964 onwards, he officiated as the Director of
Military Operations. Early in 1965, Pakistan had launched operations in the
Rann of Kutch, to regain control of territory that she claimed as her own. Indian troops were rushed to the sector, and
the offensive was blunted. As a result of the efforts of British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson, who acted as a mediator, a cease fire was accepted by both
sides, on 1 July 1965, and an agreement signed, returning to the situation as
on 1 January 1965. However, as was subsequently discovered, the Kutch
operations had been launched by Pakistan with a view to tie up Indian reserves,
and test weapons and equipment that had been supplied to her by USA. It was
also intended to gauge Indian reaction, both political and military. After the
debacle against China in 1962, India's defence capability was not held in high
esteem, and Pakistan's new President, Ayub Khan, saw a golden opportunity to
wrest Kashmir, an attempt in which Pakistan had failed in 1947.
Preparations for the
operations began in early 1965. Thousands of guerrillas were trained, and armed
by Pakistan. By mid 1965, a force of 8,000 Razakars, a lightly armed volunteer
force, was raised. In addition, about 150,000 Mujahids (Crusaders) were
trained, to support the regular Army and militia. Anti India propaganda was
stepped up, and Kashmiris were exhorted to rise against the 'alien' rule of
India. A special organisation, called the Gibraltar Forces, was created, to
undertake the operations in Kashmir. Each force was to have about 30,000 men,
divided into small groups, of about a hundred each, with a hard core of regular
troops, supported by Mujahids and Razakars. The forces were given names of
famous Muslim warriors, such as Salauddin, Ghaznavi, Babar, Khilji, and so on,
to inspire the guerrillas, and induce religious fervour. The forces were
concentrated at Murree, and placed under the command of Major General Akhtar
Hussain Malik, General Officer Commanding 12 Division, in Pak Occupied Kashmir.
In July 1965, Bakshi
was promoted Brigadier, and given command of the newly raised 68 Infantry
Brigade, in Jammu and Kashmir. Though the Brigade formed part of 3 Infantry
Division, in Ladakh, it was located in the Kashmir valley. A few days after he
assumed command, the Pakistani infiltration commenced. Crossing the border at
several places, the guerrillas began to blow up bridges, establish roadblocks,
and destroy administrative installations. Though the Indian troops had no
inkling of the planned infiltration, they were well prepared, and reaction was
swift. The infiltrators were dealt with wherever they were encountered, and
soon most were either liquidated, or surrendered. In some places, the
Pakistanis used artillery to support the guerrillas, and the operations
escalated. To prevent further ingress of guerrillas, and block the routes of
infiltration being used by them, it was decided to capture some key tactical
features. One of these was the Hajipir pass.
The road connecting Uri
and Punch passed through the Hajipir pass, at a height of 8,650 feet. The pass
was strategically very important, and provided on of the main routes of ingress
into the Kashmir valley. The pass had been given to Pakistan, after the
cease-fire agreement in 1948. It was decided to capture the pass, in order to
block the major route of infiltration, by the guerrillas. A pincer attack, from two directions was
planned, with one brigade ex 19 Infantry Division launching an attack from the
North along the road from Uri, and another brigade ex 25 Infantry Division from
the South, along the road coming from Punch. The task of capturing the feature
from the North was assigned to 68 Infantry Brigade. By this time, Bakshi had
already proved his worth as a commander, and won decorations in Burma during
World War II, in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48, and in Congo in 1962. To
indicate the confidence he enjoyed of the higher command in the Army, the
operation for the capture of Hajipir was code named 'Operation Bakshi.' Zoru
Bakshi more than justified the faith reposed in him by his superiors. In one of the most brilliant and successful
operations of the 1965 War, he captured the Hajipir pass, and wrote his name
into Indian military history.
Bakshi had only one
battalion, 6 Dogra, which had been raised only six months earlier. For the
operation, almost all the troops allotted to him were new to him. He
concentrated his Brigade at Uri in the third week of August 1965, where most of
his units joined him. He had three infantry battalions viz. 1 Para, 19 Punjab,
and 4 Rajput. Another battalion ex 161 Infantry Brigade was placed under his
command for the operation. He also had an artillery regiment, 164 Field
Regiment, equipped with 25 pounder field guns, 144 Mountain Battery, and a
troop of medium guns ex 39 Medium Regiment. In addition, he had the usual
complement of Engineers and Signals. The artillery ammunition was restricted -
the field guns had five first line scales, and the medium guns four first
lines. Information about the exact dispositions of the enemy was scanty. Bakshi
was not permitted to carry out any ground reconnaissance or visit area held by
troops of 161 Infantry Brigade, through which he had to pass to launch the
attack. The Hajipir pass, and the subsidiary features covering its approaches
were known to be held by 20 Punjab, of the Pak Army. To distract the enemy's
attention, and prevent him from reinforcing the position, troops deployed all
along the Cease Fire Line in the 19 Infantry Division Sector were ordered to
put in small scale attacks, to coincide with the main attack of 68 Infantry
Brigade. Strange as it may seem, Bakshi was not told about the pincer movement,
and the attack by 93 Infantry Brigade from the South.
