CHAPTER 3
THE LIBERATION OF GOA (1961)
Preview–
Background.
THE LIBERATION OF GOA : Planning and Preliminary Actions - Move to Concentration and Assembly
Areas – The Advance by 63 Infantry Brigade from the East– Advance of 50
(Independent) Parachute Brigade from the North - Capture of Panjim by 50
Parachute Brigade. SIGNALS IN THE GOA
OPERATIONS : 17 Infantry Divisional
Signal Regiment – 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company – 1 Medium
Radio Relay Section - Southern Command Signals. DAMAN .
DIU . CONCLUSION.
Preview
The Portuguese enclaves of Goa , Daman and Diu were the last vestiges of colonial rule on the Indian
sub-continent. After India Portugal India Goa , the largest of the enclaves,
was liberated on 19
December 1961 by a force comprising one infantry division, in an
operation lasting less than two days. There was almost no opposition and
casualties were negligible. The much smaller enclaves of Daman
and Diu were tackled by a battalion each at
the same time, both falling on 19 December. However, unlike Goa ,
the defenders of Daman and Diu
did not give up without a fight and casualties were suffered on both sides. The
Navy and Air Force played a significant role in the liberation of the three
enclaves. The conduct of the operations in Goa
has been covered in detail, from the inception stage right up to their
culmination. Daman and Diu
have been mentioned only briefly, since there was no involvement of Signals.
Though Operation ‘Vijay’, as it was
code named, was of a short duration and there was little fighting, it holds
special significance for Signals. The reason is the partial failure of
communications during the crucial phase of the operation, which resulted in
lack of command and control and necessitated change of plans. At one stage, the
Army Commander had to pass orders that were contrary to those of the task force
commander directly to a brigade major, due to breakdown in communications.
Fortunately, since the enemy capitulated without a fight, there were no serious
repercussions and Signals were spared the opprobrium that would have surely
come their way had the operations not gone the way they did. The failures
occurred due to faulty planning and could have been avoided. The operation
brought out several important lessons for Signals, in planning and execution of
tasks of a similar nature.
Background
Though Vasco da Gama discovered the
sea route to India India India Bombay Britain England India Goa , Daman
and Diu ; and the French colony of Pondicherry
Revolts
and agitations against Portuguese rule in Goa
had occurred sporadically from the sixteenth century onwards. These agitations
were usually violent and were ruthlessly suppressed. With the start of the
non-violent struggle for independence sponsored by Mahatma Gandhi in India Goa , with the
formation of the Goa National Congress in 1928 under the leadership of Dr.
Tristao Braganza Cunha. However, it was only after the end of World War II that
a civil disobedience movement came into being, on the lines of the one launched
by Mahatma Gandhi in 1930 in India India 30 June 1946 , he
wrote,
“I would
venture to advise the Portuguese Government of Goa
to recognize the signs of time and come to honourable terms with its
inhabitants rather than function on any treaty that might exist between them
and the British Government”.
The Congress Working Committee, in
its meeting on 12 August
1946 passed a strong resolution condemning the policies of Portugal Goa , which had reduced the inhabitants to a state of
poverty, forcing them to migrate to other regions in search of a living. It declared
that ‘Goa has always been and must inevitably
continue to be, a part of India
The
struggle for independence gained momentum after India India Hyderabad Jammu and
Kashmir Goa , who continued
the agitation on their own. In June 1948, meetings were held in different parts
of Goa . The Goan Police carried out a lathi charge (a lathi is a long bamboo
stick, used as a weapon) and arrested the leaders, including Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia, a prominent leader of the Socialist Party in India Goa realize that they did
not have even the right of expressing their views peacefully and holding
meetings.
After
the ceasefire in Kashmir , the Government of
India approached the Portuguese Government in 1949 for a peaceful transfer of
their enclaves in India Portugal India Pondicherry India Goa
and it was hoped that Portugal Portugal
The
Government of India opened a legation in Lisbon Lisbon Bombay Daman , separated from it by narrow strip of
an Indian territory , where the people rose and
overthrew the Portuguese rule. The liberation of these two pockets after 175 years
signalled the end of Portuguese colonial rule in India
About
a year after the liberation of Dadar and Nagar Haveli, a serious incident
brought matters to a head. On 15
August 1955 , the eighth anniversary of India Goa , Daman
and Diu in small groups, which included
several women. They were unarmed and wanted to offer satyagrah (a form of non-violent protest, popularized by Mahatma
Gandhi) to express their solidarity with the people’s liberation movement in Goa . The Portuguese authorities opened fire on the
demonstrators as soon as they entered their territory, killing 22 and wounding
225. Many were arrested and the remainder forcibly evicted. In sympathy with
the Indian demonstrators, many Goans hoisted the Indian flag on buildings,
distributed handbills and offered satyagrah.
The Police opened fire on them too, killing two and brutally assaulting the
rest, before arresting them. During the next few days, more satyagrahis entered Goa , many being arrested and the rest being evicted. In protest, the
underground nationalists in Goa set fire to
some government buildings and police barracks.
The brutal killing of peaceful
demonstrators, including several women, generated considerable resentment and
anger in India Goa .
Meanwhile, Portugal India Indian
territory for her armed forces in order to re-establish her rule
there. The case reached the International Court of Justice at The Hague 12 August 1960 . While recognizing the status
of the enclaves as Portuguese territory, the Court did not agree to the right
of free passage for armed forces, and felt that Portuguese officials could go
there after obtaining visas from the Government of India, which now had
jurisdiction over the intervening territory. The liberated enclaves remained
autonomous territories for some time after the judgment, though requests from
the people to merge them with India
The status of Goa
was also discussed in the United Nations, when several nations asked Portugal Goa and her other
colonies, as was obligatory under the UN Charter. Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Goa will soon be free”. 2
Though events in Goa
and on the international stage clearly brought out the futility of further
overtures and negotiations with the Portuguese, the Government of India was
still reluctant to resort to force to solve the problem. However, the
Portuguese themselves provided the spark that lit the conflagration. On 17 November 1961 , the
Portuguese opened fire on the Indian merchant coastal steamer ‘Sabarmati’ while she was on its normal
course off Anjidiv
Island 25 November 1961 , the Portuguese again opened
fire from Anjidiv
Island Goa from Mozambique Goa and other
Portuguese possessions in India
THE
LIBERATION OF GOA
Planning
and Preliminary Actions
Though
the Government of India did not issue any formal orders on the subject, the
Army had discreetly started taking some actions on its own. Based on newspaper
accounts of the unrest in Portuguese Africa and its possible repercussions in India 28 April 1961 ,
suggesting that he be issued a directive to allow him to make a tentative plan
in case military intervention was ever required in Goa ,
Daman and Diu .
Army HQ confirmed that no military action in these territories was contemplated
by the Government. Despite this reply, General
Chaudhuri felt that it was essential to build up an accurate intelligence
picture so that they were not caught napping if it was ever urgently
required. His staff discreetly started
the process of collecting intelligence. Information from military sources was
negligible and so liaison was established with Mr. G.K. Handoo, the special Inspector
General, Border Police. This liaison
produced good results, particularly on the aspects of topography and communications. In addition to the collation of information,
the process of developing an outline appreciation and plan was also begun.
On 29 August 1961 , while General
Chaudhuri was officiating as the Chief of Army Staff at Delhi India Poona
On 7 October 1961 , Army HQ asked
the GOC-in-C Southern Command for his appreciation and plan based on a main
task, which was to occupy the Portuguese held territories in India 24 October 1961 , while the formal
appreciation and plan were being prepared, the Prime Minister who was in Bombay USA Goa , Daman
and Diu .
General Chaudhuri gave a figure of three days in the event of Portuguese
resistance and a considerably shorter period in the event of no resistance or
of qualified resistance. On 28 October 1961 , while
both were returning to Poona Goa . These formations would come from Western and
Eastern Commands. For operations against
Daman and Diu ,
troops from within Southern Command would be used.3
General Chaudhuri submitted his appreciation
on 10 November 1961 .
The decision of the Government to undertake military operations for the
liberation of Goa was formally conveyed to the
Army on 29 November 1961
and preparations started immediately. A task force under the command of Major
General K.P. Candeth was ordered to be assembled for the operation, which was
to be conducted under the control of HQ Southern Command. The force earmarked
for Goa was to comprise 17 Infantry Division
less a brigade; 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade; two armoured regiments; one
medium artillery regiment and some engineer units. One infantry battalion (1 Maratha
Light Infantry) was nominated for Daman and a
composite force comprising 20 Rajput and a company of 4 Madras Diu ,
under the command of a brigadier. Major General K.P. Candeth, the Director
Artillery at Army HQ was ordered to relieve Major General M. M. Khanna, GOC 17
Infantry Division, who was to proceed to UK Bombay 28
November 1961 .
On 29 November 1961 , Brigadier Sagat Singh,
Commander 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade at Agra Delhi Goa and his
own role in it. Later in the day, there was a conference in the office of the Chief
of General Staff, General Kaul, where the plans were finalized. The operation
for the liberation of Goa , code named 'Vijay',
was planned for 16 December
1961 . General Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command, was entrusted
with overall responsibility of the task. In order to prevent international
intervention and reinforcements from Portugal Goa ,
it was essential that the operation was quick and decisive. The plan made by
General Chaudhuri envisaged a two-pronged attack. The main force, comprising 17
Infantry Division, was to move into Goa from
the east, while 50 Parachute Brigade was to mount a subsidiary thrust from the north.
Daman and Diu
were to be simultaneously tackled by a battalion each, while the Navy was to
capture Anjidiv Island Daman . The Indian Air Force was
assigned the task of destroying the airfield at Dambolim and the wireless
station at Bambolim, in addition to providing close support to the ground
troops. To ensure that the Indian troops were not held up at the obstacles, a
large amount of bridging equipment was grouped with the main column. A para
drop by a battalion group of 50 Parachute Brigade was also planned near Panjim,
to capture vital bridges before they could be destroyed by the Portuguese.
Sagat was elated on being informed that
a battalion group from his brigade would be used in an airborne role. Since
time and the riverine obstacles were the main considerations, he suggested that
the battalion be dropped by night in area Ponda, so that the water obstacles of
rivers Sanquelim, Bicholim, Usgaon and Candepar could be avoided. However, the AOC-in-C Operational Command, who
was present, expressed his inability to undertake a night drop. Sagat then
suggested that one company be dropped at dawn, another at first light, and the
rest of the battalion subsequently by day. This was accepted, and Sagat
returned to Agra Delhi
The
Warning Order for the operation was issued at 1530 hours on 29 November in the
form of a ‘Personal For’ signal from the Chief of Army Staff to the Army
Commanders, with copies being endorsed to Major General M.M. Khanna and
Brigadier Sagat Singh. The signal bore the precedence FLASH and was signed
personally by the Chief of General Staff, General Kaul. The signal is
significant because apart from giving the code name of the operation, details
of troops, date and time of move (No Move Before 2000 hrs on 2 December) and
concentration area (Belgaum), it also gave out the reasons for undertaking the
operations in these words:-
“…As a result of recent Portuguese hostile
action our nationals, government propose taking certain steps in area ANJIDIV Island ( . ) INDIA
According to intelligence reports, the strength of the Portuguese
Army in Goa was three infantry battalions
comprising about 2,200 ranks. In addition, there were four squadrons of armour
equipped with armoured or scout cars and three companies of artillery, each
having six 105 mm howitzers. There was some anti aircraft artillery at Dabolim
airfield and Marmagao harbour, in addition to some coastal guns at the latter
location. In addition to the above, there were about 3,000 armed local police
personnel and customs guards in Goa , equipped
with mortars and light automatics. The naval complement consisted of three
small ships; each armed with three 120 mm cannons and four multiple Pom-Poms.
