LIEUT GENERAL
HANUT SINGH, PVSM, MVC
If one was
asked to describe Hanut Singh, in one word, the one that would fit the bill is
`Soldier'. He epitomises courage, both
moral and physical, a high standard of morality, fair mindedness, discipline,
and professionalism. Though he did not
reach the highest rank - he retired as a Lieut General - Hanut had become a
legend even as a Lieut Colonel, when he was commanding the most prestigious
cavalry regiment in the Indian Army, 17 Horse.
Also called the Poona Horse, this unit has the unique distinction of
winning four VCs and two PVCs. Hanut was himself decorated
with the MVC, in 1971, when he was in command of the regiment. His
subsequent tenures, in command of the Armoured Division, and the Strike Corps,
only reinforced his claim, as the best armour commander which India has
produced, and the only one the Pakistani Army feared, and respected.
To understand Hanut, one must study his
background and early life, which were instrumental in development of his unique
traits and value systems. Hanut is the scion of a proud clan of Rathore
Rajputs, from Jasol, in Barmer district of Rajasthan. The Jasol Rajputs are
known for their valour, patriotism, courage and a highly individualistic
nature, born out of centuries of independent existence. After losing Kanauj, a
branch of the Rathores, under Rao Siaji, the son of Raja Jai Chand of Kanauj,
established a kingdom at Khed, near Jasol. It was from here that the Rathores
branched out and established the kingdoms of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Idar, and the rest.
For this reason, the Rathores of Jasol consider themselves as the senior House
of the Rathores. They have maintained their independent status ever since,
defending it against all comers. Hanut's father, Lieut Colonel Arjun Singh, was
himself a great soldier, who served in the Jodhpur Lancers, and later commanded
the famous Kachawa Horse.
Hanut was born on 6 July 1933, at Jasol. He was sent to Colonel Brown's
School at Dehradun for his early education, where he was exposed to Western
values, some of which conflicted with those in existence for centuries in
Rajput society. He tried to synthesise them, by adopting what was best in both
traditions. At school, Hanut was a brilliant student, and earned a double
promotion, from Class 7 to Class 9. He was a voracious reader, and made an
extensive study of Rajput history and tradition, in which he took immense
pride. His choice of the martial profession was almost natural, as was his
predilection for the Cavalry, which he later joined.
On 1
January 1949, the Joint Services Wing (JSW) of the IMA was established, at
Clement Town, in Dehradun. This was later shifted to Khadakvasla, near Poona,
and renamed the National Defence Academy. Hanut joined the first course at the
JSW, along with S.F. Rodrigues, who later become COAS; Ram Das, who rose to be
the Chief of Naval Staff, and N.C. Suri, who retired as the Chief of Air Staff.
In the Academy, he was a loner, known for his strict personal discipline,
moral values and strength of character. His colleagues could not fail to
notice these qualities, and held him in high regard. Unfortunately, this envy
turned to jealousy, in later years, when some of his colleagues used his strong
individualistic traits to side line him, calling him arrogant and stubborn.
Hanut
was commissioned on 28 December 1952 into 17 Horse, also known as the Poona
Horse, which is one of the elite cavalry regiments of the Indian Army. This was
natural, given his background, and inclination. In the early 1900s, Maharaja
Sir Pratap Singh of Jodhpur, the famous Sir 'P', had funded the raising of two
Rathore Rajput squadrons in The Poona Horse. Sir 'P' was appointed Honorary
Colonel of the Regiment, and since then, the Maharajas of Jodhpur have
continued to hold this appointment. Hanut's father and uncle, who were in the
Jodhpur Lancers, did attachments with the Poona Horse. So it was only natural
that Hanut should join the Poona Horse.
The Poona Horse was one the last regiments to be Indianised. As a
result, there were very few Indian officers
in the regiment at the time of Independence. To make up the
deficiencies, several officers from other regiments were transferred. This
heterogeneous collection of officers, most of whom were of average calibre, did
little to enhance the reputation of the regiment. For some reason, most of the
officers who joined after Independence, from the Indian Military Academy, were
from a feudal background, and the Poona Horse came to be known as "Kanwar
Sahib's Regiment", where the accent was on high living, rather than
professionalism (In Rajasthan, the name of a high born Rajput is prefixed with
'Thakur', that of his son with 'Kanwar', and grandson with 'Bhanwar'). It was
only in the fifties, after a new breed of officers started being commissioned
into Poona Horse, that the tide turned, and the regiment once again began to
regain its lost glory, and place of honour in the Indian cavalry.
Hanut had immense pride in his regiment, which he considered to be the
best, in the Indian Army. In those days, for various reasons, it did not get
the recognition it deserved, and Hanut was pained to hear certain senior
officers pass uncharitable remarks about the regiment. He came to the
conclusion that it was not enough for him to consider his regiment to be the
best - every good regimental officer would feel the same way. It was only when
the Poona Horse was acknowledged as the best by others, that it could
legitimately claim this distinction. This became his self imposed mission - to
get the Poona Horse accepted, and universally acclaimed, as the best cavalry
regiment of the Indian Army. He worked with missionary zeal towards achieving
this goal, and motivated and inspired other officers of the regiment to do
likewise. The success of these efforts can be gauged from the fact that the
exploits of the Poona Horse during the Indo Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971 became
legends. It emerged as the most highly decorated regiment, in both Wars,
winning a PVC in each. In 1965, the Commandant, Lieut Colonel A.B. Tarapore was
awarded the PVC; in 1971, the youngest officer in the unit, Second Lieut Arun
Khetarpal got the coveted award. This is an unique distinction, unmatched by
any other unit in the Indian Army. To top it all, the Pak Army acknowledged the
regiment's valour on the battle field by conferring on it the title
'Fakhr-e-Hind' (Pride of India). Hanut's pride and faith in his regiment was
vindicated.
As
a young officer, Hanut developed a deep admiration for the German General
Staff, particularly their total dedication to the profession of arms, and their
unmatched expertise in the art of war. He sought to emulate these qualities
himself, and motivated other officers in the regiment to do the same. As a
result, qualities like professionalism, personal rectitude and a total
dedication to the regiment and the service became the distinctive hallmark of
officers of the Poona Horse, and continues to be so even today. In fact, a
group of officers in the regiment jokingly referred to themselves as the 'PH
General Staff', and being admitted to this group was a coveted distinction, for
the others. A whole generation of Poona Horse officers was directly influenced
by Hanut's ideas and views, and it is interesting to note that almsot all of
them rose to become General officers - just one more of the many unique
distinctions earned by the regiment. Many of them, such as Ajai Singh,
Surrinder Singh, Amrik Virk, Neville Foley and Moti Dar, who joined the
regiment after Hanut, recall with nostalgia the days spent under his tutelage.
Describing
his first meeting with Hanut, in July 1956, Lieut General Ajai Singh has
written, in the book 'Fakhr-e-Hind - The Story of the Poona Horse':
"It was after two to three days of my
stay in the Regiment that I met him. I was sitting in the C Squadron office
after the Maintenance Parade when a tall, thin, smartly turned out officer
entered the office. What struck me most about him was his prominent hooked nose
and very proud and penetrating look in his eyes. He walked to me and met with
such enthusiasm, warmth and affection that I felt as though we had known each
other for ages.....Thereafter, without further ado, he took me to the Squadron
and introduced me to all members of his troop, which I was to take over. Having
done this at the garages itself, he gave me a programme for my training which I
was to commence from the next day; he also gave me a large bundle of books and
precis which I was to read in my own time. I went through all this
business-like activity in a state of total shock because, till then, such a
serious approach to professional matters had neither been seen or heard during
the few days I had spent in the
Regiment.
