THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY – A BRIEF HISTORY
Birth
of the INA
The
INA was formally created in December 1941 by Captain Mohan Singh of 1/14 Punjab
Regiment and Major Fujiwara Iwaichi of the Japanese Army. Mohan Singh claims
that after his capture by the Japanese in Malaya on 11 December 1941 he was
inspired by a sudden burst of patriotic feeling that had lain dormant until
that time. According to him, he was
encouraged by Japanese propaganda that exhorted all Asian races to ‘kick out
the white devils from the East’, and thought that if he approached the Japanese
to help him in starting a movement for India’s independence, he would be able
to attract a large number of soldiers. At that time, Mohan Singh felt that his
force ‘would provide India with a new weapon, an organized and patriotic
army to back up the non-violent struggle being carried from within by the
Indian National Congress’.1
1. Maj. Gen. Mohan Singh, Soldiers’
Contribution to Indian Independence, Army Educational Stores, New Delhi,
1974, p.67
In fact, the creation of
the INA was part of a well-planned strategy evolved by Japan even before the
commencement of the war in the Pacific. Indian nationalist movements had taken root
in Thailand, Malaya, Burma and Sumatra, under the leadership of Baba Amar Singh
and Sardar Pritam Singh. In Japan, Rash Behari Bose, Raja Mahendra Pratap and
AM Sahay formed the nucleus of the Indian nationalist movement. Even before
Japan entered the war, the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo sent Major
Fujiwara Iwaichi to Bangkok to enlist the support of the Indian nationalist
elements in South East Asia and induce the defection of Indian soldiers of the
British Army, should war break out. An agreement was signed between Amar Singh
and Colonel Tamura of the Japanese Army, according to which the Indian
Independence League (IIL) agreed to collaborate with the Japanese by inciting
and undermining the loyalty of the soldiers of the Indian Army. Leaflets in
English, Gurmukhi and Hindustani were kept ready to be thrown among them
exhorting them to disobey the orders of their English commanders if asked to
fight against the Japanese.2
2. T.R. Sareen, Japan and the Indian
National Army, pp. 51-52
On 8 December 1941 the Japanese
invaded Malaya. Captain Mohan Singh’s battalion, 1/14 Punjab, was part of 15
Indian Infantry Brigade, then deployed near Jitra. After a preparatory
bombardment with mortars, Japanese tanks attacked the position on 11 December 1941.
The battalion literally disintegrated, with most of the personnel being
captured immediately or during the course of the next few days, while trying to
escape southwards towards Singapore. Mohan Singh was part of a group that
included his CO, Lieutenant Colonel LV Fitzpatrick, who was wounded.3
3. Joyce C. Lebra, Jungle Alliance – Japan
and the Indian National Army, pp.16-18. (Lebra erroneously writes that
Mohan Singh was the second-in-command of the battalion. In fact, there were
several officers senior to him, including Major VDW Anderson, the 2ic).
On 15 December 1941
Mohan Singh’s group met Major Fujiwara and Giani Pritam Singh, who had been
following the Japanese as they advanced through Malaya. Pritam Singh and
Fujiwara explained to Mohan Singh their plans for raising an army to fight for
Indian independence. Mohan Singh was highly impressed with Fujiwara, who was a
genuine idealist and a great believer in the concept of the Greater Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere. With arguments backed by phrases such as ‘Asia for
Asiatics’ and India’s ‘shackles of slavery’, Fujiwara convinced Mohan Singh
that India was not going to be free by non-violent methods being advocated by
Mahatma Gandhi. If Indians wanted freedom, they would have to fight for it. He
told Mohan Singh, ‘If you really want freedom for your country you must
aspire to do something active. You must raise an Indian National Army’. 4
4. Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger,
p.3.
After detailed discussions with
Fujiwara, Mohan Singh agreed to raise the INA according to the model suggested
by the Japanese. It soon became apparent that the role that the Japanese
government was ready to allot to the INA was marginal. Instead of a fighting
force, the Japanese intended to use the INA for propaganda purposes,
particularly to foster anti-British feeling among Indian soldiers and the
Indians in the region, for controlling prisoners of war and for maintaining law
and order among the Indian population. Though Mohan Singh found Fujiwara to be
a well-informed person, he felt that his knowledge of the strength and position
of the Congress in India was poor. Whereas he had great regard for Mahatma
Gandhi as a saint, he had not the slightest faith in his glorified weapon of
non- violence. Mohan Singh tried to convince Fujiwara that under the prevailing
conditions in India, the Congress method of fighting the British was the only
practical one.5
5. Mohan Singh, p.78
It took less than 15
days for Mohan Singh to change his opinion about Mahatma Gandhi and the
Congress, and fall in line with the stance of the Japanese. After discussions
in Taiping on 30-31 December 1941, during which the Japanese handed over a
memorandum on the role of the INA, Mohan Singh wrote to Fujiwara on 1 January
1942, agreeing to accept the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose and modifying
his views with regard to the Congress: “The day Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose’s
name comes before us, we promise that if it suits our purpose we will openly
condemn the Indian National Congress”. 6
6. Mohan Singh, p.86
After the battle of the
Shin River on 7 January 1942, three Indian infantry brigades were dispersed.
