CHAPTER 7
SUBHAS BOSE & THE INA – SOME UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
The Indian National Army remains an enigma, even today. Throughout
its life span of three years, and even later, the INA has generated several
controversies and given rise to conundrums some of which remain unsolved.
Ironically, during its existence the activities of the INA remained shrouded in
mystery and it was only after it ceased to exist that most of these
controversies surfaced. Though there is a wealth of literature available about
the INA and its leader, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, many questions still remain
unanswered. These are often discussed at debates and seminars and provide the
topic for articles and books. Some of these questions will be discussed in this
chapter.
Q.1 Why did
some Indian soldiers join the INA while others did not?
In the Foreword to
Toye’s book, Philip Mason, who was the Joint Secretary in the War Department in
1945-46, gives four motives for joining the INA. A few did so with the
intention of re-joining British forces when they saw a chance; some were
puzzled, misinformed, misled, and on the whole believed the course they took
was the most honourable open to them; others were frankly opportunist and some
really were fervent nationalists.
Stephen Cohen has given
a similar analysis. ‘At least three factors influenced the decision to join
the INA: personal comfort, nationalist political beliefs, and the charismatic
appeal of Subhas Bose. A few of the
defecting officers anticipated personal rewards for themselves when they
transferred allegiance to the Japanese, and to this extent the British label of
“treasonous rabble’ was accurate. No INA officer has ever admitted such a
motive, but interviews with former INA leaders and British officers indicate that
money and security were important considerations for a few Indians.’ 1
1. Stephen Cohen, The
Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, p.152
Major (later Major General) Shahid Hamid was the
Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the
Commander-in-Chief in India in 1946-47. According to him, ‘Most of the men
who joined the INA were cowards and were not prepared to face the hardships of
the prisoner of war camps. It was an escape from ill treatment and starvation.
Very few joined for patriotic reasons.’ 2
2. Major
General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, p.17
Some of the reasons given by ex INA officers for
joining the INA are interesting, even amusing. A number of officers such as
Shah Nawaz, JKT Bhonsle, Gian Chand etc. did not join the INA initially, but
later changed their minds. Shah Nawaz writes: ‘We decided that the best
course was (a) for the senior officers to join the INA, gain control of it and
prevent the ill treatment of prisoners of war, and also their exploitation by
the Japanese. If we were unable to do this, then we would try and wreck the INA
from within, if and when we had an opportunity to do so. (b) For the rank and
file to remain out of the INA and if need be to undergo hardships and ill
treatment, but the senior officers in the INA would do their best to help them.
This at that time concerned mainly the Muslims’. 3
3. Shah Nawaz, p. 47
The concern of Shah Nawaz for Muslims was one of the reasons that
prompted his decision to join the INA. This has been confirmed by Harbaksh
Singh, who writes that Shah Nawaz joined the INA ‘because of some dispute over
accommodation for a Muslim JQ.’ As for Bhonsle, Harbaksh does not mince words.
“Bhonsle, I knew, had done it to save his skin. He had admitted as much to
me.”4
4. , p.134
Prominent among those who did not join were Captain (later Lieutenant General)
Harbaksh Singh, 5/11 Sikhs; Captain (later Major General) HC Badhwar; Captain
(later Lieutenant General) KP Dhargalkar, both of the 3rd Cavalry
and Captain (later Lieutenant General) AC Iyappa, Signals. The reasons for
these officers deciding against joining the INA were mainly two – distrust of
the Japanese and lack of faith in the INA leadership. According to Harbaksh, ‘unless
Mahatma Gandhi or Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru made an appeal over the air for
every young man outside India to join the INA to liberate India with the help
of the Japanese, we would not join, as we had no faith in its leadership’.5
5. Harbaksh Singh, pp.111-112
Cohen cites another reason for the
professional soldier being less than sympathetic to the INA – his oath of
loyalty. Many did not regard lightly the breaking of their oath, and preferred
to spend the war in a prison camp undergoing privations at the hands of the
Japanese or the INA. In India, the concept of loyalty is closely linked to
‘salt’. An employee is expected to be loyal to his employer, whose salt he has
eaten. For many Indian soldiers joining the INA meant being untrue to their
salt, and facing the stigma of faithlessness and disloyalty in their regiments
and villages when they returned home.
There is no doubt that those who refused to join face hardships, hard
labour, and even torture, sometimes by their own men. Some of the officers who
refused to join were subjected to third degree methods to bring them in line.