So this was Hanut - stoic, business-like and
upright. Being a senior subaltern he had full authority over the Young Officers
(YOs) which he exercised with ruthless impartiality, whether it was in the
Officers' Mess, or on the play grounds. Some of the senior YOs, of course,
resented this attitude but Hanut would not compromise. Irrespective of what the
juniors and seniors felt about this remarkable man, one thing was universally
true; he was loved by the men and admired and respected by all officers. Even
then, as a youngster, I could foresee that he might just be the right man to
usher in a new era in the Poona Horse -an era of regenerated Regimental spirit,
professionalism and high spirits. As time passed, my anticipation proved more
than correct. His influence on all the officers that were to follow was so
complete that some of them went so far as to emulate him even in talk, gestures
and mannerisms. This also explains why, in the course of time, he came to be
nicknamed 'Gurudev' (teacher, or master)."
Writing in
a similar vein in the same book, Lieut General Surrinder Singh, who
joined the Poona Horse in January 1958, reminisces:
"Amongst this lot, the officer who was to have the
most profound influence was Hanut Singh, who had joined the Regiment in January
1953. A tall, lean and ascetic figure, uncompromising in his beliefs and
convictions yet gentle and considerate to his juniors and subordinates,
possessed with an exuberant sense of humour and a pungent, ready wit, he was an
extremely dedicated and devoted professional. His forte was instruction,
delivered in a modulated and compelling tone which carried conviction and
understanding. A man of sterling character combined with a forceful
personality, he had no time for fools - a fact which was soon apparent to those
in this category."
An
amusing side light was Hanut's bachelorhood. He was strongly of the view
that a married officer could not devote
himself whole heartedly to his profession, as his family would demand some of
his time and attention. He remained a bachelor himself, and also encouraged
others to follow his example. As a result, the Poona Horse had a fair number of
rather senior bachelors. This added great zest to mess life, but also caused
considerable anxiety and consternation to the concerned parents, who naturally
blamed Hanut for the continued refusal of their sons to enter into
matrimony.
Hanut devoted his spare time to spiritual pursuits, and to his favourite
hobby of reading. He had an abiding love for books, and read extensively on a
wide variety of subjects. But what he loved to read was spiritual literature,
and the biographies of great men, particularly the great Captains of War. He
found socialising, and the meaningless small talk that goes with it, painfully
boring. He liked nothing better than to be left alone, with a good book. In an
extroverted society like the Army, this character trait of his was considered
odd, and he was soon dubbed as being anti-social. Hanut did not mind this, and
was quite happy as long as he was left to himself, and his books.
In
the mid fifties, the Poona Horse was issued with Centurion tanks. Hanut, who
was then a young Captain, was selected to attend a Centurion tank gunnery
course, in the United Kingdom, in 1958. He was awarded a 'Distinction' on this
course, and on his return, was appointed a gunnery instructor at the Armoured
Corps Centre and School, Ahmednagar, in May 1959. There he rewrote the General
Staff pamphlet on 'Technique of Shooting from Armoured Fighting Vehicles'. He
also introduced revised techniques of shooting, and new tank gunnery training
methods, and wrote out precis for disseminating instructions on these subjects.
These continued to be the bedrock of gunnery training in the Armoured Corps, as
long as the Centurions were in service; and it was these techniques, and
training methods, which enabled the Centurions to out shoot the Pakistani
Pattons, and establish their supremacy on the battlefield, during the Indo Pak
wars of 1965 and 1971.
When Hanut joined the Armoured Corps, there was no tactical doctrine
available on armour, and neither were there any publications on armour tactics
at unit level. What was taught at the Armoured Corps Centre and School was
basically Infantry oriented tactics, based on precis issued by the Infantry
School, Mhow. Hanut felt that armour must have a tactical doctrine of its own,
based on the principles of mobile warfare. So he decided to evolve such a
doctrine, and based on that, develop unit level tactics, for armoured troops,
squadrons and regiments. In this context, he was of the view that only the
Germans had really understood mobile warfare, and practised it during war. He
carried out a deep study of the campaigns and battles fought by the Panzer
formations and units during World War II, in order to grasp the basic
principles of mobile warfare. Based on these, he began developing unit level
tactics, which he would teach, and practice in his troop and squadron during
training. From the experience gained, he would modify and expand them, and
disseminate them to other officers in the regiment. He kept detailed notes,
which were constantly updated, over the years.
In
December 1960, Hanut returned to the regiment. After attending the Junior
Command course at the Infantry School in 1961, he began preparations for the
Staff College entrance examination. He qualified, and proceeded to Wellington,
to attend the course in 1963. His colleagues on the course remember him as a
thoroughly dedicated professional, who had little time for distractions such as
the races at Ooty, or the weekly dances at the Gymkhana Club. Even as a
student, his leadership qualities became abundantly clear, to his instructors,
as well as his colleagues.
There
is an interesting anecdote about Wellington, which brings out Hanut's character,
and style. During the telephone battle, he was given the appointment of a
divisional commander. As is the custom,
he was wearing the badges of rank of a Major General, though he was actually a
Major. This was done to give realism, during training. After he had given out
his orders, the actual 'battle' commenced. At about 9 p.m., after the 'enemy'
had made his opening moves, Hanut told his staff that he was retiring for the
night, and was not to be disturbed until a situation arose which required his decision,
or personal intervention. This caused some surprise, since it was contrary to
the normally accepted, nail chewing image of a GOC, supposedly under pressure,
who remained on tenter hooks, and kept harassing his staff and subordinates,
instead of letting them alone to get on with their jobs. The result was that by
the time he was actually required to do something, he was already bleary eyed,
and his mind fogged for want of rest and sleep.
Having said so, Hanut went to his allotted office and went to bed on the
camp cot, which he had placed there. He slept soundly, and awoke next morning
to the twittering of birds. It seemed strangely quiet, so he went out to find
out what was going on. He found all the rooms locked, and no sign of the other
student officers, or directing staff. He later learnt that as the 'enemy' had
failed to make any headway, the exercise had been prematurely called off at 1
a.m. The senior instructor told the others to go home, without disturbing
Hanut, in accordance with the instructions he had given to his staff! This
incident became the subject of much amused comment, during the summing up, and
even later.
Hanut
performed exceptionally well on the course, and when it was over, he was posted
as Brigade Major of 66 Infantry Brigade. During the 1965 War, when Poona Horse
wrote its name into history books, by destroying 60 enemy tanks for the loss of
only nine of its own, and Lieut Colonel Tarapore won a posthumous PVC, Hanut
was not with the regiment. After a
tenure of a little over two years in this appointment, he was reverted to his
regiment, in October 1966. After spending two years with the regiment, Hanut
was again posted to a prestigious staff appointment, as GSO 2, in the MO
Directorate at Army HQ. This was the first of his many stints in MO, where he
was to serve again as a Brigadier and as a Major General.
In August 1970, Hanut was promoted Lieut
Colonel and posted as Officer Commanding
Tactical Wing in the Armoured Corps Centre and School. Hanut had
retained his notes, made during his earlier tenures at the School, and which he
had updated periodically, during his subsequent tenures in the regiment, and on
staff. He used his notes to write out the basic books on armour tactics, and on
the tactical handling of armoured units and sub units. These remain the basic
books on armour tactics even today, and are
still used at the Armoured Corps Centre and School and the College of Combat. In April 1971, he
was nominated on the Senior Command course at the College of Combat, which had
recently been established at Mhow. In September, 1971, Hanut was posted as
Commandant, 17 Horse. (The Commanding Officer, or CO, is called the Commandant,
in cavalry regiments). The regiment was located at Sangrur, and was part of 16
Independent Armoured Brigade, which was then commanded by Brigadier A.S.
Vaidya, MVC, who later became Chief of Army Staff.
By then, war clouds had begun gathering, and
within days of his assuming command, Hanut had to move his regiment to battle
locations. 17 Horse was carrying out its annual field firing at Naraingarh ranges on 8 October 1965, when
it received a message asking it to return at once to its permanent location. On
his way back to Sangrur, Hanut reported to HQ 16 Independent Armoured Brigade,
where he was briefed by the Brigade Commander. Vaidya informed him that 17
Horse had been placed under command 323 Infantry Brigade, at Dinanagar, and he
should move the regiment to its concentration area immediately. The regiment began
moving by road and rail on 10 October, and within four days, had concentrated
at Sujanpur, a small village near Madhopur. After reaching its new location,
Hanut was called to HQ 39 Infantry Division, and briefed regarding his task.