Many Indian prisoners of war, after being subjected to intensive propaganda by
Mohan Singh and his men, agreed to transfer their allegiance to the Japanese.
Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, and a large number of Allied soldiers
surrendered. Different figures have been given by historians about the total
number of Allied prisoners, the number of Indian soldiers and the number that
agreed to join the INA. According to Mohan Singh, 45,000 Indian soldiers were
handed over by Lieutenant Colonel Hunt to Fujiwara at Farrer Park on 17
February 1942, who handed them over to Mohan Singh. However, Menezes gives the
figure of Indian soldiers as 60,000, which is also the number mentioned by
Cohen, relying on Winston Churchill’s History of the Second World War. After
Mohan Singh spoke to the assembled Indian prisoners at Farrer Park, most of
them cheered enthusiastically. They were then sent to the Bidadari Camp, but
the officers were separated from the men and not allowed to talk to the latter.
During the next few days, the prisoners were asked to volunteer for the INA,
with implied threats by the Japanese that the non-volunteers would be ill-treated,
and the leaders in any non-cooperation would be shot.7
7. Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and
Honour – The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, p.382
Estimates vary as to the actual numbers that
joined the INA when it was formed. Mohan Singh writes that 42,000 men
volunteered, while 13,000 remained non-volunteers. According to him, approximately one third
of the officers and one fifth of the VCOs did not join. Gerard Corr writes that
out of the 55,000-60,000 Indian prisoners, probably about 20,000 enlisted
immediately.8 Approximately the same figure is given by Joyce
Lebra, who writes that close to 25,000 of the 45,000 Indians taken prisoner at
Singapore did not volunteer.9
8. Gerard
H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers, p. 116
9. Lebra, p.83.
Mohan Singh promoted himself from captain to
general, and became the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the INA. He set about organizing the newly formed
Army, using novel techniques. All subedars and subedar majors were given the
rank of captain, while jemadars were made lieutenants. To gain the confidence
of these newly promoted officers, who were much older than the Indian
Commissioned Officers (ICOs), Mohan Singh decided to give them command of
battalions and brigades, using the ICOs to fill staff appointments such as
brigade major, staff captain, adjutant etc. The command of the brigade was
given to Subedar Onkar Singh of 5/4 Punjab Regiment.
The first INA division
was raised on 1 September 1942. Mohan Singh wanted to raise two divisions, but
the Japanese agreed to only one. The division had three brigades, which were
commanded by Lieutenant Colonels IJ Kiani (Gandhi Brigade), Aziz Ahmed Khan
(Nehru Brigade) and Prakash Chand (Azad Brigade). Lieutenant Colonel JKT
Bhonsle was given command of No. 1 Field Force Group, which had three infantry
battalions and a heavy gun battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Burhan-ud-din
commanded the Bahadur Group. The other functionaries were Major Jaswant Singh
(Intelligence Group); Colonel MS Brar (Propaganda and Welfare Group),
Lieutenant Colonel Kulwant Rai (Medical Group), Major SA Malik (Reinforcement
Group), Lieutenant Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan (Officers Training School) and Major
AB Mirza (HQ POWs).
Gradually,
Mohan Singh began to realize that the Japanese had no intention of building up
the INA into a strong military force. They wanted to use the INA more as a
political pawn than a military weapon. In fact, the role that they had
envisaged for the INA was propaganda, fifth column duties and minor military
operations. They hoped that when they marched into India with the INA ‘they
would be acclaimed as liberators of India and Indians would automatically join
them and the plum of victory will fall into their lap, ripened by the heat of
their own activity. Thus they intended to use us as spies, euphemistically
calling us patriots and freedom fighters’. 10
10. Mohan
Singh, p.201
Disillusioned by the Japanese attitude and
his differences with Rash Behari Bose, the President of the IIL, Mohan
Singh decided to dissolve the INA. On 21 December 1942 he signed a Special
Order of the Day formally dissolving the INA. The Japanese promptly arrested
Mohan Singh, and placed the INA under the IIL, headed by Rash Behari Bose, an
Indian revolutionary who had married a Japanese and lived in Tokyo. He was
under the influence of the Japanese and Mohan Singh had earlier refused to
accept his authority over the INA, leading to differences between them. Though
Mohan Singh had taken a pledge from his officers that the INA would not be
raised again, this was soon forgotten. JKT Bhonsle became the new Commander of
the INA, with the title of Director, Military Bureau.
