LIEUT GENERAL THAKUR NATHU SINGH
Thakur Nathu Singh was the
second Indian officer to pass out from Sandhurst, who achieved three star rank
in the Indian Army, the first being Maharaj Rajendra Sinhji. Though not very well known outside the Army, he was
one of the most colourful of our military leaders. He rose to the second
highest rank and appointment in the profession, and did not reach the top by
choice. He could have become the first Indian Commander-in-Chief, if he wished
to, but he declined, in deference to Cariappa, who was senior to him. Though
trained by the British, he was born an Indian, and never allowed anyone to
forget this. A nationalist to the core, he was frequently in trouble for his
anti British views. His brushes with authority were many, and if it was not for
the legendary British sense of fair play and justice, he would not have
survived in uniform.
Nathu Singh was born in
1900 - his date of birth according to his school records is 10 May 1902 - at
Gumanpura, in the princely state of Dungarpur, in Rajputana. He was the only
child of Thakur Hamir Singhji of Gumanpura, who was a noble man from the
vassalage of Dungarpur. Unfortunately,
he lost both his parents before he was
seven years old. During a visit to his village, Maharawal Vijay Singhji, the
ruler of Dungarpur State, was impressed by his intelligence and quick wit, and
took the young boy under his wing. The orphaned Nathu was educated at the
Maharawal's own alma mater, the prestigious Mayo College at Ajmer, along with
the scions of most of the Rajput nobility. In school, he topped his classes,
and was nick named 'Baghi' (rebel), by his colleagues for his outspoken and
forthright manner.
In 1911, he visited
Delhi and attended the Grand Durbar, on the occasion of the coronation of King
George V. Far from being impressed by the pomp and pageantry, he was filled
with shame and revulsion at the subservience of the Indian rulers, who had to
pay obeisance to the Crown. This made a deep impression on the young boy, and
he felt the first stirrings of nationalism. During his visit to Delhi, he also
came into contact with the Nehru family. After attaining the age of 15, he
began to take an interest in national affairs, and attended a few meetings of
the All India Congress Committee. In 1915, he met Jawahar Lal Nehru for the
first time, and thereafter, his father, Moti Lal Nehru. The Maharawal, who was
a descendant of the senior branch of the Udaipur royal family - one of his
ancestors, Jaimull, had died defending Chittor, against Akbar - was himself a
great patriot. He had implanted the seed of nationalism in Nathu Singh's mind,
which took root, and flowered, as he grew older.
Nathu Singh's
background and heritage - he was from the Mairtia clan, of Rathore Rajputs,
renowned for their valour - resulted in a natural inclination for the military
profession. His guardian, the Maharawal had also expressed a desire that he
should follow the martial tradition of his forbears, and join the Army.
Unfortunately, the Maharawal died in 1918, when Nathu Singh was still at
school. This left him alone in the World, without a guide or friend. Soon after
he returned from school in 1920, he had the first of his many rows with the
British. The Political Officer in Dungarpur was a diehard imperialist, who
treated all Indians as subjects of the British Crown. He asked Nathu Singh to
carry out certain orders, which were contrary to the wishes of the Rajmata
(Queen Mother). Nathu Singh refused, and there was a fearful ruckus. However,
the British Political Officer later developed a liking for the young firebrand,
and advised the Rajmata to send him to Sandhurst, which had just been opened to
Indians. Nathu Singh wanted to become a soldier, but not under the British. He
would have preferred the Army, or even the Police, in one of the princely
states, of Rajputana. But this was not to be. He bowed to his guardians's
wishes, and applied for the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He had been an
exceptionally bright student, and this, coupled with his background, enabled
him to clear the written examination and the interviews with the C-in-C and the
Viceroy. He sailed for England, in July 1921, alongwith Kumar Shri
Kishensinhji, and Gurbachan Singh. They were later joined by Charles Ba Thien,
from Burma.
Nathu Singh spent a year
and a half at Sandhurst. The only other cadet from Rajputana, Kunwar Sheodutt
Singh, who had joined six months earlier, acted as his guide, and the two
became close friends. Nathu Singh took the tough regimen in his stride, and did
well in all activities. His British instructors and colleagues were impressed
by his intellect, but somewhat surprised at his boldness and lack of servility,
which they had come to expect from all Indians. Nathu Singh disliked the
British, and made no effort to conceal this.
Unlike most other Indians of that time, he did not suffer from an
inferiority complex, and considered himself the equal, if not the better, of
any Englishman. One can imagine the difficulties he must have encountered at
Sandhurst, on account of his views. In fact, his anti British attitude
persisted throughout his service, and he was frequently in trouble on this
account. Amongst the British, he was known as a rebel, while his Indian
colleagues promptly christened him ' Fauji Gandhi', a name which Nathu himself
did not relish. At this time, Mahatma Gandhi had begun his non cooperation
movement in India, and Nathu seemed to be following in his footsteps. However,
much as he admired Gandhi for his
patriotism, he did not share his creed of non violence, and considered his
methods of achieving Independence through non cooperation as impractical. He
was of the view that apart from causing delay, such tactics would harden the
British attitude, and create antagonism. He felt that a better method was for
Indians to gain a strong presence in the Services, both civil and military.
They could then weaken the British structure from within, and take over at an
opportune moment.
At Sandhurst,
General Jacob of the Indian Army, addressing the cadets, told them that since
the British were likely to stay in India for a long time, the best among them
should join the Indian Army. Nathu Singh immediately sought an interview with
the Commandant, and told him that if the British had no intention of leaving,
he was not interested in getting his commission. During his stay in England, he
also met Subhas Chandra Bose, who was in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) at that
time. They had a common meeting ground, in their dislike of British rule, and
desire to be rid of it. However, they differed in their views regarding the
best method to achieve their goal. Both were strong personalities, and their
frequent interaction helped in fuelling the fires of nationalism, which burned
in the hearts of both these great patriots. Their meetings also generated a
feeling of mutual respect and admiration. Two decades later, when the British
Government ordered the trial of the Indian National Army (INA) prisoners, one
of the few men in uniform who protested against the decision was Nathu Singh.
On passing out from
Sandhurst, Nathu Singh was commissioned
on 1 February 1923, and assigned to 1/7 Rajput Regiment. All newly commissioned
Indian officers had to do an attachment with a British battalion, and Second
Lieut Nathu Singh was attached to the 2nd Battalion, the Prince of Wales'
Volunteers, which was located at Mhow, in Central India. His CO, Lieut Colonel
B. Ritchie, found him to be a keen and energetic officer, who made himself very
popular with officers and men. In his recommendation for his retention in the
Army, he wrote: " I certify that, in my opinion, the retention of
Second Lieutenant THAKUR NATHU SINGH 1/7th Rajput Regiment, attached 2nd Bn.
The Prince of Wales's Volunteers, is, in every respect, desirable, and likely
to be advantageous to the Service....". This opinion was also held by
Major General L.R. Vaughan, the GOC Central Province District. On 28 August
1924, while endorsing his remarks in the annual confidential report of Second Lieut
Nathu Singh, he wrote: " One of the most promising Indians I
have met. He should make good, if he continues trying."
After a year with the
British battalion, he was posted to his parent unit, the 1/7 Rajputs, also
known as Queen Victoria's Own Light Infantry (QVOLI), then located at Dardoni,
in the North West Frontier. He served with the battalion from 1923 to 1926.
During these three years, he worked hard, and learned the ropes. However,
unlike most subalterns, he did not follow the dictum of being seen, but not
heard. He had strong views, and he did not hesitate to articulate them. His
antipathy for the British, and their ways, could not be hidden, and this soon
brought him into conflict with his superiors.
Nathu Singh's first brush
with authority was over the matter of dining in the officers mess. He was a
high caste Hindu, and initially refused to dine in the mess, with other
officers. He made it known that in his home, at Dungarpur, his parents would
never have permitted him to share a table with an Englishman, regardless of his
station, and he found no reason to deviate from his religious beliefs.
Naturally, this created a commotion, and he was hauled over the coals. Finally,
he agreed to dine in the mess, but considered it an act of condescension. His
CO, Lieut Colonel A.H. Macleverty, has this to say, on 1 February 1925:
"Quick and intelligent at
his work, and professionally upto the standard of his rank; good at games. Must
become more liberal in his views, if he expects to come upto the standard of a
British officer in all respects.