Bakshi's plan for the
operation envisaged a two-pronged attack, from the North, to be conducted in
three phases. In the first phase, 1 Para was to attack from the right, and
capture Sank Ridge, Sawan Pathri and Ledwali Gali, by 0500 hours on 25 August
1965. Simultaneously, 19 Punjab was to attack from the left, and capture Ring
Contour and Pathra, by 0100 hours, on 25 August 1965. In Phase 2, 19 Punjab was
to capture Point 10330 and Point 11107, two features on the left axis, by 0600
hours, while in Phase 3, 4 Rajput was to capture Hajipir Pass by 1430 hours,
the same day, along the right axis. D Day for the operation was 24 August
1965.
Bakshi met the
commanding officers of the infantry battalions and the artillery regiment for
the first time on 23 August at Uri, when he issued his orders for the
operation. He had not met any of them earlier, and had not had a chance to see
the officers and men under their command. He was also not aware of the plan of
93 Infantry Brigade, which was to link up with him, from the South. Undeterred
by these handicaps, Bakshi went ahead with his orders, during which he
explained not only his plan, but also his philosophy for conduct of the attack.
He stressed the need for surprise, speed, flexibility, offensive action, and
the necessity for officers to lead from up front.
On 24 August, the Army
Commander flew to Headquarters 25 Infantry Division, and was briefed on the
plan for attack from the South. He was surprised to learn that 25 Infantry
Division, with the permission of the Corps Commander, had drastically reduced
the scope of the operation. He ordered that the minimum strength to be employed
for the attack was a battalion, and the objective should be as far towards
Kahuta as possible. He then flew to Headquarters 19 Infantry Division, where he
found things more to his liking. Bakshi was ready to undertake the operation as
planned, but recommended postponement by a day, since there was heavy rain
throughout the day and night, and all the nullahs (streams) along the right
axis were flooded. This was approved by the Army Commander. Bakshi also decided
to switch over 4 Rajput to the left axis, i.e. Ring Contour - Pathra, instead
of the Sank - Ledwali Gali approach. In the revised plan, there were two
converging arms of the pincer, meeting at Hajipir pass. The left column,
comprising 4 Rajput and 19 Punjab, was to advance along Point 10048 - Point
110944 - Bedori- Kuthnar di Gali - Hajipir pass. The right column, comprising 1
Para, was to advance along Uri - Sank - Ledwali Gali - Hajipir pass.
The attack was launched
on the night of 25 August. By 0130 hours on 26 August, 19 Punjab had captured
Pathra. However, it could not proceed further to Bedori, due to the rugged and
precipitous terrain, and stiff resistance by the enemy, and fell back to Pathra
by first light. On the right axis, 1 Para launched their attack on Sank as
planned. Initially, the assaulting troops lost their way, due to lack of
topographical information about the feature. In a subsequent attempt the same
night, they were held up by intense enemy fire, and suffered about 30
casualties. The forward companies were pinned down, and had to extricated next
morning, with great difficulty. Bakshi was now in a dilemma, since both the
attacks, on Bedori and Sank, had failed. He decided to attack Sank again, using
1 Para, and requested Divisional Headquarters to assign the task of capturing
Bedori to 161 Infantry Brigade. To add to his worries, at about midday on 26
August, he received a 'personal for' message from the Army Commander,
expressing dissatisfaction at the heavy expenditure of artillery ammunition,
which 'was not commensurate with the results.' After the failure of his initial
attacks, Bakshi knew that if he failed again, he was unlikely to remain in
command for long. Hence it was all the more important that the enemy positions
be softened up by a heavy barrage of artillery before the attack went in. If he
succeeded, no one would hold the heavy ammunition expenditure against him. If
he failed, he would be sacked in any case. He decided to disregard the signal,
and go ahead with the attack, as planned.
At about 1500 hours on
26 August, Bakshi got a telephone call from the General Staff Officer Grade 1
(GSO I) from Headquarters 19 Infantry Division, who informed him that Bedori
had been captured by 161 Infantry Brigade. Bakshi was skeptical, since none of
his troops had reported any movement or battle noises. When he expressed his
doubts, the GSO 1 connected him to Commander 161 Infantry Brigade, who
confirmed the news. Bakshi then decided to modify his plan, and asked 4 Rajput
to resume the advance along the Left Axis, and proceed to Kuthnar di Gali,
skirting round the Western slopes of Bedori. The attack of 1 Para on Sank would
go ahead as planned.
The attack by 1 Para on Sank went in at
2230 hours, after a heavy artillery barrage. The enemy opened up with automatic
weapons, with the aim of breaking up the assault. The artillery forward
observation officers, accompanying the assaulting troops, adjusted the
artillery fire on the enemy, who had come out of his defences. In spite of
heavy opposition, 1 Para continued their attack, and by first light on 27
August, Sank had been captured. The enemy vacated the feature, leaving 15 dead,
and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. 1 Para did not lose the momentum, and
continued to press on. By midday, they had secured Sar and Ledwali Gali.
