CHAPTER – 3 THE GREAT INDIAN MUTINY – 1857

CHAPTER – 3

THE GREAT INDIAN MUTINY – 1857

            The uprising of 1857 that British historians christened the Sepoy Mutiny or the Great Indian Mutiny was in fact not a mere rebellion but an Armageddon. Though it began as a mutiny by soldiers in the service of the East India Company, it soon turned into a conflict between two peoples, one enslaved by the other for over a hundred years. The objective of the insurrection being freedom from British bondage, Indian historians had good reason to name it the ‘first war of independence’. Whatever it’s appellation, there is little doubt that it was a watershed in the history of the sub-continent and a turning point in the Indo-British relations. For the first time since the beginning of British rule in India, the seeds of nationalism were germinated in the heart of every Indian, irrespective of his religion and caste. It would take ninety years for the plant to grow and bear fruit. Hundreds of thousands of people took part in India’s freedom struggle, many sacrificing their youth and their careers, some even their lives. But it is important to remember that in 1857, it was the common soldier who kindled the flame that finally lighted up the lives of all Indians.

            The Mutiny     lasted well over a year and ended only after the Proclamation by Queen Victoria on 1 November 1858 ending the rule of the East India Company in India, though sporadic revolts continued even after this. Though the major events took place in North-Western Provinces (Agra and Oudh), there were few parts of the sub continent that remained untouched. Much has been written about the Mutiny and it is therefore not intended to cover it in detail in this chapter. However, the principal events that occurred at important stations will be briefly mentioned, along with the principal causes of the Mutiny and its consequences. More importantly, the role that it played in the struggle for freedom from British rule will be examined. 

            Unlike their predecessors of foreign origin who ruled over India, the British did not invade the country. When they first arrived, it was not with the aim of conquest, but trade. In fact, of the several European nations which had a presence in the sub continent, the British were the only ones without any mandate or support from their government. The United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies, which later came to be known as the East India Company, saw in India, as they did in China and several other countries in the East, an opportunity to make huge profits. The British soldiers they employed to guard their factories and warehouses, proved to be inadequate, forcing them to recruit additional numbers from the local population. This gave birth to the Company’s Army, the forebears of the present day Indian Army. Even after the arrival of regular British troops of the King’s or Queen’s Army in later years, the Company’s Army retained its distinct identity, right up to 1857.

           

After gaining a foothold the British proceeded to subdue the local rulers by military force and acquire territory. In the initial years they had to compete with the French, Dutch and Portuguese who had similar designs. Displaying superior military prowess and political acumen, they soon defeated other European forces as well as local potentates and their power and influence increased rapidly. With territorial gains came added responsibilities and the Company soon found itself performing the role of the ruler that it had displaced. Motivated by a genuine desire to provide an efficient administration and improve the lot of the common people, social and economic reforms began to be introduced. With arrogance born of a firm belief in their superiority, they failed to consider the effects of these measures on a people who valued caste and religion above everything, including their lives. In spite of their foreign descent, the Mughals were aware of the role of religion and caste in India and took special care to avoid measures that hurt local sensibilities on this account. The only exception, Aurangzeb, proved to be the last of the Great Mughals. It was a lesson the British should have learned but did not.

Since the British professed to have come to India for trade, in the initial years they did not assume the mantle of rulers despite the fact that they had gained control of considerable tracts of territory. Even after become the virtual rulers of Carnatic and Bengal the Company did not assume sovereign powers. Clive approached the Emperor at Delhi for grant of Diwani (the right to collect revenue) in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Though they had become de facto rulers, the British continued to propagate the myth that they were acting as agents of the Emperor. It was only in the second or third decade of the 19^th Century, when they were confident of their power that they began to assert their independence and authority. They encouraged the Nawab Wazir of Oudh to declare himself as the King; struck coins in the name of the Company and replaced Persian with English as the language in the Court. These measures caused alarm among the populace and local chieftains, who realized the real intentions of the British in India. With each new act that affirmed their status as rulers rather than agents, discontent and apprehension among the common people increased, culminating in the outburst of 1857.

            The first instance of a slight to the religious prejudices of the Indian soldier occurred in 1806, resulting in the mutiny at Vellore. This was followed by the unfortunate events in Barrackpore in 1824, where sepoys of the Bengal Army were fired upon merely for refusing to proceed for duty overseas, an act which would have resulted in loss of caste and social ostracization.  The brutal manner in which these mutinies were suppressed convinced the sepoys that their British masters were indifferent to their religious feelings. Shortly after the Barrackpore incident the British abolished the ancient Hindu practice of Sati (self immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands). Educated and enlightened Indians such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy welcomed the measure, but the common people saw in it another assault on their religion.

In 1939 the British invaded Afghanistan, marking the beginning of the First Afghan War that ended in 1942. It was an unmitigated disaster, in which hundreds of British soldiers and thousands of Indian sepoys lost their lives. Most of those who were captured were enslaved and converted to Islam. The lucky few who were rescued by a relief force returned to find that they had become outcasts in their own homes. According to Sardar Bahadur Hedayet Ali, a Subedar in Rattrays’ Sikhs, the Afghan War was the root cause of the Mutiny. It not only antagonized the Hindu sepoy, who found himself virtually excommunicated by his relatives and colleagues, but also the Muslim, who felt unhappy to fight against a co-religionist. Hedayet Ali says that ‘the Mahomedans always boasted among themselves how they had evaded the English order by never taking aim when they fired.’1

Subedar Hedayet Ali describes the trauma faced by Hindu sepoys who returned from the Afghan War in these words: ‘None of the Hindoos in Hindoostan would eat with their comrades who went to Afghanistan, nor would they even allow them to touch their cooking utensils; they looked upon them as outcasts, and treated them accordingly.’ A similar account is given by Sitaram, who served in Afghanistan as a Jemadar. ‘Great fears were felt by the sepoys at the idea of having to go across the Indus……..The sepoys dreaded passing the Indus, because it is out of Hindustan. This is forbidden in our religion: the very act is loss of caste. In consequence of this many sepoys obtained their discharge, and many deserted.’ 2

The enlargement of the Company’s dominions in India was accompanied by a corresponding increase in missionary activities. Several missionary schools were established, where students were not only taught basic subjects but also enlightened about the Christian faith. The missionaries believed that Christianity was the only true religion and considered it a sacred duty to convert those who followed other religions. Missionary activity was carried out not only in schools but also in jails, where prisoners were instructed in the Gospel by visiting Indian clergymen. Though the missionaries were not directly supported by the government, the fact that the functionaries of the Company belonged to the same faith and were frequently seen in their company gave to Indians the impression that both had a common aim – to make them Christians. The impression was reinforced by the introduction of common messing in jails in 1845, doing away with the system of food being cooked separately for each caste. This naturally caused considerable resentment among the higher castes, especially the Brahmins, who lost caste for eating food cooked by others.

Act XXI was enacted in 1850, which permitted converts to inherit ancestral property. Though it was applicable to all religions, in effect it benefitted only converts to Christianity. Hinduism did not permit conversion from other religions and the Muslim convert derived no advantage because Islam forbids inheriting the property of an infidel. The law was therefore seen as a measure intended to encourage conversion to Christianity. Hindus found the new law particularly offensive since it gave to those who left the religion rights to the property of their ancestors without the inherent obligations such as lighting the funeral pyre and performing rituals on death anniversaries. The Hindu, therefore, felt that the law inflicted on him a double loss, the loss of a son in his life and the loss of his religious services hereafter.3

In 1855 there was a serious incident at Bolarum near Hyderabad that should have acted as a warning to the British that the sepoy was quite capable of resorting to violence if severely provoked as regards his religion. Not realising that an important Muslim festival, Moharrum, also fell on that day, Brigadier General Colin Mackenzie commanding the Hyderabad Contingent issued an order on 21 September banning processions on 23 September, a Sunday. This enraged the Muslim troopers of the 3^rd Cavalry, who felt that the Moharrum procession had been banned. Though the order was withdrawn next day, the damage had been done. On the fateful day, the Muslim troopers took out the procession along the forbidden route that ran past the Brigadiers’ bungalow. Mackenzie, who was then sitting on his lawn with some other officers and ladies, was annoyed when the processions neared his house, accompanied by loud music and lamentations, which are an integral part of the pageant. He came out of his house and ordered the men to disperse. When they refused, in a fit of rage he snatched some of the flags they were carrying. The angry men dispersed but shortly after wards made a murderous attack on Mackenzie who was left for dead but survived. Subsequently, all the Indian officers of 3^rd Cavalry except two were dismissed. The Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, opined that Brigadier Mackenzie had acted indiscreetly: ‘the order was not only unusual, but objectionable in that it put forward the Moharrum in direct confrontation with the Christian Sabbath, and so introduced a religious element into the prohibition.’ Mackenzie was brought down to the rank of major and transferred to Murshidabad as Agent to the Governor General. He eventually retired as a lieutenant general. 4

In 1856 Lord Canning arrived in India as Governor-General. His predecessor, Lord Dalhousie had approved the draft of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, which appeared to be a natural consequence of the abolition of Sati. The measure to permit widows to marry had been advocated by several Hindu scholars, particularly Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, who argued that it was based on old scriptures. In effect, the practice was already in vogue among the lower castes, and it was only the higher castes such as the Brahmins who despised it. Though the measure was permissive and did not impose any compulsion, it was viewed as yet another attempt to interfere with ancient Hindu customs. So strong were social prejudices at that time that very few widows actually took advantage of the new law, in spite of the efforts of social reformers.5

Another unpopular measure introduced in 1856 concerned the terms of engagement of new recruits to the Bengal Army. Due to caste prejudices, sepoys of the Bengal Army were unwilling to serve overseas, and their terms of service specifically included a clause to this effect. The Madras Army, which had a fair proportion of Brahmins, had no such qualms and were frequently sent abroad, even when the area of operations fell in the jurisdiction of the Bengal Army. Wishing to put an end to this anomaly, Lord Canning decided that future recruitment to the Bengal Army would include a condition for overseas service. Though the sepoys already serving were not affected, they were alarmed by the new regulation, which would close the door to military service to future generations. The ill timed measure convinced the sepoy that the British had no regard for long service and loyalty, and neither could they be trusted to respect religion and caste. 6

The sepoys regarded the changes in the terms of recruitment of the Bengal Army a breach of faith by the British. Later, a British officer who had spent many years with the Bengal Army was to admit: ‘Almost all the mutinies in India, whether in Bengal or elsewhere, have been more or less produced, or least have had in some sort the initiative, from ourselves. There has usually been some departure from contract, some disregard of the feelings, health or convenience of the native soldiers, when at the same moment the utmost care was lavished on a European regiment; some interference with their pay or rights, or what they supposed to be their right’.7

Instances of breaches of promise regarding pay and allowances had caused trouble in the Bengal and Madras Armies in 1843 and 1844. The Indian sepoy had an insular outlook and disliked foreign service. To him, any place far away from home was foreign, and he expected to be compensated financially for the hardships that he had to endure in unfamiliar regions.  During the First Afghan War, General Pollock had paid the sepoys a special batta (allowance) when they crossed the Indus. In 1843 Sind was annexed and became a part of the British Empire. It was no longer a foreign land and hence batta ceased to be admissible. However, the sepoy could not comprehend these legal niceties, since the Indus had still to be crossed. In 1844 the 34^th Bengal Infantry and 7^th Bengal Cavalry had refused to march to Sind unless the Indus batta was paid. Their example was followed by the 69^th and 4^th Regiments, which refused to cross the Indus unless a special allowance was paid to them. A similar demand by the 64^th was conceded by the Commander-in-Chief, who agreed to grant an increment in pay and certain other benefits such as family pension to the heirs of those who died from disease contracted on service. The commanding officer, Colonel Moseley, persuaded the regiment to cross the Indus, assuring the men that they would be getting the same batta as given to Pollock’s sepoys. However, on arrival at Shikarpur they refused their pay when they found that they were to be paid only eight rupees as batta, instead of the twelve that they had been promised. (The salary of a sepoy was seven rupees). It was only on the personal intervention of General George Hunter, whom the men loved and respected, that they finally agreed to receive their pay.  Holding the commanding officer responsible for the crisis, Hunter removed him from command. Moseley was tried by court martial and cashiered. Thirty eight of the mutineers were also tried and sentenced to death. Finally only six were awarded capital punishment, the sentences of the others being commuted to life imprisonment or hard labour for various terms. Considering that the entire regiment had mutinied, the sentences were regarded as lenient.  However, the bond of trust between the British officer and the sepoy had been broken. In 1857 when commanding officers tried to assure the sepoys that there was no animal fat in the grease used with the new cartridges, the men disbelieved them. 8

Instances of disaffection concerning pay and allowances were not confined to the Bengal Army alone. Towards the end of 1843, the 6^th Madras Cavalry was ordered to move from Kamptee to Jubbulpore, which was outside the Madras Presidency. Unlike their colleagues in the Bengal Army who left their families in their villages, troops of the Madras Army kept their families with them. On the assumption that the move to Kamptee was temporary, the troopers of 6^th Cavalry left their families behind before moving. On arrival at Jubbulpore they were surprised to learn that their stay at the new station was of a permanent nature and that too at lower allowances than they had expected. They now had to send for their families from Kamptee, incurring considerable expense from their pockets. They also learned that their next move would be to Arcot, 900 miles to the south. Incensed by this apparent breach of faith, for which they held their commanding officer Major Litchfield responsible, the troopers refused to obey his orders. The Brigadier commanding the station paraded the men and took their complaints. Fortunately, approval for paying higher allowances arrived before the situation got out of hand, and a major crisis was averted. 9