Hanut
learned that his regiment had been temporarily placed under command 323
Infantry Brigade, for a defensive task. There were reports of an impending
attack by Pakistan in the general area Gurdaspur-Dinanagr, and 323 Infantry
Brigade was deployed to contain this thrust, with 17 Horse in a supporting
role. Hanut was subsequently briefed by Brigadier G.S. Grewal, Commander 323
Infantry Brigade, who asked him to base himself at Dinanagar, and select
suitable dispersal areas for his regiment. By the time Hanut reached the rest
house at Dinanagar, which he had selected as his regimental HQ, it was almost
10 p.m. While Hanut was inside the rest house, he felt that some men were was
following him, in the dark. He stopped, and asked the men, in loud voice, what
they were upto. It transpired that it was a party, led by an officer, from 36
Infantry Division, who had been reconnoitering the area. Hearing the tanks of
17 Horse coming into the area, they had assumed that it was the spear head of
the Pak offensive. Hanut's aquiline nose, and handle bar moustache had led them
to mistake him for a Pathan. They were apologetic when they found that they had
been stalking the Commandant of the Poona Horse, instead of a Pakistani
officer.
Next
morning, orders were received that the Scinde Horse, which had just arrived,
would relieve the Poona Horse, which was to revert under command of 39 Infantry
Division, and move to Malichak. After spending almost a month there, the
regiment moved to a forward concentration area near Dinai, just short of Samba,
on the Pathankot-Jammu road. By this time, all personnel on leave, courses and
extra regimental employment had rejoined, and the regiment was upto full
strength. The period spent in Malichak had been put to good use, in training,
and reconnaisance.
In
1971, the Indian Army's main task was the liberation of Bangla Desh, then
called East Pakistan. On the Western Front, it was decided that a posture of
offensive defence would be maintained. This was primarily because of the
commitments of troops in the East, and the possibility of intervention by
China. However, it was expected that Pakistan would undertake a major
offensive, either in the Punjab, Jammu
and Kashmir, or Rajasthan. As part of his overall strategy, Lieut General K.P.
Candeth, GOC-in-C, Western Command, had planned certain offensive operations,
with the intention of drawing out Pakistani reserves, so that they were not in
a position to undertake major offensives against India. An advance by 1 Corps
into the Shakargarh bulge was part of these plans.
Lieut
General K.K. Singh, GOC 1 Corps, had been the DMO at Army HQ before assuming
command of 1 Corps in October 1971. He was thus familiar with the overall
strategy and plans, for the operations. He had three infantry divisions (36, 39
and 54), two independent armoured brigades (2 and 16), two independent
artillery brigades and two engineer brigades. He also had a locating battery
and an air observation post squadron. 36 Infantry Division, under Major General
B.S. Ahluwalia, was initially deployed South East of the Ravi river, in the
Thakurpur-Gurdaspur-Dinanagar area; 39 Infantry Division, under Major General
B.R. Prabhu, was North of the Ravi, in the Madhopur-Bamial-Dayalchak area; and
54 Infantry Division, under Major General W.A.G. Pinto, was deployed around
Samba, between the Bein river and the Degh Nadi.
Lieut
General K.K. Singh, known as 'KK', had commanded 1 Armoured Brigade during the
1965 war, and Poona Horse had been under his command at that time. In 1971, he
was given the task of containing the enemy offensive, and then delivering a
riposte against his lines of communication, so as to force him back. In case
the enemy did not launch an offensive, 'KK' was to advance into the Shakargarh
bulge east of the Degh Nadi, and capture Zafarwal, Dhamtal and Narowal.
Subsequently, he was to secure the line Marala-Ravi link canal-Degh Nadi and
later take Pasrur. 'KK' appreciated that the best manner of carrying out the
tasks allotted to him was to go on the offensive. He planned to launch the
offensive in the central sector of the Corps zone, retaining a strong defensive
posture on the flanks. As part of this plan, 54 Infantry Division was to
advance between the Degh Nadi and the Karir Nadi, led by 16 independent
Armoured Brigade less 16 Cavalry. 39 Infantry Division was to advance beteween
the Bien river and the Karir Nadi, led by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, to
guard the western flank. The eastern flank was to be guarded by two brigades
(one each from 26 and 39 Infantry
Divisions), supported by 16 Cavalry. 36
Infantry Division, supported by Scinde Horse, was to hold a defensive position
along the Ravi river.
Based
on the information available at that time, it had been appreciated that the
enemy would have laid three or four tiers of minefields, starting from the
internatioanl border. In 54 Infantry Division sector, the first mine field was
visualised to be at the border; the second along the general line Bhoi
Brahma-Thakardwara-Nagwal; the third along the general line Ghamrola-Barkhanian;
and the fourth in conjunction with the Basantar Nala. The enemy was also
expected to have advance positions based on the Basantar Nala, with covering
troops operating ahead of it, to delay the advance of Indian troops, and deny
crossings over the minefields.
Based
on the enemy's anticipated deployment, it was planned that two infantry
brigades ex 54 Infantry Division, with a squadron each of 17 Horse under
command, would secure a bridge head across the first minefield in area
Dandaut-Gola-Mawa-Mukhwal and establish a firm base for the divisional advance.
The third brigade of 54 Infantry Division and 4 Horse would then advance
between the the Basantar river and Karir Nadi, with a view to secure crossings
across the second minefied at Thakurdwara. Thereafter 4 Horse with one brigade
would make another bridge head across the third minefield at Barkhanian. Once
the third mine field had been breached, a combat group comprising 17 Horse and
18 Rajputana Rifles less two companies would break out and secure an encounter
crossing over the Basantar Nala in general area Pinjori, for a subsequent
advance for the capture of the Zafarwal-Dhamtal complex.
While
the various contigencies were being worked out, Hanut was dismayed to find that
in each one of these plans, his regiment was kept in reserve, and not given an
operational task. When this happened the
third time running, Hanut met the Brigade Commander, and asked him why
his regiment was not being given any task. "From this," said
Hanut, "I can only conclude that you do not have confidence in me, or in
my regiment, or both." Vaidya was
initially non plussed, at being confronted in this manner by one of his COs,
but had to agree that he was right. He went on to explain that he had just
taken over the brigade, and did not know the units well enough. He was going by
what his predecessor, Brigadier K.K. Kaul had told him about the units, and
their COs. Hanut pointed out that because of a personality clash between Lieut
Colonel Shiv Raj Singh, the previous Commandant of 17 Horse, and the Brigade
Commander, the latter's opinion about the regiment was biased, and requested
him not to go by it. Vaidya agreed, and assured Hanut that in future, he would
see that his regiment got its rightful due.
After air strikes against Indian airfields during the evening of 3
December 1971, Pakistan attacked Indian
positions in Chhamb the same night, preceded by heavy artillery bombardment of
border outposts. The next day, Yahya Khan formally declared war. Indian counter
offensive plans were immediately put into motion, in the Eastern as well as the
Western sectors. In the evening, on 4 December, 17 Horse received orders to
deploy for the protection of the firm base of 54 Infantry Division. This entailed
move of the regiment from East to West across the Samba T junction.
Simultaneously, 7 Cavalry was asked to move from West to East across the same
choke point, to its forward assembly area West of Samba. The two columns
reached the choke point at the same time, and got stuck in a traffic jam.
Fortunately, the enemy artillery and air did not take advantage of the
disaster, and the chaos was sorted out only after the two COs personally
intervened. It was primarily the initiative of the junior leaders of both
regiments, who worked overtime to disentangle their respective tanks, which
enabled the regiments to reach their forward assembly areas by first light.