Badhwar and Dhargalkar were locked in underground cages, which were about five
feet long by five feet wide and seven feet high, and sometimes held five or six
prisoners. They were kept inside these cages for 88 days, during which time
they saw nothing of the outside world. 6
6. Cohen, p.149
The fate of
those who refused to join the INA was uncertain. The fortunate ones remained in
POW camps or were sent as working parties to depots and airfields. Many were
sent to labour camps in Borneo, the Celebes and Thailand, where thousands died
of disease and starvation. Those who joined the INA not only had a more
comfortable life but also a better survival rate. According to Menezes,
of the 40,000 prisoners of war who did not join the INA, 11,000 died in
captivity, of disease, starvation or were murdered, some even cannibalized by
the Japanese. Strangely enough, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind,
which claimed the allegiance of all Indians and guaranteed equal rights and
equal opportunities to all its citizens, did nothing to alleviate the
sufferings of these unfortunate soldiers.
Corr writes:‘As for Gill, suffering in solitary confinement, he
(Bose) did nothing. Neither did he do anything for the thousands of Indians in
Thailand who were being worked to death on the Infamous Death Railway. He left
them to their appalling fate’. 7
7. Corr, p.149
What is the truth? Did the majority
of prisoners join the INA for patriotic reasons, or for pecuniary gains, better
living conditions and to escape torture and harsh treatment at the hands of
their Japanese captors?
Q.2 Were the aims of the INA practical and
achievable?
In mid-January 1942 Mohan Singh said that the eventual object of the INA
was to drive the British out of India. During the Bangkok Conference held in
June 1942, the Indian Independence League resolved that the INA would be used
for operations against British forces; to secure and safeguard Indian National
Independence and for any other purpose that may assist the Independence of
India. Soon after his arrival in South East Asia, Bose declared: ‘Indians
outside India, particularly Indians in East Asia, are going to organise a
fighting force which will be powerful enough to attack the British Army in
India. When we do so, a revolution will break out, not only among the civil
population at home, but also among the Indian Army, which is now standing under
the British flag.’ 8
8. Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories of INA and its
Netaji, p. 89
The aim of the INA, as envisaged by Mohan Singh, the IIL and also by Bose
was twofold – to militarily defeat the British and to subvert the loyalty of
the Indian Army. Were these aims achievable? Bose was confident that as soon as
he entered India, Indian soldiers would lay down their arms. However, it was
the height of military naiveté to believe that the ill-trained and ill-equipped
INA would be able to defeat the British Army. Mohan Singh, Shah Nawaz as well
as several others have written that the Japanese did not support them with
weapons, ammunition and supplies. If this was true, why did they agree to send
their men into battle, where they were bound to suffer heavy casualties?
Though Bose was not a professional soldier, even he must have known that the
military objectives of the INA were not achievable. According to Corr, Bose
made two fatal errors of judgement during his career. The first was his
decision to challenge Gandhi, which set him on the road out of India. The
second error was to believe that he could return through military means. ‘Bose
was aware that the tide of war had turned against Japan and the Imphal
offensive was a gigantic gamble. Yet he spoke to his men in a way that
suggested the road to Delhi lay open. …. Becoming a victim of his own
propaganda, Bose urged on his regiments to destruction. In the end he
lost touch with reality.’9
9. Gerard H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers,
p.165
After the defeat at Imphal, when General Kawabe told him that the order
to retreat had been given, Bose declared that the INA would continue the
operations. “Increase in casualties, cessation of supplies, and famine are
not reason enough to stop marching. Even if the whole army becomes only spirit
we will not stop advancing towards our homeland. This is the spirit of our
revolutionary army,” he said. Though Corr writes that Kawabe was much
moved, he must also have been amused at Bose’s innocence. ‘Prodigal with
emotional language, Bose did not seem to feel he had been sufficiently prodigal
with the lives of his soldiers. He talked – to the amazement of even the
Japanese – of sending the Rani of Jhansi Regiment up to the battle front.’10
10. Corr, p.166
Having known that the INA did not have the military strength to defeat
the British Army, why did its leaders send it into battle, to face death and
destruction?
Q3.
How did the INA perform in battle?
Almost all ex-INA officers eulogize
the gallantry of its members during operations. Some even suggest that the INA
planned and executed the attack on Imphal, with the Japanese playing a
subsidiary role. Shah Nawaz writes: “While the INA was on the offensive
there was not a single occasion on which our forces were defeated on the
battle-field, and there was never an occasion when the enemy despite their overwhelming
superiority in men and material were able to capture a post held by the INA. On
the other hand there were very few cases where INA attacked British posts and
failed to capture them”.11
11. Shah Nawaz, p. 159
According
to Dr. RM Kasliwal, who was the personal physician to Bose in 1945, “In the
fighting in the Imphal sector our troops played a very prominent part. They
pushed the enemy back everywhere ….. Our armies, along with those of our allies
chased the British forces deep into Manipur sector. Some of our troops reached
Kohima and occupied that town, and some penetrated up to Dimapur.”12
12. RM Kasliwal, The Impact of Netaji and
INA on India’s Independence, p.20
The war
diaries of the Indian Army formations and units that fought in Imphal not only
contradict the INA claims but also contain unflattering accounts of their
performance, which are endorsed by the Japanese who were fighting
alongside. The low casualty figures and the large numbers of INA personnel who
surrendered and deserted are also indicative of the pedestrian performance of
the INA. Several foreign writers have commented on the performance of the INA
in battle. Cohen writes:“…the INA was starved of equipment, logistic support
and information, and although it did occupy Indian soil briefly, it’s battle
history was dismal.” 13. John Connell writes: “In
every recorded clash between British and Indian forces and the INA in Burma,
the INA was worsted. Their leadership was far from inspiring: three officers in
all were killed in battle, one was killed by a Japanese sentry and one died in
an air crash.”14
13. Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the
Development of a Nation, p.152
14. John Connell, Auchinleck- A Critical Biography, p.97,
One of
the reasons for the INA’s poor performance was the quality of its leaders.