While the capture of
Sank raised spirits in the brigade, Bakshi was in for a shock on the Bedori
approach. 4 Rajput came under fire from Bedori while going around its Western
slopes, and asked for artillery fire to neutralise the 'enemy fire'. Bakshi did
not permit this, believing that Bedori was held by troops of 161 Infantry
brigade. He spoke to the Divisional Headquarters and Commander 161 Infantry
Brigade, who again confirmed that Bedori had been captured. In the mean time, 4
Rajput was suffering casualties. Bakshi ordered them to fall back, till the
situation became clear.
Bakshi now decided to
exploit the success he had achieved on the Sank approach, and ignore the Bedori
approach till the situation became clearer. Hajipir pass, being in depth, was
not expected to be occupied by the enemy, ab initio. However, the enemy had by
now been alerted, and would have started moving additional troops, to reinforce
the feature. Once it was reinforced, it would no longer be within the
capability of a brigade to capture the pass. He decided to go for the pass
directly, without waiting for Bedori to be cleared. Of course, this meant a
frontal assault, from the North. This would have to be under enemy observation,
and fire, and could result in heavy casualties. He knew that the men were
physically and mentally exhausted, having spent two days on the move, in rough
terrain and abominable weather. The attack would succeed only if pressed home,
and needed resolute leadership.
Bakshi spoke to
Lieutenant Colonel Prabhjinder Singh, the Commanding Officer of 1 Para, and
told him that he was looking for a suitable officer who could deliver the
goods. Prabhjinder suggested the name of his Second-in-Command, Major (later
Lieutenant General) Ranjit Singh Dayal. Dayal was summoned to the Brigade
Headquarters, and Bakshi personally briefed him on the mission. He explained
that Dayal would have to avoid the direct approach, along the ridge from
Ledwali Gali to the Western Knoll. He would have to capture the knolls on
either side of the pass, from an unexpected direction. He was told to take an
infantry company, with an additional platoon. An artillery officer would
accompany him, as the forward observation officer (FOO). Another company of 1
Para was earmarked to reinforce Dayal as soon as he had captured the pass. At
the end of his briefing, Bakshi told Dayal, "If you succeed, the credit
will go to you. If you don't, I will accept responsibility for the
failure."
While all this was going
on, Bakshi received another call from the GSO 1 of 19 Infantry Division, who
informed him that Bedori had in fact not been captured, as reported earlier,
and was still in enemy hands. Shortly afterwards, the Divisional Commander
spoke to Bakshi, and told him that Bedori must be captured at the earliest, and
had priority even over Hajipir pass. Bakshi was flabbergasted, and protested
strongly, saying that the diversion of troops from the Sank axis to Bedori
would take time. What was more important, any delay in the capture of Haji Pir
would give the enemy time to occupy and strengthen the defences at the pass.
But the Divisional Commander would have none of it. The capture of Bedori had
been announced on All India Radio on 26 August, and its immediate capture was
essential, to avoid embarrassment.
Bakshi was forced to
modify his plans again. However, he decided to make no change in the plan for
the capture of Haji Pir, by Dayal. The problem was finding troops for the
capture of Bedori. At this stage, Lieutenant Colonel Sampuran Singh, the
Commanding Officer of 19 Punjab, volunteered to capture Bedori using the
subsidiary axis Kaunrali - Burji - Bedori Spring - Bedori. Bakshi readily
granted permission, and instructed 4 Rajput to maintain pressure on the enemy
from the North and North and North West, to divert their attention when the
attack went in, on night 28/29 August.
Major Ranjit Singh
Dayal left with his column at last light on 27 August. He was accompanied by
Captain Vaswani, as his second-in-command, and Second-Lieutenant JS Talwar, of
164 Field Regiment, as the FOO. As the company was descending from Ledwali Gali
into the Haidarabad nullah, it came under machine gun and mortar fire from the
western shoulder of the pass, which overlooked the nullah. But this was more of
a nuisance than a threat. Soon, the column came under fire from a different
direction. A party of Pathans, withdrawing from Sawan Pathri had seen the
force, and concluding that they were being encircled, had opened fire. Dayal
despatched a platoon to deal with the Pathans, and asking them to join up with
him later, continued the advance. In case it was delayed, the platoon was told
to join the battalion, at Ledwali Gali. Dayal also ordered the FOO to register
the eastern and western shoulders of the pass, which dominated the area all
round.