The Arrival of Subhas
Chandra Bose
Subhas Chandra Bose was then in Germany, having reached there after his
dramatic escape in January 1941 from Calcutta, where he had been placed under
house arrest by the British authorities. With the support of the Germans, he
had tried to raise the Indian Legion from the Indian prisoners of war in North
Africa. However, he met with limited success, and only about three thousand
prisoners agreed to join him. It was only after a year that Bose was able to
have an audience with Hitler, and request him to recognize his movement or at
least announce that India would be granted independence after the war. Hitler
felt that such a declaration was premature, and asked Bose to wait until German
forces had advanced far enough. After German losses at Alamein and Stalingrad,
it became clear that this would not happen. Bose then requested the Germans to
arrange his move to South East Asia, where he had already been invited to take
over the IIL and the INA. On 8 February 1943 Bose left Kiel in a German submarine,
accompanied by Abid Hasan. On 28 April 1943 he was transferred to a Japanese
submarine near Madagascar, reaching Sabang in Northern Sumatra on 6 May and
Tokyo on 16 May 1943. This was not the first, or indeed the last time that Bose
left his followers to their fate, moving to greener pastures. In the words of
Fay: “Bose left behind three thousand Indian men in Wehrmacht uniforms whose
future would be half-hearted participation in the manning of the Atlantic Wall
and then a British prisoner of war cage – three thousand men and a wife and
child”. 11
11. Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army,
p.200
On
his arrival in Tokyo, Bose found the Japanese more accommodating than the
Germans. Prime Minister Tojo received him soon after his arrival, and was quite
receptive to his project of forming a provisional government in exile. On 16
June 1943 Tojo made a declaration in the Diet that Japan was firmly resolved to
extend all help to India to achieve full independence. This was music to the
ears of Bose, who had tried for almost two years to get a similar commitment
from Hitler, without success. He made a series of radio broadcasts, publicizing
his presence in South Asia, calling Japan India’s greatest friend. He received a tumultuous welcome when he
reached Singapore on 2 July 1943, followed by week-long celebrations that were
later commemorated annually as ‘Netaji Week.’ On 4 July he accepted the
Presidency of the IIL and the allegiance of the INA, which he reviewed on the
next day, giving it the battle cry ‘Chalo Dilli’ (To Delhi). Two days later, another parade was held, at
which Tojo himself took the salute.
On 8 August 1943 Subhas Chandra Bose
assumed personal command of the INA. Unlike Mohan Singh, who had taken the rank
of general, Bose held no military rank – he was just the Supreme Commander.
However, he wore a uniform that was neither Indian nor British, but was similar
to what he had seen in Italy and Germany – breeches, tunic and jack boots. (The
only other member of the INA to wear breeches was Captain Lakshmi Swaminathan,
who commanded the Rani of Jhansi Regiment). The uniform was not the only thing
Bose took from the Germans and Italians.
Hitler and Mussolini had titles – Fuehrer and Il Duce – and deciding
that he too must have one, he settled on ‘Netaji’ (The Leader). On 21
October 1943 Bose announced the formation of the Arzi Hukumat-e-Hind, or
the Provisional Government of Free India, which was recognized by Japan,
Germany, Italy and some other countries that were under Axis domination. A few
days later, the Provisional Government declared war on Great Britain and the
United States. Bose made the declaration of war at a rally of fifty thousand
Indians, who were asked to ratify it, by standing up and raising their hands if
they were prepared to lay down their lives. The audience rose instantly,
cheering, raising their rifles in the air, and shouting, “Netaji Ki Jai!
Inqilab Zindabad! Chalo Delhi!” The declaration proved to be a windfall for
the new government – during the next few days over thirteen million dollars
were collected from Indians in Singapore and Malaya. The money was spent as
soon as it poured in.12
12. Lebra, p.130; M. Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, p.158
In
November 1943 Bose was invited to Tokyo for the Greater East Asia Conference,
which he attended as an observer. During his visit, he met Prime Minister Tojo
and requested that Japan formally hand over to the Provisional Government of
Free India the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal, which the
Japanese had occupied in early 1942. This would give his government a measure
of legitimacy, he reasoned. Tojo demurred, since the islands were strategically
important, and the Japanese Navy was bound to object strongly. Finally, a
compromise was reached. Tojo announced that Japan was ready to hand over the
islands shortly, as the initial evidence of her readiness to help in India’s
struggle for independence. This was a
declaration of intent, not a de facto transfer. The distinction was
significant, for the next step – the actual transfer of administration – was
never taken by the Japanese Government.13
13. Lebra, p.133
Military Operations
Conducted by the INA
From the day of
its inception, Mohan Singh had been pressing for the INA to be sent to the
front to take part in actual operations and wanted to raise two divisions.
