50
Parachute Brigade Signal Company
50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company had moved from Agra Calcutta West
Bengal . After it became known that Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ was
likely to be conducted in the later part of the
year, all specialist vehicles and medium power radio sets were called up
from Agra to Barrackpore near Calcutta where 50
Parachute Brigade was located. The company commander, Major Manmohan
Bhatia, joined the company in early November 1971. The three other officers in
the company were Captain P.K. Ghosh, Lieutenant A.S Bhagat and Lieutenant I.P.
Singh. The brigade commander, Brigadier Mathew Thomas had also assumed command
a few days earlier.
At Barrackpore local telephones were
provided from the automatic exchange already existing. Due to the non
availability of underground and overhead permanent pairs for extensions, these
were provided on cable laid by linemen of the company. The scale of telephones
was also reduced to two for each major unit. Towards the end of November 1971 Major
Bhatia was informed by Brigadier Thomas that Captain P.K. Ghosh was to go on a
special mission. Apparently it was a toss-up between two Bengali officers and
finally Ghosh was selected. On 28 November Ghosh moved by air along with
Lieutenant Colonel K.S. Pannu to Shillong for an operational conference from
where they proceeded to HQ 95 Mountain Brigade. Pannu returned on 1 December
whereas Ghosh was sent on the special mission, details of which have been
described elsewhere.
Another important action in which
the company was involved was the para drop that was planned near Tangail. The
battalion earmarked for the drop was 2 Para, communications for which were
planned as shown below:
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The personnel and equipment that
were earmarked to be dropped were as under:-
·
Pathfinder - One radio operator with RS 734
·
Air support tentacle
comprising eight personnel, including a driver, with a jeep and trailer. They
were to carry one RS GU 734, one RS GR 345, one RS AN/PRC-25 and one receiver R
209.
·
A radio detachment to
work as out station on B1 link, comprising three operators and two RS GR
345.
On
3 December a one to one link was established between 2 Para and HQ 95 Mountain
Brigade at Gauhati to check the radio sets and confirm suitability of
frequencies. The detachment earmarked for the para drop was attached to 2 Para
next day and preparations began to prepare the jeep and trailer for heavy
drop. Line detachments were moved to
Kalaikunda and Dum Dum air fields for establishing line communications to the
mounting bases. On 5 December
information was received that 2 Para was to operate under 101 Communication
Zone. Since signal instructions of this formation were not held, an officer was
sent by air to Shillong to collect them.
Being Army HQ reserve, 50 Parachute
Brigade had not been assigned any specific role before the commencement of
hostilities. It was only on 5 December that the brigade commander was called by
the Chief of Staff, HQ Eastern Command and briefed about his mission to capture
Jessore from the rear. They were to form part of 9 Infantry Division, under II
Corps. Major Bhatia immediately left for the CSO’s Branch in HQ Eastern Command
to get the signal instructions for the operation. However, his visit was fruitless.
The CSO, Brigadier Tewari told Bhatia
that he was not aware of this operation and advised him to contact the
concerned formations. After informing
the brigade commander and the BM, Bhatia left by road for HQ 9 Infantry
Division on 6 December. He reached their
location in the night and since the shelling was intense, decided to stay the
night there. On his return to Calcutta Bangladesh Khulna
On 7 December the brigade less 2
Para moved along axis Dum Dum – Basirhut – Bangaon – Jessore and concentrated
at Abdulpur 5 km short of Jessore. On 8 December the brigade was placed under 4
Mountain Division and commenced its advance with 7 Para leading on Axis
Pakhuria-Kajura-Simkhali, maintaining communications on D1 and D2 nets. Bhatia
was at the start point when Lieutenant Colonel R.P. Singh, CO 7 Para got into the first tank. At about 1130 hours they
came under intense fire from Pakistani troops occupying a defensive position at
Khajura. Taking them to be Razakars, and being unaware of the strength of the
enemy, CO 7 Para decided to launch an attack. In the ensuing skirmish, three
officers including Colonel R.P. Singh and three OR were killed and one officer
and three OR were wounded. Bhatia was at the B-1 control and fully in the
picture. The ill fated action came to an
abrupt halt. The brigade commander was also in the B-1 vehicle trying to fathom
what happened. He spoke on the D-1 for immediate award of a Param Vir Chakra
for CO 7 Para. Bhatia was asked to rush to HQ 9 Infantry Division to arrange a
helicopter for evacuating the casualties. Fortunately, the officer commanding
the helicopter squadron was Bhatia’s course mate and the helicopter was
promptly made available.
Resuming the advance that evening,
they entered the domain of 4 Infantry Division which was also advancing towards
Magura. Though the company had their
frequencies, the operator at the D-1 control of 4 Division refused to let them
join the net, since he did not have any instructions. On Bhatia’s insistence,
the operator agreed to get an officer on the set. The officer turned out to be
Major G.L. Chadha who was well known to Bhatia. They decided on a code sign
extract for seven days and thus we were able to join the net. However, next
morning 50 Parachute Brigade reverted to 9 Infantry Division and was ordered to
return to its old location near Jessore.
Lines were laid in the harbour and communications again established with
9 Infantry Division on D1 and D2. On 10 December the brigade moved to
concentrate at Barrackpore from where it was to be air lifted to the Western
Theatre. At a conference held the same evening it was informed that the brigade
less 2 Para that was to carry out the para drop on 11 December would be air
lifted to Palam, sorties for which would commence at 6 am next morning. Next morning the company was
airlifted to Delhi
The drop by 2 Para took place on 11
December, while the company was in Bararckpore. As has been mentioned elsewhere,
the battalion was not in communication throughout the night and came up on the
radio only at about 0715 hours on 12 December. While the Adjutant of 2 Para
attributed the failure in communication to a mix up in the frequency being
used, Major Bhatia has this to say:-
“Regarding communications after the para drop, one has to
view all the facts in totality. The communications were not a failure as they
were not opened!!! I had talked to the operators after they got back to the
Company. The night of the para drop was pretty chaotic and on landing, they
were immediately on the move. They were not given time to stop and erect the
aerial for the comn link up. Knowing the force commander very well, I can fully
appreciate his priority in getting on to the objective by first light. This was
the reason why there was no news from them that night. In fact we too were on
listening watch that whole night at Barrackpore. I did not expect much as the
directions were totally different. I was hoping for some stray radiation or the
remote possibility that the detachment may try to contact us in case of any
emergency. This did not happen on ground and the force just pushed ahead to get
to the objective. (By then it was clear that the objective was to get to Dacca
In response to a query whether the
cause for the link not getting through could be use of an incorrect frequency and
the reason for not using alternate means such as the air support net, Bhatia
has clarified :-
“We had tried out our
communications with 95 Brigade prior to the operations as also the tentacle
frequencies were tried out. So it stands to reason that had our detachment been
given time to establish communications, we would have been through. The fact
that they ‘mysteriously’ came up the next morning proves my point. How come
just over the night when they were running like hell towards their target all
the confusion got sorted out?? Elementary - they did not stop for anything
since they had it going so good and did not want to waste time on
communications - they had to get there first! The members of the communications
detachment were handpicked, very capable persons who could be trusted to take
all possible actions to ensure communications come what may - using alternate
frequencies, other nets etc. and I don't doubt their competence, capability or
integrity even for a second.”
Though Tewari confesses that he
could never really get to the bottom of the story as to why it happened, he
feels that the reason may be similar to that given above by OC 50 Parachute
Brigade Signal Company. He writes:-