......I do not consider him well
suited for regimental life........he has strong religious convictions, which
colour every question......He finds mess irksome, and states that he cannot
dine with Europeans when at his home.....I do not think that his heart is in
his profession, as he has more than once stated that his ambition is service in
his state.....his wife is and must remain purdah, which will seriously affect
the social side of regimental life......".
According to the
custom then in vogue, apart from the CO, two other senior officers of the
battalion were required to give their recommendations regarding retention of an
officer in service. On 3 February, 1925, Major B.S.A.F.Greville, wrote:
"I am of the opinion that
the retention of 2nd Lieutenant NATHU SINGH 1/7th Rajput Regiment, in the
Indian Army is undesirable......owing to his high Hindu principles he conveys
the impression that he is conferring a great concession on his brother officers
by dining with them.......he will find it difficult to come into line with
British officers, and in every respect, take their place....On the other hand,
I consider he has an excellent knowledge of his profession and has good powers
of imparting it to others. He is keen on games and speaks good English."
This opinion of
Nathu Singh was seconded by another officer of his battalion, Major
E.M.C.Brander, who wrote:
"Considering that 2/Lieut
THAKUR NATHU SINGH has been trained at Sandhurst, he is obviously very backward
in the ideas, which not only make things difficult for him but awkward for the
other officers...... He has been dining in the mess, but on account of his
strict religious principles it is obviously distasteful to him....he appears to
be completely dominated by his
religion.....I do not recommend his retention in the Indian Army. This is to be
regretted as professionally he is very competent. He is intelligent, picks up
things quickly and is also good at games.".
The recommendations of
Nathu Singh's CO and other officers of the battalion were endorsed by senior
officers in the chain. If anything, they used stronger words. Major General
A.L. Jacob, GOC Waziristan District, wrote:
"This officer is
entirely out of place in a regiment. The fact of his considering it a mark of
condescension on his part having his meals in the mess with the other officers
speaks for itself. From enquiry it appears that he himself personally had no
wish to proceed to Sandhurst......wishes to serve in either the Army or police
in a Native State, and I strongly recommend that he be allowed to do so."
Finally, General
Claud W. Jacob, GOC-in-C, Northern Command wrote:" The sooner this
officer is removed from the Army the better." With this, it appeared that Nathu Singh's
fate was sealed. He was called for a final interview with the Army Commander,
where his CO was present. After talking to Nathu Singh, the General was
impressed by his family and educational background, as well as his obvious
intelligence. He decided to give him another chance, and sent Nathu Singh out
of his office, after advising him to adjust himself to Army life. The Army
Commander then gave a dressing down to the CO, for not appreciating the
background of the young Indian officer, and told him to handle him properly.
Nathu Singh was standing outside the door, and heard the whole conversation,
which he often related in later years.
When his first report had been written, he had
been in the battalion for just three weeks. After a year, the perceptions of
his CO and other officers had changed. Nathu Singh had become moderate in his
views as well as his behaviour, based on the advice of the Army commander. On 1
April 1926, Lieut Colonel B.S.A.F. Greville, who was now commanding the battalion,
wrote:
"A keen, hard working
officer who takes great interest in his work.....With regard to the adverse
remarks in last year's report he has shown much improvement in all respects and
appears to be much more broad minded in his views.....His manners in the mess
are now satisfactory and he finds no difficulties in the feeding
arrangements....conveys the idea that he is very pleased and happy with Army
life."
Nathu Singh's
reluctance to dine in the mess can be attributed not only to his religious
beliefs, but also to the fact that he was married, and since his wife was in
'purdah', as most Rajput women of station were in those days, he did not relish
the thought of leaving her alone at home, while he dined in the mess. He had
been married at a very young age to Surya Kumari, the daughter of Thakur Laxman
Singh, a high born Rajput chieftain from Mewar, in Rajputana. He had two
daughters and three sons, two of whom joined the Services. The eldest daughter,
Chandra Kumari, who was born in November 1927, was married to a police officer.
The second daughter, Anand Kumari, was born in March 1929. She was married to
Major Guman Singh, who later commanded
his father-in-law's battalion, 1/7 Rajputs, during the Jammu and Kashmir
operations in 1947-48, when it performed with legendary gallantry, suffering
heavy casualties. He retired in 1967, as a Colonel. His elder son Pratap Singh,
born in July 1931, was commissioned into an elite Cavalry regiment, but had to
leave after a few years due to ill health. The second son, Ran Vijay Singh, was
born in December 1932. He joined the Indian Navy, and was trained at Dartmouth,
from where he passed out in 1952. He retired as a Rear Admiral. The third,
Amarjeet Singh, who was born in December 1935, joined a tea company.
In 1926, Nathu Singh was
posted to the 10/7 Rajput, which was the Regiment's training battalion, at
Fatehgarh, in the United Provinces. He remained there for three years, before
being posted back to his parent battalion in 1929. During his stay in
Fatehgarh, he continued his association with the Congress leaders, such as the
Nehrus, Jinnah, and Sarojini Naidu, whom he had met while giving evidence
before the Skeen Committee. In 1926, a committee had been appointed, with Sir
Andrew Skeen as Chairman, to go into the question of an Indian Sandhurst.
Pandit Motilal Nehru and MA Jinnah were members, along with several others. The
Committee examined 122 witnesses, which included commanding officers, KCIOs,
their parents, and VCOs. Among the KCIOs who gave evidence were Cariappa and
Nathu Singh. During this period, Pandit Motilal Nehru, who had resigned from
the Committee in March 1926, heard about his desire to leave the service, and
dissuaded him from it. He spent a couple of evenings in Nathu Singh's house in
Fatehgarh, where he also met some British officers and their families. He
strongly advised Nathu Singh to stick to the Army and not join the National
movement or political department of the Government of India, or return to
Dungarpur State service, all options which he was considering. Nathu Singh
followed this advice, and continued to serve in the Army, even though his heart
was not in it.
During his stay in
Fatehgarh, the C-in-C, Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, visited the
battalion. All officers were lined upto be introduced to him. Nathu Singh was
wearing a 'safa' (turban), instead of a regulation hat. He had been wearing the
'safa' since he had been commissioned, and surprisingly, nobody had objected to
it. When the C-in-C came to Nathu, he took him to be a Viceroy's Commissioned
Officer (VCO), who normally wore such head gear. Shaking his hand, he asked, in
Hindustani: "Kaisa hai, Sahib" ("How are you?" VCOs were normally addressed as 'Sahib', as
JCOs in the Indian Army are even today). Without batting an eyelid, Nathu
replied, in Hindustani: "Bahut accha hai, Sahib". ("Very
well, Sir"). By now the CO had realised the confusion, and introduced him
to the C-in-C, as Mister Nathu Singh. The Chief quickly said: "How do you
do, Nathu Singh." Once again, he replied: "Very well, Sir."
Nathu Singh returned to
1/7 Rajput, which was in Razmak, in
Waziristan, in 1929. The battalion moved to Peshawar in 1930, and the next
year, Nathu Singh was promoted Captain. Soon after this, the C-in-C, Field
Marshal Birdwood, again visited the battalion. He enquired as to the number of
Indian officers present in the unit.
When told that Nathu Singh was the only one, he came upto him, and said: "How
are you getting on? Remember, one of these days, you will command this
battalion. Learn how to do it now, so that you can do it well in battle."
At that time, Indian
officers were members of the officers mess, but were not given membership of
the club, which admitted only Europeans. This created a peculiar situation, and
a solution was found by making them honorary members. In 1933, three Indian
officers, who were honorary members of the Peshawar Club, applied for permanent
membership, and were black balled. When Nathu Singh heard about it, he was furious.
He had already resigned his honorary membership earlier, and he now advised
other Indian officers to do the same. As a result, all Indians resigned en
masse. This caused a commotion, and the Club President wrote to him, on 21
November 1932:
"The Club Committee hopes that you will accept their invitation to
become an Honorary Member of the Club, as they consider it would help the
matter when, at a suitable time, the case for full membership is again brought
up for discussion. The Committee much regretted your decision to resign from
the Club the year before last."