However, the Japanese agreed to only one. Mohan Singh soon realised that the
Japanese were not serious about making the INA a strong force that could
conduct regular military operations. After the ‘dissolution’ of the first INA
in December 1942, its strength had dropped to 12,000. After the arrival of
Subhas Chandra Bose, about 10,000 prisoners agreed to join and it was decided
to raise two more divisions. The first operational exposure of the INA was in a
minor role in the Arakan, where it was employed in small detachments. This was followed by two operations in Imphal
and on the Irrawaddy, for which Bose was able to convince the Japanese to allot
specific sectors to the INA, instead of using it in penny packets. Bose
repeatedly stressed that advance into India must be led by the INA, and ‘the
first drop of blood to be shed on Indian soil should be that of a member of the
INA.’
In the Arakan
offensive in February 1944, INA special groups comprising espionage and
propaganda elements totalling about 250 men were part of the Japanese offensive
against the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions. These men were
organised in small parties that had mainly nuisance value, shouting propaganda
or confusing orders in encounters with British-Indian troops, leading them
sometimes into Japanese ambushes and spying out their defensive positions. One
of these parties led by Major LS Misra managed to subvert an Indian outpost
held by a platoon of Gwalior Lancers. This was touted as major success by the
INA, Bose calling it an ‘active and important’ part in a great Japanese
victory, which alas never materialized, the Arakan battle ending in a
shattering defeat for the Japanese.14
14. Toye, p. 105.
The next operation
in which the INA took part was the Japanese offensive against Imphal in March
1944. A group of about 150 irregulars of the INA Special Forces was attached to
each of the three divisions that the Japanese employed in Imphal. The only
regular INA division available was the 1st INA Division, under
Colonel MZ Kiani – the 2nd Division was in Malaya - which comprised
the 1st (Subhas) Regiment with a strength of 3,000 men, and the 2nd
and 3rd Regiments, each two thousand strong. (The regiments were
akin to brigades, and were sometimes referred to as such). The first to be
mobilized was the Subhas Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan,
which was sent to the front with great fanfare, after a farewell speech by Bose
himself on 3 February 1944. No. 1 Battalion, under Major PS Raturi was
despatched to the Kaladan Valley, while No. 2 and 3 Battalions (Majors Ran
Singh and Padam Singh) were to proceed to Haka and Falam area in the Chin Hills.
No. 1 Battalion
reached the Kaladan Valley on 24 March, as the 81st West African
Division was withdrawing. It had several
skirmishes with the rear guards, suffering a few casualties. It remained there
intact, without further encounter, until September, posting a company at Mowdok
in the Sangu Valley, on Indian soil, during the monsoon. The crossing of the
border was accompanied by great jubilation. According to the Japanese plan,
Imphal was to be captured by 10th April 1944. The 2nd and
3rd Guerilla Regiments reached Rangoon only in March, when the
offensive was well underway and there was little chance of them playing a role
in the battle. However, Bose had persuaded General Kawabe to let them at least
enter Imphal on the heels of the Japanese.
In any case, nobody expected
that these men would have to fight. They were to line the route at
Bose’s entry into Imphal and assist in the formation of the new divisions
there.15
15. Toye, p. 106
The 2nd
Guerilla Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel IJ Kiani) together with the headquarters
of the 1st INA Division commenced their move from Rangoon on 25
March. On his arrival at Maymyo on 28 March the Divisional Commander, Colonel
MZ Kiani, was told that if he wished to be present at the fall of Imphal, he
should immediately rush his force to Tamu and join the Yamamoto Force, which
was part of the Japanese 33rd Division. 2nd Regiment
moved post-haste, leaving behind all its heavy baggage, mortars and machine
guns at Kalewa, with the men carrying only a blanket, a rifle and fifty rounds
of ammunition. The Regiment reached the village of Khanjol towards the end of
April, and was informed that it would take part in the attack on Palel
airfield, in conjunction with the Japanese thrust, which was planned for 1 May.
With great difficulty the Regiment was able to muster 300 ex-Indian Army
soldiers, who were grouped in a task force under the command of Major Pritam
Singh, a staff officer at divisional headquarters who volunteered to lead the
assault. The force left Khanjol on the night of 30 April, but took almost two
days to travel the twelve miles to the assembly area, reaching there on 2 May.
The Japanese attack had gone in a day earlier from the East, but Pritam Singh
decided to attack from the South on his own.
The attack was
launched on the night of 2 May. At about 2230 hours the leading company, moving
in extended order, ran into a platoon of 4/10 Gurkha Rifles, about five miles
short of the objective. The INA soldiers had been assured that neither British
nor Indian troops would fire on them, and were talking and smoking as they
walked, with no semblance of discipline.