At
the border post of Galar Tanda, there was a 30 foot high observation tower,
which provided the Pakistanis observation into Indian territory, and could be
used to bring down artillery fire over the concentration areas of own troops. B
Squadron was located at Gala, right opposite the tower, and Hanut ordered them
to destroy it. An accurate shot from one of the tanks of B squadron brought
down the tower, and this signalled the start of the battle, in the 54 Infantry
Division sector. A troop of Pakistani tanks, hidden behind the tall grass,
emerged on hearing the shot, and pulled back in panic. Hanut realised that
since the enemy tanks were moving freely along the border, there could not be a
minefield in that area. He conveyed this information to Commander 16 Armoured
Brigade, but Vaidya did not react. The full scale attacks went ahead as
planned.
91
and 74 Infantry Brigades launched their attacks for the capture of
Dandout-Chamana Khurd-Chhahal and Mukhwal at 2000 hours on 5 December. The
infantry did not encounter any enemy, and neither did the trawls find any
mines, when they went through the anticipated minefield. Both brigades secured
their bridgeheads, and two squadrons of 17 Horse were moved to protect their
flanks. Shortly after mid night, 4 Horse was inducted into the bridge head, but
commenced its break out only at first light. By 0800 hours, leading elements of
4 Horse had contacted the minefield astride Thakurdwara. Surprisingly, the
regiment waited till last light, before the leading squadron commenced
breaching the minefield. Once again, no enemy was encountered, and a firm base
was secured across the minefield. A squadron of 17 Horse was moved up, to take
over the firm base, and relieve 4 Horse for further advance.
Unknown
to Indian troops, Pakistani armour was present in the area. B Squadron of Pak
20 Lancers had withdrawn behind the
first defensive minefield at Thakurdwara on the night of 5/6 December, and next
day, when 4 Horse was advancing, this squadron was strafed by the Indian Air
Force, and withdrew to the next minefield, at Barkaniyan, by last light on 6
December. It was joined by a squadron of 33 Cavalry (Pattons), and soon
afterwards, the rest of 20 Lancers had also concentrated behind the second
minefield. On the morning of 7 December, 17 Horse was moved from Bhoi Brahmana
to guard the western flank. To the East, the operations of 39 Infantry
Division, with 7 Cavalry in support, had not made much progress, and were still
to cross the first minefield. The enemy had developed Dehlra and Chakra as a
strong defensive position, and a squadron ex Poona Horse was sent to Dadwan Kalan
to mask Chakra, and secure Bari, while 4
Horse was orderd to clear Darman and
Ghamrola. After completing its task, 4 Horse moved forward to Barkaniyan, and
Poona Horse less two squadrons was moved from Rayian to Gala, with the other
two squadrons at Bhoi Brahmana and Sadwal/Dadwan Kalan.
On
the afternoon of 8 December, information was received of of a likely enemy
counter attack at Mukhwal. 17 Horse less two squadrons, with a company of 18
Rajputana Rifles under command, was ordered to secure Mukhwal. As the column
was moving along a high embankment, it came under air attack. Only the leading
tanks could get off the road, while the rest of the two kilometre long column
conntinued to move in single file along the narrow road. Hanut was in the leading
tank, and had managed to get off the road, into the tall elephant grass.
However, he saw sortie after sortie of enemy aircraft coming in to attack the
column with bombs and rockets. Expecting most of his tanks to have been written
off, he was very perturbed, and when the attack was over, he asked all stations
to report casualties. Everyone was surprised, and relieved, when it was found
that there were no casualties. Having seen their bad shooting, the Poona Horse
treated the Pakistani Air Force with contempt, for the rest of the war.
After
reaching Mukhwal, Hanut deployed the company of 18 Rajputana Rifles on the high
ground ahead of the village, with their armoured personnel carriers (APCs) in
close support. The armour was held in reserve, hidden from view in the village
itself. The plan was that when the enemy launched his attack, the infantry
would mount their APCs and withdraw towards Mukhwal, firing their machine guns.
Once the enemy assumed that he had captured the area and began to reorganise, the
tanks and APCs would mount a combined assault. Shortly after the deployment had
been completed, the enemy started shelling the area, and Hanut thought that he
was registering targets, before the attack was launched. However, the infantry
and armour waited in vain, as the enemy did not attack, causing all round
disappointment.
While
the operations of 54 Infantry Division had progressed well, 39 Infantry
Division had not been able to capture Dehlra. Major General W.A.G. Pinto, GOC
54 Infantry Division, realised that unless the
Dehlra- Chakra complex was cleared, he would not be able to progress his
own operations. He therefore decided to clear it using his own troops, and gave
the task to Brigadier Ujagar Singh, Commander 74 Infantry Brigade, who was given
a squadron ex 4 Horse for this purpose. This was completed by first light on 11
December. Pinto now ordered Brigadier A. Handoo, Commander 91 Infantry Brigade,
to establish a bridge head across the Barkhaniyan minefield. 17 Horse was
placed under command 91 Infantry Brigade for for this operation, with the
further tasks of breaking out from the bridge head, contacting the enemy
positions along the Basantar nullah, and if opportunity offered, to establish
an encounter crossing across the Basantar. The regiment moved forward from
Mukhwal and concentrated at Tarakwal by 1400 hours on 12 December. 18 Rajputana
Rifles less two companies, mounted in APCs, was placed under command 17 Horse
for the encounter crossing, in addition to an Engineeer task force, with trawl
tanks and bridge layer tanks.
Hanut
planed to carry out the encounter crossing during the hours of darkness, as
soon as the bridge head acroos the minefied had been established by 91 Infantry
Brigade. However, Commander 91 Infantry Brigade did not permit this, since he
was worried about his own security. Hanut knew that the Basantar would be
heavily defended, and a daylight encounter crossing would not succeed. Finally,
it was agreed that a squadron of 4 Horse would take over the defence of the bridge
head, allowing 17 Horse to break out the same night. The operation began on the
night of 13 December, and 91 Infantry Brigade secured a bridge head across the
minefield. The Engineers began trawling, and by 2330 hours, a safe lane for
tanks had been cleared. At 0230 hours, the combat group commenced the break
out.
After
going some distance, some tank tracks were found. It was conjectured that these
belonged to enemy tanks which had withdrawn from the Barkhaniyan minefied, and
would lead to a suitable crossing place over the Basantar. The regiment had
made an elaborate navigation plan, with night charts, showing the route from
point to point, and compass bearings. It was felt that following the tracks
would result in faster movement, and save time. So the navigation plan was
abandoned, and the combat group began to follow the tank tracks. This proved to
be a mistake, since the enemy tanks, instead of crossing the Basantar, had
veered off East, and crossed a tributary of the Basantar, instead of the main
nullah. The 'nullah' was contacted in the early hours of 14 December. The
crossing was found to be unmined and undefended, and only then did it dawn on
the two COs that they had hit a tributary, rather than the main Basantar
nullah. The combat group quickly swung round, to get back on the original axis,
but it was soon daylight, and the area was found to be boggy.
The tanks were dispersed, and it was decided to make an attempt later. As it
turned out, the Basantar was heavily defended, and too formidable to have been
breached by an encounter crossing, so the failure to reach the correct place
was really a blessing in disguise. Though the regiment suffered a number of
casualties due to air attacks during the day, these were not as large as what
would have been inflicted if the encounter crossing had been attempted.
During the next two days the enemy resistance on the home side of the
obstacle was systematically cleared, and
on 15 December, a deliberate operation was launched, across the Basantar
nullah. 47 Infantry Brigade, under
Brigadier A.P. Bhardwaj, was made responsible for securing a bridge head. The
brigade had three battalions: 13 Grenadiers, 6 Madras and 16 Madras, in
addition to 17 Horse nad 18 Rajputana Rifles less two companies. The plan
involved the capture of area 2r in the Ghazipur reserved forest, including
Saraj Chak by 16 Madras in Phase 1, followed by the capture of Jarpal and Lohal
by 13 Grenadiers in Phase 2. 17 Horse and 18 Rajputana Rifles less two
companies was to ensure protection of the bridge head against enemy counter
attack. On the subsequent day, 13 Grenadiers, supported by a squadron of 17
Horse, was to capture Barapind, while 16 Madras, supported by another squadron
of the regiment, was to capture Ghazipur.