After the refusal of several regiments of the Bengal Army to serve in Sind, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier sent an urgent appeal to Bombay for help in garrisoning that province.  Bombay, being unable to comply with the request, passed it on to Madras, where the Marquis of Tweedale, holding the double office of Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency, agreed to send two regiments of Native Infantry. One of these regiments had been earmarked for Burma, where higher allowances were admissible. Being unaware of the regulations of the Bengal Army, the Governor assured both regiments that they would be paid allowances in Sind at the same rate that they would have got in Burma. The regiments embarked at Madras for Bombay from where they were to proceed to Karachi. Incensed at the move of the Madras regiments without his approval, the Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, countermanded the move and ordered that both regiments be disembarked at Bombay. When the men reached Bombay, they were informed that the higher allowances promised to them could not be paid to them. Since they had already drawn their salaries in advance, in order to make provision for their families which were left behind, they found themselves almost penniless in Bombay, with not enough money even for food. The sepoys demanded that they should be given rations, which was refused. The men broke out on parade and refused the orders of their officers. It was only after the General commanding the station intervened that order was restored, and the men agreed to accept an advance of pay. The sepoys were unable to appreciate the inability of the government to pay them the higher allowances. To them it was a clear case of breach of promise made by a person no less than the Governor himself. 10

Instances of refusal of pay continued to occur in 1849, especially in the Punjab. In July 1849 the 13^th and 22^nd Regiments of the Bengal Infantry at Rawalpindi refused their pay. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier, received reports that the four regiments at Wazirabad and two at Jhelum were likely to follow their example. Napier hurried from Calcutta to Simla, where Lord Dalhousie, the Governor General had moved to escape the heat of the plains. There were signs of the disaffection spreading to the whole of the Punjab if it was not curbed immediately.  After consulting Dalhousie, Napier decided to tour the affected areas himself. The sepoys at Rawalpindi and Wazirabad had been pacified by Colin Campbell and John Hearsey, who were destined to play even greater roles in 1857. But Napier knew that the trouble was far from over and made preparations to crush a general uprising if it occurred by using European troops. His fears were confirmed when the 66^th Regiment at Govindgarh broke out into open mutiny. Fortunately, the 1^st Native Cavalry was unaffected and with their help the mutiny was suppressed. The 66^th Regiment was ordered to be disbanded and struck from the Army List.

Though the disaffection appeared to have been smothered, Napier felt that the sepoy had a genuine grievance that needed to be resolved. In 1844 Lord Ellenborough had approved the grant of compensation to troops when the cost of items of daily rations such as flour increased above a certain figure. His successor, Lord Hardinge had issued new regulations in 1845 which effectively reduced the amount of compensation. Napier felt that this was unfair and pending receipt of formal approval from the Governor-General, issued orders in January 1850 that the sepoys be paid the higher rate as given in the 1844 regulations. Dalhousie was then not in India, but on his return in May 1850, took strong exception to the action of the Commander-in-Chief. He did not agree with Napier’s view that ‘a mutinous spirit pervaded in the army in the Punjab, and that …….the Government of the country was placed in a position of “great peril”.’ Dalhousie went on to record: ‘the safety of India has never for one moment been imperiled by the partial insubordination in the ranks of its army.’ 11

The confrontation between Dalhousie and Napier ended with the resignation of the latter. Though Dalhousie was right in asserting that Napier had exceeded his authority in issuing the orders granting higher allowances to the sepoy, there were many who felt that the Governor-General should have supported his Commander-in-Chief, whose fears about disaffection among the sepoys were genuine, as was emphatically proved just seven years afterwards. To the sepoy, Napier’s resignation and the cancellation of his orders granting him higher allowances was another proof, if any was needed, that even the highest in the land could not be trusted, and the Company only wanted to use his services to extend its dominions, with least concern for his welfare. 

Between 1852 and 1856 the war in Crimea severely strained the resources of Britain, forcing her to reduce the number of British troops in India by almost 3,000. The majority of the available British regiments were concentrated in the Punjab, which had recently been annexed, denuding the rest of the country. As a result, the number of European troops available at most of the cantonments in the rest of the country was small. This proved to be a costly lapse when the mutiny broke out in 1857. Another fall out of the Crimean war was the manner in which it changed the impression about the British in the minds of the Indian public. Heavy losses in Crimea dealt a severe blow to the image of the English, and a proposal in the British Parliament to send troops from India to Crimea was dropped when it was realized that the measure would reveal to the subject race the weakness of the rulers. The Patriotic Fund, established in England to raise subscriptions for the Crimean War served to reinforce the impression among intelligent Indians that the British were as short of money as they were of men.12

 Along with social and economic reforms the British rulers introduced a legal system that treated all native subjects as equals, without regard to caste or rank. While the measure could be lauded as being fair and just, it did not take into account the age old caste equations in India and the privileged position enjoyed by persons ranking high in the feudal order. A well-born noble found that he could be summoned to the court of a magistrate like any common criminal, even on minor complaint by a money lender or a petty shop keeper. A situation such as this never occurred in a native kingdom, where caste and rank were always respected, even while dispensing justice. The British legal system was resented by all Indians, especially those of high rank and caste. It was unpopular even with the poor peasants, due to the complexities of the English legal procedure and rampant corruption in the lower judiciary. 13

Perhaps the most unpopular law enacted by the British was one that allowed the sale of land of a cultivator for failure to pay the rent. Traditionally, land rights in India were inalienable. A cultivator or debtor was usually imprisoned or held in bondage until his relatives paid off his dues to secure his release. The rent was usually paid in kind, the common method of recovery being a division of the standing crop before it was harvested. The system was complicated and time consuming, and with a view to simplify matters the Company decided to replace it with the new system of sale of land in cases of default. The system had its advantages and would have worked if the rents were fair and reasonable. However, not only were the rents fixed by the Company very high, there were no safeguards for bad harvests when the rains failed, a common occurrence in India. This led to many zamindars (land owners) losing land held by their families for several generations, and feudal overlords being turned into pensioners overnight. Since the land in question was usually bought by a money lender or bania (merchant), this led to a severe upheaval in the social order.  More than any other class, the zamindars who had been dispossessed of their lands nursed the greatest grudge against the Company’s rule, and waited for an opportunity to avenge the injustice and humiliation heaped on them. 14

The social reforms and changes in the legal system affected the people living in dominions under British rule, with the princely states remaining virtually unaffected. However, this was not to last long. As the power of the British grew, so did their appetite for territory. If a princely state could be annexed by force of arms, this was done. If not, subterfuge was resorted to, a classic example of the latter being Dalhousie’s infamous doctrine of lapse. The state of Punjab was annexed in 1849, though the ruler was a minor and in fact a ward of the British.  Yet he was blamed for the Multan rising leading to the Second Sikh War. Satara was annexed in 1850, after the death of the ruler without a male heir, though he had adopted one on his death bed, in accordance with the prevalent custom. In 1853, Nagpur and Jhansi were annexed for the same reason. The widows of the rulers of Satara and Jhansi sent emissaries to London to plead their case, without success. Both were to play an important role in the 1857 uprising, Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi being immortalized for her courage and fortitude in fighting the British. The annexation of Carnatic and Tanjore followed, even though the rulers had always been loyal to the Company. These measures not only alienated public opinion in India but were widely criticised in Britain. However, by far the most shocking example of British duplicity was the annexation of Oudh. 15

In 1856 Wajid Ali Shah, the King of Oudh was deposed and his kingdom made part of the British Empire. Unlike others Indian states that had been annexed under the doctrine of lapse for want of a male heir, Oudh was amalgamated with the Company’s dominions on grounds of maladministration, a charge that found few takers even among the British. The rulers of Oudh had always been faithful allies of the British and the measure shocked everyone. The administration of Oudh under the King was not of the best, but this could be said of most princely states. In 1853 there was a mutiny over arrears of pay in a regiment of the King of Oudh’s service at Faizabad under the command of Captain Barlow, who reportedly spent more time at the races in Cawnpore than in his regiment.  Colonel W.H. Sleeman, the Resident in Lucknow was one of the severest critics of the policy of annexation. With rare prescience, he wrote:  ‘The native states I consider to be breakwaters, and, when they are all swept away, we shall be left to the mercy of our native army, which may not be always sufficiently under our control.’ After the mutiny in Barlow’s regiment he recommended that the British should assume the administration as trustees of the Oudh royal family, and spend the entire revenue on the benefit of the people. In 1854 Sleeman had to go on leave to Britain due to ill health and died during the voyage. Lord Dalhousie forwarded Sleeman’s proposal to the Court of Directors in London, but did not recommend annexation. However, he received instructions that Oudh should be annexed. Dalhousie complied, and it is difficult to miss the touch of glee and avarice in the entry in his diary:  ‘So our gracious Queen had five million more subjects and 1,300,000 pounds more revenues than she had yesterday’.16   

The annexation of Oudh caused widespread anger among the local population as well as the sepoys. Oudh contributed the largest number of soldiers – almost two thirds - to the Bengal Army, with a fair number joining the armies of the other two presidencies. The Oudh sepoys, numbering about 60,000, enjoyed a privileged position by virtue of the system that permitted them to address petitions for legal redress through the British Resident in Lucknow, to the envy of others who were not in the Company’s service. After the annexation of Oudh the Resident was replaced by a Chief Commissioner, and the entire population became subjects of the Company. The Oudh soldiers ceased to enjoy the special privileges they had become accustomed to and their petitions no longer received the attention they had earlier taken for granted. The Oudh sepoy naturally blamed the British for the deprivation of this right, and this had an adverse effect on his devotion and allegiance. Another unfortunate sequel of the annexation of Oudh was the disbandment of the royal army of Oudh and of the armed guards of the Oudh taluqdars (nobles). About 15,000 of the discharged men were absorbed in the newly raised Oudh Irregular Force and the Military Police, but the remainder had to be discharged. This created a large body of disgruntled soldiers, of which many remained in Lucknow, with the others carrying their resentment to their villages. These erstwhile soldiers formed the backbone of the mobs that rampaged through Oudh when the mutiny broke out a year later, the immediate cause being the greased cartridge. .

            The Enfield rifle having proved its worth in Crimea, in 1856 it was decided to introduce it in India to replace the old-fashioned musket. To train sepoys in the use of the new weapon, depots were established at Dum Dum, Ambala and Sialkot. Cartridges for the rifle were manufactured at Fort William in Calcutta and supplied to the depots. The suspicion that the cartridges contained the fat of cows and pigs first came to light after a brief conversation between a Brahmin sepoy of the 2^nd Regiment, Native (Grenadier) Infantry and a low caste khalasi (labourer) attached to the magazine at Dum Dum. The khalasi asked the sepoy for some water from his lota (vessel for carrying water), which the latter refused, since he was not aware of the caste of the khalasi. The labourer replied: ‘You will soon lose your caste, as before long you will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of cows and pigs.’ The news spread like wild fire and soon came to the notice of Captain Wright, an artillery officer attached to the Rifle Instruction Depot at Dum Dum. Wright immediately brought this to the notice of the Major J. Bontein, commanding the Dum Dum Musketry Depot, as well as Major General John Hearsey, commanding the Presidency Division.

            The next day, Bontein also sent a report to General Hearsey.  On receipt of the letter from Captain Wright, Bontein had paraded all the sepoys and asked if any of them had a complaint. ‘At least two thirds of the detachment immediately stepped to the front, including all the native commissioned officers. In a manner perfectly respectful they very distinctly stated their objections to the present method of preparing cartridges for the new rifled musket. The mixture employed for greasing cartridges was opposed to their religious feeling, and as a remedy they begged to suggest the employment of wax and oil in such proportions as, in their opinion, would answer the purpose required.’ Acting with alacrity, General Hearsey forwarded the reports of Wright and Bontein to the government on 24 January, recommending that the sepoys be permitted to purchase the ingredients required to make the grease themselves from the market. Approval of the government was received within four days. 17

            However, news of the affair had reached other stations, thanks to the Dharma Sabha, a religious organisation in Calcutta, which propagated the view that it was the intention of the government to convert all soldiers to Christianity by force. One of the stations affected was Barrackpore, situated 16 miles form Calcutta on the banks of the Hoogly, where the headquarters of the Presidency Division was located. The station had four native regiments – the 2^nd Grenadiers, the 34^th and 70^th Bengal Infantry and the 43^rd Light Cavalry. The station commander was Brigadier Charles Grant, with General Hearsey in command of the Division. Soon after the Dum Dum incident, a company of the 34^th arrived at Berhampore, near Murshidabad, where the 19^th Bengal Infantry was located, bringing tales of the greased cartridge. On 26 February, Lieutenant Colonel M.W Mitchell, commanding the 19^th regiment, ordered that a parade would be held next morning for a firing exercise using blank ammunition When the percussion caps for the morning parade were issued on 26 February, the men refused to accept them, fearing that they would have to use the cartridges during the parade. Mitchell called in the 11^th Irregular Cavalry and threatened the 19^th that he would send them to Burma or China. The Regiment then dispersed, and the Cavalry was withdrawn. It was decided that the Regiment would be marched to Barrackpore, where it would be disbanded in the presence of European troops. A steamer was promptly despatched to Rangoon to fetch the King’s 84^th Regiment, which was sent to Chinsura near Barrackpore when it disembarked. The 19^th was then ordered to march to Barrackpore, where it arrived on 30 March. En route, they were met by some emissaries from the 34^th who asked them to join hands and kill their officers. However, the 19^th refused, professing their loyalty and willingness to serve anywhere, as long as their religion was not interfered with. Keith Young, the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion that in view of the repentant attitude and good behaviour of the unit, it should be given the option of volunteering for service in China or Persia instead of being disbanded. But the Governor-General did not agree, opining that in the interest of discipline, an act of mutiny could not be condoned. On 31 March 1857, the 19^th Bengal Infantry was disbanded with due ceremony, in the presence of the 84^th Foot, a wing of the 53^rd, two batteries of European Artillery, the Governor General’s Bodyguard and the Native Brigade. After the disbandment, General Hearsey addressed the men, announcing that as a reward for their penitence and good conduct, they would be permitted to retain their uniforms and paid the cost of conveyance to their homes. Touched by the kindliness shown to them, many of them broke down, saying that they had been misled by the sepoys of the 34^th, against whom they vowed vengeance. 18

            Two days before the disbandment of the 19^th, the most serious incident – the first attack on a British officer - had already occurred at Barrackpore. On 29 March Mangal Pandey, a young sepoy on quarter guard duty in the 34^th Bengal Infantry ran amuck, probably under the influence of bhang (intoxicant).  He first fired at the Sergeant Major, and then at the Adjutant, Lieutenant Baugh, who came to the scene hearing of the attack. After Baugh’s horse was shot under him, he approached the mutinous sepoy with his drawn sword, with the Sergeant Major at his side. However, Mangal Pandey proved to be more than a match for them and wounded both Baugh and the Sergeant Major, who were saved from certain death by a Muslim sepoy who rushed to their aid, holding Mangal Pandey until they escaped. The other sepoys of the quarter guard did not intervene and Mangal Pandey continued to rant with a rifle in his hands.