Copies of the letter
were sent to other Indian officers. Nathu Singh anger shows in his remarks,
noted on the letter, which is marked 'Strictly Personal'. " Left to me,
I would have much liked to get the Bar ploughed by donkeys or better still by
the breed mules, where the plot for black balling of a few of the WOGS, who
wanted to join as permanent members instead of Hon. was hatched." Soon afterwards, a dinner was held in the
club, to celebrate the satisfactory conclusion of the Mohmand operations, for
which Nathu was later "Mentioned in
Dispatches". He decided to boycott the dinner, and other Indian officers
did the same.
There was a furore. His CO, Lieut Colonel V.R.
Munton, was on leave, and wrote, from
England, on 16 November 1933:
"Blaxland tells me he has put in for a mention &
I met Gen. Coleridge yesterday & he tells me he has forwarded it, so I hope
you will get it & I add my heartiest congratulations. But about this
"dinner at the club" question. Gen Coleridge told me that you
engineered the whole refusal. At this distance it is very difficult to
visualise the show & to gauge what the atmosphere was at the time - I will
look into this on my return. But I do feel it was a damned silly thing not to
go to the dinner. A regiment is rather a sacred thing, if you work it out &
it is hallowed by a hundred odd years of tradition & blood. To let it down
merely to vent a private grievance sounds very petty. You probably didn't mean
it as such but it savours of non-cooperation - & the latter in the Army is
absolutely disaster. To take up the attitude of a "die-hard" isn't
going to do much good. Quite apart from the fact that at the next show the Bn.
will probably be left behind, your own military career may be affected. A
successful staff officer has to show tact & sympathy, & be prepared to
advance to a half-way line."
On his return
from England, Lieut Colonel Munton went
into the affair, and found that it was some British officers who had done the
mischief, and not Nathu Singh. Of course, he had declined to attend the dinner,
but this was in reaction to the black balling of the three Indian officers. In
fact, by standing up for his Indian colleagues, Nathu Singh gained the respect
of several British officers, who felt that the club rules were unfair.
In 1934, 1/7 Rajputs moved
to Secunderabad, in the Deccan. By now, Nathu Singh and the battalion had got
used to each other. At that time, as it is now, the Staff College was considered
a stepping stone to higher ranks in the Army, and all officers attempted to
clear the entrance examination, as soon as they were eligible. However, before
they could do so, they had to be recommended by their COs. In Nathu Singh's
case, it was not just ambition which spurred him, but a burning desire to prove
to the British that he was better than they thought him to be.
For three years, Nathu
Singh was denied the recommendation to compete for the Staff College
examination, on the grounds that he lacked experience. Naturally, he was livid
with rage, especially as several other officers, junior to him, were granted
permission. However, there was little he could do, but wait. Then, a new CO
took over, and in 1935, Nathu Singh was given the necessary recommendation. He
appeared in the entrance examination, and not only qualified, but secured a
competitive vacancy. In fact, he secured 915 marks out of 1000 in the Strategy
paper, a record which has still not been equalled. The fact that he had done so,
without any guidance or coaching, was noticed, and commended by his CO. To
Nathu Singh, his success was especially sweet, as his earlier CO had considered
him inexperienced, and not yet ready to
take the examination.
At Quetta, one of his instructors
was B.L. Montgomery, who later achieved fame as the victor of El Alamien.
'Monty' was greatly impressed by Nathu's sharp mind, and grasp of tactical
problems, and predicted that he would go far in the profession. He was known
for his anti Indian bias, and held a poor opinion of Indians, and their
intellectual capabilities. Once, he is said to have remarked "I do not
like things Indian", drawing a prompt retort from Nathu Singh, "then
what are you doing here, Sir?"
After successfully completing
the course at the Staff College, Quetta, in 1937, Nathu Singh was posted as
Staff Captain of the Naushera Brigade. After the outbreak of World War II, he was promoted Major, and
appointed Brigade Major of the same
brigade. He was on excellent terms with his first brigade commander, Brigadier
Nye, who later became Vice Chief of Imperial General Staff. However, he was at
logger heads with Nye's successor, due to his views supporting the stand of the
Congress Party. In 1942, he was packed
off to Imphal, as GSO 2 (Chemical Warfare), of IV British Corps. He was mainly
concerned with the evacuation of refugees, who poured into India, as a result
of the Japanese invasion of Burma. He literally saved thousands of refugees
from certain death, and his contribution was acknowledged when he was
transferred to 2/7 Rajput, as the second-in-command.
By now, Nathu Singh
had put in almost twenty years service, and should have been promoted to Lieut
Colonel, and given command of a battalion. However, his promotion was delayed
by almost a year, and he remained the second-in-command. This was probably due
to his pro nationalist stance. During the Quit India movement in 1942, he was
asked to suppress an agitation. He placed a picket on the route of the rally, but
persuaded the Congress leaders, who were known to him, to take another route.
Next day, the CO again asked him to do the same. Nathu Singh objected, saying
that it was not fair to ask him to shoot at his own countrymen, who were only
asking for their freedom. He requested the CO to give the job to some other
officer, but this was refused, and he was told
that if he disobeyed orders he would be court martialled.
Nathu Singh refused
to carry out the orders, and the matter was reported to the District Commander,
Major General Bruce Scott. Most British officers could barely conceal their
glee, as they felt that the 'die hard' had finally been trapped. When he was
marched up to General Scott, Nathu Singh defended his action, as a 'concientous
objector', quoting the example of similar cases in Ireland. To his good luck,
Scott turned out to be an Irishman. He appreciated the stand taken by Nathu
Singh, and let him off.
On 20 October 1943,
he was promoted Lieut Colonel, and given command of 9/7 Rajput, at Chhindwara. When he took over the battalion, it had been
graded 'unfit for war', after having been mauled by the Japanese in Burma.
Nathu Singh set to work like a man possessed, and within a few months, had
turned it round. He was full of energy and determination, and his hard work
paid off. During the next inspection, the Brigade Commander could find little
fault, and the battalion was graded 'fit for war'. In fact, it was graded as
the best battalion in the division, and Major General 'Tiger' Curtis, GOC 14
Indian Division, congratulated them at a parade, in front of the entire
division. The irony that this was done by Nathu Singh, who had been considered
unsuitable by his CO twenty years earlier, was not lost on his British
superiors, or his colleagues.
The Divisional
Commander, Major General 'Tiger' Curtis, was known to be man who was difficult
to please. Once, Nathu Singh was asked
to conduct a demonstration, for all officers of the division. Curtis was so
impressed by Nathu Singh's performance that he saluted him, in front of all
officers, a rare honour for a subordinate officer, and that too an Indian.
After this, Nathu Singh became the blue eyed boy of the GOC. This was resented
by Brigadier Talbot, Commander 109 Indian Infantry Brigade, who was Nathu
Singh's immediate superior. However, even he admired Nathu Singh for his
professional capabilities. One day, after Nathu Singh had left the battalion,
Brigadier Talbot came to visit 9/7 Rajput. While talking about Nathu Singh, he
remarked: "Your previous CO, with his electric moustaches, could get
anything done."
After about a year, he
received orders transferring him to 3 Maratha Light Infantry, in Italy. Nathu
was surprised, and annoyed, as he had been expecting to get command of his own
battalion, 1/7 Rajput. Command of a battalion in action would entitle him to
quick promotion, and he would probably get a chance to command a brigade in
field, and become the first Indian to do so. But Nathu Singh wanted command of
his own battalion, and nothing else. He appealed to the C-in-C, General
Auchinleck, under whom he had served in the NWFP, and who had become his
mentor. 1/7 Rajput had been part of Brigadier Auchinleck's brigade, during the
Mohmand operations, in 1933. Nathu Singh was the Adjutant of the battalion, and
could be seen galloping from company to company, conveying orders and
instructions, under heavy fire. Auchinleck was impressed by his courage, and
mentioned him in dispatches. This was also the beginning of a long association
between Nathu Singh and the 'Auk'.