After registration had
been completed, the company moved along the left bank of the Haidarabad nullah,
hugging the hillside. By about 1800 hours, it started raining, and the valley
was covered with low clouds and mist. It made movement difficult, but also
concealed their movement, and the enemy lost touch with the company till the
morning. Crossing the nullah, the column began to climb, avoiding the track. At
about 2000 hours, they reached a house, which appeared to be occupied. It was
found to be occupied by ten Pak soldiers, who had fallen back from Bedori, and
were resting for the night. After they were disarmed, they were pressed into
service for carrying loads. Soaked to the skin, and utterly exhausted, the men
kept on moving, throughout the night, weighed down by heavy loads. Dayal knew
that soon it would be first light, and before that happened, he must reach the
pass. He kept up the pace, and did not allow the men to rest, except after
crossing a difficult stretch, when they were halted, counted, and only then was
the advance resumed. He had taken the precaution of taking a local porter as a
guide, who led them to the pass, without losing his way even once.
At about 0430 hours on
28 August, the company hit the old Uri Punch road. At this stage, Dayal decided
to give the men a much-needed break. After a few hours rest, the advance was
resumed at 0700 hours. After advancing for about an hour, the leading platoon
negotiated a turn, and came under intense machine gun fire from the western
shoulder of the pass. The area was open, and the objective was almost 1200
yards away. Leaving the leading platoon and the forward observation officer to
keep the enemy engaged from the front, Dayal took the balance of the company to
the right, and began climbing up the western shoulder of the pass. On having
reached the top, they rolled down, completely surprising the Pak soldiers, who
took to their heels, without offering any resistance. By 1100 hours on 28
August, Hajipir pass had been captured. Twelve Pakistanis, including one
officer, were taken prisoner. There was not a single Indian casualty.
After the capture of Hajipir,
Bakshi turned his attention to the capture of Bedori, which was to be attempted
by 19 Punjab. Bedori is a rocky feature, where it was difficult to dig
trenches. The enemy had constructed stone 'sangars', to improve their defences,
on the pattern used in the North West Frontier. During the frontier campaigns,
the mountain gun had been used in direct shooting role very effectively against
such defences. Bakshi decided to use similar tactics, and ordered one 3.7 inch
howitzer to be deployed forward, for the destruction of sangars on Bedori, by
direct shooting. While 19 Punjab was getting ready for the attack, the howitzer
picked up one sangar after the other, and before last light on 28 August, had
knocked out most of them. The attack was launched during the night, and Bedori
pass was captured in the early hours of 29 August. It was found that two
companies of the enemy, supported by five medium machine guns, occupied the
position. However, the enemy was so shaken up by the ferocity of the assault by
19 Punjab that he did not launch a counter attack, and left behind a large
quantity of arms and ammunition.
After the loss of
Hajipir, the enemy began to bring up fresh troops on to Ring Contour, a feature
about 1,500 yards South West of the pass. When Bakshi got wind of this on 29
August, he ordered 1 Para to dislodge the enemy before it could build up in
larger numbers, and launch a counter attack. The same night, a platoon patrol
was sent from 'D' company, which had joined 'A' company on the pass. However,
the platoon found the task beyond its capacity. Dayal then set off himself, at
about 0730 hours, with a platoon of 'D' company, and Major AS Baicher, the
company commander. He told the remainder
of 'D' company and a platoon of 'A' company to follow, along with the forward
observation officer.
The assault involved a
descent of about 1,000 feet, and then an ascent to the same height. It was now
broad daylight, and when the enemy saw the assaulting troops, he reacted
violently, and opened fire with all weapons, including artillery. As the
platoon was climbing the last 100 feet, the fire intensified. The platoon was
composed entirely of 'Ahirs' (a sub caste of Hindus, found in North India,
especially in the region around Delhi. They are simple and hardy folk, mostly
engaged in agriculture and dairying, who worship Krishna). Suddenly, the Ahirs
raised their battle cry - Krishan Maharaj ki Jai ( Glory to Lord Krishna)
- and then charged. A hand-to-hand fight
followed, in which nine men were killed, and 26 wounded, including the platoon
commander. The enemy lost eight men, and the rest ran away. During the next
three hours, the enemy launched three counter attacks, but all were beaten
back. Major Baicher was wounded in the leg, and Major Dayal had a narrow escape
- a machine gun burst shot off the sten gun slung on his left shoulder. By 1600
ours on 30 August, the enemy gave up, and the feature was firmly in Indian
hands. Soon afterwards, 19 Punjab linked up with 1 Para, and the entire area
between Bedori, Ledwali Gali and Hajipir pass was free of the enemy. On 1
September, Bakshi moved his tactical headquarters to Hajipir pass.
The battle of Hajipir
pass is a saga of courage, determined
leadership, and valour. Its capture was an important victory for
India, and a big blow to Pakistan. The credit for the success went to Dayal,
who had led his men resolutely, and to Bakshi, who had not only conceived the
bold plan, fraught with risk, but had executed it brilliantly. Had the attack
failed, there is little doubt that he would have been held responsible, since
he had undertaken it without the approval of higher authorities. He had taken a
grave risk, but it had paid off. In battle, a commander must be prepared to
take risks, and Bakshi had proved this quite conclusively. He was awarded a
Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), the country's second highest gallantry award. Having
already won the Vir Chakra earlier, he became the only Indian to have won both
the awards. Major Ranjit Singh Dayal was also awarded the MVC, for his courage
and gallantry, in capturing Haji Pir pass. Incidentally. The Muslim porter who
guided Dayal to the pass, continued to work for the Indian Army for several
decades, as a Mate (Supervisor) in the Labour Procurement Organisation, which
provides porters and ponies, to carry stores for troops operating in difficult
areas in Jammu and Kashmir.