            Meanwhile, news of the incident reached General Hearsey who got the impression that the entire brigade had mutinied. Without wasting a moment, Hearsey rode to the parade ground accompanied by his two sons and Major Ross, one his staff officers. Ordering the guard to follow him, General Hearsey and the three officers rode towards Mangal Pandey who shouted to the other sepoys to join him. Seeing that none of the sepoys were ready to come to his aid, Mangal Pandey turned his rifle on himself and fired. However, his wound was superficial and he was immediately taken into custody. He was later tried by a court martial consisting of 14 native officers who unanimously found him guilty, 11 of them voting for the death sentence. On 8 April Mangal Pandey was hanged in Barrackpore, in the presence of all native troops. A few days later, Jemadar Isuri Pandey, who had prevented the other sepoys of the guard from coming to the aid of the Sergeant Major and the Adjutant, was also hanged. On 6 May seven companies of the 34^th Bengal Infantry that were present at Barrackpore during the mutiny were disbanded, after being stripped of their uniforms. (Three companies of the Regiment, stationed at Chittagong, which had disassociated themselves from the actions of Mangal Pandey and professed their loyalty, escaped disbandment).  This seemed to end the trouble caused by the greased cartridges. Two days after the disbandment of the 34^th, General Hearsey reported that he had asked European troops to return to their barracks, since he did not think they would be needed again. Lord Canning was about to order the 84^th back to Rangoon, when news came of the outbreak of the mutiny at Meerut. 19

The official date of the start of the Sepoy Mutiny is taken as 10 May 1857, when the 3^rd Cavalry broke out into open mutiny at Meerut. Though a similar incident had occurred at Lucknow a week earlier, it was nipped in the bud. On 2 May a battalion of the Oudh Irregular Infantry at Lucknow refused the new cartridges. The following day, Henry Lawrence discreetly disarmed them. In order to prevent the disaffection from spreading and restore confidence among the men, he discharged a few of the ring leaders, announced some promotions and then re-armed about 200 personnel. Had similar discretion been displayed by Colonel Carmichael Smyth at Meerut, or either Major General William Hewett or Brigadier Archdale Wilson acted with alacrity and pursued the troopers of 3^rd Cavalry who left for Delhi, the mutiny might never have taken place. John Lawrence was later to remark: ‘I do assure you that some of our commanders are worse enemies than the mutineers themselves.’20

Meerut was then one of the largest cantonments in India, with a large complement of European and Native troops. The European complement comprised the 1^st Battalion of Her Majesty’s 60^th Rifles; the 6^th Dragoon Guards (Carabiners); a troop of Horse Artillery; a company of Foot Artillery and a light field battery. The three native corps were the 3^rd Light Cavalry, the 11^th and the 20^th Bengal Infantry.  Reports of the events at Dum Dum and Barrackpore had reached Meerut and caused considerable excitement among the sepoys. Apart from the greased cartridges, it was rumoured that the Government was attempting to destroy the religion of the people by mixing ground bones in the flour being sold in the bazaars. The disaffection among the sepoys was palpable, and there were instances of the men not saluting their officers and some bungalows being burnt. It was in the midst of this unsettled state that on 23 April Lieutenant Colonel Carmichael Smyth, commanding the 3^rd Light Cavalry, ordered a parade of 90 skirmishers to be held next morning in order to explain to the men the new mode by which they might load their carbines without biting the cartridges.

During the evening some of the officers came to know that the men would refuse the cartridges next day. The Adjutant informed the Commanding Officer and advised him to cancel the parade, but Colonel Smyth  refused. The parade was held on 24 April as ordered. Out of 90 troopers, 85 refused the cartridges, even after the Commanding Officer spoke to them. The parade was dismissed and the matter reported to Major General Hewett, commanding the Meerut Division. Hewett did not approve of Carmichael Smyth’s ill-advised decision to hold the parade, but could not avoid ordering a court an inquiry. The proceedings of the inquiry were submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, General George Anson, who ordered the mutinous soldiers to be tried by a native general court martial. By the votes of 14 out of the 15 native officers forming the court, all 85 were convicted and sentenced to ten years hard labour.21

On 9 May 1857, a parade was held in Meerut to announce the sentences awarded to the 85 troopers of the 3^rd Light Cavalry. After announcing the sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment, the men were stripped and put in fetters, in front of the entire garrison. Under a burning sun the men of the three native regiments - 3^rd Light Cavalry, 11^th and 20^th Native Infantry – watched in sullen silence as blacksmiths put leg irons on the ankles of each prisoner. The men being shackled implored the Divisional Commander, Major General Hewitt, to have mercy, and when this failed, loudly called upon their comrades to come to their aid, heaping insults on their Commanding Officer, Colonel Carmichael Smyth, whose folly in holding the parade in April had triggered the crisis. To deter any untoward incident, two British regiments – 60^th Rifles and 6^th Dragoon Guards – had been placed behind the native troops, in addition to some artillery guns. After the parade, the prisoners were sent to jail, the troops being marched back to their lines. The British officers went back to their bungalows, remarking on the salutary effect the punishment must have had on the natives. As they went to bed that Saturday night, nothing was farther from their minds than a mutiny, in which most of them were to lose their lives. 

The mutiny started in the evening on 10 May, when members of the British community were getting ready to go to evening church service. As the 60^th Rifles was assembling for the church parade, a cry was raised that the British soldiers were intending to descend on the Indian troops, disarm and put them in chains. This caused a panic, precipitating the outbreak. Some Indian troopers galloped to the jail and released their comrades who had been imprisoned the previous day. The whole of the 3^rd Cavalry then joined the soldiers of the two native infantry regiments who had assembled on the parade ground. Lieutenant Colonel Finnis, commanding the 11^th Native Infantry, rode to the parade ground as soon as he heard about the outbreak. He harangued the men, and asked them to return to their duty. His own men had been the last and most hesitant of the rebels; Finnis was confident hat his men loved him and would listen to him. But the men of the 20^th had no such compunctions. They fired a volley and Colonel Finnis fell, riddled with bullets. He was the first victim of the Great Indian Mutiny.22

The soldiers were soon joined by a mob of civilians from the bazaar (market) who proceeded to murder Europeans and set fire to their houses. Though the troopers of 3^rd Cavalry started the mutiny, they did not harm any of their officers. When they set free their colleagues from the jail, they did not release the other prisoners, who were later set free by the mob from the town. They also did not harm the British jailor. In fact, many of the British officers and their families escaped death only because of the help given by Indian soldiers and servants, some of whom risked their lives for this. Soon after the outbreak of the mutiny, the bulk of 3^rd Cavalry, mainly Muslim, made off for Delhi to meet the Emperor, Bahadur Shah II.  Surprisingly, no effort was made to stop or intercept the troopers who rode towards Delhi, and neither was any attempt made at pursuit. Meerut had more European troops than most stations in India, who could easily have quelled the mutiny. Overwhelmed by events, the 70 year old General Hewett seemed to be gripped by mental paralysis, leaving everything in the hands of Brigadier Archdale Wilson, who commanded the station. Unfortunately, Wilson proved unequal to the task and after a fruitless search of the native lines, ordered the European brigade to retire to the cantonment for the night. A resolute commander would have sent the dragoons in pursuit of the mutineers leaving only some infantry and artillery to defend the cantonment.  If they had reached Delhi even a few hours after the mutineers, the city could have been saved and the mutiny suppressed. As historians were later to record, far fewer men held the Residency at Lucknow against disciplined troops for many months. Fifty years earlier, Gillespie had crushed the mutiny at Vellore and saved the Southern Peninsula from universal revolt with a regiment of dragoons and some galloper guns. 23

After the outbreak on 19 May, an eerie silence descended on Meerut. Almost all the native troops had left, some for Delhi and the rest for their homes. The British garrison continued to stay in their barracks, with the women, children and unarmed civilians taking shelter in a walled enclosure called the Dumdama. The calm lasted five days, until some Bengal Sappers and Miners from Roorkee arrived on a routine tour of duty on 15 May. When orders were given for the unit magazine to be taken away from them, the sappers panicked, one of them shooting their commanding officer. Gripped by fear of reprisal, the mutineers fled, about fifty taking shelter in a grove, where they were destroyed by the artillery.

            The rebels from Meerut reached Delhi on 11 May and made their way to the Red Fort, where they appealed to Emperor Bahadur Shah to assume command, placing their services at his disposal. Pleading poverty – he was a King only in name, subsisting on a pension from the Company - Bahadur Shah vacillated, but ultimately agreed, after having sent a camel-borne messenger to Agra to inform John Russell Colvin, the Lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Provinces.   The Meerut troopers were joined by the sepoys of the 38^th Native Infantry, which had lately refused to go to Burma. Since there were no European troops in Delhi, they had the entire city at their mercy. What followed was an orgy of violence, with several Europeans, including women and children being killed.  Delhi was to remain in the hands of the rebels until 20 September, when it was finally recaptured by British forces under Nicholson, who died at its gates. Bahadur Shah’s life was spared, but he was banished to Rangoon. Three of the princes were shot in cold blood, the remaining 21 being hanged. 24

            Situated on the banks of the River Ganges, Cawnpore was an important military station that commanded the Grand Trunk road and the one to Lucknow, the capital of Oudh. It had a strong garrison, comprising a European Artillery battery of six guns, three native infantry regiments – the 1^st, 53^rd and 56^th – and the 2^nd Light Cavalry. The commander was Major General Sir Hugh Wheeler, a distinguished soldier with over 50 years of service. News of the events at Meerut and Delhi reached Cawnpore on 14 May, but did not cause much alarm. The garrison was strengthened on 22 May by a contingent of 55 Europeans and 240 troopers of the Oudh Irregular Cavalry from Lucknow. Since their presence created some uneasiness Wheeler sent them back on 30 May. Responding to a call from Lucknow where open mutiny broke out there, and assured of reinforcements from Calcutta, Wheeler sent two officers and fifty men to Lucknow on 3 Jun, depleting his own strength.  By this time the situation had become tense after a cashiered officer who was drunk fired on a patrol of 2^nd Cavalry on 2 Jun. He was tried next day but acquitted on the grounds that he was not in his senses. Fearing the worst, Wheeler ordered all non-combatants to go into an entrenchment, where a month’s provisions and one lakh rupees were also moved. This was the signal for the mutiny, which broke out on 4 Jun.

            The 2^nd Cavalry led the mutiny, being joined by the 1^st Regiment. After waiting for a day, the 56^th also joined but the 53^rd remained firm until they were fired upon by the artillery, under Wheeler’s orders. After looting the treasury and freeing the prisoners from the jail, the mutineers decided to march to Delhi, but were persuaded to return by emissaries of the Nana Sahib, the ruler of Bithur, the seat of the exiled Peshwas near Cawnpore. After a siege lasting 22 days, during which the women and children suffered the most, Wheeler agreed to evacuate the entrenchment, in return for a promise of safe passage for all Europeans by the Nana Sahib. On 27 June the garrison surrendered, and were escorted to the Sati Chaura Ghat on the Ganges, where boats had been provided. As soon as the Europeans had got into the boats, the boatmen jumped in the river and the mutineers opened fire with muskets and cannon that had been placed on the banks, hidden from view. Most of the party were killed by fire or drowned when they jumped into the water to save their lives. The few boats that got away were followed by musket fire till nightfall. The survivors were captured and sent back to Cawnpore where the men were shot, under orders of the Nana. Only four men who had boarded the boats escaped, being given shelter by a local chieftain who escorted them to a detachment that was going from Allahabad to join Havelock’s force. At Cawnpore, five men and 206 European women had been confined in the infamous Bibighar on 1 July. Shortly before Havelock entered the city on 17 July, the occupants of the Bibigarh were put to death, and their bodies thrown into a well. 25

While the garrison at Cawnpore was under siege, Neill was busy hanging innocent natives at Benares and Allahabad. In fact, Neill’s atrocities were the main reason for the massacres at Sati Chaura and the Bibighar. Lord Canning had summoned Colonel J.G. Neill from Madras as soon as news of the mutiny at Meerut reached him, and despatched him to reinforce Cawnpore and Lucknow as soon as he reached Calcutta. Arriving at Benares on 3 June, he decided to disarm the 37^th Native Infantry, though Brigadier Ponsonby, who was in command, saw no sign of disaffection in the Regiment. At a parade the same evening, the 37^th obediently surrendered their arms, when suddenly European troops appeared on the scene, with cartridges and grapeshot. Thinking that they were going to be killed by the European soldiers as had happened in the Punjab, the sepoys panicked and made a rush for their arms. The Europeans immediately opened fire, and in the confusion, Sikhs and Irregulars also started firing.  Neill took over command from Ponsonby and proceeded to hunt down rebels and suspects among the local population, ‘hanging them up with as little compunction as though they had been pariah dogs or jackals or vermin of a baser kind.’26

The news from Benares reached Allahabad next day, causing the 6^th Native Infantry under Colonel Simpson to mutiny. However, 80 men from the Regiment and about 400 Sikhs who were in side the fort, remained steady under Captain Brasyer. After killing their officers the mutineers proceeded to plunder and burn the homes of Christians, many of whom were killed. After the looting and killing, most of the sepoys went away to their homes, never to be seen again. On 11 June Neill arrived at Allahabad and entered the fort. However, instead of hurrying to Cawnpore to relieve the beleaguered garrison under Wheeler, he proceeded to punish and terrorise the local population. Punitive expeditions sent by land and by river burned villages and hanged persons of all shades on the least suspicions of complicity or sympathy with the mutineers. These atrocities continued unabated until 30 June when Havelock arrived at Allahabad and took over command. The news of Wheeler’s capitulation at Cawnpore reached him soon afterwards. 27

At Lucknow, Henry Lawrence’s timely action had contained the disaffection in the Oudh Irregular Infantry after it refused the cartridges, but things were far from quiet. Lucknow then had only one British regiment – the 32^nd – against four Native regiments - the 13^th, 48^th and 71^st Native Infantry and the 7^th Cavalry. As soon as Lawrence came to know of the disasters at Meerut and Lucknow, he asked the Governor General for plenary powers in Oudh. He was immediately promoted Brigadier and became the head of the Army as well as the civil administration. As a precautionary measure, he moved the women and children into the Residency and the Machhi Bhawan, which were organized for defence. The mutiny broke out on 30 May, but was subdued, with the help of the loyal elements of the 13^th and 71^st who joined the British regiment. Some of the arrested mutineers were tried next day and hanged while the rest marched to Delhi. Lawrence shifted his headquarters into the Residency, which he began to fortify against an attack from the rebels that he knew was inevitable. After General Wheeler’s capitulation at Cawnpore the rebel force made its way towards Lucknow.