Commenting on this aspect, Toye writes: “…few of the platoon and company
commanders in the 1st INA Division had been trained as officers at
all: most of them had been promoted direct from the ranks by Mohan Singh… What
quality of leadership could be expected of officers such as these in the war of
1944?”15
15. Toye, p.120
In military terms, are the claims of INA victories
genuine?
Q.4
How many INA soldiers were killed in battle?
Apart
from their performance in battle, INA veterans make tall claims about the
number of soldiers who died in battle. Captain SS Yadav, an ex-INA officer has
complied a book (Forgotten Warriors), listing the names of all members
of the INA. This is also claimed to be the official history of the INA. The
list contains about 13,000 names, with several appearing more than once and
many addresses missing or incomplete. It has a list of 131 persons who died in
action and a Roll of Honour listing the names of 1602 persons who died from all
causes, including wounds, sickness, accidents etc. Yet, he writes: “The
valiant troops of the INA had to withdraw to Burma from the battlefronts of
Kohima and Imphal. About twenty six thousand heroes of the Indian National Army
laid down their lives”.16 Shah Nawaz is more
conservative, stating that 4,000 INA soldiers were killed in the fighting in
April and May 1944.
16. Captain SS Yadav, Forgotten Warriors
of Indian War of Independence 1941-1946, p.50
The INA figures appear to be grossly
inflated. Quoting official figures given by GHQ India, Toye writes: “The INA
Division had started out for Imphal six thousand strong: only two thousand six
hundred returned, and of these about two thousand had to be sent at once to
hospital. During the campaign 715 men deserted, about four hundred were killed
in battle, about eight hundred surrendered, and about fifteen hundred died of
disease and starvation.17
17. Toye, pp.125-126
In subsequent operations, the number of desertions
increased, while fewer were killed in action. Menezes writes: “Of some
15,500 INA personnel in Burma in 1945, 150 were killed in action; 1,500 died of
starvation or disease; 5,000 surrendered or deserted; 7,000 were captured;
2,000 escaped towards Bangkok. 18
18. Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour – The Indian
Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, p. 397
It is obvious that the number of INA
soldiers killed in action was much less than what is claimed in the official
history. Unfortunately, there is no Roll of Honour or a war memorial on which
the names of these fallen soldiers can be inscribed.
Q5. Were Indian soldiers in the pre-Independence
Indian Army patriots or mercenaries?
The soldiers of the INA fought
against their compatriots in the British Indian Army. The professed aim of the
INA was to free India from British rule. Hence they considered themselves as
patriots and the Indians serving in the British Indian Army as mercenaries.
This question had baffled most Indians of that time and does so even today.
Almost all
officers who joined the INA claim that they did so for patriotic reasons. Of
course, none of them has been able to explain why his sense of patriotism
surfaced only after being captured. If they felt so strongly about serving
under the British, they should have resigned. In the Preface to Toye’s book,
Philip Mason wrote, “One must respect such a man as Subhas Chandra Bose, who
resigned from the Indian Civil Service because he sincerely believed it his
duty to India; that respect can hardly be extended to all who changed sides in
adversity and who a second time chose the more comfortable path”19.
19. Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger, p. VIII
Mohan Singh feels differently,
writing: In whatever dignified colours we may paint the pre-Independence
Indian Army, we cannot hide one hard fact that, besides its responsibility for
the defence and security of our country, it had to play its purely mercenary
role.20
20. Mohan Singh, p. 65
Of course, there is an inherent contradiction
in Mohan Singh’s statement – responsibility for defence of one’s country does
not blend with a mercenary role. The primary task of the Indian Army, even
under British rule, was defence and internal security of the country. In 1933
the War Office had spelt out the role of the Indian Army in the following
words: “The duties of the army in India include the preservation of internal
security in India, the covering of the lines of internal communication, and the
protection of India against external attack. Though the scale of forces
is not calculated to meet external attack by a great Power, their duties might
well comprise the initial resistance to such an attack pending the arrival of
imperial reinforcements.21
21. Bisheshwar Prasad, ed. Official History of the Indian Armed
Forces in the Second World War 1939-45 – India and the War, p.35
The supplementary role implied the
provision of an Imperial Reserve, for which the British Government agreed to
grant an annual subsidy of 1.5 million pounds to the Government of India. This
role was modified by the ‘1938 Plan’ (Document No. B-43746), which stipulated
six tasks for the Indian defence forces, viz. defence of the Western Frontier
against external aggression; defence of land frontiers other than the Western
Frontier; maintenance of law and order and the suppression of disorder and
rebellion; safeguarding strategic lines of communication within India;
provision of a general reserve with mobile components; and provision of forces
for possible employment overseas at the request of the Government of UK. In
view of the enhancement in the responsibilities assigned to India, the
Chatfield Committee was constituted in 1938 to recommend measures to modernize
and increase the size of the Indian armed forces. The Committee recommended
that a new contract be negotiated with the Government of India, to enable it to
fulfill its task. The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the
British Cabinet on 28 June 1939, but before they could be implemented, World
War II broke out.
As will be obvious, the primary
responsibility of the Indian Army – defence of India – never changed. The
employment of Indian troops overseas was covered by a formal contract between
the governments of UK and India. By
definition, a mercenary soldier fights for money or reward for a country other
than his own. Strictly speaking, the term would be more appropriate for the INA
soldiers who fought for a foreign power – Japan. It is pertinent that the
salaries of all ex-Indian Army soldiers in the INA were paid by Japan, the
Provisional Government of Azad Hind paying only for the civilian
recruits.
Who were the mercenaries – Indian
soldiers in the Indian Army or the Indian National Army?
Q.6 What is the truth about atrocities committed by the INA?
There were several reported instances of the INA soldiers committing
atrocities on Indian soldiers who were captured and held in their custody, as
well as on those who refused to join the INA. After the end of the war, some of
them were tried by court martial and convicted, not only for waging war against
the Crown but also murder, and causing grievous hurt. Of the three officers
(Shah Nawaz Khan, P.K. Sahgal and G.S. Dhillon), who were tried in the Red Fort
in 1945, Dhillon was charged with the murder of Duli Chand, Hari Singh, Daryao
Singh and Dharam Singh, whereas the other two were charged with abetment to
murder, in addition to waging war against the King. Later, Captain Burhanuddin
was also tried for murder but found guilty only of causing grievous hurt.
Apparently, “Teja Singh was stood on a table, his wrists tied to a
rope eight feet from the ground, the table removed, and Teja Singh beaten by
120 men in succession under Burhanuddin’s orders until he lost consciousness,
with the result that he subsequently died.”22
22. Connell, p.817
Commenting on the atrocities omitted
by the INA, Shahid Hamid writes: ‘Most officers later realized that the INA
was a trap, but once in they could not get out. They had no love for the
Japanese and maintained that they were let down by them. The atrocities
committed by the Kempatai (Japanese Special Military Police) did not help
towards better relations. Taking their clue (sic) from the Kempatai the INA
committed atrocious crimes in the name of patriotism against their own
comrades. These are considered among the most degrading crimes in the history
of soldiering’23
23. Hamid, p.17
However, there is a contrary view,
which holds that stories of INA atrocities were sometimes concocted or
deliberately exaggerated by British Intelligence, in order to protect Indian
soldiers from falling prey to INA propaganda. According to Peter Ward Fay, in
1943 the British authorities adopted a programme that was intended to blacken
the name of the INA, which was christened the JIFC (Japanese Indian or Inspired
Fifth Column), which came to be known as Jiffs. Each unit was asked to form a ‘josh group’, in which officers were detailed
to educate and train in countering INA propaganda and possible seduction by
contact parties of the INA as had occurred in the Arakan. Interrogation files
were combed for instances of barbarous behaviour by the Japanese towards
prisoners, and these were circulated among troops deployed on the Burma Front.
“There is a purpose here. It is to instil hatred of the Japanese, contempt
for traitors, and in general a desire to be ‘up and at them’ into the men”.
24
24. Fay, p.424
The INA executed some of its own
members, who were accused of desertion. This was done after trials conducted by
the INA under its own Act, whose legality was suspect. However, Bose had
himself decreed that traitors would be executed, even though he had earlier
announced that anyone who wished to leave the INA could do so at any stage.
There was the well-known case of Captain Durrani, who not only instructed
several intelligence agents sent to India to surrender, but gave them
intelligence to pass on to authorities in India. At a secret midnight
arraignment in the Bidadri Concentration Camp, Bose personally interrogated
Durrani, who was weak and dazed after ten days of Japanese third degree. Bose
would take no denial. “You should be
grateful to me”, he said, “that I have saved you from the Japanese
firing squad, and that you will be shot by Indians”. 25.
25. Toye, p.112. (Durrani survived and was
later decorated with the George Cross for his fortitude.)