After the capture of
Hajipir pass, 68 Infantry Brigade expected some rest, but this was not to be.
On 2 September, the Divisional Commander ordered Bakshi to capture Bisali
(Point 11229), which was the highest feature on the western side of the road
joining Uri and Hajipir. However, it had little tactical significance, and
Bakshi requested that he should be permitted to press on to Kahuta. This was
not agreed to, and he was told to capture Bisali first. 6 Dogra relieved 1 Para
at Hajipir pass on 3 September, and was now available for further operations.
The Commanding Officer of 4 Rajput, Lieutenant Colonel Sudershan Singh,
requested that the task of capturing Bisali be assigned to him, since the other
two battalions, 1 Para and 19 Punjab, had already had their share of glory
during the Hajipir battle. This was accepted by Bakshi, who also gave 4 Rajput
two additional companies from 6 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles. 1 Para was to be used
in Phase 2 of the brigade attack.
4 Rajput launched the
attack on Bisali at 2200 hours on 4 September, with artillery support. At about
3.30 a.m. on 5 September, the Commanding Officer reported that he had captured
the objective, and Phase 2 could be cancelled. The assaulting troops were
exhausted, and having captured the objective, flopped down for a well-earned
rest. The FOO with he leading company realised that what they had captured was
not the top of the feature, and expressed his doubts to the company commander,
who was his batch mate at the Academy. The company commander's response,
accompanied by a choice expletive, was to advise the FOO not be afraid, and go
to sleep. When dawn broke, the enemy began firing from the top, and then
counter attacked. 4 Rajput withdrew in disorder, leaving behind a large
quantity of weapons. The casualties were substantial - two officers and 63
other ranks killed; four officers and 47 other ranks wounded.
Soon afterwards, the
Divisional Commander visited 68 Infantry Brigade and discussed the plan for the
link up with 93 Infantry Brigade, which was undertaking an offensive from Punch
towards Kahuta. Bakshi was ordered to advance southwards towards Kahuta. Once
again, there was a disagreement, since Bakshi preferred to operate along the
eastern ridge of Kuthnar - Ziarat, while the Divisional Commander ordered an
advance along the western side. 1 Para was tasked to capture Ring Contour South
of Point 8786 in Phase 1, while 19 Punjab was to capture Point 8777 in Phase 2.
Both attacks failed.
Bakshi then decided to
switch to the eastern approach, which he had always preferred. On 8 September,
he ordered 1 Para to relieve 6 Dogra. The revised plan was to capture Point
9270 with 19 Punjab and Point 7720 with 6 Dogra. Both attacks were successful,
and operations continued further South. On 9 September, 19 Punjab secured
Ziarat while 6 Dogra captured Halan Zanubi next day. On 10 September, Major
Megh Singh, with a platoon of commandos from Punch, made contact with 19 Punjab
at Ziarat. Kahuta, an important town North of Punch, was captured on 11
September, and this opened the road link between Uri and Punch, which had been
not in use since 1947. However, the enemy was still holding strong positions
around Gitian from where they could interfere with the movement on the
Uri-Punch road. On 15 September, the enemy attacked 19 Punjab positions between
Kahuta and Gitian three times without success. On 18 September, Bakshi ordered 6
Dogra to capture enemy positions South of Gitian, consisting of Left Knoll,
Tree Hill and Hut Hill. It was to be a silent attack with a pre arranged fire
plan, on call. 6 Dogra was to attack Tree Hill and Hut Hill, while one company
each from 1 Para and 19 Punjab were to simulate attacks on Ring Contour and
Point 8777 respectively, to divert the enemy's attention.
On night 20/21
September, 6 Dogra launched their attack and the forward companies managed to
capture their objectives. But the enemy brought down effective artillery fire,
causing some disorganisation, and Bakshi ordered a company of 19 Punjab to
pitch in. This was on of the most expensive battles of the campaign, where
three officers lost their lives - Major Lalli, of 6 Dogra, Major Ranbir of 19
Punjab, and the artillery FOO from 164 Field Regiment. In addition, one JCO and
32 other ranks were also killed. The list of wounded included five officers,
three JCOs and 80 other ranks.
By this time, Pakistan
had launched a full-scale attack, code named 'Grand Slam', in the Chhamb-Akhnur
sector, and the conflict between India and Pakistan had escalated into a
full-scale war. The focus shifted to the plains of the Punjab, where the
decisive battles of the 1965 war were fought. On 23 September, a cease-fire was
declared, after a resolution in the UN Security Council, and hostilities came
to an end. As a result of the agreement signed in Tashkent between President
Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India, troops of
both countries had to withdraw to positions held by them before 5 August 1965.