Deciding to give battle before the rebels reached the city, Lawrence met them at Chinhut on 30 June but was defeated due to the defection of the Oudh gunners and the timidity of the Native cavalry. The 32^nd Regiment suffered heavy casualties, with three British officers and 116 men killed in the days fighting. The remnants retired to the Residency along with about 500 sepoys, who remained with them throughout the famous siege. Tragedy struck the garrison when Lawrence was mortally wounded and breathed his last on 4 July. The garrison now came under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Inglis.  Since the telegraph wires had been cut, they had to rely on messengers to communicate with the relieving forces, many of them being caught and put to death. The garrison was constantly under attack by the besieging force of sepoys, and there was considerable loss of life not only from enemy fire but also disease and starvation. On 25 September, a force under Brigadier General Havelock and Sir James Outram fought its way into the Residency. During the 87 days the siege lasted, the strength of the garrison had fallen from 1692 to 982, which included many sick and wounded. 28

 The garrison in the Residency was reinforced, but the siege continued.  On 7 November a messenger arrived with the welcome news that a strong army led by the Commander-in-Chief himself was expected to reach Lucknow in the next few days.  On 12 November, Sir Colin Campbell reached Alam Bagh, just south of Lucknow.  A semaphore telegraph was established between Alam Bagh and the Residency to exchange messages.  Lucknow was relieved on 17 November but subsequently evacuated. Leaving a small force under Outram at Alam Bagh, the Commander-in-Chief returned to Cawnpore and established his headquarters there.  Preparations began for the reduction of Oudh, and the capture of Lucknow.  By the end of February 1858, the army had concentrated at Alam Bagh, and operations against Lucknow commenced on 2 March. The capture of the city by British forces on 22 March was followed by destruction and pillage on an unprecedented scale. In spite of most of the captured booty being misappropriated, the booty collected by the prize agents was worth a million and a quarter sterling. 29

After the mutiny at Lucknow, the disaffection soon spread to neighbouring stations. On 4 June the 41^st Native Infantry at Sitapur shot their Commanding Officer and several others. The 9^th and 10^th Irregular Cavalry soon joined the 41^st after shooting their officers. With the help of some loyal elements a few officers and their families were able to reach Lucknow, but the majority, including the Commissioner, J.G Christian, and his family were killed. At Azamgarh, the 17^th Native Infantry looted the treasury on 3 Jun, and marched towards Oudh. The troops at Benares followed their example on 4 June, and the two groups of mutineers proceeded to Faizabad, where the garrison comprised a horse battery of Native artillery, the 22^nd Native Infantry, the 6^th Oudh Irregular Infantry and a squadron of the 15^th Irregular Cavalry. Influenced by the mutineers from Azamgarh and Benares, the Faizabad garrison also rose. The troopers of the 15^th Cavalry tried to induce the others to murder their British officers, but the infantry sepoys refused; they not only arranged for boats to allow the Europeans to get away, but also gave them some money from the treasury. Unfortunately, a number of them were attacked as they made their way down the River Gagra. Many were saved by local chieftains such as Raja Man Singh of Shahganj, who was in British custody for a revenue default, but was released at the instance of Captain Alexander Orr, the Assistant Commissioner at Faizabad. 30

Though the major events connected with the mutiny of 1857 occurred in Oudh, several other military stations held by the Bengal Army were affected in varying degrees. At Hoti Maidan the 55^th Native Infantry fled when they were to be disarmed, leading to the Commanding Officer taking his own life. The regiment was pursued, 120 sepoys being killed and 150 captured, 40 of the latter being blown from guns. Nearly 500 escaped, but many were caught by the tribesmen and sold as slaves. The 124 who later surrendered were executed. At Gwalior the Subsidiary Force killed several British officers, non commissioned officers and a few women and children on 14 June. The Gwalior Contingent later joined Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi, and took part in several engagements with British forces under Tantia Tope. The trouble soon spread to Indore, where the Holkar’s troops attacked the Residency on 1 July. The 23^rd Native Infantry and the wing of 1^st Cavalry at Mhow joined the Holkar’s forces, after killing their officers. At Nasirabad the 15^th and 30^th Native Infantry mutinied on 28 May, but the 1^st Bombay Lancers did not join. However, the officers were not harmed and fled to Beawar. The mutineers made their way to Delhi where they later took part in the defence of the city against the attack by British forces. The Neemuch Brigade comprised the 72^nd Native Infantry, the 7^th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent and a wing of the 1^st Bengal Cavalry. When the troops rose on 3 June and left for Delhi, the officers fled to Udaipur. The Neemuch Brigade took part in the siege of Delhi, until it was defeated at Najafgarh on 25 August by Nicholson. 31

The news of the mutiny reached Lahore, on 12 May 1857. Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab was then at Rawalpindi, en route to the Murree Hills, to join his family. The senior civil officer present in Lahore was Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner. Receiving information from a spy that the sepoys at Lahore were about to rise, Montgomery rushed to the cantonment at Mian Mir and proposed to Brigadier Stuart Corbett, the commander of the Lahore garrison, that he should disarm the four native regiments at Lahore - the 16^th Grenadiers, the 26^th Native Infantry, the 49^th Native Infantry and the 8^th Light Cavalry. The European troops comprised the 81^st Foot and some European horse artillery. The 2,500 Indian soldiers outnumbered the 600 Europeans more than four times. Early on the morning of 13 May, the four native regiments were paraded and disarmed in the presence of the European horse artillery and six companies of the 81^st Foot. It was later discovered that the disarmed regiments were planning to march that night to Ferozepore and seize the magazine. 32

At Multan two regiments of native infantry were disarmed by a horse artillery troop, which was then itself disarmed. Due to paucity of British troops, it was decided that the disarmed sepoys should be sent home in small batches. Alarmed by a rumour that they would be massacred en route, the sepoys attacked the British and Sikh troops on 31 August, killing some officers and men. At Peshawar the 51^st Native Infantry was disarmed on 22 May, after which many deserted. The local tribesmen were offered rewards to apprehend the deserters, and many were rounded up. On 29 May the Subedar Major and 12 sepoys were hanged. A few months later, after information was received that the sepoys were secretly buying arms, they were searched. They ran towards a field where the concealed arms were found. They were fired upon by the newly raised 18^th Punjab Infantry, 50 falling at the first volley and many being bayoneted in the lines. Out of a total strength of 870 only 70 survived. 33

            Ferozepur had three native regiments – the 45^th and 57^th Infantry and the 10^th Cavalry. The British element comprised the 61^st Foot, a light field battery and two companies of foot artillery. Brigadier Innes, who had taken charge of the station just two days earlier, decided to disarm the native infantry, overruling the commanding officers. As they were being marched to the parade ground, the 45^th discovered the presence of European troops, and about 200 men ran away. The 57^th gave up their arms, but the rest of 47^th  left the station, with the exception of 130 men. They were pursued and scattered, some finding their way to Patiala, where the ruler put them in prison, some being caught by villagers, and others joining the rebels at Delhi. The 10^th Cavalry remained loyal and did not join the mutiny. At Jullunder the 36^th and the 61^st Native Infantry came to know that they were to be disarmed and mutinied on 7 June, marching to Ludhiana and thence to Delhi. The 41^st Native Infantry at Kangra remained orderly and gave up their arms willingly. 34

            Like Oudh, the province of Bihar provided a large number of recruits for the Bengal Army. At the cantonment at Danapur near Patna were stationed three native infantry regiments – the 7^th, 8^th and 40^th - in addition to a company of native artillery. The British element comprised the 10^th Foot and a company of European artillery. News of the incident at Benares reached Danapur on 7 June, causing considerable excitement among the sepoys. Major General Lloyd, commanding the Danapur Division, did not consider it prudent to disarm them, and preferred to wait for the commotion to die down. However, William Tayler, the Commissioner, felt that strong measures were needed to reassure the large number of European planters, whose families had moved to Patna. Distrusting the native sepoys, Tayler summoned the Rattray’s Sikhs to Patna for the protection of the Europeans who had taken shelter in his house, which was converted into a stronghold. On 12 June a Muslim of the Wahabi sect found spreading sedition among the Rattray’s Sikhs was arrested, tried and hanged. Tayler then called the leaders of the Wahabi community for a meeting, at the end of which three were detained. Tayler then issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of weapons held by the citizens within 24 hours and imposed a curfew at night. These measures could not be enforced, and provoked a riot in the city on 3 July, during which Dr. Lyell, assistant to the Opium Agent was killed. After arresting 43 of the rioters, Tayler ordered them to be tried by a Commission, comprising himself and the Magistrate of Patna. After a quick trial, 19 were hanged, three acquitted and the rest sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. Subsequently, the sentences of 19 of the 21 survivors were overturned by a superior court. The punishments, which were unjust, only increased the disaffection among the people. Lord Canning was later to record: ‘I believe that in the course of Mr. Tayler’s proceedings men were condemned and executed upon insufficient evidence’. 35

            General Lloyd was still not in favour of disarming the sepoys. On 15 July instructions came from Calcutta that if he felt it necessary to disarm the sepoys in the presence of European troops, he could disembark the Fifth Fusiliers who were on their way to Benares. These instructions leaked out and soon became known to everyone, including the sepoys. Still not willing to disarm the sepoys, on 24 July Lloyd decided to take away their percussion caps, reasoning that this would prevent them from using their weapons without humiliating them. The regiments were paraded and the percussion caps kept in the stores were collected and loaded in bullock carts. As these carts were returning they were detected by the men of the men of the 7^th and 8^th Native Infantry who raised an alarm and tried to stop the carts. However, the officers were able to restore order and the carts were allowed to pass. But each sepoy still had 15 caps that he carried on his person. The task of collecting these was assigned to native officers. The men refused to surrender the caps, even when asked by the officers. Matters escalated when some soldiers of the 10^th Foot, joined by patients from the European hospital, fired on the sepoys.  The 40^th Native Infantry did not at first join the mutiny, but when fired upon by the men of the 10^th Foot, they went off and joined the mutineers. 36

            The mutineers proceeded to Arrah, where they joined the forces of Raja Kunwar Singh, of Shahabad. Then over 80 years old, Kunwar Singh was a true Rajput lord of the old school, held in high esteem by his tenants. Even the British admired him for his open heartedness and chivalry, and Tayler had earlier assisted him in managing his estates in order to reduce his debts. However, Tayler was later overruled by the Lieutenant Governor, and Kunwar Singh lapsed into further debt again. He was on the verge of losing his estates and was saved from ruin by the mutiny of the sepoys. Assuming command of the mutineers who swelled his ranks, he overthrew British authority in Shahabad and established his own government. When he came under pressure from the British he marched through Mirzapur to Rewa, hoping to persuade the ruler to join his cause. Failing in this venture, he proceeded to Banda and then to Kalpi to join the Nana Sahib for a joint attack on Cawnpore, which did not materialise. He then went to Lucknow where he was received with great honour. He marched to Azamgarh where he defeated the British forces under Colonel Milman and occupied the town. Colonel Dames, who had hurried from Ghazipur to Milman’s rescue was repulsed when he attacked the city. Stung by two defeats in succession, the British authorities raised the reward for Kunwar Singh’s apprehension from 10,000 rupees to 25,000. Lord Mark Kerr was sent from Allahabad to relieve Azamgarh and was soon joined by Sir Edward Lugard. In the face of overwhelming strength of the British, Kunwar Singh vacated the town and crossing the Ganges near Ghazipur, re-entered Bihar. His fought his last battle on 23 April 1858 near his home town of Jagdishpur where he inflicted a severe defeat on British forces under Captain Le Grande, killing almost 150 of the 300 men who opposed him. He did not live to savour his victory, dying of his wounds on 24 April 1858. Known as the Lion of Bihar, Kunwar Singh is still revered for his courage and fortitude.37

            Jhansi had been annexed by Lord Dalhousie in 1854 on the death of the ruler without a male heir. The fort was garrisoned by the 12^th Native Infantry and the widowed Rani Laxmi Bai and her adopted son moved to a palace in the city with their retainers. News of the events at Meerut and other stations soon reached Jhansi and a wing of the 12^th stationed in the cantonment outside the fort mutinied on 5 June. Most of the British and Christian population moved inside the fort, except for the British officers who stayed with the men in the lines.  On 6 Jun the mutineers shot the British officers and laid siege to the fort. Being promised safe passage, the British contingent inside the fort came out on 8 June, but were massacred. Rani Laxmi Bai played no part in the massacre but came under suspicion because the mutineers had approached her for help. After extorting a large sum of money from her, the mutineers left for Delhi. Rani Laxmi Bai sent letters to Major W.C Erskine, the Commissioner of Sagar Division, conveying news of the mutiny and the state of anarchy that prevailed in Jhansi. She also sent letters to British authorities at Agra, Indore, Jalaun Gwalior and Jubbulpore. Erskine forwarded her request to the Lieutenant Governor, asking her to look after the administration of Jhansi until British authority was restored.