The Auk promptly had his
transfer orders rescinded, and Nathu Singh assumed command of 1/7 Rajput on 17
September 1944. When World War II ended, he was commanding the battalion, in
the Andamans, and accepted the formal surrender of Japanese troops in the
Andaman and Nicobar islands frmm Vice Admiral Teejo Hara, on behalf of the
Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia. It was from Andamans that he wrote
the famous letter to Auchinleck protesting against the INA trials. Running into
eight pages, and couched in the strongest language, it brings out his anger,
and anguish, at the unfairness of the trials, and its repercussions. As an
example of courage, and candour, it has few equals.
In his letter, dated
17 December 1945, Nathu enclosed a Note, which bore the heading REPERCUSSIONS
OF THE I.N.A. TRIALS ON THE MINDS OF AN INDIAN IN THE ARMY. It summarised the
following main reasons which led to the
formation of the INA:
1. The general treatment of
Indian officers, including denial of Indian food, in messes, and the freedom to
wear Indian clothes, listen to Indian music, or talk in their native language.
2. Brainwashing,
propaganda, and torture inflicted on Indian prisoners of war by the Japanese.
3. The British Government
tried to satisfy the demands for Indianisation of the Army, by opening entry to
Sandhurst, and establishing the Prince of Wales Royal Military College (now
called the Rashtriya Indian Military College, or RIMC). With only five
vacancies at Sandhurst, and only one school to prepare candidates, it was a
hoax.
4. The Eight Unit
Scheme, which ensured that British officers would not have to serve under
Indians, and effectively segregated them.
5. Restricting entry of Indians to Artillery, Navy and Air
Force, to negligible numbers.
6. The opening of the
IMA was supposed to be a step towards Indianisation. However, whereas KCIOs
were posted as company officers, ICOs were given command of platoons, replacing
VCOs. Hence, there was no reduction in the number of British officers.
7. After establishment
of the IMA, Indians ceased to get King's commissions, and were given Indian
commissions. This conveyed an impression that Indian officers were inferior,
and were equivalent to the Provincial Civil Service, which is subordinate to
the ICS, to which KCIOs were equated. As a result, the upper classes stopped
sending their wards to the Army, and preferred the ICS.
8. Discrimination
between KCIOs and ICOs in terms of pay, though they did the same job, and had
to maintain the same standard of living.
9. ICOs took the place
of VCOs in units, leading to reduction in vacancies of the latter, and
dissatisfaction.
10. As soon as World War
II began, Indianisation was' thrown to the winds', based on the premise that
units officered by Indians could not be trusted.
Nathu Singh felt
that all these factors, put together, led to grave doubts whether the British
were serious about Indianisation, or it was merely 'window dressing,' to
impress the public and the outside World. Though two and a half million Indians
had fought in two wars, they had not been able to produce a single General.
Important appointments dealing with operations were denied to them, and just a
handful were given command of units. Drawing a parallel with the Soviet Union,
which took shape at about the same time as Indianisation began in India, the
disparities were obvious. However, his most scathing comments were reserved for
the unfair treatment meted out to Indians, which he covers at length.
Nathu Singh wrote:
".....The formation of the INA was not alone the work of its leaders like
Bose, or of the Jap Opportunist. The
creation and growth of the INA was a direct result of the continuous
unjust treatment of Indian officers in the Army. It is the natural heritage of
years of dissatisfaction, disappointment and disgust of various elements in the
Indian Army. The present members of the INA are to be blamed for their conduct,
but equally to blame is the Imperialist Anti-Indian British element in the army
who by their talk and action daily estranged the otherwise loyal mind of the
Indian, and last but not the least to blame are the British reverses in the Far
East, which left the Indian soldier to their fate.
Time is critical,
and at this juncture, large issues are at stake. Momentous decisions have to be
made, and on them will depend the future Indo-British relations. The previous
services of those in the INA who actually fought for the British till they were
captured by the enemy deserves lenient treatment. Wisdom and foresight suggest
that the crimes of the members of the
INA be condoned."
One can
only marvel at the brashness of a Lieut Colonel, addressing the C-in-C, on such
a sensitive political issue. No less surprising is the Auk's response. Far from
taking offence, he realised that the feelings expressed by Nathu Singh stemmed
from nationalistic fervour, rather than a rebellious disposition. He not only
chose to ignore the fact that the writer had disobeyed orders, in addressing
the C-in-C directly, but replied, in his own hand. He could sense the anguish
in the heart of Nathu Singh, and could empathise with him. However, he felt
disturbed and hurt at the bitterness in Nathu Singh's letter, and admonished
him, much as a school master would his favourite pupil. Written in a human
vein, the letter brings out the Auk's deep attachment to the Indian Army, and
his fondness for his Indian subordinate.
Marked 'Personal and
Private', the Auk's hand written letter
of 19 February 1946, reads:
"....I know that many of
the views expressed by you are based on fact. All the same, I do feel that you
are wrong to dwell so much on past mistakes and bitterness and I know that many
of your opinions are exaggerated and unfair. I say I know this and it grieves me to think that you, whom I regard as an old
friend, should deliberately rake up old errors and misunderstandings......You
are one of the people on whom I had hoped to rely....I was deeply disturbed and
I may say, disappointed by the general attitude of mind expressed in your note,
but I still hope that it does not represent your permanent frame of mind, as
this would cause me sorrow.....Needless to say you have my assurance that this
matter is private between us. Your note will not be seen by any one else and it
will not have the slightest effect on your official standing, so far as I am
concerned, because I realise that you would not have written as you did had you
not had full trust in my good faith and friendship for you.....I do value your
having written to me as freely and openly as you did..."
In May 1946, Nathu Singh was
promoted Colonel, and posted as Deputy Director, Personnel Services, in the
Adjutant General's Branch in Army HQ, which was then located at Meerut. Very
soon, he had differences with the Director, Brigadier Duke, which necessitated
the transfer of one of them. Under
normal circumstances, Nathu Singh should have been moved out, but the Auk
decided to post out Brigadier Duke instead, and Nathu Singh was promoted
Brigadier and appointed Director in his place. Nathu Singh pleaded with the
C-in-C to transfer him, instead of Brigadier Duke, but he did not agree. The
Auk either felt that Nathu Singh was right, or perhaps it was because he was
fond of him that he took such a decision.
Nathu Singh's
closeness to the Auk can be gauged from the fact that when the latter heard
about his differences with Brigadier Duke, he called him to Delhi, and made him
stay in his own house. He even took him to England, to enable him to study the
selection procedure for officers in the British Army. When the time came for
Nathu Singh to return to Meerut, he asked the
ADC for the bill, for the drinks he had, while staying in the C-in-C's
house (This was later renamed as Teen Murti, and became the Prime Minister's
House, in Nehru's time). The ADC told him to talk to the C-in-C himself, which
he did. The Auk said: "Don't be silly, Nathu. You are my guest."
To this Nathu Singh replied: "Sir, I wish I had known this earlier. I
would have had a few more drinks."
Soon after becoming
the Director, Nathu Singh submitted a paper on the reorganisation of the Army,
and its officer cadre, which was approved by Auchinleck. A training school was
immediately started at Yol, for emergency commissioned officers (ECOs), so that
they could be granted permanent regular commission (PRC). This helped about
4000 ECOs to get absorbed in the regular Army, as ICOs. It was at this time that he was offered the
post of the C-in-C, after Independence. Sardar Baldev Singh was then the
Defence Minister of the Interim Government. At a tea party held at his house,
Baldev Singh conveyed this to Nathu Singh, in the presence of several other
leaders, including the premiers of Punjab and the North West Frontier Province.
He followed it up with a letter, on 22 November, 1946, addressed to Nathu
Singh:
Your letter of 21st November has reached me. You have been selected and
earmarked to be the First C-in-C of India, with Command over the three Defence
Services. This decision has been arrived at, after the Muslim League joined the
'Interim Government', and with the consent of all the Political Parties
comprising the Government. It is on the recommendation of the present C-in-C,
and with the approval of the Governor General, the Viceroy, and may be the HMG.
The approval of the officers senior to you does not arise.