Q7. Did the INA resort to coercion to collect funds?
Maintaining
a large military force like the INA needed considerable amount of funds. The
Japanese agreed to pay the salaries of the prisoners of war, and to supply the
weapons, equipment and rations. Most of the weapons and equipment were captured
from the British Army after the fall of Singapore, and as it retreated from
Burma. However, the civilian recruits had to be paid by the IIL, which had to
rely on contributions from the Indian community in South East Asia. In the
initial period these contributions were voluntary, and sufficed to meet the
needs of the INA. However, after the arrival of Bose, the IIL was expanded,
with a secretariat and eight departments to handle its multifarious activities.
By October 1943 the monthly expenses amounted to about a million local dollars
or 116,700 pounds sterling.
The arrival of
Bose infused new life into the movement, and Indians made generous
contributions. A merchant named Habeeb donated his entire estate to the IIL.
Even poor Indians did not lag behind and gave whatever they could afford.
However, the contribution soon dried up and persuasion was replaced by
threats. On 25 October 1943 Bose
addressed the merchants of Malaya with severity: Legally speaking there is
no private property when a country is in a state of war. If you think that your
wealth and possessions are your own, you are living in delusion. Your lives and property do not belong to you;
they now belong to India and India alone. 26
26. Toye, p.94
When Bose heard
that some of the rich Indians of Malaya were murmuring that he was harassing
them, and wanted to change their nationalities or avoid payment by some other
means, he told them; ‘I stand here today representing the Provisional
Government of Azad Hind which has absolute rights over your lives and
properties…If you do not choose to come forward voluntarily, then we are not
going to remain slaves on that account… Everyone who refuses to help our cause
is….. our enemy. 27
27. Toye, p.95
Bose soon
recognized that cash donations would not be enough to meet his needs and
decided that he must make a systematic levy on Indian property. From the
beginning of 1944 Indians had to declare their assets. Levies of from ten to
twenty five percent were imposed and collected with progressive vigour. After a
state reception in Manila, Bose visited Saigon on 24 November 1943, where the
Indian community was assembled to greet him.
He assessed its contribution to his funds at twelve million piastres
and, when the leaders demurred, exclaimed, much as he had done in Malaya:
‘All your wealth would not buy back one life lost in battle. I have full
jurisdiction over you and can order you to the front.28
28. Toye, p.98
The shortage of
funds was aggravated once it became clear that Japan was losing the war. In
November 1944 the collection in Malaya fell from $ 2,000,000 to $ 617,000, in
six months. It became difficult to enforce assessments - now that people knew
that time was on their side, they delayed payments and concealed assets. In
December 1944 Bose toured the region, to collect funds. In Penang he ordered
the arrest of a defaulter, which had a salutary effect on the others. On his
return to Singapore, he threatened ten people with arrest. Letters were sent
out to each defaulter, with a warning that if they did not pay up within three
days, they would face arrest and imprisonment. On his way back to Rangoon in
January 1945 Bose addressed a public meeting.
His speech was direct and bitter: those who opposed him should say so
openly, they could then be put into concentration camps with the British and
their property could be confiscated: if they wished to remain free they must
pay their assessments. Bose left with the Japanese Security Police a list of
ten persons for immediate arrest, and eighty others for varying degrees of
surveillance and pressure: in the following two weeks the ten were arrested. 29
29. Toye, p.133
In July 1945
‘Netaji Week’ was celebrated in Singapore. The rich Indians were called for a
meeting to hear new demands for money. On the orders of Bose, five of the
defaulters warned in January were arrested by the Japanese Security Police.
Several demand notes went out from the IIL.
A man who had promised ten thousand dollars but sent only half received
a terse note: ‘I regret that our instructions are not to accept part
payments. Netaji made it very clear that promises must be fulfilled in a day or
two. It is incumbent on you to pay your promised amount at once.’ Kuala
Lumpur was similarly visited, where five defaulters were arrested. 30
30. Toye, p.162
Were these coercive methods to extort funds from
Indians living in foreign countries lawful?
Q8 What is
the truth about Bose’s marriage to Emilie Schenkel and the reasons behind
keeping it hidden?