There was no air force worth the name, though the possibility of a few
transport planes could not be ruled out. However, in the event of operations
being prolonged or adequate warning being given, the Portuguese could reinforce
their naval and air force units.
Move
to Concentration and Assembly Areas
HQ
17 Mountain Division had been out on a training exercise near Kapurthala that
had just concluded on 29
November 1961 . The GOC, General Khanna who was on leave, was
summoned urgently to Delhi Delhi 30 November 1961 .
As soon as he returned from Delhi Goa . The concentration areas for
Goa , Daman
and Diu were Belgaum 11 December 1961 . The first train carrying the advance
party left Ambala on 2 December. Next morning, Major General K.P. Candeth took
over command of 17 Mountain Division from General Khanna and left for Poona Poona Poona Belgaum 12 December 1961 .
50 (Independent)
Parachute Brigade began its move from Agra on 2 December 1961, the major
portion moving by rail to and the rest by air to Poona and thence by rail to
Belgaum. The brigade headquarters was established at Mile 4 Road Belgaum –
Savantvadi immediately on arrival of the brigade commander’s party on 5
December. By the morning of 8 December, the whole brigade had concentrated in
the harbour area. On the brigade’s arrival at Belgaum Battery ; 380 Field Company
Engineers and 2 Sikh Light Infantry. The last named unit had recently moved to
Begumpet from Madras
On 9 December 1961 , GOC 17 Infantry Division
briefed his orders group on the impending task. This was followed by the issue
of the divisional operation order on 11 December 1961 . The
operation was to be conducted in two phases. In Phase 1, Ponda was to be captured,
while Panjim and Marmagao were to be captured in Phase 2. The advance was to be
undertaken two-up on three axes, named Red, Yellow and Blue. The Red Axis (Doda
Marg- Assonara – Sanquelim – Usgao – Pilliem) was allotted to 50 Parachute
Brigade Group and the Yellow Axis (Anmod
– Molem – Pilliem - Ponda) to 17 Infantry
Division, with 63 Brigade leading and 48
Brigade in reserve. The Green Axis provided an alternate route to Ponda ahead
of Mollem and was to be used by 63 Brigade in addition to the Yellow Axis. Significantly,
D Day for the operation was not specified. 5
As
the rest of 17 Infantry Division was to follow 63 Brigade on the Yellow Axis on
wheels, two sets of move tables were made with different priorities dependent
on the delay that was likely to be encountered due to the damage done to the
roads and the repair programme of own engineers. The ghat
section of the road between the border and Mollem had not been used for the
last five or six years. As a result, it
was over-grown with thick foliage, forming a canopy. It had precipitous slopes and hairpin bends
with the culverts and two small bridges – in fact an ideal demolition
country. The road was believed to be
extensively cratered, mined and culverts and bridges blown. One move table catered for delay until 1430
hours on D day and the other until last light on D day.
The Army Commander had decided to
establish his tactical headquarters at Belgaum Belgaum 12 December 1961 . The same day, HQ 17 Division
moved forward to its forward concentration area at Tinaighat. By 13 December, 50 Parachute
Brigade had moved to a location close to Savantwadi, after certain bridges had
been reinforced by the Engineers. The distance from Belgaum
On
15 December 1961, the COAS, General P.N. Thapar, accompanied by Lieutenant
General P.P. Kumaramangalam, the Adjutant General, and the Army Commander
visited 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade, where Brigadier Sagat Singh
presented his plan for the operation. At the end of the presentation, the Army
Commander expressed the view that the timings were too optimistic, and had
reservations about them being adhered to. Sagat then gave the timings in
writing, and the party left, after wishing the brigade good luck. On return to
his tactical headquarters, the Army Commander conveyed his doubts to his staff.
However, Air Vice Marshal E.W. Pinto, the Theatre Air Commander; Major General
P.O. Dunn, the Chief of Staff; and Mr. G.N. Handoo, of the Intelligence Bureau,
who knew Sagat well, supported him and he was allowed to proceed according to
his plan. As it happened, Sagat had already kept a reserve of four hours and
was able to remain well ahead of the estimated timings when the operations ended.
6
During
his visit, the COAS addressed the troops of 17 Infantry Division and 50 Parachute
Brigade and wished them luck. Next day, a Special Order of the Day from the
Chief was read out to all ranks. The D Day for the operation was originally 14
December. However, this was postponed twice, for political reasons. Diplomatic
efforts were still being made and it was hoped that the United Nations and
other countries may act to avert an armed conflict. On 16 December, the Army
Commander landed at the airstrip near 8 Cavalry and informed GOC 17 Infantry
Division that the D Day would be 18 December.
This was later confirmed by a signal giving the code word ‘Bull Dozer’. Troops were ordered to move forward to the assembly
area on the afternoon of 16 December. The brigade assembly area of 50 Parachute
Brigade was east of Dodamarg, about 50 km from the concentration area at
Savantvadi. On the Eastern thrust, 63 and 48 Brigades moved to their assembly
areas near Anmod. On 17 December, the
order to enter Goa was received through the
codeword ‘Varaha’. Patrolling across the border was allowed after last light on
17 December 1961
with a view to liquidating the enemy posts enroute near the border,
facilitating further advance and gaining information especially of road
communication and state of defences.
The
Advance by 63 Infantry Brigade from the East
On
the Yellow Route Green Route Green Route
The
second battalion of 63 Brigade, 2 Bihar was to
move on the Green Axis up to Mollem and thereafter use the Yellow Axis to reach
Ponda. Leaving the start point at 0400 hours, the battalion found Tamri
vacated, the Portuguese having withdrawn after being warned by barking dogs.
Continuing the advance, the battalion passed through Surla and arrived at road
junction approximately 1500 yards west of Mollem at 0515 hours. According to
the plan, Mollem was to be cleared by 3 Sikh, which had still not arrived.
Since there was no wireless contact with the brigade headquarters, the
battalion had to wait there. Eventually after 3 Sikh had taken Mollem, 2 Bihar also reached there at 0815 hours, where they were
met by the brigade commander, Brigadier K.S. Dhillon and the Chief of General
Staff, General Kaul. The battalion was asked to continue the advance to Ponda
on the Yellow Axis. A few civilian vehicles were commandeered and one company
was made mobile, the petrol being provided by a mining company. The foot column
left at 1230 hours and the mounted column at 1300 hours. On reaching Darbandora,
about ten miles away, it was found that two adjacent culverts had been blown off,
flooding the right side of the road, with the left being mined. While a
diversion was being cleared and marked, local people pointed to an alternative
route to Ponda known as the Miner’s Route.
Leaving the marching column to continue along the Yellow route, the mounted column with the Commanding Officer
proceeded by the miner’s route and arrived at the Candiapar River 4.15 p.m. The bridge having being blown, the leading company
waded across and established a fire base on the far bank where they firmed in
for the night. The remainder of the battalion reached the near bank by 2200
hours. A little after midnight ,
4 Sikh Light Infantry that had been following HQ 63 Infantry Brigade had
reached the Candiapar
River
During
the night of 18/19 December, the main divisional headquarters column commenced
its move forward along the Yellow Axis, led by bridging train for bridging of
the Candiapar River and followed by 48 Infantry Brigade Group. As the bridging fleet consisted mostly of old
vehicles, there were many and frequent breakdowns along the one-way road where
even a motor cycle could not pass. As a result, 48 Infantry Brigade that was to
pass through the 63 Infantry Brigade at Ponda could not clear Mollem during the
night. The main divisional headquarters was also stranded along the road. 7
The
GOC with his ‘R’ Group had reached Mollem by 2200 hours on 18 December. After taking stock of the situation and
realizing that the enemy had very little will left to fight, he gave his orders
for advance on 19 December. According to
the Operational Order No. 2 issued at that time, 48 Infantry Brigade was to
advance on Yellow Axis with a view to capture Panjim; 63 Infantry Brigade was
to advance and capture Margao and Marmagao; 50 Parachute Brigade was to firm in
at Ponda and be prepared to take over from 48/63 Infantry Brigades. The grouping
was to be completed by 0200 hours and advance to commence at 0630 hours on 19
December. However, the Army Commander nullified these orders. Since the divisional headquarters was not in
touch with Tactical HQ Southern Command, the Army Commander directly ordered 50
Parachute Brigade to advance during the night and capture Panjim as soon as
possible. This fact was communicated to HQ
17 Infantry Division on telephone at 1000 hours on 19 December and by a signal,
a copy of which is given below:-
SIGNAL MESSAGE
FLASH 190825
From TAC HQ SOUTHCOM SEC
To 17 INF DIV 02066
Info
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 Para Bde has been
ordered by this hq to move into PANJIM as we could NOT contact you last evening
(.) essential you send one bde to occupy MARMAGAO peninsula earliest possible
and confirm this has been done
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although
its communication vehicles were stranded all along the ghat section of the Anmod
– Mollem road, by 0800 hours on 19 December the main divisional headquarters had
assumed control with a relay station vehicle in area Mollem. However, 50 Parachute Brigade was still not
in touch. Realizing the urgency of the
task of capturing Marmagao at the earliest, and knowing that 48 Infantry Brigade
units were still held up East of Mollem, orders were issued to Commander 48 Infantry
Brigade to take over 3 Sikh, a battalion of 63 Infantry Brigade halted at Candiapar,
and dash down to Panjim. However, the
orders had to be cancelled as Panjim had already been captured by troops of 50
Parachute Brigade. The other formations of 17 Infantry Division continued with
their tasks.
The task allotted to 63 Infantry
Brigade was to capture Margao and Marmagao.
The outline plan was for 4 Sikh Light Infantry to lead the advance at 0600
hours on foot across the Candiapar
River Bihar to follow 4 Sikh
Light Infantry; and 3 Sikh to reach Borim and await further orders. The leading
companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry waded across the Candiapar River Bihar to pass through as ordered by the brigade commander.
For the advance on 19 December, 2 Bihar was divided into two parties. At 0730 hours two companies with the CO left
in mechanical transport by a new lateral route, which joined up with the Green route
to Ponda, while the remainder of the battalion waded through the Candiapar River
Civilians in Verna informed the
leading troops that about 500 Portuguese held a defensive position on the high
ground north of the village. C Company
was sent in an out flanking move to the left under Captain Bhandari. When they were about 300 yards away, the enemy
opened small arms fire on our troops who promptly returned the fire and charged,
upon which the enemy surrendered. The
bag was 11 officers, 23 sergeants, 91 soldiers and large quantity of arms and
equipment. While this was going on, B Company
under Major Bose charged the enemy position from the right further in depth and
they also surrendered. Their bag was 16
officers, 307 soldiers, 14 armoured cars, 21 jeeps and various other equipments.