The Gurkhas, forewarned of their approach, waited for them to reach a
suitable position and then opened fire. The INA soldiers panicked and
scattered, but Pritam Singh rallied some of them and approached again, this
time more cautiously. He tried to parley with the Gurkhas, asking them not to
fire. When this failed, the INA column attacked the platoon, but was beaten
back. Pritam Singh launched seven attacks, before deciding to call it off. He
ordered a withdrawal, sending a patrol to carry out reconnaissance for a new
attack and calling his regimental commander for help. Two INA officers and many
soldiers were killed; about thirty-five more surrendered or were captured. The
Gurkhas lost two killed. Shortly afterwards the regimental headquarters was
attacked by a company of the Frontier Force Rifles, followed by an air strike,
in which fifty INA soldiers were killed and about the same number wounded. An
artillery concentration severely shook the morale of the rest, and Kiani
ordered the 2nd Regiment to withdraw to Khanjol. The reconnaissance
patrol sent by Pritam Singh had also surrendered.16
16. Toye, p. 226.
The failure at
Palel and the casualties were a severe jolt to the morale of the INA, which had
come to believe the assurance given by Bose that propaganda and not firepower
would decide the result when they would face Indian troops. Even for the
Japanese, the battle was not going according to plan. By the first week of May
the offensive of the Yamamoto Force had lost steam. The INA continued to hold
Khanjol and Mittong Khunue in spite of frequent attacks and temporary
withdrawals. Rains throughout May and
June restricted activity on both sides to patrolling and the 2nd
Guerilla Regiment did not fight any more battles. But the effects of climate,
hunger and malaria took a heavy toll and by the beginning of July, the strength
of the Regiment was down to 750 men. On 3 July an Indian battalion, the 4th
Mahratta Light Infantry, attacked and cleared Khanjol, which was held by just
50 men, and occupied Mittong Khunue. The Indian battalion did not advance
further, and continued to hold the end of the Mombi track until it finally
withdrew in the third week of July.
The 3rd
Guerilla Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Gulzara Singh, did not play any
significant part in the Imphal battle. The Regiment reached Tamu on 26 May
after the monsoon had broken and was ordered to occupy a defensive position
around Narum. One battalion was used for transport duties with the other two
occupying the villages of Lamyang, Keipham and Khosat. The Regiment was already
depleted by sickness when it arrived in the battle area. The rains and irregular
supplies added to their woes, reducing the strength of the battalions to almost
half. Both the 2nd and 3rd Guerilla Regiments and the
remnants of the 1st Regiment began to withdraw on 18 July 1944.
Though the
campaign ended in July, by the end of April 1944 it had become clear that the
offensive against Imphal was not going well. However, INA headquarters in
Maymyo, without any means of communications with the forward troops, was
unaware of this development, and in mid-May, Bose sent three senior ministers
of his cabinet - Chatterji, Alagappan and AM Sahay – to Tamu, partly in order
that they might be at hand when Imphal was entered, and to buy up supplies,
relieve the INA difficulties and bring back an accurate report. Their report
reached Bose towards the end of June, but he was still unaware of the actual
state of affairs. Even on 10 July, when the Japanese officially informed Bose
that the Imphal campaign was being abandoned, he appeared to have no inkling of
the magnitude of the disaster. (No one has been able to explain the reason for
lack of communications between Bose and his field commanders. There must have
been hundreds of wireless sets in the equipment captured from the British at
Singapore. Bose also had a secret radio link to Germany, on which he sometimes
spoke to Nambiar, and also his wife). Netaji Week was celebrated in Rangoon
with customary gusto, including parades, speeches and cultural events. Bose
issued a statement on the year’s progress, and finalised the government
organisation that would be needed once Imphal was captured. He broadcast
messages to the people of India, including those who worked for the government,
and to soldiers of the Indian Army, assuring them that they would be taken into
the INA after victory, and their service would count towards their INA
pensions!
The decision to
suspend the Imphal campaign was made public on 26 July, the day the Japanese
Prime Minister Tojo resigned. It was only in August when survivors from the
front began arriving in Rangoon with tales of horrible deaths due to disease
and starvation that Bose was enlightened of the magnitude of the tragedy that
had befallen his soldiers. On 19 August there was a desperate appeal from
Colonel Kiani to intervene with the Japanese to save hundreds of sick men
stranded by floods on the withdrawal route. Bose was helpless, for the Japanese
were themselves in dire straits and could do little to help the INA. Bose
blamed the Japanese for the debacle, by denying essential supplies to the INA,
and recommended the dissolution of the Hikari Kikan that had been responsible
for this task. In future, the INA would look after all their administration
themselves, he declared. He was enraged when he came to know of the large
number of desertions in the INA and publicly berated the officers for their
lack of leadership, which resulted in low morale of the troops. Of 6000 men
that had been sent the front, at least 1500 had deserted or been captured.