            Emboldened by the collapse of British authority, the rulers of the neighbouring states of Orchha and Datia decided to capture Jhansi in September 1857, but were defeated by the soldiers and local chieftains who rallied around the Rani. Meanwhile, Sir Hugh Rose had arrived in Bombay and was appointed commander of the Central India Field Force that was to operate in Malwa, Bundelkhand, Rajputana and Central India. After reducing Garakhota near Sagar, he decided to attack Jhansi. The siege of Jhansi began on 22 March 1858, and the cannonade started three days later. On 31 March Tatya Tope arrived with 20,000 men but was defeated. The assault on the fort went in on 3 April and after a bitter house-to-house battle lasting over 24 hours, Jhansi fell on 4 April. The city was ransacked and its inmates put to the sword. The Rani escaped to Kalpi, where all rebel leaders had congregated under the leadership of Rao Sahib, a nephew of the Nana. Rose continued to Kalpi, which the rebel leaders were forced to evacuate on 23 May.  The Peshwa’s forces moved to Gwalior, whose ruler, the Scindia had once been a vassal of the Peshwa but was now an ally of the British. As soon as the Peshwa’s forces reached Gwalior, the Scindia fled and the city fell on 1 June without a shot being fired. Sir Hugh Rose did not give them much respite and arrived at Morar outside Gwalior on 16 June. After a hard fought battle Gwalior was captured on 20 June and the Scindia escorted back to his palace. Rani Laxmi Bai lost her life in the battle, dying a soldier’s death on 17 June 1858. The fall of Gwalior marked the end of the Mutiny of 1857, though sporadic incidents continued for another year. 38

            As already mentioned, the major events connected with the Mutiny occurred in units of the Bengal Army, with the armies of the other two Presidencies remaining virtually unaffected. In Bombay, risings occurred at Satara, Kolhapur, Belgaum and Dharwar. At the recently annexed state of Satara, a chaprasi (peon) gave the call to the 22^nd Native Infantry to rise on 12 June. He was hanged, along with 16 other conspirators, including the son of Rangaji Bapaji, who had argued the case against the annexation of the state in London. The 27^th, 28^th and 29^th Regiments of the Bombay Army at Kolhapur, Belgaum and Dharwar respectively had a high percentage of pardesis from Oudh.  On 31 July the pardesis of the 27^th plundered the treasury and many fled to the Sawantwadi jungles. A detachment of European troops sent from Poona later disarmed the 27^th Regiment. Next day, 21 were convicted, two hanged, 11 shot and eight blown from guns. At Belgaum a conspiracy of a mutiny in the 28^th Regiment was discovered on 10 August. Two men were tried and executed.  In Bombay, where three regiments of the Bombay Army were garrisoned, it was discovered that a mutiny was planned during the Diwali festival in October. Eight men were arrested, of which two were executed, and six transported for life. In September, attempts to mutiny were detected at Hyderabad (Sind) and Ahmedabad, while at Karachi, a mutiny actually occurred. Kolhapur was again disaffected, and a group that seized the town was dislodged, with 36 being tried and executed. 39

            In the Madras Army there were a few incidents of disaffection due to the presence of the pardesi elements, who had their sympathies with the sepoys of the Bengal Army.  At Nagpur the 1^st Cavalry of the Nagpur Subsidiary Force was disarmed when on the verge of mutiny and three ringleaders were hanged on 29 Jun 1857. At Madras the 8^th Madras Cavalry refused to embark for Bengal and was disbanded. After a mutiny at Raipur 22 January 1858 during which a sergeant major was killed, two troopers from the 3^rd Madras Cavalry and 15 men from the Madras Artillery were hanged. 40                     

                                                                                                                                               

            The principal reasons for the failure of the Mutiny were lack of a clear aim, poor planning and coordination, absence of central leadership, indifference of large sections of the civil population and non-involvement of the Bengal and Madras Armies. The British were able to offset their inferiority in numbers by enlisting the support of several Indian princely states, as well as the Sikhs and Gurkhas. After overcoming the initial shock and reverses in the early stages of the Mutiny, the East India Company was able to draw on the vast resources of the British Empire for reinforcements and material. The Mutiny had a good chance of ending British rule in India when it broke out, but with each passing day the probability decreased. More than a year elapsed before the disturbances ceased and normalcy returned. But things could never be the same again. The Mutiny was a cataclysm that left deep scars on the psyche of the British rulers and the natives of the country.

            The Mutiny of 1857 was not preplanned. Though the greased cartridges were the reason that triggered the outbreak at Meerut, two weeks elapsed from the time the men refused the cartridges to the actual outbreak on 10 May 1857. The incident at Barrackpore involving Mangal Pandey had occurred more than a month earlier, and another at Lucknow a week earlier. The garrison at Delhi mutinied on 16 May, though the rebel troopers from Meerut had arrived five days earlier. Thereafter, troops at several cantonments rose on different dates, right up to the end of the year. One can safely conclude that though the Mutiny was inevitable, it was not premeditated.  Commenting on the causes of the failure of the mutiny, an eminent historian, Dr. Tara Chand, writes:-

            The failure of the Revolt was a foregone conclusion. It was actuated by pure negations. It was not inspired by any positive creative idea; it did not entertain either the vision of a higher social order or of a higher political system. It was a transient intoxication and not a settled permanent transformation of the will of the people. As it was an almost spontaneous episodic outburst, there was no stable well-ordered organisation behind the movement as a whole. It lacked plan, programme and funds. The only thing that united the rebels was the desire to eliminate foreign rule.41

            At the outbreak of the Mutiny, native troops outnumbered their British counter parts more than five times. The number of European officers in the three Presidency Armies was 6,170 and that of European soldiers 39,352. Against this, the number of native sepoys was 232,224. However, the Mutiny failed because the number of sepoys that joined the uprising was much smaller. The sepoys of the Madras and Bombay Armies did not revolt. Even in the Bengal Army, only about 70,000 sepoys actually joined the Mutiny, with about 30,000 remaining loyal up to the end and an equal number deserting or being disarmed. It is safe to assume that the British would have been in dire straits if the whole of the Bengal Army had mutinied, and the sepoys in the armies of other presidencies joined them. 42

            Though the sepoys fought valiantly, they could not match European tactics and technology. No Indian held commissioned rank at that time, and the highest rank a native could achieve was that of subedar major. The artillery was almost entirely in the hands of Europeans, who also manned the electric telegraph, which played a crucial role. Not realising the value of the telegraph, the rebels made no efforts to disrupt it, except at a few places such as Lucknow and Delhi. Consequently, the Governor General in Calcutta was able to obtain information and pass instructions without hindrance to almost every British official in the sub continent. Writing to C. Raikes, ICS, in Agra on 18 August 1857, Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab remarked: ‘Under Providence, the electric telegraph has saved us.’ 43

            Historians differ on the nature of the mutiny and its political significance. Some feel that it was purely a military uprising with little popular support from the masses, which was the most important reason for its failure. Others believe that it was a political revolt spurred by an upsurge of nationalism in the common people who wanted to break free from the bondage of British rule. The latter opinion conforms to the views of those who describe the uprising of 1857 as the first war of Indian independence. According to Surendra Nath Sen:

…it would be wrong to dismiss it as a mere military rising. The Mutiny became a revolt and assumed a political character when the mutineers of Meerut placed themselves under the King of Delhi and a section of the landed aristocracy and civil population declared in his favour. What began as a fight for religion ended as a war of independence for there is not the slightest doubt that the rebels wanted to get rid of the alien government  and restore the old order of which the King of Delhi was the rightful representative. 44

            The end of the mutiny also saw the end of the rule of the East India Company. In November 1858 Queen Victoria issued a proclamation taking over the responsibility for governing India. A Royal Commission, presided over by Major General Jonathan Peel was set up to enquire into the events of 1857 and recommend changes to avoid recurrence of similar incidents. Based on the report of the Peel Commission, sweeping changes were carried out. The number of British troops in India was increased from 38,000 to 62,000, while the native component was reduced from 230,000 to 135,000. The native component in the artillery was done away with, and it was now manned entirely by Europeans. The recruitment pattern of the Bengal Army was changed, with the recruitment of Brahmins and Rajputs from Oudh, the North-Western Provinces and Bihar being severely curtailed. The number of irregular cavalry units on the ‘silladar’ system was increased, since experience had shown that most of them had not been disaffected.

            The mutiny of 1857 was an important landmark in the history of India. This was the first instance when large sections of the populace came together with the common aim of throwing out an alien power. Though India was not unified as a country, this was the first occasion when a nationalistic feeling was seen among the people. The sepoys who started the uprising and the people who joined them were from all religions and castes, and from every social and economic group, which was an exceptional occurrence in the sub continent. Since the fight was for freedom from British vassalage, the mutiny of 1857 can rightfully lay claim to the title of the first war of Indian independence. The leading role of the sepoy in the uprising cannot be disputed. In the Foreword to S. N. Sen’s book Eighteen Fifty Seven, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad wrote: ‘There would have been no revolt in India in 1857 had not he initiative been taken by the disaffected sepoys.’45

           

END NOTES – CHAPTER 4

This chapter is largely based on J.W Kaye’s A History of the Sepoy War in India, (London, 1877); G.W. Forrest’s A History of the Indian Mutiny, (London, 1904); S.N. Sen’s Eighteen Fifty - Seven, (New Delhi, 1957); Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes’ Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993); and Dr. Tara Chand’s History of the Freedom Movement in India (New Delhi, 1967) Specific references are given below:-

1.         S.N. Sen, Eighteen Fifty - Seven, (New Delhi, 1957), p.6, quoting Gubbins’ The Mutinies in Oudh, 3^rd Edition, Appendix 12.

2.         Sitaram, From Sepoy to Subadar: being the Life and Adventures of a Native Officer of the Bengal Army, translated by Lieutenant Colonel Norgate, edited by Lieutenant Colonel D.C. Phillot, p.60

3.         Sen, p. 12

4.         Lt. Gen S.L. Menezes, Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993), p. 120.

5.         Sen, p. 15

6.         Sen, p. 16

7.         Menezes, p.121, quoting A Retired Officer, Mutiny in the Bengal Army, (London: 1857), p. 4

8.         J.W. Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in India 1857-1858, (3 vols, London, 1877), i, pp.278-89

9.         Kaye, i, pp. 291-3

10.       Kaye, i, pp. 294-6

11.       Kaye, i, p. 318

12.       Kaye, i, pp. 342-5

13.       Sen, p. 31

14.       Sen, p. 33

15.       Sen, pp. 35-7

16.       Menezes, p. 151, quoting J.G.A. Baird, The Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, (Shannon, 1972), p. 369.

17.       G.W. Forrest, A History of the Indian Mutiny, (3 vols, London, 1904), i, pp. 1-3

18.       Forrest, i, pp. 22-4

19.       Forrest, i, pp. 25-9

20.       Menezes, p. 160         

21.       Forrest, i, p. 33

22.       Captain N.T. Parker, Memoirs of the Indian Mutiny in Meerut, (Meerut, 1914), p.31.

23.       Forrest, i, p. 38

24.       Sen, p. 106

25.       Forrest, i, pp. 474-9

26        Kaye, ii, pp. 216-26

27.       Sen, p.152

28.       Forrest, i, p. 333

29.       Sen, p. 239

30.       Forrest, i, pp. 207-13

31.       Menezes, p. 169         

32.       Sen, p. 328

33.       Menezes, p. 170         

34.       Sen, p. 330

35.       Sen, pp. 242-8

36.       Kaye, iii, pp. 93-4

37.       Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, (3 vols, New Delhi, 1967), ii, p. 102 and Sen, pp. 260-1

38.       Tara Chand, ii, p. 103 and Sen, pp. 264-93

39.       Menezes, pp. 180-81, quoting T. Rice Holmes, A History of the Indian Mutiny, (London 1898), pp.467-70.

40.       Menezes, p. 182

41.       Tara Chand, ii, p. 106

42.       Kaye, i, p. 626 and Sen, p. 408

43.       Brigadier T. Barreto, History of the Corps of Signals, Volume 1, p.34, quoting ‘Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the North West Province during the Mutiny of 1857, p. 491.

44.       Sen, p. 413

45.       Sen, p. xiii

CHAPTER – 2 THE BARRACKPORE MUTINY - 1824

CHAPTER – 2

THE BARRACKPORE MUTINY - 1824

            The mutiny at Barrackpore in 1824 is important for many reasons, not the least being the ferocity with which it was suppressed. In a misplaced desire to punish indiscipline, fire was opened on Indian troops without warning or provocation, resulting in several deaths and injuries.  The incident elicited universal condemnation from all quarters, especially those who had spent long years with Indian troops. As an example of brutality the bloodshed at Barrackpore was matched only by the massacre at Jallianwala that was to occur almost a hundred years later. The tragic episode continued to haunt Britons and Indians for many years, and many felt that it provided Indian soldiers the rationale to kill British officers in 1857. Like the revolt at Vellore, ignorance and arrogance of senior British officers were the major factors responsible for the Barrackpore mutiny.