All this was over by 1430 hours when 4 Sikh Light Infantry was ordered to pass
through and proceed to Vasco da Gama.
Starting from Verna at 1445 hours, 4
Sikh Light Infantry reached the area of road junction east of the Dabolim airfield
at 1530 hours. By a swift out flanking
move, the leading company commander rounded up six enemy officers and over 100
men with huge quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment. The battalion kept
up the pace and reached the out skirts of Vasco da Gama at 1600 hours where a
large number of Portuguese surrendered.
A small party of the enemy was still holding out in the area of the Baina
beach near Marmagao. A platoon sent out
to deal with them captured 40 of the enemy with a large booty of arms and
ammunition. The occupation of the
Western tip of the peninsula was thus completed. However due to a breakdown in communication
between HQ 63 Infantry Brigade and main divisional headquarters, the fact of
capture of Marmagao was not known to the latter until 2300 hours on 19 December
1961.
The
third battalion of 63 Infantry Brigade – 3 Sikh - was divided into mounted and
unmounted columns and kept in reserve.
The marching columns reached Dabolim airfield by 2200 hours on 19 December
and the vehicular columns reached Margao by last light. In the early hours of 20 December when Captain
R.S. Dahiya was out on a contact patrol with a small party, he rounded up 400
Portuguese soldiers who were hungry and keen to surrender.
After
1600 hours the Governor General of Goa, General Manuel Antonio Vassalo E’ Silva was found at Alparquiros camp in Vasco da Gama
and he formally surrendered in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces to Brigadier K.S. Dhillon, Commander 63 Infantry Brigade at 2030 hours on
19 December 1961. The instrument of
surrender was signed in the presence of COs 4 Sikh Light Infantry and 2 Bihar , Lieutenant Colonels R.B. Nanda and K.S. Chadha
respectively.
Advance
of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade from the North
The
brigade commander, Brigadier Sagat Singh had planned to advance into Goa on two axes. The Red Axis (Dodamarg – Bicholim –
Sanquelim – Usgao – Piliem) was allotted to 2 Para while the Maroon Axis
(Dodamarg – Assonora – Tivim – Mapuca – Betim) was to be used by 2 Sikh Light
Infantry. The brigade headquarters was to follow on the Red Axis. The task of capturing Ponda was given 1 Para
which was the only element of the brigade to advance on foot, the rest moving
on wheels. To ensure safe initial entry of the brigade into Goa ,
1 Para was to secure Ibrampur, Doddumorgu and Maulinguem before the start time
on D Day.
To
carry out the pre-H Hour operations, 1 Para detailed C Company to secure Ibrampur
and Doddumorogu and D Company to occupy Maulinguem by 0230 hours. Ibrampur was
occupied without any opposition but Doddumorogu was found to be held by a
platoon of infantry and a troop of armoured cars. The Portuguese were inside a building
surrounded by trenches and fortified by barbed wire. When the company assaulted the position, they
came under heavy fire from the armoured cars and the enemy inside the
building. The Company Commander, Major I.R.
Kumar, detailed two men to cut the wire and make gaps and also detailed parties
to deal with the armoured cars. The
attack was driven home, one armoured car being destroyed by a rocket launcher. Portuguese casualties were three killed, two wounded
and 24 captured. Own casualty was one killed. Meanwhile D Company occupied Maulinguem, killing
six and wounding three Portuguese, at a cost of one Indian soldier wounded.
Another preliminary operation was for the
Sanquelim bridge by 2 Para, which is best described in the words of the brigade
commander, Brigadier Sagat Singh:-
From a
Portuguese map obtained through smugglers by 2 Para, we gathered information
that they had constructed a 110-foot single span RCC bridge over the river
flowing by the eastern boundary of the Sanquelim town. I felt strongly that if
we could capture the bridge intact, it would speed up 2 Para's advance. We
worked out a careful plan. A company of 2 Para led by Major Uthaya set off on
man-pack basis after
last light on the night of December 15/16.
He was guided by seasoned smugglers who knew their clandestine tracks across
country. The tasks given to Major Uthaya were to capture the bridge intact; if
not, to find out a crossing place across the river. The company got to their
forming up place on the eastern end of the bridge. As they started crawling forward, trouble began in the form
of incessant barking of dogs. Though the Portuguese map had not shown it, some
hutments of the labourers who had worked on the bridge construction had settled
at the eastern end. Men of 2 Para crawled carefully forward a little at a time
but the dogs would not give up.
The
Portuguese guards became alert and suspicious. As our men were preparing to charge, the Portuguese blew up
the demolition charges and scurried towards Usgaon. Major Uthaya was able to
locate and mark a crossing place at which all vehicles, tanks and guns got
through without difficulty. I can never forget the scene of Major Uthaya
meeting me at the Sanquelim end of the bridge with tears rolling down his eyes
and in choked voice telling me, "Sorry. I have failed you." -meaning
that he had not got the bridge intact. Actually, the mission was a great
success. The crossing place enabled us to maintain the momentum of our advance
in motor transport. What Major Uthaya did not realize at the time was that he
had prevented the Portuguese from firing all the demolition charges affixed to
the long single span. They could only fire the charges in the demolition
chambers at either end of the single l10-foot span. In the aftermath, the span
was lifted by marine jacks and with additions to the abutments on either side;
the bridge was re-commissioned economically and in a short time. I have
narrated this in some detail not only to commend the performance of the 2 Para Company
but to say that in war, howsoever you
might plan in detail, there would be imponderables (like barking of dogs at
night) to contend with. 8
Another
reason for the loss of surprise that resulted in failure to capture the Sanquelim Bridge Goa . Had the radio announcement been delayed until
the morning, perhaps the bridge would not have been blown.
On 18 December, troops of 2 Para started
moving out from the forward assembly area at 4 a.m. The advance was held up as soon as it started, due
to a damaged culvert near the abandoned Portuguese customs post en route to the
start point. Vehicles could negotiate it with great difficulty and the AMX
tanks were unable to cross it. The culvert
was quickly strengthened with steel decking and the move forward resumed. The
vanguard company crossed the start point at the given time and the advance
continued. The rate of advance was very
slow owing to darkness and the difficult nature of the track especially at the
nullah crossings. By first light, the
vanguard had reached Corpol, where they met C Company 1 Para which was
escorting a Portuguese prisoner captured earlier. Thereafter, the going got
slightly better and the speed of advance increased. At approximately 0730 hours
a Portuguese armoured car was seen by the vanguard company on the track.
However, before any action could be taken it turned round and sped away towards
Bicholim. Unfortunately, the AMX tanks were approximately 1000 yards to the
rear. At 0830 hours the vanguard cleared Bicholim where the bridge was found
demolished. However, the river was crossed by a ford immediately to the north of
the bridge. A good tarmac road was now available and the advance was resumed at
a good speed, with a view to linking up with the company at Sanquelim which was
causing some anxiety, its whereabouts not known to the battalion. The vanguard
established contact with C Company on the outskirts of Sanquelim at 1030 hours. As both bridges had been blown, the vanguard
was guided to a ford through which it crossed and resumed its advance to Usgao. The crossing at the ford took considerable
time as the tanks of 7 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry were also using it and there were
frequent breakdowns. C Squadron of 7 Cavalry,
which was acting as mobile troops, had moved on to the Red Axis, ahead of the
vanguard, from the area of Maulinguem.
The
mobile troops and the vanguard reached Usgao at 1140 hours to find the bridge
over River Madei blown. The river was a
formidable water obstacle, 600 feet wide and unfordable. The banks on either side of the bridge were
reported to be mined. However, with
adequate caution, a landing place was reconnoitred south of the bridge. Two country boats were immediately acquired
for ferrying troops who had now dismounted from vehicles and the CO decided to
resume the advance on foot from the far bank. It was decided to build rafts to ferry jeeps
which would be utilized to carry two detachments 106 mm RCL, one section MMG
and one troop of heavy mortars. Work on construction of improvised rafts commenced
and officers were dispatched to commandeer barges and landing ship tanks which
were reported in the area. Troops started crossing the river in boats at midday . By 1330 hours, B and D companies
and the CO’s party had crossed and were on their way to Ponda, which was
secured by A Company at 1345 hours.
On
arrival at Ponda, it was found that the Portuguese had set fire to their
equipment and baggage and some buildings were burning. Hooligans were seen looting the
barracks. Immediately a platoon each was
posted to the three army barracks in the town and the fire was brought under
control. As more troops arrived, guards were put on various public utilities
like petrol pumps, municipal offices, post offices, police station and the
administrator’s office. The bazaar area
was patrolled and unruly crowds dispersed. Meanwhile C Company, which was at Sanquelim,
was lifted in vehicles and moved to Usgao to rejoin the battalion, leaving
behind one platoon for garrison duties. The
CO arrived at Ponda at 1430 hours. Accompanied by the Second-in-Command and a
few officers, he proceeded to reconnoitre the ferry site at Unde where a large
number of barges were reported to be moored, and the bridge at Banasterim. At Unde,
they found six large iron ore barges, each of which could carry 500 men in
addition to two or three jeeps. The
ferry owners’ agents and drivers were warned to stay with their ferries and be
prepared to move at short notice during night 18/19 December 1961.
It
was now dark and the party went towards the Banasterim bridge from Ponda by a
detour. The bridge at Mardol had been
blown and the nullah in the immediate vicinity was not easily fordable. Another bridge had been cratered but with a
little engineer assistance could be made fit for transport. The CO returned to Ponda at approximately 2030
hours where he met the brigade commander who had arrived from Candiapar River
and apprised him about the ferry at Unde and the state of bridges on road Ponda
– Banasterim. Brigadier Sagat informed them that 1 Para had reached Banasterim
and ordered the battalion to send out a contact patrol. Contact was established with rear elements of
1 Para at 0730 hours next morning, the battalion having moved towards Panjim earlier.
9
Tasked to advance on the Maroon
Axis (Dodamarg – Assonora – Tivim – Mapuca – Betim), 2 Sikh Light Infantry
started on time but was delayed by approximately two hours due to obstacles
encountered inside the border and
crossed the start point at 0900 hours on 18 December 1961. A Squadron of 7 Cavalry and a troop of B
Squadron of 8 Cavalry led the advance. The advance was rapid until they reached
Assonora, where the bridge was found to be demolished. The mobile troops
reported the presence of eight tanks on the far bank and exercised great
caution in pursuing the advance. With
the engineer resources at hand and local labour and material available, the
force commenced crossing the river by a diversion at 1145 hours. At 1300 hours the
column reached Tivim where the bridge was again found demolished and a diversion
was taken via Colvale. At 1400 hours the
head of the column hit the Pernim – Mapuca road where numerous anti-tank mines
were encountered. Considerable time was
spent in disarming and removing these mines.
However, by 1600 hours the column got well under way and reached Mapuca at
1700 hours.
One
company group was detached at Mapuca to round up the Portuguese personnel still
around, creating confidence amongst the public and affording protection to the
town. The route from Mapuca to Betim was
mined at places and obstacles had been created by demolishing culverts and
felling trees. By 1745 hours the entire
column reached Betim. Since permission to cross the creek at Betim had not been
granted, the column was split into groups and went into night harbour. At about
200 hours a priest from Panjim came in a boat to the harbour of A Squadron
On
returning to the harbour, Major Sidhu came to know that his men had captured
two men who claimed to be locals from a nearby village, which fell on the route
that the squadron was to take next morning. Wishing to confirm if the men were
telling the truth, Major Sidhu decided to reconnoitre up to the village.