For the second time, Haji Pir pass, captured at great cost, was returned to
Pakistan.
In March 1967,
Bakshi was posted as Brigadier General Staff, Headquarters Eastern Command, in
Calcutta. Lieutenant General Sam Manekshaw was the Army Commander, and he found
Bakshi to be a pragmatic, efficient and competent staff officer. At that time,
Eastern Command was engaged in building up defences in the North East, which had
become the Indian Army's top priority after the debacle of 1962. The situation
in Naga and Mizo Hills had also begun to deteriorate, and this too required
deft handling. Bakshi did not stay for long in Eastern Command. In December
1967, he was selected to do the course at the Imperial Defence College, London.
This was a prestigious course, on which only highly rated officers, of the rank
of Brigadier, were sent. He stayed in London for a year, and qualified on the
course with distinction. The Imperial Defence College has now been renamed the
Royal College of Defence Studies, and one Indian officer is still nominated on
the course, even though India now has its own institution of the same level,
called the National Defence College, in Delhi, since 1961.
On his return from England, in February
1969, Bakshi was posted to the Military Training Directorate at Army
Headquarters. In June 1969, he was promoted Major General, and appointed
General Officer Commanding 8 Mountain Division, in Nagaland, where insurgency
had become a serious problem. His previous experience in Eastern Command, as
well as the fact that Sam Manekshaw was still the Army Commander, probably
played a part in his appointment. Soon after the announcement of his
appointment as Chief of Army Staff, Sam came to Nagaland on a farewell visit.
He told Bakshi, perhaps in a lighter vein, that Brigadier (later Lieutenant
General) SK Sinha, who was commanding 71 Brigade, had reached his limit, and
had not acquitted himself well as a brigade commander. He hoped that Bakshi
would duly reflect this in Sinha's Annual Confidential Report. Bakshi replied
that on the basis of performance, he considered Sinha to be the best brigade
commander among the six he had in his Division. As the Reviewing Officer, Manekshaw
could always disagree with Bakshi's assessment, and write whatever he liked in
Sinha's report. Manekshaw smiled and said that Bakshi was showing his
regimental loyalty, since he and Sinha were from the same Regiment. Bakshi
replied that it was not a question of loyalty but of conscience. Sam was soon
to take over as the Army Chief, but this did not deter Bakshi from expressing
his views, knowing them to be contrary to those of the Chief designate.
Fortunately, Sam admired men who had the courage to speak their minds, and did
not take it amiss.
When Bakshi was
commanding 8 Mountain Division, there was an incident of two Nagas who were
reported missing from a village. It was alleged that they had been picked up by
soldiers from an infantry battalion, which was operating in the area. Sinha, who was the brigade commander, called
the commanding officer and asked him to investigate. The commanding officer
visited the picquet, and then reported that his men were not responsible. The
Nagas insisted, and reported the matter through the civil administration. The
Lieutenant Governor took up the matter with Zoru Bakshi, and he spoke to Sinha
about it. Sinha told him that there was no truth in the allegations, and
suggested that he order an inquiry to investigate. Bakshi detailed Brigadier
Irani, who was commanding one of his brigades, to conduct the inquiry. He had
been an instructor at the Academy, when the battalion commander was a cadet,
and he was able to get the truth out of him. The company commander, in order to
win laurels and impress his commanding officer, was keen to notch up a high
score in terms of captured weapons. He
picked up the two Nagas, who were suspected to be hostiles, and based on the
advice of a JCO who claimed to have supernatural powers, subjected them to
torture to elicit information about hidden weapons. In the process, the two
Nagas died, and their bodies disposed off.
When the truth came out,
Bakshi was very upset, and conveyed his displeasure to Sinha, who had been badly
let down by one of his battalions. He told Sinha that he was about to put him
up for the award of an AVSM, but could not do so any longer, after this
incident. He had the battalion commander removed from command, and demoted to
the rank of Major. The two officers who were directly involved were court
martialled, and sentenced to be dismissed from service, and to undergo varying
terms of imprisonment. The JCO was also dismissed from service.
In September 1970,
Bakshi was posted as General Officer Commanding 26 Infantry Division, which was
responsible for the defence of Jammu. In 1971, operations against Pakistan
became imminent, after it was realised that the problem of the refugees from
East Pakistan could not be solved by other means. Since the primary aim of the
operations was the liberation of Bangla Desh, the Government had decided that
only a defensive posture would be maintained in the West. However, limited
offensive operations were planned, with the intention of drawing out Pakistani
reserves, so that they could not be used for major offensives, against India.