The letter goes on to
answer several other questions raised by
Nathu Singh, such as acceleration of nationalisation, integration of the three
Defence Services, 'Dominion Status' for the country, and the appointment of an
Indian as the next Governor General, after Lord Wavell. Baldev Singh also made
it clear that after the 'Transfer of Power', the C-in-C would be working under the Ministry of
Defence. Nathu Singh is said to have declined the offer, since he felt that
Cariappa was senior, and the appointment should rightfully go to him. However,
the next letter from Nathu Singh contains no reference to this offer of
promotion. Instead, it deals with a very important subject - the partition of
India. Dated 24 November 1946, it reads:.
".....In our case, unless we remain within the Commonwealth maybe
for a short period of a year or two, it is clear to me that by the Cabinet
Mission's latest suggestion of groupings into zones, they may have may have
made sure of cutting the country into three pieces and controlling India, the
subcontinent, as they have no doubt they will play havoc with us. To put them
in their place, I know Pandit Nehru, and through him, the Congress are trying
to do so. But please beware lest India is broken up by bolstering the Muslim
League and other communal forces - Sikhs demand for Khalistan, the Princes bid
for Federation and encouraging Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir becoming
independent by joining hands with other reactionaries...."
The Defence Minister replied, on
27 November 1946:
"Your letter of 24th has
reached me, its contents are much appreciated by Pt Jawahar Lalji, Sardar
Patel, and my other colleagues of the Executive Council, including the members
of the Muslim League....I know you are keeping yourself well out of the present
constantly changing political developments, much influenced by the British
Imperialists in combination with Mr Jinnah and other leaders, and I expect of
you to keep a special eye on the various communities that are being tapped and
influenced by them.....I understand you are preparing a paper on acceleration
of Nationalisation.....I would much like to discuss this very vital matter with
you before you finalise your proposals for the consideration of the Gopalaswamy
Nationalisation Committee."
Nathu Singh and
Sarojini Naidu had given evidence before the Skeen Committee on the same day,
and they had become quite close to each other. Sarojini Naidu insisted that
Nathu Singh should call her 'Mah' (Mother), and that is the way she signed her
letters to him. The two often corresponded, and at this juncture, he wrote to
her, about the problems facing the Country, and nationalisation of the Army.
Sarojini Naidu responded, on 9 January 1947, and wrote:
"Dear Nathoo Singh,
Many Thanks for sending me your very illuminating 'Shot in the dark'. It
gives a correct picture of the situation from every angle.
.....As the security of the country depends entirely upon the Army, the
army should not be based on what the country can afford to have for its
defence. It will be fatal to rely on a small armed force, however efficient and
modernly equipped it may be; because our country is vulnerable, bristling with
traitors and the fifth columnists, in millions in every part of India. We all
know the character and honesty of our potential enemies and so called friends.
Our leaders should get advice from us Indians in the army and other
branches..... and not repeat not from hirelings, who have their own axes to
grind;....
One thing more, probably you
have noticed but have not mentioned; is how the army is at a disadvantage
because of that 'steel frame', who wants to have the last word in everything
pertaining to the Army. That steel frame must go.
Once again, many thanks for sending me the most illuminating 'Shot in
the Dark.'
Yours
Mah"
In February 1947,
Nathu Singh was called to give evidence before the Armed Forces Nationalisation
Committee. The Committee was set up in November 1946, and consisted of Sir
Gopalaswamy Ayyangar (Chairman), Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru, Muhammad Ismail
Khan, Sardar Sampuran Singh, Major General D.A.L. Wade, Brigadier K.S.
Thimayya, Wing Commander Mehr Singh and Commander H.M.S. Choudri as members,
with Lieut Colonel B.M. Kaul as Secretary. Auchinleck had indicated that out of
22,000 officers in the Indian Army, only 8,500 were Indians, with most of them
being ECOs, with very little service or experience. If the Indian Army were to
be nationalised immediately, officers with less than nine years service would
be commanding battalions. While this could be acceptable in war, it would do
incalculable harm if resorted to in peace, where officers needed to have
judgement, wisdom, patience and a knowledge of human nature, which could only
be acquired by experience. He warned against the dangers of entrusting the
command of the Army to officers who lacked experience, especially in the
prevailing circumstances, when disruptive forces were swaying public opinion.
Nathu Singh was in
Meerut, when he received a questionnaire, which covered several aspects of the
problem. He wrote a personal letter to Thimayya, who was member of the
Committee, on 8 February 1947, in which he suggested that each issue should
first be discussed 'in house' by the Army, before Indian officers give
evidence. Unless this was done, the Committee may arrive at wrong conclusions,
since most officers lacked knowledge and experience, and did not have at their
disposal the necessary data to arrive at valid conclusions. He felt that
"Each problem should be thrashed out by experienced Indian officers
selected by the Nationalisation Committee, prior to the matter coming up before
them. It is in this manner that the Committee will be able to get well
considered opinions for their final recommendations."
When Nathu Singh
appeared before the Committee, the date for transfer of power had been
announced as June 1948, by the British Prime Minister. He suggested that by
that date, Indians should be in full control of the Army, and if this was to be
achieved, they must begin to hold responsible positions straight away. He
strongly refuted the Committee's suggestion of a Military Mission, to continue
after transfer of power, and recommended advisers, who would be responsible to
the Indian Government instead of the War Office, as would happen in case of a
Military Mission. He also objected to the concept of keeping Indian officers as
apprentices or under studies, for important appointments, and felt that they
should be deputies instead, so that they had authority as well as
responsibility. When asked about the partition of the Army, in case power was
transferred to more than one State, Nathu Singh stated that he would hate to do
that. In fact, he said that it is not possible to split up the army. He closed
by saying, "I suggest that Indians should be consulted in all future
planning at A.F.H.Q. This has not been done in the past. We are going to be
holding the baby soon. We must be taken into confidence."
The Armed Forces
Nationalisation Committee submitted its report on 12 May 1947. However, by this
time the date of transfer of power had been advanced to 15 August 1947, and the
Committee's recommendations became redundant.
Nathu Singh again wrote to the
Defence Minister on 31 May 1947, after reading his broadcast, about Partition.
By this time, he had been transferred to Derajat Force, in Dera Ismail Khan. He
wrote to Sardar Baldev Singh:
"...I was amazed and
shocked to read your broadcast in the paper at the possibility of a division of
the defence services. As an Indian I hate it. My conception is that to
partition India would be equivalent of committing rape of our Motherland and to
partition the defence services means nothing short of civil war within a few
years time......You will play an important part in the final shape of things to
come. What about your collecting a selected number of senior officers from all
classes and communities from the services and forcing down the throat of uncompromising
political leaders, the wisdom of a united India staying within the
Empire...."
The Defence Minister
replied, on 12 June 1947:
" .....I entirely agree
with you that the division of India would be equivalent to committing rape of
our Motherland and the division of the Defence Forces will have a serious
effect on the Military. If in case there is no other solution to our political
problem except the division of the country, then division of the Army is
inevitable, and this is what I have stated in my statement...I have noted your suggestion about certain officers. We
have at present a number of problems facing us and we will need the help of
senior Indian officers, but the final decision will have to be taken after the
Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab have given their verdict about partition of
the Provinces."
Nathu Singh's
correspondence with Sardar Baldev clearly brings out his concern for the unity
and integrity of India. He was of the opinion that the British deliberately
partitioned India, to make it weak, even hoping that it would be
'ungovernable', and force the warring factions to ask them to extend their stay
in the Colony. He felt that the Armed Forces, being unaffected by the virus of
religion and communalism, were capable of holding the country together, and
partition could have been avoided. He never forgave Nehru and the other leaders
for their failure to consult the Armed
Forces, or take them into confidence, before taking the decision to accept
partition. At this time, Nathu Singh was posted on the North West Frontier,
from where he could do little but write letters. Also, he was only a Brigadier,
and though the most voluble of the KCIOs, he was not the senior among them. Had
this been the case, perhaps he could have influenced matters, and events may
have taken a different turn. It is pertinent to note that in January 1947,
Cariappa had been sent to the Imperial Defence College, in UK, from where he
was recalled only in July, and was thus absent at a very crucial juncture, when
the fate of the Indian Army was being decided.