Accompanied by four officers, three OR and the two prisoners, Major Sidhu left
in a Dodge 15 cwt. truck at 2230 hours. On reaching the village, the prisoners
were released after they were identified by the residents. However, another
local informed Major Sidhu that about 50 to 60 nationalist prisoners in the
Aguada Fort were likely to be murdered during the night by the five or six
Portuguese soldiers who were guarding them.
Deciding
to rescue the prisoners, Major Sidhu immediately left for the Aguada Fort,
about seven miles away, accompanied by the informer. The party reached the fort
at about 2330 hours and found the gate closed. Major Sidhu asked the sentry to
call his commander, telling him that the Portuguese authorities in Panjim had
decided to surrender. The Portuguese suddenly opened fire with automatics,
mortars and grenades. Major Sidhu and his party were taken by surprise but returned
the fire. However, they were overwhelmed and suffered heavy casualties. A light
machine gun burst hit Captain V.K. Sehgal who died instantly. The truck was
loaded with ammunition which exploded, setting it on fire. Major Sidhu was also
hit and ran back about 100 yards where he was caught in a medium machine gun
burst. Two officers and one OR who were not seriously injured walked back to
the harbour, reaching there at about 0330 hours. A troop of AMX tanks, a troop
of Stuarts and two rifle troops were immediately dispatched to the fort,
reaching there at 0530 hours. After a few bursts of machine gun fire, the Portuguese
hoisted the white flag and surrendered. Major Sidhu and Captain V.K. Sehgal
were killed in operation, with two officers and two OR being seriously wounded.10
The
third battalion of 50 Parachute Brigade, 1 Para started from the assembly area
at 0500 hours and arrived at Matna post of own border police at 0600 hours. After halting for an hour, when 2 Para was
approaching Maulinguem, 1 Para also left for the same place, arriving there at
approximately 0800hours. The battalion had to halt for another hour awaiting the
success signal indicating occupation of Bicholim and allowing the brigade
column to pass through. To save time, the battalion was allowed to march, keeping
the track clear for vehicles, without waiting for the entire column to pass
through. This enabled the battalion to reach Bicholim at about 1030 hours. After
a short halt outside the town, the battalion marched to Piligao ferry reaching
there at 1245 hours.
There
were no local boats at the ferry site when the battalion arrived, but after a while,
a large boat appeared followed by a small Z craft. In the meantime, two
engineer vehicles fetched up with four storm boats. After the guns were in
position to give fire support, the first company was ordered to go across. As
the first company was about to shove off, it was learned from the local
civilians that the ferry site on the opposite bank was mined. Actual
reconnaissance on the far side proved that the site was suitable for the
infantry but a diversion had to be made for vehicles to avoid the mines. This was done by the engineers with great
speed. Three jeeps carrying 106 mm RCL guns were landed and the advance towards
Banasterim bridge started at 1630 hours.
On reaching the Banasterim bridge at 1745 hours, it was found blown and
there being no boats, the battalion took up position on the eastern side.
Shortly afterwards, a message was received from brigade headquarters that the
Army Commander would visit the unit next morning and they were to stay put in
that position till further orders.
Capture
of Panjim by 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade
At about 2100 hours, the Chief of
Staff Southern Command spoke to the brigade major of 50 (Independent) Parachute
Brigade who informed him about the latest disposition of the forward troops,
which was the general line Betim, Piligao, Banasterim and Ponda. Thereafter at about 1000 hours the Army
Commander spoke to the brigade major, informing him that the Government of Goa
was assembling in Panjim at 0800 hours next morning to finalize the terms of
surrender. He desired that Indian troops
should be on the outskirts of Panjim and ordered the immediate advance by 1
Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry into Panjim. The Army Commander wanted this to
be conveyed to the GOC 17 Infantry Division also. However, as wireless communications were not
through, this was communicated to the duty officer at Tactical HQ Southern Command,
who sent a special officer courier to convey the message to GOC 17 Infantry
Division.
In
his report General Chaudhuri has explained the reasons for his decision, as under:-
On the evening of 18
December, Tactical HQ Southern Command discovered that both 63 Infantry Brigade
of 17 Infantry Division and 50 (Indep) Para Brigade had been ordered by GOC
Task Force to harbour for the night, and that the next morning the GOC intended
to advance his reserve brigade, 48 Infantry Brigade, through the Para Brigade
on to Velha Goa and Panjim. This action
had probably been taken as communications within 17 Infantry Division had not
been working too well and the GOC wanted to make sure of fresh troops for the
advance. The GOC-in-C Southern Command,
in his capacity as the overall Commander, felt however that in view of the very
small resistance offered by the Portuguese there was no reason why the advance
could not immediately continue, and with the same troops, after a small break
for reorganization. In any case if the
reserve brigade was to pass through the Para Brigade and then continue the
advance into Panjim there would be a further delay. It must be remembered that 48 Infantry
Brigade which was in reserve was still in the Anmod area and had not been moved
behind the Para Brigade. He accordingly ordered the advance to be resumed as
soon as possible, during the night, and by the troops already in the lead.
Because Signal communications were still poor, HQ 50 (Indep) Para Brigade was
informed of this decision, with some difficulty in the early hours of 19 December.
11
Based
on the orders received from the Army Commander, 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light
Infantry were ordered to cross the Banasterim and the Mandovi Rivers
Being
unable to procure any boats and the ferry not operating, 1 Para decided to
cross the Banasterim
River
Realizing
that the show was up and that I had very little time if I wanted to win the
race for Panjim, I commandeered a civilian car and two trucks which had arrived
on the far side with passengers apparently to welcome Indian troops. Collecting
whatever men who had put their uniforms on from the two companies who swam
across and my battery commander I started in that car and two trucks for
Panjim. I left instructions that other companies will follow me as they come
across using whatever civilian transport was available. It is worth mentioning
that civilians were so enthusiastic that they were begging to be given a chance
to lift troops in their vehicles.
At about 0830 hours on December 19, I arrived at Governor-General's
Secretariat (The Palace), occupied it, and placed a guard there. The civilians
accorded a very enthusiastic welcome and what is more it was spontaneous. Then
we made for the ferry crossing in order to contact 2 Sikh Light Infantry in
case they were across. When I reached the police station I noticed that 2 Sikh
Light Infantry troops had entered that place.12
Lt Col Sucha Singh of 50 (I) Parachute Brigade accepts
surrender of
Portuguese troops at Bambolim, Goa – 19 Dec 1961
Even
as 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry were vying for the prize of Panjim, 2 Para,
which was in Ponda, was preparing to cross into Velha Goa. The divisional
commander visited Ponda at approximately 0900 hours and went round the town accompanied
by Commander 50 Parachute Brigade. Soon after his departure, information was
received that 1 Para had entered Panjim. Hence the proposed advance to Velha
Goa was called off. The battalion was
ordered to take over the administrative responsibility of Ponda. At 1130 hours
Brigadier Sagat Singh left Ponda escorted by a platoon from C Company, taking the
ferry route from Unde to Panjim.
General Chaudhuri accompanied by Air
Vice Marshal E.W. Pinto and the Chief of Staff landed by a helicopter at Banasterim
at 0900 hours on 19 December 1961. On
being told that a battalion of 50 Parachute Brigade had already reached Panjim,
he decided to drive into the town. After crossing the Banasterim by ferry, he drove
straight down to Velha Goa from where he passed a wireless message to the Chief
of the Army Staff giving the news of the fall of Goa. He stopped just short of
Panjim to visit a hospital where the Portuguese wounded in action were being
treated. Mr. Sardesai, the nationalist
leader was also admitted there for treatment.
The Army Commander then drove to the Secretariat where he was mobbed by
the joyous civilian population. They
wanted him to fly the Indian National Flag on the Secretariat building which he
did.
The
Army Commander then drove to the Broadcasting House, met the Goan
Secretary-General in the latter’s house and then went to the Portuguese officers’
mess where he accepted the surrender from the local military commander. Thereafter, he expressed a desire to see the
Mandovi Hotel, but due to small arms fire still continuing in the vicinity he
decided to go back to Belgaum church of St. Francis
Xavier Belgaum
The COAS, Gen PN Thapar (far right) with deposed
Portuguese
Governor General Manual Antonis Vassalo E’ Silva
(seated
centre) at a POW facility in Vasco Da Gama, Goa
SIGNALS
IN THE GOA OPERATIONS
17
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment
17
Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment was kept busy throughout the year of 1961 with
a series of training events and inspections. The unit was located at Ambala
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S.V.S. Juneja, who had assumed command
in January 1961. During the month of
October 1961, the unit was inspected by the divisional commander, Major General
M.M. Khanna. From 14 to 17 November, the CSO XI Corps, Brigadier M.B.K. Nair
visited the unit, including the brigade signal sections of 48, 63 and 64
Infantry Brigades. On 21 November, the unit proceeded to take part in the Western
Command Army/Air Cooperation Exercise ‘Parakram’. The exercise was to end on 29
November and the troops were looking forward to a welcome break after several
months of hectic activity involving a series of training events and
inspections. After the end of the exercise on 29 November 1961 , a campfire was organized in
the unit area. Among the guests was the officiating GOC, Brigadier K.S.
Dhillon. The festivities were suddenly interrupted by a message from the divisional
headquarters directing everyone to pack up and move back to Ambala before first
light, next morning.
The CO and the command group left
shortly after midnight and
reached Ambala at 0345 hours. The rest of the unit followed and by 0830 hours on
30 November 1961 ,
the whole regiment was back in Ambala and standing by for further orders. After
attending a conference chaired by the GOC who had just returned from Delhi Goa and ordered preparations for the immediate move to
the concentration areas. Telegrams and signals were sent to recall all
personnel on leave and temporary duties and Colonel Juneja left for Delhi
The next morning, an advance party of the unit
left for Belgaum
The bulk of the unit’s vehicles left on 3 December 1961 by a
special vehicle train under the command of Second Lieutenant S.C. Dhawan. The
remainder of the M3 group was further split into two parties. One party under Major N.S. Chahal, OC No. 1
Company, comprising one JCO and 37 OR, left in another train in the forenoon. On
the same day Captain S.P. Khetarpal and Lieutenant I.N. Talwar reported to the
unit at Ambala on attachment from 5 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment. A cipher
officer, Captain K. Parthasarthy reported on attachment from UP Area
(Independent) Signal Company at Bareilly
The personnel of the advance
party that had left Ambala on 2 December arrived at Belgaum 5 December 1961 , the balance of the M3
Group under the Second-in-Command, Major C.M. Nanda, left Ambala at 1000 hours.
The party comprised five officers, three JCOs and 59 OR. A little later the
last contingent of the unit under Major H.R. Gogna, the Quartermaster, left in
another train with one JCO and 13 OR. All that remained at Ambala was a small rear
party under Captain Chanan Singh. A welcome addition to the unit’s strength was
the arrival of Lieutenant B.B. Mathur, who joined at the railway station as the
unit’s first regimental medical officer. By the evening of 5 December, the
party under Second Lieutenant S.C. Dhawan that had left two days earlier, had
reached Kirkee. By this time the divisional commander, Major General K.P.