One subject that remains somewhat of a mystery is Bose’s secret marriage
to Emilie Schenkl, an Austrian girl he first met during his visit to Europe in
the thirties. She worked as his secretary and helped him produce The Indian
Struggle in 1934. During a subsequent visit in 1937, she accompanied Bose
to the health resort of Bad Gastein, where he wrote his autobiography, The
Indian Pilgrim, which was published ten years later.31
31. Fay, p.195.
Emilie was his secretary again in 1941, when he went
to Germany after his dramatic escape from Calcutta and established the Free
India Centre. Toye writes: ‘In July 1942 it became necessary for Fraulein
Schenkl, who had been Bose’ private secretary for more than a year, to leave
the Free India Centre. The dismissal was not what it seemed. Bose had known
Emilie Schenkl ever since 1934; she was now secretly his wife, and in September
1942 was to bear him a daughter’. 32
32. Toye, p.75.
Though it is fairly certain Bose married Emilie Schenkl secretly in
1937 and they had a daughter named Anita Bose Pfaff in 1942, some questions about the marriage
remain. It has not been clearly established if there was an actual marriage
ceremony. Bose chose to keep his marriage a secret and did not reveal it except to a
chosen few. What could be reason for this? Several historians have written
about it including members of his own family, such as Sugata Bose. He writes:-
On 4 November 1937,
Subhas sent a letter to Emilie in German, saying that he would probably travel
to Europe in the middle of November. "Please write to Kurhaus Hochland,
Badgastein," he instructed her, "and enquire if I (and you also) can
stay there". He asked her to mention this message only to her parents, not
to reply, and wait for his next airmail letter or telegram. On 16 November, he
sent a cable: "Starting aeroplane arriving Badgastein twenty second
arrange lodging and meet me. ...”. He
spent a month and a half—from 22 November 1937, to 8 January 1938—with Emilie
at his favourite resort of Badgastein.33
33. Bose, Sugata (2011), His Majesty's Opponent: Subhas
Chandra Bose and India's Struggle against Empire, Harvard University
Press. p. 127
He goes on to write: On 26 December 1937, Subhas Chandra Bose secretly
married Emilie Schenkl. Despite the obvious anguish, they chose to keep their
relationship and marriage a closely guarded secret.34
34. Bose (2011), pp. 129–130.
Leonard A Gordon, who has written a biography of Netaji and his brother
Sarat Chandra Bose, writes:-
Although
we must take Emilie Schenkl at her word (about her secret marriage to Bose in
1937), there are a few nagging doubts about an actual marriage ceremony because
there is no document that I have seen and no testimony by any other
person. ... Other biographers have written that Bose and Miss Schenkl were
married in 1942, while Krishna Bose, implying 1941, leaves the date ambiguous.
The strangest and most confusing testimony comes from A. C. N. Nambiar, who was
with the couple in Badgastein briefly in 1937, and was with them in Berlin
during the war as second-in-command to Bose. In an answer to my question about
the marriage, he wrote to me in 1978: 'I cannot state anything definite about
the marriage of Bose referred to by you, since I came to know of it only a good
while after the end of the last world war ... I can imagine the marriage
having been a very informal one ...'... So what are we left
with? ... We know they had a close passionate relationship and that they
had a child, Anita, born 29 November 1942, in Vienna. ... And we have
Emilie Schenkl's testimony that they were married secretly in 1937. Whatever
the precise dates, the most important thing is the relationship."35
35. Gordon, Leonard A. (1990), Brothers against the Raj: a biography
of Indian nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose, Columbia University
Press, pp. 344–345.
According to Fay, Emilie had begun living with Bose
almost from the moment he reached Europe. Since Bose had taken a vow that he
would not marry until India was free, he was naturally reluctant to formalize
their relationship. However, Emilie wanted to get married, and he could not
refuse her. But he agonized over the repercussions when the secret became
known, as it was bound to someday. Many years later, soon after the debacle at
Imphal, during a rare moment when he was alone with Laksmi Swaminathan, he
asked her, “Do you think people in India will understand?” 36
36. Fay, p.312.
Q. 9 Was
Azad Hind Government a sovereign state?
On 21 October
1943, Bose announced the formation of the Arzi
Hukumat-e-Azad Hind, or the Provisional Government of Free India, with himself as the Head of State, Prime Minister and
Minister of War. (This was the second Provisional Government of Free India, the first
having been established in in Kabul on 01
December 1915 by Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh, with the support of Germany,
Turkey and Afghanistan. The
Provisional Government ceased to function in 1920 when King Amanullah of
Afghanistan made peace with England after his famous war of independence). The INA was declared to
be the army of Azad Hind. Immediately
after its formation, the Provisional Government of Free India declared war
against the Allied forces on the Indo-Burma Front. The Azad Hind
Government also produced its own currency, postage stamps, court and civil
code, and was recognised by some Axis powers.
To qualify as a sovereign state, the Azad Hind Government needed some
territory of its own. In 1942, the Japanese took possession of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. A year later, the Provisional Government of
Azad Hind and the INA were established in the Islands with Lt
Col. A.D.