When India achieved
Independence, Nathu Singh was in command of the Derajat Force, at Dera Ismail
Khan. He saw the horrors of Partition, and played an important role in the
evacuation of refugees. He was shocked at the behaviour of some British
officers of the civil service, who were encouraging the local Muslim population
to threaten Hindus, and force them to migrate to India. He tried his best to
check this, and brought it to the notice of the political leaders, who
expressed their helplessness. He also had a row with his Divisional Commander,
Major General W. Fleming and the Army Commander, Sir Frank Messervy. To get him
out of way, he was transferred, as Commander, Kamptee Sub Area, on 6 September 1947.
In his new appointment, he soon had a tiff with the GOC-in-C, Lieut General
Goddard. Nathu Singh came to know that the garrison at Secunderabad was being
reduced, and promptly ordered that this should be stopped. He was able to
visualise the need of troops, for the Hyderabad operations, which were
undertaken subsequently. Goddard was furious, and placed Hyderabad under his
direct command. He also got Nathu Singh transferred to Kurukshetra, to look
after the refugee camp, which had been set up following the Partition, and the
large scale migration which followed. The camp had about twenty thousand
people, and it was not an easy task to keep its agitated inmates satisfied.
Once, after all his efforts to convince them to keep the camp area clean
failed, he collected his entire staff, and along with them, gave a
demonstration. After this, the inmates began to cooperate, and he had no more
problem on this score.
While he was at the
refugee camp, Edwina Mountbatten came to visit. She was impressed, and told
Nathu Singh "You must be a genius." She said that he should ask
Mahatma Gandhi to visit the camp, which he did. When Nathu Singh met Gandhiji,
they had a discussion about non violence. Nathu Singh asked the Mahatma how he
expected his principles of non violence to work, in the existing circumstances.
He also asked "In 1921, you had said that we would achieve independence
in one year. What happened? You had said, division of the country over my dead
body. And the country has been divided." Gandhiji had no answer.
Very soon, he got another promotion, thanks to
the large number of British officers who left when India became independent. He
was promoted Major General, and appointed GOC Deccan Area, where he was
involved in the planning of the Hyderabad operations, which took place later.
While he was there, he was called to Delhi, to attend a briefing, so that he
could take over command of the operations in Jammu and Kashmir, which had
already commenced. Due to some reason, he could not reach Delhi in time, and
Brigadier Kalwant Singh, who was then Director of Operations at Army
Headquarters, and familiar with the situation, was promoted Major General, and
despatched to Jammu and Kashmir, as GOC Jammu And Kashmir Force. When Nathu
Singh reached Delhi, he went to the Operations Room, and came to know of this
development. After studying the situation, he went to meet the Prime Minister,
which was then a normal practice, for senior Army officers.
When he reached the
Prime Minister's house, he found him sitting on the lawn, talking to some
ministers, and civilian officials. Presently, Nehru got up and went inside. The
others present there asked Nathu Singh for his views, on the best way to deal
with the crisis, in Kashmir. Nathu Singh replied that if he had his way, he
would use the minimum troops, to hold the passes, and with maximum force,
attack and capture Lahore. This would force Pakistan to withdraw, and vacate
all occupied territory in Jammu and Kashmir. The civilians were impressed by
the logic of this argument, and when Nehru returned, they told him that the
General had a good plan, to throw out the invaders. When Nehru asked him to
repeat what he had said, Nathu Singh demurred, saying that he would rather not,
since he knew it would not find favour. But Nehru insisted, and Nathu repeated
what he had told the others. Nehru became angry, and said that a responsible
senior officer like him should not have thought of such a foolhardy scheme,
which could cause an international crisis. It is interesting to recall that in
1965, a similar plan was approved by Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was then the
Prime Minister, and it was the threat to Lahore which saved Kashmir, from
Pakistani aggression.
In December 1947,
Nathu Singh was posted to Lucknow, as GOC UP Area. Sarojini Naidu, who had been
appointed Governor of the United Provinces after Independence, was also in
Lucknow. Apart from being a well known patriot and freedom fighter, she was a
renowned poetess, and known as "The Nightingale of India." She was
very close to Mahatma Gandhi and other Congress leaders, and had played a
prominent part in the struggle for freedom. Nathu Singh discussed with her the
problems of India's security, and the Armed Forces. He had put down his views
in a paper called 'Notes on National Security', and he gave her a copy. She
forwarded them to Nehru, who was the Prime Minister, and prevailed on him to
through them. Nehru's comments on the Note make interesting reading. In a hand
written note, dated 1 January 1948, he wrote:
".....It is axiomatic that India must be strong militarily etc or
otherwise she will not only not progress but might break up. How best to build
up strength in various sectors is a question of balancing resources....
..... Strength, and even
purely military strength, depends today far more than before, on our industrial
growth & scientific research. It depends also on internal cohesion and
peace in industry etc. This latter is a political & economic problem of
exceeding complexity and cannot be dealt with simply by military or police
methods.
.....The whole question of
defence is intimately tied up with international questions as well as economic
questions. The Notes (of General Nathu Singh) though they refer to
international matters do not show an intimate knowledge of the international
set-up or economic questions which are of vital importance today both
internally and externally.
......No British officer will be in operational command in the Indian
Army after 31.3.1948.
.....Some of the lines of approach
in these notes are arguable. They may land us in difficulties. But generally
Major General Nathu Singh's notes are helpful and it is desirable that urgent
thought should be given to these matters by our senior officers and those in
control of the political destinies of the nation.
(Signed)
J.Nehru
1//1/48"
The divergence of
views between Nehru and Nathu Singh are obvious. The ideals, so dear to Nehru's
heart, and his consciousness of the international role which he saw for India,
are also evident. However, one cannot but help remark that he also appears to
pontificate, much as a school master would on a student's essay, submitted for
evaluation. His remarks about Nathu Singh's ignorance of international matters
are ungracious, when one recalls that having been in office for just five
months, he himself had little experience, as Nathu Singh was to subsequently
remind him. He was also out, by almost a year, in his assertion about British
officers not being in command after 31 March 1948.
Nathu Singh's tenure in
Lucknow was short, but eventful. He had to put down two mutinies, at Allahabad
and Jhansi, which were nipped in the bud, and did not affect the rest of the
Army. During this time, he also had an unfortunate misunderstanding with
Jawahar Lal Nehru, concerning his absence at a parade held at Lucknow. Though
he had known Nehru for several years, their relations soured, and were never
cordial after this. In January 1948, soon after taking charge, he had written
an Appreciation on the Defence of India, and forwarded it to Army HQ. He was
greatly perturbed by a directive issued from the office of the C-in-C, which
sought to reduce the size of the Regular Army to 150 thousand - during World
War II, it had risen to 2.5 million -
with an annual budget allocation of 45 crore rupees (a crore is ten
million), for the next three years.
In the preamble, he
wrote:
"We as soldiers must approach our leaders and submit our minimum
requirements and make it clear that if funds are not provided for such a force,
the responsibility will be upon them. A soldier is but a servant of the State.
He must however, point out any weaknesses in the defensive structure of the
country with all the emphasis at his command. In order to arrive at a correct
appreciation, we must consider both military and allied factors and not be
swayed by any notions of idealism or allow political considerations to affect
our judgement.....
A NEWLY CREATED NATION WHICH HAS ONLY JUST THROWN OFF HER BONDAGE OF
FOREIGN RULE OF 200 YEARS AND MORE CANNOT RISK A REVERSE ALMOST AT HER REBIRTH.
.....We must NOT decide on the size of our Defence Service on what we
can financially afford but on what we need in the form of a Modern Defence
based on the following considerations :-
(a) What is the strength
and armament of present and potential enemies of India?
(b) What is the force
required by India to meet this threat
(c) What will be the cost
of maintaining such a force?
(d) What is the maximum
amount the country can afford to pay for its Defence Forces?
(e) To arrive at a
compromise between (b), (c) and (d0 above, consistent with the safety of our
land.
Keeping the above in view, the Land Forces which India should maintain
are given in the enclosed appreciation. They are only my first thoughts."
Nathu Singh
proceeded to list out the frame work of the Indian Army, for the future. By
present standards, he was extremely conservative - he asked for one corps
headquarters, one armoured division, two infantry divisions, one parachute
brigade, one armoured brigade, and the associated complement of Artillery,
Engineers and Signals. The number of infantry battalions was only 28. However,
he advocated a large complement of territorial army, which would provide the
second line of defence, and boost the resources of the regular army, during
war.