The infantry attack went in as planned, and
the bridge head was secured by 16 Madras at 2030 hous. Breaching of the
minefield commenced, and the armour was waiting, for safe lanes to be cleared. The second phase of
the brigade attack also went in, and at 2330 hours 13 Grenadiers reported that
it had secured Jarpal. Meanwhile, there
were frantic calls from Lieut Colonel V. Ghai, CO 16 Madras, reporting that he
was being threatened by enemy armour, building up for the counter attack. At about 0230 hours, there was another
desperate appeal from Ghai, indicating that the situation was critical, and if
he did not get any armour, he would not be able hold out. Hanut realised that
waiting for the safe lanes could mean destruction of the infantry, and loss of
the bridge head. Crossing the mine field, still unbreached,
could result in a large number of his tanks being written off.
Hanut decided to take the risk, and send at least one squadron across,
to relieve the beleaguered infantry. He
gave the task to 'C' squadron, which was led by the second-in-command, Major
Ajai Singh, who had taken over after Major Moti Dar, the squadron commander,
had been wounded, his tank having received a direct hit. Captain Ravi Deol was
transferred to 'C' squadron from 'B ' squadron, since he was familiar with the
area, having seen it during daylight. The squadron began to negotiate the
minefield, with Deol as the navigating officer, and Ajai in the following tank.
Miraculously, the squadron crossed the minefield, without a single casualty,
and successfully secured the bridgehead. The next day, a jeep and an armoured
personnel carrier (APC), which tried to follow the tank tracks, blew up on the
enemy mines. Hanut attributes the luck of the squadron, in crossing 600 metres of
unbreached minefield, without a single casualty, to the 'Hand of Allah'. (The
Standard of the Poona Horse is surmounted by a silver hand, which was captured
by the regiment from the 1st Khusgai Regiment of Fars, during the Persian War,
in 1857. The hand bears the inscription, dated AD 1066, 'Yad Ullal Fauk
Idehim', which means 'The Hand of God is above all things').
There was a fierce tank battle, on 16 December, followed by another one
on 17th, when the full weight of Pakistan's 8 Armoured Brigade was brought to
bear on the Poona Horse. Inspired by
Hanut's leadership, the regiment fought like lions, and in a single days
battle, destroyed 50 enemy tanks, losing 13 of its own. In the Battle of
Basantar, one of Pakistan's oldest and proudest cavalry regiments, 13 Lancers,
was decimated, while another, 31 Cavalry, was crippled. It was during this
action that Second Lieut Arun Khetarpal, a young officer with barely six months
service, sacrificed his life, and was awarded a PVC. The incident is now a
legend, and merits recounting.
During the battle, Major Amarjit Bal, OC B Squadron, who had only two of
his troops with him, requested for reinforcements. Hanut called Major Man
Singh, OC A Squadron, on the radio, but he had gone to the Regimental Aid Post
(RAP) with a casualty. The Squadron second-in-command, Captain V. Malhotra, was
ordered to reinforce B Squadron, with two troops. Malhotra immediately took
off, with Number 3 Troop, under Avtar Ahlawat, and Number 4 Troop under Arun
Khetarpal. With their guns blazing, the six tanks rushed towards the enemy, and
shot up several enemy tanks, taking some prisoners, which were carried piggy
back, till they were handed over to the infantry. These tanks of A Squadron in
fact raced ahead of the positions occupied by B Squadron, and had to be pulled
back in line, by Hanut, on the radio. They had barely got into fire positions
when the main attack by the enemy was delivered, and they were smack in the
middle of it. Whereas three tanks managed to find some cover, the three being
commanded by Malhotra, Ahlawat and Khetarpal were out in the open.
Very
soon, Malhotra's tank became inoperative due to a mechanical defect, and that
of Ahlawat was shot up. Now only Arun Khetarpal was left in the fray. Hanut had
just passed a net call on the radio, ordering "all tanks will fight it out
from where they are; no tank will move back even an inch". Arun's tank had
received a hit, but it had ricocheted. Now he received a second hit, and the
tank caught fire. Malhotra ordered him to abandon his tank, but Arun, realising
that he was the only one left, who could stop the enemy, refused, saying "
my gun is still functioning. I will get the remaining lot." When Malhotra
insisted that he abandon his tank or pull back, Arun switched off his radio
set. The driver, Prayag Singh, remonstrated with Arun, saying that it would
take them only a few minutes to pull back, put out the fire, and rejoin the
battle. Arun replied "Didn't you hear the CO's transmission. No tank will
pull back even an inch."
By this time most of the enemy squadron, commanded by Major Nissar, had
been destroyed, but four or five tanks were still left. Arun systematically
began knocking them out, and the last tank he hit was that of Major Nissar himself,
at a range of barely 75 metres. At this stage, his own tank suffered a fourth
hit, killing the radio operator, and severely wounding Arun and the gunner. The
driver, Prayag Singh, showing great presence of mind, reversed his tank behind
cover, and evacuated the gunner to another tank. Though he was himself wounded,
he tried to pull Arun out of the tank, with the help of the crew of another
tank. In the process, the gallant officer breathed his last.
Arun Khetarpal's act of supreme sacrifice was more than an act of
personal courage, and valour. It was a manifestation of 'The PH Horse Spirit',
which Hanut had inculcated amongst his officers. Twenty years later, when Hanut
wrote the book "Fakhr-e-Hind", he dedicated it to "The PH
Spirit", which, according to him, is 'an intangible compendium of many
qualities that defies description, but infuses every Poona Horseman and guides
and sustains him both in peace and in war.' In simpler terms, it is a rare
combination of comradeship, loyalty and total dedication to the profession of
arms. Arun's refusal to abandon his tank, at grave personal risk, on the
grounds that the CO had forbidden such a course of action, is a manifestation
of the fierce sense of loyalty which Hanut commanded from his subordinates. It
is such a feeling of mutual trust, and loyalty, which wins battles, and the
ability to inspire it is the true hall mark of a leader, which Hanut undeniably
was.
Another oft repeated tale about the Battle of Basantar concerns Hanut's
habit of daily meditation. It is said that during the thick of the battle,
Hanut did not answer on the radio, when the Brigade Commander, Brigadier A.S.
Vaidya called him. When Vaidya questioned him about it later, Hanut is said to
have replied that he was doing his 'puja'. The story is only partly true. Hanut
did switch off his radio set to HQ 16 Independent Armoured Brigade, but this
was because his unit was placed under command of 47 Infantry Brigade, for the
bridge head operations. Also, he did not want any distraction or interference,
during the tank battle, where the rapidly changing situation required his
undivided attention. According to Hanut, he was never called by Vaidya, during
the battle, who only came to know about the action from the After Action
Report, much later.
Even
before the operations commenced, Hanut had anticipated that his regiment would
be involved in a major battle with Pakistani armour, as soon as they crossed
the Basantar river. Accordingly, he had rehearsed his unit, on the map and a
sand model. One aspect which he repeatedly stressed was that once they had
beaten back the inevitable counter attack, the enemy would be in complete
disarray. This was the decisive moment which they must exploit, by sallying
forth and finishing off the remnants of enemy armour. As he had foreseen, this
opportunity presented itself at 1100 hours on 16 December, when the counter
attack by Pak 8 Armoured Brigade was decisively repulsed. Some of the more
enthusiastic officers of Poona Horse asked Hanut on the radio when he was going
to launch them into action, as planned. But the enemy response had been far
stronger than Hanut had anticipated, and he did not want to risk leaving the
bridge head undefended. The Brigade and Divisional Commanders were listening in
on the radio, but did not react. Hanut asked his Adjutant to pass a message
from him to the Brigade Commander, on the Brigade net, requesting him to
"build up sister unit fastest". Since the enemy was monitoring the
net, the message could not be made more explicit. But Vaidya failed to grasp
the significance of the message, and did nothing. The second armoured regiment
- 4 Horse - was moved to the bridge head only after last light on 16 December,
on the instructions of the Corps Commander. Thus, a magnificent opportunity was
lost, and the cease fire saw them still confined to the bridge head.