In October 1943,
Bose received an invitation to visit Tokyo from the new Japanese Prime
Minister, General Koiso. Bose found the Japanese still receptive to his
demands, which included the appointment of an ambassador to his government,
increase in the size of the INA by at least 50,000, a loan agreement, better
weapons including tanks, planes and guns to supplement captured British stores,
distribution of propaganda literature written by himself and transfer of all
Indian POWs to the INA. At this time, American bombers were already paying
frequent visits to the Japanese capital, and many of these demands appeared to
be meaningless, which is probably the reason for the Japanese conceding them.
However, in return for sending a diplomat to his government, the Japanese asked
for a quid pro quo – Bose agreed to put the INA under Japanese command
during the defence of Malaya and Burma.17
17. Lebra, p.143, Sivaram, p.230
Though the writing
was on the wall, Bose continued to exhibit his confidence that the Japanese
would win the war. In an article in the Azad Hind on 6 November 1944,
after the retreat from Imphal, he reiterated his firm conviction that the final
victory would belong to Japan and Germany. ‘A new phase of war was
approaching’, he wrote, ‘in which the initiative would again lie in the
hands of the Japanese’. Not surprisingly, Professor Joyce Lebra was
constrained to write: “Bose’s constant repetition of this faith throughout
and even after the Imphal campaign raises the question of the soundness of his
military judgement”. 18
18. Lebra, p.191
After spending a
month in Japan, Bose returned to Singapore in December 1944. He spent over a
month in Malaya, reviewing the functioning of the training camps at Seletar and
Kuala Lumpur, and going over the finances. On both counts he found the outlook
dismal. The number of new recruits barely matched those who were shedding their
uniforms and slipping away. The income of the Indian Independence League was
drying up, and when persuasion failed, draconian measures were adopted to
increase collections.
At a press
conference in Rangoon the day after his arrival, Bose asserted that the war had
now entered the third phase, which would be decisive, and Indians must play
their rightful part. “Had the rains not intervened,” he said, “we
should by now have occupied the Manipur basin”. During a rally in October,
he had given a new war cry – khun (blood). In the days that followed, he
repeated it at every opportunity. He no longer talked of the march to Delhi,
but blood. It was Indian blood that he wanted, and he asked for it because the
old slogan did not sound convincing now. The war was not over, but Bose knew
that his men were not going anywhere near Delhi. Yet, the fight must go on.
Freedom, he observed, carries a price – blood. And since blood was all that his
young recruits had to offer, it became his constant refrain in the months that
followed. “Tum mujhe khun do, main tumhen azadi dunga (give me blood,
and I will give you freedom)”, he said. As 1945 opened, this was all Bose had
to offer. 19
19. Fay, p.315.
After their defeat
at Imphal, Japanese forces had withdrawn to the Irrawaddy River, where the next
major battle was to take place. Two INA divisions, the 1st and the 2nd,
were to take part in the battle. In the event, only one regiment of the 2nd
Division, the 4th Guerilla Regiment under Major GS Dhillon could
take part, the rest still waiting in Rangoon for their stores and equipment to
arrive from Malaya. Mutiny and desertion had become a serious problem in the
INA, and troops were screened before being sent to the front. About 150 men
from Dhillon’s regiment were sent back as suspect, leaving him with 1,200 men
to defend twelve miles of the river. Bose ordered several measures to raise the
morale of the troops. They were protected from contact with Imphal survivors
and encouraged by glowing accounts of INA heroism in battle. Gallantry awards
were presented and there were accelerated promotions, including four major
generals, one of them being Shah Nawaz Khan, the newly appointed commander of
the 2nd INA Division.