Candeth had arrived in Belgaum
On
6 December, the Adjutant’s party arrived at Belgaum Sholapur Belgaum Poona Belgaum
Communications in the
concentration area were provided on line and scheduled despatch service (SDS)
to the main and rear divisional headquarters, the divisional administrative
area, the divisional troops, and the three brigades. Only two of the division’s
own brigades – 48 and 63 – had accompanied it to Belgaum Belgaum Delhi Poona
A major problem faced by the unit
was a shortage of secondary batteries. Against a deficiency of 700 secondary
batteries of 125/175 AHC (ampere hour capacity), the unit was able to get only
102 new batteries. These had to be put through the ‘initial charge’ before they
could be used. All available avenues such as the Police, Posts and Telegraphs
Department and the local market at Belgaum 24 December 1961 , after the operation was over. As a
result, some units were forced to carry heavier 125/175 AHC batteries on
improvised manpack carriers.
On 11 December 1961 the SO-in-C, Major General
R.N. Batra and CSO Southern Command, Brigadier Jaswant Singh, visited the unit
and discussed the Signals plan and the problems being faced by the unit. Most
of the demands placed by the unit earlier had already been met. Additional bids
for equipment and cable to meet the requirements of the operational plan were
examined and almost all were accepted. Brigadier Sagat Singh arrived in the
unit accompanied by Major R.R. Chatterji, OC 50 Parachute Brigade Signal
Company and joined the discussions. Two adhoc air-support tentacles had been
allotted to 50 Parachute Brigade for the operation. The Commander wanted them
to be given ASREX code documents, so that they were fully operational. This was
agreed to. Another demand of Brigadier Sagat Singh was for allotment of the
radio relay equipment that had recently been received from the United Kingdom Delhi Agra
Soon after the departure of the
SO-in-C, the M1 (layout) group of the unit moved under Major M.D. Rana to the assembly
area at Tinaighat on the Londa-Anmod road, near the border. At about 2130 hours
that night, the CO gave out his orders to all officers. The unit moved out next
morning and by afternoon of 12 December, communications had been established at
the new location. Rearward communication to Belgaum Belgaum
At Tinaighat, the unit received two
important reinforcements. One was a detachment from 1 Air Support Signal
Company under Captain Rangarajan. The second was No. 1 Medium Radio Relay
Section under Captain A.S. Kahlon to extend and bridge gaps in line communications
for 17 Infantry Division along the axis Tinaghat-Ponda-Pauda. Two detachments
of No. 1 Medium Radio Relay Section had been left earlier at Belgaum under
Captain G.A. Newton and allotted to 50 Parachute Brigade for similar tasks
along the axis -Belgaum-Sawantwadi-Banda. A carrier quad cable was laid between
Tinaighat and Custom Chauki for providing the carrier tail to the radio relay
terminal to work backwards to Belgaum 18
December 1961 . This was followed on 17 December by the codeword
‘Varaha’, signifying the permission for the Task Force to enter Goa . All was now set for the commencement of Operation
‘Vijay’. The rearward communications to Tactical HQ Southern Command (Belgaum
·
Three speech circuits
were derived on the two pairs of permanent line hired from the Posts and Telegraphs
department by mounting ACT 1+1 on one pair and using the other pair as
physical.
·
One telegraph circuit
was provided by mounting equipment S+DX on the
physical pair and using a modified fullerphone, popularly known as
‘Tingaphone’.
·
A wireless link using
radio telephony (RT) or speech was provided with Poona
Forward
communications in 17 Infantry Division was as under:-
·
One speech and one telegraph
circuit were provided to 48 and 63 Brigades. For 50 Parachute Brigade, only a
speech circuit was provided through Belgaum
·
Wireless nets D1, D2,
D4, D5, D8, S11 and S12 were provided. These were to stay on listening watch
until wireless silence was lifted. Two SCR 399 sets were provided, one at the
control of D1 net and the other for 50 Parachute Brigade. According to the unit
war diary, ‘due to the distance involved
and the fact that 50 Para Brigade was required to work on a different axis in
difficult country, it was essential to use 399 sets’. Apparently, the
limited mobility of the heavy vehicle in which the set was mounted was not
taken into account, with calamitous results.
·
For air support
communications two air support tentacles each were given to 63 Brigade and 50
Parachute Brigade, with the control station at the main divisional headquarters
where the joint operations centre (JOC) was also located. The ground liaison
officers’ (GLO) net was established with airfields at Bombay Poona Belgaum
At 1630 hours on 17 December,
codeword ‘Menakshi’ was flashed to all concerned. This was the signal for all
wireless links to open at 2000 hours on the day frequency with a short tuning
call on CW. Meanwhile, Second-Lieutenant P.Z. Mani had joined 63 Brigade with a
jeep mounted No. 19 HP set to work as a relay station on D1 net. At 2000 hours,
all wireless links were opened as ordered. After establishing communications
the sets were closed down, with orders to open again at 0445 hours on 18
December, shortly before the commencement of advance.
Fifteen minutes before the ‘H’ Hour
on 18 December 1961 ,
all wireless links were opened. According to the unit’s war diary, at 0730 hours
all stations were through, with the control station using wire aerials. At 1245hours,
Captain R.K. Bhavnani was sent out with a SCR 399 station to act as a relay
station. Apparently, the state of wireless communications deteriorated and it
was felt that this was due to extended ranges. The war diary entries of the day
tell their own story:-
1400 hrs – Extended distance between forward troops to
Brigade HQ and Brigade HQ to Main Division is having its effect on wireless
communications. It is essential for troops using all means including Liaison
Officers if necessary to keep the higher HQ informed of latest
position/situation.
1600 hrs - Relay
stations manned by 2/Lt P.Z. Mani and Captain R.K. Bhavnani doing well.
Messages are being cleared between Ops Room Main Division, GOC’s Rover, and
Commander 50 Para Brigade.
1630 hrs – 50 Para Brigade reached CANDIAPAR River
far bank (TONY given). Medium Radio Relay terminal through from new location 50
Para Brigade back to BANDA. This has proved the ease of move and speedy
establishment of communications by means of radio relay terminal.
1635 hrs – Divisional Recce and Layout Party left to
recce new harbour area on Road MOLEM-PILIEM, inside GOA.
1800 hrs – Commander Signals gave the following
orders:-
(a)
Cable
diagram to be made and left with detachment Southern Command Signal Regiment
for reeling including brigades (63 Infantry Brigade laid 7 miles to Start
Point)
(b)
Rear tyre of one 399 vehicle was punctured. As
there is no spare tyre, ferrying will have to be carried out. On arrival of Main
HQ in new location one wheel from another 399 vehicle will be removed to ferry
the first vehicle. The detachment will wait in the old area even if the Rear
Division moves out in the meantime.
(c)
Relay
station between Divisional Administrative Area and Rear Division to stay at
Start Point tonight and join Rear Division on 19 December morning. One L/Hav to
be briefed in detail about the road.
2100 h - Commander Signals left with GSO 1 for area
MOLEM-PILEM to join up with the GOC’s Rover.
Both main and rear headquarters moved
out from their previous locations at 1130 hours. The movement was slow due to
the blown up bridges and craters on the road. Between Custom Chauki and Mollem,
the convoy was held up due to a damaged bridge that had earlier been built by
the Engineers. Apparently, both the main and rear headquarters had no
communications with anyone during this period. According to the war diary,
…the speed of advance of forward troops and lay of
the land had an adverse effect on wireless communications, including relay
stations. Difficulty of move on the main axis – YELLOW Route, particularly when
the HQ convoy was held up made efficient communications extremely difficult.
The road was so narrow throughout the ghats area that even a jeep could not
cross even in the same direction. This prevented the replacement of faulty equipment.
Lack of space off the road made it impossible even to sling wire aerials. The
present type of Command Vehicles proved to be entirely unsuitable in hilly area
with narrow and steep one way road. These vehicles are only suitable in the
plains and should in any case be replaced by smaller 1 ton 4X4 vehicles.
The
convoy of Main and Rear HQ 17 Infantry Division and Signals moved only at
midday on 19 December, after the road was cleared. By 0730 hours, both
headquarters were deployed on Road Molem – Ponda. At this time 48 Brigade was
in Ponda; 63 Brigade in Margao and 50 Parachute Brigade in Mapuca. All wireless
links were established but their performance was still unsatisfactory. It was
felt that this was due to the effect of iron and manganese in the soil. Mobile
wireless sets working on rod aerials or low slung wire aerials could not work
even over short distances. The war diary of the unit records:-
The
speed of advance of forward troops was particularly fast. It is however
essential that for effective command and control all HQ must stop at regular
intervals, put up proper wire aerials for communication to higher HQ and then
move on. If this temporary halt is not acceptable for tactical reasons then
commanders at all levels must ensure effective and frequent use of LOs or
possess speedy means of transport e.g. helicopters to visit subordinate HQ and
use of light aircraft e.g. Auster to communicate with forward troops.
Of course, there was no line
communications with the brigades or rearwards. The only line that existed was
between main and rear divisional headquarters on which one speech and one
fullerphone circuit was functioning. However, the unit was impressed with the
performance of the radio relay terminals that had been allotted. An entry in
the war diary records:
The requirement of
radio relay equipment as an integral part of an Infantry Division has been
proved beyond doubt. It should be available down to Battalion HQ for speedy
establishment of communication between Battalions and Brigade HQ and between
Brigade HQ and Divisional HQ.
The unit’s
suggestion to provide radio relay communications to battalions was obviously
unreasonable. At that time, radio relay terminals were mounted in vehicles,
with generators carried in trailers. The size of the Yagi aerials also made
their use impractical in battalions. In hindsight, it could be said that the
unit was literally asking for the moon. After 50 years, radio relay between
brigade and battalion has not been provided even in mechanized formations let
alone infantry and mountain divisions. The
logic for including recommendations in a war diary, which is a record of events
as and when they occur, is not clear.
On 3 January 1962 , the unit moved into the
permanent buildings of the Portuguese Camp and established the signal centre and
exchange. On 24 January 1962 ,
the unit handed over all commitments at Goa to
a detachment of Southern Command Signal Regiment and left Goa
by road for Desur. The unit was divided into three groups, comprising
personnel, vehicles and specialist vehicles. The first group entrained at Desur
on 25 January while the vehicles left by road for Kirkee, where they entrained
on 30 & 31 January 1962 .
By 5 February 1962 ,
the entire unit except for 48 Infantry Brigade Signal Company, had arrived in
Ambala, in time to celebrate the Corps Anniversary on 15 February 1962 . This brought to an
end the role of the unit in Operation ‘Vijay’.
Many reasons have been advanced for the failure of
communications during the advance of 17 Infantry Division. Most of these
reasons are valid and deserve serious consideration and study, if only to avoid
similar occurrences in future operations. It may come as a surprise to many
that in 17 Infantry Division, the communications within the battalions
functioned well while the communications manned by Signals failed. Given that
the terrain was the same, how did this happen?