            From modest beginnings in the middle of the 18^th Century, British presence in India continued to expand rapidly, and by 1820 almost half the Indian sub-continent was under British rule. These territorial gains had been obtained by force of arms, with the assistance of Indian troops serving in the three Presidency armies.  During this period they conducted successful military campaigns against the French in South India, Siraj-ud-daula and Mir Kasim in Bengal; Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan in Mysore; the Marathas in Central India and the Gurkhas in Nepal. By the time Lord Hastings left India in 1922 after having spent ten years as Governor General, the United Company of Merchants Trading to the East Indies, commonly known as the East India Company, was the Paramount Power in India. In 1923, Lord Amherst came to India as Governor General. Soon afterwards, the British were confronted with a new enemy – Burma.

            Like the British in India, from the middle of the eighteenth century the Burmese dynasty based at Ava had embarked on a career of conquest. After gaining control of the Irrawaddy delta and the Tenasserim coast, they invaded the then independent state of Arakan in 1784 and made it part of their kingdom. This brought them in direct contact with the eastern frontier of Bengal, which was under British control. In 1913 they seized the kingdom of Manipur, forcing the ruler to seek refuge in the neighbouring                                    state of Cachar. In 1818, they took control of Assam, installing a ruler who agreed to accept Burmese suzerainty. The conflict between the Burmese and the British started over the refugees from Arakan who had been permitted by the latter to occupy the waste tracts in the Chittagong district. The Burmese demand for the refugees to be returned was refused after it was found that the few who had been sent back were starved to death. Buoyed by their success, the Burmese laid claim to Dacca and Chittagong and threatened to attack and capture Bengal if their demands were not met. In September 1823 the Burmese occupied the small island of Shahpuri at the mouth of the river that divided Chittagong and the Arakan, overpowering the small British guard that was stationed there. This led to a declaration of war with Burma, though the Directors hoped that war could still be averted.  However, this was not to be and the incident marked the beginning of the First Burmese War.

The British plan for operations against Burma consisted of a sea-borne expedition to Rangoon from where a force would be transported up the Irrawaddy to attack the Burmese capital of Ava. The expedition left Port Cornawallis in April 1824 with a force of 11,000 soldiers, of which half were European and the rest Indian troops from the Madras Army, who had no compunction regarding crossing the sea. Rangoon was captured without difficulty, the town having been evacuated under orders of the government. As a result, the British could not find any provisions, boats or boatmen, which they had counted on for the subsequent expedition to Ava. The rains started soon afterwards, and the force had no option but to wait at Rangoon until the monsoons ended and supplies arrived from Madras. Meanwhile, in May 1824 a Burmese force of 8,000 under the command of Maha Bandula advanced towards Chittagong, routing a detachment of 300-400 Indian sepoys and some local levies at Ramu. Most of the British officers were killed and the captured sepoys sent as prisoners to the Burmese capital. This caused a panic in Calcutta, it being reported that the Burmese had captured Chittagong and were pushing up in war-boats to capture Calcutta. There were many rumours, each more outlandish than the other: Bhandula was carrying a set of golden fetters for the Governor General; the Commander-in-Chief had been killed; the Governor General had committed suicide, swallowing pounded diamonds and so on. Indeed, Bhandula might well have captured Chittagong, which was virtually undefended, had he not been recalled from the Arakan to deal with the sea-borne invasion of Rangoon. 1

Dismayed by the failure of the sea-borne expedition to Rangoon, the British authorities decided on an overland advance into Burma. Two expeditions were planned, one from Cachar via Manipur to northern Burma and the other from Chittagong across the Arakan into the Irrawaddy valley, where it could link up with the Rangoon force. The expedition from Cachar was to comprise 7,000 soldiers, while the Arakan force was larger, with 11,000 troops with naval support. Three regiments of the Bengal Army stationed at Barrackpore, the 26^th, 47^th and 62^nd, were earmarked for the Arakan campaign. Barrackpore was the headquarters of the Presidency Division, under the command of Major General Dalzell. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army was General Sir George Paget, a veteran of the Peninsular war, who had never served with Indian troops earlier.

            The three regiments at Barrackpore received orders to march to Chittagong in October 1824. The decision to march was taken because most of the soldiers in the Bengal Army were high caste Brahmins, who were averse to a sea voyage. The three regiments had just marched almost 1,000 miles from Muttra (now Mathura). For some regiments, frequent moves on foot seemed to be the norm. For instance, the 47^th had moved no less than four times in as many years between 1807 and 1811: in 1814 it marched 500 miles from Barrackpore to Benares; in 1816, it moved to Dinapur, 300 miles away; and in 1818, it marched 500 miles to Agra. The men were reluctant to undertake another long march, this time against an unknown enemy. Stories about the Burmese success at Ramu could not have left the sepoys unaffected. Some of these stories extolled the military prowess of the Burmese troops and credited them with magical powers. They were also rumoured to torture prisoners and mutilate the dead.

Apart from fear and fatigue, another reason for the reluctance of the men was the great financial hardship they faced during each move. Each high caste soldier customarily carried his own brass utensils for cooking and drinking water, wrapped in a bundle that also included his bedding. Because of their weight, these bundles could not be carried by the soldiers in addition to their knapsacks, muskets and ammunition, and were usually transported on bullocks, which they hired at their own expense. For the march to Chittagong, no bullocks could be found, since all the available animals had already been purchased for the sea-borne expedition to Rangoon.  The few bullocks that were available were of inferior quality and quoted exorbitant rates that were beyond the means of the sepoys, who requested that the government should provide the bullocks or pay them an additional allowance.  The commanding officer of the 47^th Regiment forwarded the representation of the men to the Commander-in-Chief, but received an unsympathetic response. The situation was not improved by threats by the Muslim Subedar Major that if they did not stop complaining about the bullocks, they would be sent by sea.2

             On 1 November 1824, the day they were to commence their march, the men of the 47^th Regiment assembled on the parade ground but refused to fall in, complaining that their knapsacks were old and torn. Though a deduction had been levied two months earlier, new knapsacks had not yet been provided and the men’s grievance was genuine. Their officers tried to reason with them but the men were adamant, making it clear that they would not march unless their pay was increased or bullocks provided to them. This information was conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief, General Paget, who immediately ordered two British battalions, a company of artillery, a troop of the Governor General’s bodyguard and one native regiment to proceed to Barrackpore, and reached there himself that night.

            News of the happenings in 47^th Regiment reached the other two affected units, the 26^th and 62^nd Regiments that were located nearby. The commanding officer of the 26^th, Lieutenant Colonel D’Aguiliare, had deployed his unit in accordance with instructions received from Major General Dalzell. The Right Company and Regimental Colours were detailed as an honorary guard to the Commander-in-Chief while the Left Company was detailed for a similar duty for the Governor General. Two companies were detailed to cover the guns under Captain Hodgson, and the remainder of the officers and men stayed in the lines, with their arms. These measures were probably taken with a view to disperse the unit, so that the disaffection of the 47^th does not spread to the other units.3

At about 8 p.m. the commanding officer of the 62^nd Regiment, Major B. Roope, came to know that some men from the Left Half had made a rush on the quarter guard and forcibly taken away the Colours. Roope rushed to the parade ground where he found the whole battalion in a disorderly mass. They were all carrying their rifles, many of which were loaded. Other officers also reached the parade ground and asked the men to fall in. Some of them obeyed immediately, while others dallied, forming up slowly in small groups. However, the men who had snatched the Colours refused to fall in. Major Roope, who was mounted, started moving slowly through the ranks towards the Colours around which he concluded the ‘bad characters’ had collected. When he was within a few paces of the Colours his horse’s head was forcibly turned and he was struck in the back with muskets. According to Major Roope, ‘A man who carried one of the Colours and is supposed to be one of the principal instigators was upto that night considered one of the best men in the Corps, so difficult is it to find out the character of the Natives.’4

In the 26^th Regiment, a report reached Lieutenant Colonel D’Aguiliare at about midnight that the Left Half of 62^nd had joined the 47^th Regiment with their Colours. He also heard the bugle salute of the 47^th Regiment, which confirmed this report. Hearing a noise from the direction of his own quarter guard, D’Aguiliare rushed towards it, where he was informed that some of his grenadiers had snatched the King’s Colours from the guard room and gone towards the 47^th Regiment. Sending Lieutenant Robe to report to Major General Dalzell, D’Aguiliare ordered a roll call of his unit, which at that time consisted of 202 men in addition to 192 Benares Provincials.  About ten men of the Left Company were found absent, in addition to the Subedar Major, who was later found to have gone to General Dalzell. Soon after this Lieutenant Robe returned and intimated the orders of General Dalzell, which was to move the men to the Regiment’s other Colour at the residence of the Commander-in-Chief. This was done without any protest or misgiving from the men.5

 Early the next morning the powerful force of mainly British troops took up their position on the parade ground of the 47^th Regiment, whose sepoys, joined by some men from the 26^th and the 62^nd, stood with their arms in front of their lines. They presented a petition to the Commander-in-Chief expressing their fear that they were going to be sent by ship to Rangoon which would make them lose caste; they begged to be discharged and allowed to go home. Paget replied that there was no intention of sending them by sea without their consent, but refused to listen any further to what they had to say until they had ground their arms. To this the men paid no heed. Three officers, who were thought to have some influence over them were sent to warn them that they must either ground their arms or agree to march immediately to Chittagong; but the men did not comply, standing ‘with ordered arms in a state of stupid desperation, resolved not to yield, but making no preparation to resist’.

Paget galloped off the parade ground and ordered the guns to open fire. The men were not aware of the presence of the guns, and were not given any warning before artillery fire was opened. The men instantly broke and fled, flinging down their muskets and running off in all directions. At least 60 were killed by the artillery, a few sabred by the cavalry and 20-30 were drowned trying to swim across the Ganges. Many were wounded and taken prisoner. After the firing had ceased the 26^th Regiment, which had been kept in the house appropriated for the Commander-in-Chief, was ordered to scour the lines of the 47^th, and then move towards the burial ground. Two men who were found hiding in a tank were placed under arrest. A court martial, held the same day, sentenced 41 men to death, 12 of whom were hanged next morning. The sentences of the others were commuted to 14 years imprisonment with hard labour and many more convicted later were given similar sentences. All the Indian officers were dismissed, even though they had taken no part in the mutiny, it being argued that they must have known about the conspiracy. The 47^th Regiment was disbanded and its number effaced from the army list. 6

Paget’s handling of the situation came in for severe criticism at that time and for ever afterwards. He was reputed to be a hard disciplinarian with no knowledge of Indian troops. What was worse, he had a bitter prejudice against native troops, forgetting that they had been largely responsible for winning for Britain her territories in India. He later told the House of Commons that there prevailed in the native army, both among officers and men, ‘a great spirit of insubordination’. Many felt that if a senior India service officer of strong personality like Thomas Munro, John Malcolm or David Ochterlony had been present, the bloodshed would not have occurred. The Directors were also unhappy with the role of the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, who treated the whole episode as a purely military matter, leaving it entirely to Paget to handle.  He made no comment on the inquiry proceedings that were sent to London, prompting the Directors to contemplate his recall for his lack of interest.

            Unknown to the British officers, the men of the 47^th who died on 2 November 1824 became martyrs in the Bengal Army. After the outbreaks at Meerut and Delhi, the Calcutta Englishman of 30 May 1857 recorded: ‘A circumstance has come to our knowledge which, unless it has been fully authenticated, we could scarcely have believed to be possible, much less true. When the mutiny at Barrackpore broke out in 1824, the ringleader, a Brahmin of the 47^th Native Infantry, was hanged on the edge of the tank where a large tree now stands, and which was planted on the spot to commemorate the fact. This tree, a sacred banyan, is pointed out by the Brahmins and others to this day, as the spot where an unholy deed was performed, a Brahmin hanged. This man was, at that time, considered in the light of a martyr, and his brass “pootah” or worshipping utensils, consisting of small trays, incense-holders, and other brass articles used by Brahmins during their prayers, were carefully preserved and lodged in the quarter-guard of the (Barrackpore) regiments, where they remain to this day, they being at this moment in the quarter-guard of the 43^rd Light Infantry at Barrackpore. These relics, worshipped by the sepoys, have been, for thirty-two years, in the safe keeping of the regiments, having, by the operation of the daily relief of the quarter-guard, passed through the hands of 233,600 men and have served to keep alive, in the breasts of many, the recollection of a period of trouble, the scene of a mutiny and its accompanying swift and terrible punishment, which, had these utensils not been present to their sight as confirmation, would probably have been looked upon as fables, or, at the most, as very doubtful stories.’ 7

            The memory of the massacre in Barrackpore was an important factor in the bloodshed that occurred in 1857-58. Philip Mason has quoted an old Indian officer as saying, ‘They are your men whom you have been destroying.’ He added: ‘He could not trust himself to say more …(Paget) could surely have avoided that sudden and brutal act which, like Dyer’s at Amritsar a hundred years later, suggests a man using power to vent a deep dislike which had perhaps grown stronger for being long suppressed. These two cases, Vellore and Barrackpore, set the pattern of the mutiny. They were a warning to which few paid attention.’8

            The mutiny at Barrackpore in 1824 occurred due to seemingly trivial reasons - the availability of bullocks and knapsacks and increase in pay. The misplaced fear of being sent by sea may also have played a part. However, what shocked everyone was not the mutiny itself but the brutal manner in which it was quelled. The bloodshed could have been avoided if the situation had been handled with tact and understanding by the officers, particularly General Paget. Though the mutiny was quickly suppressed - it lasted for less than a day – its long term effects were far reaching and had a bearing on the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857.