Loganathan as Governor General. The islands were renamed Shaheed (Martyr)
and Swaraj (Independence). However, the Provisional
Government’s civil authority was never enacted in areas occupied by the INA;
instead, Japanese military authority prevailed and responsibility for administration
of occupied areas of India was shared between the Japanese and the Indian
forces. During his interrogation after the war, Loganathan
admitted that he had only had control over the islands' education department,
as the Japanese had retained full control over the police force, and in
protest, he had refused to accept responsibility for any other areas of
Government. He could not prevent the Homfreyganj massacre of 30 January 1944, where forty-four Indian
civilians were shot by the Japanese on suspicion of spying. Many of them were
members of the Indian Independence League, whose leader in Port Blair, Dr. Diwan Singh,
had already been tortured to death in the Cellular Jail after doing
his best to protect the islanders from Japanese atrocities during the first two
years of the occupation.37, 38
37. Dasgupta,
Jayant (2002) Japanese in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Red Sun over
Black Water. Delhi: Manas Publications. Pp. 67, 87, 91–95.
38. Mathur,
L.P. (1985) Kala Pani. History of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands
with a study of India's Freedom Struggle. Delhi: Eastern Book Corporation.
pp. 249–251.
Significantly, when the Japanese
surrendered at the end of World War II, there was a formal surrender ceremony
which Lt Col Nathu Singh, who was commanding 1/7 Rajput battalion of the Indian
Army, accepted the formal surrender of Japanese troops in the Andaman and
Nicobar islands from Vice Admiral Teejo Hara, on behalf of the Supreme Allied
Commander, South East Asia.39
39.
Singh, Major General V.K. (2005), Leadership
in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers: New Delhi, Sage
Publications, p.65
Can the Azad Hind Government still claim that it was a sovereign state?
Q10. Was
Netaji a military or a political leader?
Subhas
Chandra Bose was only 24 years old when he returned to India from England in
1921, after having resigned from the ICS. He met Mahatma Gandhi who in turn
advised him to meet CR Das, who was leading the freedom movement in Bengal.
Bose found Das to
be more flexible than Gandhi and sympathetic to the extremism that attracted
idealistic young men such as Bose in Bengal. It was Das who launched Bose into
nationalist politics. For the next 20 years, Bose worked within the ambit
of the Indian National Congress politics even as he tried to change its course.
40
40.
Gordon
1990, p. 69.
Bose's writings prior to 1939 shows
that he disapproved of the racist practices and annulment of democratic
institutions in Nazi Germany. However, he expressed admiration for the
authoritarian methods which he saw in Italy and Germany during the 1930s, and
thought they could be used in building an independent India. During the
two years he spent in Germany from 1941 to 1943, he was able to open the Free
India Centre in Berlin, and to set up a Free India
Radio on which he broadcast every night. He also created the 3,000 strong Free
India Legion from Indian prisoners of war captured by Germany’s Afrika
Korps. This restored his reputation as a
politician, which had been adversely affected in the previous two years.
After his arrival in
Singapore in 1943, Bose realized that the Japanese were more responsive to his
aspirations than the Germans. He was able to obtain more support from Japan
than he had from Germany. The Indian National Army that had been disbanded was
revived and took part in some operations in Burma alongside Japanese forces. He
also created the Provisional
Government of Free India in Japanese occupied Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These
efforts did not bear fruit and after the recapture of Singapore by British
forces and the surrender of the remnants of the INA at Rangoon, Bose escaped to
Manchuria, hoping to continue his campaign for liberating India with the help
of the Soviet Union. His life ended in the plane before could complete his journey.
There is little doubt that Bose had all the qualities needed by a
successful political leader. He was
confident of his abilities and just a week after his arrival in Singapore said
so himself. On 9 July, 60,000 people stood in pouring rain to hear Bose
proclaim: ‘There is no nationalist leader in India who can claim to possess
the many sided experience that I have been able to acquire.’ 41
41. Toye, p. 82
But
can the same be said about his military experience? He had not undergone any
military training at all, yet when he raised the INA he chose to be its
Commander-in-Chief. He emulated Adolf Hitler, not only in his actions but also
in matters of dress, salutation and title. Hitler had some military experience
having served in the German Army during World War I, but had risen to rank of
corporal. He often overruled his marshals with disastrous results, which
ultimately led to his downfall.
During Imphal campaign, though the Japanese appreciated the firmness with
which Bose's forces continued to fight, they were endlessly exasperated with
him. A number of Japanese officers, even those like Fujiwara, who were devoted to
the Indian cause, saw Bose as a military incompetent as well as an unrealistic
and stubborn man who saw only his own needs and problems and could not see the
larger picture of the war as the Japanese had to.42
Fujiwara, who knew
the INA and its leaders more than any other Japanese officer, writes: “As
leader of the Army, Bose became the foundation of spiritual strength and was
the pivot of the INA organisation. However, the standard of his operational
tactics was, it must be said with great regret, low. He was inclined to be
idealistic and not realistic. To this Toye adds: “The fact that he was
neither a good soldier, nor the infallible political genius his disciples
believed, makes only the more remarkable his power of fascination.”43
43. Toye, p.178
Though Bose had worn
the mantle of a military leader, in Germany as well as in Singapore, some of
his actions show that he was not aware of the responsibilities that such a role
entails. One of these was the safety and well-being of the men under his command,
which is part of the motto of every Indian officer who passes out from the
portals of the Indian Military Academy.