On
16 December, there were six major units in the bridge head, three from 47
Infantry Brigade, and three from 16 Armoured Brigade. However, none of the brigade
commanders was in the bridge head, to issue orders. Hanut was the senior CO,
and on his own initiative, issued orders for readjustment and redeployment, in
consultation with the others. In fact,
as Hanut recounts, the first time he saw any senior officer during the Battle
of Basantar was just a few hours before the cease fire on 17 December, when the
Corps Commander, Lieut General K.K. Singh, came to visit and congratulate the
regiment, accompanied by the Divisional Commander, Major General W.A.G. Pinto,
and Brigadier A.P. Bhardwaj, Commander 47 Infantry Brigade.
In
the various post mortems carried out after the War, and in the After Action
Reports, commanders at all levels glossed over their lapses, and weaknesses. In
the euphoria of victory, everyone indulged in mutual praise and
congratulations. In discussions and debriefings, Hanut brought up these
weaknesses, and also mentioned them in his After Action Report. This caused a
lot of resentment among some senior officers, who felt that he was being
unnecessarily critical. Hanut had very definite ideas about command in battle,
and the responsibility that goes with it. In armour battles, command has to be
exercised from 'up front', and he always made sure that his own tank was
positioned at the point of contact. This enabled him to see and assess the
action as it developed, and issue orders according to the exigencies of the
situation. He did not like to look back over his shoulder, and strongly
rebuffed attempts at back seat driving by his superiors. He found it distracting to have to answer meaningless
queries from staff officers at higher HQ, and frequently switched off his
rearward radio, leaving the second-in-command or Adjutant to deal with them.
This allowed him to concentrate on his command, and conduct the battle without
interference.
After
two years as Commandant of the Poona Horse, Hanut was posted as GSO 1, HQ 31
Armoured Division, in September 1973. After two years in this important
assignment, he was promoted Brigadier, and appointed Commander 14 (Independent)
Armoured Brigade, which he commanded with distinction. Shortly after he assumed
command, a discussion was held at the Corps HQ, to evaluate the concept of
crossing of a water obstacle by an armoured division, and the subsequent break
out. This concept had been worked out by the Armoured Division, and after
endorsement by the Command and Corps HQ, had been forwarded to Army HQ, for
approval. The Military Training Directorate had made out a draft Training Note,
which was sent to the Corps HQ for their comments, and approval, before issue. At this time, Lieut General Z.C. 'Zoru' Bakshi was the Corps
Commander, and Lieut General I.S. Gill was the Army Commander. Bakshi wanted
the concept to be discussed and evaluated, before taking a decision in the
matter. It was a high level discussion, in which almost all senior formation
commanders of Western Command participated, or attended as observers. The Army
Commander was also present.
When Hanut read through the paper, he found that the concept was totally
impractical. He felt that it had been conceived by some chair borne tactician,
and he was surprised that it had been accepted all the way upto Army HQ,
without anyone questioning many of its basic assumptions. When he tried to
raise the issue within his syndicate, he was over ruled by his syndicate
leader, on the grounds that it had already been approved. When the discussion
got under way, almost every one lauded the concept as brilliant. During the tea
break, Hanut spoke to the Chief of Staff HQ 2 Corps, who was conducting the
discussion, and told him that he wished to express a personal opinion on the
issue, as his syndicate was not in agreement with his views. When the
discussion was resumed, the Chief of Staff invited Hanut to give his comments.
He began by saying that " Though I find myself in the position of being
one man against the house, yet I have some very major and serious reservations
about the proposed concept." He went on to outline his objections, and
finished by saying that the concept
cannot be executed even in a full scale 'Exercise with Troops', let
alone in war.
There was a stunned silence, and everyone started looking at the Army
Commander, Lieut General Gill, who intervened, to say: "Hanut, you are not
one man against the house. I too do not agree with this concept." He then asked him whether he had an alternate
concept to suggest. Hanut gave out what he thought to be a workable solution.
During the Summing Up that followed, both the Army and the Corps Commanders
agreed with his views, and the proposed concept was scrapped.
A few months later, an Exercise With Troops was held, in which his
brigade was tasked to execute a breakout. At the planning stage itself, Hanut
pointed out to the commander of the infantry division which was establishing
the bridge head that the site selected was incorrect, because due to the
presence of lakes on two sides, the armour would have to break out through a
defile, which could be easily blocked by the enemy. Hanut was over ruled, and
was assured that his tanks would be given a safe passage. When the exercise
began, the situation developed exactly as Hanut had feared. Hanut immediately
called off the break out, and ordered his tanks to deploy. Next morning, the
Army and Corps Commanders visited the site, and met Hanut. When asked why he
had not carried out the manouevre, he replied: "I am not prepared to order
my leading regiment to undertake a mission, which I know to be suicidal."
They left without a word. Subsequently, Hanut was given a clear passage through
the defile, and the armoured brigade broke out as planned.
In
January 1978, Hanut was nominated to attend the course at the National Defence
College. After the course, he was posted to the MO Directorate, where he
remained for an unprecedented three and a half years. In May 1982, he was
promoted Major General, and given command of 17 Mountain Division, in Sikkim.
Hanut's first brush was with Talyarkhan, the Governor of the State, a man with
an enormous ego. He never tired of telling anyone he met how close he was to
the Nehru family, particularly Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who had specially selected
him to oversee the transition of Sikkim from an independent kingdom to a State
of the Indian Union. Hanut found that Talyarkhan behaved more like a colonial
ruler, than a constitutional head of government. He demanded various perks and
privileges, which went beyond the laid down protocol. One of these was that he
expected to be received by the divisional commander, or at least one of the
brigade commanders, whenever he visited any part of the State. His predecessor,
Major General 'Tich' Sharma, had extended these courtesies to the Governor, but
Hanut decided to put a stop it. Shortly after he took over, the Governor
decided to visit North Sikkim, and the brigade commander requested Hanut's
permission to receive him, as was customary. Hanut told him that there was no
need for this, since the Governor's visit was at the behest of the civil
administration, and the Army had nothing to do with it. However, if he visited
any place where an Army unit was located, the local unit commander could be
present, at the time of his arrival and departure.
When
Talyarkhan landed at the helipad he was very incensed, because, as he put it,
'only a Lieut Colonel' was present to receive him. On his return to Gangtok, he
immediately rang up Hanut, who was not available because he was at his prayers.
This further enraged the Governor, who threatened to complain about this to the
Chief of Army Staff. He tried to speak to the Chief over the Post and Telegraph
circuit, but could not do so because the lines were down. When Hanut heard
about this, he directed that the Governor's call to the Chief be given on Army
channels, which was done. Naturally, nothing came out of it. When Hanut was
asked about the incident, he pointed out that there was no protocol requirement
for an Army representative to receive the Governor, unless he was visiting Army
units. In fact, he made it clear that this time, one of the battalion
commanders had been asked to receive him because it had become an established
practice, and he did not want to make abrupt changes. In future, no Army
officer would be present. When Talyarkhan found that Hanut could not be brow
beaten, his attitude changed, and their relations became cordial, though
formal, thereafter.
Hanut's relations with Lieut General Surjit Singh Brar, the Corps
Commander, were not so cordial. They had differences of opinion on almost every
thing, which included operational and administrative aspects. Hanut found the
operational plans to be passive, and wanted to introduce a more aggressive form
of defence. This concept called for substantial reserves at every level, and
the only way they could be created was by restructuring the deployment. As was
his practice, Hanut ran a sand model exercise, which he conducted personally,
in order to apprise the officers of the division with the concept. The Corps
Commander, who attended the discussion, did not agree with the concept, and was
openly critical. In order to avoid an unseemly argument, in front of junior
officers, Hanut terminated the discussion, saying that: " So long as I am
the GOC, this is how I will fight the defensive battle." And that was that.