In April 1948, he was promoted Lieut General,
and appointed GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, at Ranchi. Like many other Indian
officers, he had risen from the rank of Lieut Colonel to Lieut General, in less
than three years. He continued his efforts to convince the political and
military leadership of the necessity of maintaining a strong Army. When asked
for a run down of the Army, by Army HQ, he replied, on 24 October 1950 :-
"....The situation
facing the country from the military point of view is today virtually the same
if not worse because, although Pakistan outwardly appears to be fraternising
with our country, recent speeches of their leaders leave no room for doubt that
they are preparing for a show-down with our country over the KASHMIR issue.
.....Communist China's complete
success over the KUOMINTANG and the establishment of th Peoples' Government,
their recent activities, their declared policy towards liberation of Tibet, and
the recent Mission from the latter country clearly indicate the writing on the
wall. The Communist menace is gradually
spreading towards the very borders of India.
.....To ensure the security of
our borders and our State, the Defence service ratio between INDIA and
PAKISTAN should be two to one . If this is reduced, we will be laying
our country open to an ever present danger of a major war."
Nathu Singh's
remarks, especially with reference to Pakistan and China, display an insight of
international affairs which very few Indians had, at that time. Even Nehru, who
orchestrated India's foreign policy for almost two decades following
Independence, failed to grasp the nuances which Nathu Singh had perceived. As a
result, the Defence Forces were neglected, with disastrous results in 1962.
Nathu Singh cried himself hoarse, trying to convince the political and military
leadership of the need of maintaining a strong Army. He did not visualise a
large force - that would be a 'white elephant', he felt - but one that was well
trained and equipped. Unfortunately, his lone voice did not reach the ears of
our leaders, cloistered in their ivory towers, who were more worried about
solving the problems of the World than those of their own country. Nehru was a
great intellectual, and a patriot. The saga of his sacrifices during the
freedom struggle forms one of the most glorious chapters of the history of our
Nation. However, as a statesman, his achievements are more than matched by his
failures. An intimate knowledge of military affairs is important for those who
decide the fate of peoples, and nations. Among his contemporaries, such as
Churchill, Stalin, Chiang Kai Shek, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Tito, and Nasser,
Nehru was one of the few who had never worn an uniform.
Soon after Independence, the
Prime Minister held a conference of senior Army officers, to elicit their views
regarding keeping British officers for some more time, as advisors. Nehru felt
that Indian officers lacked the experience to take over the responsibility for
such a large Army, and wanted to retain British officers for a longer period,
as Pakistan had done. Almost every one agreed with Nehru, except for Nathu
Singh. He said: " Officers sitting here have more than 25 years service,
and are capable of holding senior appointments in the Armed Forces. As for
experience, if I may ask you Sir, what
experience do you have to hold the post of Prime Minister ?" There was
a stunned silence, and Nehru did not reply. Finally, it was decided to keep the
British advisors for some more time, as proposed by Nehru.
Nathu Singh had always
been a stormy petrel, and neither rank
nor age had dimmed his ardour. He had as many admirers as he had detractors.
Most of his superiors found him a difficult subordinate. He possessed many fine
qualities, but two which he lacked were modesty and reticence. Even Cariappa,
who was from the same regiment, while commending his loyalty, sense of duty, concern for the
welfare of troops, and administrative
abilities, could not help adding that he found him loquacious and immodest. In
fact, his close association with Cariappa, who became the first C-in-C, rarely
deterred him from doing what he thought was right. Cariappa was a stickler, who
never allowed regimental loyalty to affect his behaviour, and this led to
several brushes between these two 'Rajputs'. But they were close friends, and
Nathu Singh was not above pulling Kipper's leg, when he had the chance.
Once when he was the
GOC-in-C Eastern Command, he visited Delhi, and was a house guest at White
Gates, where Cariappa lived, as the C-in-C. Nathu Singh knew about his host's
rigid rules regarding dress, and wanted to tease him. So he put on a kurta and pyjama, and went and
sat in the drawing room. When Cariappa entered the room some time later, he
immediately noticed this, and asked his guest why he was improperly dressed.
Nathu Singh replied that what he was wearing was now the national dress, and
permitted to be worn even at formal functions.
Cariappa had taken
over as C-in-C on 15 January 1949, and retired after exactly four years, on 14
January 1953. At that time, the three Army Commanders were Maharaj Rajendra
Sinhji, Thakur Nathu Singh, and SM Shrinagesh. Rajendra Sinhji should have
retired three months earlier, but was given an extension, probably in order to
enable him to succeed Cariappa. Due to a new rule, promulgated in 1950,
officers retired after four years in command, and when Cariappa retired, he was
only 53 years old. In fact, Rajendra Sinhji, though a year junior, was six
months older than Cariappa. Nathu Singh
was junior to Rajendra Sinhji by a year and half, but almost three years
younger in age. Eventually, Rajendra Sinhji was appointed the next C-in-C.
Nathu Singh had already created a few ripples, which had effectively
jeopardized his chances of being considered for the top post in the Army. In
March 1948, when he was GOC UP Area, he had protested at not being considered
for promotion to the rank of Lieut General, merely because he was not graded
'outstanding' by the Army Commander, Lieut General Rajendra
Sinhji, who promptly rectified the mistake. In 1951, he wrote to the C-in-C,
General Cariappa, making certain allegations against Major General Hira Lal
Atal, who was then Adjutant General (AG), at Army HQ. Nathu Singh felt the
methods being adopted by the AG to screen State Forces personnel were wrong,
and resulted in several excellent officers and men, who had served with
distinction during World war II, being de-mobilised. He also felt that the one
tenure system of four years, proposed by Atal, was primarily to ensure his own
promotion as Army Commander. Nathu Singh's letter was brought to the notice of
the Prime Minister, who turned down the allegations. This was not surprising,
considering that Atal was a Kashmiri, and close to Nehru. As for Nathu Singh,
he was conveyed the 'displeasure' of the Government of India, for trying to
impugn the character and military reputation of another officer. Later, in
1952, he sent a representation directly to the Defence Minister, regarding his
extension of service.
These letters and
representations did little to endear Nathu Singh to the bureaucrats and
politicians of the day. In marked contrast, the British Government had taken no
cognizance of the letter he had written to the C-in-C, in 1946, protesting
against the trial of the INA prisoners. Little wonder, that Nathu Singh, in
spite of his dislike, could only admire the British sense of fair play. He said
that whenever the British said anything derogatory about India, he went for
them. But he admitted, "If you
take the best of them, we have never produced anyone quite like them. I have
not known a British officer who placed his own interests before his country's,
and I have hardly known any Indian officers, who did not."
Whatever one may say
about the propriety of Nathu Singh's representation, it is difficult to refute
the logic of his arguments. The four year rule ensured that senior officers retired
at a comparatively young age - Cariappa at 53, Nathu Singh at 51, and Thimayya
and Thorat at 55. This was at a time when the Indian Army needed officers with
experience, and was even considering retaining British officers for several
years. In fact, the British heads of technical Arms, such as Engineers and
Signals - Major General Harold Williams and Brigadier CHI Akehurst - continued
upto seven years after Independence, as did the C-in-C of the Navy, Vice
Admiral CTM Pizey. The only persons affected by the four year rule were the
Army Chief and the Army Commanders, where experience was needed the most. It is
difficult to believe that Cariappa supported the move; perhaps he acquiesced,
since he must have felt that to do otherwise may appear selfish, since he too
was affected. And being the gentleman he was, that was the last thing he would
have liked to be accused of. In the event, he recommended the proposal, and
Nehru accepted it, without going into the implications. If he had done so,
perhaps the Indian Army would not have had to suffer the infamy of 1962, since
Thimayya as well as Thorat would still have been around, to say 'No' to Nehru
and Krishna Menon, as Sam Manekshaw said to Indira Gandhi in April 1971, when
she wanted to go to war with Pakistan.