After having created
the Indian Foreign Legion in Germany, when he found that the Germans were not
willing to give him the role that he wanted, he left for Singapore, to seek the
help of Japan. He left 3,000 soldiers of the Indian Foreign Legion to their
fate. He did something similar when he found that the INA had not failed to
achieve its objectives. Ten days before the INA surrendered to British forces
at Rangoon, Bose left for Manchuria, along with the women of the Rani Jhansi
Regiment and a few others. He left 10,000 soldiers of the INA to their fate.
This was contrary to the time honoured custom of a commander always
surrendering with his troops, instead of leaving them to their fate.
America declared its independence in 1776, but it took
another five years to win freedom from the British. On October 19, 1781,
the British General Charles Cornwallis surrendered in Yorktown, Virginia along
with 8,000 British troops. During World War I, in the siege of Kut-al Amara,
Major General Charles Townshend surrendered to the Turkish forces on 29
April 1916. He spent the rest of the war confined at Constantinople, while
around 4,000 of the 10,000 troops which surrendered at Kut died either on the
march to Turkish prison camps, or were worked to death in the camps. During World
War II, Lieutenant General Arthur Percival
surrendered at Singapore to the Japanese along with 136,000 men in February
1942. Churchill called it “the worst disaster in British history”. A more
recent example is the surrender of Lieutenant
General Niazi along with 93,000 Pakistani soldiers at Dacca in 1971, after the
liberation of East Pakistan by the Indian Army. Bose may not be aware of this
military custom, but surely his military advisers must have been. It is
surprising than none of them advised him about this tradition.
Shahnawaz mentions an interesting incident that
occurred on 29 April 1945 during the journey after Bose left Rangoon. He
writes: “General Isoda of the Liasion Department asked Netaji to go
in the car and the Rani Jhansi girls in the lorries. He said “Do you think I am
Ba Maw of Burma that I will leave my men and run for safety?”44
44. Shahnawaz, p. 243.
In fact, this is
exactly what Bose was doing – leaving his men and running for safety.
Q.11 Did
the INA play a part in India’s independence?
Most INA veterans assert that they played a stellar
role in India’s independence from British rule. In support of this view, they
cite various documents that show that one of the reasons that prompted the
British decision to grant independence to India was the realisation that they
could no longer rely on the Indian Army.
In note written in early 1946 Lord Wavell wrote: “It would not be
wise to try the Indian Army too highly in suppression of it’s own people.”45
In the Foreword to KC Praval's book on the Indian Army, Lieutenant General SK
Sinha wrote, ‘There had also been the Naval mutiny at Bombay and the Army
(Signals) mutiny at Jubbulpore. It was now clear as daylight to the British
that they could no longer use the Indian Army to perpetuate their imperial rule
over India…”46
45. Wavell, The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 197
46. Major KC Praval, Indian Army After Independence, p. IX.
Menezes writes: ‘Now in early 1946, serious cases
of mutiny suddenly occurred in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN), less serious in the
Royal Air Force (RAF) (wanting early repatriation) and in the Royal Indian Air
Force, and a lesser protest in the Indian Army, at Jubbulpore in the Signal
Training Centre.47 Though Menezes calls the Jubbulpore
mutiny ‘a lesser protest’, in fact it was taken most seriously by the British
authorities. The RIN and RIAF at that time were miniscule forces, with hardly
any role in governance. The major instrument of British power was the Indian
Army, and disaffection in its ranks was a cause for concern, however small. On
28 March 1946, less than a month after the suppression of the mutiny at
Jubbulpore, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India,
broadcast his famous appeal to all officers of the Indian Army. On 30 March
1946, the Hindustan Times commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal. “There
is no doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought
about, the foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian
Army…”48.
47. Menezes, p. 404
48. Hamid, p.47
While there is no doubt that
nationalist feelings had taken root in the Indian Army, there is no proof that
the INA was the catalyst. There were three prominent mutinies in 1946 – the RIN
mutiny at Bombay, Karachi and other places; the Army mutiny at Jabalpur and the
RIAF mutiny at several places. The root causes of all three were deficiencies
in pay, food, accommodation etc; delay in demobilization and discrimination
against Indian servicemen. While it is true that after the INA trials - not
before - there was a feeling of sympathy for the INA prisoners in certain
quarters in the Armed Forces, there is nothing on record to show any direct
correlation between these movements and the INA. In fact, after the fall of
Rangoon so strong was the feeling against the INA prisoners amongst Indian
soldiers that Auchinleck had to issue instructions for their safety. The
assertion that these mutinies were inspired by the INA appears to be
fallacious.