During his visits to the forward defences, Hanut found that the officers
and men were living under appalling conditions. The men were in sheds, without
any insulation, and had to huddle around 'bukharies' (stoves, used for
heating), as the shed never really got heated. Once the 'bukhari' was put out,
it became unbearably cold inside. The tin roofs of the sheds had holes, letting
in rain and melted snow, causing permanent slush inside. There were no toilets
and bathrooms - just a hessian cloth enclosure, flapping in the wind. There was
no lighting, so the day ended as soon as the sun went down. Hanut thought it
was shameful to make troops suffer in this manner, even after spending twenty
years in the same locations. He berated the officers for timidly accepting this
state of affairs, and told them that unless they insisted on certain minimum
standards facilities for troops, no one else would do anything about it.
At
the next Operational Works Conference,
Hanut raised the issue about living conditions of troops. He pointed out
that they already had surplus defence works in almost all defended localities,
and suggested that for the next few years, the funds for operational works be
used for providing decent living accommodation for troops. To his surprise, the
Corps Commander replied that he had also been around the forward defences, and
found the state of accommodation was quite satisfactory. Obviously, either the
standards used by the Corps Commander were low, or he was deliberately trying to
snub Hanut.
When
Hanut realised that he would get no help from Corps HQ, in the form of funds,
he requested for some engineer effort. However, even this was refused. Hanut
then decided to procure the necessary material using funds and engineer resources
of the division. Wood was available locally at cheap rates, and this was used
for insulating the living accommodation. When the Corps HQ objected to this, on
the ground that it would increase the risk of fires, Hanut said that he would
take the responsibility, and the work continued. Bathrooms were made using
hollow cement blocks, and each post was provided with a generator, for
lighting, as well as a radio, so that their day did not end at sunset.
Naturally, the troops were delighted, and when Hanut left, after a year, the
'Water Shed Brigade' recorded their appreciation and thanks, by inscribing the
memento they presented to him with the words: "You have done more for
improving our operational preparedness, administrative facilities and our living
conditions in one year, than others have done in twenty." Hanut cherished the gift, as it came from the
heart.
During Hanut's tenure in Sikkim, there was no lavish entertainment of
VIPs, for which the division had acquired a dubious reputation. During summer,
there was always a large stream of visitors, who expected to be looked after,
along with their families and relatives. Once they found that they were
expected to pay for the hospitality, the numbers began dwindling. Soon, the
stream of visitors dried up, as word went around that social life in Gangtok
had become dull, after the new GOC had taken over. Hanut took it as a
compliment, since it was a welcome relief to his harassed staff, who had to
make all the arrangements, including the accommodation, transport and sight
seeing. Not surprisingly, this led to further deterioration in the relations
between Hanut and the Corps Commander. After a year, General K.V. Krishna Rao,
the COAS, selected him to command the prestigious Armoured Division, to which
every Cavalry officer aspires. Hanut was happy to leave, not only for personal
reasons, but also for professional ones.
He would now have a chance to put into practice his ideas on armoured warfare.
Soon after he took over as GOC 1 Armoured Division in May 1983, Hanut
found that there were several shortcomings in training, and the state of
equipment was poor. He stopped all other
work for the next few months, and had the entire division carrying out
equipment maintenance. Then one day he
announced that they were all going to the desert, for training. Before sending
them out, he taught them the operational concepts and tactics that he wanted
them to practice, so that they knew exactly what was required of them. First,
all regiments were sent out, under their COs.
Brigade commanders were forbidden to visit them, till after a
month. He would visit them after exactly
six weeks, and watch them for a week. If
satisfied, he would order them to return.
If not, they would continue to train in the desert.
When Hanut arrived in the training area, he brought along his own
caravan, and a small mess detachment. He
would park it near the unit or formation he was visiting, and ask for a
telephone line. In all other respects,
he would be independent. He never taxed
the units for mess facilities, accommodation, manpower and so on, leaving them
free to concentrate on training. He
ensured that this procedure was followed by his brigade commanders also. Of course, there were no parties, and he
would flare up if he saw sofa sets, carpets and curtains being carried to the
exercise area, as was the custom in the Armoured Division.
While he was commanding the Armoured Division, an operational discussion
was held, at the Corps HQ. General K. Sundarji, who was then GOC-in-C Western
Command, was also attending, along with most of the senior commanders. Exercise
'Chetak', a large scale exercise with troops, had just given over. A large
number of concepts had emerged, regarding the employment of the Armoured
Division, with which Hanut was not in agreement. Though the main theme of the
discussion was slightly different, Hanut decided to take advantage of the
gathering to raise the issues which had been bothering him.
When Hanut expressed his strong reservations about the concept, Sundarji
threw the discussion open to the house, and asked all other divisional
commanders for their views. Though most of them had agreed with Hanut in
private discussions, no one dared to speak out openly against the issues
raised, since most of them had been advocated by Sundarji, or had his
endorsement. This led to a verbal duel between the Armoured Divisional
Commander and the Army Commander. Finally, Hanut ended his argument, making it
clear that as long as he was in command of the Armoured Division, he would
fight the battle the way he was advocating.
Having said this, Hanut sat down.
There was a stunned silence.
Sundarji was the Army Commander, and his promotion and appointment as the
Army Chief was almost a certainty.
Crossing swords with him was tantamount to sacrificing one's career, and
Hanut seemed to have done just that. Soon afterwards, some one remarked:
"After this, Hanut may as well plan his retirement, and start growing roses."
But as usual, the prophets of doom were proved wrong. Sundarji was one
of the few senior officers in the Army, who not only tolerated a professional
difference of opinion, but even appreciated it, provided it was backed by sound
reasons. In December 1984, Hanut was posted to the MO Directorate, at Army HQ.
This was his third tenure in MO, and it was expected that he would soon be
promoted Lieut General, and given command of a Corps. At this time, General
A.S. Vaidya was the COAS. Though he was also from the Armoured Corps, and Hanut
had served under him earlier, the two did not see eye to eye on many matters.
Fortunately, Sundarji had by now taken over as Vice Chief of Army Staff, and he
acted as a buffer. After a year in MO, Hanut was promoted Lieut General, and
side stepped as Director General of Armoured Corps, in December 1985. His
promotion was not without impediment.
Though he had been approved by the selection board, Vaidya was not favourably
inclined, and tried to block his promotion. However, Arun Singh, the Minister
of State for Defence, over ruled him, reportedly at the behest of Sundarji, who
was slated to succeed Vaidya. When
Sundarji took over as Chief on 1 February 1986, he called Hanut and told him
that he wanted him to command the Strike Corps, for Exercise 'Brass Tacks',
which was to be the largest and most ambitious series of exercises, undertaken
by the Indian Army till then. Sundarji wanted to try out certain new concepts,
including the Air Assault Division and the Reorganised Assault Plains Infantry
Division (RAPID), which were his brain children.
On 29 April 1986, Hanut took over as GOC 2 Corps. Naturally, he was delighted at the chance to command the
prestigious Strike Corps. Here was an
opportunity to put into practice the concepts of mobile warfare that he had
studied and evolved, but which had remained only theoretical, for want of an
opportunity to practice them. Hanut set about his task in right earnest, to
educate and inculcate the troops, and more so the formation commanders, who
would have to implement them. He held a series of talks, followed by map and
sand model exercises, followed by training exercises without troops (TEsWT),
and finally full scale exercises with troops. By the time Exercise 'Brass Tacks-4',
the full scale exercise with troops
began, his Corps was keyed to a pitch of training which is seldom
achieved.