According to Brigadier P.Z. Mani, the communications between the
infantry battalion headquarters and companies was good because of the smaller
distances between them. Most of the time, the sets were between two spurs or
within the same re-entrant. If one company went ahead and was out of
communication with the battalion headquarters, the message was relayed by one
of the other companies. Alternately, the radio operator or officer would climb
up the spur and get through. On the
other hand, the distances between the control and outstations on the divisional
nets were larger, and often there were several spurs intervening between them.
Since the radio sets were heavier and used secondary batteries, the option of
carrying them manually to hill tops was not available.
As regards the reasons for the good performance of the
brigade nets of 50 Parachute Brigade, Brigadier Mani feels that this was due to
the difference in terrain over which they were operating. 50 Parachute Brigade was deployed
from north to south along the coast or near the coast. They had a usable
road and open country, as they were almost along the sea. Another factor
was the type of equipment being used. Paratroopers use radio sets that are
lighter and can be man packed. This enabled them to move up the spurs in case
the signal strength was low.
As
mentioned earlier, relay stations were deployed before the advance commenced,
but these did not prove very effective. Brigadier Mani, who was manning one of
the relay stations, has this to say:
Captain RK Bhavnani, OC ‘A’
Section took out a relay station even before me with a 19 HP set. The 19
HP sets use a lot of battery capacity and the batteries require frequent
charging. The small charges are adequate for short periods and not for
large number of batteries required by 19 HP sets. During the move of the
battalions and the first brigade, Captain RK Bhavnani took a SCR 399
station to relay. That also was not effective as the SCR 399 required the
generator to be working all the time and Captain Bhavnani had to stop and relay
from a static node, which was in a valley again under high screening”.
Another factor was the lack of VHF
sets with the formation. The signal regiment and brigade signal companies were
holding HF sets such as RS 62 and RS 19 for forward communications. For rear
links, they were using RS 399 or RS 53 which were mounted in specialist called
Command Vehicle High Power (CVHP) or Command Vehicle Low Power (CVLP), which
had large generators under tow. As the first battalion entered the zigzag
hilly roads, even the 62 sets were found to be ineffective due to screening.
The heavier sets were found to be useless since they were installed in heavy
vehicles that could not get off the narrow roads, which were jammed. As soon as
they came out of the hills and reached the plains, communications improved. But
this was after the critical period was over. The only VHF sets that were
available were with the infantry battalions, for communication between company
and platoon. These functioned well, except for short period when they were
screened by intervening features.
Perhaps the most important factor
was the mental outlook of the officers and men, who had been operating in the
plains of the Punjab and had got used to the
communications that existed in that area. On being moved suddenly to a
different region, they were not able to change their techniques to suit he new
environment. This lack of flexibility in mental outlook was perhaps the most
important factor for the problems that the unit faced. This is best described
by Brigadier Mani who states:
17 Infantry Division and its
brigades were located in Ambala. We had intensive training for plains
warfare and we were good at it. The Signal Regiment had perfected drills
and communications to brigades on the move and never failed. Since
brigades could go on more than one axis (1 or 2) and if the distance to either
or the front brigades were stretched, we had perfected the relay station drill
which was very effective and never failed. The GSO2 (ops) who manned the
D1 link at the Divisional HQ and would pass the message to me at the relay
station and from the relay station I would pass on to the forward brigade
or brigades and back to the division and there were no failures at
all. But in Goa the situation was completely different due to the terrain
i.e. zigzag roads with high spurs and hilltops. If the two sets are
within a re-entrant communications were good, if the front set went beyond
the spur it was completely screened. It was impossible to lift the set
and go up the spur to rebroadcast as the sets and batteries were very
heavy.
As far as I knew the orders from the
Army HQ to HQ 17 Division was to move at fastest pace and capture Goa. They
arranged the rolling stock and we were in Belgaum without
delay. Thereafter we had to drive a long divisional convoy along bad
underdeveloped roads. Then came the move down the steep curvy hill
roads. If one vehicle stopped the convoy could not move, as there was no
space for overtaking. We were not bold
enough to push a broken down vehicle down the hill and go ahead. The
plains movement plans and the fear of loss to the government in the loss of a vehicle and the explanation
that was to be given to the auditor was also a big thought in that
direction. This was paramount in our minds, as we were all in a peacetime,
auditable environment. Subsequently a stalled vehicle stopping the convoy
was thrown down the hill after the arms, ammunition and passengers were taken
out. 13
50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade Signal Company
As
mentioned earlier, Commander 50 Parachute Brigade was summoned to Delhi 29 November 1961 . In the
afternoon all unit commanders were asked to assemble at the brigade headquarters
for a conference, which was chaired by Lieutenant Colonel Sucha Singh, VrC,
M.C., CO 1 Para , in the absence of Brigadier
Sagat Singh who was still in Delhi Independence
Major
R.R. Chatterji was then commanding 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company, with
Captain Vinod Kumar as the Second-in-Command.
The two section commanders, who also carried out the functions of Quarter
Master and Mechanical Transport Officer, were Lieutenants G.C. Sah and M.S. ‘Tilly’
Ahluwalia. Captain Vinod Kumar was on annual leave and had just got
married. Inevitably, he had to be
recalled and he arrived back in Agra 2 December
1961 just in time to be briefed by the OC, who was leaving by the
first train. He was to bring up the
vehicles and equipment, which were to follow in a special train subsequently.
Fortunately, Agra was home not only for 50 Parachute Brigade but also the Central
Ordnance Depot which held signal equipment for the entire Army, as well
as 509 Base Workshop which specialized in repairs to such equipment. Both these
establishments were imbued with the ‘para’ spirit and went out of their way in
making up deficiencies, repairing wireless sets and initial charging of a large
number of secondary batteries. This was done on a war footing, and according to
Major R.R. Chatterji, these two establishments were the first ones in action in
Operation ‘Vijay’.
Most
of the men of the company left by the first military special on 2 December 1961 along with
the Major Chatterji and Lieutenant Sah. Captain Vinod Kumar and Lieutenant M.S. Ahluwalia
followed in the vehicles special that carried the vehicles and equipment. The Panditji (Religious Teacher) of the company,
Naib Subedar Dogra, was left as OC of the rear elements left at Agra
By 6 December, most of the
personnel of 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company were established near between kilometres
9 and 14 on road Belgaum – Savantwadi. Since the first party had moved without
its equipment, rudimentary communications were established between the major
units and the brigade headquarters on an omnibus circuit using the cable of the
battalions. The vehicle and equipment party caught up subsequently, having
moved by road from Poona
On
12 December the unit moved to the forward concentration area near Savantwadi. Brigadier
Jaswant Singh, CSO Southern Command, visited the company at Savantwadi and gave
them the welcome news that they would be allotted a section of the new radio relay
equipment, C 41/R222 which had recently been inducted and was still undergoing
trials. Since the equipment was still on trial, he stressed that it should be
handled with kid gloves as any damage would cause embarrassment. From path
profiles that had been drawn it appeared that communications could only be
established on radio relay once the forward terminal reached Bicholim. This was
the only planned direct communication from HQ 50 Parachute Brigade to the
Tactical HQ Southern Command at Belgaum
The
parachute brigade moved out of Savantwadi and was in Dodamarg by the evening of
17 December. Since radio silence had been imposed and lines could not be laid
at such short notice, it was known that the brigade would be without rearward
communications till H Hour, when it would come up on the wireless net of 17
Infantry Division. By a stroke of good luck, an unused permanent line route of
the Posts and Telegraphs Department was found at Dodamarg, running very close
to the radio relay terminal. The intrepid signallers of 50 Parachute Brigade
Signal Company commandeered the line for use as a ‘tail’ from the brigade headquarters
to the radio relay terminal. By evening of 17 December the brigade exchange had
a direct line to Tactical HQ Southern Command at Belgaum
Radio
silence was broken at 0500 hours on 18 December 1961 . While forward nets functioned well, communications
to 17 Infantry Division were not satisfactory. Major Chatterji and Captain
George Newton, who was in charge of the radio relay detachment, had earlier
decided to try the equipment from Dodamarg and other intermediate positions
before reaching the planned location at Bicholim. Hence, the rear terminal had
been asked to remain on listening watch from first light on 18 December. Once the forward terminal at Dodamarg was
switched on it got through immediately and the CSO Southern Command had his
second pleasant surprise within a matter of twelve hours when the Major
Chatterji spoke to him and gave him the latest situation report. However, the
radio relay terminal had to be closed after the brigade headquarters moved
forward. Due to breakdown in radio communications with 17 Infantry Division, 50
Parachute Brigade had no rearward communications until the radio relay terminal
was again set up at Bicholim.
The
major problem faced by the advancing troops was not from enemy opposition but
the terrain. The infantry elements had to overcome the problem of blown bridges,
which in view of the feebleness of opposition could be overcome by using water
crossing expedients or rounding up ferries and boats manned by enthusiastic
locals. For Signals, the biggest difficulty was the choked roads blocked by bigger
vehicles of the bridging column, which had been given priority in the move
plan, in anticipation of blown bridges. As a result, the brigade command
vehicles got mixed up with the bridging vehicles and could not reach the brigade
headquarters until after Panjim had been entered. Fortunately, the brigade
major had moved ahead of the bridging convoy with the step up and a reserve
radio detachment, both in jeeps, and so forward command communication to the
battalions and the armour could be maintained.
The brigade forward net had a 19 HP set at the control and mostly man
pack 62 sets as out stations.
Though
the speed of advance of 50 Parachute Brigade was swift, Tactical HQ Southern
Command at Belgaum remained in the dark, due to breakdown in wireless
communication in 17 Infantry Division once its communication vehicles entered a
screened area in the region of Anmod and got stuck there among their own
complement of broken down bridging vehicles. They managed to get through to
their own brigades at about 0800 hours on 19 December by establishing a relay
station at Mollem. The division got
through to the parachute brigade only intermittently. In the afternoon a message was received by
the brigade to halt all further advances and firm in where they were as the
advance would be resumed by 48 and 63 Infantry Brigades the next day on the
axes Ponda-Panjim and Margao-Mormugao respectively. The said message was cleared to the
battalions.
Sometime
in the afternoon of 18 December, an IAF aircraft was sent to find out what was
happening on the front of 50 Parachute Brigade. It flew over the brigade headquarters
and dropped a message. Unfortunately it was fired upon with small arms when it
flew over 2 Sikh Light Infantry, but suffered no damage except for two bullet
holes in its wings. The battalion could not be blamed as the aircraft had no
identifying marks under the wings. As if in retaliation, four Vampires of the
IAF put in a set piece rocket attack on 17 Para Field Regiment which was
deployed in the region of Piliem. Once again, the damage was slight - a damaged
trailer wheel. Here again, it was not the IAF’s fault as 50 Parachute Brigade
had gone beyond the initially fixed bomb lines and corrections could not be
sent as the rear links were not operational. Major Chatterji had been visiting
the artillery unit and had just left when the attack was launched. He saw the
attack from a few hundred meters away and rushed back to pass the information
back to Tactical HQ Southern Command. Fortunately, when he got back to brigade
headquarters, he found Captain Newton there with his radio relay terminal. The
set was opened and communications to Belgaum
As the sun went down, the wireless
nets began to misbehave and brigade headquarters lost touch for good with 17
Infantry Division. Even the battalions, at the limit of radio range, were
barely in communication. However, they had been told of 17 Division’s embargo
on further advance. A message came through from Tactical HQ Southern Command that
the Army Commander would visit 1 Para at Banasterim at 0930 hours on 19 December.