The 7th
Indian Division began to cross the Irrawaddy on 14 February 1945 at Nyangu and
Pagan, where the 4th INA Regiment was deployed. The attacking troops
suffered some casualties from medium machine guns in the INA defences, but
managed to cross the river. About a hundred men of the 7th INA
Battalion under Lieutenant Hari Ram surrendered at Nyangu and one hundred and
forty of the 9th INA Battalion under Lieutenant Chandra Bhan showed
a white flag and laid down their arms at Pagan. Shah Nawaz has chosen to gloss
over these surrenders, mentioning only the gallantry of the INA troops and the
casualties they inflicted on the enemy. ‘Our men having used up all their
ammunition resorted to bayonet charges, but eventually most of the men of the 7th
Battalion were overpowered and had to surrender’.20
20. Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories
of INA and its Netaji, p. 190
However, Bose was deeply pained when he heard
of the surrenders, and wrote to Dhillon: ‘I have heard with grief, pain and
shame of the treachery shown by Lieutenant Hari Ram and others. I hope that the
men of the 4th Regiment will wash away the blot on the INA
with their blood.’ Worried by the desertions, Bose wrote another
letter to an officer of the INA Police at Mandalay, ‘According to my
information the men who recently deserted from Mandalay … are still in the
Mandalay area. These men must be arrested and sent down to Rangoon under
escort. If you cannot arrest them, they must be shot at sight.’ 21
21. Toye, p. 139
On 17 March 1945
there was another action at Taungzin where Dhillon’s troops are said to have
redeemed their reputation, according to INA accounts. A British motorized
column attacked an INA company under the command of Second Lieutenant Gian
Singh Bisht, in which the company lost about forty men, including the company
commander. Shah Nawaz has described the
action thus: ‘In the name of India and Indian independence they charged the
enemy trucks. The enemy immediately debussed and hand to hand fighting ensued
which lasted for full two hours, but our heroes would not give in. Forty of
them sacrificed their lives after inflicting heavier losses on the enemy. The
enemy was so impressed by their determination that they beat a hurried retreat’.22
A more down-to-earth version of the action has been given by Fay, who
writes: ‘Near Taungzin one day a company of his let itself be trapped in the
open by light tanks, armoured cars and infantry in trucks, tried vainly to
break out with the bayonet and lost several score men dead or captured. ……But
Dhillon was also prone to heroics. When the publicity people at Rangoon heard
about the Taungzin disaster, they transformed it into a sort of latter-day
Charge of the Light Brigade, and Dhillon was pleased’. 23
22. Shah Nawaz, p. 195
23. Fay, pp. 342-343.
The next action
occurred at Mount Popa on whose western slopes the 2nd INA Regiment
under PK Sahgal was occupying defences.
Headquarters 2nd INA Division was also at Popa, under its
newly appointed commander, Major General Shah Nawaz Khan. In February Bose decided
to visit Mount Popa himself, to get a first-hand account of the conditions
there. His first visit to the front line had to be cut short because the enemy
got there first. He was in Meiktila on 25 February when news came that British
tanks had reached Mahling, just twenty miles away. When Shah Nawaz advised that
they should turn back, Bose refused, saying “England has not produced the
bomb that can kill Subhas Chandra Bose.” However, reason finally prevailed
over bravado, and he fled from Meiktila, accompanied by a very anxious Shah
Nawaz in the only staff car that they had. Everyone was armed to the teeth and
ready for the worst, Bose sitting with a loaded tommy gun across his lap with
Shah Nawaz beside him, his personal physician next to the driver and the
liaison officer on the running board. The scene is now a key element of the
Bose legend.
Soon after his
return to Rangoon Bose received the shocking news that five staff officers of 2nd
INA Division – four majors and one lieutenant - had walked across to the
British lines. Soon afterwards, British aircraft dropped leaflets signed by one
of them, advising others in the INA to surrender. The shameful desertions soon
became a topic of conversation in every Rangoon household and the subject of
laughter in every Japanese mess. Bose
was rattled by the treachery, and said that he would take his own life if such
a thing happened again. He announced the observance of a ‘Traitors’ Day’ in
each INA unit, when deserters would be publicly dishonoured. He issued two
special orders, outlining a number of measures to deal with the problem. One of
these specified that ‘every member of the INA - officer, NCO or sepoy - will
in future be entitled to arrest any other member of the INA, no matter what his
rank may be, if he behaves in cowardly manner, or to shoot him if he acts in a
treacherous manner.’ 24.
24. Toye, p. 142. Special Order of the
Day, 13th March 1945
Unfortunately, the
desertions did not stop. Late in March, one of Dhillon’s battalion commanders
deserted. On the night of 2 April, just before a full-scale attack on the 2nd
INA Regiment at Legyi, three staff officers and some NCOs deserted. The attack
came at mid-day and the INA defences soon collapsed, even the administrative
area being overrun. Sahgal ordered a counter attack but the two platoons
concerned deserted. A second counter attack after nightfall succeeded, but
Sahgal then came to know that the whole of his 1st Battalion – the
CO, company commander and about three hundred men - had deserted. The remainder
could not face another attack and Sahgal withdrew them on his own initiative
during the night. What followed was a rout. Except for an odd occasion when
they decided to stand and fight, the 2nd INA Division disintegrated
and virtually ceased to exist. By the end of April, only fugitives remained at
large. On 13 May 1945, Shah Nawaz, Dhillon and about fifty men surrendered at
Pegu.