Nathu Singh retired on 1
February 1953, exactly 15 days after Cariappa retired as C-in-C of the Indian
Army. He did not grudge the promotion of Maharaj Rajendra Sinhji, who succeeded
Cariappa, after having been given an extension. But he did feel that the denial
of an extension to him was unjust. If he had been allowed to serve, he would
have automatically succeeded Rajendra Sinhji, when the latter retired, in March
1955. After his retirement, there were strong rumours that he was being appointed Governor of a State. After all, he was just
51 years old, and in the prime of his life. A known nationalist, his loyalty
and integrity were beyond reproach. He had many admirers, and one of them was
Sarojini Naidu. She was still the Governor of United Provinces, and spoke to
him about a gubernatorial appointment. However, by this time, his tiffs with
Nehru had taken their toll. Nehru was familiar with his bold and outspoken
ways, and did not want to take the risk of dealing with an intractable Governor,
who would do what he thought was right, and not what he was told.
After his retirement, Nathu Singh continued
to write to Nehru and other leaders, on various issues. He was furious at the
incident which resulted in Thimayya's resignation, and subsequent statement by
Prime Minister Nehru in Parliament. Nathu Singh felt that Thimayya had been
shabbily treated, and was concerned at the growing demoralisation in the Army.
He wrote to Nehru, requesting him to constitute a committee which should review
the present state of the Army, and suggest improvements. Nehru replied,
assuring that he would do so. When this did not happen, Nathu Singh wrote an
angry letter to the Prime Minister, warning him of the dangers of marginalising
the Armed Forces, and lulling the Nation into a false sense of security. On his
own initiative, he organised the Forum of Old Guard, which could advise the
Government on key issues dealing with national security. This had the backing
of most of the retired generals, including Cariappa. Unfortunately, Nehru chose
to ignore these warnings, at incalculable cost.
Sometime later, he was
encouraged to join politics, by Maharawal Laxman Singh, of Dungarpur, whom
Nathu Singh respected, and still regarded as his 'Chief'. He joined the
Swatantra Party, of Rajgopalachari (Rajaji), who had been Independent India's
first Governor General. In 1964, he fought a bye election from Bhilwara, in
Rajasthan, but lost to the Congress candidate. He was not familiar with the
ways of politicians, and often shared the platform with his rival, for his
campaign speeches. He would tell the voters that if they voted for him, he
would work for the whole Country, and not only for his own constituency. So if
they wanted something to be done for their District, they should vote for his
rival, and not for him.
Even after his
retirement, Nathu Singh continued to take an active interest in National
affairs, especially the Army. He was perturbed with the gradual deterioration
in the status of Army personnel, and of the decline in moral standards, in the
Country. He would discuss these issues with anyone he met, and kept writing
letters to successive Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers, as well as the
President. In 1993 the author spent two weeks in the military hospital at
Jodhpur, where General Nathu Singh was
also a patient, in the adjoining room. He was as mentally agile as ever, and
carried a bundle of files and books with him, wherever he went. He appeared to
be extremely distressed by the corruption, sycophancy and decay in moral standards, in the country, as
well as the Army. What was needed, he said, was men of character, a quality
which seemed to be lacking in the present day crop of leaders. Having lived by
the highest standards of morality all his life, he found it difficult to
stomach the present day state of affairs.
In strength of
character, personal morality and sense of duty, Nathu Singh equalled Cariappa,
though they were poles apart in other spheres. In 1947, when he was a Brigadier,
he visited the office of the Military Secretary at Army HQ, who was responsible
for postings and promotions, of officers. His son-in-law, Major Guman Singh,
was due for promotion, and was to be posted to a battalion of the Rajput
regiment, as CO. 1/7 Rajput, which was in Razmak, was likely to be sent to
Jammu and Kashmir shortly, while the other battalion falling vacant, 4/7
Rajput, was at Ramgarh, in Bihar. The Military Secretary asked Nathu Singh
where he wanted his son-in-law to be posted.
Nathu Singh replied that posting suitable officers was the job of the
Military Secretary, and he had no choice in the matter. But when asked to
indicate his views, as a senior officer of the regiment, he said that he would
prefer his son-in-law to be posted to 1/7 Rajput, so that he could see some
active service, and do his duty for his country, by fighting the enemy.
Nathu Singh was a man of
simple tastes, and moderate in food and drink. But he was a workaholic, and
rarely sat still. He would rise at dawn, and go for a long walk, a habit he
continued with even after retirement. He always kept a small note pad and
pencil next to him, which he used to jot down thoughts as and when they
occurred to him. Even when he slept, he kept the note pad under his pillow, and
would sometimes get up in the middle of the night or early morning to make
notes. His dedication to his job, or the task at hand, was total, and he did
not allow anything to distract him, even for a short while. His boldness, and
outspoken nature, were often not liked by his superiors, but this did not deter
him from speaking out. He possessed a sharp intellect, which even his severest
critics acknowledged. He was also a man of wit, and his repartees are
legendary.
Once, when he was a young
officer, his British CO spat out,"Damn the country, and the people."
Nathu Singh promptly replied, "I was in England, and did not like it, so I
returned. Why don't you?" Another time, a British officer asked him if he
was from Rajputana. On receiving a nod, he continued, “I believe your ancestors
were bandits?" Nathu Singh retorted, "They may have been. But at that
time, yours must be living up in trees."
Just a few days
before his death, he came to attend the Prize Giving ceremony at Mayo College.
He was 94 years old, but came, primarily to meet TN Seshan, who was the Chief
Guest. He spent three days at his old school, and attended every function. He
was continuously ticking off people, and advising the boys to fight for the
interests of the country. A few days later, he went to the military hospital at
Nasirabad, for a medical check-up. The day after he was found fit, he had a
cardiac arrest, and died, in the hospital itself, on 5 November 1994. The next day, his body was taken to his
village, near Udaipur, where he was cremated. Though he had served all his life
in the Army, and retired as an Army Commander, it was a police guard of honour
which reversed arms at his funeral. The famous lines, quoted below, were never
so true, as in case of Nathu Singh:
"Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note
As
they carried his body to the ramparts..."
Like Cariappa and
Thimayya, Nathu Singh was one of the founding fathers of the modern Indian
Army. Though not as famous as the other two, he equalled them in strength of character, and surpassed
them in nationalistic fervour. Many called him a maverick, others a renegade or
a rebel. He was highly individualistic, with scant respect for authority. He
never hesitated to express his views, and he could not care less if these were
not liked by his superiors. However, no one could ever fault him on
professional capability, personal integrity, diligence, or courage, both moral
and physical. He had many faults, but these were more than compensated by his
sterling qualities of character, and his deep sense of national pride. A
colourful personality, Thakur Nathu Singh was not easy to ignore, and will not
be easily forgotten.
5 comments:
Many Faujis have fond memories of respected son of India General Sri K.S.Thimmiah.
As a civilian, son of a civilian I would like to state ordinary people loved him.I grew up hearing stories told by my father about exploits of the general in protecting our country and the debt we civilians owe to this one man without whom entire kashmir we would have lost as politicians of those days were more interested in their image in western press rather than holding dear national interests.
It is unfortunate prime minister Nehru relied on advise from lord Mountbatten even in the crucial decision making after Independence rather than trusting a fellow Indian.Havoc played by VK Menon and Mr Kaul is known, but we the people have never forgotten Timmy Sir.He is in our hearts.Thorat sir too is always in our high esteem
November 4, 2017 at 6:32 AM
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I had the privilege of meeting Gen. Nathu Singh on a number of occasions between 1980 and 1992 at Udaipur. His wit and sense of humour were disarming.
Thanks sir for an excellent perspective....of an era gone by..much missed...as all the prophecies of marginalizing the armed forces are coming true sadly.
1. I had heard only about the incident between Nehru and Lieutenant General Nathu Singh when the former had spoken about retention of British Officers as the Indian Officers lacked experience, and prompt came the reply from the General, that Nehru took did not have experience of Prime Ministership, hence Prime Minister of England ought to prevail.
2. This article gave me a great insight into the General officer, and ancestry, schooling play a major role in character building of the man. In todays era, both have taken a backseat, and no wonder the Defense Forces Officer cadre lack courage, integrity, character of the order desired especially in top rungs.
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