This was communicated to 1 Para, but this was the last message that could be
cleared to any battalion that night, as the ionospheric conditions made
communication impossible till just before dawn the next day. Immediately after
this, General Chaudhuri spoke to the brigade major on radio relay, which was
still working, and told him that he had reliable information that the
Portuguese were ready to surrender and ordered the parachute brigade to move
into Panjim early next morning.
When
this message was received at the brigade headquarters, Major R.R. Chatterji was
away on reconnaissance in Bicholim to assess the tele-communication resources in
the town. On his return he found his Second-in-Command, Captain Vinod Kumar,
about to set off with the message to 1 Para, who were the nearest. However,
both the brigade major and OC signal company felt that Vinod’s life at that
juncture could not be thrown away as they had, only a few days before, torn him
out of the arms of a brand new wife. Sending anyone else at that late hour was
also inadvisable as the route was unmarked and there were mines on the way.
Fortunately, after a tense night, the brigade forward net got through before
dawn and both 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry were given the go ahead to race
into Panjim.
Soon
after the entry of Indian troops into Panjim, the Army Commander arrived. His
helicopter landed about three kilometres outside Panjim where he was met by the
bridge major and the signal company commander, the brigade commander being away
with the divisional commander. The brigade major took the Army Commander into Panjim.
Major Chatterji followed in a jeep with a radio set, with the Army Commander’s
pilot, Squadron Leader Liddel accompanying him. Since the roads were choked
with cheering crowds, the rear jeep got separated and was misdirected on to a
wrong road. As a result, Chatterji and Liddel found themselves at the Cortalim
ferry miles away from Panjim and on an uncleared axis. At the ferry they found some sour faced
Portuguese officers and men and also noticed a number of armoured cars in an
adjacent grove with their guns painting menacingly in their direction. They did a quick about turn and got away as
fast as possible. According to the Liddel, Chatterji’s Jeep moved faster than
his aircraft. Just outside Panjim, they
met 1 Para advancing towards them in extended order. The CO, Lieutenant Colonel Sucha Singh was
not a little surprised.
The Army Commander, after visiting
various installations and the Portuguese military hospital was just leaving Panjim
when Major Chatterji and the pilot caught up with them. Fortunately, they had not been missed. On being noticed, a number of messages addressed
to Army HQ and Tactical HQ Southern Command were handed over to Major Chatterji.
He had them cleared to the brigade headquarters from where they were cleared on
radio relay to Tactical HQ Southern Command. The message to the Chief of Army
Staff read: “Entered PANJIM to tumultuous
welcome (.) Am going to try and find 17 Div now”.
After the Army Commander took off,
the brigade major took the radio Jeep and got back to the brigade headquarters Major
Chatterji’s Jeep got stuck till late in the evening between two ferries, as the
rear elements of 1 Para were moving up in the opposite direction. Major
Chatterji and his driver had not eaten anything that day and were agreeably
surprised when the cheerful proprietress of a Taverno, housed in a dilapidated
mud hut in a small village brought out chilled Becks beer out of a kerosene-powered
refrigerator and charged only one rupee for a bottle. Major Chatterji being
fully aware of his responsibility towards government transport restricted the
drivers to one bottle of beer with their lunch. There being no such constraint
in his case (the driver having been reinstated to driving by then) he had a
more substantial lunch. They managed to
get back to the brigade headquarters by the evening. 15
1 Medium Radio Relay Section
1
Medium Radio Relay Section (1 MRRS) had been raised as an independent unit in
1959 at Delhi to conduct trials on multi channel radio relay equipment imported
from UK. The initial trials were conducted on radio set SPO 50-50, which was being
used by the British Post Office. The civilian system could not satisfy the
stringent military requirements of terrain and climate. In 1960 the unit received eight RS C41/R222,
the militarized radio relay equipment developed by ATE Bridgeworth for the British Army. The equipment
provided only the radio and had to be integrated with indigenously developed
multichannel equipment ACT 1+4 for multiplexing. The militarized system was found suitable and
approved as the standard system for multichannel radio relay communications in
the Indian Army. Additional sets were
ordered and received during 1961.
Operational and technical control of
1 Medium Radio Relay Section was exercised by Signals Directorate at Army
HQ. On 9 December 1961 at about 11 am the
OC, Captain A.S. Kahlon was summoned urgently to the office of the SO-in-C, Major
General R.N. Batra, where Brigadier Jaswant Singh, CSO Southern Command was
also present. On being asked by General
Batra how soon could he move for an operational task, Kahlon replied “Within two
hours, Sir”. He was told to move as soon as possible and report to CSO Southern
Command in Poona Delhi
At 0900 hours
on 10 December 1961 ,
the personnel and equipment of 1 Medium
Radio Relay Section under Captain Rangarajan reached New
Delhi Poona
At Advance HQ Southern Command at Belgaum, Major
Fonseca, the SO 2 (Signals) tasked the section to extend/bridge the line of communication (LOC) along Axis
Tinaghat-Anmod-Panjim and Sawantwadi-Bicholim-Panjim to support the advance of
17 Infantry Division and 50
Parachute Brigade respectively. It
was decided to allocate four radio relay detachments to engineer two links or a
chain over two hops to support operations of 17 Infantry
Division and two radio relay detachments to provide the link rear wards
from HQ 50 Parachute Brigade. The section less two detachments under
Captain A.S. Kahlon along with the detachments of 1 Air Support Signal Unit
left at first light on 15 December for Tinaighat where HQ 17 Infantry Division
was located. Captain Newton with two detachments reported to HQ 50 Parachute Brigade
at Sawantwadi on the same day. The radio
relay detachments were attached to the respective formations for
administration, while their operational and technical control was with CSO Southern
Command.
Captain Kahlon discussed the deployment
and outline plan for provision of radio relay communications with the General
Staff of HQ 17 Infantry Division, and obtained their approval for pre D Day reconnaissance
up to Custom Chauki and grouping of radio
relay detachments with the divisional reconnaissance party. Captain Kahlon and Havildar Onkar Singh, the
detachment commander of the anchor station to be located in area of Custom Chauki,
were escorted by 4 Sikh Light Infantry which was deployed in the area during
early hours of 17 December. The anchor
detachment moved into the site at Custom Chauki at last and line detachments of
Southern Command Signal Regiment under Major Bawa laid the carrier quad cable from
Tinaighat to the anchor station the same night.
The forward detachments advanced with
the reconnaissance party of the main divisional headquarters at last light on
18 December. Due to the narrow and
congested road axis the vehicular movement was slow, and the party reached
Ponda only at midday on 19
December. The divisional headquarters representative
decided to use the Portuguese Army barracks (the present location of 6 Technical
Training Regiment of 2 STC) for the main divisional headquarters and the signal
regiment. Since the location did not afford suitable radio line of sight (RLOS)
for VHF communications, Captain Kahlon moved the radio relay detachments about
a kilometre ahead towards Panjim. The detachments
deployed at about 1500 hours and immediately got through to link Ponda to
Custom Chauki. The line party of the
divisional signal regiment laid two pairs of local tails on WD cable to
terminate two channels derived over the radio relay system to Advance HQ
Southern Command well before the arrival of the main divisional headquarters in
the evening.
As described earlier, 50 Parachute
Brigade was ordered to capture Panjim thanks to the rearward communication link
provided on radio relay by Captain Newton. After the capture of Goa on 19
December 1961 , the radio relay detachments earmarked for Panjim
moved forward with Captain Kahlon on 21 December to augment the communications
being organized for the tactical divisional headquarters established for the
GOC, General Candeth, who had taken over as Military Governor. As the main axis was still not open to
vehicular traffic, the route followed was Ponda-Margo-Marmagoa-Panjim. While
passing through Bambolim, Captain Kahlon saw some high towers with aerials in the
barracks and drove in to investigate. He
discovered that it was Portuguese Defence Services wireless station for
communicating to Lisbon Belgaum
Elements of HQ 17 Infantry Division
and 17 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment kept moving into Altinho area in Panjim
over the next few days. Carrier quad tails were laid on priority from the radio
relay terminal to their exchange/signal centre.
The radio relay chain was re-engineered during the night on 24 December
to get through directly from Panjim to Custom Chauki, to provide four channels
for speech/telegraph directly to Tactical HQ Southern Command at Belgaum over
the channelling equipment which had been installed by the Posts & Telegraphs
Department. With the closing down of the relay station at Ponda its two radio
relay detachments were moved, one each
to Custom Chauki and Altinho as standby.
Prior to Operation ‘Vijay’, there
was only a single wire permanent line earth return circuit from Custom Chauki
to Panjim for telegraph traffic to Goa . The
Posts & Telegraphs Department put in considerable effort to convert this
route to take on their multichannel equipment under Mr. A.K. Bannerjee who was working
with CSO Southern Command. On his request
on 25 December, after approval by Brigadier Jaswant Singh, as an interim measure
one speech channel derived over the radio relay system was extended for
termination on the Panjim central battery civil exchange. The termination posed a technical problem as
the ACT 1+4 working over the radio relay system catered only for magneto calling. The limitation was overcome by a minor
modification at the civil exchange. The termination of this channel patched the
Indian Posts & Telegraphs communications provisionally to Panjim the same
day.
After the direct line from Poona to Belgaum was put
through on 29 December, it was decided that one radio relay detachment be left
at Panjim and another at Custom Chauki as a standby to speech and telegraph
circuits that had been provided on lines. The rest of 1 Medium Radio Relay
Section was ordered to move back on 30 December. Before they left, they were
asked to perform another task. Soon after the liberation of Goa ,
Mr. Neurikar of All India Radio had requested the help of the Army to sort out
and salvage the equipment left by Emissora de Goa, the Portuguese broadcasting
station in Goa . On directions of the Military Governor,
Captain G.A. Newton was made available for this assignment from 25 to 29
December. With his assistance, the engineers of All India Radio soon rigged up
a 5 Kilowatt transmitter at Bambolim. On completion of its task, 1 Medium Radio
Relay Section, less the two standby detachments mentioned earlier, left on 30
December 1961 for Belgaum enroute to Delhi under the OC, Captain A.S. Kahlon,
along with Captain G.A Newton who was on attachment. The 1 Air Support Signal
Unit detachments joined at Belgaum Poona Kolhapur 1 January 1962 . Entraining at Poona on a special train on 3
January, the section arrived at Delhi on 4 January 1962, four weeks after it had
left the station.16
By all accounts, the performance of
1 Medium Radio Relay Section during Operation ‘Vijay’ was commendable. It was a
fledgling unit, still in the process of finding its feet, using equipment on
which the men had not been fully trained. In spite of these handicaps, it
provided reliable communications, which proved crucial for the success of the
operations. Considering the lack lustre performance of signal units with
considerably larger resources, the officers and men of the section deserve high
praise. In fact, the performance of this small unit was one of the redeeming
features of signal communications during Operation ‘Vijay’, which served to
dilute the harsh criticism that Signals was subjected to for its overall
performance.