The End of the INA
Rangoon fell to
British forces on 4 May 1945. A day earlier, the senior British officer who was
a prisoner in the Rangoon jail had ordered the disarming and concentration of
the INA, which was now under the command of Major General Loganadhan, the
Supreme Commander having left about ten days earlier along with a few senior
officers, about fifty League workers and the last contingent of women of the
Rani of Jhansi regiment. In his last message before leaving Bose declared ‘I
do not leave Burma of my own free will. I would have preferred to stay on here
with you and share with you the sorrow of temporary defeat.’ But his
advisers had overruled him, he had other responsibilities in Siam and Malaya
that nobody else could fulfil, and for Indians this defeat was only an incident
in their struggle. ‘Go down as heroes’, he said, ‘go down upholding
the highest code of honour and discipline’.25
25. Toye, p. 146
Bose’s last words
to his men were to ‘uphold the highest code of honour’, which he was even then
violating, perhaps unknowingly. Not
being a professional soldier, he can be forgiven for not being aware of the
time honoured code that a captain always goes down with his ship and a
commander with his troops, be it death or captivity. (Percival surrendered with
85,000 of his men when Singapore fell in 1942 and Niazi with 93,000 troops in
1971 in East Pakistan. Captain Mulla went down with the INS Khukri in
1971). However, most of the senior INA officers had spent long years in
uniform, and it appears strange that they advised him to escape, leaving more
than ten thousand of his men to their fate.
It has been
suggested that Bose wanted to go to Russia and carry on the struggle from
there, but there appears no concrete proof of this. Another reason put forward
is that the British authorities would have executed him if he had been
captured, but this appears unlikely. Bose was never a member of the Indian Army
and could not have been tried for treason under the Indian Army Act, like Shah
Nawaz, Sahgal and Dhillon. His stature and prestige in India would have
deterred the British from even contemplating such a step. In fact, the wave of
sympathy that swept the country after the INA trials would have multiplied
manifold and united the Indian people against the British. Who knows, with Bose
being present at the final parleys, India may not been partitioned.
The INA ceased to exist after its
remnants surrendered to British forces on 4 May 1945. The Supreme Leader of the INA, Netaji Subhas
Chandra Bose died in a plane crash shortly after this. But the legend of Bose
refuses to die. Anton Pelinka has a very interesting and plausible reason for
this ‘mythos’ as he calls it. He writes:-
Whatever Bose had in mind when his plane
crashed on August 18, 1945, he could no longer realize it. But in the
imaginations of millions of people in in India (and likely also in Pakistan and
Bangla Desh), Bose lived on. Above all, there remained the fact that
independence did not come to mean a high standard of living for the many but
rather expulsion and death for millions and the still unsolved problem of mass
poverty. In the face of all these disappointments, Bose embodied the hope that remained
unfulfilled.
And for that reason, he was not allowed
to die. The Bose mythos begins with the doubt that Subhas Chandra Bose actually
perished in the plane crash of August 18, 1945 in Taipei. Many people were
willing to believe in a cover-up of mass proportions, regardless of who might
have carried it out. Bose was alive, it was said, or had been seen somewhere,
he was alive in a Soviet camp, he was a high ranking member of Mao’s People’s
Liberation Army and would soon, very soon, in fact, return to India. He would
come, like a messiah, to eradicate all evil and thus, to fulfill the
unfulfilled promises of independent India. (Bose, M, 1982, p.251).
Numerous commissions of the Indian
government have examined the circumstances surrounding his death. They all
arrive at the same conclusion: Bose died on August 18, 1945 in Taipei from
severe burns sustained in the plane crash. Bose’s family also subscribes to
this interpretation (Bose, Sisir, interview 1999: Bose, Sugata, interview,
2001). But the legend refuses to die. The hundredth anniversary of his birth
was celebrated intensively in India, particularly in Calcutta. The city administration
in Calcutta, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, published a detailed report on
Bose’s life works. In this special edition of the Calcutta Municipal Gazette,
Bose’s death is reported in lapidary fashion: “The mysteries concerning his
death remain unsolved till date” (Calcutta Municipal Gazette 1997:344).
The fact that Calcutta was and continues
to be the place where Bose’s mythos is cultivated points to a further function
of this mythos. Bose stands for Bengal’s disappointments. Around 1900, Bengal
was the most important part of British India, and Calcutta was the capital of
the empire’s crown jewel. But then Bengal lost more and more of its importance.
The British moved the capital to Delhi, and Bengal seldom played an important
role in the Indian national congress. Bose was the exception to this rule. And
then came the partition. After Punjab, Bengal was the second of India’s
traditional regions to be divided, with all of the terrible consequences for
both sides.
Bose is the protest against the loss of
significance, especially for the Bengali sense of self, against the dominance
of Delhi, and that of Uttar Pradesh, against the predominance of Hindi. For
Bengal, Bose could not be allowed to die. In the ongoing memory of him, Bengal
celebrated self-pity and nostalgia (Chaudhuri 1987:799). Bose’s mythos is also
Bengal’s attempt to demand recognition of its importance within India.26
26. Anton Pelinka, Democracy Indian
Style –Subhas Chandra Bose and the Creation of India’s Political Culture,
Routeledge, 2003, pp.8-9.
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