END NOTES

This chapter is largely based on Sir Penderel Moon’s The British Conquest and Dominion of India, (London, 1989); Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes’ Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993); and Military Department Records in the National Archives of India.   Specific references are given below:-

1.         Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, (London, 1989), pp. 433-5.

2.         Lt Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993), pp.107-8.

3.         Statement of Lieutenant Colonel D’Aguiliare, commanding 26^th Native Infantry, Military Department, National Archives of India (NAI), 3 November 1824.

4.         Statement of Major B. Roope, commanding 62^nd Native Infantry, Military Department, NAI, 6 November 1824.

           

5.         Statement of Lieutenant Colonel D’Aguiliare, NAI, 3 November 1824      

6.         Moon, pp. 438-9

7.         Menezes, pp.109-10

8.                  Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour, (London, 1974), p. 246.

CHAPTER - 1 THE VELLORE MUTINY –1806

CHAPTER - 1

 THE VELLORE MUTINY –1806

            The mutiny at Vellore in 1806 has been termed by some historians as ‘The First War of Indian Independence’. It was the first major uprising by Indian troops during the British Raj in India, resulting in the death of over a hundred Europeans, including over a dozen British officers. The mutiny was quelled as quickly as it flared up, thanks to the prompt response and resolute leadership by the commanding officer of a British battalion at Arcot, 16 miles away. Several hundred Indian soldiers were killed in the fighting, the rest being put under arrest. Justice was swift and severe, with several mutineers being executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The disaffected units were disbanded and both the Governor the Madras Presidency as well as the Commander-in-Chief were recalled.  The mutiny brought home to the British authorities the dangers of hurting the religious susceptibilities of Indian troops and disregarding the significance of caste. Unfortunately, these warnings were not heeded, leading to an even greater conflagration that almost ended British rule in India half a century later in 1857.

            In 1799 the British attacked and captured Seringapatnam, the stronghold of Tipu Sultan, who died in the battle.  Tipu’s family, including his four sons and their retinue, was interned in the fort at Vellore, where a large complement of the Madras Army was maintained. The garrison comprised two Indian battalions and a detachment of a British Crown regiment, having about 1500 Indian and 370 European soldiers respectively. On 13 March 1806, Sir John Craddock, the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, issued a new set of dress regulations, with a view to smarten up the soldiers. According the new regulations, Indian soldiers of the Madras Army could no longer display caste marks on their foreheads or wear earrings. Beards were forbidden and moustaches had to be in accordance with a regulation pattern. They were also required to wear a new type of headgear. The orders were issued with the approval of the Madras Government and the Governor, Lord William Bentinck, who was then 32 years of age.

The wearing of caste marks by Hindus was de rigueur for Hindus, while most Muslims wore the ear-ring as a charm, given to them at birth and dedicated to some patron pir (saint). While beards were common in both communities, there was considerable difference in their shape and size. Muslims wore the beard but not the moustache, which was popular among Hindus. Another controversial regulation concerned the new head gear that troops were required to wear – a stiff round hat with a flat top, a leather cockade, and a standing feather. Resembling the tope worn by Europeans and Eurasians, it was no longer called a turban, but a topi. In the phraseology of the natives, a topi-wallah or hat-wearer was synonymous with a feringhee (white man) or Christian.1

            The new dress regulations caused considerable resentment when they were promulgated, among both Hindus and Muslims, who felt it was a direct attack on their religions. British officers who had been in India for long and realised the grave consequences of the new orders did not communicate them to their troops and made representations to the authorities in Madras. One of them was the commanding officer of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, Lieutenant Colonel Montresor, who decided in consultation with the Resident, to suspend the execution of the orders. Montresor’s foresight prevented any untoward incident such as the one that occurred at Vellore, and he was later commended for his judicious measure.2

            The garrison at Vellore comprised two Indian battalions, the 1^st/1^st and the 2^nd/4^th Madras Infantry. The orders regarding the new dress were received in Vellore in late April or early May. Here too the commanding officer of the 1^st/1^st, Lieutenant Colonel M. Kerras (he was later killed in the mutiny) decided not to communicate to his men the paragraph that he considered offensive, which ordered: ...‘a native soldier shall not mark his face to denote his caste, or wear earrings, when dressed in his uniform; and it is further directed that at all parades, and on all duties, every soldier of the battalion shall be clean shaved on the chin. It is directed also that uniformity shall as far as is practicable, be preserved in regard to the quantity and shape of the hair upon the upper lip’. 3

However, it was not the orders concerning caste marks, earrings, beards and moustaches that caused the trouble, but the new headgear. On 7 May 1806 a company of the 2^nd/4^th Madras Infantry, respectfully but firmly declined to wear the new headgear. The news was immediately conveyed to Madras, and shortly afterwards, Sir John Cradock visited Vellore. In the meantime, a Court if Inquiry had been held and 19 men arrested by the commanding officer. Cradock ordered the guilty men sent to Madras for a court martial, which sentenced two of the arrested men to 900 lashes each while the rest were awarded 500 each. The sentence of 900 lashes was carried out on the first two, but the rest were pardoned after they apologised.

The 2^nd/4^th was moved from Vellore to Madras and the unrest appeared to have been subdued. However, reports of objections to the new headgear came in from several other stations, and in June Craddock wanted to rescind the orders. But the Governor and his Council did not agree, since a Brahmin and a Syed had been consulted before issuing the new dress regulations. On 17 June 1806 a Muslim sepoy at Vellore, Mustafa Beg informed his commanding officer that a mutiny was in the offing. His report was referred to a committee of Indian officers who declared it as false. This was only to be expected, since most of the Indian officers were themselves part of the conspiracy. However, the European officers at Vellore were out of touch with their men and failed to read the signs. Mustafa Beg was declared insane and imprisoned. (When the mutiny broke out, he escaped, but later returned and was given a reward of 2,000 pagodas and a subedar’s pension).4

The favour shown to Mustafa Beg caused bitter resentment among the sepoys. ‘The disposition of the gentlemen of the Company’s service,’ they said, ‘and the nature of their government, make a thief happy, and an honest man afflicted’. According to a paper transmitted to Adjutant General   Agnew from the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force: ‘In the affair at Vellore, when the mutiny first commenced, it was on account of Mustapha Beg; and the gentlemen of the Company’s Government have bestowed upon him a reward of two thousand pagodas, with the rank of Soubahdar. The same Mustapha Beg, Sepoy, was the man who gave the signal for the revolt to the people at Vellore, and this is the man whom the Company have distinguished by their favour.’ 5

 

            The mutiny at Vellore broke out on the night of 9 July 1806. At about 3 a.m. the sepoys attacked the barracks of the European soldiers of the 69^th Regiment, killing over 100 and wounding many more. Over a dozen officers were shot down as they emerged form their houses to find out what was going on. The survivors managed to barricade themselves in a bastion above the main gateway where they held out, the mutineers soon dispersing in search of plunder. After looting the houses of the officers many of them left the fort. A British officer, Major Coats, who was outside the fort rushed to Arcot, 16 miles distant, where a British cavalry regiment and some Madras cavalry was located. Within 15 minutes of getting the news Lieutenant Colonel Rollo Gillespie, commanding the 19^th Dragoons, galloped off to Vellore with one squadron; the rest, with the Madras cavalry squadron and some galloper guns (horse artillery) followed shortly afterwards.  

            Gillespie reached Vellore shortly after 8 a.m. Fortunately, the outer gates of the fort had been left open and only the inner gate was shut. Gillespie had himself hauled up to the ramparts by a rope let down by the beleaguered survivors and immediately assumed command. At about 10 a.m. the galloper guns arrived, the inner gate was blown in and the cavalry poured into the fort. The mutineers offered little resistance and in ten minutes the fort was again in British hands. Between 300 to 400 mutineers were killed on the spot, with several others being made prisoner. Many of the mutineers who escaped by jumping down from the walls were rounded up later. A few of them were tried and executed, six being blown from guns, five shot, eight hanged and five transported. Most of the remainder were discharged, and the units were disbanded.6

            Other than Vellore, there was some unrest at Hyderabad, Nundydroog, and Pallamcottah. In Hyderabad, Lieutenant Colonel Montresor had recently taken over command of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force. He had imposed several local restrictions, such as banning the use of drums and tom-toms in the bazaar, which were commonly used in marriage and religious processions. Immediately after the outbreak of the mutiny at Vellore, he decided to revoke the orders regarding the new dress, in anticipation of instructions from the Madras Government. The new dress regulations were cancelled on 17 July 1806 and this seemed to remove the immediate source of anger. However, the troops in Hyderabad were not satisfied and reiterated their old grievance of the leather stock, which some of them threw on the ground during a parade. On 14 August 1806 the troops were paraded under arms, with a British regiment – the 33^rd – along with some artillery and cavalry drawn up on both flanks. Four Subedars who were believed to be the ring leaders were called to the front, arrested and marched off under a guard to Masulipatam. This nipped the problem in the bud, and there was no further sign of trouble.7

The native troops at Nundydroog planned to rise against and massacre their British officers at midnight on 18 October 1806 and quietly sent their families out of the Fort. At about eight in the evening of the fateful day, A British officer galloped to the house of the Commandant, Colonel Cuppage and told him about the planned mutiny. Shortly afterwards, an old and distinguished native officer came with the same intelligence. Cuppage immediately despatched a messenger with an urgent appeal for reinforcements to Colonel Davis commanding the 22^nd Regiment of Dragoons in Bangalore. One of the officers’ houses that was considered suitable fro defence was selected, into which all officers congregated and took post. Davis received the news soon after daybreak and by three o’clock his troopers were clattering into Nundydroog.8

Pallamcottah was located in the southernmost part of the peninsula. Major Welsh, with six European officers, commanded a native battalion that had many sepoys whose relatives had been killed at Vellore. In the third week of November 1806, intelligence was received that the Muslim soldiers had met in the mosque and planned to rise and kill all the Europeans. Welsh immediately arrested and confined 13 native officers, and turned about 500 Muslim sepoys out of the Fort. He also sent a letter by country boat to Ceylon, calling for European troops. Two days later Colonel Dyce, who commanded the Tinnivelly District, arrived in Pallamcottah and addressed the Hindu troops, who were asked if they wanted to serve the Company or leave. All the men went up to the Colours, presented arms and took the oath, following it up with three unbidden cheers. Major Welsh was later severely condemned as an alarmist and had to face a court martial, but was honourably acquitted. 9

            The large number of Europeans killed in Vellore set alarm bells ringing throughout British India and in London. The Governor, Lord William Bentinck quickly ordered a Commission of Inquiry to investigate into the circumstances connected with the mutiny. The President of the Commission was Major General J. Pater, the other members being Lieutenant Colonel G. Dodsworth; Nathaniel Webb, Senior Judge of the Appeal Court; J.H.D. Oglivie, Second Judge of Circuit; Major W. Douse and J. Leith, the Judge Advocate General, who also functioned as the Secretary. The Commission assembled at Vellore on 21 July and submitted its report on 9 August 1806. The Commission found two major reasons for the outbreak of the mutiny – the changes in dress and the presence of the family of Tipu Sultan at Vellore.

            The officers of the two units who were examined confessed that they had no inkling of the resentment felt by the men because none of them had expressed any dissatisfaction against the issue of the new headgear. However, examination of other witnesses confirmed that they found it highly offensive. Though the turban was made of broadcloth covering an iron frame, it also had a cotton tuft resembling a father and a leather cockade. It was the last item that the sepoys disliked, other than the shape which resembled a tope or European hat. The Commission felt that the ‘sepoys appear to feel that the wearing of the new turban would make them come to be considered as Europeans, and would have removed them from the society and intercourse of their own castes.’ Though such prejudices may appear unreasonable, the Commission judiciously commented, ‘Prejudices would cease to be so, could they be regulated by reason.’

            Continuing on the subject of the strong religious feelings and prejudices prevalent in India, the Commission remarked:

In this country the prejudices of the conquered have always triumphed over the arms of the conqueror, and have subsisted amidst all the revolutions and shocks to which the empire has been subjected. Any innovation, therefore, in that respect, must be calculated to call forth their feelings, and the more trivial the object required to be sacrificed, the stronger, in our opinion, would be the reluctance to make it. Nothing could appear more trivial to the public interests than the length of hair on the upper lip of a sepoy, yet to the individual himself the shape and fashion of the whisker is a badge of his caste, and an article of his religion. And the sanctity in which this article is held has occasioned revolutions in different eastern nations, rather than suffer it to be violated. 10

            The Commission went at great lengths to investigate the involvement of the sons of Tipu Sultan, especially the youngest, Prince Moizuddin. While the family of Tipu was interned in the palace in the fort, under the care of Colonel Mariott, a large number of followers had settled down in the vicinity at Pettah. The residents of the Pettah intermingled with the Muslim sepoys of the regiments in the fort, and were suspected to have conspired with them in the mutiny. On the night of the 9 July the wedding of one of Tipu’s daughters, Princess Noor-ul-Nissum was being celebrated in the palace, and a large crowd had assembled to watch the proceedings. It was reported that many of the followers from the palace helped the mutineers as soon as the firing started. The flag of Tipu Sultan was also brought out and hoisted on the garrison flagstaff by the sepoys and the followers. Though the Commission could not find any concrete evidence of the direct involvement of any of Tipu’s sons in the mutiny, it relied on the statements of Colonel Mariott, who suspected Prince Moizuddin, due to certain events that occurred in the days preceding the mutiny, such as his request to purchase a horse, and to permit one of his cousins to spend the night with him in the palace. Though Mariott refused both requests, he thought they were enough evidence of the evil intentions of Prince Moizuddin.