Southern
Command Signals
The
operations for the liberation of Goa were
conceived and planned by GOC-in-C Southern Command, while the actual execution
was the responsibility of GOC 17 Infantry Division, the Task Force
Commander. A soon as Brigadier Jaswant
Singh, CSO Southern Command, came to know that the decision to undertake
military operations had been taken, he sought permission to visit Belgaum,
which was to be the concentration area for the troops taking part in the
operation as well as the Advance HQ Southern Command. His visit brought to
light certain factors that had a bearing on communications. Southern Command
Signals would have to cater for rearward communications of the Task Force. He
felt that there would be no problem providing communications from Poona Belgaum
Brigadier
Jaswant Singh was able to appreciate the difficulties that would be faced by
Signals because of the terrain. He writes:-
Another factor
that stood out was that on the main axis the road from the border into Goa was
very narrow and only 44 miles long. Therefore heavy vehicles would be very
restricted in allocation of sufficient road space. Therefore, I suggested that
it would be best not to “Overload” the Divisional Signal Regiment with too much
equipment and Signal stores. I offered to create a suitable ad hoc Advance Signal
stores dump or Depot from where the Signal Regiment could draw equipment and
stores as required. But Commander Signals 17 Division had different views: he
wanted everything authorized in the Regiment’s Equipment Tables plus more – e.g.,
I still remember that 180 miles of D8 Twisted Cable was demanded. Even the
Chief of Staff suggested that since the total distance to Panjim was only 44
miles, this demand was far too much. In the end the Regiment did get 180 miles
of cable, but in the event very little of it was used if at all.
Troops were to
cross the border on night D-1, and the Main Divisional HQ was to be located on
our side of the border up to which all line and wireless channels as required were
laid and began working beautifully. However, after about 2 hrs of H Hr, no
officer could be contacted and therefore no calls from Command HQ could be put
through to Division on any channel line, Radio Telephony or wireless
message. I therefore decided to send a
senior officer from the Command Signal Regiment in a jeep wireless detachment to
find out and report immediately the problem, and at least to restore some one channel
to Main HQ.
What he found on reaching there was classic. All heavy vehicles, including wireless vehicles
working back to Command HQ were left behind and most officers of Divisional HQ
had moved forward behind the leading troops!
All the important officers of the Divisional Signal Regiment similarly
had moved forward minus any means of communications. And no vehicle was permitted forward of the
Traffic Control point without a very high level permit.
…..On the other
hand, communications with 50 Para Brigade worked all right – until they went
under command 17 Division.
Perhaps 17 Division
had some justification. The road was
indeed bad, the second Brigade of the Division had to be pushed forward from
the positions gained by the initial Brigade, and on top of it all, the Chief of
the General Staff, Army HQ, was to land near the forward Brigade. On the other hand, the Commander Signals who
could have made do with lighter wireless sets was keen on the higher powered
sets only and these were left well behind.
In any case, the operations were moving too fast for them to react
really efficiently.
…..In
general, it is evident from the official history of Goa Operations that not
only did the links back did not work, but also their links forward, and to 50
Para Brigade were not a roaring success.
Fortunately, there was little opposition from the enemy and nothing
serious happened. 17
The Portuguese enclave of Daman lay at the entrance of the Gulf
of Cambay about 100 miles north of Bombay Daman was estimated to
be three companies consisting of 360 all ranks. (It was later found to be an
underestimation). In addition there were some police and customs outposts along
the border contiguous with India Daman
was given to 1 Maratha Light Infantry, which was located at Poona port
of Daman Belgaum
The
battalion moved from Poona midnight , two companies advanced
towards their objectives, the flying control tower and Post 175. Both companies
captured their objectives, with minor casualties. However, surprise had been
lost and the Portuguese were ready to retaliate.
After
a rocket attack by the Air Force on the Big Fort at first light on 18 December,
the operations commenced for the capture of Nani Daman. However, the Portuguese
offered stiff resistance, bringing down fire on the attacking troops with
medium machine guns, mortars and artillery. By the end of the day, the two attacking
companies had made little progress, and the CO asked them to firm in for the
night, deciding to move up the reserve companies for a fresh attack next
morning. At about 0745 hours on 19 December two Mystere aircraft fired rockets
at the Big Fort and some guns near a temple inside the town. Half an hour
later, the Portuguese surrendered. The Governor, Antonio Jose Da Costa Pinto,
who was himself wounded, signed an unconditional surrender at 0830 hours. By
1300 hours the town was occupied by Indian troops. About 600 white soldiers,
seven 25 pounder guns, eight 81-mm mortars and large amount of small arms and
ammunition was captured.
Unlike,
in Goa , the local population did not greet the
Indian troops, being unsure of their conduct. Being used to atrocities at the
hands of the Portuguese, they expected similar treatment from the victors. It
was only after a few days that they began coming out of their houses and going
about their daily business. The Indian casualties in the operation were one JCO
and three OR killed; and one JCO and 13 OR wounded. The Portuguese casualties
were 10 killed and two wounded. The total number of prisoners was 853,
including 24 officers, 544 soldiers, nine Portuguese police, 268 local police
and eight Portuguese civilians.18
DIU
The island
of Diu Kathiawar peninsula separated
from it by a narrow creek. It was the
smallest of the Portuguese possessions in India, having an area of about 38
square kilometres and a population of 14,280 according to the 1960 census. Like
Daman , the strength of troops holding Diu was estimated to be 360, which again turned out to be
an underestimation. The task of
capturing Diu was given to Brigadier Jaswant
Singh, Commander 112 Infantry Brigade, which was located at Ahmedabad. The troops allotted to him were 20 Rajput; a
company of 4 Madras Jamnagar island of
Diu Jamnagar Belgaum Delhi
According to the operation orders, 20 Rajput, under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bhupinder Singh, was to carry out an assault
crossing of the tidal creek at low tide south of Kob at night and then move on
to capture Diu airfield, followed by Diu town.
An hour before the assault by 20 Rajput, C Company of 4 Madras Diu
opposite the citadel, and then await further orders. The troops were to
concentrate at Una by 15
December 1961 . The force commenced its move from Ahmedabad on 13
December.
Moving in three stages, via Rajkot 15 December 1961 . Next
evening, Mr. Bernardo, the Police Commissioner of Diu
met Mr. Jadeja, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Junagadh and told him:
“We know that
we would be defeated but we will fight. We hope you will treat us nicely when
we lose”.
At 2100 hours that night, All India Radio broadcast
a distorted version of Mr. Bernardo’s conversation, announcing that the Portuguese
in Diu were ready to surrender. Shortly
afterwards, the Army Commander spoke on telephone to the brigade commander, who
gave him the correct version. On 17 December the codeword for commencement of
operations against Diu was received from
Tactical HQ Southern Command. At 0130 hours on 18 December, C Company 4 Madras
launched the assault on Gogla. However,
the enemy brought down heavy fire from small arms and 25-pounder guns on the
attacking troops, who did not have any artillery to counter it. After a bitter
fight, the company was forced to withdraw at 0400 hours. The second attack at 0630
met the same fate and several men were wounded. The attempt by 20 Rajput to
force the crossing was delayed due to the long march over soft and marshy
ground, leading to loss of surprise. Two companies launched their improvised
boats in the creek opposite at 0230 hours, an hour after the attack by the
Madrassi Company. As both companies reached the middle of the creek, the
Portuguese opened up with medium and light machine guns, sinking two of the
four boats. Two men were killed and 15 wounded including one of the company
commanders. The crossing was abandoned at 0500 hours and the troops had to
return to the home bank.
Realizing that it would be difficult to counteract
the enemy’s defensive fire without artillery support, a message was flashed to
I.N.S. Delhi, indicating the targets
that needed to be neutralized. The Air Force also started engaging targets
after first light. On being informed of the situation, the Army Commander
directed that no attempt should be made to cross the creek during day. The Navy
and Air Force should be asked to engage Diu Fort and the coastline opposite
Gogla, which could then be captured at night. This proved to be quite effective
and by evening the enemy guns fell silent. At about 0845 hours a Portuguese
officer came over with a message from the Governor of Diu offering to surrender
with a request that all Portuguese nationals be permitted to seek protection in
Brazilian embassy. The message was relayed to the Army Commander who directed
that only an unconditional surrender was to be accepted. The Portuguese were
informed at 2130 hours that if they did not surrender unconditionally by 0900
hours next day, the attacks would start again. At 0830 hours on 19 December 1961 the
Governor agreed to surrender unconditionally and Indian troops began to enter Diu . At a ceremony held at 1100 hours the Governor of Diu
personally surrendered to Brigadier Jaswant Singh, with 16 officers, 43
sergeants and 333 soldiers laying down their arms. The Portuguese casualties in
the operation were one killed and 22 wounded. The Indian casualties were eight
killed and 17 wounded.
CONCLUSION
The
liberation of Goa , Daman
and Diu in 1961 was an important landmark in the
history of post independence India
The problems faced by 17 Infantry
Divisional Signal Regiment were genuine. However, they were not new. Units that
took part in the Jammu and Kashmir
ENDNOTES
TO CHAPTER 3
(This
chapter is largely based on the official history published by the History
Division, Ministry of Defence viz. P.N. Khera’s, Operation Vijay – The Liberation of Goa and Other Portuguese Colonies
in India; Historical Report of 50
Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’; Report on Operation ‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant General J.N.
Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command; unit histories and personal accounts).
1.
Khera, P.N., Operation Vijay – The Liberation of Goa and
Other Portuguese Colonies in India, History Division, Ministry of Defence
(HD-MOD), New Delhi, 1974, p.31.
2.
Khera, p.39
3.
Report on Operation
‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command dated 04 May 1962 , (HD-MOD), New Delhi
4.
Historical Report of 50
Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’, (HD-MOD), New Delhi
5.
HQ 17 Infantry Division
Operation Order No 1/61 dated 11
December 1961 , (HD-MOD), New Delhi
6.
Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership
in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, Sage Publications, New Delhi
7.
‘Operation Vijay’, Historical Records, HQ 17 Infantry Division, (HD-MOD),
New Delhi
8.
First Person Account –
‘Reminiscences of a Historic and happy Association’ by Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh,
published in The Story of the Indian
Airborne Troops, by Maj. Gen Afsir Karim, Lancer International, New Delhi,
1990. pp. 153-4
9.
Historical Report, 50
Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’, History Division, Ministry
of Defence, (HD-MOD), New Delhi
10.
Report on Aguada Fort
Incident, (HD-MOD), New Delhi, File FMN/BDE/224/H/III.
11.
Report on Operation ‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant
General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command, (HD-MOD), New Delhi, File
No. SEC/11/182/H.
12.
First Person Account –
‘Operation in Goa’ by Brigadier Sucha Singh, VrC, MC, published in The Story of the Indian Airborne Troops,
by Maj. Gen Afsir Karim, Lancer International, New Delhi
13.
Personal input by
Brigadier P.Z. Mani (Retd)
14.
Write Up entitled ‘Operation Vijay – 18/19 December 1961’
by Major R.R. Chatterji, OC 50 Parachute Brigade Signal Company.
15.
Ibid.
16.
Personal input by Major General A.S. Kahlon (Retd).
17.
Write Up by Brigadier
Jaswant Singh, CSO Southern Command.
18.
Khera, p.103.
19.
HQ 112 Infantry Brigade
Operation Instruction No 1 dated 17 December 1961 .
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