Lieutenant General KP Candeth, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western
Command, had accordingly planned an advance by 1 Corps in the Shakargarh bulge,
and a two pronged offensive by 15 Corps, with 10 Infantry Division advancing
North of the river Chenab, and 26 Infantry Division advancing South of the
river, to threaten Sialkot. Pakistan's 15 Infantry Division, under Major
General Abid Ali Zahid was holding defences in the Sialkot sector. To its rear,
Pakistan’s strongest strike formation, 1 Corps, had its headquarters at
Sialkot. Considering the importance of the task assigned to 26 Infantry
Division, Sam Manekshaw, the Army Chief, had selected Zoru Bakshi to command
the Division.
The operations commenced
on 3 December 1971, after air strikes by Pakistan, and orders were issued for
the planned advances by Indian troops to commence. However, due to the
Pakistani offensive in Chhamb, 10 Infantry Division had to fall back, and could
not undertake any offensive action. A brigade of 26 Infantry Division was sent
to 39 Infantry Division, to make up the loss of 33 Infantry Brigade, which had
been despatched to Punch, to counter the Pakistani offensive in that sector.
This resulted in the cancellation of the all-important offensive of 26 Infantry
Division, towards Sialkot. However, Bakshi was not deterred by this setback,
and proceeded to capture Chicken's Neck, which was one of the important gains
of the 1971 operations, and compensated, to some extent, the loss of Chhamb, by
10 Infantry Division.
Zoru Bakshi coined the
name ‘Chicken’s Neck’. To the South of Akhnur, there is a narrow strip of
territory, belonging to Pakistan, measuring about 170 square kilometres in
area. It is actually an islet, between the river Chenab and one of its
subsidiary channels, called Chander Bagha. It has a small neck in the South,
and a jagged head, with a beak, shaped like a dagger, extending towards the
North. The beak pointed towards the Akhnur Bridge, and because of its shape,
and the threat it posed to Akhnur, the area had long been known as 'the
dagger'. Bakshi felt that the name indicated a defensive mentality, and
promptly informed everyone that henceforth it would be known as the 'Chicken's
Neck', which could be wrung at will, by India. It is known by this name, even
today.
The Chicken's Neck,
called the Phuklian salient by Pakistanis, was strategically important, as it
provided Pakistan with the shortest access to the bridge over the Chenab at
Akhnur. It enabled operations to be developed towards Jammu, and also uncovered
the flanks of troops deployed in the Jaurian sector. They used it for
infiltration into Indian territory, from their base at Marala, which lay to the
South of the salient. To enter the salient, they had to cross the Chenab, using
ferries. Intelligence reports indicated that the area was held by four
companies of Rangers, supported by a regular battalion and some armour.
Protective minefields had been laid around the defended localities. Except
during the monsoon, the area was dry, and could be negotiated by tanks and
motor vehicles.
Bakshi's main task was
to defend Jammu, and almost his entire division was deployed in a defensive
posture. He had been allotted an armoured brigade and an additional infantry
brigade for the operation. Though his role was defensive, Bakshi had to
undertake the advance towards Sialkot, as part of the limited offensive planned
by 15 Corps. Bakshi had planned to carry out certain preliminary operations, to
facilitate his task, as soon as operations commenced. In order to remove the
Pakistani threat to the Akhnur Bridge, he decided to capture the Chicken's
Neck. This would release the troops employed in the close defence of the
bridge, which he could then utilise for the advance towards Sialkot. It was
essential that this be done swiftly, immediately after hostilities broke
out.
Since the Pakistani
defences were oriented towards the North and North East, Bakshi decided to
infiltrate into the salient from the South, from where the enemy least expected
an attack. This would achieve surprise, cut off his route of withdrawal, and
demoralise the enemy, even before his main defences were contacted. He tasked
19 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Mohinder Singh, to carry out the
operation. 9 Para Commando, and some armour were given in support. He decided
not to use the bulk of the armour, since he realised that it would take several
days to ferry the tanks across the river, and once in the salient, it would be
extremely difficult to retrieve them, for subsequent advance towards Sialkot,
which was his main task.
19 Infantry Brigade
commenced infiltration on the evening of 5 December 1971. The operation
achieved complete surprise, and the leading battalion found well-prepared
defences, which were not occupied, having been vacated by the Pakistanis. In
spite of this, the leading troops made slow progress, since they insisted on
following set piece battle drills, losing precious time. The situation called
for bold and audacious action, but the commanders were over cautious, and
refused to exploit the factors of surprise, and demoralisation of the enemy.
The pace was further slowed down due to motor vehicles of the follow up battalion
getting bogged down in the soft sand of the rivulets and streams that they had
to cross.
Bakshi arranged to set
up roadblocks, using his tanks and the para commandos. However, most of the
enemy was able to withdraw before the roadblocks were in place. In one case,
some armour that had been inducted into the salient, to hasten its clearance,
clashed with the roadblock armour, which mistook them for withdrawing Pakistani
tanks. Timely intervention of the brigade headquarters staff averted what could
have been a disaster. The para commando road block at one of the ferries was
attacked by a large body of withdrawing Pakistani troops, and had to be rescued
by tank mounted infantry, which was rushed to their aid. By the evening of 7
December, the salient was cleared of the enemy, and Chicken's Neck had been
captured. Enemy casualties were 32 killed, four wounded, and 28 captured,
including two officers. Leaving a battalion to hold the salient, Bakshi
withdrew the remainder of the brigade, to be used for other tasks.