            The Madras government initially advanced the theory that the Vellore mutiny was part of a widespread plot to expel the British and restore Muslim authority. Bentinck supported this view in his first report to the Governor General at Fort William. Based on Bentinck’s report the council at Fort William wrote to London on 30 July 1806, clearly stating: ‘We deem it highly probable that the insurrection was instigated by one more of the sons of Tippoo sultan confined in the Fort’.11 However, Bentinck modified his views after the Commission of Inquiry was unable to find any evidence to support this theory. The next report to London dated 26 August 1806 stated: ‘no attempts appear to have been made by the sons of Tippoo Sultan to excite revolt in Mysore and that no appearance on commotion exists or has existed in that Country’.12

            In spite of finding no direct evidence of the involvement of Tipu’s sons, the British authorities could not seem to get it out of their heads. A subsequent report to London dated 1 October 1806 stated: ‘With regard to the second point we have decidedly formed the following conclusions – That the strongest assumption and even positive evidence exists in proof that Sultan Moozoodeen the fourth son of the late Tippoo Sultan was actively concerned in the insurrection. That scarcely any ground of suspicion is established against the Prince Mohieudeen, the third and only legitimate son and that the rest of the sons and relatives of the family are entirely free from guilt’. The report also indicated the measures intended to be taken with regard to the future treatment of the sons of Tipu, who were all to be ‘detained’ permanently in Bengal, with Prince Moizuddeen kept in a state of  ‘strict confinement’, separately from the others.13

            There was a divergence of views between Fort William and Fort St. with regard to the treatment of the sepoys. The former wanted all ‘men who did not side with the British or were absent’ to be sent to other regiments and the two units disbanded, the men sent to Cape Prince of Wales Island Battalion and Malacca. The Madras council did not agree with this view, arguing that discharging all men will aggravate the situation and was dangerous, as it may spread disaffection. However, the Governor General’s Council at Calcutta insisted on exemplary punishment to the majority of men and banishment from India for the rest.14

            Apart from the family of Tipu Sultan and the sepoys, action was also taken against the Governor of Madras, Lord William Bentinck and his Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Craddock. Both were considered responsible for the outbreak and were recalled. A year later, Lord Minto came out to India as Governor-General. He was struck by the mutual ignorance of each other’s motives, intentions and actions in which Europeans and natives seemed content to live in India. ‘I do not believe that either Lord William or Sir John Craddock had the slightest idea of the aversion their measures would excite. I fully believe that their intentions were totally misapprehended buy the natives’.15

The controversial dress regulations were cancelled on 17 July 1806. This was followed by a general order on 24 September 1806 according to which, ‘interference with the native soldiery in regard to their national observances was strictly prohibited’. Another measure taken by the Court Of Directors in London was downgrading the position and authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Craddock’s successor, Lieutenant General Hay McDowell was not included in the Governor’s Council, as his predecessors had been. The Directors’ reason for doing this was Craddock’s errors of judgment that caused the Vellore mutiny. However, the measure caused considerable resentment in the Madras Army, and was partly responsible for the serious unrest among officers in 1809. 16

            The mutiny at Vellore was the first major mutiny by Indian troops after the establishment of British rule in India, in which a large number of Europeans were killed in an attempt to overthrow the British and re- establish Muslim rule in Mysore. It was a warning to the British that Indian soldiers could rise if their religious sensibilities or caste prejudices were hurt. Unfortunately, the British authorities in India could not read these signs, and had to face their greatest challenge fifty years later, when the greased cartridges were issued to Indian troops, leading to the holocaust of 1857.

END NOTES

This chapter is largely based on J.W Kaye’s A History of the Sepoy War in India, (London, 1877); Sir Penderel Moon’s The British Conquest and Dominion of India, (London, 1989); and Military Department Records in the National Archives of India.    Specific references are given below:-

1.         J.W Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in India, (London, 1877), Vol. I, p. 218.

2          General letter from the Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, The East India Company; Foreign Department – Secret Letters to Court 1806, National Archives of India (NAI), 26 August 1806.

3.         Report of the Commission of Inquiry Assembled on 9 August 1806, for the Investigation of the Circumstances connected with the Mutiny at Vellore; NAI, House of Commons papers, 1861 (HC 284), p.2 

4.         Penderel Moon, The Brtitsh Conquest and Dominion of India, (London, 1989), p. 351.

5.         Kaye, p. 227.

6.         Lt. Gen S.L. Menezes, Fidelity & Honour, (New Delhi, 1993), p.100.

7.         Kaye, p. 237.

8.         Kaye, p. 239.

9.         Kaye, p. 241.

10.       Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p. 5

11.       Secret Letters to Court 1806, (NAI), 30 July 1806.

 

12.       Secret Letters to Court 1806, (NAI), 26 August 1806.

           

13.       Secret Letters to Court 1806, (NAI), 1 October 1806.

14.       Secret Letters to Court 1806, (NAI), 20 December 1806.

15.       Moon, p.352, quoting Countess Minto (ed), Lord Minto in India, p. 309

16.       Lt. Gen S.L. Menezes, p.102

CONTENTS

CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations

Glossary of Hindustani Terms

Prologue

Chapter            Subject                                                                                 Page No         

1                      The Vellore Mutiny - 1806

2                      The Barrackpore Mutiny - 1824

3                      The Great Indian Mutiny - 1857

4                      The Singapore Mutiny - 1915

5                      The Peshawar Mutiny - 1930

6                      Mutinies and Revolts during World War II

7                      The RIAF Mutiny - 1946

8                      The RIN Mutiny - 1946

9                      The Jubbulpore Mutiny – 1946.

10                    Nationalism in the Armed Forces

11                    The Soldier’s Contribution to Indian Independence

Bibliography

PROLOGUE

PROLOGUE

            The role of the Indian Armed Forces in the struggle for freedom from British rule has not been properly documented or publicised. The general public remains unaware and the nation’s leaders have never acknowledged or appreciated the part played by the military in this important chapter of our history. As a result, the affected personnel have not been given recognition or reward for their efforts. In some cases, they were deprived of their livelihood and liberty, without compensation. There is a need to undo this injustice and acquaint the nation with Armed Forces’ contribution to the freedom movement. This book attempts to undo this injustice and acquaint the nation with the soldier’s contribution to the freedom movement.

            India’s independence from British rule in 1947 was achieved after a protracted and sustained struggle that lasted several decades. It has a unique place in World History since it was characterised by non-violence, a novel form of rebellion popularised by Mahatma Gandhi. It was the only instance when a colonial power not only relinquished authority voluntarily but also advanced the date of its departure. The saga of India’s freedom movement has been documented by scores of Indian and foreign authors. Though essentially non-violent, the movement had elements that involved the use of force, the most notable being the Indian National Army (INA) led by Subhas Chandra Bose. Scores of books have been written about the INA, even though its contribution in the attainment of independence was insignificant. On the other hand, with the exception of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, no historian has made more than a passing reference to the mutinies by personnel of the Armed Forces against British rule. These revolts occurred throughout the 200 odd years of British rule in India. Most of these uprisings were localized to small garrisons, and occurred due to ill treatment, bad food, appalling living conditions, perceived injustice, lack of sensitivity to religious or ethnic sentiments etc. However, many were politically motivated and inspired by a spirit of nationalism, the most prominent being the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857, also called the First War of Indian Independence. Though the mutiny of 1857 was quelled, the spirit of nationalism that it kindled could not be extinguished. A number of smaller mutinies and revolts that took place during the next 90 years, especially during the two World Wars and immediately after wards. These rebellions were instrumental in the decision of the British Government to pull out of India in August 1947.

            Before starting work on this project, I had to take an important decision – whether or not to include the Indian National Army (INA). As is well known, the INA was a Japanese sponsored force created from Indian prisoners of war during World War II. Many of those who joined the INA claimed they did so for patriotic reasons, and refute the charges of treason - as the act of going over to the enemy is regarded in the military – by arguing that after the fall of Singapore, they were handed over to the Japanese authorities by the British, who thereafter had no claim on their allegiance. This appears to be a strange argument, since after a mass surrender, the senior captured officer hands over charge of the men under this command to the victor. This is what Percival did after the fall of Singapore in 1942, and Niazi after the fall of Dacca in 1971. The act of being handed over to the enemy is a military custom, which does not absolve the captured soldiers from their allegiance or duty. It is also worth remembering that India was then at war with Japan, and joining the enemy to fight one’s own compatriots could hardly be termed a patriotic act. This was realized by the leaders of the freedom struggle, who denounced the INA in no uncertain terms, Nehru even proclaiming that he would meet Bose ‘sword in hand’ if he tried to cross over into India. Most leaders, including Gandhi, trusted the British more than the Japanese, having heard of the atrocities committed by the latter in China. They knew that Japanese rule over India would be many times worse than that of the British, which in any case was about to end. Most important of all, they wanted to gain freedom on their own, not with the help of a foreign power.

            Though Subhas Chandra Bose was a popular figure, the activities of the INA remained virtually unknown until the end of World War II. However, the Red Fort trials brought them into the limelight, thanks to the Congress, which found a cause to mobilize public opinion against British rule. Having opposed the INA during the War, Congress leaders suddenly changes their stand, turning erstwhile villains into heroes. The Indian Armed Forces could not remain unaffected by this change, and opinions differed widely regarding the treatment of those who had broken their oath. Many felt that the soldiers who joined the INA had been untrue to their salt and deserved no sympathy, while others were of the opinion that they were genuine patriots, even if the methods adopted by them were wrong. This is often quoted as the reason for the mutinies that occurred in the three services early in 1946. A close examination reveals that the main grounds of the three mutinies were discrimination between British and Indian soldiers in matters of pay, food, accommodation, along with resentment against the harsh punishments awarded to the INA prisoners.  Based on this, many INA veterans claim a major share of the credit for obtaining freedom from British rule. However, this argument is fallacious, since the INA had ceased to exist when these mutinies occurred. The mutineers were protesting against the British action taken against the INA personnel, which they felt was too harsh. This does not signify that they condoned the actions of the men in joining INA and fighting alongside Japan, an enemy country. In fact, the feeling against them in the Indian Army was so strong that the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Auchinleck, had to issue strict instructions to ensure the safety of the INA personnel who had become prisoners after the fall of Rangoon.  

There are several other reasons for not upholding the claim of the INA of having contributed significantly to India’s independence. None of the persons in authority who were responsible for the decision - Attlee, Pethick-Lawrence, Cripps, Wavell, or Mountbatten – have acknowledged or mentioned that the INA played a part in their discussions. The same applies to the leaders of the freedom struggle, such as Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah and many others.  On the other hand, there is ample evidence that the Indian Armed Forces figured prominently in the deliberations that preceded the end of British rule in India.  Having forsaken their allegiance to the Indian Army by joining the Japanese, INA personnel could not be treated as members of the Indian Army, unlike the other prisoners of war who elected to undergo hard labour and torture rather break their oath of loyalty.

It is significant that most of the books written by INA veterans make a pointed reference to their contribution to Indian independence, even in their titles. Examples are Soldiers’ Contribution to Indian Independence, by ‘General’ Mohan Singh; Forgotten Warriors of Indian War of Independence 1941-1946; Indian National Army by Captain S.S. Yadav; India’s Struggle for Freedom by Major General A.C. Chatterjee; and The Impact of Netaji and INA on India’s Independence by Dr R.M. Kasliwal. Captain Yadav’s book runs into three volumes and contains a list of all members of the INA, state wise. Surprisingly, most of these names are not to be found in the list of Indian soldiers who were captured by the enemy during World War II, which forms part of the official records maintained by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence.

Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was one of the greatest patriots produced by this country. The nationalism of most of the persons who joined the INA, especially the ones who did not wear a uniform, is also not in doubt. Many of them took grave risks, giving up lucrative businesses in Malaya, Thailand, Burma and Singapore to join the INA. However, the issue under consideration is not their objective – driving the British out from India – but whether they were able to achieve it, even partly. From the analysis given above, it is doubtful if they made a significant contribution to Indian independence. For this reason, the INA has been omitted from this study. 

            Though Indian soldiers, sailors and airmen continued to serve with commitment until the end, it would be wrong to assume that they did so willingly. The wave of nationalistic fervour sweeping through the country forced many of them to introspect their role in the freedom struggle, leaving some confused and insecure. The men naturally looked to their officers for guidance, who were equally uncertain about their future course of action.   These issues, coupled with the growing aspirations for independence, became a source of concern for the military hierarchy, which was aware of the discontent and alienation of Indian officers. They tried to take remedial measures, but it was too late. By the time World War II ended, Indian officers had become true nationalists.

            Most people in India, and indeed the World, believe that the chief architect of independence was Mahatma Gandhi, who confounded the British rulers with his new weapon – non violence- against which they had no defence. This may be the truth, but not the whole truth. Irrespective of official pronouncements from the Viceroy’s House on Raisina Hill in Delhi or Whitehall in London, the British were loath to leave India, right up to the end of 1946. Even as the Cabinet Mission was trying to reconcile the differences between the Congress and Muslim League, the Chiefs of Staff in London were examining options to continue their hold on India. After rejecting options involving withdrawal from India for strategic reasons, they proceeded to work out the quantum of British troops that were required to keep the country under control, since the Indian Armed Forces could no longer be trusted. At one stage, the British Government seriously considered a recruitment drive in Europe to raise the additional troops needed for this purpose. It was only after they failed to find the five British divisions that Auchinleck had asked for did they agree, very reluctantly, to quit India. Had the Indian Armed Forces remained staunch, there is little doubt that British rule would have continued for at least another 10 to 15 years. The nationalistic feeling that had entered the heart of the Indian soldier was one of the most important factors in the British decision to grant complete independence to India, and also to advance the date from June 1948 to August 1947.

New Delhi                                                                                   Maj Gen V.K. Singh          

   September 2007