It
is now well known that during Exercise 'Brass Tacks', India and Pakistan almost
went to war. Due to various reasons, the crisis was averted, and the troops
withdrawn from the border. By Hanut's own reckoning, if he had been given the
task, his Corps would have executed the offensive operations which would be
rated among the classics of mobile warfare. His officers and men were itching
for a fight, and a chance to put into practice all that they had been learning
and practising for the last few months. When the whole thing fizzled out, most
of them were bitterly disappointed. If Hanut had been given the 'go ahead',
there is little doubt that he would have changed the map, given his past record
of bold and brilliant handling of armour.
Hanut
feels that second only to the rare privilege of commanding his regiment in
battle, the command of 2 Corps provided him the greatest professional
satisfaction. He had the unique opportunity of being able to personally train
and handle the Corps in a full scale exercise with troops, with the opposing
defending forces also being full scale. This was the first time that a full
scale exercise with troops of such a magnitude was held, and this was also
likely to be the last time. For not only is the cost of holding such exercises
prohibitive, it is rare to find another
Chief like Sundarji, who would have the vision and perception to
conceive such an exercise.
Hanut remained in command of 2 Corps for over
two years. The fact that he had been selected for this appointment by Sundarji,
with whom he had crossed swords a few years earlier, had surprised many of his
contemporaries. In fact, Hanut's career is a case study, to disprove the
theories often put forward, of the Indian Army being a `one mistake' Army, with
the 'zero error syndrome'. Hanut fell
out with his immediate superior officer, in almost every rank and
appointment. Yet, he was never denied a
promotion. In spite of personal
differences, not one of his superiors could fault his professional competence,
dedication, and loyalty to the organisation. It was sheer brilliance which
brought him to the rank of Lieut General.
While in service, Hanut's life style was
spartan. He shunned parties, and if
forced to attend one, left after a short while. He was deeply religious, and
never missed his daily meditation. Because of his reserved temperament, he gave
the appearance of being distant and
aloof, and was a strict disciplinarian.
Yet, his concern for the welfare of men was legendary. He had forbidden the prevalent custom of
employing working parties of men, to carry out area cleaning, or gardening, on
Sundays and holidays, and in the evenings.
His attitude towards the men, and their problems, was always
sympathetic, and he spared no effort to better their living conditions. He
expected high standards, but forgave errors of judgement. Whenever he saw a
mistake being committed, he corrected it, without losing his temper. In fact,
he would personally teach not only officers, but even JCOs and 'jawans'. The
only time he was angry was when he found someone sleeping during a professional
lecture or discussion.
Hanut
had many facets to his personality, some of which were seen only by his closest
associates. He was a very humane and level headed person, who went out of his
way to help people in distress. With ladies, he was extremely charming, but his
behaviour was always respectful and correct. Contrary to popular belief, he had
many admirers among the fairer sex. His sense of humour, both in conversation
and in writing, was unmatched. He could bring laughter, in company, from the
most innocent incident.
However, in many respects, his behaviour and
style were not in consonance with the generally accepted norms of the Indian
Army. He found the widely prevalent practice prefacing every sentence with
'Sir', when talking to a superior, disconcerting. He gave up the habit, and
also encouraged his subordinates to do so. He was upright, truthful,
knowledgeable and had a mind of his own.
He never hesitated to express his views, even when he knew they would not be accepted. However, he never
became argumentative, or forced down his ideas on his subordinates. This
approach to personality development was later used by his detractors, to let
him down, by branding him as anti establishment.
A
lot is spoken about Hanut's religious
beliefs. Religion and the military profession appear to be a contradiction in
terms, but Hanut did not see it that
way. Religion had always formed an integral part of Rajput culture and ethos.
Hanut believed that religion gave the inner strength to a soldier, to rise
above the mundane and achieve self actualisation, when the mission became
supreme, rather than the individual. In fact, Hanut found religion a great
motivating factor. He did not practice religion in the traditional manner of
rituals and fasts but as an intellectual, who explored and found a new
dimension to it. His wide reading enabled him to grasp the true meaning of
religion, and he abided by the tenet
of the Bhagwad Gita, which equates Dharma, or religion, with Karma, or
righteous living. Hanut realised that for a soldier, the two are synonymous,
and this became the basic philosophy of his life.
Hanut's attitude towards his profession was a subject of intense debate.
His dedication to the profession of arms was so complete that he never married,
as he felt it would compromise it. He made it a subject of deep study,
research, and experiment, in order to become perfect. In the process he
developed professional acumen of unmatched brilliance, on all military matters.
When he spoke, it was with authority, born out of years of experience, and
study. His inner strength and conviction were transparent, and had a hypnotic
effect on his subordinates, who were ever ready to follow him, regardless of
the consequences. He had an intense desire to teach whatever he knew to anybody
who cared to learn. In the process, he got so involved that he would not spare
himself or the student, till he was satisfied that the learning process was
complete.
Many of Hanut's contemporaries felt that he was eccentric, and on a
perpetual collision course with his superiors. Hanut knew this, but felt that
since he always acted in the interest of the Service, and the men under his
command, he was justified. Some of his superiors understood this, and tolerated
his idiosyncracies, and a few even appreciated it. However, the larger majority
could not stomach it, and reacted adversely. Hanut was rarely perturbed by this
reaction, since he knew the reason from which it stemmed, and did not hold it
against the concerned officers.
Hanut's last assignment was the Commandant of the Armoured Corps Centre
and School, at Ahmednagar, where he moved in July 1988. It was expected that he
would be made an Army Commander, but this was not to be. By now, General
Sundarji had retired, and General V.N. Sharma, who was also from the Armoured
Corps, had taken over as COAS. Having a
faultless service record, there was no reason for Hanut not being considered
suitable for command of a field army.
Yet he was not. The reasons given
out were two. One, he was a bachelor, and shunned social
life. While this was valid, the second,
concerning his religious beliefs, was
not. He was branded a 'religious bigot', a charge which
was blatantly untrue, and unfair. Though
he was a deeply religious man, Hanut could by no stretch of imagination be
called a bigot. He was extremely broad minded and never
interfered with those practising other religions. The fact that troops, of all religious
denominations, literally worshipped him,
should have been enough to give the lie to this insinuation, made by one of his
own ilk.
When Hanut was informed of his having been passed over by a subordinate,
who expressed his sorrow, his reply was typical. "Why should you be
sorry. It is the Army which should be
sorry. If they don't want me, the loss is theirs". Not many officers, in uniform, would take
their supersession so philosophically.
Hanut knew it was not a reflection on his professional competence, and
felt no need to represent against it. He
continued to do his job, with the same dedication and loyalty, till his retirement, on 31 July 1991.
In
the final analysis, Hanut would like to be remembered as a 'Soldier's General'.
He always felt, and told other officers: "We as officers do not deserve
the men we command. We do so little for them, and they give us so much more in
return." Wherever he went, he tried to ameliorate and improve the working
and living conditions of the common soldier. Often, a JCO, NCO or Jawan would
walk upto him, and introduce himself, saying: "You will not remember me,
but I was serving in so and so unit under your command. I heard that you were
around, and came to pay my respects." (The word they usually used was 'darshan', which really has no equivalent in
the English language). In fact, one of Hanut's most treasured memories is of
the soldier, who walked upto his driver, and asked him: " Yeh wohi
general sahib hain jo ki jawanon ka itna khayal rakha karte the? Maine darshan
to nahin kiye hain, par nam bada suna hai." ( Is this the same General, who was known for
his concern for the welfare of troops. I have never had the chance to see him,
but have heard a lot about him).
Today, Hanut lives in Dehradun.
Having lived like a hermit even while in uniform, he has been able to
make the transition to retired life smoothly, unlike several others who found
the change traumatic, due to the perks of office suddenly vanishing. He spends most of his time in meditation, and
reading. Having followed a rigid and
spartan regime all his life, he is still in good health, and has several years
of active life before him. Though
comparatively unknown outside Army circles, Hanut will be remembered as one of
the finest armour commanders of the Indian Army. His simplicity, courage, boldness, high sense
of moral values, and professionalism will always be a source of inspiration to
generations of officers of the Indian Army.