The capture of
Chicken's Neck, within 48 hours, did a lot to raise the morale of the Indian
forces, in the sector. The operation was brilliantly conceived, and had it been
pursued with greater vigour by the leading elements, which tended to be over
cautious, a large number of prisoners would have been captured. In an operation
reminiscent of the capture of Hajipir pass in 1965, Zoru Bakshi had once again
proved that in war, it is not numerical superiority but daring and audacity that
brings success. After the capture of Chicken's Neck, 26 Division had little to
do, and had to content itself with small raids on border outposts, opposite its
area. It was unfortunate that higher commanders found no use for the troops of
26 Infantry Division, which had been relieved after the operation, or its
gallant commander, for the rest of the war. Since he had already won both the
MVC and the VrC earlier, Bakshi was awarded the Param Vishist Seva Medal
(PVSM), for this operation. This made him the most highly decorated soldier the
Army, who had won awards at every level, from company to division.
After completing
his tenure in 26 Infantry Division, Zoru was appointed the Director of Military
Operations (DMO), at Army Headquarters, in October 1973. He remained for a year
in this important appointment, which carries a lot of respect, and authority.
In September 1974, he was promoted General-General, and appointed the Military
Secretary, at Army Headquarters. He was now responsible for promotions and
transfers of all officers, of the Army. Bakshi performed this job with credit,
and was known for being fair and impartial.
In May 1975, Bakshi was
given command of the Strike Corps, which is perhaps the most coveted assignment
for a Lieutenant General. He replaced Lieutenant General TN Raina, who moved on
promotion as Western Army Commander, and later became the Army Chief. Bakshi
remained in command of 2 Corps for more than three and a half years, till he
retired on 31 January 1979. He thus had the longest tenure, as a Corps
Commander, in the Indian Army. Though he
had all the qualifications to be promoted as an Army Commander, the rules
stipulated that only Lieutenant Generals who had at least two years residual
service could be given this appointment. Age was against Bakshi, and he had to
retire as a Corps Commander. If he had been younger, there is little doubt that
he would have become not only an Army Commander, but probably the Army Chief as
well.
After retirement, Bakshi did not take up
a job, in the private or public sector. With his drive and determination, he
was ideally suited for a challenging assignment, such as breathing new life
into a sick public sector undertaking. If he had been given such a job, there
is no doubt that he would have done it well, as Prem Bhagat did in the Damodar
Valley Corporation. Because of his modest and unassuming nature, he was not
very well known outside the Army, and this was the reason for his services not
being utilised. However, he continued to take keen interest in the profession
of arms, and was a regular visitor to the United Services Institution of India,
in Delhi. Even today, he is an elected member of the Council, of the
Institution.
Zoru Bakshi is one of
the most well known generals of the Indian Army. A highly decorated soldier, he
possesses all the qualities one would expect in a successful military leader. A
thorough professional, he epitomises the classic image of an officer and a
gentleman. In battle, he has displayed, time and again, his brilliance as a
strategist and tactician. In all operations he has undertaken, he has tasted
defeat not once, and neither has he lost an inch of territory, to the enemy.
This is a unique record, unequalled by any other Indian military leader, except
for Lieutenant General Sagat Singh. His courage on the battlefield is matched
by his sense of fair play, upright behaviour, morality and the courage to stand
by his convictions, and his subordinates. Zoru Bakshi is a true son of the
soil, who defended the honour of his Motherland, and of his command, always and
every time.
6 comments:
Hello i need address of Z.C.Bakshi, As we are developing documentry on world war 2 veterans.
Please mail on nilkanthdestiny@gmail.com
More clients that are visiting the Chennai escort service center to take the new and stylish escort service. In the Chennai escort service center, there are many of the hot and dedicated Chennai escort girls are available that are uniquely offering the service. Visit More: Chennai escorts service
There are huge numbers of clients are pick the book Bangalore call girls for the fun where they are getting special fun without any of the issues. Their many clients will book the call girls for the fun and take the special companion with them. Visit More: Book Bangalore escorts service
Hot and best Hyderabad Escorts amazing call girls in Hyderabad come to your doorstep and you quickly spice things up in your bedroom? Visit More: Hyderabad Escorts Service
wow really such a nice site,am very happy for using of this site,thank you so much sharing of this type of information.
Satta is a unique game to place your bets and win only when you have found the right medium or connection.satta king You will have to find an authentic mediator to play Satta
Sattakingand place bets. How can you find out the authentic results? This is where Satta King Satta king
comes into the picture. It is an online portal that has been designed to cater to Satta results
from different zones.
forex
forex trading
fx
foreign exchange
social trading
leverage trading
crypto
cryptocurrency
Post a Comment